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Tesis Doctoral

Participación Ciudadana y Política Exterior

La confluencia entre actuación doméstica y transnacional de la sociedad civil brasileña

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Estudio de Doctorado en Políticas Públicas y Transformación Social
Instituto de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas
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RESUMEN

Al tomar como punto de partida los debates sobre relación entre democracia y globalización y sobre la transformación del rol del Estado, esta investigación parte de la premisas que el Estado sigue siendo un *locus* privilegiado para el ejercicio de la democracia y que la política exterior es uno de los lugares donde es posible conjugar agencia, control democrático y responsabilidad de este mundo 'globalizado'. Sin embargo, la política exterior ha sido tradicionalmente tratada como una política singular y diferente de otras políticas públicas domésticas de un Estado. Esta supuesta singularidad, defendida tanto en el ámbito analítico como en la práctica, ha contribuido a que la política exterior se configure, actualmente, como una de las pocas políticas que no han presentado cambios significativos en lo que dice respecto a su apertura hacia la participación de la sociedad civil.

La presente investigación parte de una observación empírica sobre el crecimiento de la movilización de la sociedad civil brasileña frente a agendas de política exterior y buscó analizar como se configura su participación en el ámbito de la política exterior brasileña, identificando sus características y factores que explican el actual contexto de mayor apertura a la participación. Para apoyar este trabajo de análisis, la investigación propuso establecer un diálogo con dos perspectivas analíticas que se complementan: el Análisis de Política Exterior y los estudios sobre acción colectiva transnacional. Estas dos perspectivas apuntan a la importancia de analizar tanto el proceso decisorio de la política exterior como las dinámicas de la sociedad civil como factores explicativos de la mayor apertura de la política exterior a la sociedad civil.

El conjunto de análisis presentado constata que la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior brasileña responde a los cambios en los procesos decisorios de la política exterior brasileña, caracterizados por la diversificación de las agendas y la entrada de Ministerios sectoriales. Como resultado de esta horizontalización del proceso decisorio, la participación de la sociedad civil responde, y es moldeada, por dinámicas de diferentes actores gubernamentales. Estas dinámicas, a su vez, son influenciadas por estímulos existentes tanto en el ámbito doméstico como internacional. Complementariamente, esta investigación argumenta que la actuación transnacional de la sociedad civil condiciona sus estrategias domésticas hacia la política exterior.

ABSTRACT

Contributing to the debate of the relationship between democracy, globalization and the changing role of the State, this research starts from the premise that the State remains a privileged *locus* for democracy. In this context, foreign policy is a policy space that allows the confluence between agency, accountability and responsibility in a globalized world. Nevertheless, it has been traditionally considered a singular policy, compared to other domestic public policies. This supposed singularity, defended by some both in theory and practice, has contributed to the insulation of foreign policy. As a result, the policy is one of the few that have not presented significant improvements in terms of civil society participation.

This research is based on empirical observation of the increased engagement of Brazilian civil society in foreign affairs. It aimed to analyze civil society participation in foreign policy by identifying the characteristics and drivers that have contributed to greater openness to civil society engagement. To support the analysis, the research is framed around two complementary analytical approaches: Foreign Policy Analysis and Transnational Collective Action Studies. These perspectives stress that foreign policy decision-making processes and the dynamics of civil society transnational engagement are explanatory factors of Brazilian foreign policy recent receptivity to civil society.

The analyses presented show that civil society participation responds to changes in Brazilian foreign policy decision-making, characterized by the diversification of its contents and the increased involvement of other sectorial Ministries. As a result of such horizontalization, civil society participation responds to, and is shaped by, different governmental bodies' dynamics. These dynamics are influenced by opportunities and constraints perceived by State actors at national and international arenas. Additionally, this investigation argues that civil society transnational engagement conditions its domestic strategies to influence foreign policy.

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN

“¿Puede la democracia sobrevivir a la globalización?”

Con esta pregunta, Barber (2000) sintetiza la preocupación central de una extensa producción teórica que se ocupa de debatir la relación entre democracia y globalización y las consecuencias de la dislocación del *locus* de poder y decisión del Estado, o mismo de las organizaciones multilaterales, a una multiplicidad de instancias y actores no-estatales que ya no se limitan a actuar en los marcos de gobernanza estatales o interestatales. Subyace a esta pregunta un importante debate sobre la transformación del rol del Estado moderno y, consecuentemente, el impacto en la relación entre soberanía y autoridad política definida por la noción de territorio, piedra de toque para las democracias representativas actuales.

Al explotar el debate sobre la relación entre democracia y globalización, diferentes dimensiones de análisis emergen, como la discusión sobre la misma globalización, sus características empíricas o su impacto sobre el rol de Estado. Relacionado al último, se destacan los debates sobre si el Estado ha o no perdido su centralidad para la regulación económica, política y social; o aún, si es posible construir parámetros para el ejercicio de la democracia y la participación de la sociedad civil más allá del Estado. Sin embargo, la relación entre globalización y Estado también apunta a un ámbito menos explotado por la literatura: la posibilidad de reforzar el poder de agencia y control democrático de este mundo globalizado *en el* marco de los Estados Nacionales.

En este sentido, la presente investigación busca abordar esta discusión desde un análisis direccionado a la democratización de la política exterior y la posibilidad de participación de la sociedad civil en la misma; partiendo de las premisas que (i) el Estado sigue siendo un *locus* privilegiado para el ejercicio de la democracia, (ii) éste aún proporciona parte de los recursos y oportunidades que soportan la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil; (iii) la política exterior es *uno* de los lugares donde es posible conjugar agencia, control democrático y responsabilidad de este mundo interconectado. No obstante, esto no significa afirmar que la existencia de políticas exteriores democráticas agotan el debate sobre la relación democracia-globalización.

Así el objeto central de análisis de este compendio de artículos es la participación de la sociedad civil en los procesos de formulación de política exterior y el caso seleccionado ha sido el brasileño. Para ello, partimos del entendimiento de la participación de la sociedad civil entendida como la existencia de procesos decisorios deliberativos que reúnan a representantes de la sociedad civil y del gobierno, buscando influenciar la formulación e implementación de políticas y programas gubernamentales, dentro de un sistema democrático representativo. Por sociedad civil entendemos aquella esfera de interacción social entre la economía y el Estado (Cohen y Arato 2000: 8), donde sujetos sociales movilizan demandas y recursos materiales estratégicos (relacionados con las dinámicas políticas e institucionales) y simbólicos (relacionados con la construcción de identidades colectivas, marcos de interpretación y generación de nuevas culturas, valores y subjetividades). Finalmente, por política exterior, asumimos su carácter de política pública y utilizamos como definición mínima aquel conjunto de acciones del gobierno que resulta de un proceso de interacciones, alianzas y disputas entre ideas y actores públicos y privados¹.

Para acercarse al objeto, se consideró necesario, en primer lugar, entender la relación entre participación ciudadana, democracia y política exterior, formulada principalmente, en el marco de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. De este ejercicio emerge, como constatación, la existencia de un argumento que defiende una supuesta singularidad de la política exterior frente a otras políticas públicas, que se ha reproducido en la praxis y en el *mainstream* de la disciplina, marcada por la predominancia del paradigma realista en Relaciones Internacionales. Este paradigma se ancla en el análisis de una actuación de los Estados, autónomos y soberanos, como actores unitarios en el ámbito internacional en defensa de un interés nacional.

La defensa de esta singularidad de la política exterior contribuye a que ésta se configure, actualmente, como una de las pocas políticas que no han presentado cambios significativos en lo que dice respecto a sus interfaces con actores de la sociedad civil. En otras palabras, inclusive en países democráticos, las políticas exteriores parecen haberse escapado de la atracción democrática y siguen como dominio reservado y secreto (Badie, 2009), constituyéndose como una de las políticas más difíciles donde obtener control democrático

¹ Esta síntesis se basa en las definiciones expuestas en Souza (2006) y Subirats et al (2008).

en el ámbito doméstico (Dahl, 1999) y cuyo proceso decisorio presenta baja calidad democrática (Dahl, 1950).

Por lo tanto, discutir la participación en la política exterior requiere, primeramente, la desconstrucción del argumento sobre la singularidad de la política exterior, ejercicio este realizado por el Análisis de Política Exterior, sub-campo de la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales que parte de la crítica hacia el realismo propuesta por el neoliberalismo en Relaciones Internacionales y proporciona elementos de análisis que permiten explicar la actuación del Estado en un escenario de interdependencia. Al evidenciar el enlace entre las dinámicas domésticas y externas para entender las decisiones tomadas en el ámbito de la política exterior el Análisis de Política Exterior promueve la aproximación entre el objeto de análisis y el campo de las demás políticas públicas, que pueden y deben ser objeto de control democrático. Sin embargo, el Análisis de Política Exterior, aunque reconozca el rol de actores no-gubernamentales en los procesos de formulación de política exterior, se caracteriza por la centralidad analítica en el Estado.

Los artículos presentados en esta tesis indican que, para entender la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior, es necesario incorporar un análisis más detenido de las dinámicas y procesos establecidos por la sociedad civil en el ámbito internacional, pues éstos influyen el formato de la participación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito doméstico. Para complementar un análisis centrado en las dinámicas estatales, se ha establecido un diálogo con las producciones centradas en dinámicas societarias, más específicamente los debates sobre movimientos sociales transnacionales y sociedad civil global. Estas producciones proporcionan elementos no sólo para comprender los procesos que influyen en su participación doméstica en la política exterior, pero también iluminan diversos aspectos respecto a las prácticas de representación, participación y control democrático ejercido en el seno de la sociedad civil, contribuyendo a pensar, desde esta matriz societaria, los desafíos y oportunidades que se presentan al relacionar participación de la sociedad civil, democracia y globalización.

El apartado dos registra el abordaje metodológico y las preguntas que orientaron los estudios. En el apartado tres rescato los principales elementos que conforman el debate sobre la relación entre democracia y globalización y entre democracia y política exterior que justifican la selección del objeto de estudio y de la literatura que apoya el análisis, mientras

que en el apartado cuatro discuto las principales cuestiones y contribuciones que la literatura seleccionada proporciona al análisis del objeto. En el apartado cinco contextualizo este debate para el caso brasileño. El apartado seis debate los principales resultados de los trabajos desarrollados a luz de la literatura seleccionada y las implicaciones analíticas de la investigación. Los anexos traen los artículos que conforman esta tesis por compendio.

2. PREGUNTAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y METODOLOGÍA

La preocupación central que orientó el desarrollo de los trabajos que conforman esta tesis por compendio fue entender como se configura la participación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito de la política exterior. Para ello, los trabajos desarrollados buscaron responder a las preguntas registradas en la tabla 1.

Tabla 1. Preguntas de investigación y análisis desarrollados

Preguntas de investigación	Análisis desarrollados	
<p>¿Cómo se da la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior?</p> <p>¿Cuáles son los posibles factores que explican la apertura de la política exterior a la participación de la sociedad civil?</p>	<p>Participação da Sociedade Civil na Política Externa Brasileira – Uma análise da qualidade democrática, Melissa Pomeroy</p> <p><i>Artículo no publicado, enviado a Contexto Internacional</i></p>	Anexo 1
<p>¿Cómo ocurre el proceso decisorio de la cooperación Sur-Sur, en el marco de la política exterior brasileña?</p> <p>¿Cuáles son los posibles factores que explican la apertura de la política exterior a la participación de la sociedad civil?</p>	<p>Leite, I. C., Pomeroy, M., Suyama, B. (2015) <i>Brazilian South-South development cooperation: the case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa</i>. Journal of International Development 27 (8):1446-1461</p>	Anexo 2
<p>¿Cómo la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil influencia sus estrategias hacia la política exterior?</p>	<p>Pomeroy, M.; Shankland, A., Poskitt, A., Tandon, R., Bandyopadhyay, K. (2016) <i>Civil society, the BRICS and international development cooperation: perspectives from India, South Africa and Brazil</i> in Gu, J., Shankland, A., Chenoy, A. <i>The BRICS in International Development</i>. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan</p> <p>Capítulo de libro para la serie “International Political Economy” editada por Timothy M. Shaw</p>	Anexo 3

Una importante aclaración respecto al proceso de construcción del conocimiento presentado en los tres artículos que componen esta tesis se hace necesaria. La preocupación central e hilo conductor que motivó la construcción de los artículos representa, por un lado, la confluencia de mi trayectoria académica y profesional y, por otro lado, una agenda de la sociedad civil brasileña en la cual me encuentro involucrada.

Las principales preguntas de investigación emergieron, por lo tanto, de la participación directa en reuniones junto al gobierno y debates en redes de la sociedad civil, así como en interfaz del trabajo de investigación realizado profesionalmente, en el ámbito de un centro de estudios dedicado al análisis de la actuación brasileña – sea del gobierno o sociedad civil – junto a otros países del Sur. El abordaje inductivo de las preocupaciones iniciales y una postura de apertura al pluralismo teórico han permitido, posteriormente, una aproximación deductiva a las evidencias a partir de los debates teóricos en los cuales la investigación se inserta (democracia y globalización), así como la identificación de complementariedades entre los dos principales marcos analíticos seleccionados para apoyar el análisis de las evidencias (Análisis de Política Externa y Teoría del Proceso Político).

Las elecciones hasta aquí registradas imponen una serie de desafíos. Primeramente, la necesidad de explicitar una concepción epistemológica que niega la posibilidad de neutralidad y desinterés del analista político, entendiendo que este estará siempre insertado en un contexto social y político que no le permite un acceso privilegiado al conocimiento o la “verdad” sobre los hechos observados. Es necesario considerar, por lo tanto, el debate sobre las implicaciones éticas del trabajo del analista político, que en última instancia, tiene el potencial de moldear el contexto, o al menos, las interpretaciones sobre la realidad política que estudia. Siendo así, la responsabilidad reside en hacer transparente las premisas sobre las cuales la interpretación de la realidad analizada es fundamentada (Hay, 2002).

En segundo lugar, el hecho de que el objeto de investigación se define a partir de mi inserción personal en determinadas redes ha, de cierta manera, determinado el universo de observación. Sin la pretensión de establecer categorizaciones que no serían posibles, la mayor parte del conocimiento que soporta los análisis ha sido construido a partir de la interlocución con la sociedad civil movilizadora acerca de temáticas que presentan interfaz

con la agenda de la cooperación Sur-Sur del gobierno brasileño, principalmente en lo que dice respecto a agendas de desarrollo, como es el caso del desarrollo agrario, comercio internacional y políticas de inclusión social. Dentro del campo definido como sociedad civil y, en especial, dentro del caso brasileño que configura el objeto de estudio, existen otros sujetos que pueden presentar dinámicas diferentes, como sería el caso del movimiento sindical o de derechos humanos, que no han sido abordados con profundidad por los artículos. La especificidad del universo tratado, necesitaría de estudios comparativos, sea para otros sectores de la sociedad civil brasileña como para realidades de otros países, para verificar si las conclusiones podrían ser generalizables. Frente a lo que Hay (2002) sintetizó como “*parsimony – complexity trade-off*” los estudios propuestos nos alejan de las posibilidades de generalización y simplificación interpretativa de la realidad, pero brindan con precisión descriptiva, especificidad histórica, concreción y plausibilidad.

A partir de las reflexiones abiertas tanto por las observaciones empíricas como por los marcos analíticos trabajados se identifica una interrelación con la propuesta de cosmopolitismo metodológico. Beck y Sznaider (2010) afirman que la crítica al nacionalismo metodológico no debe ser confundida con la tesis sobre el fin del Estado, y que el cosmopolitismo metodológico debe ser interpretado como un marco que permite entender, entre otras cuestiones, la transformación del Estado. En este sentido, preguntas que iluminen el transnacionalismo que se erige en el marco de los Estados-Nación contribuyen a esta perspectiva metodológica, pues implican que el analista político no está más partiendo de la referencia de lo nacional como principio estructurador de lo social y de la acción política. Es a partir de la observación de aspectos concretos de la fusión entre lo nacional y lo internacional que los análisis empíricos pueden contribuir al cosmopolitismo metodológico. Así, de igual modo que los objetos centrales del presente análisis se delimitan por la categoría nacional - sociedad civil y el Estado brasileños - la investigación aboga por la importancia de entender ambos como objetos compuestos por fronteras analíticas porosas y, sobretudo, buscando evitar que las fronteras analíticas clásicas de lo considerado nacional y lo considerado internacional nos impidan entender las transformaciones que están ocurriendo y sus implicaciones.

Finalmente, vale registrar que el trabajo se apoya también en los resultados de tres investigaciones aplicadas, restringidas al ámbito de la cooperación Sur-Sur brasileña y cuyos argumentos se encuentran debidamente citados a lo largo del texto.

Tabla 2. Investigaciones aplicadas que sostienen los trabajos presentados

Ámbito de análisis	Informe	
Proceso decisorio de la cooperación Sur-Sur en el marco de la política exterior brasileña	Leite, I. C., Suyama, B., Waisbich, L., Pomeroy, M. (2014). <i>Brazil's Engagement in International Development Cooperation: the state of the debate.</i> Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.	Anexo 4
Características de la cooperación Sur-Sur brasileña		
Participación de la sociedad civil en la agenda de cooperación Sur-Sur brasileña		
Actuación de la sociedad civil en la cooperación Sur-Sur brasileña	Suyama, B., Pomeroy, M. (2014). <i>Supporting Autonomy and Resistance - The Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa native seed bank project.</i> Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.	Anexo 5
Proceso decisorio de la cooperación Sur-Sur en el marco de la política exterior brasileña	Leite, I., Suyama, B., Pomeroy, M., (2013). <i>Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection: Drivers, lessons and shifts in the engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development.</i> United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Paper. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER	Anexo 6

3. EL MARCO DEL DEBATE: GLOBALIZACIÓN, DEMOCRACIA Y POLÍTICA EXTERIOR

3.1. DEMOCRACIA Y GLOBALIZACIÓN

La globalización no tiene una definición consensuada², pero a grandes rasgos es interpretada como una condición estructural determinante³, marcada por el aumento e intensificación de la integración económica, de la compresión del tiempo y espacio. de la interconectividad entre los pueblos, del volumen del intercambio de productos, personas e ideas; así como mayor percepción de estos enlaces por parte de las sociedades. Desde una perspectiva constructivista, se aboga que aunque la globalización sea solamente una construcción social, esto es suficiente para afectar las percepciones y actitudes de actores y, consecuentemente, ejercer efecto en dinámicas políticas y económicas domésticas (Hay, 2002). Así, incluso considerando el debate sobre si hoy el mundo es más interdependiente o sí las economías y sociedades son más integradas que antes, lo que sí emerge como consenso es que las fronteras de análisis que determinaban temas de Ciencias Políticas o Relaciones Internacionales resultan insuficientes para dar cuenta de una realidad interdependiente, sea ella pasada, actual o futura.

² En primer lugar, porque al reunir estudios culturales, económicos y políticos, muchas veces sin diálogo entre los mismos, los estudios sobre la globalización no han logrado conformar un cuerpo teórico robusto por sí mismo y basado en investigación empírica sobre sus componentes y consecuencias. En segundo lugar, las definiciones acerca de la globalización son múltiples. A título de ejemplo, encontramos Harvey (2011a) que afirma que ésta es una etapa del capitalismo marcada por la compresión del tiempo y espacio; Keohane y Nye (2000) que la definen como el aumento del de redes de interdependencia en distancias multicontinentales y Massey (1991) con la crítica hacia la noción de una globalización como proceso homogéneo, sin diferenciar las desigualdades que siguen conformando los territorios y su inserción diversa en el ámbito internacional. En tercer lugar, se destaca el debate empírico sobre la misma existencia de la globalización. Encontramos en este debate la defensa basada en evidencias sobre el aumento del volumen de transacciones financieras que caracterizarían la economía mundial y desafían cualquier capacidad reguladora del Estado (Ohmae, 1996); visiones escéticas sobre la extensión de la globalización, sugiriendo más bien una regionalización o triangularización del aumento de las transacciones, principalmente entre Europa, América del Norte y Asia-Pacífico, apuntando incluso al crecimiento del rol del Estado (Hirst y Thompson, 1999); una visión de globalización compleja que entiende ésta como un proceso más allá de lo económico, que implica en una redefinición del rol del Estado (Held *et al*, 1999) y; finalmente, la tesis ideacional que interpreta la globalización como una condición estructural contingente, pues ésta se caracteriza no solamente por causas y consecuencias económicas sino también de un discurso que influencia las elecciones políticas, que puede a la vez ser moldeado y transformado por las mismas (Marsh, Smith, & Hothi, 2006; Hay, 2000).

³ A excepción de la tesis ideacional.

Concerniente a la relación entre democracia y globalización, el reto analítico que se impone – y se encuentra todavía sin respuestas definitivas - dice respecto a la transformación del rol del Estado y su impacto en las premisas de análisis contemporáneos sobre la democracia, principalmente en lo que se refiere a la tríada Estado – territorio - soberanía. No se ha explotado suficientemente, desde la teoría democrática, las implicaciones de la disociación entre estas dimensiones (Held, 2006:290), resultantes del mayor nivel de interdependencia de los Estados Modernos y el actual ordenamiento del sistema internacional, incluyendo a la gobernanza en el ámbito de las organizaciones internacionales, la extensión del derecho internacional y el crecimiento de dinámicas transnacionales en diversos ámbitos.

Así la equivalencia Estado – territorio que ha marcado la constitución de los Estados modernos se encuentra en transformación y desafía los presupuestos de la teoría democrática para la delimitación de la comunidad a partir del criterio territorial (demos). Si la democracia ejercida dentro de las fronteras del Estado no es más suficiente, las preguntas que se imponen son: ¿Quién debería rendir cuentas y a quien?; ¿Quién representa a quien y con base en qué?; ¿Quién participa de las decisiones y cómo? (Held, 1999, Sørensen, 2006).

Sin embargo, la transformación del rol del Estado Moderno, no necesariamente implica en una conclusión absoluta sobre su reducción o pérdida de influencia y autonomía. Ésto porque, históricamente, la soberanía de los Estados ha estado en constante transformación (Biersteker, 2002; Sørensen, 2006). El análisis pormenorizado de las transformaciones en el rol del Estado ilumina algunas implicaciones analíticas que se reflejan en el debate sobre globalización y democracia.

Biersteker (2002) sintetiza los argumentos que hacen hincapié en la necesidad de revisar la relación de equivalencia entre Estado-territorio-soberanía: (i) la cesión de autoridad por parte de los mismos Estados a instituciones multilaterales, (ii) el no reconocimiento internacional de autoridad de los Estados sobre algunas materias (como, por ejemplo, derechos humanos, imposición de barreras no arancelarias que impactan políticas laborales y ambientales); y (iii) la emergencia de la autoridad de actores no-estatales, sean empresas, mercados, organizaciones no gubernamentales y, incluso, individuos.

Desde una perspectiva que aboga por una visión más dialéctica, se enfatiza la coexistencia de un sistema de Estados soberanos y un sistema económico global capitalista. Sørensen

(2006) identifica como argumentos que apoyan esta visión: (i) la cesión de autoridad a niveles de gobernanza supra o interestatales posibilita que procesos regionales y globales sean sometidos al control político de los Estados, que siguen como los actores centrales y moldean normas y organizaciones multilaterales; (ii) la soberanía es una institución legal, que comprende independencia constitucional y capacidad regulatoria, siendo la primera más difícil de contestar que la última, ya que la regulación de determinados ámbitos se ve hoy más compartida con actores no-estatales, domésticos e internacionales. Complementariamente, actores no-estatales económicos y sociales todavía se apoyan en los recursos que existen y son regulados por instituciones económicas, políticas y culturales que se encuentran en el ámbito de los Estados (Tarrow, 2005; Harvey, 2011a, 2011b; Hirst y Thompson, 1999).

Frente al debate sobre la transformación del rol del Estado, es posible concluir que, aunque la globalización y el aumento de la interdependencia ejerzan impacto en la soberanía de los Estados, éste debe aún ser considerado como punto focal de las decisiones de política internacional. Cobran sentido, por lo tanto, las demandas - teóricas y de la praxis - por una mayor politización y democratización de la política exterior, ya que ésta posibilita conjugar agencia, control democrático y responsabilidad sobre este mundo interconectado (Hill, 2003a). Sin embargo, ésta es una política que parece haber estado al margen de estos debates. En el próximo apartado busco iluminar los enlaces entre los debates sobre democracia y globalización en el marco de los estudios sobre política exterior.

3.2. DEMOCRACIA Y POLÍTICA EXTERIOR

La política exterior ha sido tradicionalmente tratada como una política singular y diferente de otras políticas públicas domésticas del Estado (Badie, 2009). Las razones se remontan tanto a su desarrollo teórico en la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales como en la praxis diplomática (Ingram y Fiederlein, 1988).

Teóricamente, la consolidación de la disciplina se ha enfocado, en gran medida, en el desarrollo de grandes teorías explicativas del sistema internacional, influenciadas por el paradigma realista en las Relaciones Internacionales. Esta concepción se remonta a la construcción de los Estados modernos y su inserción “personificada” o “individualizada” en el escenario internacional, basada en las premisas de autonomía y soberanía del Estado

como un sistema político de unidad homogénea (Badie, 2009; Lopes, 2013) y defensor y representante del interés nacional (Morgenthau, 1978). La “departamentalización” de la disciplina y la ausencia de ejercicios interdisciplinarios también han contribuido a reforzar esta separación (Lentner, 2006).

En el ámbito de la praxis una serie de factores contribuyen al refuerzo de esta singularidad. En primer lugar está la herencia de una concepción de política exterior que se resume a las dinámicas interestatales, centradas en el conflicto y equilibrio de poder (Biersteker, 2002). Aún, la constatación empírica de la tendencia de concentración del poder ejecutivo, sea en la figura del Jefe de Estado o de los Ministerios de Relaciones Exteriores, refuerza aquellos argumentos – realistas y elitistas - sobre la importancia de que la política exterior no esté subyugada a la irracionalidad y cortoplacismo de la opinión pública (Lopes, 2013; Villa y Tostes, 2006). Finalmente, la defensa del carácter técnico y especializado de la política, así como el refuerzo de la identidad de clase y el espíritu de cuerpo de las burocracias diplomáticas (Badie, 2009; Hill, 2003b) contribuyen a reforzar la singularidad de la política exterior frente a otras políticas públicas.

Sin embargo, la crítica hacia el paradigma realista que emerge con el extenso desarrollo del campo del neoliberalismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, agregan importantes innovaciones al andamiaje teórico: el reconocimiento de los actores no-estatales como actores de las relaciones internacionales; la noción de que el Estado no es un ente monolítico, pero sí un actor sujeto a múltiples presiones internas y externas; y, finalmente, la reinscripción de las dinámicas económicas en el análisis de las relaciones internacionales. El reconocimiento de estas dinámicas, abre camino a la consolidación del sub-campo del Análisis de Política Exterior, que ha contribuido a hacer cada vez menos sostenibles los argumentos utilizados para impedir la democratización de la política exterior.⁴

⁴ En este sentido, vale registrar la respuesta de Waltz (1996) que argumenta que la Teoría de Política Internacional tiene como objetivo analizar aquellas variaciones en el ámbito internacional que condicionan a los Estados con características semejantes a actuar de manera común y no analizar las variables internas que determinan el comportamiento de los gobiernos. Según el autor, el intento de añadir más variables a la teoría de Política Internacional resulta un ejercicio teórico poco fructífero, abogando así, por mantener los estudios de las dinámicas domésticas e internacionales separadas. En sus palabras “las teorías son escasas en formulaciones y su belleza reside en la simplicidad. La realidad es, en general, compleja y fea” (Waltz, 1996:56, traducción libre).

En primer lugar, aunque la política exterior sigue como prerrogativa exclusiva del Estado, el reconocimiento de que éste no es el único actor en las Relaciones Internacionales y que éste está sometido a la influencia y presión doméstica y externa de actores de distinta naturaleza, permite el establecimiento del diálogo con el pluralismo y cuestiona la consistencia de la idea de un único interés nacional (George y Keohane 1991 citado en Lopes 2013). La extensa literatura bajo el paraguas del Análisis de Política Exterior ha comprobado empíricamente que el proceso decisorio de la política exterior responde a la existencia de disputas entre los diversos intereses y concepciones presentes en la sociedad doméstica, así como es influenciada por factores e intereses presentes en el ámbito internacional (Milner, 2007; Keohane y Milner, 1996).

El argumento de la complejidad de la materia internacional y, consecuentemente, la necesidad de especialización y centralización para su conducción presupone que el debate democrático sobre la política exterior conllevaría a una reducción de la eficiencia y eficacia en la conducción de la política exterior. Concerniente a los objetivos de largo plazo de la política, la baja capacidad técnica y desinterés del legislativo, así como la falta de información e interés del ciudadano mediano, contribuirían para que sus opiniones fuesen irracionales, cortoplacistas o manipuladas. A corto plazo, en los casos que presionan por respuestas a amenazas inminentes, el tiempo necesario para el debate democrático impediría una respuesta eficiente del Estado.

Sin embargo, estos argumentos ignoran una serie de desarrollos tanto de orden empírico como normativo. Empíricamente, ignoran la comprobación de la movilización de los congresos (Martin, 2000); que, inclusive en el Ejecutivo, el proceso decisorio no es concentrado (Allison, 1969), y la internacionalización de las demás políticas favorecieron a la entrada de nuevos agentes públicos en el proceso decisorio (Pinheiro y Milani, 2011); que la opinión pública ya ejerce presión sobre el proceso decisorio de la política exterior (Holstin, 1992)⁵. Normativamente, ignora el hecho de que el debate democrático podría servir para ampliar y redefinir los mismos objetivos de las políticas exteriores a largo plazo (Nincic, 1992 apud Villas y Tostes, 2006); así como el debate sobre la imposibilidad de proporcionar, desde una lógica tecno-racional o sectorial, respuestas satisfactorias a los

⁵ Ver nota de pie de pagina 15 sobre el debate acerca del impacto de la opinión pública en el proceso decisorio de la política exterior.

problemas complejos⁶ que determinan la ausencia de una única mejor solución y, por lo tanto, requieren más deliberación que conocimiento especializado. En otras palabras, es la argumentación basada en reglas y procedimientos deliberativos que permite que ciudadanos y formuladores de políticas lleguen a juicios morales y alternativas políticas (Majone, 1989).

El breve rescate del debate sobre la relación entre democracia y política exterior apunta a la necesidad de interpretar la última como resultado de la confluencia de disputas domésticas y presión externa, concepción que es desarrollada con mayor profundidad en el Análisis de Política Exterior. Como consecuencia, normativa y empírica, emerge la necesidad de avanzar en la operacionalización analítica del reconocimiento de actores no estatales, incluso la sociedad civil organizada, como agentes de política exterior. Por lo tanto, para cumplir con el objetivo del presente análisis - entender la participación de la sociedad civil organizada en la política exterior brasileña - en el próximo apartado serán abordados dos debates que permiten un doble enfoque: tanto de la perspectiva estatal (Análisis de Política Exterior), como de la perspectiva societaria (Teoría del Proceso Político y debates acerca de la “sociedad civil global”), estableciendo el diálogo entre las ausencias y complementariedades de ambos abordajes.

⁶ Definidos en los Análisis de Políticas Públicas, como “problemas malditos” (Brugué et al, 2011) - del inglés wicked problems - aquellos caracterizados por la incertidumbre e interdependencia de las dimensiones que les configuran y la diversidad de actores, valores e intereses involucrados (Heald y Alford, apud Brugué et al, 2011)

4. EL MARCO DE ANÁLISIS: POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y ACTUACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL

La contribución central del Análisis de Política Exterior reside en la ampliación de la comprensión sobre el proceso decisorio de la política exterior, destacando la importancia de aquellas variables que ejercen la influencia sobre el mismo, como pueden ser procesos que ocurren en el ámbito internacional y determinantes domésticos. Por tener como premisa el carácter de política pública de la política exterior, esta corriente considera las demandas y conflictos entre los distintos grupos domésticos como factor que influencia la formación e implementación de la misma, desmontando por lo tanto la equivalencia entre Estado e interés nacional. Así, el foco en el análisis de los roles de los liderazgos, grupos de interés, política burocrática y opinión pública se ha convertido en una de las principales características del campo. No obstante, aunque precursores en establecer el enlace entre lo doméstico y lo internacional y en reconocer la existencia e importancia de otros actores en el proceso decisorio de la política exterior, el foco de análisis aún es el Estado (Salomón y Pinheiro, 2013). Si en el trabajo seminal de Snyder, Bruck y Sapin (1962:204)⁷, los autores afirman que “las relaciones internacionales no gubernamentales no pueden constituir el análisis del comportamiento de los Estados *a menos* que el comportamiento de los tomadores de decisión se vea de alguna manera determinado por o direccionado hacia estas relaciones”⁸, más recientemente algunos estudiosos empiezan a abogar por la incorporación de los procesos transnacionales más allá del Estado (Garrison et al, 2003) y de la interacción entre las unidades de decisión gubernamentales y actores no-estatales que actúan dentro y fuera de las fronteras del Estado en la formación e implementación de la política exterior⁹.

⁷ Los autores indican una serie de categorías bastante amplias a ser observadas como determinantes del comportamiento de cualquier Estado internacionalmente. Entre ellos los ambientes interno e internacional/externo del proceso decisorio, los tomadores de decisión y la estructura social, política y comportamental de los Estados incluyendo los arreglos institucionales, los valores, las características sociales de organización del Estado, los grupos sociales, los procesos sociales relevantes (como formación de opinión, procesos políticos, socialización de los adultos) (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1962:201).

⁸ Traducción libre, itálico original.

⁹ Curioso notar que la incorporación de esta perspectiva de análisis tiene menos que ver con la praxis que con el desarrollo del campo, ya que el impacto de las redes transnacionales de activismo, aunque más acentuado actualmente, no es necesariamente novedoso. Tilly y Tarrow (2007) describen el impacto del movimiento anti-

Por lo tanto, para complementar el tradicional “filtro” Estado, utilizado en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales será aplicado un “filtro” sociedad civil. Eso porque los estudios presentados en este compendio indican que las interacciones establecidas por la sociedad civil en el ámbito internacional no pueden ser disociadas del ámbito doméstico, pues influyen sus estrategias domésticas para participar del proceso decisorio de política exterior. En este sentido, contribuciones provenientes de la Teoría del Proceso Político y de los estudios sobre la “sociedad civil global”, permiten abordar la actuación de la sociedad civil en un contexto globalizado y apoyan el entendimiento de las estrategias de la sociedad civil hacia la política exterior.

El análisis del activismo transnacional emerge como un proceso inverso al Análisis de Política Exterior que ha caminado del internacional hacia el doméstico. Al extrapolar los estudios sociológicos sobre la acción colectiva y la política contenciosa ejercida en el ámbito doméstico hacia el internacional, los estudios sobre el activismo transnacional, buscan dar cuenta de explicar una realidad cada vez más interconectada en las relaciones entre Estados y sociedad civil. Así, partiendo de la contribución constructivista de las Relaciones Internacionales, de la sociología política y de la política comparada, los análisis sobre el activismo transnacional, bajo la Teoría del Proceso Político¹⁰, exponen las dinámicas caracterizadas por el aumento de la densidad de relaciones horizontales entre Estados, burócratas y actores no estatales, y de los enlaces verticales entre los niveles subnacionales, nacionales e internacionales. Establece así una estructura formal e informal ampliada que invita al activismo transnacional y facilita la formación de redes, conformando una estructura de relaciones densa y triangular entre Estados, actores no estatales e instituciones internacionales (Tarrow, 2005).

esclavismo del siglo dieciocho como uno de los primeros movimientos transnacionales que tuvieron impacto no solo en la política doméstica británica, pero también en su política exterior hacia los Estados Unidos.

¹⁰ Una serie de críticas importantes son direccionadas a la Teoría del Proceso Político (TPP). Desde los estudios sobre movimientos sociales, se afirma que la TPP “despolitiza las protestas y su ideología, resignificándolas como elementos componentes del mismo juego democrático” (Gohn & Bringel, 2012). También se ha apuntado el riesgo de explicaciones tautológicas sobre las dinámicas de los movimientos sociales, pues al buscar una constancia de las variables que explicarían la emergencia de los movimientos sociales, el resultado acaba siendo variables tan amplias que no dan cuenta de procesos históricos específicos (Caren, 2007).

Asimismo y frente a las críticas presentadas, también es cierto que es en el campo de la TPP donde más se ha avanzado en el sentido de entender los formatos del activismo de las últimas dos décadas (Bringuel & Domingues, 2012).

Mientras la teoría del proceso político afirma que el activismo transnacional es más que simplemente un reflejo de la globalización (aunque ésta proporcione los temas e incentivos que motivan actualmente gran parte del activismo transnacional), los estudios sobre la “sociedad civil global”, a su vez, dialogan directamente con la propia retórica que conforma su objeto, es decir la importancia práctica de los usos de la idea de “sociedad civil global” (Keane, 2003; Jaeger, 2007; Bartelson, 2006), que responde directamente a los procesos de la globalización y emerge como potencial respuesta al déficit democrático de la gobernanza mundial. En este sentido, además de posibilitar puentes para pensar la relación entre democracia y globalización, la proliferación de estudios empíricos dentro de este campo nos proporciona elementos para entender los actores y dinámicas de la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil.

4.1. EL PROCESO DECISORIO DE POLÍTICA EXTERIOR: MÚLTIPLES ACTORES Y DINÁMICAS

El Análisis de Política Exterior se configura como un amplio campo que se desarrolló a partir de contribuciones interdisciplinarias tan variadas como los análisis de Política Pública, la Psicología Social y Cognitiva, Sociología, Economía e Historia, así como de las contribuciones del constructivismo a la disciplina (Salomón y Pinheiro, 2013). Buscando apoyarse en evidencias empíricas, la diversidad de estudios y abordajes comparten entre sí un mismo objetivo: desvelar la caja-negra de los determinantes que ejercen influencia sobre el proceso decisorio de la política exterior, proporcionando así un enlace entre los ámbitos domésticos e internacional, tradicionalmente abandonados en los análisis sobre política internacional.

Sus principales abordajes pueden ser resumidos en los análisis comparativos, análisis de los procesos decisivos y los análisis contextuales (Hudson y Vore, 1995). Los análisis comparativos, basados en rigurosos datos agregados, buscan construir una teoría generalizable a diferentes naciones e identifican una serie de variables relevantes al análisis. A su vez, los análisis centrados en los procesos decisivos y en los contextos de la política exterior, aunque a un nivel menos generalizable, proporcionan explicaciones

plausibles sobre como operan los determinantes domésticos e internacionales en la política exterior de Estados específicos.

Los análisis contextuales incorporan aquellos factores de la política doméstica o del contexto internacional que afectan las decisiones sobre política exterior, incluyendo a los diferentes tipos de régimen político y relaciones entre Estado y sociedad. Los análisis sobre el proceso decisorio, a su vez, se centran en las normas y estructuras de diferentes grupos domésticos, así como la influencia de procesos organizacionales y política burocrática (*bureaucratic politics*) en las decisiones de la política exterior (Allison, 1969). En ambas vertientes, más recientemente y coincidiendo con la consolidación del constructivismo en las ciencias sociales, se ha ido incorporando el rol de las ideas, creencias, valores y concepciones que permean la toma de decisión, sean éstas percepciones del contexto externo o doméstico.

Los estudios centrados en los procesos decisorios de la política exterior permiten el análisis de la arquitectura institucional de la arena decisoria de política exterior, de la cual forman parte innumerables actores gubernamentales, sea del nivel nacional (ministerios y agencias federales) o sub-nacional (provincias y municipios). En este sentido, el reconocimiento de la política burocrática y de los procesos organizacionales ¹¹, por ejemplo, indica la importancia de entender las decisiones de política exterior como el resultado de una sumatoria de elecciones hechas por representantes que ocupan diferentes posiciones dentro del gobierno. Dichas elecciones son, a su vez, influenciadas por prioridades y percepciones formadas a partir de estas posiciones (Allison, 1969). Así, la supuesta racionalidad y defensa del interés nacional de las decisiones del Jefe de Ejecutivo o del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, tradicionalmente considerados como el *locus* de formulación de la política, no encuentran sustentación empírica.

Al agregar al análisis la relación entre los roles de la opinión pública, de las élites y los grupos de presión, los análisis contextuales abren espacio para indagaciones sobre como

¹¹ La literatura sobre la política burocrática busca ofrecer explicaciones sobre el rol de las motivaciones de las burocracias en influenciar los procesos decisorios de las políticas públicas. El principal factor explicativo sostiene que las motivaciones en promover los intereses o la supervivencia de cada agencia (en general traducidos en aumento presupuestario, de competencias o autonomía) se superponen a los análisis racionales sobre eficiencia y eficacia. Los modelos de procesos organizacionales explican como los procedimientos de operación cotidianos de cada burocracia pueden funcionar como obstáculos a cambios, ya que la implementación de decisiones políticas se da a través de los circuitos de procedimientos establecidos

los determinantes domésticos podrían afectar la política exterior. Al evidenciar dentro del concepto de Estructura Doméstica la importancia de operacionalizar los arreglos institucionales y los procesos de construcción de coaliciones (*policy networks*) que canalizan las demandas sociales para dentro del sistema político, Risse-Kappen (1991) lanza luces sobre la importancia de entender la exacta naturaleza del enlace entre sociedad y gobierno¹². Putnam (1988:442)¹³, a su vez, llama la atención sobre la importancia de un análisis de política exterior anclado en una teoría sobre la política doméstica que explique las relaciones de poder y las preferencias de los actores, para entender entre otras cosas, como se da la dinámica de ratificación de las negociaciones internacionales en el ámbito doméstico. Si, por un lado, esta es una dinámica peculiar de los gobiernos democráticos, esta no necesariamente será siempre realizada de forma democrática (Putnam, 1988:436) o restringida a la formalidad de aprobación de los Congresos, pues supone también apoyo de grupos, burocracias y hasta incluso la opinión pública.

Aún, respecto a la posibilidad de que el contexto internacional inflencie el proceso decisorio de política exterior, el Análisis de Política Exterior resalta que éste es un proceso de doble-vía. Así, Putnam (1988) al identificar la dinámica de reverberación, explica los efectos que presiones internacionales ejercen sobre la alteración de equilibrios y posiciones domésticas – aumentando o disminuyendo el conjunto de posibilidades (*win-sets*). Aunque el modelo de Putnam sea bastante simplificado - un único negociador y una única

¹² Risse-Kappen (1991) busca analizar el rol de la opinión pública como variable explicativa para los outputs de la política exterior de democracias liberales. A partir de estudio comparado entre Japón, Estados Unidos, Francia y Alemania concluye que la opinión pública no ejerce un impacto directo en los elites responsables por las decisiones en política exterior, pero sí a través de las estructuras domésticas y los procesos de construcción de coaliciones. El autor categoriza diferentes estructuras domésticas aplicables a los casos: dominado por el Estado (Estados con instituciones políticas centralizadas y sociedades polarizadas, dominadas por élites), control societario (sociedades con alto grado de movilización y los diversos sectores y instituciones estatales débiles) y corporativismo democrático (donde tanto instituciones políticas como la organización social son fuertes y se involucran en un constante proceso de negociación). Su argumento en primer lugar busca evidenciar la incapacidad de las explicaciones sobre Estado Fuerte – Estado Débil en dar cuenta de las variaciones de las estructuras domésticas y, en segundo lugar, encerrar el debate sobre la prevalencia de las instituciones sobre *policy networks* o vice-versa, abogando por un abordaje mixto.

¹³ Putnam (1988) aboga por la necesidad de ir más allá de la constatación que determinantes domésticos importan o de listar los posibles ámbitos de determinantes. Al apuntar a la complejidad de las interacciones entre las negociaciones realizadas - tanto en el ámbito internacional como doméstico – el autor avanza en desvelar las dinámicas que explican el enlace entre ambos niveles, entre ellas: la ratificación en el ámbito doméstico de las posiciones negociadas a nivel internacional, los determinantes de los conjuntos de posibilidades (*win-sets*, o el conjunto de acuerdos internacionales posibles de ser ratificados para cada situación), las tácticas de negociación, la reverberación domésticas de los acuerdos internacionales y el rol del negociador principal

negociación aislada de otros aspectos contextuales - ya prevé la posibilidad de influencia del contexto internacional en las posiciones de actores más allá del Estado¹⁴.

Así, considerando algunas de las perspectivas desarrolladas bajo el Análisis de Política Exterior, es posible evidenciar algunos factores determinantes de la formulación de política exterior: la inexistencia de un *locus* concentrado de formulación, pero sí una variedad de actores gubernamentales que tienen acceso a la formulación e implementación de la misma; la importancia de un análisis informado del contexto doméstico y su sistema político, incluyendo las relaciones entre Estado y sociedad y; la influencia del contexto internacional para la toma de decisión a nivel doméstico, incluyendo su efecto tanto en actores estatales, como no-estatales.

4.2. SOCIEDAD CIVIL Y PARTICIPACIÓN: ENTRE LO DOMÉSTICO Y LO INTERNACIONAL

Muy poco se ha producido sobre la relación entre sociedad civil y política exterior. Entre la producción que analiza esta relación encontramos estudios sobre el rol de la opinión pública¹⁵ o - intrínsecamente conectados con el anterior - los estudios sobre diplomacia

¹⁴ Posteriormente el concepto de efecto bumerang es desarrollado por Keck & Sikkink (1998), para explicar la capacidad de actores no estatales domésticos para acceder al ámbito internacional con el objetivo de influenciar decisiones domésticas. Vale subrayar que la relación entre los dos conceptos no es dada por los mismos autores, incluso porque en la reverberación el efecto puede ser intencional o no intencional, motivado por la actitud de un actor en negociación o por los mismos efectos de la negociación, mientras en el efecto bumerang el efecto es intencionalmente provocado por un actor no estatal doméstico. Pero con el objetivo de establecer los puentes entre las dos corrientes analíticas que contribuyen para el presente análisis se considera importante el destaque de la lógica común a los dos conceptos: la posibilidad de que el internacional ejerza un efecto sobre el proceso decisorio doméstico de los Estados.

¹⁵ Predominantemente de matriz norteamericana, los estudios sobre opinión pública irrumpen al final de la Segunda Guerra, a partir de la emergencia de las encuestas de opinión. Los primeros estudios concluyeron que la opinión pública no ejerce impacto significativo sobre la política exterior, además de ser volátil, poco coherente (Almond, 1950) e irracional (Morgenthau, 1978). Como demuestra (Holstin, 1992) una segunda generación de estudiosos, buscando comprender el fenómeno de la guerra del Vietnam y soportada por una variedad de resultados de encuestas, cuantitativamente y cualitativamente, más amplias desafía estas conclusiones. Este segunda generación de estudios afirma que la opinión pública acerca de la política exterior es coherente y poco volátil, pero carece del nivel de información necesario para debates más específicos. Para un mapeo general del campo ver Holstin (1992), para una propuesta de operacionalización de categorías para el estudio de la relación entre opinión pública y política exterior ver Rosenau (1960).

pública, dirigida a la opinión pública doméstica o la opinión pública internacional¹⁶. No obstante, estos abordajes no dialogan directamente sobre la participación de la sociedad civil en el proceso decisorio de la política exterior. Al considerar que dicho proceso se da en la confluencia de factores domésticos e internacionales, como propuesto por el Análisis de Política Exterior, cobra sentido entender como se da la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil y como ésta se refleja, en el ámbito doméstico en sus estrategias que buscan influenciar la política exterior.

Así, aunque tampoco dialoguen directamente con el proceso de producción de política exterior, los estudios sobre sociedad civil global permiten un diálogo con el debate sobre democracia y globalización, pues nos remiten a las formas de representación en el seno de la sociedad civil, ofreciendo puentes para pensar la cuestión de la representación de la sociedad civil participante en iniciativas institucionales. Los estudios sobre el activismo transnacional bajo la perspectiva de la teoría de movimientos sociales, a su vez, se ocupan de entender como se dan los procesos de la sociedad civil que operan a la vez en el doméstico y en el internacional.

Si Keohane y Nye (1971) abrieron paso al reconocimiento de actores no estatales en las relaciones internacionales y procesos transnacionales, los análisis sobre el rol de la sociedad civil se han mantenido al margen de este debate, cuya énfasis ha estado principalmente en los actores económicos transnacionales. Sin embargo, con el crecimiento exponencial de la actuación transnacional de las organizaciones no-gubernamentales y de movimientos sociales¹⁷ confiere un nuevo ímpetu a la teoría liberal en relaciones, y los

¹⁶ Snow (2009) describe los diferentes entendimientos sobre diplomacia pública existentes: (i) el primero más instrumental y propagandístico centrado en la ampliación de información y comunicación como un mal necesario para la consecución de los objetivos de la diplomacia tradicional; (ii) el segundo que ruega por una diplomacia pública capaz de crear un contexto de comunicación simétrica y bidireccional entre diversos actores, más allá del Estado, como ciudadanos, empresarios y académicos. Dentro de este segundo entendimiento más positivo, Chitty (2009) resume la diplomacia pública a los múltiples abordajes que el sector público - junto a sector privado, sociedad civil organizada, media y población en general - desarrolla con vistas a construir una política exterior más democrática y que busque el interés nacional, representando los intereses, aunque diversos y difusos, de la población de un territorio. Aunque reconozca la importancia de actores no-estatales para la política exterior, es cierto que el concepto es dirigido a un aspecto comunicativo y de relaciones públicas y no, necesariamente, alterar la apertura de los procesos decisorios (Snow, 2009).

¹⁷ A título de ejemplo, vale citar el alcance de las organizaciones no gubernamentales a partir de la década de 90. Greenpeace y World Wildlife Fund, por ejemplo, manejaban en 1992 un presupuesto cuatro veces mayor que el de Programa Ambiental de Naciones Unidas. En 1994, ambas organizaciones sumaban un total de 6 millones de miembros (Villa, 1999).

estudios sobre sociedad civil global, a partir de la década del 90, retoman las premisas de Keohane y Nye, ampliando el enfoque y conceptualizando acerca de la acción política de la sociedad civil para más allá de las fronteras del Estado y con capacidad de ejercer impacto en el sistema internacional. En este sentido, Keck y Sikkink (1998:30) constatan que gran parte de la interacción transnacional de actores no-estatales se da a través de redes y diferencian tres tipos de actores, de acuerdo con sus motivaciones: (i) los actores económicos, con objetivos instrumentales; (ii) las comunidades epistémicas y grupos científicos, motivados por la promoción de soluciones específicas; (iii) las redes transnacionales de la sociedad civil, motivadas por principios y valores compartidos.

Pertenciente al tercer grupo, Kaldor et al (2003:4) definen la “sociedad civil global” como una “esfera de ideas, valores, organizaciones, redes e individuos ubicados primordialmente fuera de las instituciones, familias, mercados y Estados y más allá de las fronteras nacionales de las sociedades, políticas (*polities*) y economías”. La amplitud y diversidad de actores que conforman la sociedad civil global implican, naturalmente, que dentro del concepto coexistan actores con objetivos y roles diversos¹⁸, como es el caso de las organizaciones no gubernamentales (locales e internacionales), grupos de presión, redes de activismo, movimientos sociales y movimientos religiosos que, en común, representarían la variante social de la globalización económica, sea por el hecho de que son los procesos que conforman la globalización los que permiten su existencia, sea porque su actuación está, en general, relacionada a sus efectos.

Su acción política se basa en el ejercicio de la influencia y su fuente de autoridad y legitimidad proviene de las críticas y respuestas que articulan hacia los desequilibrios sistémicos percibidos y en defensa de los bienes públicos globales para los cuales los Estados no tiene respuestas inmediatas (Villa y Tostes, 2006). Además, a la sociedad civil

¹⁸ Kaldor et al (2003) identifican que la sociedad civil global representa, al menos, cuatro tipos de posiciones diferentes respecto a la globalización (reformistas, soportadores, opositores y regresivos - aquellos que apoyan y se oponen a la vez, de creando mensajes de apoyo condicionados a sus intereses particulares). Además, identifican que los roles que pueden asumir es también variado. Los autores construyen así un modelo que abarca diferentes tipos de actuación en la arena transnacional: (i) inserción de las organizaciones no-gubernamentales como implementadores de políticas estatales y de organizaciones multilaterales, (ii) organizaciones no-gubernamentales actuando conjuntamente con corporaciones transnacionales; (iii) creación de redes de confianza entre organizaciones de la sociedad civil (iv) activismo, donde movimientos sociales y redes cívicas desafían el sistema establecido (Kaldor et al, 2003:8)

global muchas veces se le acredita el potencial de ejercer presión democrática al poder de los Estados y de las estructuras de gobernanza internacional, confiriendo mayor transparencia y control a las instituciones internacionales, dando voz a grupos afectados y menos empoderados, informando a un público más amplio sobre las actividades de las instituciones internacionales, así como contribuyendo con perspectivas diversas a los debates internacionales (Scholte, 2002).

Sin embargo, diversas críticas resaltan el riesgo de sobrevalorización de aspectos normativos sobre constataciones empíricas. Entre ellas, el hecho de que el potencial democratizador que la sociedad civil global ejercería sobre el sistema internacional, presenta una contradicción inherente, relacionada a los desafíos de legitimidad, representatividad, rendición de cuentas y diversidad de la misma sociedad civil. En este sentido, alertan sobre la ausencia de criterios, cuales sean, que garanticen la legitimidad de la sociedad civil global en representar intereses vinculados a una base social (*constituency*), categoría ésta que tampoco encuentra cualquier criterio de delimitación. Inclusive aceptando que sus agendas buscan profundizar una democracia más substantiva, a través de la defensa de los bienes públicos globales o erradicación de las múltiples desigualdades existentes; no se ha establecido ningún tipo de procedimiento que garantice los aspectos mínimos de una democracia formal con criterios compartidos y transparentes sobre representación y delegación de poder, incluso cuando éstas participan de espacios internacionales de consulta institucionalizados (Villa, 2006). Asimismo, se observa en muchos espacios globales, como por ejemplo en el ámbito de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, una predominancia de organizaciones no-gubernamentales frente a otros tipos de organización social, la desigualdad de recursos y relaciones de poder existente entre organizaciones de países en desarrollo frente a las de los países desarrollados y, finalmente, la predominancia de discursos y valores occidentales.

Si a las visiones normativas que alaban el potencial democratizador de la sociedad civil global les falta el diálogo con las evidencias empíricas sobre los desafíos listados anteriormente, también es cierto que esta crítica, basada en criterios provenientes de la democracia representativa (Lavalle et al, 2006; Bexell et al, 2010) peca por la ausencia de diálogo con una agenda de investigación que trata de analizar los mecanismos de representatividad establecidos, en el seno de la sociedad civil, a partir del análisis empírico

de sus experiencias. En este sentido, tratan de entender cuales son los mecanismos de representatividad, rendición de cuentas y participación establecidos tanto por la sociedad civil global como por la sociedad civil actuante en instituciones participativas domésticas. En este sentido, se destacan los estudios sobre nuevas formas de representación (Keck, 2004; Dryzek y Niemeyer, 2008; Avritzer, 2007; Lavalle et al, 2006), de ejercicio democrático (Porta, 2009) y rendición de cuentas (Anheier y Hawkes, 2008).

Otra aspecto importante a ser matizado se refiere a la relación entre la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil y el sistema estatal. Vale resaltar que, desde la perspectiva de lo internacional como un campo de estructura de oportunidades, se enfatiza que parte de los esfuerzos de la sociedad civil global reside justamente en ampliar sus espacios de participación y posibilidades de influencia en el marco de los Estados (Keck y Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005) y los activistas transnacionales tienen, inevitablemente, sus recursos y redes condicionados a su existencia en los marcos de Estados y sociedades nacionales (Tarrow, 2005).

Con eso, la contribución de los análisis sobre el activismo transnacional reside en el intento de profundizar analíticamente el entendimiento sobre las fronteras entre lo domestico e internacional ofreciendo, en contrapartida, una visión de un internacionalismo complejo, horizontal y vertical, que ofrece una serie de caminos de conflicto y alianzas (Tarrow, 2005:9; Keck y Sikkink, 1998). Parten del principio de que conceptualizar la relación entre lo domestico y lo internacional como una vía de dos manos, como suponen los diversos estudios que siguen a Putnam, es insuficiente para entender la complejidad de las relaciones que se establecen. Esto porque no dan cuenta de incorporar las dinámicas de construcción de significados y de negociación de identidades e intereses que atraviesan y ejercen impacto en las relaciones y estrategias establecidas en ambos niveles. Por otro lado, el análisis de la actuación de la sociedad civil centrada exclusivamente en el ámbito internacional tampoco explica satisfactoriamente la complejidad del enlace entre los dos niveles, pues ignora la centralidad del Estado y el enraizamiento doméstico del activismo transnacional. De esta combinación de premisas, los análisis sobre el activismo transnacional apuntan al reflejo que la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil ejerce en el ámbito domestico. Al proporcionar elementos para analizar el contexto y el formato de su

actuación transnacional, apoyan el análisis de la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior.

Con relación al contexto de actuación transnacional de la sociedad civil, Tarrow (2005) indica que ésta se da en regímenes de contención compuestos, en los cuales dos sistemas de normas, el doméstico y el internacional, condicionan los repertorios de la política contenciosa¹⁹. Aunque el autor indique que este contexto no es propiamente novedoso, el mismo se destaca por un diferencial cualitativo, caracterizado por el aumento de la intensidad de relaciones, la ampliación del tipo de actores y una agenda mayor de temas y oportunidades, proporcionada por las estructuras, instituciones y normas presentes al nivel internacional. Dichos regímenes de contención compuestos son la base de una estructura de oportunidad política ampliada, que combina elementos estáticos y dinámicos, que pueden estimular o desestimular la acción colectiva e incide en la elección de las estrategias y repertorios de política contenciosa. Entre las dimensiones de dichas estructuras que pueden presentarse como oportunidades o restricciones están la multiplicidad de centros independientes de poder; la apertura hacia nuevos actores; la inestabilidad de los alineamientos políticos; la disponibilidad de aliados; el grado que el régimen facilita o reprime demandas colectivas (Tilly y Tarrow, 2007).

Más específicamente, concerniente a las estrategias, Tarrow (2005) indica seis mecanismos a través de los cuales se puede analizar el activismo transnacional, ellos son: (i) la movilización de discursos o símbolos reconocidos a nivel global para enmarcar una cuestión local (*global framing*); (ii) internalización de agendas como respuesta a presiones externas; (iii) la difusión de agendas o disputas de un país a otro(s); (iv) la coordinación de la acción colectiva a un nivel diferente del inicial; (v) la internacionalización de demandas domésticas - cuando éstas son proyectadas hacia instituciones u otros ámbitos internacionales para que éstos ejerzan presión en el Estado nacional (como el efecto boomerang de Keck y Sikkink, 1998); (vi) formación de coaliciones internacionales con demandas semejantes (como las redes transnacionales de defensa de Keck y Sikkink, 1998). Como resultado, hacen disponible recursos presentes en el ámbito internacional

¹⁹ Aquella que se sitúa en la intersección de la acción colectiva, la política (*politics*) y la contención (demandas que contienen intereses en disputa). Para un análisis sobre repertorios de la política contenciosa ver Tilly y Tarrow (2007).

para disputas domésticas, que los utilizan para influenciar resultados de las políticas domésticas e internacionales.

La identificación de los procesos utilizados en el activismo transnacional contribuye con herramientas que permiten entender cuales son aquellos determinantes externos que ejercen efecto en la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior. Entre ellos, y central para el análisis, la concepción de estructura política de oportunidades. La realidad de interdependencia ofrece una agenda internacional más amplia, menos jerarquizada y más compleja, que es definida y manejada por diversificados centros de poder (Tomassini, 1984), ampliando así la estructura de oportunidad política disponible para que actores de la sociedad civil brasileña puedan movilizar recursos y repertorios de política contenciosa que, a su vez, impactan en su relación con el Estado y con la política exterior brasileña.

5. PARTICIPACIÓN Y POLÍTICA EXTERIOR: EL CASO BRASILEÑO

Para situar el caso brasileño en el debate de los tres artículos, una breve revisión sobre los tres principales elementos analizados – política exterior, participación ciudadana y actuación transnacional de la sociedad civil – se hace necesario tanto respecto al debate teórico como a los principales puntos de inflexión de la praxis. Con esta revisión, se espera no solamente situar los tres artículos presentados sino también explicitar el diálogo de los artículos con las complementariedades y ausencias de la producción académica relativa al objeto de estudio.

Los procesos brasileños de democratización y apertura económica de las últimas tres décadas, han favorecido una diversificación de las agendas de política exterior. Por un lado, la apertura comercial y la inserción internacional en una economía globalizada, a través de un modelo de integración competitiva de cadenas productivas, ha hecho con que la política exterior genere impactos redistributivos internos, inexistentes en una economía de protección industrial (Lima, 2000). Por otro, la redemocratización política ha promovido una oxigenación de la política exterior, con entrada de nuevos actores gubernamentales especializados para dar cuenta de las nuevas agendas y competencias de la política exterior. Con eso, cada vez más la literatura brasileña analiza la “horizontalización” del proceso decisorio de política exterior como un continuum de las dinámicas político-económicas domésticas y, por lo tanto, un reflejo de la disputa entre los múltiples intereses

y concepciones presentes en la sociedad que compiten por el acceso al proceso decisorio. (Pinheiro y Milani 2011; Leite, et al. 2014).

No obstante, la producción académica que se ocupa de analizar estos cambios se ha centrado principalmente en los nuevos arreglos institucionales entre actores gubernamentales y, consecuentemente, la alteración del rol tradicionalmente desarrollado por la burocracia diplomática. Esta producción se ocupó, principalmente, en analizar, las competencias constitucionales de diferentes instituciones del Ejecutivo para actuar en distintas etapas del ciclo de la política exterior (Sanchez, et al. 2006; França y Sanchez 2011) y del Legislativo (Lima e Santos, 2001; Soares, 2005; Figueira, 2009); desde el Análisis de Políticas Exteriores, la “internacionalización” del Estado y la ampliación de las agendas de política exterior y participación de otros órganos públicos en su formulación (Milani y Pinheiro, 2013) o la pluralización de los agentes de política exterior (Cason y Power 2009).

Lopes (2013, 2011), a su vez, se ocupa de entender el proceso de adaptación de la política exterior brasileña a la condición democrática y, como conclusión, atribuye a la política exterior las características de un “republicanismo mitigado”. Según el autor, a la retórica democrática de Jefes de Estado y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, se suman las iniciativas de apertura al diálogo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores bajo una concepción poliárquica. Como conclusión, afirma que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores ha logrado adaptarse a las demandas de democratización de la política exterior, transformándolas en insumos para legitimar su tradición aristocrática sin, democratizar efectivamente el contenido de la misma. Sin embargo, su análisis centrado exclusivamente en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores sintetiza demasiado la realidad de la actuación internacional del Estado y no toma en consideración que la pluralización de la formulación de la política exterior implica analizar la relación entre gobierno y sociedad civil a un nivel más detallado y más allá de la tradicional institución responsable por la política exterior.

En este sentido, retomamos aquí una breve revisión de la literatura que se ha ocupado de analizar las relaciones entre Estado y actores no estatales en el ámbito de la política exterior brasileña. La participación en el ámbito de las negociaciones internacionales multilaterales de comercio es el ámbito más analizado, con artículos influenciados por la teoría de los dos niveles de juego y que buscan fundamentalmente entender la formación de preferencias de los actores y el impacto final de su participación en los resultados de las

negociaciones (Veiga 2007; Carvalho 2010; Santana 2001; Oliveira y Milani 2012; Carvalho 2003). Aún, Berringer (2015), analiza la influencia del cambio en la relación de fuerzas entre fracciones de la burguesía nacional y sus efectos en la política exterior de comercio. La literatura en el ámbito de la integración regional es más abundante en lo que se refiere a los canales de participación de las instituciones de integración regional, marcadamente el Mercosur, con pocos análisis académicos sobre la participación en el ámbito doméstico brasileño (Mesquita, 2012). Finalmente, la producción analítica sobre la participación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito de la cooperación Sur-Sur es más bien escasa y busca registrar las estrategias de la sociedad civil en el control democrático de la política (Ciommo y Amorim, 2015; Marcolini, 2014; Leite et al, 2014), en iniciativas propias de cooperación (Suyama y Pomeroy 2014; Berrón y Brant, 2015; Santos, 2013) o analizar la participación de la sociedad civil como implementadora de proyectos específicos (Schmitz, 2014).

Paralelamente a los cambios en la naturaleza del proceso decisorio de política exterior, Brasil ha experimentado una importante etapa de innovación institucional en los últimos 20 años con la institucionalización en larga escala de los espacios participativos. Las innovaciones participativas ganan fuerza a partir de la redemocratización brasileña en 1988, principalmente a nivel local. A partir de 2003, con la llegada del Partido de los Trabajadores al Ejecutivo Federal, un nuevo empuje es conferido a la promoción de iniciativas institucionales de participación ciudadana, con la consolidación y ampliación de experiencias a nivel federal, como es el caso de los consejos nacionales de políticas públicas, las conferencias para definición de prioridades de políticas sectoriales y la creación de la Secretaria General de la Presidencia que tiene como misión apoyar y buscar ampliar la participación en el Ejecutivo Federal. En Brasil, actualmente, existen más consejeros y consejeras – aquellos ciudadanos y ciudadanas que participan de los consejos de políticas públicas – que diputados y diputadas municipales electos (Avritzer, 2007)

Respecto a la literatura sobre movimientos sociales e instituciones participativas, la redemocratización del país ha suscitado un interés académico importante y se ha conformado una importante agenda de investigación acerca de los movimientos sociales en la década del 80 y, posteriormente, con la institucionalización en escala de espacios participativos, un ímpetu importante se ha dado a las investigaciones sobre la acción de la sociedad en la arena pública y en los espacios de participación institucionalizados (Alonso,

2009), aunque en algunos casos desconectadas de la dimensión asociativa y conflictiva que conforman la naturaleza de los movimientos participantes (Gohn y Bringel, 2012).

Así, la escala y la relación cada vez más estrecha entre participación ciudadana y políticas públicas instigó una amplia agenda de investigación nacional que busca avanzar más allá del consenso normativo sobre el valor democrático de la participación ciudadana. Considerando que los representantes de la ciudadanía en las instancias participativas tienen autoridad para decidir sobre un amplio espectro de políticas públicas, cuestiones como la representatividad de los participantes (Lavalle et al, 2006; Avritzer, 2007; Avritzer, 2011) y la contribución efectiva de estas instancias emergen en el centro del debate sobre las políticas públicas participativas (Pires, 2011; Pogrebinschi y Samuels, 2014).

A partir del año 2000, no obstante, la agenda de investigación sobre movimientos sociales es retomada por innumerables centros y proyectos académicos, respondiendo a la necesidad de renovación frente al agotamiento del debate sobre las nuevas formas participativas institucionalizadas, el retorno de la intensidad de la actuación de los movimientos en Brasil, así como el cúmulo de la literatura internacional acerca del activismo transnacional (Gohn y Bringel, 2012).

A título de ejemplo Wampler (2014), analiza en qué medida la institucionalización de la participación, en Brasil, ha cambiado la estructura de oportunidades para la acción colectiva durante las dos últimas décadas, concluyendo que el uso de estrategias contenciosas también están direccionadas a asegurar el acceso y respecto a los acuerdos realizados *en el ámbito* de las instituciones participativas, contestando así la idea presente en Tarrow (1998 apud Wampler 2014) sobre la utilización de estrategias contenciosas en la ausencia de oportunidades de acceso a las instituciones.

Otra importante confluencia se refiere a los análisis sobre el activismo transnacional en el marco de los debates post colonialistas (Gohn y Bringel, 2012). Bringuel (2014) acentúa la importancia de rescatar, en el estudio sobre acción colectiva, las dimensiones de la espacialidad de la contestación (no solamente como contexto pero configurando en sí un campo de disputa), la noción de traducción (el refuerzo de la sinergia y convergencia existente entre la diversidad de resistencias contra-hegemónicas) y las dinámicas de difusión (como procesos creativos y contingentes dependientes de las dimensiones anteriores). Estas dimensiones confieren especificidad a los análisis sobre los ejemplos

más paradigmáticos de acción transnacional en que se involucran parte de los movimientos brasileños, como el Foro Social Mundial, la Campaña Regional contra el Alianza de Libre Comercio de las Américas y los movimientos rurales y de disputa por la tierra (Vía Campesina, Movimiento de los Sin Tierra). En este sentido, se cuestiona por ejemplo, la noción linear de internacionalización a partir de la globalización frente a la concepción de una configuración espacial múltiple, caracterizada por las disputas que configuran la lucha social en América Latina, previa a la década del 90.

El presente análisis dialoga por lo tanto con la producción académica brasileña relacionada. Por un lado, busca contribuir con una perspectiva ampliada sobre la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior. En otras palabras, considerando la pluralización de actores gubernamentales y la horizontalización del proceso decisorio de la política exterior, cobra sentido analizar los múltiples puntos de entrada a la participación de la sociedad civil en la materia, combinando tanto el análisis de diferentes agendas sectoriales como diferentes interlocutores gubernamentales (no solamente el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). Por otro lado, al explotar la relación entre la actividad transnacional de la sociedad civil y su participación institucional en el ámbito doméstico, establece puntos de diálogo con la literatura que empieza a analizar la confluencia entre los estudios sobre democracia participativa y activismo transnacional.

6. CONCLUSIÓN

Los dos artículos y el capítulo de libro presentados para esta tesis abordan diferentes ángulos de análisis sobre el objeto de estudio: la participación de actores de la sociedad civil organizada en la política exterior brasileña. Los trabajos presentan una visión general de las iniciativas participativas institucionales en el ámbito de la política exterior, desde la perspectiva de su calidad democrática; un análisis profundizado de la experiencia de un ministerio en la cooperación con África, iluminando los factores domésticos e internacionales que llevaron a un cambio de su inserción internacional; una reflexión sobre la actuación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito de la cooperación Sur-Sur y del mecanismo de integración interregional del cual forman parte Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica (BRICS). La principal herramienta analítica utilizada para los dos artículos fue el Análisis de Política Exterior, mientras que el capítulo del libro se apoya en la contribución de la literatura sobre sociedad civil y activismo transnacional.

El primer artículo (*Participação da Sociedade Civil na Política Externa Brasileira – Uma análise da qualidade democrática*) analiza la participación de actores no gubernamentales en tres ámbitos de la política exterior brasileña: negociaciones internacionales multilaterales (de comercio y temas sociales), integración regional y cooperación Sur-Sur para el desarrollo internacional²⁰. Para ello, son utilizados criterios de análisis provenientes de la literatura acerca de la calidad democrática de la participación ciudadana (relacionados a los participantes, organización e institucionalidad de las iniciativas). El enfoque principal es la participación en el ámbito doméstico e institucional, es decir, la interacción de los actores no gubernamentales con el gobierno brasileño, sin considerar estrategias contenciosas o articulaciones a nivel internacional que puedan influir en el ámbito doméstico. Se concluye que la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior, desde esta perspectiva institucional, viene creciendo pero es difusa, discrecional, con alto grado de informalidad y presenta una serie de desafíos relacionados a su calidad democrática. Complementariamente, el artículo apunta a factores que influyen la apertura de los procesos decisorios a la sociedad civil, como pueden ser las respuestas de diferentes

²⁰ Este artículo se apoyó en una revisión de literatura existente, participación en algunos de los procesos analizados y entrevistas informales.

actores gubernamentales influenciadas por estímulos percibidos en el ámbito internacional, presión doméstica o determinadas por su posición y misión institucional.

El segundo artículo (*Brazilian South-South development cooperation: the case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa*) explota el proceso decisorio de la cooperación Sur-Sur en la protección social y la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional y el caso del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Combate al Hambre²¹. El artículo busca comprender las dinámicas domésticas e internacionales que contribuyeron al ascenso de la cooperación Sur-Sur a una prioridad de la política exterior durante el periodo 2003-2010, así como a los cambios en la estrategia de inserción internacional del Ministerio en cuestión, incluyendo el rol de la sociedad civil. El artículo refuerza las evidencias sobre la movilización de la agenda de política exterior por parte de actores gubernamentales más allá del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, apunta a la existencia de coaliciones entre sectores dentro del Estado y actores de la sociedad civil que reverberan en la actuación internacional del gobierno y discurre sobre las oportunidades domésticas e internacionales percibidas que influenciaron la agenda de cooperación en protección social. Entre los resultados, se identifica que la confluencia de diversos factores domésticos e internacionales llevaron al Ministerio a priorizar la agenda de seguridad alimentaria en el ámbito de la política exterior con África. Esto, a su vez, ha favorecido a la participación de la sociedad civil en la cooperación del ministerio. En este caso, es posible afirmar que al menos tres elementos han contribuido a un escenario de mayor protagonismo de la sociedad civil: el consenso, por parte de los promotores gubernamentales, sobre la participación de la sociedad civil como factor de éxito en la implementación doméstica de las políticas compartidas con países africanos; el hecho de que la coalición central que determinó el cambio del enfoque de cooperación con África del Ministerio era integrada por sectores de la sociedad civil organizada; la participación y apoyo del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en las iniciativas de cooperación Sur-Sur con países africanos.

²¹ El artículo es resultado de una investigación realizada en 2012, en el marco del programa “*Research and Communication on Foreign Aid (ReCom)*”, financiado por el Instituto Mundial de Investigación Económica de la Universidad de Naciones Unidas (UNU-WIDER). La investigación se apoyó en una revisión de literatura y entrevistas a representantes del gobierno y la sociedad civil y resultó en una primera publicación en 2013 (anexo 6) que fue posteriormente actualizada y adaptada para su publicación en el *Journal of International Development*, en 2015.

El tercer análisis (*Civil society, the BRICS and international development cooperation: perspectives from India, South Africa and Brazil*)²² proporciona un análisis detenido de los formatos que la actuación de la sociedad civil brasileña adquiere en el ámbito de la cooperación Sur-Sur: su participación en iniciativas institucionales, sus esfuerzos para la construcción de espacios autónomos de debate y monitoreo de las iniciativas de cooperación Sur-Sur del gobierno y su actuación transnacional autónoma junto a sus contrapartes en otros países en desarrollo. Como resultado se identifica la experiencia de actuación internacional de la sociedad civil como una característica común a la mayoría de los sectores involucrados en la agenda analizada. Asimismo, al analizar dos casos de activismo transnacional – el ProSavana y el seguimiento de la agenda BRICS, es posible percibir que su actuación internacional repercute en sus estrategias domésticas hacia las agendas de política exterior, tanto en lo que dice respecto a su interlocución con el gobierno, como hacia la construcción de alianzas en el seno de la sociedad civil.

El conjunto de análisis constata que la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior brasileña se da a partir de la interlocución con diferentes instituciones del Estado. Como consecuencia, apunta a la diversidad de formatos que esta participación asume y la ausencia de una directriz que oriente la participación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito de esta política, por parte del Estado. Asimismo, el conjunto de análisis permite comprender las dinámicas que determinan la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior. En este sentido, los hallazgos centrales se resumen en dos factores explicativos y dos implicaciones analíticas, analizados en detalle a continuación.

6.1. FACTORES EXPLICATIVOS

Como factores explicativos de la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior encontramos que la apertura a la participación responde a los cambios en los procesos decisorios de la política exterior brasileña, caracterizados por la diversificación de las

²² El capítulo es resultado de dos investigaciones realizadas en el marco del programa Rising Powers in International Development, coordinado por el Instituto de Estudios del Desarrollo de la Universidad de Sussex (IDS). La primera investigación, desarrollada en el año de 2013, resultó en el informe brasileño sobre la cooperación internacional en los países BRICS (Anexo 4: Brazil's Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate). La segunda investigación formó parte de la línea sobre el Rol de la Sociedad civil en la Cooperación Sur-Sur y consistió en un estudio de caso sobre el proyecto de cooperación entre movimientos rurales brasileños, mozambiqueños y surafricanos, publicado en 2014 (Anexo 5: Supporting Autonomy and Resistance, The Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa native seed bank).

agendas de política exterior y la entrada de nuevos actores gubernamentales especializados. Como resultado de esta horizontalización del proceso decisorio, la participación de la sociedad civil responde a motivaciones de diferentes actores gubernamentales que condicionan los formatos establecidos. Estas motivaciones, a su vez, son influenciadas por estímulos existentes tanto en el ámbito doméstico como internacional. Con relación al ámbito doméstico, en lo que dice respecto a la relación entre Estado y sociedad civil, es necesario entender las dinámicas que la última establece en el ámbito internacional, pues éstas configuran sus estrategias domésticas hacia la política exterior.

La participación de la sociedad civil como resultado de la horizontalización del proceso decisorio y respuesta a determinantes domésticos e internacionales

Aunque todas las iniciativas de apertura a la participación de la sociedad civil analizadas son formalmente coordinadas por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, la participación de otros actores del Ejecutivo Federal influencia el formato que la participación adquiere. La tabla 3 resume las principales características de las experiencias analizadas de acuerdo con los responsables gubernamentales por su creación y sus motivaciones, su grado de institucionalización y participantes.

Tabla 3. Principales características de las experiencias de participación analizadas

Experiencia	Promotores	Motivaciones	Institucionalización	Participantes
Negociaciones multilaterales	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Legitimar posición del gobierno Presión de la sociedad civil organizada brasileña	La participación se da en reuniones y grupos de trabajo interministeriales <i>ad hoc</i> . Las Secciones nacionales de consulta (SENALCA y SENEUROPA) son reglamentadas por decreto y prevén la posibilidad de invitación de la sociedad civil como observadores	Invitados por el gobierno
Negociaciones sociales	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Presión de las NNUU Presión de la sociedad civil organizada brasileña	Reuniones y grupos de trabajo interministeriales <i>ad hoc</i> Consulta via internet (2014)	Invitados por el gobierno
Mercosur Social y Participativo	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Secretaría General de la Presidencia	Existencia de espacios de participación en el ámbito regional y necesidad de coordinación de posiciones domésticas Impulso a la integración social	Espacio Formal creado por decreto presidencial	Inicialmente invitador por el gobierno, posteriormente definidos por reglamento interno formulado participativamente
REAF	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Ministerio de Desarrollo Agrario	Confluencia de intereses en promover agricultura familiar en el ámbito regional	Espacio Formal, creado por resolución del Grupo Mercado Común	Sección Nacional compuesta por organizaciones “referencia” en agricultura familiar
PAA África	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Combate al Hambre	Cambio de prioridades en la agenda de cooperación del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social u Combate al Hambre Existencia de coalición con participación de la sociedad civil en la temática Consenso sobre el rol de la sociedad civil como actor para el desarrollo	Plan de Trabajo, ancorado por Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional	Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentar y Nutricional (representantes electos en las conferencias)

La literatura especializada y discutida en los artículos identifica una serie de desafíos respecto a la calidad democrática y efectividad de la participación de cada uno de estos espacios. Sin embargo, es posible observar mayor institucionalización de aquellas iniciativas promovidas en coordinación con otros actores del Ejecutivo Federal.

En el ámbito de las negociaciones multilaterales de comercio, se identificó que la interlocución entre sectores organizados de la sociedad civil se dio principalmente con el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, a través de los espacios creados por éste. La motivación en abrir los canales de participación reside en la búsqueda de legitimidad de posiciones preestablecidas por las burocracias, así como respuesta a presiones de los propios actores sociales brasileños. Respecto a las negociaciones multilaterales sociales, la motivación central identificada reside en la legitimidad delante del sistema internacional, particularmente la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, que recomienda la incorporación de la sociedad civil en los diálogos que conforman posiciones nacionales, reconociendo, a su vez, la influencia que la sociedad civil es capaz de ejercer en las materias sobre las cuales la organización actúa y respondiendo a las críticas acerca de su propio déficit democrático. Como principales características de la participación de actores no gubernamentales en las negociaciones multilaterales de comercio y temáticas sociales se encuentran la baja institucionalización y discrecionalidad de la burocracia diplomática en abrir canales de participación y la falta de criterios de representatividad que orienten la invitación de los participantes por parte del Ejecutivo.

En el ámbito de la integración regional, el Programa Mercosur Social y Participativo es coordinado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y la Secretaria General de la Presidencia. Esta iniciativa de participación cuenta con mayor institucionalización y busca mayor representatividad y diversidad de los participantes. Asimismo, el hecho de que, en el ámbito regional, el Mercosur cuente con espacios de participación más formales seguramente influyó la necesidad de establecer un espacio domestico de coordinación de posiciones de la sociedad civil brasileña. Aún en el ámbito de la integración regional, la Red Especial de Agricultura Familiar, ha sido creada por la confluencia de intereses del Ministerio de Desarrollo Agrario, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y sindicatos y movimientos sociales rurales y se destaca por su carácter participativo en la estructura institucional del Mercosur.

El análisis sectorial de la cooperación Sur-Sur para el desarrollo promovida por el Ministerio del Desarrollo Social y Combate al Hambre con el continente africano, apunta a una serie de factores más contextuales que refuerzan el argumento que la participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior está condicionada a la confluencia de factores domésticos y externos. El artículo comprueba que la movilización y disputa para acceder al proceso decisorio de la política exterior brasileña ocurre en el marco de las instituciones y se apoya en las coaliciones establecidas junto a actores no-gubernamentales. La posibilidad de participación de la sociedad civil se dio porque hubo un cambio de prioridades en la agenda de cooperación del Ministerio, favoreciendo la temática de seguridad alimentaria y nutricional y el Programa de Adquisición de Alimentos África (PAA Africa) que cuenta con una fuerte movilización de actores de la sociedad civil, incluyendo un espacio de participación institucionalizado a nivel nacional, el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional.

El fortalecimiento, dentro del gobierno, de coaliciones alrededor de la agenda de Seguridad Alimentaria e Nutricional es uno de los principales factores domésticos que explica este cambio de prioridades. Este proceso resultó en la creación de estructuras institucionales destinadas específicamente a fortalecer el rol internacional brasileño en la agenda de combate al hambre, como es el caso de la Coordinación General de Combate al Hambre dentro del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y el Centro de Excelencia contra el Hambre, en alianza con el Programa Mundial de Alimentos de las Naciones Unidas. Internacionalmente, la elección del brasileño José Graziano como director de la Organización Mundial de Agricultura e Alimentos y su actuación como emprendedor de la difusión de la experiencia brasileña de combate al hambre, la priorización de la agenda de Seguridad Alimentar y Nutricional en la agenda global y la elección Africana de la agricultura como eje de sustentación de su desarrollo son los factores identificados como determinantes para el cambio de prioridades.

Los resultados apuntan también a la influencia de la concepción sobre el rol de la sociedad civil y de la participación ciudadana de los actores que promueven las iniciativas. A excepción del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores que tiene su origen en el período colonial (1808), todos los demás órganos del ejecutivo federal que promueven las iniciativas analizadas fueron creados durante la década del 2000, después de la Constitución Democrática de 1988, en estrecha conexión con las agendas de los movimientos sociales brasileños y la defensa de derechos sociales y políticos. En

común, se identifica en sus misiones institucionales el consenso sobre el rol de la sociedad civil como actor central para la formulación de políticas públicas²³. El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, a su vez, incorpora el concepto de diplomacia pública como orientador de su actuación en los marcos de la redemocratización del país pero, de manera reactiva, como una necesidad impuesta por la circunstancia democrática del país (Lopes, 2012:69).

La actuación transnacional de la sociedad civil reconfigura sus estrategias domésticas de participación en la política exterior

Una contribución importante desde la literatura sobre la actuación transnacional de la sociedad civil se refiere a la importancia de incorporar el análisis de su actuación internacional para entender sus estrategias domésticas. Bajo esta perspectiva y a partir de los artículos que componen esta tesis, se percibe que el historial de actuación de la sociedad civil en el ámbito internacional es un factor explicativo de la participación de la misma en el ámbito doméstico, así como configuran sus estrategias de influencia hacia la política exterior.

Como hemos visto, los principales interlocutores en las iniciativas de diálogo gubernamentales son aquellas organizaciones movilizadas para actuar en las temáticas y que cuentan con capacidad de interlocución con la burocracia diplomática. En el caso de las negociaciones multilaterales en temáticas sociales, muchas veces la participación y el diálogo ocurren porque las organizaciones mantienen el seguimiento de las temáticas en sus agendas, de manera autónoma y en diálogo con redes internacionales de la sociedad civil y presionan la apertura del diálogo o son invitadas por su

²³ La Secretaría General de la Presidencia (creada en 2003) tiene como competencia principal intermediar las relaciones del Gobierno Federal con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, incluso en la creación e implementación de canales que aseguran la consulta y participación en la definición de las prioridades de las políticas públicas brasileñas. La creación del Ministerio de Desarrollo Agrario (2000), responde “a la necesidad de legitimar como políticas de Estado, las cuestiones agrarias y de la tierra, así como responder a las demandas de la sociedad y de los movimientos sociales por políticas de reforma agraria y desarrollo rural sostenible, con énfasis en la agricultura familiar” (Brasil, s/d) 23. El Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, creado en 2004, responde a una larga e histórica disputa para el reconocimiento del sistema de protección social como responsabilidad del Estado (Leite et al, 2013) y cuenta con una serie de espacios de participación institucionalizados, a través de los cuales establece el diálogo y control social sobre sus políticas, siendo la sociedad civil responsable por desarrollar mecanismos, criterios, estrategias y directrices”. (Brasil s/d). El Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional 2012-2015, explicita la garantía de participación social en las negociaciones internacionales y proyectos de cooperación internacional que busquen la promoción del derecho humano a la alimentación (Brasil, 2011).

conocimiento especializado. Lo mismo ocurre en el caso de la cooperación Sur-Sur para el desarrollo, cuyo grupo comprometido en hacer el seguimiento de esta agenda reúne actores previamente involucrados en la cooperación recibida, lo que les ha permitido acumular conocimiento, u organizaciones no gubernamentales y movimientos sociales con historial de actividad transnacional, especialmente relacionada a la gobernanza multilateral, al comercio internacional y las campañas contra el Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas, que presentan interrelación con las temáticas abordadas por la cooperación Sur-Sur.

Más allá de influenciar el universo de participantes, analizar como se dan los enlaces transnacionales de la sociedad civil ilumina las dinámicas que contribuyen a explicar sus estrategias hacia la política exterior.

En el caso de las alianzas de contestación establecidas alrededor del ProSavana, proyecto de cooperación trilateral entre Brasil-Japón-Mozambique, se identifica una serie de dinámicas establecidas en el seno de la sociedad civil de los países: la existencia de sectores de la sociedad civil brasileña movilizadas para monitorear las acciones de política exterior; la internacionalización de una agenda doméstica de disputa, relacionada con los modelos duales de desarrollo agrario promovidos internamente y que se reflejan en la cooperación Sur-Sur brasileña; la formación de una coalición internacional entre movimientos sociales brasileños y mozambiqueños (y en menor medida japoneses) que promovió una serie de actividades conjuntas con vistas a influenciar los tres gobiernos, así como movilizar otros sectores de las sociedades civiles domésticas. Asimismo, se resalta que las relaciones de confianza e identidad ideológica previamente establecidas entre movimientos sociales brasileños y mozambiqueños en el marco del Diálogo de los Pueblos, han facilitado la construcción de un diagnóstico común sobre los desafíos percibidos en el marco de la iniciativa gubernamental y la elaboración de demandas que permitiesen el diálogo tanto junto al gobierno mozambiqueño como brasileño.

El caso de la construcción alrededor de la agenda BRICS, a su vez, demuestra también la validez de las premisas sobre política contenciosa transnacional, al demostrar que la sociedad civil de los cinco países buscan construir diagnósticos y discursos comunes que favorezcan el enlace de las agendas domésticas e internacionales; permitan establecer bases para una coalición internacional; y proporcionen elementos para la

consolidación de bases de apoyo domésticas, que favorezcan la legitimidad y representatividad de las demandas. Es a partir de esta negociación de identidades y demandas que se forjan las estrategias que sirven para subsidiar la acción de la sociedad civil en el ámbito doméstico de cada país e internacionalmente, en relación a la construcción institucional del mecanismo inter-regional.

Al rescatar estos dos ejemplos de estrategias de política contenciosa transnacional llevadas a cabo por la sociedad civil brasileña es posible percibir que su actuación en el ámbito de la política exterior responde, a la vez, a estrategias construidas en el ámbito doméstico e internacional. Esto implica no solamente un ajuste de estrategias discursivas y tácticas para su actuación en ambos los niveles, sino también la necesidad de generar bases de apoyo domésticas que legitimen la actuación de las mismas y proporcionen, efectivamente, un enlace entre agendas domésticas e internacionales, más allá de la construcción discursiva.

Así, existe un constante proceso de reformulación de las estrategias de influencia en la política exterior, pues el proceso de internacionalización de agendas domésticas no se encierra en sí mismo. El resultado de las interacciones internacionales es, a su vez, internalizado y reflejado en las estrategias hacia la política exterior. Aunque, para efectos explicativos, estemos hablando de dos ámbitos, los hallazgos de la investigación demuestran que la agenda de la sociedad civil es forjada en un proceso fluido que ocurre *a la vez* en el ámbito doméstico e internacional.

6.2. IMPLICACIONES ANALÍTICAS

Las principales implicaciones analíticas debatidas en los resultados hasta aquí pueden ser resumidos en dos puntos que proponen, a partir de los casos estudiados, puentes entre campos de estudios:

Incorporar la perspectiva de la sociedad civil en el Análisis de Política Exterior

El Análisis de Política Exterior se dedica a explicar los determinantes domésticos e internacionales que influyen las decisiones de política exterior. Los resultados de esta investigación demuestran que cobra sentido, al analizar el proceso decisorio de la

política exterior, incorporar un análisis más allá del Estado, buscando entender cómo actores no-gubernamentales interactúan con el mismo. Al establecer el diálogo con estudios que analizan específicamente la actuación internacional de la sociedad civil se ha demostrado que no es posible entender su actuación en el ámbito doméstico de la política exterior sin considerar su actuación internacional. Así, al agregar la perspectiva de la sociedad civil concluimos que parte de lo que es analizado como determinante doméstico, dentro del campo de Análisis de Política Exterior, es también resultado de procesos establecidos por la sociedad civil en el ámbito internacional.

Incorporar la perspectiva sobre representatividad en los análisis sobre participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior

Como se ha visto el debate sobre participación de la sociedad civil en la política exterior presenta una interrelación importante con el debate sobre la pluralización de los modos de representación política, incluida aquella ejercida por la sociedad civil. La construcción de bases sociales (*constituencies*) domésticas que permitan un efectivo enlace entre agendas domésticas e internacionales es una preocupación presente entre la sociedad civil actuante en agendas transnacionales. El análisis de las negociaciones multilaterales de comercio ha indicado que tanto sociedad civil como actores privados buscaron construir nuevas institucionalidades, a través de la construcción de confederaciones o redes, que diesen cuenta de establecer capacidades para presentar propuestas hacia el gobierno y confiriesen legitimidad y credibilidad en la interlocución con el mismo. Como estrategia para la actuación alrededor de la agenda BRICS, la sociedad civil de los cinco países ha decidido establecer el diálogo entre las poblaciones afectadas por las obras de infraestructura financiadas por los Bancos de Desarrollo de cada uno de los países y aquellas que serán en el futuro afectadas por las obras financiadas por el Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo anunciado por el bloque, constituyendo así una comunidad transnacional de afectados.

En el cernido de esta cuestión está la imposibilidad de pensar la representatividad en los marcos de los procedimientos tradicionales de la democracia representativa, como puede ser la elección de representantes basada en un criterio territorial. Sin embargo, la cuestión de la legitimidad de las prácticas de intermediación política ejercidas por la sociedad civil, tradicionalmente pensada en clave de la autorización consentida del

representado al representante, sigue como un punto a ser explotado²⁴. Lavalle y Vera (2011), identifican la dimensión de rendición de cuentas, como un proceso que confiere legitimidad al largo del tiempo y no como autorización inicial, siendo rescatada como alternativa para pensar la representatividad de la sociedad civil. No obstante, la dificultad de definición del universo o base social a ser representada (constituency) sigue como desafío práctico y analítico. Este debate reproduce los desafíos ya conocidos por los estudios que se enfocan en la representación política ejercida en las instituciones participativas o las críticas hacia el potencial democratizador de la sociedad civil global. Sin embargo, un campo de investigación todavía no explotado es el referido a las formas de representación ejercidas en la confluencia de estos dos debates, como puede ser la participación en las agendas de política exterior y su relación con la constitución de una representatividad que opera a nivel transnacional.

²⁴ Lavalle y Vera, (2011) identifican en la literatura una serie de formulaciones que buscan conferir significado a la pluralización de la representación política: representación por afinidad, representación virtual, representante presuntivo, representante sustitutivo, representante auto asumido, mediación políticos, representación ciudadana, representación no-electoral, representantes discursivos.

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Anexos

**ANEXO 1. PARTICIPAÇÃO DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA POLÍTICA
EXTERNA BRASILEIRA – UMA ANÁLISE DA QUALIDADE
DEMOCRÁTICA, MELISSA POMEROY**

Participação da Sociedade Civil na Política Externa Brasileira: Uma análise da qualidade democrática

Resumo

Partindo da construção analítica que põe em evidência a horizontalização do processo decisório da política externa brasileira e considerando esta como política pública e passível de controle democrático, esse artigo analisa a qualidade democrática das instituições participativas dessa política, a partir de critérios estabelecidos pela teoria democrática. A participação da sociedade civil é analisada em três âmbitos da política externa: negociações internacionais multilaterais, integração regional e cooperação sul-sul. É possível afirmar que a participação da sociedade civil na política externa brasileira tem um caráter difuso, discricionário e com alto grau de informalidade.

Palavras chave: participação, política externa brasileira, sociedade civil, qualidade democrática, análise de política externa

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CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL

Participação Social e Política Externa Brasileira

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Palavras chave: participação, política externa brasileira, sociedade civil, qualidade democrática, análise de política externa

Introdução

Os processos brasileiros de democratização e abertura econômica das últimas três décadas, favoreceram uma diversificação das agendas de política externa. Por um lado, a abertura comercial e a inserção internacional em uma economia globalizada, através de um modelo de integração competitiva de cadeias produtivas, fez com que a política externa gerasse impactos redistributivos internos, não tão acentuados em uma economia de proteção industrial (Lima 2000). Por outro, a redemocratização política promoveu uma oxigenação da política externa, com a entrada de novos atores especializados - principalmente governamentais - para dar conta de suas novas agendas e competências (Pinheiro e Milani 2011). Entre as principais consequências dessa ampliação de agendas de política externa, estão as reformas administrativas nos órgãos diplomáticos responsáveis pela política (Ministério de Relaciones Exteriores) e o aumento da demanda por participação de setores sociais nos processos de formulação e execução da política (Milani, 2011).

Paralelamente, no âmbito doméstico o Brasil viveu transformações importantes no que diz respeito a sua consolidação democrática. Por um lado, experimentou uma importante etapa de inovação institucional nos últimos vinte anos, com a institucionalização em larga escala dos espaços participativos, configurando um contexto participativo sem precedentes. Por outro, a sociedade civil brasileira se fortaleceu, seja na forma de movimentos sociais ou organizações não-governamentais especializadas. Finalmente, a partir de finais da década de noventa, observa-se também a ampliação da atuação da sociedade civil no âmbito transnacional, definindo também o espaço internacional como espaço de articulação de estratégias que oferece restrições e oportunidades (Tarrow, 2005).

É cada vez maior o consenso entre a academia brasileira sobre a política externa como um contínuo das dinâmicas político-econômicas domésticas e, portanto, um reflexo da disputa entre os múltiplos interesses presentes na sociedade que competem pelo acesso ao processo decisório. Em outras palavras, cada vez mais a compreensão da política externa se afasta das leituras realistas de *Política de Estado* e se aproxima do campo de análise de políticas públicas, cujo processo decisório deve estar sujeito a controles democráticos (Pinheiro e Milani, 2011). A produção acadêmica tem avançado em explicar e analisar diversos aspectos dessa realidade da política externa brasileira, seus novos arranjos institucionais entre atores governamentais e as alterações e

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continuidades do papel tradicionalmente desempenhado pela burocracia diplomática brasileira. A diversidade de análises aborda perspectivas relacionadas às competências constitucionais para atuar em distintas etapas do ciclo da política externa, por parte do Executivo (Sanchez, et al. 2006; França e Sanchez 2011) e do Legislativo (Lima e Santos, 2001; Soares, 2005; Figueira, 2009), análises sobre a internacionalização do Estado e ampliação das agendas da política externa (Milani e Pinheiro, 2013) e pluralização dos agentes de política externa (Cason e Power 2009) ou, ainda, a influência da mudança de correlação de forças entre as frações da burguesia nacional e seus efeitos na política externa (Berringer 2015).

Entretanto, existe ainda um longo caminho a ser perfilado respeito à análise relacionada a democratização dos seus processos decisórios e a participação de atores não governamentais, principalmente sociedade civil organizada, objeto central da presente análise. Considerando a política externa brasileira como política pública e portanto passível de controle democráticos e com base na recente construção analítica que põe em evidência a pluralidade de atores e agendas, assim como horizontalização do seu processo decisório, esse artigo busca analisar a qualidade democrática do diálogo entre Executivo e sociedade civil, a partir dos avanços nos estudos sobre participação democrática. Com isso busca-se identificar similaridades e diferenças em formatos, atores e motivações que compõem as instituições participativas da política externa.ⁱ Para tanto, a participação da sociedade civil será analisada em três âmbitos da política externa, quais sejam, negociações internacionais multilaterais (comerciais e setoriais), integração regional e cooperação sul-sul para o desenvolvimento.

O enfoque adotado se apoia em critérios proveniente da literatura democrática, mais especificamente, daquela que se ocupa das democracias participativas e deliberativas, tais como grau de formalização e participação, representatividade, diversidade e extensão da participação, qualidades da deliberação. Ainda, a Análise de Política Externa é adotada como ferramenta analítica para acessar fatores domésticos e externos que influenciam os processos decisórios da política externa, contribuindo para a compreensão das dinâmicas domésticas e internacionais que influenciam a abertura à participação de atores não-governamentais nos três âmbitos selecionados. Assim, através de revisão de literatura e observação participante, busca-se analisar as principais características da participação na política externa brasileira, em diferentes instâncias do Executivo com competência para atuar internacionalmente.

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3 Nesse sentido, o foco são naquelas interações que se dão no âmbito da política
4 externa, que vem respondendo ao novo contexto com reformas administrativas e
5 gradual abertura à interlocução com novos atores. O presente artigo vem a contribuir
6 com reflexões acerca dos desafios a serem considerados nesse processo de abertura e
7 diálogo. Ao entender como, para cada um dos casos selecionados, acontece a abertura
8 busca-se contribuir para o entendimento sobre o exercício do controle vertical entre
9 Estado e sociedade e para pensar arranjos e arcabouços institucionais que considerem
10 o atual contexto da política externa brasileira.

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12 Como resultados gerais é possível afirmar que a participação da sociedade civil na
13 política externa brasileira tem um caráter discricionário, com alto grau de informalidade,
14 não vinculante e sem critérios de representatividade dos participantes. Em geral, a
15 abertura ao diálogo e participação da sociedade civil na política externa brasileira
16 responde a três fatores: (i) a participação de demais instituições do Executivo nas
17 agendas de política externa para além do Ministério de Relações Exteriores (i) a
18 existência de uma coalizão ao redor de uma determinada temática que reúna setores da
19 sociedade civil com histórico de atuação internacional ou capacidades específicas para
20 dialogar com burocracias altamente especializadas; e (ii) oportunidades no âmbito
21 internacional ou doméstico que incentivem a participação ou causem algum tipo de
22 constrangimento para iniciativas não participativas.

23
24 As próximas seções trazem, primeiramente, uma breve análise sobre o atual contexto
25 da política externa brasileira frente à mudanças de ordem global e doméstica,
26 ressaltando os impactos que estas exercem em seu processo decisório. Em seguida,
27 apresenta-se um resgate dos argumentos sobre a relação entre política externa e
28 democracia que reforçam ou desafiam a singularidade da política frente a outras
29 políticas públicas, permitindo assim a ponte com a literatura sobre participação no
30 âmbito das políticas públicas. A terceira seção introduz os principais critérios que
31 suportam a análise sobre a qualidade democrática da participação da sociedade civil na
32 política exterior, realizada na quarta seção. A quinta e última seção sintetiza os
33 principais argumentos desenvolvidos e explora algumas implicações analíticas.

34 35 **O contexto da Política Externa Brasileira e as implicações para sua** 36 **democratização**

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38 A inserção brasileira no exterior passou por mudanças substantivas nos últimos quinze
39 anos, com a adoção de uma política externa proativa e pragmática como um pilar do
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3 governo recém eleito do ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, marcando uma
4 posição internacional mais ambiciosa e reconfigurada, como instrumento da estratégia
5 de desenvolvimento doméstico, frente à concepção até então predominante de política
6 externa como acessório à manutenção de estabilidade macroeconômica e credibilidade
7 internacional (Hirst et al, 2010).
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11 Beneficiando-se das transformações econômicas globais, marcadamente a alta no
12 preço dos commodities e crescentes movimentos por parte das economias emergentes
13 em fortalecer uma ordem internacional multipolar, o país intensificou sua atuação
14 política e econômica em diversos âmbitos globais e regionais, como o G20, a criação do
15 mecanismo interregional BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul), a
16 ampliação temática e geográfica dos processos de integração regional, o maior
17 intercâmbio político e econômico com a África, a intensificação da diplomacia
18 presidencial, além de maior protagonismo no sistema multilateral e nos debates sobre
19 sua reformas. A inserção brasileira na Cooperação Internacional para o
20 Desenvolvimento também adquiriu contornos inéditos, através de um aumento
21 substantivo de sua Cooperação Sul-Sul que, como instrumento de política externa,
22 concretiza a combinação do princípio de solidariedade, com o adensamento de relações
23 políticas, sociais e econômicas. Finalmente, deve-se considerar também o crescimento
24 das operações internacionais de instituições e bancos públicos, assim como o apoio do
25 Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento à internacionalização das empresas brasileiras.
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28 Se por um lado, mudanças na ordem internacional, como a intensificação da
29 mundialização do capital ou a necessidade de proteção de bens públicos globais,
30 contribuíram para a ampliação do caráter transnacional de agendas nacionais e locais;
31 por outro, as próprias políticas brasileiras se internacionalizaram, motivadas em grande
32 parte pela intensificação das relações Sul-Sul. São inúmeras as variáveis que explicam
33 a crescente internacionalização, para cada uma das políticas setoriais brasileiras, como
34 podem ser o contexto internacional de sua inserção, a existência de regimes
35 multilaterais ou regionais, o contexto e prioridade das agendas domesticamente, a
36 existência e atuação de *constituencies* domésticas ou a atenção midiática dada às
37 mesmas (Pinheiro e Milani, 2011).
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40 A ampliação das agendas de política externa e o fortalecimento de narrativas sobre a
41 identidade do Brasil como potência média do Sul global capaz de agir como
42 intermediário ou mediador das relações internacionais (Leite et al, 2014) - ou na
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3 definição de Keohane (1969), como *system-affecting state* – contribuiu também para um
4 aumento da atenção pública doméstica sobre a política externa brasileira, assim como
5 para o aumento de demandas e expectativas internacionais. O novo papel do Brasil
6 “emergente” aliado a narrativa construída sobre sua identidade se converte também em
7 objeto de controle democrático, por parte da sociedade civil brasileira, funcionando
8 como uma extensão de disputas internas e coalizões internacionais acerca das políticas
9 de desenvolvimento promovidas pelo Brasil, doméstica e internacionalmente.

10
11 Se a abertura econômica e a intensificação de impactos distributivos internos
12 condicionou a ampliação da agenda da política externa a novos atores especializados e
13 o aumento da disputa pelo acesso ao processo decisório por parte de setores da
14 sociedade, esse novo quadro intensificou uma série de desafios de ordem político e
15 analítico. Entre eles, a necessidade de estabelecimentos de novos arranjos para a
16 construção de consensos na formulação das diretrizes de atuação internacional, para
17 lograr maior legitimidade, representatividade e, ao mesmo tempo, coordenação.ⁱⁱ

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19 Em suma, trata-se de uma mudança na natureza do processo decisório da política
20 externa brasileira que, tradicionalmente, gozou de autonomia e legitimidade para ser
21 definida exclusivamente pelo Ministério de Relações Exteriores (MRE) seja por conta do
22 regime de proteção industrial, pré-abertura econômica, que pautava o conteúdo central
23 da política externa, seja porque o MRE guardava certa distância da opinião pública ou
24 por conta de seu corpo burocrático altamente especializado e qualificado, garantidor de
25 legitimidade perante outras estruturas do governo e sociedade (Pinheiro, 2003 citado
26 em Figueira, 2009). A abertura comercial, a redemocratização do Estado e das políticas
27 e, conseqüentemente, a ampliação de agendas, atores e interesses contribuem para
28 que a legitimidade da tomada de decisão de política externa não se centre mais na
29 autoridade burocrática, mas sim em sua formulação democrática (Pinheiro e Milani,
30 2013).ⁱⁱⁱ

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32 Domesticamente, dois condicionantes agregam elementos importante à análise sobre a
33 abertura dos processos decisórios da política externa, quais sejam, a democratização
34 das políticas públicas brasileiras e o fortalecimento e internacionalização da sociedade
35 civil.

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37 O Brasil experimentou uma importante etapa de inovação institucional nos últimos 20
38 anos com a institucionalização em larga escala dos espaços participativos, configurando
39 um contexto participativo sem precedentes. As inovações participativas ganham força a
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3 partir da redemocratização brasileira em 1988, principalmente a nível local. A partir de
4 2003, com a chegada do Partido dos Trabalhadores ao Executivo Federal, um novo
5 ânimo é conferido à promoção de iniciativas institucionais de participação cidadã,
6 consolidando e ampliando as experiências a nível federal. Entretanto, a formalização da
7 participação no âmbito da política externa, apesar de debatida no âmbito do governo
8 federal e defendida pela sociedade civil - no formato de um Conselho Nacional de
9 Política Externa - continua apenas como uma proposta.

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15 No que diz respeito ao processo de democratização e o ressurgimento da possibilidade
16 de incidência da sociedade civil na esfera pública, Dagnino (2004) ressalta uma
17 “confluência perversa” entre um projeto neoliberal de Estado mínimo e transferência de
18 responsabilidades sociais para a sociedade civil e o projeto democratizante e
19 participativo que emerge com o fim do regimes autoritário. Assim o crescimento
20 exponencial do número de organizações não governamentais no Brasil combina
21 respostas ao imperativo liberal e “terceirização” de funções do Estado, com o resgate da
22 tradição de construção de cidadania e participação política dos movimentos
23 pedagógicos populares, abortada pela ditadura (Steil e Carvalho 2001).

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30 Finalmente, fatores estruturais também contribuíram para que a sociedade civil se
31 internacionalizasse. Entre eles, o impacto dos ajustes econômicos da década de 90,
32 que magnificaram a percepção da conexão entre decisões globais e impactos locais,
33 percebidos de maneira semelhante nos diversos países de renda média ou baixa; a
34 ampliação da possibilidade de participar em âmbitos internacionais, como no caso das
35 Conferências da ONU; a evolução dos sistemas de comunicação e transportes que
36 facilitaram a conexão entre os diversos atores, culminando na intensificação de uma
37 política contenciosa a nível global, tão bem representada no âmbito regional e global
38 pela campanha contra a Área de Livre Comércio das Américas e as demonstrações
39 altermundistas a partir de Seattle, respectivamente. Setores organizados da sociedade
40 civil brasileira com comprovado histórico de influência sobre políticas nacionais e de
41 engajamento internacional em redes internacionais junto a sociedades de outros países,
42 contribuem para a formulação de narrativas e recomendações que visam influenciar a
43 agenda da atuação internacional brasileira em determinados setores. Nesse sentido,
44 não é possível dissociar a atuação internacional da sociedade civil de sua crescente
45 demanda por participação no processo decisório da política externa brasileira.

56 57 **Política externa e democracia**

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3 A política externa é tradicionalmente tratada como uma política singular e diferente de
4 outras políticas públicas domésticas de um Estado (Badie, 2009). A defesa desta
5 singularidade da política externa contribui a que esta se configure, como uma das
6 poucas políticas que não apresentaram mudanças significativas de suas interfaces com
7 a sociedade civil. Em outras palavras, mesmo em países democráticos, as políticas
8 externas parecem ter escapado à “condição democrática” (Lopes, 2013) e seguem
9 como domínio do reservado e secreto (Badie, 2009), constituindo-se como uma das
10 políticas mais difíceis de exercer controle democrático (Dahl, 1999) e cujo processo
11 decisório apresenta baixa qualidade democrática (Dahl, 1950).

12
13 Posições cétricas, sob o *prima realista* das Relações Internacionais, reforçam
14 especificidades da política externa entre as políticas públicas e sua dificuldade em ser
15 compatibilizada com a democracia. Entre elas, identificam-se argumentos centrados na
16 irracionalidade da política democrática, sujeita a imediatismos e disputas relacionadas
17 ao acesso ao poder via eleições que colocam em risco o “interesse nacional” a longo
18 prazo (Lopes, 2013; Villa e Tostes, 2006) ou, ainda, no fato de que a desconcentração
19 de poder sobre a matéria colocaria em risco a credibilidade de compromissos perante a
20 comunidade internacional (Lima, 2000). Finalmente, a defesa do carácter técnico e
21 especializado da política, assim como o reforço da identidade de classe das burocracias
22 diplomáticas (Badie, 2009; Hill, 2003a) contribuem para a diferenciação da política
23 externa frente a outras políticas públicas. Estes argumentos estão baseados na herança
24 de uma concepção de política externa que se resume às dinâmicas interestatais
25 (Biersteker 2002) e remonta à construção dos Estados modernos e sua inserção
26 “individualizada” no cenário internacional, baseada nas premissas de autonomia e
27 soberania do Estado e como defensor e representante do interesse nacional
28 (Morgenthau 1978).

29
30 Dentro do amplo campo denominado Análise de Política Externa, diversos argumentos
31 reforçam a artificialidade da separação entre política externa e doméstica e comprovam
32 empiricamente que o processo decisório da Política Externa responde a existência de
33 disputas e interesses dos diferentes grupos domésticos assim como de fatores
34 presentes no âmbito internacional (Milner, 2007; Keohane e Milner, 1996).

35
36 As análises centradas no processo decisório demonstram a influência dos processos
37 organizacionais e burocráticos para as decisões em política externa, ressaltando, assim,
38 a arquitetura institucional da qual fazem parte ministérios, agências, estados e
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3 municípios. A suposta racionalidade e defesa do interesse nacional das decisões do
4 chefe do executivo ou dos Ministérios de Relações Exteriores, tradicionalmente
5 considerados o lócus de formulação, encontram sua sustentação empírica desafiada
6 (Allison, 1969).
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10 Ao agregar como componentes analíticos a relação entre os papéis da opinião pública,
11 das elites e dos grupos de pressão, abrem espaço para indagações sobre como os
12 determinantes domésticos, relacionados às diferentes naturezas dos sistemas políticos,
13 poderiam afetar as decisões em política exterior. Ao evidenciar dentro do conceito de
14 Estrutura Doméstica a importância de operacionalizar os arranjos institucionais e os
15 processos de construção de coalizões que canalizam as demandas sociais para dentro
16 do sistema político, Risse-Kappen (1991) lança luzes sobre a importância de entender a
17 exata natureza do enlace entre sociedade e governo. Putnam (1988), por sua vez,
18 chama a atenção para a importância de uma análise ancorada em uma teoria sobre a
19 política doméstica que explique as preferências dos atores e como estas impactam a
20 dinâmica de ratificação doméstica das negociações internacionais. Segundo, o autor,
21 esta é uma dinâmica peculiar dos governos democráticos, mas não necessariamente
22 realizada de forma democrática ou restrita à formalidade de aprovação dos Congressos,
23 pois supõe também apoio de grupos, burocracias e opinião pública. Aponta, ainda, para
24 a importância do contexto internacional e sua influência sobre a política externa,
25 configurando um processo de mão-dupla onde pressões internacionais exercem efeitos
26 sobre o ambiente doméstico, especificamente sobre a alteração de equilíbrios e
27 posições que podem aumentar ou diminuir o conjunto de possibilidades de sucesso de
28 uma negociação (*win-sets*).
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41 O argumento da complexidade e especificidade da matéria internacional e,
42 conseqüentemente, a necessidade de especialização e centralização para a sua
43 condução pressupõe que um debate democrático teria como efeito uma redução da
44 eficiência e eficácia na condução da política externa, tanto no que se refere a seus
45 objetivos de curto e longo prazo. A longo prazo, por conta da baixa capacidade técnica
46 e desinteresse do legislativo, assim como por falta de informação e interesse da
47 cidadania em geral, o que contribuiria para que suas opiniões fossem irracionais,
48 manipuláveis ou imediatistas. A curto prazo, nos casos que pressionam por respostas a
49 ameaças iminentes, o tempo necessário para o debate democrático impossibilitaria a
50 tomada de decisões tempestivas. Sem embargo, estes argumentos são autorreferentes
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3 e ignoram (i) o fato de que o debate democrático poderia servir para ampliar e redefinir
4 os próprios objetivos das políticas exteriores a longo prazo (Nincic, 1992 citado em
5 Villas e Tostes, 2006), (ii) a comprovação empírica da mobilização existente nos
6 congressos (Martin 2000) (iii) que mesmo no executivo, a conformação do conteúdo da
7 política exterior não é concentrada (Pinheiro e Milani, 2013), (iv) que a opinião pública
8 exerce pressão sobre o processo decisório (Holsti, 1992).
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11 A defesa da singularidade da política externa devido a sua complexidade não é capaz
12 de apresentar evidências que diferenciem a política externa das demais políticas
13 públicas neste aspecto. Ignora, por exemplo, o debate sobre a impossibilidade de
14 proporcionar, desde uma lógica técnica-racional ou setorial, respostas satisfatórias aos
15 “problemas malditos” (Brugué et al, 2011).^{iv} Paradoxalmente, segundo esta literatura, a
16 complexidade determina a ausência de uma única melhor solução e, por tanto, requer
17 mais deliberação do que conhecimento especializado. Em outras palavras, é o diálogo,
18 baseado em regras e procedimentos deliberativos, que permite que cidadania e
19 formuladores de políticas cheguem a juízos morais e alternativas políticas
20 compartilhadas (Majone 1989).
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23 Outro debate relevante para o entendimento da relação entre política externa e
24 democracia diz respeito as transformações que a globalização impõem ao papel dos
25 Estados. Held (2006) aponta para o fato de que o debate sobre democracia tem dado
26 por garantida a equivalência entre Estado - território- soberania. Segundo o autor, a
27 teoria democrática não há formulado adequadamente sobre as implicações da
28 dissociação entre essas dimensões e os impactos da governança e processos
29 decisórios no âmbito das organizações internacionais, a extensão do direito
30 internacional e crescimento do transnacionalismo em âmbitos como a cultura e o meio-
31 ambiente. Essas dinâmicas desafiam as premissas da teoria democrática para a
32 delimitação da comunidade baseada em um território (demos) (Held, 1999, Sørensen,
33 2006).
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36 Não obstante, desde uma perspectiva que advoga por uma visão mais dialética da
37 relação dos impactos da globalização no papel dos Estados, podemos listar os
38 argumentos: (i) a cessão de autoridade do Estado para os níveis de governança supra
39 ou interestatais possibilita que os processos regionais e globais sejam submetidos ao
40 controle político dos Estados, que seguem como os atores centrais da construção de
41 normas e organizações multilaterais; (ii) a soberania é uma instituição legal, que
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3 compreende independência constitucional e capacidade regulatória; (iii) não existe um
4 *democracia* internacional fora dos limites dos Estados (Sørensen, 2006); (iv) não existiu
5 nunca um passado “glorioso” do Estado, no qual este tenha sido capaz de manter
6 controle absoluto sobre fluxos transfronteiriços (Badie, 2009).
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10 Assim, apesar da globalização e do aumento da interdependência econômica
11 exercerem impacto na soberania dos Estados, este é ainda considerado o melhor
12 candidato para ocupar o lugar de ponto focal das decisões de âmbito internacional e
13 multilateral e proporcionar assim espaço para controle democrático. Cobram sentido,
14 por tanto, as demandas - teóricas e da práxis - por uma maior politização e legitimidade
15 doméstica das agendas de política externa, já que estas proporcionam um dos poucos
16 pontos onde é possível conjugar agência, controle democrático e responsabilidade
17 deste mundo interconectado (Hill, 2003b).
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24 **Uma análise da qualidade democrática da participação na política externa** 25 **brasileira** 26

27 Para analisar a qualidade da participação na política externa brasileira assumimos como
28 ponto de partida analítico as seguintes premissas sobre seu processo decisório: (i) toda
29 a estrutura do Poder Executivo apresenta, normativamente, competências para definir
30 agenda, formular e implementar política externa (Silva, Spécie e Vitale 2010); (ii) a
31 crescente “internacionalização” de partes da estrutura estatal brasileira se dá de forma
32 atomizada para responder à dinâmica e multifacetada agenda global (Hirst, 2011), (iii) o
33 poder de agência de atores governamentais e não governamentais para além do
34 Ministério de Relações Exteriores cresceu (Pinheiro e Milani 2011), trazendo consigo
35 diferentes interpretações sobre as agendas internacionais, o papel do Estado e
36 oportunidades e constrangimentos a nível internacional.
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44 Diante dos elementos elencados, a questão central que se impõe é: se a legitimidade
45 política das decisões não se sustenta na defesa de um interesse nacional unívoco,
46 dado que este é inexistente, mas sim do exercício da democracia em sua formulação;
47 como fazer transparecer a pluralidade dos interesses em disputa e promover a
48 construção democrática dos sentidos da política externa junto a *constituencies*
49 domésticas?
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54 Nesse sentido e assumindo a política externa como política pública é possível construir
55 pontes com as produções sobre as instituições participativas brasileiras. A escala e a
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relação cada vez mais estreita entre participação cidadã e políticas públicas instigaram, na última década, uma agenda de pesquisa nacional que busca avançar além do consenso normativo sobre o valor democrático da participação cidadã e lança luzes sobre desafios já conhecidos para as instituições participativas domésticas. Considerando que os representantes da cidadania nas instâncias participativas têm autoridade para influenciar um amplo espectro de questões governamentais em todos os níveis administrativos da federação, questões como a representatividade (Lavalle, et al 2006; Avritzer, 2007) e a contribuição efetiva destas instâncias emergem no centro do debate sobre as políticas públicas (Avritzer, 2011; Pires, 2011, Pogrebinski e Samuels, 2014).

Também ocupa parte expressiva da literatura democrática contemporânea questões concernentes à qualidade deliberativa desses espaços e suas potencialidades em resgatar a democracia como ideia de vida em comunidade (Dewey, 1927:48) ou, como democracia forte (Barber, 2004), frente às debilidades de um sistema representativo baseado em uma ideia de democracia de caráter instrumental e liberal. Ainda o desenho institucional ou organização da participação e sua relação com a efetividade das instituições participativas é também objeto de análise e discussão da literatura que se ocupa das democracias participativas (Fung e Wright, 2003; Avritzer, 2008).

Para tanto serão analisados, para as diferentes iniciativas participativas no marco da política externa brasileira, critérios como: quem participa das iniciativas (extensão da participação, grau de abertura e método de seleção, representatividade dos participantes frente ao universo de grupos interessados), como se dá essa participação (metodologias utilizadas, se são processuais ou pontuais, qualidade da informação proporcionada, grau de participação – informação, consulta ou deliberação); institucionalidade da participação (se conta com algum grau de formalização institucional, seja regulamento ou, ao menos regularidade, lócus institucional, desenho e origem da iniciativa).^v Além disso, as motivações principais que explicam o impulso da iniciativa são analisadas, entendendo que estas determinam formatos e resultados da participação (Pomeroy, 2009).

Participação da sociedade civil na Política Externa Brasileira

O processo de adaptação a um novo contexto levou o Itamaraty a construir novos canais de diálogo com a sociedade civil (Mesquita, 2012). Entretanto, não está claro se esse processo responde a existência de uma diretriz coerente. Por um lado, tem-se o

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3 conceito de diplomacia pública, presente no documento interno “Reflexões sobre a
4 Política Externa Brasileira” (1993) e orientador de ações de transparência e
5 comunicação através do site homônimo do MRE (criado em 2013). Por outro, não existe
6 uma mensagem clara sobre como essas diretrizes se traduzem em ações de abertura à
7 participação da sociedade civil.^{vi}

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11 Nas últimas duas décadas foram estabelecidas uma miríade de iniciativas de diálogos
12 de formatos diversos, pontuais ou mais constantes, que abarcam aspectos variados da
13 atuação diplomática brasileira, porém nem sempre levadas adiante exclusivamente pelo
14 Itamaraty.^{vii} Alguns dos formatos identificados são grupos de trabalho, reuniões
15 informais, seminários, comitês, seções nacionais de consulta, conselhos empresariais e,
16 mais recentemente, consultas públicas. Vale destacar que alguns desses são
17 procedimentos comuns a participação da sociedade civil em outras política públicas
18 brasileiras, que também incluem audiências públicas, conselhos e conferências
19 nacionais (Brasil 2012). Entretanto, o debate sobre participação no Brasil, raramente
20 considera os âmbitos da política externa e vice-versa.

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29 Ainda, a participação da sociedade civil pode dar-se também diretamente em âmbito
30 internacional, em coordenação com a burocracia diplomática, como no caso do
31 Mercosul (Foro Consultivo Econômico-Social do Mercosul, Redes Especializadas) ou da
32 CPLP (Fórum da Sociedade Civil da Comunidade dos Países da Língua Portuguesa).

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45 Para dar conta de entender o atual estado da qualidade democrática da participação na
46 política externa, buscou-se analisar três âmbitos da política externa brasileira. A análise
47 por âmbitos permite uma visão mais ampla da participação, sem se focar em
48 mecanismos pontuais ou em temáticas específicas que possam representar dinâmicas
49 particulares. Finalmente, a existência de estudos prévios que analisam a interlocução
50 entre governo e sociedade contribui para a definição dos três âmbitos.

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60 No caso da participação nas negociações multilaterais de comércio, a maior parte da
literatura se centra nas preferências e formas de atuação de grupos de interesse do
setor privado e organizações da sociedade civil, analisando as condições domésticas e
externas para explicar posições e resultados das negociações de acordo com as
preferencias de cada grupo. Influenciadas pela teoria de jogos de dois níveis (Putman,
1988), as produções analisam também questões como credibilidade, legitimidade e
poder de barganha desde uma perspectiva focada nas negociações no âmbito das

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3 organizações internacionais (Veiga 2007; Carvalho 2010; Santana 2001; Oliveira e
4 Milani 2012; Carvalho 2003).

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7 Não obstante, proporcionam elementos para entender o formato de diálogo
8 estabelecido entre atores não governamentais e burocracia diplomática. Como
9 principais características da participação destacam-se (i) informalidade, baixa
10 institucionalização e discricionariedade da burocracia diplomática respeito a abertura de
11 canais de participação – em relação a quem convidar, quando convocar, sobre qual
12 agendas e definição de formatos (ii) escassas informações proporcionadas pela
13 burocracia diplomática; (iii) carácter informativo ou consultivo das iniciativas; (iv) baixa
14 representatividade dos participantes convidados pelo Executivo; (v) busca por
15 legitimidade de posições pré-estabelecidas pelas burocracias (Veiga 2007, Carvalho,
16 2003, Santana 2001; Farias e Ramanzini Júnior 2010). Finalmente, ainda que
17 estabelecer relações de causalidade e atribuir a efetividade da participação no conteúdo
18 final das negociações seja desafiante, parece ser unânime a avaliação - dentre os
19 estudos sobre o tema – sobre a baixa capacidade de influência que esses canais de
20 diálogo exerceram sobre as posições brasileiras (Veiga, 2007; Santana, 2001; Carvalho
21 2010).

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23 Respeito ao carácter discricionário e informal, a produção acerca do tema identifica que a
24 assimetria de informações entre representantes diplomáticos e atores não
25 governamentais contribui para que o poder de definição de agenda se concentrasse no
26 governo. Essa situação era particularmente relevante no início dos anos 90, momento
27 em que se dão as primeiras iniciativas de diálogo. Nesse sentido, setores empresariais,
28 movimentos sociais e sindicatos buscaram estratégias autônomas para superar a
29 dependência de informações do governo. No caso dos atores da sociedade civil, seu
30 histórico de articulação internacional contribui para que acessassem informações junto
31 à redes transnacionais de movimentos e sindicatos. O setor empresarial, por sua vez,
32 se organizou domesticamente para gerar conhecimento e expertise necessários para
33 uma atuação mais informada junto ao governo (Carvalho, 2010)

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Esse processo também gerou novas institucionalidades, como a criação da Coalizão
Empresarial Brasileiro (CEB), do Fórum Permanente de Negociações Agrícolas
Internacionais, da Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos (REBRIP), que contribuiu
para maior representatividade nas instâncias de diálogo, que eram conformadas a partir
de convites feito pelo Itamaraty sem definição de critérios de representatividade

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3 (Santana, 2001, Carvalho, 2003, Oliveira e Milani, 2012; Veiga, 2007). Outro aspecto
4 relevante identificado pelas produções diz respeito ao fato dos diálogos se estenderem
5 para outros ministérios, como por exemplo para o Ministério de Agricultura e Pecuária,
6 Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e
7 Comércio e Ministério do Meio Ambiente, impondo desafios a questão de coordenação
8 por parte do MRE (Veiga, 2007; Carvalho, 2013).
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13 No caso das negociações internacionais sobre temáticas sociais, identificam-se
14 similaridades com relação a discricionariedade, informalidade, escassez de
15 informações, caráter consultivo e informativo dos canais abertos e falta de critérios de
16 representatividade para participantes. Não obstante a motivação central identificada é a
17 legitimidade diante do sistema internacional e resposta à recomendação do próprio
18 sistema ONU com relação a necessidade de estabelecer processos participativos
19 (Mesquita, 2012), assim como a mobilização existente na própria sociedade civil
20 (Santoro, 2012).
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27 Marcado por um momento inicial de resistência e desconfiança do governo brasileiro em
28 abrir canais de diálogo, a participação nas rodadas temáticas consolida-se através de
29 reuniões informais e seminários informativos. A incorporação de representantes da
30 sociedade civil nas delegações negociadoras ainda não é uma prática consolidada e,
31 muitas vezes, o diálogo durante as negociações acontece por iniciativa própria de
32 algumas organizações que dispõem de recursos para acompanhar o processo de
33 maneira autônoma, aliado a obtenção de informações junto a redes internacionais da
34 sociedade civil. Mais recentemente, o Itamaraty estabeleceu uma consulta para o
35 processo de preparação da contribuição brasileira ao novo acordo sob a Convenção-
36 Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima (2014), aberta a indivíduos e
37 organizações sociais de todo o país para contribuírem online via questionário e reuniões
38 presenciais, indicando uma mudança no sentido de estabelecer formatos mais
39 estruturados de participação. Entretanto, essa não é ainda uma prática consolidada, tal
40 como demonstra o processo sobre a Agenda Pós-2015, que apesar de petições formais
41 por parte de amplo espectro da sociedade civil, com forte liderança da Associação
42 Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (ABONG), não contou com processo
43 estruturado de participação dentro do calendário de negociações internacionais.
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48 A participação no âmbito da integração regional pode acontecer diretamente nas
49 instituições regionais, ou no âmbito doméstico, através do Programa Mercosul Social
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3 Participativo, coordenado pela Secretaria Geral da Presidência e pelo MRE, que
4 estabelece de diálogo permanente entre governo e sociedade civil sobre os temas da
5 integração no Mercosul. O programa, ainda que apresente desafios relacionados à
6 qualidade democrática (Ramanzini Júnior e Farias, 2015), conta com maior
7 institucionalização, representatividade e diversidade dos participantes. Instituído por
8 decreto presidencial em 2008, conta com um Conselho, reuniões periódicas e uma
9 proposta de regulamento que prevê composição e funcionamento. Representantes
10 delegados da sociedade civil podem participar e encaminhar propostas para as Cúpulas
11 Presidenciais do Mercosul.
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14 O fato que o Mercosul conte com espaços formais de participação seguramente
15 influenciou a necessidade de estabelecer um espaço doméstico de coordenação de
16 posições da sociedade civil brasileira (Mesquita, 2013). O consenso sobre a
17 necessidade de envolvimento das sociedades para o aprofundamento da integração e
18 cooperação regional também contribui para a abertura à sociedade civil (Ramanzini
19 Júnior e Farias 2015). Vale ressaltar também que a Secretaria Geral da Presidência é o
20 órgão responsável pela participação social no Executivo Federal e, portanto, além de
21 acumular experiência e conhecimento específico sobre a matéria, sua própria missão
22 contribui para uma concepção de participação mais elaborada e abrangente.
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25 Ainda, com relação ao Mercosul merece destaque a participação da sociedade civil no
26 âmbito da Reunião Especializada sobre Agricultura Familiar (REAF), reconhecidamente
27 uma das instâncias mais abertas à participação social (Alemany e Leandro, 2006). A
28 REAF surge como confluência dos interesses do governo brasileiro e um grupo de
29 sindicatos rurais e movimentos do campo (Bülow e Carvalho 2012). Para o governo
30 brasileiro, em especial os Ministérios de Desenvolvimento Agrário e Relações
31 Exteriores, a REAF contribuiria a conferir coerência à política externa no que diz
32 respeito as suas interfaces nacional - de políticas de apoio à agricultura familiar – e
33 internacional – ao apresentar alternativas ao modelo de integração regional proposto no
34 âmbito das negociações da Área de Livre Comércio, então em andamento. Para as
35 organizações sociais brasileiras mobilizadas em incidir no processo de integração
36 regional, a REAF representa uma oportunidade de fortalecimento de suas agendas e
37 ampliação do seus espaços de incidência política, com repercussão para além do
38 âmbito regional.
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3 Finalmente, no âmbito da Cooperação Sul-Sul para o desenvolvimento, identificam-se
4 diferentes – e incipientes - modalidades de participação da sociedade civil, tais como: (i)
5 sociedade civil como executora de projetos – seja a partir de convite do governo ou a
6 partir de estratégias próprias com apoio do governo (Schmitz, 2014; Marcolini, 2014;
7 Suyama e Pomeroy, 2014); (ii) organização autônoma de iniciativas produção e difusão
8 de informação para opinião pública e especializada com finalidade de controle e
9 monitoramento da política de cooperação em sua integralidade (Ciommo e Amorim,
10 2015; Leite et al, 2014; Marcolini, 2014); (iii) participação da sociedade civil em
11 iniciativas específicas de cooperação promovida pelas instâncias governamentais (Leite
12 et al, 2015).^{viii}

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14 Nesta última modalidade, a participação é quase inexistente e dispersa entre os
15 ministérios que promovem as iniciativas. Em alguns casos, a sociedade civil organizada
16 é chamada para compartilhar, pontualmente, sua experiência no marco de projetos
17 específicos (Santos, 2013). Por conta do caráter disperso e descentralizado da
18 Cooperação Sul-Sul brasileira (Leite et al, 2014), é esperado que a participação da
19 sociedade civil responda a diferentes concepções sobre sua finalidade e adquira
20 diferentes formatos (Milani, 2008; Pomeroy, 2009). Uma exceção à regra é o caso do
21 Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (CONSEA), que participou
22 regularmente de reuniões no marco do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos África,
23 promovido pela Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome do
24 MRE junto ao Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social (Beghin, 2014; Leite et al, 2015).
25 Nesse caso, vale destacar que a participação se ancora no Plano Nacional de
26 Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional, que explicita a participação social no âmbito de
27 negociações internacionais e projetos de cooperação internacional (PAA Africa 2015)

28 Reflexões

29 A breve revisão de algumas iniciativas de participação no âmbito das agendas de
30 política externa indica a inexistência de diretrizes e critérios para a conformação de
31 iniciativas de diálogo com a sociedade civil, que se caracterizam em grande parte por
32 sua informalidade, baixa institucionalização e discricionariedade. Como consequência,
33 identificam-se uma série de limitações à qualidade da participação, como a assimetria
34 de informações, falta de metodologias estruturadas e transparentes e falta de critérios
35 concernentes a diversidade e representatividade dos participantes.

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Constata-se que variedade de atores do executivo que contribuem à abertura à participação da sociedade civil em agendas da política externa, imprimem diferentes concepções de participação que refletem-se em diferentes formatos. Sem ânimo de estabelecer relações de causalidade, é possível identificar um conjunto de evidências que indicam que a abertura ao diálogo com a sociedade civil vem respondendo à fatores domésticos e internacionais próprios de cada temática em questão, assim como das capacidades e estratégias de mobilização dos setores não governamentais.

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Ainda há muito espaço para a análise sobre a participação da sociedade civil na política externa e percebe-se um crescente interesse pela temática na agenda de pesquisa de internacionalistas. Futuras investigações poderiam promover um diálogo mais estruturado com a extensa produção brasileira sobre instituições participativas e analisar mais profundamente as iniciativas de participação no âmbito da política externa. Nesse sentido, alguns dos aspectos levantados por essa literatura dizem respeito à efetividade da participação e influência exercida nas decisões e às formas de representação exercidas no âmbito da sociedade civil nas agendas de política exterior.

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Outro campo de análise diz respeito ao entendimento sobre como a ação externa da sociedade civil conflui em suas estratégias perante a política externa. Nesse sentido, considerando que os estudos sobre ativismo e movimentos sociais transnacionais apontam para a arena internacional como um contínuo das estruturas de oportunidade política (Tarrow, 2005; Keck e Sikkink, 1998) seria possível estabelecer pontes entre os campos de pesquisas sobre ação coletiva e a Análise de Política Externa, entendendo que o primeiro oferece uma série de ferramentas analíticas que podem contribuir para o entendimento do papel da sociedade civil, em geral, relegado pelo segundo, cujo foco central segue sendo o Estado e os atores governamentais (Salomón e Pinheiro 2013).

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ⁱⁱ Não seria possível referir-se à representatividade sem mencionar o papel do legislativo. Não obstante, o foco principal da presente análise reside em estabelecer diálogos com a produção que, no campo da teoria democrática, se ocupa da participação da sociedade civil como existência de processos deliberativos que reúnam a representantes da sociedade civil e do governo executivo, visando influenciar a formulação e implementação de políticas e programas governamentais, no marco de uma democracia representativa. Para uma revisão da produção sobre a participação do legislativo brasileiro na política externa ver Figueira (2009).

ⁱⁱⁱ Isso não significa que o MRE não siga sendo ator central na definição e formulação da política externa, mas sim que não é mais ator exclusivo do processo (Pinheiro e Milani, 2013). No âmbito das competências constitucionais em matéria de Política Externa, pouco foi alterado com a constituição democrática de 1988 (Sanchez et al 2006), mantendo o Poder Executivo como ator central. Não obstante, essa proporcionou princípios generalistas para a ação do Estado em política internacional que impactaram na capacidade de ação dos diversos atores dentro dos poderes Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário, contribuindo para que o processo decisório sobre ação internacional estivesse também nos marcos de democratização das políticas públicas levadas adiantes por outros órgãos (Milani, 2011).

^{iv} Do inglês *wicked problems*, são aqueles problemas caracterizados pela incerteza e interdependência das dimensões que os configuram e a diversidade de atores, valores e interesses envolvidos. (Heald e Alford, citado em Brugué et al, 2011)

^v Critérios adaptados de Parés & Castellà (2009), Arnstein (1969), Brugué (2009).

^{vi} Tampouco existe uma clareza conceitual sobre o termo na literatura, que aborda o conceito desde o prisma de abertura ao diálogo com a sociedade civil, ou entes subnacionais ou ainda como estratégia de posicionamento midiático nacional e internacional (Snow 2009).

^{vii} Não há informação sistematizada sobre as diversas iniciativas de diálogo com atores não governamentais empreendidas pelo Ministério de Relações Exteriores. Para além das iniciativas tratadas nesse artigo, porém sem pretensão de configurar-se como uma lista extensiva citam-se: Diálogos sobre Política Externa (2014); consulta para subsidiar o processo de preparação da "contribuição nacionalmente determinada" levada às negociações no âmbito da Convenção-Quadro das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima (2014); reuniões em torno da agenda do BRICS; Grupo Interministerial de Trabalho sobre Comércio Internacional de Mercadorias e de Serviços (GICI); seções nacionais de consulta (SENALCA e SENEUROPA); Comitê Empresarial Permanente do MRE. Ainda, conjuntamente com a Secretaria Geral da Presidência identificam-se o "Encontro Política Externa, Diálogo Social e Participação Cidadã" (2011) e

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junto ao Ministério de Meio Ambiente, as “Consultas com a Sociedade Civil Internacional: Rumo à Rio+20” (2011).

^{viii} Destacam-se ainda iniciativas da sociedade civil que não contam com o apoio do governo, conformando o que vem se conceitualizando como “cooperação ativista”, para esses casos ver Marcolini (2014) e Berrón e Brant (2015). Finalmente, outro campo de análise relacionado diz respeito às articulações da sociedade civil brasileira junto a parceiros de outros países que têm como foco promover resistência a projetos de cooperação promovidos pelo governo brasileiro, tendo como caso emblemático a aliança entre movimentos sociais brasileiros e moçambicanos e suas atividades contenciosas perante ao projeto de cooperação trilateral Prosavana. Mesmo partindo da premissa que essa atuação transnacional da sociedade civil reflete em suas estratégias domésticas de influência na política exterior, não conforma parte da análise pois o foco aqui estabelecido se restringe à participação no âmbito doméstico.

**ANEXO 2. LEITE, I. C., POMEROY, M., SUYAMA, B. (2015)
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BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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Abstract: The article analyses domestic and external drivers of the rise of South–South development cooperation to a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations. It argues that the rise was a consequence of presidential leadership, growing domestic mobilisation, shifts in the global political economy and the prioritisation of South–South development cooperation by traditional donors. It explores the case of the Ministry of Social Development cooperation with Africa, focusing on two experiences—the Bolsa Família and the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme. Although the ministry’s partnership with traditional donors remained constant, there was increased domestic leadership in the food purchase programme. © 2015 UNU-WIDER. *Journal of International Development* published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: South–South development cooperation; social development; Brazil; Africa; international organisations; foreign policy analysis

1 INTRODUCTION

Political theories on foreign aid have treated it as driven by donors’ diplomatic, economic and/or moral objectives (Morgenthau, 1962; Black, 1968; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). Few of them have explored foreign aid decision-making as resulting from a complex interaction between actors and dynamics inside and outside donor countries. New approaches have started filling such a gap by analysing, for instance,

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the influence of northern donors' domestic institutions, ideas and interests in decision-making on the allocation of aid (Lancaster, 2007). However, there is a need to better understand how domestic drivers operate in the case of emerging donors and how they interact with international actors and dynamics. This article aims at contributing to the literature by analysing domestic and external drivers of the rise of South–South development cooperation to a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations (2003–2006 and 2007–2010).

The term South–South cooperation has been broadly used to refer to practices such as coalitions aimed at enhancing the bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations (Lechini, 2009; Ayllón, 2011), trade and investments (Bobiash, 1992; UNDP, 2011), technological and scientific cooperation (Ohiorhenua & Rath, 2000; Lechini, 2009), regional integration (UNDP, 2011; Ayllón, Ojeda, & Surasky, 2014) and South–South aid (Bobiash, 1992) or South–South development cooperation. The latter is understood as an intersection between international development cooperation and South–South cooperation, encompassing flows of technical cooperation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans among developing countries aimed at tackling primary development problems.¹

It is important to stress, however, that there is no consensus among providers of South–South cooperation on its conceptual and operational definitions. For instance, China adopts the expression 'foreign aid' (China, 2011), accounting for grants given at rates inferior than the ones measured by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Lengyel & Malacalza, 2011). Brazil, on the other hand, adopts the expression 'development cooperation', which accounts for non-disbursable flows only (IPEA, ABC, 2010).

Brazilian contributions to development cooperation multiplied by more than five between 2005 and 2010 (IPEA, ABC, 2010, 2014). Brazil became a reference for traditional donors (international organisations and DAC donors) because of its development trajectory in the 2000s and identification with liberal values defended by the western community and, also, for Brazil's principles of solidarity, demand drivenness, non-conditionality and non-interference in partners' domestic affairs.² At the same time, there has been unprecedented domestic mobilisation and dispute around the country's South–South development cooperation and foreign policy and the role Brazil should play at the global economic and political architecture (Leite, Suyama, Waisbich, & Pomeroy, 2014).

This article argues that South–South development cooperation became a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations not only as a result of decisions made by traditional foreign policy decision-making institutions in Brazil, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidency, but also as a consequence of growing mobilisation and disputes between domestic institutions and interest groups, shifts in the global political economy

¹Defining South–South development cooperation as efforts 'aimed at tackling primary development problems' can be interpreted in different ways, as the decision regarding what constitutes a primary development problem is political and variable. To complicate matters further, separating the idea of South–South development cooperation from the web of relationships of South–South cooperation may give us a very incomplete understanding of interests and mutual gains, as well as the integrative results and impact of initiatives.

²Such principles result mainly from the Brazilian government's self-perceptions as a receiver of cooperation. The discourse on solidarity, however, gained ground since the Workers' Party has been in power from 2003 onwards, but it has also been influenced by the mobilisation of civil society organisations in foreign policy issues (Leite *et al.*, 2014).

and the prioritisation of South–South development cooperation in the agenda of traditional donors.

In order to further develop such an argument, the case of South–South development cooperation between the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS, in Portuguese) and Africa is explored.³ The continent became the top destination of resources allocated under the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in Portuguese) since the years that followed the creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, in 1996. Although cooperation in social development did not figure among the leading areas of ABC's sectorial resource allocation, the number of initiatives in that sector has grown in the period 2002–2005 compared with previous periods (Iglesias Puente, 2010), and other resources were mobilised to support specific programmes.

Foreign policy analysis is used as the main theoretical-analytical tool. Foreign policy analysis, a subarea of both international relations and political science, explains 'factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers' (Hudson, 2005: 2), by taking into account, although not exclusively (Salomón & Pinheiro, 2013), an analysis of external and internal drivers to decision-making (Hermann, 1990, cited in Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Milner, 1997; Putnam, 1988). Foreign policy in Brazil is understood to be an increasingly contested field in which various actors mobilise to influence decision-making, thus downplaying the traditional role played by the diplomatic bureaucracy in the country's foreign policy (Pinheiro & Milani, 2013).

In order to analyse domestic actors and dynamics, this paper draws on public policy analysis and, in particular, the policy cycle and policy arena approaches, to unpack the role played by domestic institutions, interests groups, ideas and policy entrepreneurs⁴ in decision-making (Souza, 2006). Additionally, a policy-lending lens is used to shed light on the relation between domestic mobilisation to 'export' policies to other developing countries and political objectives related to strengthening the legitimacy of such policies domestically (Morais, 2011).

To account for the external dynamics, shifts in global political economy and in the aid architecture that influenced Brazilian South–South development cooperation and traditional donors engaged in triangular and multi-stakeholder initiatives with the country will be explored. Drawing from world system theory (Wallerstein, 2004), Brazil is approached as a semi-peripheral country. According to that theory, relations between semi-periphery and periphery tend to be closer in cycles of contraction in the global economy, pressuring semi-peripheral countries, for instance, to look for markets in the periphery as a means to overcome decreased commercial access to central economies (Carlsson, 1982). That does not mean, however, that relations between semi-periphery and periphery will necessarily reproduce centre–periphery logic, as middle powers tend to develop multiple and apparently conflicting strategies resulting from their heterogeneous domestic, social and economic structure and from 'cross-purposes resulting from the diversity of objectives and interests at stake in the international system and from the imbalance in their [Middle powers'] power resources' (Lima, 1990: 11).

³Although initiatives involving MDS analysed in this article are mainly focused on technical cooperation—that is, the sharing of experiences and public policies with Africa—the authors chose to use the term 'South–South development cooperation', as Brazilian technical cooperation is intertwined with other modalities, such as contributions to international organisations, financial cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

⁴Policy entrepreneurs are individuals, organisations or networks that seek to initiate dynamic policy change (Mintrom apud Stone, 2001).

Lastly, the article takes into consideration that the international development cooperation field has been dependent on a 'political market' (Milhorance, 2013) for solutions that have been dominated by traditional donors (King & McGrath, 2004). Decisions on which solutions will be chosen depend simply not only on their effectiveness but also on the distribution of power in the international system in a given moment and its impact on global governance structures. International organisations and other donors are understood as bureaucracies that tend to find new strategies when solutions previously defended by them are questioned, thus guaranteeing their existence (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

The article is structured in three sections. The first section maps the dynamics leading to the rise of South–South development cooperation and analyses Brazil's trajectory in particular. The second section explores how South–South development cooperation involving MDS and African countries has shifted, both thematically and in terms of its strategies. The conclusion summarises the article's findings and suggests areas for future research.

2 CONTEXTUALISING BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC TRAJECTORIES

After having experienced a phase of demobilisation in the 1980s and 1990s (Lechini, 2006; Morais, 2009), South–South cooperation has re-emerged in the 2000s as a multifaceted force in international relations, and South–South development cooperation gained renewed prominence in the global agenda. This section maps internal and external dynamics that have influenced such prominence and analyses Brazil's trajectory in South–South development cooperation, contextualising the priority given to this area under the Lula administrations.

The emergence of progressive governments in several southern countries, Brazil among them, has led to the reinstatement of the role of the state in development (Morais, 2009). As a result, policies targeted at social inclusion were launched in many countries, and in some cases, their exportation to other developing countries was used as an instrument to increase their legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011). Economic and geopolitical objectives are also stressed by the literature as drivers of emerging donors' engagement in South–South development cooperation (Ecosoc, 2008; Rowlands, 2008), converging with what has been pointed by analysts as a more pragmatic character of South–South cooperation (Lima, 2008; Abdenur, 2009; Ayllón, 2011).

Traditional donors also prioritised support to South–South development cooperation in a context characterised by efforts to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development cooperation, in response to criticism by southern governments and social movements regarding the impact of neoliberal conditionality-based policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s (structural adjustment programmes, in particular). South–South 'knowledge exchange' became a means to promote social development policies and an allegedly more horizontal environment in development cooperation. For instance, in 1999, the World Bank created the Global Development Network, aimed at fostering the transfer of 'best practices' between developing countries (Morais, 2009).

The international context was also characterised by a 'revolution' brought about by the emergence of new actors, especially China, in development cooperation (Woods, 2008; Severino & Ray, 2009). Focused on infrastructure, Chinese cooperation challenged values

traditionally held by western donors and, consequently, their priorities, advice and prescriptions (Humphrey & Messner, 2006).⁵ At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 2011), the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness incorporated a new focus on the role of the private sector and economic growth in development, shifting the agenda from official development assistance to development finance (Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2013).

That was the general context in which South–South development cooperation gained prominence in Brazil. Nonetheless, it is also necessary to analyse it as part of the country's particular trajectory. Brazil's involvement in South–South development cooperation dates back to late 1960s and early 1970s (Cervo, 1994; Valler Filho, 2007; Vaz & Inoue, 2008). Backed by political and economic purposes designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁶ Brazilian involvement in South–South development cooperation did not emanate from particular strategies designed by implementing agencies but was mediated by traditional donors that had provided them with cooperation, thus replicating received cooperation in third countries (Leite, 2013).⁷

In the first half of the 1980s, in a context marked by economic crisis, access to developed countries' knowledge and technology becomes a priority. However, Brazil continued to provide cooperation mainly with the financial support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (Iglesias Puente, 2010). The persistence of such initiatives resulted from a knock-on effect of Brazilian diplomatic activism in the 1970s, increasing participation of domestic implementing institutions in international spaces and growing international diffusion of their experiences, and advances in the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.⁸ The repercussions of the global economic crisis in Brazil would compel its government to confer a renewed focus to South–South cooperation (Valler Filho, 2007) and to its relations with peripheral countries.

In 1996, 22 middle-income countries, including Brazil, were elevated by the United Nations High Committee on South–South cooperation as pivot countries in South–South development cooperation. As a Brazilian diplomat has put it, 'those emerging and "graduated" countries (...) were assigned with a new role: being the protagonists of South–South cooperation' (Iglesias Puente, 2010: 83).

The strategic character of the involvement in South–South development cooperation, in both domestic decision-making and implementing agencies, became more visible

⁵The prominence of ideas focused on the social dimensions of development, which emerged in the 1970s with the basic human needs approach (Lancaster, 2007), was strengthened with the launching of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000s. The emergence of different approaches does result not only from technical decisions based on lessons learnt but also from the mobilisation and feasibility of solutions proposed by a growing number of official and non-governmental organisations engaged in international development in a context marked by opposition from political coalitions at home to foreign aid (which tend to grow stronger in periods marked by economic downturns).

⁶Valler Filho states that '... Brazilian diplomacy started using international cooperation actions driven by political motives in order to guarantee and disseminate the country's image not only in Latin America, but also with an emphasis on the new African frontier, due to the independence process in former colonies. (...) the cooperation provided would be an instrument of foreign policy aimed at both political and economic objectives. Brazil was asserted as an emerging power, closely linked to export promotion and the opening of markets for Brazilian consultants and equipment' (Valler Filho, 2007: 68).

⁷Diplomats leading ABC were conscious of such dynamics and argued with UNDP that the best national experiences to be shared with other countries were not the ones that received development cooperation but the ones Brazil 'has developed by its own means, with or without the support from developed countries' (Ferreira Dutra apud Iglesias Puente, 2010: 329–330).

⁸The Buenos Aires Plan of Action resulted from the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (Buenos Aires, 1978).

under the Lula administrations. The agenda gained unprecedented attention from the presidency,⁹ as well as from several government agencies and civil society organisations pressuring for transparency and participation in foreign policy decision-making and the allocation of South–South development cooperation. Implementing agencies started assuming a proactive role in diffusing their experience and in the creation of demand by partners (Iglesias Puente, 2010). Therefore, domestic drivers to Brazilian South–South development cooperation started having a bigger influence than in previous periods.

Brazil's provision of development cooperation also started to be measured and classified in different modalities: technical, scientific and technological, educational, humanitarian and financial contributions to multilateral organisations (IPEA, ABC, 2010). Each of these modalities involves overlapping and, in some cases, opaque, institutional frameworks. For instance, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, technical cooperation is coordinated by ABC, but the General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFOME, in Portuguese) is also involved in that modality. Other ministries and official agencies also started allocating part of their own budget to technical cooperation.

It is important to note that the increasing role of Brazil in South–South development cooperation was not accompanied by institutional reforms, such as the design of a national legal framework to support it. A Brazilian diplomat has pointed out that

[...] there is no legal norm that clearly defines distinctions between financial cooperation and technical cooperation [...] and that unequivocally establishes its scope, principles, aims, instruments of action, delimitation of competencies and inter-ministerial or inter-institutional coordination mechanisms [...] (Iglesias Puente, 2010: 135).

In the face of constraints imposed by national laws concerning public procurement, budgetary execution and payments abroad, technical cooperation initiatives have relied on international organizations and traditional donors for their operationalization.

Focusing analysis in particular sectors and geographic regions helps to shed more light on how the interaction among domestic and external dynamics has influenced the profile of Brazilian cooperation. In the case of South–South development cooperation in social development, Iglesias Puente (2010) notes that it was mainly implemented by Brazilian non-governmental organisations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administrations (1995–1998 and 1999–2002). In a context marked by the elevation of the *Bolsa Escola* programme¹⁰ to 'best practice' by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and UNDP (Morais, 2009), the Brazilian non-governmental organisation *Missão Criança* supported the creation of similar programmes in Latin American and Africa.

While domestic coalitions supporting *Bolsa Escola* and minimum income programmes have used the promotion of their ideas abroad as an instrument to earn legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011), the role of the presidency was less visible. Cardoso's diplomatic speeches rarely mentioned South–South development cooperation, despite the rise in the number of

⁹Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) emphasise that South–South relations were part of Lula's foreign strategy of searching for autonomy through diversification of partnerships.

¹⁰*Bolsa Escola* was a cash transfer programme conditional on school attendance. It was implemented in two Brazilian cities in 1995 (Campinas and Brasília) and became a national programme in 2001.

cooperation actions during his administrations (Iglesias Puente, 2010); in such cases, social development was among the issues raised.¹¹

Even though relations with Africa were not a priority during Cardoso's administrations, the continent was already an important part of ABC's portfolio. In terms of the number of initiatives, Africa ranked second in 1995–1996, and although it fell to third place in 1997–2001, it led in terms of resources allocated (Iglesias Puente, 2010). The creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in 1996 has contributed to that prominence, as it opened spaces for the diffusion of Brazilian experiences in Portuguese-speaking African countries (Leite *et al.*, 2014).

Brazil's turn to Africa, beyond the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, was announced during Lula's presidential campaign (Saraiva, 2002) and promptly consolidated in his administration's first months with the celebration of the Brazil–Africa forum. Domestically, the Afro-descendent coalition in Brazil grew stronger (Patriota, 2011), and the 'culturalist discourse' re-emerged,¹² emphasising not only the relevance of African culture to Brazilian society but also the country's debt to Africa because of its history of slavery.¹³ Brazilian shift to Africa also happened in a context characterised by China's increased economic presence in the continent.¹⁴

Closer relations with Africa can be verified in the number of presidential visits to the continent; while Cardoso visited only two African countries, Lula has visited 23 (Brun & Muxagato, 2012). Trade between Africa and Brazil increased by almost 234 per cent (Brun & Muxagato, 2012), and Brazilian direct investment in the continent jumped from US\$69million in 2011 to US\$214billion in 2009 (WB, IPEA, 2011). Resource allocation to technical cooperation in Africa implemented under ABC's coordination rose from around US\$525thousand in 2003 to more than US\$22million in 2010, with a significant increase after 2008 (Brasil, 2011). The diverse profile of Brazil's engagement with Africa was analysed by Saraiva (2012) as resulting from a balance between idealism and realism. It also converges with theories on middle powers' foreign policy and on the role South–South relations played in satisfying contradictory demands from Brazilian society (Westhuizen, 2013).

Besides focusing on Africa, Lula proactively raised social issues in international *fora* during his presidency. In 2003, he argued in Davos for increased aid to tackle hunger, and in 2004, he was one of the leaders in the launching of the 'Global Action Against Hunger and Poverty'. At that same year, the CGFOME was created under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the 'international interface of the [national] Zero Hunger Program', coordinating 'Brazilian foreign policy in food and nutritional security, rural development and international humanitarian cooperation' (MRE, 2013).

As the next section will show, at that time, there was an intense debate among different coalitions in Brazil on which policies would be more effective in fighting hunger. Traditional donors were important players not only in the implementation of policies

¹¹The areas most frequently mentioned in Cardoso's diplomatic discourses were the fight against human immunodeficiency virus/AIDS, education and environment (Iglesias Puente, 2010).

¹²The 'culturalist discourse' emerged in Brazilian foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, conferring symbolic relevance to Africa for its participation in the construction of Brazil as a nation (Saraiva, 1997).

¹³According to Lechini (2006), the culturalist discourse was dominant among Brazilian official representatives participating in the Brazil–Africa forum in 2003.

¹⁴Former president Jiang Zemin's visit to Africa in 1996, followed by the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Summit in 2000, was emblematic of the economic turn in China–Africa relations (Alden, 2012). Chinese foreign direct investment's stock in Africa arose from US\$56million in 1996 to US\$4.46billion in 2007 (Renard, 2011: 18).

defended by particular coalitions but also in promoting their international diffusion and Brazilian South–South cooperation in social development with Africa.

3 EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST HUNGER IN AFRICA

This section explores how South–South development cooperation involving the MDS and African countries has shifted, both thematically and in terms of its strategies.¹⁵ These shifts were internally shaped by the evolution of the social development institutional framework in Brazil and the mobilisation of domestic actors and coalitions around specific agendas. New institutional arrangements have been created, responding both to the legal constraints of Brazilian South–South development cooperation and to the leadership of policy entrepreneurs. What has been observed is the increased protagonism of national actors, even though traditional donors remained as partners.

In Brazil, the promulgation of the Democratic Constitution in 1988 was followed by a process of reorganisation and redefinition of the country's social policies in the 1990s. However, the universalist agenda still remained to be accomplished as structural adjustment policies resulted in sub-financing of social policies (Jaccoud, 2009). After the macroeconomic stabilisation, social financing was recovered with a stronger focus on poverty (Vaitsman *et al.*, 2006). A new cycle of social assistance started in the 2000s with the promulgation of laws and norms, the creation of coordinating agencies and increased resources invested in social programmes. MDS was created in 2004 to integrate and streamline national development policies, including programmes on social assistance, food and nutritional security, and cash transfers.

At that time, there was an intense debate among different coalitions regarding which should be the central component of social protection policies. The food security coalition, integrated by civil society organisations ahead of the Zero Hunger programme and MDS' Department of Food and Nutritional Security, claimed that the major issue to be tackled was food and nutritional security and initially pointed to the limitations of cash transfers to empower people (Morais, 2011). A World Bank representative opposed such a perspective in a 2003 Zero Hunger seminar, claiming that cash transfers were more effective in fighting poverty than food stamps (Patu, 2013). The World Bank's view had the support of top leadership from the Ministry of Economy (Patu, 2013). In 2004, the *Bolsa Família* Programme was established in Brazil, unifying previous cash transfer initiatives and allowing them to achieve national coverage.¹⁶

The Zero Hunger programme was revised 10 months after its launch as a broader initiative to include *Bolsa Família*. At this point, Zero Hunger had in its core three

¹⁵Apart from literature review, this section is based on 13 interviews with relevant stakeholders from MDS, the International Centre for Inclusive Growth, the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger and representatives from African delegations visiting MDS. These interviews took place in 2012 and 2014.

¹⁶Since MDS' creation, there were three different visions regarding the relation between cash transfers and social development. One focused on the role of cash transfers in social assistance, the second focused on the social expenditure aspect of cash transfers, and the third defended the role of cash transfers in food security (Cotta, 2009, *apud* Morais, 2011). Zero Hunger was supported by the third coalition, which was critical about the emancipatory potentiality of cash transfers but had later accepted it as part of the programme.

programmes that became MDS' main social development 'policy exports' to Africa: the *Bolsa Família*; the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE, in Portuguese), which provides meals in all public, philanthropic and community schools and carries out food and nutritional education actions¹⁷; and the food purchase programme (PAA, in Portuguese), in which family farming products are purchased and distributed to social assistance networks and food-insecure households, as well as to ensure public stocks and price regulation.

The *Bolsa Família* Programme initially became the flagship of Brazilian South–South cooperation in social development. The Africa–Brazil Programme on Social Development, supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth,¹⁸ was launched during a study tour in 2006 that gathered delegations from six African countries to exchange experiences in cash transfer. The exchange led to the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty project in Ghana. Financed by DFID, the project influenced the development of Ghana's National Social Protection Strategy, which had cash transfer as its main component (Souza, 2007).¹⁹ The International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth supported the project by gathering programme documentation, providing administrative support and acting as an advisory partner that informed MDS staff about Ghana's social and governmental realities. The centre's role as mediator was later evaluated as crucial to keeping partners informed about each other's context (Souza, 2007).

Despite the role played by Lula's presidential diplomacy in catalysing the signing of international agreements in cooperation in social development, *Bolsa Família* had rapidly become politically strong in Brazil, thus not necessarily needing international recognition to gain domestic legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011). Brazilian South–South development cooperation in cash transfers happened in a context marked by the global diffusion of cash transfers programmes intermediated by international organisations, mainly the World Bank and the IADB (Morais, 2011; Sugiyama, 2011; Gonnert & Hurtado, 2012). The promotion of *Bolsa Família* abroad is seen as having been driven by requests that arose exponentially because of the programme's allegedly proven success, rich documentation in international literature and its dissemination by international organisations. The fact that the creation of *Bolsa Família* in Brazil was supported, technically and financially, by the World Bank and DFID also contributed to such dissemination. Both institutions invested in documentation and sponsored events where Brazilian representatives presented the experience (Morais, 2011; Gonnert & Hurtado, 2012).

But domestic and external drivers to Brazilian South–South development cooperation in social development with Africa have shifted later on. On the one hand, resulting from

¹⁷In 2009, under the Zero Hunger programme, a law was sanctioned ratifying that 30 per cent of PNAE's budget should be spent buying food from family farming.

¹⁸Established in 2004 as a global centre by UNDP in partnership with the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic and the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research, the centre has the mandate to 'promote the production and dissemination of studies and policy recommendations, the exchange of best practices in development initiatives and the expansion of South–South Cooperation' (IPC, 2014).

¹⁹After the project, the partnership with DFID continued through the involvement of MDS' representatives in regional events, the realisation of another study tour of African delegations and the launching of the programme's webpage. MDS' participation in those events, initially thought of as a means of technical assistance, was later valued as an advocacy tool, grounding cooperation in high-level political alliances (Andrade, 2008).

strong mobilisation of the food and nutritional security coalition, under the National Food Security Council (CONSEA),²⁰ the network of social protection was progressively expanded to include Food and Nutritional Security at its core (MDS, 2008). In 2010, the right to food was included in the Brazilian constitution. On the other hand, after its first experiences in Africa, the *Bolsa Família* team, acknowledging that the African context differs greatly from the Brazilian one and that international organisations were already highly invested in promoting cash transfer initiatives, decided to deprioritize its direct engagement with Africa (Morais, 2011).

The global context also started shifting with the re-emergence of food security at the top of the international agenda with the 2007/2008 food crisis, catalysed by the increase of commodity prices and projections of population growth (Patriota & Pierri, 2013). In Africa, there was a reprioritisation of agriculture's role in the continent's development (Milhorance, 2013). There was also a growing dissatisfaction in Africa with the dominance of cooperation in social development by cash transfers programmes, which, despite evidence of positive impacts, are perceived as costly, demanding a complex delivery structure and as dominated by a donor-driven agenda (Devereux & White, 2008).

In 2010, the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight Against Hunger and Rural Development took place in Brasília. The event convened more than 40 African ministers and established agriculture as a priority for cooperation. The conference established the main areas for future dialogue and cooperation, including public food purchase, broader coverage of existing school meal programmes and support to family farming modernisation.

In 2012, already under Dilma Rousseff's first administration (2011–2014), the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme (PAA Africa) was launched with two main objectives: (i) to support innovative local initiatives of food purchase from smallholders for humanitarian food assistance and (ii) to strengthen partnerships and strategies to support long-term solutions for fighting hunger through local food purchase. Five African countries were included in the project (Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal), implemented through a partnership between CGFOME, MDS, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme's (WFP) Centre of Excellence Against Hunger²¹ and DFID.

Although there were not many public evaluations or evidence-based studies translated into different languages, as was the case for *Bolsa Família*, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme relied on policy entrepreneurs that promoted it in different policy circles, building coalitions and links between different partners. The role of José Graziano in advocating for family agriculture and food security agendas from inside FAO and the political mobilisation of CGFOME in Brazil were key determinants for the visibility of the programme. In a manner similar to the *Bolsa Família* framework, FAO and WFP were working as 'disseminating' agencies for the programme. In this case, however, the key leaders in both organisations spearheading this process were Brazilians, originally involved in the Zero Hunger programme's development and implementation.

²⁰CONSEA includes government and civil society and is responsible for the proposition of guidelines in food and nutrition. It has a consultative character and advises the president on policies and guidelines to guarantee the right to food. CONSEA stimulates society's participation in the formulation, execution and follow-up of food and nutrition security policies (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar, 2013).

²¹The Centre of Excellence Against Hunger was created in 2011 as an initiative of the Ministry of Education partnered and hosted by the WFP, focusing on creating 'a global forum for South–South policy dialogue and learning on school feeding and food and security programmes'.

Drawing on the Brazilian experience, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme also proposed a stronger focus on civil society participation. Social accountability and civil society mobilisation, which are treated as key determinants for the programme's success in Brazil (Chmielewska & Souza, 2011), have been raised as important aspects of its international delivery. CONSEA is actively involved in the programme and has participated in official delegations, receives international delegations for information exchange and participates in the programme's monitoring committee (Observatório Brasil e o Sul, 2014). Among other actors engaged in food and nutritional security in the country, CONSEA is contributing to build a stronger domestic constituency for it. Their involvement in international dialogue and negotiation forums also contributes to a more qualified dialogue with international partners and African counterparts.

The case of the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme highlights a different dynamic of Brazilian South–South development cooperation in social development. Although it relied on international organisations for its implementation, it has a strong leadership of national actors. The programme is funded by the Brazilian government through contributions to international organisations. MDS provides technical support and shares expertise drawn from its domestic food purchase programme, while CGFOME coordinates the programme's partner network and is responsible for formulating policy guidelines in consultation with partners. Learning and knowledge-sharing activities are supported by the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, while DFID helps to design the programme, participates in the steering committee and contributes with funding. FAO contributes with technical expertise in nutrition-related and agricultural production issues; provides seeds, fertiliser and agriculture tools and inputs; and fosters knowledge exchange, support partnerships and inter-institutional dialogue among project stakeholders. The food purchase and delivery are organised by the WFP, linking smallholder farmers to farmers' organisations in order to procure food items for use in school feeding.

4 CONCLUSION

This article argued that the priority conferred to South–South development cooperation in foreign policy under Lula's administrations (2003–2006 and 2007–2010) resulted from a complex interaction between domestic and external drivers. That period was marked by enhanced leadership of the president in South–South development cooperation, as well as by increased mobilisation around the theme from national institutions beyond the Ministry of External Affairs and from interest groups beyond traditional elites. Debates about foreign policy decision-making, development models and the allocation of resources to South–South development cooperation have contributed to the increased importance of domestic actors in Brazilian South–South cooperation decision-making.

That does not mean, however, that external drivers were no longer important. Shifts in the global political economy and in the aid architecture were accompanied by contradictory pressures coming from the loss of legitimacy of neoliberal policy prescriptions, as well as from the rise of China as a leading actor in development cooperation. As bureaucracies, international organisations and other traditional donors tend to shift their agenda as the global distribution of power changes and as models previously defended by them lose legitimacy. Participating in triangular partnerships with southern countries has an important role in helping international organisations and northern donors reconstruct their legitimacy. From the point of view of the DAC, it was

an instrument to strengthen its traditional agenda, concentrated in the social dimensions of development, *vis-à-vis* the increasing appeal of Chinese aid.

By analysing the case of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS) and African countries, it was possible to argue that MDS' initial participation resulted more from external than domestic drivers. It therefore reproduced the historical trajectory of triangular models involving Brazilian implementing agencies, replicating in third countries the bilateral initiatives with traditional donors in which Brazil had previously been a beneficiary.

Domestic and international shifts have contributed to change such dynamics. The *Bolsa Família*'s team de-prioritised its engagement in Africa, and the food security coalition grew strong in Brazil and abroad. Graziano was elected as FAO's director general and acted as a policy entrepreneur in the dissemination of Brazilian experiences in that area. Food security also re-emerged in the global agenda, and Africa reprioritized the role of agriculture in its development. Supported by the same donors that previously focused on triangular initiatives in cash transfers, MDS started implementing the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme. By comparing the *Bolsa Família* and the food purchase experience, it was possible to observe that although partnership with traditional donors remained constant, Brazilian leadership in South–South development cooperation was enhanced because of domestic drivers and actors.

But it is also important to add that the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme was implemented in a context characterised by the impact of the global economic crisis in Brazil and to a renewed priority given during the Rousseff's first administration (2010–2014) to opening new markets for Brazilian products and promoting partnerships in science and technology with developed countries. On the one hand, just as in the first half of the 1980s, presidential diplomacy assumed a very low profile. Nonetheless, despite the de-prioritisation of South–South cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme continued to be implemented. On the other hand, backed by the mobilisation of the industry coalition, the focus of Brazilian development cooperation shifted to financial cooperation aimed at opening markets to Brazilian products and satisfying demands from African governments for credit. It was in such a context that another South–South cooperation programme started being negotiated and implemented: the More Food Programme Africa. The offer of this programme, which includes credits to import Brazilian equipment for family farming, has allegedly influenced how African countries voted for FAO's director general (Barbosa, 2011).

This double facet of Brazilian cooperation (financing and capacity building) can be explained by the fact that middle powers receive contradictory domestic pressures and tend to respond to both the expansionist objectives and the search for a more egalitarian international system (Lima, 1990; Westhuizen, 2013). As a country that does not hold as many hard capabilities as great powers, Brazil tries to influence other countries using soft power, including the exportation of national policies (Lima, 2010). South–South relations respond to domestic groups defending both social and economic developments, although the latter tend to be stronger in contexts marked by economic crisis.

It was beyond the scope of this article to consider the domestic drivers in partner countries. Literature on triangular cooperation highlights that one of its main challenges is restricted involvement of beneficiary countries in setting the agenda and elaborating demands (Fordelone, 2009). This article has also not included an assessment of the impact of triangular partnerships in Africa. What was the role of African countries in triangular partnerships involving MDS? Have such partnerships changed the context and approach

of South–South development cooperation? Will the bigger role played by Brazil in triangular partnerships make projects more effective than the ones led by traditional donors? Exploring these questions is essential to better understand the true potential and impact of South–South development cooperation.

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ANEXO 3. POMEROY, M.; SHANKLAND, A., POSKITT, A., TANDON, R., BANDYOPADHYAY, K. (2016) CIVIL SOCIETY, THE BRICS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL IN GU, J., SHANKLAND, A., CHENOY, A. THE BRICS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE. HAMPSHIRE: PALGRAVE

Civil society, the BRICS and international development cooperation: perspectives from India, South Africa and Brazil

Melissa Pomeroy, Alex Shankland, Rajesh Tandon, Adele Poskitt, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay

INTRODUCTION

Literature on the BRICS and development tends to focus on government-to-government relations, state-led South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), their engagement in multilateral processes and their growing presence of their business sectors within their regions and in least developed countries. Much less attention has been paid to the roles played by civil society actors from the BRICS countries and their contribution to international development.

Civil society is notoriously hard to define, and even more so in the case of the BRICS, with their extreme diversity of political cultures and histories. Here we adopt the definition developed by Cohen and Arato (2000: 8) of civil society as the sphere “of social interaction between economy and state” where social subjects mobilize strategic and symbolic demands and resources. More specifically, we focus on civil society understood as ‘the world of associational life’, identified by Edwards as ‘the most common of the understandings in use today’ (2009: 19), and within that world we look in particular at formally structured civil society organisations (CSOs) and social movements engaging with SSDC and BRICS processes.

Among the BRICS countries, we include more in-depth examinations of India, South Africa and Brazil. This is partly because the ‘IBSA’ countries are the three most visible ‘Democratic Emerging Powers’ (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013) and home to some of the best-known civil society organisations of the Global South, as well as participants in a tripartite ‘institutionalised coalition’ of their own, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, that is based on their ‘established normative pull as large democracies and emerging economic powers’ (Vieira 2013: 296). It is also because they are the three countries that held BRICS Heads of States’ summits during the period during which the fieldwork for this chapter was carried out, in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. After Russia in 2015 (where the first ‘Civil BRICS’ meeting was a particular focus of controversy among civil society organisations, as we discuss in this chapter), the sequence of Heads of States’ summits has now moved back to India, which makes this a good moment to take stock of the picture that has emerged during the period since the 2012 Delhi Summit.

Civil society in the IBSA countries has long been mobilized to promote social rights and reduce the inequality that is a marked feature of all the BRICS (Krozer 2015). As these countries claim recognition for their development successes in the international arena, they often fail to acknowledge that some of the policy innovations that enabled these successes had their roots in civil society struggles and proposals. Moreover, civil society

organisations' south-south engagement, guided by the principle of solidarity among peoples, began long before their countries emerged as 'rising powers'. Against this background, Indian, South African and Brazilian civil society organisations' engagements with official SSDC often aims to contest and shape both its guiding conceptual framework of development and its implementation practices, based on their own previous domestic and international experiences (Moiwa *et al.*, 2015).

This chapter argues that despite the apparently more promising engagement environment in the 'Democratic Emerging Powers', even in these countries civil society efforts to achieve effective influence over BRICS and individual countries' SSDC agendas face many obstacles. At a national level, the fact that SSDC is mainly seen as an agenda relating to foreign policy, which has traditionally been closed to civil society engagement, and the restrictions increasingly imposed on the domestic enabling environment for civil societies are critical stumbling blocks to engagement (Poskitt *et al.* 2015). Internationally, even under Indian, South African or Brazilian presidencies the BRICS have certainly proved less open to civil society than to other sectors, such as academia or business, that have their own channels to reach government leaders. Within the IBSA countries civil society's lack of common diagnostics around BRICS potentialities and pitfalls contributes to a fragmented engagement agenda, which is compounded by the difficulty of building cross-BRICS links with civil society organisations from the very different contexts of Russia and China.

This chapter draws on evidence from a number of research projects in which our three institutions – the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), the South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre (Articulação SUL) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) – have worked over the last few years²⁵. It also draws on participant observation at the three summits held in 2012 (Delhi), 2013 (Durban) and 2014 (Fortaleza) and at a number of CSO events debating BRICS during this period, as well as on a review of academic and policy-oriented literature.

In the next three sections we provide an overview of the specific dynamics of civil society engagement in SSDC and in debates over their role in the BRICS grouping for each of the three focus countries. The following section discusses commonalities and differences across these three countries and their fellow BRICS, Russia and China, and discusses civil society engagement with the BRICS at the transnational level, analysing key characteristics and tendencies observed since 2012. In the conclusions, we discuss the prospects for civil society engagement with the BRICS' international development

²⁵ Including the IDS/ PRIA/Articulação SUL 'CSO-led South-South Cooperation' project (funded by the UK Department for international Development), the Articulação SUL / Brazil and the South Observatory "Brazilian civil society's south-south engagement' project (funded by Oxfam), PRIA's studies of 'The Transnational role of Indian Civil Society" (funded by the Forum on India's Development Cooperation) and of 'Civil Society-BRICS Engagement (funded by FIM - Forum for Democratic Global Governance) and an IDS study of BRICS and G20 actors and spaces for the Oxfam-supported 'BRICSAM' grouping of civil society networks.

cooperation activities through the Indian and Chinese presidencies and beyond, with a particular focus on the New Development Bank.

INDIAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SSSDC AND BRICS

In the last three decades, certain major shifts have come into currency as far as the Indian CSOs are concerned. First, India being categorised as 'lower middle income country' by the DAC/OECD, a large number of official donors and their recipient International NGOs have either withdrawn or declined aid resources in India. Those Indian CSOs who have been traditionally receiving developmental resources from such sources are now faced with the declining resource scenario. Second, the funding sources for CSOs from the central and state governments are now primarily geared towards service provisions and administered through 'tender' based approaches. In addition, as many accountant and managerial consultancy firms are entering into the social development and service provision arena, competition has increased between the former and the latter. It has also resulted in declining resources to support actions for such issues as social mobilisation, capacity building, empowerment, etc. The advocacy organisations, specifically, that are engaged in on policy advocacy, also fall in this line. Third, over the years micro finance has become the 'business model' for many CSOs to pursue financial sustainability for the organisations, which undermined the social and political empowerment of the marginalised. Finally, with proliferation of the private sector and accumulation of enormous fortunes amassed by taking advantage of the governmental deregulation, economic liberalisation and globalisation, many such private companies have started promoting corporate social responsibilities (CSR) and private philanthropic activities. However, it is not obvious that CSOs are the primary vehicles of promoting CSR.

In addition to the internal socio-political and economic changes occurring inside India, the country has also witnessed several changes so far as its international position and relationships are concerned. India's emergence as a possible super power and its expanding domestic market along with its rising stature in international forums has set a very optimistic future. In 2010 alone, as many as twenty-four heads of state/government had visited India including the top leaders of the world's five most powerful countries (most notably known as the P-5) and signed deals of billions of dollars with India. In fact, it was business which took centre stage in bilateral talks. With the exception of China, all other leaders supported India's candidature for a permanent UN Security Council seat. 'Nuclear-armed India has emerged as the world's largest democracy. In May 2011, the Prime Minister of India visited Africa to attend the second 'India-Africa Summit' in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and pledged a \$5 billion aid package to Africa, an amount almost equivalent to its own annual healthcare budget - around \$5.9 billion for the realisation of

the latter's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the conclusion of the Third India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi in 2015 (26-29 October) the Indian Prime Minister doubled its pledge and offered \$10 billion in concessional credits to Africa over the next five years. The new loan offer would be in addition to the \$7.4 billion in soft loans and \$1.2 billion in aid provided since the first India-Africa summit in 2008. India's new offer includes a grant assistance of \$600 million; an India-Africa Development Fund of \$100 million; an India-Africa Health Fund of \$10 million; 50,000 scholarships in India over five years; and expansion of the Pan Africa E-Network to institutions of skills, training and learning across Africa. The Indian presence will not only enhance commerce and infrastructure but also include other key development areas, such as education and training. Besides Africa, India is also trying to expand its relations with other regions in the seemingly multi-polar world and not to confine itself with the traditional ally Russia or the new friend, the USA. In June 2011, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, India also expressed its interest to become the full member showing its desire for a bigger stake in the Eurasian region. Thus, the near nine per cent economic growth and a huge market are the reasons which are prompting India to be an influential world leader gaining substantial attention.

India is seen as a rapidly rising global power by virtue of being the largest democracy and having younger demographics, and is one of the top five economies of the world today. As a member of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB), India has increased its stakes and influence following the global financial crisis of 2008. In new multilateral mechanisms like G20, IBSA and BRICS, India's influence is increasingly being felt. Indian business enterprises (both public and private) have been making their presence felt around the world. Indian investment abroad in 2012 was higher than foreign investment in India.

The emergence of BRICS as an independent bloc, whose membership is not determined by the US, the UK and France - the original founding powers G7/G8 - may be seen as a countervailing influence to G7/G8. China, India, Brazil and South Africa were never members of G7; Russia has used its position to maintain both sets of membership, even though it is not one of the founding powers of G7. As a result, BRICS is able to define its agenda and priorities independent of the G7 in the global governance arena. In addition, BRICS is able to strategize to use its collective presence as a bloc in the G20. The significance of BRICS as a potential centre of countervailing authority in global governance has to be kept in mind. This potential may not merely be based on the economic strength of BRICS but also on its political attraction as an alternative centre of power. This may indicate the emergence of multi-polar global order in the future where more than one centre of authority attempts to influence global governance (Martin and Tandon, 2014:152).

While Indian government and business establishments are going global, most Indian CSOs have largely remained domestically focused in their development efforts. Although the Indian CSOs collectively are concerned about declining international support for

development activities, they are not collectively focussed on the 'impact of India outside India'. Over the last few years a group of Indian CSOs have been focussing on India's positioning in the global context as well as the role of India's policy, investments and international activities which have dramatically changed during the last few years.

Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) undertook an effort to facilitate civil society-BRICS engagement which was not a full-scale official engagement with BRICS but was still an effort to make this engagement meaningful. It articulated its expectation from the engagement as: "BRICS as a multilateral entity has an ambitious agenda. It has the potential to significantly change the established norms and practices of international development and cooperation, which is largely established by the OECD/DAC. It has the potential to change the architecture of global governance institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organisation etc. As the Indian government intends to spend a significant amount of resources in other developing countries it is pertinent to ask questions such as - how are these decisions taken? what values and norms guide such decision-making?" In addition, it also raised questions about India's aid to other developing countries: who is receiving it? from where is it going? and what purpose is it serving? (PRIA, 2013:2).

Concerned with growing inequality and exclusion in India, a meeting of development NGOs in New Delhi issued a call for greater attention to those trade and economic policies in BRICS countries which perpetuate and exacerbate such exclusion. Meeting in advance of the 4th BRICS Summit being held in New Delhi on March 28-29, 2012, these NGOs asked the Prime Minister of India, as host of this Summit, to take a lead in evolving an institutional mechanism for on-going dialogue with development NGOs and civil society in all the five BRICS countries so that their practical knowledge can be harnessed in addressing the challenges of increasing inequality and exclusion.

In its Summit in Sanya (China) in April 2011, the declaration from BRICS Heads of States identified a shared concern related to growing inequality in their countries; it also acknowledged the importance of promoting a wide range of people-to-people exchanges across BRICS countries to build understanding and share knowledge. Indian NGOs have considerable practical knowledge on such issues as food security, youth unemployment, economic inclusion, basic education, environmental sustainability, local development and urban poverty; these issues were identified by BRICS for attention by its leadership. It was critical that the capacities and expertise of this vast segment of active and knowledgeable development NGOs and civil society in all the five BRICS countries is adequately harvested so that current policies of economic growth do not perpetuate further inequality and exclusion.

Indian development NGOs also called upon the BRICS Summit to use their collective influence in ensuring that firm commitments for addressing challenges of climate change are secured in the forthcoming UN conference Rio+20 in Brazil. In order to ensure that global multi-lateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank live up to the new commitments made in the past couple of years, BRICS Summit must issue a call for

open, transparent and merit-based recruitment of the President of the World Bank this summer, and put an end to post-colonial hegemony of America and Europe.

It emphasised that as the country responsible for carrying forward the mandate from the 4th BRICS Summit, India can play an important leadership role in ensuring that such mechanisms for dialogue and exchange of knowledge between development NGOs and civil society and the BRICS deliberative processes are institutionalised in a creative manner. It is also hoped that BRICS governments will support such processes actively so that the vision of BRICS as an alliance for 'stability, security and growth' in the world is realised for all citizens of the world.²⁶

One of the constraints in civil society engagement was the lack of information. There is a need for the CSOs to engage with BRICS in a more constructive manner. Need to inform the local CSOs and to consult with CSOs and academics in other BRICS countries, thereby bringing these actors together to understand and form a uniform position, wherever possible. BRICS summits have talked about broadening cooperation between the BRICS countries beyond the respective governments to include people to people cooperation through sports, cultural exchanges etc. The BRICS academic forum has been formalized through the 'BRICS Think Tank Council'. But there has been a conspicuous absence of civil society from the whole process. In the consultations organized under the BRICS-Civil Society engagement initiative it has been decided that civil society should engage with BRICS on its own terms to know more about how things move within BRICS. Under this initiative, there have been interactions with the BRICS officials in China and Brazil who have responded positively so far as engagement with civil society is concerned. It is important to bring forth the contribution of civil society through dialogues. Civil society interventions in the last few decades in India have successfully shaped many social policies, be it in the sector of health, education and so on. It is important to acknowledge civil society contributions in innovation and applications of development methodologies particularly in the context of local diversities. There is also an additional dilemma for civil society to engage with foreign policies or even to encourage the government to spend money outside the country because the country itself is characterized by a huge list of domestic problems, which also simultaneously needs to be addressed. It is very urgent to create/generate an information hub through which information on BRICS-related development could be accessed.

It is not easy to establish credibility in the eyes of the government; demonstrating the credibility of civil society and educating the government on the contribution of civil society on an on-going basis is very crucial. There is a need to foster dialogues between civil society and BRICS policy makers. Also, there is a need to foster dialogues between the domestic and the international civil society so as the former could take lead in engaging with the BRICS policy makers. The governments in China and Russia are

²⁶ BRICS Must Address Growing Inequality – Declaration by Indian CSOs, March, 2012

often critical about the non-BRICS international civil society engaging in the BRICS process. Civil society needs to engage more with academic community as many of them have official access to BRICS by which they can bring relevant information. Thus, engaging with the academic community needs to be done in a more concretized way.

In recent years the volume and diversity of Indian development cooperation, under the broad rubric of SSDC, has grown dramatically. The new government which came in power in May 2014 at the centre has indicated that this cooperation, through a variety of instruments like, Technical Assistance, Training and Capacity Building, Trade and Investment, Concessional Line of Credit, and Financial Assistance will continue to expand. India, so far, has largely relied and engaged government and business institutions to implement its development cooperation with other developing countries.

Many Indian Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) for decades have been implementing a wide range projects and programmes in other developing countries, with resources from International NGOs, Foundations, Bilateral, Multilateral agencies and occasionally with assistance from the Government of India. The practical knowledge and skills gained through implementing projects and programmes nationally and sub-nationally have been utilised by these CSOs in other developing countries with similar development contexts. However, the current official policy and practice do not adequately and explicitly recognise the existing and potential contributions of Indian CSOs in development cooperation. There is need for an informed and constructive policy dialogue between government, CSOs and other actors for institutionalising CSO engagement in India's development cooperation.

The role and contribution of Indian CSOs at the national and sub-national development is well documented. However, there is a dearth of systematic research and analyses of the role and contribution of Indian CSOs as providers of SSDC. An initial mapping pointed out that there are indeed several CSO led initiatives, the analyses of which could provide significant lessons for framing SSDC policy and practices.

In the last two years, particularly after the formation of Development Partnership Administration (DPA) – an agency responsible for formulation of SSDC policies and programmes and coordination of SSDC projects – under the Ministry of External Affairs (MoEF), Government of India, PRIA and some other CSOs have made some modest endeavour to initiate meaningful policy dialogues and engagement with DPA. These initial engagements have been encouraging but it needs to be much more robust and meaningful towards “generating and communicating evidences and lessons from Indian CSO led development cooperation practices to support policy advocacy for institutionalising CSO engagement in India's development cooperation”.

One of the significant development in facilitating civil society engagement in official SSDC in India was the creation of the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC). It was launched in January 2013 with an idea to have a forum for exploring various facets of development cooperation, which would also seek to draw upon India's

own experience. Currently its Secretariat is located in Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) – a think tank of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. The steering mechanism includes a number of Indian CSOs and academic institutions as well as representation from the Development Partnership Administration. Over the last two years, FIDC has been playing a critical role not only in bringing out information related to India's development cooperation in a systematic manner but also creating appropriate platform for dialogues between Indian CSOs by organising several conferences, workshops and seminars across the countries. Such events have been attended by a large number of CSOs. On the occasion of the Third India Africa Summit Forum in New Delhi, FIDC with support from RIS and MEA published "India Africa Partnership: Towards Sustainable Development" – a compilation of case studies on India's development cooperation in Africa. It also included several case studies on Indian CSO's work in Africa.

Another significant achievement was the reference to FIDC in the *India Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation* signed last week gives a boost to the activities of forum. It noted: "Encourage use of modern social networks to build communities of mutual interest. Linkages between academia, journalists, media entities and civil society will be further encouraged inter-alia through the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC) to document successful development interventions by civil society among communities in developing countries."

While civil society is reasonably strong and visible in Brazil, India and South Africa, its nature and pattern is considerably different in China and Russia. In addition, the democratic space for civil society, though shifting constantly, is relatively open in the first three BRICS countries, as compared to China and Russia. Therefore, civil society's engagements with national policy-makers, political leaders and senior officials are very different in character across the BRICS; much more active, constructive and critical engagements are taking place in Brazil and India, as well as in South Africa, than in the other two at this stage.

Civil society engagement with BRICS on this aspect of internal recognition by BRICS that it is an elite club should focus on BRICS strengthening formal multilateral institutions to legitimately fulfil their mandates for common public goods. If BRICS is seen to be behaving as its predecessor G8 behaves, with narrow sectarian interests regularly undermining and weakening the formal, legitimate multilateral mechanisms of global governance, then this new club will also be perceived as illegitimate and self-serving.

Civil society engagements with BRICS, therefore, have to be careful in not uncritically supporting BRICS positions and the BRICS Development Bank's investment strategies. It is in this sense that FIM's on-going experience of promoting engagement with BRICS over the past two and a half years has been valuable. As FIM supported the in-country process of building a network of civil society in BRICS countries, it raised this set of issues. FIM's engagement supported capacity development of domestic civil society in BRICS countries; in so doing, it shared the experiences of Civil G8 and G20. This

approach by FIM has begun to sensitise key interlocutors amongst civil society in BRICS countries not to lose sight of the impact of BRICS on other societies, especially those from sub-Saharan Africa and southeast Asia, where investment from BRICS countries is beginning to create certain local tensions.

National civil society from BRICS countries may create a platform of working together with the official BRICS mechanism, but it is important for them to remember that BRICS is as 'illegitimate' and a rich man's club as its predecessor G8. Civil society engaging with BRICS has to keep its character as a global governance institution in focus. Civil society mandate with BRICS as a global governance mechanism, therefore, has to remain strictly aimed at democratising this mechanism, not only with respect to civil society within BRICS countries but also globally, especially where missing voices of civil society need to be enabled (Martin and Tandon, 2014).

SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SSDC AND BRICS

South African civil society's engagement with domestic development issues is as vibrant as it is diverse, extending as it does from partnership in local-level service delivery to fierce contestation in national policy debates. Historically, South African CSOs have benefited from significant flows of resources from Northern donor countries in support of their work on domestic development issues, though these flows have diminished in recent years and now tend to be focused on South Africa-based organisations that work at a regional or pan-African level. CSOs' relationship with the ANC-led government has become increasingly tense in recent years, but this tension is still tempered by recognition on both sides that, as a 2008 government-commissioned report put it, civil society's role as 'a key partner in a democratic and free society... is particularly pertinent in South Africa, where civil society played a fundamental role in the transition to democracy' (CASE/Planact/Afrika Skills Development 2008: 3).

Despite this recognition, civil society in South Africa does not have a strong tradition of influencing the government's foreign policy. According to Michelle Pressend of the Economic Justice Network (EJN), "when it comes to foreign policy and international relations, these discussions seem to be the domain of an elite group of think tanks, experts, international NGOs and representatives from business forums" (2013: 1). Thus far, debates within civil society about the country's geopolitical relations in general and international development cooperation in particular have been ad hoc and largely reactive. Nevertheless, opportunities for engagement with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) have expanded in recent years and some civil society-led initiatives have emerged, with both trends receiving a major boost from the debates around the country's hosting of the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013. In this section we review civil society-led initiatives to engage with development cooperation policy and practice and then discuss the evolution of civil society debates on

the BRICS and development before and during the Durban summit. We conclude with an assessment of emerging trends in South African civil society's engagement with development cooperation policy and BRICS development agendas.

Civil society-led initiatives

Civil society in South Africa is heterogeneous, with diverging interests and strategies for engaging on issues related to BRICS, development cooperation and foreign policy. The most prominent voices in debates on these issues largely come from international NGOs, think-tanks, national organisations and networks, media and the labour movement. There has been some collaboration between these groups and individuals, but divergences and fragmentation can also be identified.

An initial indication of a coordinated civil society effort to discuss foreign policy issues was the establishment of the civil society network South Africa Forum for International Solidarity (SAFIS)²⁷. Since the group launched in November 2011 it has organized a series of debates on issues such as migration and security, but there has not been as much progress in systematically engaging with and influencing government policy as was initially hoped.²⁸ The group is facing the challenge of members not prioritising joint initiatives, but rather pursuing their own organizational goals, and it remains to be seen whether SAFIS can become the effective platform with a role in shaping South Africa's foreign policy that its founders hoped it would.

In addition to SAFIS, other civil society-led initiatives to engage with foreign and development cooperation policy have included the 'BRICS from Below' mobilisation (discussed later in this section) and some activities linking CSOs and academic actors that were supported by the Open Society Foundation's South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) between 2011 and 2013. There have also been more ad hoc mobilisations on specific foreign policy-related issues, such as those triggered by the failure of the South African government to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir whilst attending an African Union meeting in 2015, ignoring an international warrant issued for his arrest by the International Criminal Court.

South African CSOs have also engaged directly in civil society-led development cooperation activities, based on political or humanitarian solidarity principles. CSO and social movement engagement in more political solidarity-based cooperation has generally focused on the Southern African region, via a mix of learning exchanges and joint advocacy on issues ranging from migration policy and xenophobia to the social and environmental impacts of South African investments in neighbouring countries. In some

²⁷ SAFIS is a grouping of civil society organisations and activists made up of local groups, the South African offices of international NGOs and the labour organisation COSATU. It is a locally-driven initiative, established by South African organisations that recognized the need for civil society to have a more coordinated and effective impact on the government's foreign policy. Oxfam largely funded a part-time coordinator of the network during 2012 and 2013, although the initiative is not registered and remains informal.

²⁸ G. Govender, pers. comm., 10 December 2013.

cases, however, this engagement has extended far beyond South Africa's 'near abroad', as is the case for the Cape Town-based Shack / Slum Dwellers International (SDI) alliance, which was born out of an exchange between South African and Indian housing rights activists (Poskitt and Shankland 2014). Civil society-led humanitarian cooperation has mobilised a mix of public and private (often religious) resources, operating both alongside and independently from government peace-building interventions, with the highest-profile example being the Gift of the Givers Foundation, which claims to be 'the largest disaster response NGO of African origin on the African continent' (Poskitt *et al.* 2015).

Civil society debates on the BRICS and the Durban Summit

After the country joined the grouping in 2010, the debate on South Africa's role in the BRICS came to be one of the key areas for civil society engagement with foreign policy and development cooperation issues. The emerging narrative of South Africa as the BRICS 'gateway to Africa' combined with anxieties about the impact on domestic development of other BRICS countries (notably China) to energise debate about the linkages between domestic and international development agendas.

In 2011-2012, whilst politicians negotiated South Africa's place at the table amongst the BRICS group, civil society in South Africa was largely focusing on considering the potential benefits and risks of joining the group. Some civil society conferences, research activities and debate events took place to discuss the possible impact of changing geo-political dynamics and the new southern multilateralism. BRICS was often discussed alongside other groups such as G20 and IBSA, with measured enthusiasm for exploring South-South cooperation on economic growth and development.²⁹ However, the debates about whether South Africa should join the BRIC group and what membership would look like were largely taking place within academic circles and think-tanks; there was no widespread debate within civil society that included grassroots organisations, movements and labour groups.

The decision to join the BRICS group was taken by South Africa's government with almost no consultation with civil society. The official invitation to join BRICS from the Chinese government to South Africa highlighted the strategic and political interests of both parties. The voices within civil society that were expressing concerns about joining the BRICS group were side-lined and, in many ways, civil society was left behind in a quickly changing political environment.³⁰ Very quickly debates moved from whether South Africa should join the BRICS, to what being a member now means. The coverage of South Africa's accession to BRICS in the national media was cautious and at times noticeably uncertain about what membership of a grouping seen as part of the global political elite would mean for the country.

²⁹ F. Kornegay, pers. comm., 9 December 2013.

³⁰ *ibid.*

Human rights groups in South Africa also expressed concern about the influence of China and Russia on BRICS policies, fearing that they would oppose any progressive positions the other countries might propose. University of Cape Town academic David Fig argues that “as a donor to the ruling ANC coffers, China has, for example been able to influence Pretoria to keep the Dalai Lama out of the country, even when specifically invited to the private 80th birthday celebrations of former Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu” (2013: 57).

Patrick Bond, a prominent activist and academic from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, identifies three narratives articulated by civil society in South Africa and describes them as “BRICS from above”, “BRICS from the middle” and “BRICS from below” (Bond 2013a). Whilst these categories may be oversimplified and do not make allowances for the more complex picture of the different influencing strategies used by civil society organisations and networks, they do shed light on the tensions that exist.

The “BRICS from above” narrative welcomes the opportunity for increased trade and knowledge transfer with other BRICS economies. This is mostly articulated by the business community, government and some intellectuals who see BRICS as reinforcing South Africa’s economic base in Africa. The “BRICS from the middle” are NGOs and scholars who take a pragmatic approach to leveraging influence on policy-making decisions and are hesitant to criticise BRICS openly. The “BRICS from below” narrative is highly critical of the grouping, describing its member countries as “sub-imperialists” who seek regional domination and exploitation. Strongly condemning South Africa’s positioning itself as the gateway to Africa, this narrative highlights the violations of socio-economic, political and civil rights resulting from “elite-centric, consumerist, financialised, eco-destructive, climate-insensitive, nuclear-powered strategies that advance corporate and para-statal profits” (Brics-from-below 2013).

These positions crystallised around the Durban Summit in 2013, which generated media attention to South Africa’s role within the BRICS and ignited civil society engagement on issues of trade and sustainable development. For many CSOs this was the first time they had considered the BRICS grouping either in relation to South Africa’s own local and national development needs, or to its implications for other countries in Africa.

In 2013, there was no formal mechanism for civil society organisations’ involvement in the BRICS Summit process itself. Some CSOs did participate in the official BRICS Academic Forum which took place as part of the Summit process (as did the BRICS Business Forum and Trade Union Forum), working closely with think-tanks to get information and access the sessions.

In the absence of a formal civil society space, the CSOs Groundwork (Friends of the Earth South Africa) and South Durban Community Environmental Alliance and the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society organized a joint ‘counter-summit’ entitled “BRICS-from-below!”. There were also a small number of other civil society events, mostly organized by international NGOs. For example, Oxfam hosted a public

policy dialogue with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that addressed BRICS' development cooperation and investment in Africa and discussed mechanisms for greater transparency and accountability of development assistance provided by BRICS to African states, while the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Brazilian CSO Instituto Mais Democracia organized an event on the newly proposed BRICS Bank, which aimed to create an international network of civil society organisations to monitor the bank.³¹ These INGO-led events had a distinctly 'BRICS-from-the-middle' identity, though some South African CSOs did attend both these events and the BRICS-from-below 'counter-summit'.

Policy spaces and engagement trends since Durban

Since 2013, the opening up of formal and informal policy spaces by the Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and other government agencies has enabled an increasingly broad participation for civil society organisations in debates on South Africa's development cooperation and foreign policy. While interviewees felt that in 2013 and 2014 DIRCO tended to consult civil society on a more individualised and ad hoc basis, there have recently been moves towards more systematic and formal mechanisms for dialogue. However, there is as yet no formalised national platform for CSOs from all sectors, regions and ideological positions to come together with government agencies to debate South Africa's international cooperation and foreign policy. Although responsibility for the decision to establish such a platform lies with the government, some observers have tended to blame civil society's internal divisions, with a 2013 report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) concluding that 'although there is a general openness by Pretoria to engage NGO groups in its work, one of the biggest constraints for civil society participation in government policymaking is the lack of effective co-ordination mechanisms in South Africa's NGO community' (Besharati 2013: 42).

In addition to policy dialogue, CSOs have also been directly involved in government development cooperation and peacebuilding efforts, providing specialist advisory support or outsourced service delivery alongside the armed forces and other government agencies, often with funding from the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) established by the government in 2000. However, the delays in the establishment of the long-promised South African Development Partnerships Agency (SADPA) have hampered efforts to establish a more robust legal and budgetary framework for government-CSO partnerships to deliver SSC projects.

There have been similar difficulties with establishing a formal platform for dialogue in relation to South Africa's role in BRICS. Between 2013 and 2015 the responsibility of

³¹ Attendees included representatives from international NGOs based in BRICS countries, US and Europe; multilateral agencies; South African, Brazilian, Indian and Chinese NGOs; South African, Chinese, Brazilian and British universities and one Zimbabwean non-governmental organisation. There were no local grassroots groups attending the event.

coordinating liaison with academia and civil society on South Africa's engagement with the bloc was passed between several different government departments, with DIRCO, Higher Education South Africa (HESA), the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) and Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) all playing a role at different points. In 2015, the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences was formally designated to play a leading role in the official South African BRICS Think Tank (SABTT) structure. As has been evident since the 2013 BRICS Academic Forum, think-tanks play an important role in linking civil society with policy-making processes, and there is evidence that these links have been strengthened with the establishment of the South African BRICS Think Tank (SABTT) as host for civil society liaison work.

Since the Durban Summit, there has been an increasing amount of attention from civil society groups and the media regarding South Africa's role in the BRICS bloc and the impact on the economy and foreign policy. Debates on South Africa's regional and international relations are dynamic and reflect the ideological differences between 'BRICS-from-above', 'BRICS -from-the-middle' and 'BRICS-from-below' approaches which have remained evident in the different priorities and strategies adopted by CSOs.

Civil society groups who can loosely be labelled as identifying with BRICS-from-below have continued to regard government-sponsored opportunities for policy dialogue with suspicion, and have favoured an "outsider approach" based on civil society 'claimed spaces'.³² A BRICS People's Dialogue was coordinated by the Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE) in 2013 and 2014 to share information and facilitate learning experiences about the BRICS with grassroots organisations, as part of a wider Brics-from-below effort to "build a bottom-up civil society network to analyse, watchdog and represent silenced voices of dissent" (Bond, 2013b).

Many civil society actors in South Africa have reluctantly come to see BRICS as a successor to the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) group. Many civil society actors see IBSA as a more natural alliance of countries than BRICS, given common histories of citizen activism, social justice struggles and democratization. As one civil society activist put it, "IBSA has a clear identity and shared values [and] was a direct result of the WTO Doha Round trade negotiations, whereas BRICS is a construct of Western investment banks".³³

Reflecting this reluctant acceptance of BRICS as a much more influential forum than IBSA and one with which South African civil society cannot avoid engaging, organisations like Oxfam and the Economic Justice Network (EJN) have taken a more BRICS-from-the middle "insider approach" to influencing government positions. This has included building relationships with key individuals within DIRCO, with the South African BRICS Sherpa and with Olive Shisana, the Director of the government's initially-

³² Invited spaces are government-sponsored participatory instances, whether institutionalised or not, that create opportunities for stakeholder involvement, whereas claimed spaces are those created by civil society or other non-state actors to bring together likeminded actors with common pursuits (cf. Gaventa 2006).

³³ M. Tiwana, pers. comm., 9 December 2013.

designated BRICS academic liaison agency, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). EJN and Oxfam had numerous meetings with government officials from late in 2014 in preparation for the BRICS Summit that took place in Russia in July 2015 and discussed how to work together effectively with the South African Sherpa. This strategy of engaging with the government more than six months ahead of the BRICS Summit suggests that there has been a process of learning since the Durban Summit, with some CSOs taking a more systematic and strategic approach to influencing South Africa's BRICS agenda. In the event, the South African delegation to the Civil BRICS event in Russia in July 2015 (discussed later in this chapter) included a fairly diverse range of national organisations including EJN, South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, South-African Network on Inequality, Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA) and the South African Red Cross Society.

Many CSO interviewees considered that despite the absence of a consistent platform for dialogue, the South African government has been willing to engage with civil society on the BRICS, with DIRCO often accepting meeting requests and attending civil society convened events. In 2015 the HSRC hosted a series of meetings following the BRICS Summit in Russia, which included using video technology and social media to bring together all the members of the South African delegations to Civil BRICS from four different cities across the country for a "Report back on Civil BRICS, Moscow 2015" meeting that was opened to other CSOs. The purpose of the meeting was stated as being to reflect on the Civil BRICS event and consider how civil society participation and inclusive dialogue could be improved. While the establishment of permanent institutionalised dialogue structures still appears some way off, there is evidence that since the Durban Summit both government departments and civil society have developed more systematic consultation processes on South Africa's engagement with the BRICS.

BRAZILIAN CIVIL SOCIETY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH SSDC AND BRICS

Over the past 20 years, Brazil experienced an unprecedented and important level of institutional innovation with the institutionalization of participatory large-scale initiatives at different levels, with empirical evidence of its impact in policy formulation (Pogrebinschi and Samuels, 2014). Nevertheless, this participatory tendency has not been translated to the realm of foreign policy, the main framework for Brazilian SSDC and BRICS engagement.

There is a wide analytical consensus over changes in Brazilian foreign policy's decision-making process, as an answer to an international agenda broadened by economic liberalization and raising domestic influence allowed by democratization (Lima, 2000). Those changes are characterized by the incorporation of new institutional specialized actors (Pinheiro and Milani, 2011) and existent interests and disputes in society. This

new context challenges the notion of foreign policy as a state policy and pressures it to be understood as other public policies, thus subject to democratic control (Pinheiro and Milani, 2011; Sanchez et al, 2006; Silva et al, 2010). Moreover, the strengthening of narratives about Brazil's identity as a middle-power, intermediate and system-affecting state has contributed to the raising awareness and expectations from domestic constituencies. Nevertheless, patterns of state – civil society relations around foreign policy remain discretionary, characterized by arbitrary decisions on when to open participatory spaces and who to invite; highly informal initiatives; with the participants having asymmetry information and low level of social actors' representation. The creation of an institutionalized multi-stakeholder consultative space, the National Council on Foreign Policy, remains a promise for over twenty years (Lopes, 2012).

Brazilian civil society has a large trajectory of engagement in International Development Cooperation (IDC), having benefitted from it since the 70's, which was decisive to its consolidation and its role in the Brazilian political system democratization, during the 80's and 90's. Those organizations were fundamental for the defence of social and human rights, as to the formulation of strategic orientation for inclusive public policies, guaranteed on the 1988 democratic constitution and implemented from 2000 onward. Resembling, Brazilian civil society has a consistent trajectory of transnational activism and transnational contentious politics. Since democratization, many CSOs and social movements have engaged in solidarity transnational networks. The campaign against the Free trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the World Social Forum may be considered emblematic expressions of these transnational engagements, which contributed to consolidate transnational linkages and a wide repertoire of transnational strategies and tactics³⁴.

Against this background, civil society engagement in SSDC, can be analysed according to three different perspectives³⁵:(i) its participation in government led initiatives (invited spaces); (ii) its efforts of building constituency and influence domestic decisions through "claimed spaces", and (iii) acting transnationally, through solidarity networks and horizontal cooperation initiatives.

Participation in government-led initiatives

The fragmented decision-making process of Brazilian SSDC contributes with multiple entry points for civil society (Leite et al, 2014). This dispersion also allows a polysemous context for civil society participation objectives and formats. It is possible to identify civil society participation in invited policy spaces, mainly consultative; governmental technical cooperation initiatives partnered by civil society organizations and also some influence in government SSDC initiatives formulation.

³⁴ Conceptual analysis based on Tarrow, 2005. Empirical evidences can be found in Berron, 2007 and Campos, Lorin, and Canet, 2014.

³⁵ So far, very little attention has been paid to the role of civil society in SSDC. This attempted classification is supported by evidences raised in Berrón and Brant, 2015, Suyama and Pomeroy, 2014; Leite et al, 2014; Di Ciommo and Amorim, 2015; Poskitt et al, 2015; OBS, forthcoming; Marcolini, 2014; Santos, 2013.

Government engagement with civil society tends to be limited or *ad hoc*. An initial attempt to map spaces related to SSDC shows that such spaces tend to have either a very broad remit or are too focused on specific aspects of SSDC (Leite et al, 2014).³⁶ Nevertheless, there is no further evidence on the extension of civil society influence and impact on the cooperation agenda debated on those forums.

SSDC projects implemented by civil society are not numerous, even though it is possible to identify different participation conceptions guiding those practices. Having civil society's expertise as a departing point (Berrón and Brant, 2015) there are examples of civil society implementing SSDC projects on government's behalf (Santos, 2013) and supported by government to implement their own projects (Suyama e Pomeroy, 2014). Those two conceptions are aligned with the "perverse confluence" identified by Dagnino (2004) that emerged, in Latin America with the end of authoritarian regimes, between a neoliberal minimal state project with responsibilities' transfer to civil society and a bottom-up democratizing and participatory project.

It is also worth emphasizing the role of civil society organized sectors in the formulation of narratives and recommendations to influence certain agendas of cooperation. Standing out, as example is the Food and Nutrition Security coalition with evidences of civil society's influence in the SSDC agenda. The Food Security Network (REDSAN) became recognized for mobilizing the civil society's participation and the creation of the CPLP's Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CPLP, 2012). CONSEA has been actively involved as a participant in the Food Purchase Program Africa (Beghin, 2014), raising the importance of social accountability and civil society mobilization in its international delivery (Leite et al, 2013). Mercosul's Specialized Meeting on Family Agriculture (REAF) has achieved to consolidate it's own Fund to promote its projects and assure its activities' sustainability (Maluf and Prado, 2015).

Overall, there are no indications of a government strategy to engage with society in SSDC policy formulation as a whole and the existing initiatives are rather discretionary. One hypothesis that might be formulated to explain existing spaces and initiatives is that those respond to two combined factors: the existence of civil society mobilization on specific subjects and the respective governmental interlocutor's willingness and openness. Civil society's international experience seems to be a common characteristic among major organizations and networks engaged with SSC debate and initiatives.

Domestic Influence and policy spaces

SSC is an emerging policy space in Brazil. Many of the narratives are still being formed and concepts and boundaries of the debate are fluid, including the same definition of SSC and its relation to other foreign policy strategies (Leite et al, 2014). Despite important drawbacks, such as lack of funding, public information and difficulties

³⁶ Those spaces can be classified as sectorial national councils, forums related to regional integration and specific subjects committees, promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency's General Secretariat's International Affairs Advisory department.

identifying and reaching government interlocutors to channel demands; there is a small but committed group that has managed to advance in building constituency, providing information and building spaces for debating and monitoring Brazil's actions abroad³⁷. This group gathers actors mostly identified with progressive sectors, as diverse as academics, think-tanks and individuals previously engaged with development debates from the perspective of Brazil as a recipient and also, prominent non-governmental organizations, usually with a history of transnational activity related with multilateral governance, especially international trade (Leite et al., 2014).

Although with a certain, and sometimes important, degree of diversity, the group's main concerns are related to the externalization of their own domestic agenda, in the pursuit of more equitable, sustainable and democratic development. This means that great attention is given to social and environmental impacts of Brazilian government and private sector's initiatives in southern societies. In the SSC agenda this framework is translated in demands and advocacy strategies over (i) a public debate on a SSDC policy's objectives and modalities; (ii) a more accountable, transparent and efficient institutional and legal framework, (iii) the recognition of civil society as actors in development and IDC; (iv) the National Council of Foreign Relations establishment; (v) more transparency and enhanced public debate regarding financial cooperation, in particular BNDES operations abroad (Di Ciommo and Amorim, 2015; Berrón and Brant, 2015; Leite et al, 2014).

Transnational solidarity networks and the activist cooperation

Under the framework of neoliberal prescriptions' impacts, imposed by international financial institutions dominated by developed economies, Brazilian social movements have been forging, during the last two decades, political alliances with Southern civil society. Notwithstanding, these relations are not always framed as SSC and many organizations prefer to define their practices in terms of solidarity, political ties or dialogues among southern peoples. Among the main objectives of those relations, organizations cite the construction of an international resistance's agenda to the hegemonic development model, the search for southern societies' autonomy and sovereignty, common development challenges' resolution and southern civil society's strengthening (OBS, forthcoming).

Main activities developed under this framework of "activist cooperation" (Marcolini, 2014) can be summarized as a mix of cooperation and contentious activities, centred in knowledge exchange, supporting political mobilization, coordinating international agendas of resistance and proposing alternatives. The thematic agenda is diversified and include projects related to Human Rights, Environment, Food and Nutrition Security, Gender and Democracy (OBS, forthcoming). Labour unions, peasant's organizations and the Landless Workers Movement are representative of this activist and autonomous cooperation among civil societies (Berron and Brant, 2015).

³⁷ See Poskitt et al (2015) and Di Ciommo and Amorim (2015) for main actors identified.

Although departing from different positions, the cases of ProSavana³⁸ and BRICS Bank exemplify two recent emblematic agendas of contentious politics among southern civil society. In the case of Prosavana, the alliance between Brazilian and Mozambican social movements raises a direct dispute against governments' development cooperation initiative. Movements' previous relations, shared background and common political agenda facilitated coordination and produced a series of contentious activities such as the two editions of the Peoples Triangular Conference (2013 and 2014); the "Open Letter from Mozambican civil society organizations and movements to the presidents of Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan", supported by Brazilian and Japanese organizations and individuals; visits to Brazil's savannah, a joint advocacy's agenda that pressures the three governments for more transparency and participation (Mello, 2013). The BRICS Bank, by other hand, relies on previous mobilization related to Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and is still forging itself as a concrete opportunity for engagement (Mineiro, 2013), but a homogenous position from civil society is still far from being accomplished.

Civil society engagement and the Fortaleza Summit

The self-organized parallel events in Brazil and South Africa had in common the fact that they were naturally informed by local contexts, supported by large international NGO's and northern political foundations, and established constant dialogue with government representatives during the run-up process. Brazilian Government has promoted a meeting with Sherpas and attended civil society's convened events, sharing information about developments in negotiations. Pattern of Brazilian civil society engagement with BRICS has been mainly oriented to the construction of transnational networks and domestic influence and constituency building.

Brazilian civil society has joined efforts during the run-up process for Fortaleza, organizing events, publications and fostering research agendas nationally and internationally, with other BRICS civil society's partners. Right after Durban, Brazilian Network for Peoples Integration (REBRIP³⁹), Brazilian civil society's prominent interlocutor for international trade agendas, and Socioeconomic Studies Institute (INESC) published a book entitled "The BRICS and Social Participation from the Perspective of Civil Society Organizations", co-authored by BRICS civil society's partners, discussing the role of civil society in influencing BRICS agenda. Oxfam also promoted in 2013 a workshop to discuss civil society engagement in foreign policy, including mobilization strategies around the 6th summit.

³⁸ This Brazil-Japan-Mozambique triangular initiative combines technical cooperation with private sector investment initiatives through the Nacala Fund. ProSavana is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique's tropical savannah, based on the experiences of the Brazil's *Cerrado* development. The aim is to attract private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.

³⁹ REBRIP is a network that gathers most prominent Brazilian NGOs, social movements, trade union organizations and professional associations. It was established in 1998 and formally constituted in 2001, as part of Brazilian civil society's mobilization against the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Its main focus are foreign policy, regional integration and international trade.

In 2014, REBRIP, the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ABONG) and Equit Institute promoted the international seminar “Equity and Social-environmental justice in BRICS”⁴⁰. The seminar counted with other BRICS civil society’s representatives and aimed to explore possible common agendas. The Seminar allowed an in-depth analysis of commonalities between BRICS countries regarding their state-led development models based on economic growth and natural and human resources’ intensive exploitation, setting a critic tone for the Fortaleza agenda. Against this background, strategies agreed for the organization of parallel events were aligned with Fortaleza’s local context, a city highly affected and mobilized against big infrastructure projects. As stated in the Seminar’s final report, all voices were critical to the nature of BRICS although there were different positions regarding engaging with BRICS: some considering it pointless since it was just another instrument to reproduce domination relations, others advocating for the importance of monitoring its developments and identifying opportunities for civil society’s influence (REBRIP, ABONG, Instituto Equit, 2014). Finally, a meeting between civil society representatives and Sherpas was organized by the Brazilian Government, as the grouping’s Presidency, few days before the Summit. Attendees included CSOs from the five countries and Sherpas Brazil, South Africa and India.

Nevertheless, Fortaleza’s radicalized political context and the up-coming presidential elections’ tight dispute arose caution on whether a high profile civil society event criticizing Brazil’s engagement in BRICS would be counter effective. Against this background, the parallel summit consisted in a Seminar entitled “Dialogues on Development: the BRICS from the peoples’ perspective”, organized by REBRIP and parallel meetings; attended mainly by Brazilian and South African and, in a lesser extent, Indian CSOs.

The VI BRICS Summit’s side events were hosted to debate over BRICS countries development models, the BRICS national development banks, socio and environmental inequality and financing of infrastructure and the NDB, which was still under negotiations⁴¹. A street mobilization was also organized to express discontentment over the New Development Bank as an instrument to finance big infrastructure projects. It is also worth emphasizing the presence of grassroots movements and the expressive women’s participation and the First BRICS Women’s Forum’s organization.

During the parallel meetings organized in Fortaleza, for instance, CSOs agreed some common agendas for future work, such as the NDB, BRICS’ transnational corporations and human rights and civil society participation. These agreed focus issues provide opportunities to connect with the agendas of grassroots organizations in the BRICS countries, such as social and environmental conflicts resulting from infrastructure projects and mining and other extractive industries, as well as global agendas such as

⁴⁰ Supported by Oxfam International, Action Aid and European Comission.

⁴¹ Side events were supported by Oxfam International, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Action Aid and Ford Foundation.

tax justice and wealth and income inequality. The Fortaleza meetings also identified strategies to tackle issues of representation as well as the weakness of links between national and global agendas.

These decisions showed that in Fortaleza civil society groups had managed to reach agreement on the urgent need to construct a common discourse to contest dominant framings of the meaning of development (particularly sustainable development, the stated aim of the NDB), to raise national awareness and connect with grassroots movements to build domestic constituencies, as well as to engage with local populations affected by development projects within each country and in non-BRICS countries receiving NDB projects or other BRICS investments.

Aligned with the strategies agreed and the minimal consensus reached over BRICS nature, main actors in Brazilian civil society responsible for Fortaleza parallel summits have declined to participate in the Civic Forum promoted by Russian government in 2015. The main critic expressed by REBRIP lies on the fact that the CIVIC Forum did not respect basic participatory principles, that draw on the Brazilian experience as well as on the Durban and Fortaleza self organized events, such as civil society's autonomy and diversity, including most affected populations' participation. Civic Forum was considered a "pseudo space for participation in an authoritarian manner, where the Russian government decided who would participate, what themes would be discussed and the methodology to be adopted" (Carvalho and Beghin, 2015) and participation in such space would thus express "surrender to co-optation and political capture by the governments" (ibid).

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE BRICS: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

As the previous sections have shown, civil society engagement with both SSDC and BRICS development agendas has grown significantly in recent years across the three 'IBSA' countries. However, this growth has been from a very low initial base, and in all three countries the relatively small group of CSOs that has engaged most actively has struggled to engage the mass of development-oriented NGOs and social movements, which have tended to remain exclusively focused on domestic issues. The BRICS Summits held in India, South Africa and Brazil in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively helped to energise engagement in the three countries, as they provided a powerful opportunity for bringing together debates on their domestic development policies and on their international roles.

The difficulty has been with sustaining engagement, particularly where coordination mechanisms are weak and there is no permanent formal space for dialogue with government on SSDC and other development-related aspects of foreign policy. Although

South African civil society did launch a pioneering effort at coordination with the establishment of SAFIS in 2011, this has proved hard to sustain. Brazil's civil society coordination efforts started more slowly, but have since developed more strongly – perhaps because these efforts were able to build on the foundation established by REBRIP, as well as the growing awareness of civil society regarding Brazil's new position in international system. Indian civil society has been able to make strategic use of the establishment of the FIDC as a permanent structure for dialogue with government and academia, albeit one that has increasingly come to operate as an 'invited space' rather than a jointly-owned one.

Since 2012 the political environment for engagement in all three countries has become less favourable. In South Africa, relations between civil society and the ANC have soured further, particularly after the 2014 elections revealed growing public anger over alleged corruption and splits in the labour movement's once-solid support for the ANC-led government (Plaut 2014). In India, the BJP's victory in 2014 resulted in the accession to power of a Prime Minister who is regarded with suspicion by many CSOs. In Brazil civil society's relations with the Workers' Party have remained strong, but the latter's ability to respond to CSOs' proposals on SSDC and other foreign policy issues has been seriously undermined both by budget cuts and by a prolonged political crisis that has made the government more dependent on alliances with political and economic interests that are often hostile to civil society agendas.

It has also become clear over this period that even without these shifts, it was never likely that these three countries would fulfil the hopes of those who looked to the 'Democratic Emerging Powers' as potential champions for global rights-based development agendas (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013). This is in part because the South-South Cooperation tradition of non-interference has historically made these countries reluctant to accept CSOs' criticisms of the social and environmental impacts of their 'win-win' partnerships with other developing countries – whose governments, they insist, have entered into these partnerships voluntarily, with none of the coercion or conditionalities that characterise North-South aid.

It is also because the IBSA countries' policy elites share a state-centric vision that tends to regard civil society as little more than an occasionally useful collaborator for delivering development programmes, and certainly not as an equal partner in the definition of national priorities and development strategies. Particularly where foreign policy is concerned, they tend to operate in much closer alignment with 'national champion' corporations than with CSOs, and within their South-South Cooperation programmes their lavish provision of state-subsidised credit for strategic international corporate expansion contrasts strongly with their weak and ad hoc arrangements for supporting civil society engagement in technical cooperation. They combine this preference for corporate over civil society partnerships with a strongly nationalistic approach that makes them reluctant to take advice from civil society groups whose funding often comes from abroad; in some cases, suspicion of CSOs' links with Northern donors who

are often seen as geopolitical adversaries has been channelled into restrictive measures or even outright harassment (Poskitt *et al.* 2015).

As a result of these trends, the 'enabling environment' for civil society engagement in SSDC and other foreign policy agendas across the IBSA countries has started to converge with that of their fellow BRICS, Russia and China, where CSOs are excluded from key policy decisions but increasingly encouraged to engage in outsourced service provision. Russian and Chinese CSOs have long faced much more severe restrictions than those that are beginning to affect their counterparts in the IBSA countries, and continue to operate in an environment that is far more politically closed than is the case for democratic India, Brazil or South Africa. However, CSOs have also come to be seen by the Chinese and Russian governments as useful partners for service delivery, especially at the subnational level, where there has been a rapid growth in innovative civil society-led development projects (Buxton and Konovalova 2012; Simon 2011).

The degree of civil society engagement with development cooperation also shows signs of convergence across the BRICS. Chinese and Russian civil society representatives interviewed during our research commented on the willingness of officials working on their countries' development cooperation strategies to listen to their advice and discuss practical strategies for collaboration, as long as civil society avoided any suggestion that it was questioning the government's overall policy directions. Some Russian and Chinese CSOs – particularly those with strong government links, such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation – have been actively encouraged to operate overseas, particularly in disaster relief or response to emergencies such as the West African Ebola outbreak (Poskitt *et al.* 2015).

Civil society-state engagement on development cooperation across all of the BRICS has two other common elements. The first is the role played by international NGOs and foundations such as Oxfam, ActionAid, the Heinrich Böll Foundation or the Ford Foundation. In addition to supporting constituency-building and advocacy activities on development cooperation within different BRICS countries, these organisations have played a key role in building links among CSOs from different countries, in the absence of pre-existing cross-BRICS civil society coordination mechanisms. While this support has been greatly valued by partner CSOs, it has also raised questions about power relations and who controls the agenda, in a context that has long been marked by North-South divisions in global civil society development policy fora such as the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (Poskitt *et al.* 2015).

The second common element is the importance of think-tanks and other academic actors in brokering dialogue. In some cases, think-tanks have emerged as possible allies for CSOs seeking access to development cooperation policy processes, given their privileged position as government interlocutors (Poskitt *et al.* 2015). This has been the case in Brazil, and to a lesser extent in South Africa. In India and China think-tanks have helped to create spaces with which civil society can engage, but have also tended to ensure that those spaces adhere to government agendas rather than allowing civil

society to play an agenda-setting role. This has been even more apparent in Russia, where government has tended to use think-tanks and other academic actors, rather than NGOs and social movements, as privileged representatives of 'civil society' in formal dialogue spaces, in a model initially developed for the 'Civil20' gathering that took place as part of the country's G20 Presidency in 2013 (Poskitt *et al.* 2015).

This model characterised the first ever official 'Civil BRICS' forum, which was established by Russia as part of the 2015 BRICS Summit process. This was billed as an inclusive process promoting open dialogue on a wide-ranging set of issues, but CSO interviewees from outside Russia complained that the agenda was largely controlled by representatives of government-linked academic institutions. Suspicion of the intentions of the Russian presidency led many of the most influential CSOs from other BRICS countries to stay away from the Civil BRICS forum, and provoked a lively debate between sceptics calling for a fully autonomous 'Peoples' Forum' and advocates of engagement in the government-sponsored Civil BRICS space (Salles de Carvalho and Beghin 2015; Krishnaswamy 2015). As discussed in the next section, the focus of the search for an engagement model capable of bringing together CSOs from across the 'BRICS-from-below' / 'BRICS-from-the-middle' / 'BRICS-from-above' spectrum has now shifted to India and China, hosts of the 2016 and 2017 BRICS Summits.

Notwithstanding the momentum that official Head of States' summits provides, other official BRICS decision-making instances (such as the Ministerial meetings and the Justice Forum) or official debate forums (e.g. the Academic Forum, the Think Tank Council and the Business Council) may also provide entry-points for civil society actors. Since intra-bloc cooperation activities and agreements are diverse and extensive (covering trade, agriculture, health, science and technology and food and nutritional security, to name but a few), policy-oriented non-governmental organizations and social movements with sectorial knowledge and experience may be able to establish dialogue channels around specific agendas. Nevertheless, information and consultations are discretionary, depending on the willingness of each government's official representatives to create meaningful spaces for engagement. As discussed below, joint BRICS financial initiatives such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the future Green Fund may also establish themselves as concrete opportunities for engagement, with different civil society networks already monitoring crucial aspects of the NDB's conception and implementation plans, as well as engaging domestically with executive and legislative actors to influence their governments' positions on the bank, especially with regard to human rights standards⁴².

Besides these ad hoc engagements driven by the official agenda, civil society networks have been establishing autonomous spaces for dialogue and preparing themselves to monitor BRICS initiatives and build common understandings on BRICS issues, including more in depth knowledge of other BRICS countries' contexts and enhanced skills for

⁴² For instance, Brazilian organizations have submitted considerations regarding the NDB's socio-environmental and human rights policies to the Government of Brazil (Bank on Human Rights, 2014).

engagement around the domestic and international development impact of the grouping's activities. In India, Brazil and South Africa there is a growing recognition that cross-BRICS engagement – and thus the strengthening of mutual understanding with Russian and Chinese civil society groups – is an unavoidable necessity, given the extent to which the BRICS grouping has eclipsed the IBSA alliance of 'Democratic Emerging Powers'. In Fortaleza, participating organizations have reached a minimum consensus over BRICS nature, the need to frame a common and alternative meaning for sustainable development from BRICS civil societies' perspective and the importance to engage with grassroots movements and build domestic constituencies. However, the momentum of cross-BRICS mobilisation proved hard to sustain, given the divisions over participation in the Civic BRICS and the limited presence in Moscow of organisations that had played a key role in civil society mobilisations around the Durban and Fortaleza Summits. In the final section of this chapter we review the prospects for future engagement, including key challenges around the choice of engagement strategies, linkages between local and global issues and consolidating spaces that guarantee both coordination and legitimate representation.

CONCLUSIONS

As we have discussed in the previous sections, engagement around the official BRICS Head of States' summits started in 2012, with the organization of a series of outreach meetings ahead of the Delhi Summit, then in Durban (2013) and Fortaleza (2014) with the organization of civil society's self-organized parallel meetings to the Official Summits and, finally, culminated in Russia (2015) with the organization of the official, though contested, first BRICS Civic Forum.

Civil society is mobilized to build knowledge and linkages within BRICS bloc's consolidation process, through international networking, domestic constituency building, engagement with BRICS' Sherpas and governments' officials, and consolidating initiatives such as the BRICS Trade Union Forum and parallel civil society movements' summits. While BRICS' Trade Unions publicly supports bloc's initiatives and presents straightforward demands (União Geral dos Trabalhadores, 2014)⁴³; BRICS non governmental organizations and social movements' mobilization presents a much more complex kaleidoscope of actors, visions and strategies, that in common claim the urge to forge critical international alliances (Brasil de Fato, 2014). This recent cumulative process of transnational engagement has evolved from an unfamiliar agenda to a diversified criticism.

Civil society seems to be searching for a common ground among evaluations that varies from opposing BRICS sub-imperialist interests and its investment's social and

⁴³ Composed of representatives of workers from the five nations. In 2014, the 3rd BRICS Trade Union Forum expressed the claim of its recognition as an institutional space within the formal structure of the group and the NBD.

environmental impacts to constructive criticism that recognises BRICS' social and economic inclusiveness achievements. This disjuncture leads to different positions over the format of engagement and weakens the scope of broad alliances. By one hand, a policy-oriented advocacy engagement, where civil society acts as governments' critics but constructive partners, that support the bloc's stances for transforming global governance power balance and take possible opportunities to influence BRICS project, based on the valued addition of their own expertise in social policies formulation and implementation (Poskitt et al, 2015). By the other hand, a more contentious oriented engagement addresses BRICS' maintenance role of capitalist world-system, given its focus on growth and infrastructure development, significantly related to natural resources conflicts, which could lead to a "race to the bottom" (Guerrero, 2013).

Another disjuncture relates to the fragile link between local and national concerns and global agendas. Much of civil society's engagement in BRICS has to do with the externalization of their own domestic agendas, which resonate either as agreements intra-bloc or arrangements that will have impact in extra-bloc countries such as the NBD. Nevertheless, BRICS solely focus does not generate enough traction among domestic constituencies and so far this agenda has not fully connected with public goods debates or other global and regional processes (John, 2012), that would highlight BRICS civil societies demands' commonalities, as well as provide a broader mobilising framework and long-term objectives and strategies.

As important as transnational networking is national coordination. Due to the complex nature of foreign policy issues and the apparently distant implications of BRICS decisions to national grassroots social movements, main actors engaged with the debate have primarily been restricted to international NGOs, think tanks, academics and few non governmental organisations, all well-versed in international processes. This raises issues of representation and makes coordination and outreach on a national level as a priority issue to be tackled (Tandon and Bandyopadhyay, 2013). Civil society engaged with BRICS are well aware of the challenges described so far and is forging its future agenda in response to them, as the debate in Fortaleza has shown.

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ANEXO 4. LEITE, I. C., SUYAMA, B., WAISBICH, L., POMEROY, M. (2014). BRAZIL'S ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE. BRIGHTON: INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES.

EVIDENCE REPORT

No 59

Rising Powers in International Development

Brazil's Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate

Iara Costa Leite, Bianca Suyama, Laura Trajber Waisbich and Melissa Pomeroy, with Jennifer Constantine, Lizbeth Navas-Alemán, Alex Shankland and Musab Younis

May 2014

The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Rising Powers in International Development theme.

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May 2014

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Acronyms

ABC	Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)
ABDI	Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial (Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development)
ABONG	Associação Brasileira de ONGs (Brazilian NGOs Association)
AfDF	African Development Fund
APEX	Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency)
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAMEX	Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Commerce)
CAPES	Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Brazilian Higher Education Coordination Agency)
CGFOME	A Coordenação-Geral de Ações Internacionais de Combate à Fome (General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger, attached to the Ministry of External Relations)
CGU	Controladoria Geral da União (Office of the Comptroller General)
CNM	National Confederation of Municipalities
CNPq	Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (Brazilian National Research Council)
COBRADI	<i>Relatório sobre Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional</i> (Report on the Brazilian Cooperation for International Development)
COFIG	Export Financing and Guarantee Committee
CONARE	Comitê Nacional para os Refugiados (Brazilian National Committee for Refugees)
CONSEA	Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Brazilian National Food Security Council)
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries)
CSO	Civil society organisation
CUT	Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Central Workers' Union)
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
Embrapa	Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation)
ENAP	Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (Brazilian National School of Public Administration)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FGV	Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)
FIESP	Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo)
Fiocruz	Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, attached to the Brazilian Ministry of Health)
FNPM	National Front of Mayors
FOCEM	Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural e Fortalecimento do Mercosul (Mercosul Structural Convergence Fund)
FUNAG	Fundação Alexandre Gusmão (Alexandre Gusmão Foundation, attached to the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations)
FUNEC	Fundo Especial de Cooperação Técnica (Special Technical Cooperation Fund)
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)

GR-RI	Grupo de Reflexão sobre Relações Internacionais (Reflection Group on International Relations)
GTI-AHI	Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial para Ajuda Humanitária Internacional (Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBASE	Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Institute for Social and Economic Analysis)
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum
IDA	International Development Association
IDC	International development cooperation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INESC	Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (Institute of Socioeconomic Studies)
IPEA	Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute for Applied Economic Research)
IR	International relations
ITC	International technical cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LGBT	Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
MAF	Programa Mais Alimentos África (More Food Africa Programme)
MCTI	Ministério de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation)
MD	Ministério da Defesa (Ministry of Defence)
MDA	Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (Ministry of Agrarian Development)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDIC	Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade)
MDS	Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social (Social Development Ministry)
MEC	Ministério da Educação (Education Ministry)
Mercosul	South American Countries' Common Market
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPOG	Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão (Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management)
MRE	Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Ministry of External Relations), also known as Itamaraty
MST	Movimento dos Sem Terra (Landless Movement)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PAA	Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Purchase Programme)
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
PALOP	Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (Portuguese-speaking African countries)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PP	Partido Progressista (Progressive Party)
PROEX	Programa de Financiamento à Exportações (Export Financing Programme)
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party)
REBRIP	Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos (Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples)
SAE	Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, linked to the presidency)

SENAI	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial (Brazilian National Service for Industrial Apprenticeship)
SG-PR	Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República (General Secretariat of the Presidency)
SSDC	South–South Development Cooperation
TCDC	Technical cooperation among developing countries
TCTP	Third Country Training Programme
UN	United Nations
UNASUL	União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Union of South American Nations)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive summary

The international development cooperation architecture has changed dramatically over the last decade. The global context, characterised by a lingering financial crisis and the emergence of new powers, has brought South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC) to the core of international development debate. The growing influence of emerging countries, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as development cooperation providers requires a deeper understanding of how and to what extent these countries are promoting sustainable and inclusive development by cooperating with partners in the global South. To be able to answer these questions, the national dynamics need to be unpacked by mapping institutions, ideas, and interests informing decision-making processes, and shaping, not only policy priorities, but also the effectiveness of development cooperation.

Brazil is in the spotlight and Brazilian cooperation, in all its different modalities (from technical, scientific and technological, educational, and humanitarian cooperation to contributions to international organisations, refugee support and protection, and peace operations), has risen to unprecedented levels in recent years. According to official data, Brazilian development cooperation increased from US\$160 million in 2005 to more than US\$900 million in 2010. In that period, the country's technical cooperation disbursements grew almost fourfold and its humanitarian cooperation expanded from less than half a million dollars in 2005 to US\$161 million in 2010. However, interviews and the current budget freeze on the Brazilian Cooperation Agency's (ABC) activities indicate that the upward trend may have changed in the last three years.

However, Brazil's prominent role has been accompanied by persistent national development challenges and by challenges in its development cooperation's institutional framework that hinder overall planning, coordination and a sustainable flow of resources. Nevertheless, there is a growing number of national institutions, civil society organisations and thinktanks directly involved in and/or debating SSDC in Brazil. There have also been announcements of a new agency, a White Paper on foreign policy and the creation of a foreign policy council, all pointing to the fact that the SSDC agenda is at a critical juncture in the country. It is now essential to draw on the recent history and current challenges and opportunities facing Brazil's SSDC to inform debates and political choices.

The State of the Debate report captures this particular moment of Brazil's engagement in international development cooperation by gathering and analysing the main ideas and narratives, institutions and interests informing the country's current development cooperation practices. This effort aims primarily at contributing to an evidence-based debate within Brazil on its international development engagements, as is explained in the introductory section. The second part describes the scope and methodology of the report, explaining the focus on technical cooperation. This is not only due to Brazil's growing international recognition but also because this modality involves a broad range of national partners and has a great potential to strengthen a national constituency for development cooperation.

Section 3 provides an overview of the origins of Brazilian development cooperation's principles and narratives, showing how the country's historical engagement as a receiver of development cooperation informs its current involvement in SSDC. The study points to current narratives (such as horizontality, non-conditionality and being demand-driven) that result from how the government has experienced and perceived being an aid recipient. Recognition of the support given to the advancement of some particular sectors is at the same time accompanied by resentment towards asymmetric relations and interference, which are seen as the main drivers for low and inadequate developmental outcomes. Though these narratives find some resonance among civil society groups, many tend to have a more positive view of international cooperation in Brazil's democratisation efforts.

More broadly, it is argued that Brazilian traditional foreign policy principles (such as pragmatism, pacifism and non-intervention) and the collective national perception of the country's international identity as a 'middle-power', an 'intermediate' and 'system-affecting state' belonging to the global South and serving as a bridge or a mediator in international affairs, also influence the current discourse on development cooperation. Brazil's development trajectory plays an important role in shaping the country's identity as a new cooperation provider, projecting its image as a developmental state promoting poverty reduction and social inclusion. Engagement in technical cooperation is seen as fitting all of these narratives through different angles: helping Brazil to build on its soft power, reaffirming its 'diplomacy for development', and its identity as the champion of developing nations.

In the fourth section, the study draws a tentative picture of Brazil's profile and priorities in different SSDC modalities. It contrasts the official discourse on policy priorities with the publicly available figures coming from official reports (which now cover the period from 2005 to 2010), and from technical cooperation data from ABC. In the absence of a comprehensive national development cooperation policy and up-to-date statistics, the figures reflect part of a larger and overlapping landscape of development cooperation modalities. Patterns and tendencies are thus treated with caution, emphasising the need for more in-depth analysis.

Between 2005 and 2010, technical cooperation delivered by several federal agencies has increased almost fourfold. Data related to initiatives that are coordinated by the ABC reveal that Latin America is the major geographical recipient in terms of the number of projects, while African countries receive the majority of ABC funds. Sectors vary across regions, with agriculture, health and education (including vocational training) being the three main areas. These traditional sectors have been accompanied by emerging sectors, mainly public security. Beyond geographical and sectoral allocation, the nature and implementation of technical cooperation defines the key features of Brazilian development cooperation. This is demonstrated in the priority given to 'structuring projects', the increasing intermingling of differing modalities and the expansion of trilateral cooperation agreements, notably in Africa.

Brazil's profile as a cooperation provider is a result of the interplay between numerous ideas, institutions and interests. As discussed in Section 5 of the report, informality and dispersion are central features of Brazilian cooperation's institutional framework. ABC, currently part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), is just one among a myriad of institutions making decisions and implementing cooperation initiatives. Currently, there are divergent proposals to reform this system: one is to create a new agency in charge of development cooperation, trade and investment, and the other to strengthen ABC by boosting its human and financial resources.

A second argument is that the fragmentation of decision-making calls into question the idea that Brazilian technical cooperation is purely an instrument of foreign policy – if the latter is interpreted through traditional literature lenses according to which foreign policy is a state policy developed and led by MRE, in isolation from other actors. Alternatively, there are numerous cooperation ideas and practices, and they often respond to a series of parallel (and sometimes conflicting) strategies held by different actors beyond the MRE: the presidency, ministries and other implementing agencies, the private sector, civil society, and traditional donors. It is therefore not an instrument of a single policy but of a multiplicity of interests.

Thus, findings show no clear indication that ABC responds to one single, or coherent, national public policy or strategy. However, that does not mean that technical cooperation is not influenced by foreign policy priorities. The research shows that technical cooperation may be a mechanism to maintain and/or foster Brazilian political and economic interests abroad. Conversely, the presidency is a key actor in fostering partnerships and defining priorities for development cooperation. Policy shifts from one head of state to another are clear: from

Cardoso's health diplomacy, to Lula's focus on fighting poverty and hunger, and President Rousseff's promotion of Brazilian commercial interests.

Regarding policy implementation actors, ministries and implementing agencies take part in international policy diffusion networks, promoting their national work abroad, and thus generating international demands for those successful policies and programmes. Implementation can happen with or without ABC's supervision and oversight. Findings show that the alignment of implementing agencies with broad governmental priorities is a key factor in the expansion and sustainability of their engagement abroad.

The analysis of interest groups found little information available on the links between geographical and sectoral allocations of technical cooperation and private sector investments. There is, however, a correlation between commercial and investment flows and cooperation initiatives, but causality needs to be further explored. Civil society and social movements have gone from implementing actors in the past to participants, in formal and informal spaces, of the policy debate on Brazilian technical cooperation and on SSDC. Existing participatory mechanisms related to food and nutritional security and humanitarian cooperation, for example, are seen today as models for citizen participation, and could also inform ongoing discussions on participation in foreign policymaking, beyond SSDC issues.

Unpacking the legislative branch, the National Congress is still mainly reactive to the agenda set by the Executive. Despite the lack of a specific caucus or organised group on international development cooperation, important initiatives have happened in the past decade, such as the creation of the Parliamentary Group on Brazil–Africa, and the debates on food aid and solidarity diplomacy. Findings show that Congress is slowly, but steadily, acting as a check-and-balance force on cooperation issues, and has the potential to build constituency around development cooperation in Brazil.

Finally, traditional donors and international organisations have not only played a key role in promoting Brazilian 'development solutions' abroad, but have also financially supported and operationalised Brazilian engagement in other countries. Traditional donors' mediation often influences the demands that reach the Brazilian government, and they are currently partnering with Brazil on trilateral cooperation arrangements. The description of the various actors involved in technical cooperation indicates the complexity of the interests at play, beyond the narrative of being demand-driven.

In the sixth section, the study also explores current policy debates around Brazilian SSDC. Such debates are embryonic and often fragmented, made up mostly of ad hoc and informal spaces. Despite the apparent small public constituency on the topic, existing debates allow for discussion on both specific policy aspects of Brazilian current developmental practices (geographical and sectoral priorities, budget allocation, implementation challenges, developmental impact), but also on the framework of Brazilian cooperation policymaking – including transparency, accountability, and participation. Less critical and incipient traditional policy debates in the media and academia contrast with civil society actors that are contesting official discourses and problematising political choices.

Five key issues being debated are: (1) the so-called uniqueness of Brazilian cooperation; (2) demands to recognise the role of civil society in the policies currently being 'exported' elsewhere and their legitimacy as actors in SSDC; (3) the need for more systematic publicly available information on Brazilian development cooperation, especially financial cooperation provided by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES); (4) the reiteration of the need to treat international cooperation as a public policy, promoting an inclusive process to foster debate on: what is understood as SSDC, why Brazil should cooperate, and the relationship between the different modalities coexisting; and (5) the need to democratise foreign policy by creating a council and/or a national conference.

The concluding section emphasises that efforts, such as the two official reports that systematise data on Brazilian development cooperation, are helping to assess the complex puzzle that represents the diversity of Brazilian cooperation and at the same time set the basis for the construction of a national policy. The fact that the main features of Brazilian development cooperation provision are still under construction can be seen as an opportunity to reflect on lessons learned by the various agencies involved in development cooperation. It is also an opportunity to engage various stakeholders in the debate and to build a system that is both coherent with its guiding principles and realistic with the challenges imposed by Brazil's national agenda and the tension amongst multiple domestic interests.

1 Introduction

The international development cooperation architecture has changed dramatically over the last decade. On the one hand, the diversification of providers, approaches and themes has opened up new debates on how to improve effectiveness. On the other hand, traditional development models have been increasingly challenged due to the current financial, food and climate crises, thus questioning the capacity of such models to generate sustainable social inclusion in the South.

The influence of emerging countries such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is also rapidly increasing, including their role as providers of official and non-official South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC). Brazil's role in development cooperation is marked by a wide recognition of its development experiences as potentially useful for other governments, as well as for international organisations and other actors engaged in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Beyond the growing interest in Brazil's international engagements, the current critical juncture in international development cooperation provides an extra impetus to understanding the state of the debate within Brazil on this issue, as well as the role played by ideas, institutions and interests. Brazil's growing activism in development cooperation is accompanied by the persistence of challenges to national development, as well as by challenges in its development cooperation's institutional framework that hinder a sustainable flow of resources and national planning and coordination to respond to a perceived increasing number of demands. Despite these constraints, a growing number of Brazilian actors involved in SSDC have been learning by doing and continuously reassessing modes of engagement. Within this constantly changing picture, there is a need to better understand and debate narratives, policies and practices shaping Brazilian provision of SSDC, so that particular reflection and learning processes can achieve a systemic level and contribute to an effective engagement.

This report aims to provide a snapshot of interests, institutions and ideas, including narratives and policy debates, relating to Brazil's official engagement in SSDC, mainly focusing on the provision of technical cooperation. It is divided into seven sections. Section 2 presents the methodology and scope of the research. Section 3 provides a background account of how Brazil's engagement in development cooperation has evolved in practice and in discourse in recent decades and how it relates to perceptions of the country's role in international affairs, as well as to shifting national and international politics and conceptions of development. Section 4 presents Brazil's profile as a provider of SSDC and describes its different modalities, going on to focus on the sectoral and geographic distribution of its technical cooperation. Section 5 maps and analyses the institutional framework related to Brazilian technical cooperation, decision-making processes and interest groups influencing the allocation of public resources. Section 6 focuses on policy debates and the narratives and ideas of the private sector and civil society regarding development cooperation. The final section summarises the main findings of the research and concludes with suggestions of areas for future work.

2 Research scope and methodology

International development cooperation has been traditionally framed through the conceptual framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), particularly its definition of 'Official Development Assistance' (ODA). However, emerging donors claim that South-South cooperation differs from, and is broader than, traditional development cooperation. One of the main stated differences is that the former is based on mutual benefits. According to Donald Bobiash (1992: 6), South-South cooperation refers to 'economic and political co-operation among developing countries', and its modalities include: 'co-operation among developing states in multilateral negotiations with the developed countries; promotion of South-South trade; the development of regional political and economic associations, and the provision of development assistance'.

This research focuses on the latter, which will be referred to as South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), though recognising that SSDC does not exhaust South-South cooperation and that it should not be viewed in isolation from other types of engagement (such as South-South political cooperation and South-South economic relations). Since there is no consensual definition of SSDC among Southern countries (ECOSOC 2008), this research considers it as an intersection between international development cooperation and South-South cooperation, thus encompassing the flows of technical cooperation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans among developing countries aimed at tackling development problems. SSDC has been claimed to be more effective than traditional aid as developing countries face similar development challenges. Greater potential effectiveness would also result from more horizontal relationships, mutual trust, inspiration provided by other Southern country successes and lower costs of implementation. SSDC also includes, besides official relationships, actions undertaken by the private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs).

This research focuses on Brazilian official SSDC and, specifically, on the modality known as 'technical cooperation among developing countries' (TCDC). Even though this does not represent the bulk of Brazilian SSDC (see Section 4), increasing international recognition of Brazilian development experiences has conferred a centrality to the principles and characteristics of Brazilian technical cooperation. Besides, Brazilian official technical cooperation includes a broad range of national partners, including ministries, subnational governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This means that Brazilian technical cooperation has great potential to strengthen national constituencies, supporting the allocation of public funds to promote international development. Many of the current and potential implementing agencies and groups have also been developing innovative solutions to inclusive and sustainable development. Such solutions could potentially be scaled up in a global context and used to help bring about a revision of models and paradigms within international development cooperation. For this potential to be realised, it is important to bridge the knowledge gap concerning the Brazilian architecture of technical cooperation.

The main dynamics regarding Brazilian technical cooperation cannot be fully captured if they are analysed in an isolated manner. This research will therefore explore some of the interfaces of technical cooperation with other modalities of SSDC, such as humanitarian assistance and contributions to international organisations, as well as with trade and investment.

The main intersection that will be explored in this research is related to the linkages between technical cooperation and Brazilian foreign policy, as the redefinition of Brazil as a rising power and as a global player has a crucial impact on the country's development cooperation agenda. However, emerging countries engaging in international cooperation, like traditional

donors, cannot be treated as anthropomorphic units. They encompass a collection of interests, ideas and institutions that influence the sectoral and geographic allocation of public resources.¹ Mapping these and understanding which ones shape decision-making instances (and why and how they are doing so) is crucial in order to ensure that Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation in particular, and in SSDC in general, is transparent and participatory.

The following methodology was used in each section:

- **Brazil's engagement in development cooperation (Section 3):** This section was based on a comprehensive literature review on Brazil and international development cooperation, South–South cooperation and Brazilian foreign policy. Aiming at exploring the current state of the debate in the country, priority was given to conventional sources – official and authored by scholars and diplomats – published in Brazil and/or by Brazilian authors in foreign institutions. When possible, it was cross-checked with other relevant sources. In some cases, grey literature was also included.²
- **Brazil as a provider (Section 4):** The main source of information for this section was the Brazilian official reports on international development cooperation (COBRADI) that were released in 2010 and in 2013, and that gathered data, respectively, from 2005 to 2009 and in 2010. Considering this three-year gap and lack of detailed information regarding sectoral and geographic allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, the team collected information available from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and their officials. In addition, official documents on budget allocation and execution for those missing years, ABC grey literature and figures on other modalities of South–South cooperation that were not included in COBRADI were also used. A more accurate account of the recent flows was not possible due to lack of up-to-date public systematic information, which implies that recent trends and shifts that have been identified during the research were not necessarily backed by data. Data analysis was supported by literature review and interviews with specialists and practitioners.
- **Institutions, interests, and decision-making (Section 5):** This section was based on a literature review and interviews with staff from ABC, from main implementing agencies and, to a lesser extent, from institutions that are engaged in modalities of development cooperation (in order to initially explore how technical cooperation has or has not been communicating with other modalities). The complete list of interviewees may be found in Annex 1.³ Findings from this section are preliminary and have to be further explored.
- **Policy debate (Section 6):** This section explores the views held by NGOs, the media, academia and the private sector. This section is mainly based on interviews with civil society's representatives and the private sector, as well as views and opinions shared during three focus groups that had been organised in São Paulo, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro engaging academics that work specifically on international development cooperation and SSDC (generally from the field of international relations), researchers and policy advisors from

¹ See Lancaster (2007).

² For the literature review, priority was given to Brazilian international relations journals (*Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, *Contexto Internacional* and *Política Externa*). The search was complemented by word-searching in nationwide databases, such as *Scielo*, using the words: 'cooperação internacional', 'Agência Brasileira de Cooperação', and 'sul-sul'. A review of national Master and PhD theses was done using the same keywords on the thesis database of *Portal de Periódicos Capes*. The review of official documents, statements and opinions was done using official government websites.

³ The research team guaranteed interviewees and focus group participants that they would remain anonymous, to ensure people shared their views freely.

existing foreign policy thinktanks, and representatives from NGOs, networks and social movements that have been involved in development cooperation and foreign policy discussions. The complete list of attendees can be found in Annex 2.⁴ These views are complemented by grey literature published in the last two years, authored by CSOs' representatives. Text boxes containing a short analysis of the academic debate and media coverage related to the theme of Brazilian engagement in development cooperation have also been included.

⁴ Although invitations were sent to a wide range of individuals and organisations, the meetings were mainly attended by people who had or have a close relationship with PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores – Workers' Party), and are concerned about issues of social justice, democracy and accountability.

3 Brazil's development cooperation: principles and narratives

This section explores the genesis of the principles and narratives guiding Brazil's current engagement in international development cooperation. Starting with the fact that the country has a dual engagement in the international development cooperation system (Hirst 2012; Lopes 2008), the central argument here is that Brazil's current narratives in technical cooperation are closely related to how the Brazilian government and, to a lesser extent, Brazilian CSOs have experienced and perceived being an aid recipient. Such narratives are also informed by Brazil's identity as 'belonging to the global South' (which has deeply influenced the country's foreign policy principles), by how the country sees its role in international relations and by shifting domestic ideas and politics (development models, political regimes and social mobilisation).

3.1 Brazil as an aid recipient: recognition and resentment

In most Brazilian official narratives, being an aid recipient is seen as having had a positive impact on the advancement of some domestic sectors, but also as having prevented the country from overcoming underdevelopment. A historical overview of the country's experience of foreign assistance sheds light on this ambiguity.

Specialists agree that Brazil was only marginally included in the global system of aid provision (Ayllón, Nogueira and Puerto 2007; Hirst 2011). From the 1950s, Brazil benefited from modest but sustainable aid flows coming from the OECD-DAC countries and multilateral donors.⁵ The height of Brazil's receipt of aid was during the 1960s and the 1970s when the Brazilian government, following the foreign policy principle of pragmatism, tried to link its support for Western anti-communism to receiving foreign aid to assist the country's state-led development (Leonardi 2010; Valler Filho 2007).⁶ Pragmatism, which has been a crucial element of Brazil's foreign policy (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Fonseca Jr. 1998; Lima 1982) refers to the idea that Brazilian foreign policy should adopt political realism, remain closely linked to national development strategies and avoid being constrained by ideological alignment.

During the Cold War, however, Latin America was not a priority and the actual amount of aid provided to Brazil fell short of national expectations. This generated some resentment towards traditional donors. Moreover, middle-income countries' access to aid was further limited by the 1970s global economic crisis, the general 'aid fatigue' of donors, and the establishment of graduating practices in development cooperation. By the 1980s, the Brazilian government had taken on most of the national implementation costs of foreign assistance.

According to Amado Cervo (1994), in the period up to 1989 the main bilateral donors (by number of projects) were Germany, France, Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Food and Agriculture

⁵ Although in the period up to 1983 only 0.7 per cent of the 453 projects that UNDP financed worldwide benefited Brazil (Ayllon *et al.* 2007), some authors tend to argue that financial assistance was numerically more important (Ayllon *et al.* 2007; Leonardi 2010).

⁶ Pragmatism in receiving foreign aid was first applied during the Getúlio Vargas administration in the 1930s, with negotiations with the US culminating in Brazil receiving US\$20 million in loans from the US Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK) to construct the *Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional* (CSN) steel plant in the early 1940s. For more information, see: <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/FatosImagens/CSN>

Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) figured as the main multilateral donors.

Brazilian sectors covered by international aid flows have changed over time according to national development models and the evolution of the architecture of development cooperation. Initially, during the period 1940–1960, Brazil and foreign donors converged on an economic growth-based development model, though there remained differences over the means of achieving it.⁷ During that period, the Brazilian government prioritised receiving cooperation in order to support the development of basic infrastructure and scientific and technological advances. In the 1970s, the emergence of the ‘Basic Human Needs’ approach, with its proposed focus on actions tackling poverty in rural areas, was at odds with Brazil’s official focus on economic growth. In parallel, donors’ direct support to social movements and CSOs⁸ had a significant impact on the country’s return to democracy and on the democratic reforms that followed in the 1980s.⁹ Not surprisingly, the military government perceived such international support as interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs. This preoccupation with international cooperation received by Brazilian NGOs is still present in government discourse. In an OECD-led event in 2008, the Brazilian delegation emphasised the need for government ‘supervision over the activities of NGOs in development projects’ (MRE 2008).

During the 1990s, Brazil abandoned its traditional ‘developmentalist’ strategy in favour of macroeconomic stability. Structural adjustment programmes began to be dominant¹⁰ and ODA was reoriented mainly to poverty alleviation projects (ABONG 2010; Cervo 1994). The 2000s brought another shift, with the renewal of Brazilian state-led developmentalism (Bresser-Pereira 2011), this time with a greater emphasis on social inclusion (Arbix and Martin 2010; Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro forthcoming). Social development started playing a major role in Brazilian demands for development cooperation.

Despite widespread resentment of the asymmetrical character of received assistance, there is a perception that it has nevertheless effectively contributed to fostering national human and institutional capacities in key strategic sectors, namely technology, industry and agriculture (Abreu 2013; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994). As a result, it helped consolidate success stories and national ‘islands of excellence’ (Barbosa 2011; Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Santos and Carrion 2011; Santos 2011), such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI), all of which later became active in Brazil’s engagement in technical cooperation (see Box 4.3).¹¹ From the point of view of foreign

⁷ Despite major affinities on the growth-based model, resentment of traditional donors was already significant during the period. President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961) started the ‘demonisation’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that would continue, to varying degrees, over the following decades (Almeida 2004). In the 1970s, the Brazilian government was extremely critical of shifting positions on US cooperation because they ended up affecting Brazilian nuclear ambitions during Ernesto Geisel’s administration (1974–1979). Later on, US President Carter’s policy of linking aid to pro-human rights policies was not well received in Brasília either.

⁸ The relation between the total ODA of traditional donors, their ODA to Brazil and their willingness to invest in civil society is well explored by Leonardi (2010). In his thesis, the author shows how major donors – such as Germany, Italy, Spain and France – have invested little in Brazilian CSOs when compared to smaller donors, such as the Netherlands and Sweden.

⁹ Authors tend to agree that, by funding social movements such as the Central Workers’ Union (CUT – *Central Única dos Trabalhadores*) and the Landless Movement (MST – *Movimento dos Sem Terra*) and non-governmental organisations – such as *Ação Educativa*, IBASE and *Pólis*, among others – foreign assistance has actually supported Brazil’s democratisation efforts (Campolina 2011; Landim 1993; Masagão 2011).

¹⁰ During the 1990s Brazil went through a series of unsuccessful economic stabilisation attempts, mediated by the IMF. Dissatisfaction with the IMF’s structural adjustment policies and its conditionalities was already strong at the time and is a major factor shaping Brazilian understanding of global economic governance.

¹¹ For an analysis on the Embrapa and SENAI cases see Barbosa (2011) and Gonçalves (2011), respectively. Other frequently cited examples of successful stories are the Centre for Aeronautic Technology, the Brazilian National Research Council (CNPq) and the Higher Education Coordination Agency (CAPES).

ministry officials the existence on the Brazilian side of an institutional structure designed to connect received aid to state-led national development plans (see Section 5) is seen as the main mechanism explaining this effectiveness.

By 2010, Brazil's ratio of ODA to GDP had been reduced to 0.031 (OECD 2012a; World Bank 2013). There is very little information on the subnational dynamics of this trend to unpack where reductions/increases have taken place and why. Despite this relative independence from foreign aid and the predominance of the narrative of having evolved from a recipient to a provider of technical cooperation, cooperation with other countries is still seen as an important tool to support Brazil's development.

Between 2003 and 2010, Brazil benefited from 1,800 technical cooperation projects (Brasil 2010a) and, in 2010, it received US\$661 million in ODA-like flows from DAC countries (OECD 2012a), notably from Germany, Norway, Japan, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Environment, education, agriculture, public management and health were the main targeted sectors. In 2011, Brazil received a record amount of ODA, totalling almost US\$870 million (see Annex 3). The Brazilian government also requests international cooperation in strategic sectors such as satellite technology and agro-genetic development (Hirst 2012), although in many cases the country has evolved from a recipient to a co-producer of innovation, going beyond the strict domain of international development cooperation. Embrapa's virtual laboratories – LABEX – in China, Korea, Europe and the United States are mentioned as examples of a more mature relation among the company and counterparts in other countries. Sectoral allocation of bilateral disbursements in 2010 and 2011 was mainly concentrated in social sectors and production (see Annex 4).

The recent reorientation of traditional donors – targeting new regions, closing official representations or shifting them to multi-stakeholder and trilateral ones, and channelling aid through different channels (such as international NGOs and the private sector, for instance) – was deeply felt by some sectors in Brazil, particularly by national CSOs. They claim that, despite Brazil's status as a middle-income country, it still hosts many of the world's poor (Balbis and Fernández 2011) and that development assistance and cooperation remain crucial for the sustainability of Brazilian NGOs (Masagão 2011).¹²

3.2 Principles and narratives related to Brazilian technical cooperation

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a global shift towards an emerging consensus around a more 'egalitarian philosophy' in technical cooperation (Cervo 1994). Emerging ideals of horizontality and non-conditionality have influenced the guiding principles of Brazilian technical cooperation, also resonating with the country's perceptions on its previous experiences as an aid recipient. These ideals were also closely aligned with Brazil's foreign policy principles, mainly non-intervention, autonomy, pacifism, and universalism, all of which were firmly grounded in the country's Southern identity. Such foreign policy principles are considered to guide and promote consistency in Brazilian external action. Historically, continuity in Brazilian foreign policy has prevailed over rupture even across different regimes (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Leite 2011; Lima 2005b; Vizentini 2005). Continuity is also guaranteed by having foreign policy principles enshrined in Article 4 of the 1988 federal constitution.

¹² According to data from the Brazilian NGOs Association (ABONG), financial dependency on international donors among ABONG's members was 75.9 per cent in 1993, 50.6 per cent in 2000, 39.4 per cent in 2003 and 78.3 per cent in 2007 (ABONG 2010).

Brazil's self-image in international affairs also plays a role in shaping the country's engagement with development cooperation. A prominent conception shared by politicians across the political spectrum is that of Brazil being destined to play a greater role in international affairs (Lima 2005b; Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Pecequilo 2008; Saraiva 2007). Building coalitions with other Southern countries, diversifying partners, and projecting soft power are seen as instruments that can help to guarantee Brazil's leadership in international affairs and to reduce its structural dependence (Barbosa 2011; Cepaluni and Vigevani 2007; Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Leite 2011; Lima 2005b; Puente 2010; Pecequilo 2008; Valler Filho 2007). Building on its traditional foreign policy principles and on its Southern identity, the country also repudiates coercion as an instrument for accomplishing international goals; therefore cooperation is seen as a bulwark for Brazil's international engagement.

Though belonging to the category of 'developing countries' is seen as guaranteeing preferential access to trade and differentiating responsibilities in global governance in several areas (Cozendey 2007; Ratton Sanchez Badin 2008), Brazil does not want to be seen merely as a 'developing country'; it wants recognition of its distinctive position vis-à-vis Southern countries in general. Narratives of Brazil being a 'middle-power', an 'intermediate, emerging' and 'system-affecting state', which are highly prominent in the literature (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Hurrell 2009; Lafer 2000; Lima 2005a; Saraiva 2007; Sennes 2012), have framed a collective national perception of the role of the country as an intermediary between North and South. This position, however, is not merely a self-proclaimed one: Brazil's inclusion in initiatives such as the 2007 Heiligendamm Process,¹³ as well as the leading role played by the country in establishing innovative mechanisms to finance development and in triangular arrangements with traditional donors, are clear signs that this self-perception is shared by developed countries.

Engagement in technical cooperation is seen as fitting all those narratives in different ways: as helping Brazil to build on its soft power (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010); as reaffirming its 'diplomacy for development' and its identity as the champion of developing nations (Dauvergne and Farias 2012); as cultivating hegemony in the Southern Atlantic (Morais de Sá e Silva 2005); and as a pivotal or anchor country in international development cooperation (Schlager 2007).

Brazilian diplomats and scholars, in general, subscribe to the view that the country's engagement in technical cooperation is an instrument of foreign policy. Technical cooperation is seen as a vehicle to foster relations in other domains with developing countries (Ayllón and Leite 2009; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994; Puente 2010; Valler Filho 2007). Creating favourable conditions for the achievement of economic goals abroad and gathering international support for raising Brazil's international profile on fronts such as the quest for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)¹⁴ and Brazilian candidacies in international organisations are cited as particular examples.

Brazilian identity as a development cooperation actor is also a product of the interplay between Brazil's foreign policy agenda and domestic politics. The re-emergence of South-South cooperation (see Box 3.1) in the 2000s has to be understood within the realm of state

¹³ The Heiligendamm Process was a dialogue started in 2007 between the member states of the G8 group of countries and some emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. It is considered to have been a starting point for further discussions on global governance reform.

¹⁴ Brazil's quest for a permanent seat at the UNSC has been a longstanding foreign policy priority since the 1990s. In recent years Brazil has tried to raise the issue of the Security Council reform in almost every multilateral forum, in joint efforts with other non-represented countries such as India, Germany and Japan (the G4) or through bilateral lobbying efforts with its strategic partners and permanent UNSC members. For more on the Brazilian perspective of the UNSC reform, see Brasil 2010a.

activism in the post-neoliberal setting (Hirst 2011; Leite 2012b; Morais de Sá e Silva 2009) and also in the context of the promotion of South–South best-practice transfers (Morais de Sá e Silva 2009) aiming at achieving the MDGs. Such shifts, which coincided with the Lula administration in Brazil, contributed to, and were also fuelled by, this administration’s narratives on global distributive social justice and ‘solidarity diplomacy’ (Abreu 2013; Ayllón 2012; Milani 2011).

Box 3.1 A brief historical overview of Brazilian South–South relations

Although the growing recognition of Brazil as a Southern leader is a recent phenomenon, the country’s engagement in South–South relations is not new. In Brazilian foreign policy thinking, looking South is traditionally seen as a means of universalising and diversifying partnerships, thus guaranteeing an autonomous position in the international system (Oliveira 2005). Therefore, South–South relations are seen as a pragmatic move.

Two specific historical periods marked the expansion of Brazilian South–South relations: the first under the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ of Joao Goulart’s civilian government (1961–1964), and the second under the ‘Ecumenical and Responsible Pragmatism’ of General Ernesto Geisel’s military rule (1974–1979) (Leite 2011). General Castello Branco’s administration (1964–1967) also marked the beginning of an orientation of Brazilian foreign policy towards the search for markets for higher added value products, for instance organising the first trade missions to African countries (Cervo and Bueno 2002).

Despite sharing a colonial past and the fate of underdevelopment with many developing nations, Brazil was not a protagonist in the events that brought about the emergence of the ‘Third World’ in global affairs: the Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961) conferences. The first event that Brazil actively took part in was the creation of the G-77 at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Until the 1970s Brazil maintained a strategic ambiguity in relation to Third World aspirations. Support for the movement’s development quest was not felt as strongly as support for anti-colonial struggles. While supporting anti-colonialism in general, Brazil refrained from openly condemning the presence of particular colonial rulers in Southern countries (such as in the case of the UN resolution condemning Portuguese rule in Africa). Such an ambiguous position was not welcomed by other developing countries; in 1973, for instance, Brazil was included by a number of African states in a list of countries to be subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions for supporting apartheid rule in South Africa (Pinheiro 2007). Brazil’s growing economic presence abroad, initially led by the state oil company Petrobras and later boosted by the second oil crisis, was also condemned by left-wing scholars who started seeing Brazil as a semi-peripheral country reproducing traditional exploitative relations with other Southern countries (see, for instance Carlsson 1982).

On the other hand, during the 1970s Brazil actively participated in the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (Buenos Aires 1978). Brazil had officially started providing technical cooperation in the 1960s and early 1970s, but initiatives were boosted after the Buenos Aires Conference. By the 1980s, demands for technical cooperation were already numerically more significant than projects involving received technical cooperation. Therefore, when ABC was created under the MRE in 1987, Brazil was shifting from a recipient to a provider of technical cooperation (Cervo 1994). At the time, technical cooperation was considered an instrument that could increase a country’s political and economic relations with its neighbours and with newly independent countries (Valler Filho 2007).

Just as in other Latin American countries, the place occupied by South–South relations in Brazilian foreign policy suffered a severe setback with the macroeconomic problems and democratic transition of the 1980s and 1990s (Morais de Sá e Silva 2009). A new phase began at the end of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, with Brazilian South–South cooperation being boosted by domestic and global drivers. Increasing projection of national development experiences in the context of the MDGs is seen as both resulting from and strengthening international recognition of Brazil’s state-led development model. In this new context, the traditional rationale of pragmatism in South–South relations has disappeared from the official mainstream rhetoric.

Though the element of solidarity gained centrality in the diplomatic discourse during the Lula administration, closely related to the conceptualisation of ‘non-indifference’ and to the ideals of Lula’s Workers’ Party, it was already present, to a lesser extent, in the diplomatic discourse of the preceding administration led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso.¹⁵ Solidarity, like the right to development, would be grounded in Brazil’s adherence to the principles of international law, including those contained within the United Nations Charter and the MDGs (Valler Filho 2007). It is also considered to be a national value (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; De Faria and Paradis 2011; Leite 2012b; Valler Filho 2007).¹⁶

Brazil’s official discourse is that it offers a different type of development cooperation from that provided by traditional donors. For example, official discourses emphasise that Brazil does not see itself as a ‘donor’, which would imply incorporating the asymmetries in traditional cooperation, preferring to refer to itself as a *partner* in/for development. According to the diplomat Carlos Puente (2010), even in the face of uneven development levels between Brazil and some of its partners, using the terminology ‘partner’ would help to promote a spirit of equality that is operationalised in an innovative way during the whole process of identifying the partner’s demands and jointly negotiating, designing and planning projects.

Another stated difference lies in Brazil’s opposition to a donor-driven agenda. By respecting the demand-driven principle and by avoiding supply-driven priorities Brazil claims to promote more horizontal forms of cooperation. However, absolute horizontality is difficult to achieve in practice due to differences in the level of development of recipients. This often means that the country with the highest level of relative development tends to have more weight in setting priorities or sharing knowledge. In this sense, the use of the term ‘partnership’ instead of the terms ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’ would be ‘markedly rhetorical’ (Puente 2010: 115). Márcio Corrêa (2010) from ABC, converges with Puente and also states that ‘the fact that there is political will to act in a respectful manner is not sufficient to ensure a balanced relationship of cooperation’ (Corrêa 2010: 96–7). Thus, cooperation must be empirically proven (Souza 2012).

Solidarity, or the will to ‘contribute to the social and economic progress of other peoples’ (Brasil 2010d: 9), is also a guiding principle of Brazilian cooperation. Economic and geopolitical interests are not completely denied,¹⁷ but this is not regarded as a dilemma. Brazilian technical cooperation can be both altruistic and beneficial to Brazil, contributing to fostering multifaceted relations between partners. Mutual gains have also been increasingly recognised as crucial in ensuring domestic support for technical cooperation, since the latter involves public resources.¹⁸ However, economic and commercial benefits, rather than being stated as a condition, are seen as possible medium- and long-term consequences of closer ties.

The official discourse also states that Brazil prioritises knowledge transfer – technical assistance, skills transfer and capacity-building – over other modalities of cooperation. Presenting itself as a ‘knowledge database’, sharing national best practices with countries

¹⁵ In a speech made in the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, Brazil’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, stated that ‘Brazilian foreign policy condemns the thesis of the right to intervene, which is contrary to the structuring of the world order in an equitable basis, and defends, for a matter of basic human solidarity, that the international community effectively assists men, women and children in critical situations’ (Lafer, cited in Valler Filho 2007: 47). The solidarity discourse in this context was used as an opposition to the inequitable North-South relationship established by developed countries, but did not relate to South-South cooperation specifically.

¹⁶ A more detailed discussion on solidarity in Brazilian international cooperation can be found in Seitenfus (2006).


¹⁷ See, for example, former Chancellor Celso Amorim’s speech at the launch of a SENAI Centre in Cape Verde, in 2009, available at www.fiems.org.br/ind_not/index.php?m=noticias&p=detalhes_noticias&ncur=3817 (accessed December 2012).

¹⁸ For more on domestic support to Brazilian foreign engagements, see Sections 5 and 6.

with similar problems,¹⁹ Brazil claims to have a firsthand understanding of poverty and underdevelopment, which differentiates it from industrialised countries (Abdenur 2007). The importance of the adaptation process, the recognition of local experiences and the existence of synergies between partners is also recognised. The practice of having public servants that have experience in implementing policies and programmes in Brazil – and not consultants – working as implementers of development cooperation activities is also seen as supporting this approach. By lending its own technical experts for missions abroad, Brazil might be seen to affirm its coherence with its principles of untied and sustainable aid. Moreover, cultural and socioeconomic affinities between Brazil and its partners are also seen as distinguishing assets (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010).

Finally, non-interference in partners’ domestic affairs is also a guiding principle of Brazilian SSDC, leading to practices of non-conditionality and non-discrimination based on good governance or democratic credentials. Figure 3.1 summarises the main principles guiding Brazilian SSDC and the official narratives related to these principles.

Figure 3.1 Brazilian SSDC official guiding principles and narratives



Source: Based in the sections on international cooperation and bilateral provided cooperation of Brasil (2010a) and Abreu (2012).

¹⁹ Lauro Moreira, former ABC director from 2003–2006, quoted in Lopes (2008).

4 Brazil as a provider: profile and priorities

Brazil is engaged in bilateral, regional, trilateral and multilateral development cooperation through several modalities: technical, educational, scientific and technological, and humanitarian cooperation, as well as contributions to international organisations, peacekeeping operations, and support to refugees in Brazil. Financial cooperation is also an important modality of Brazilian cooperation.

This section will present Brazil's profile as a provider²⁰ of development cooperation by analysing publicly available information: (1) the two reports entitled *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development* (hereafter COBRADI)²¹ (Brasil 2010d, 2013), which cover government expenditures from 2005 to 2010, published by the government thinktank the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), which is linked to the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (SAE) of the presidency, in partnership with ABC; (2) information on technical cooperation provided by ABC; (3) qualitative information on programmes, projects and main institutions engaged in cooperation; and (4) published analysis produced by diplomats and researchers.²²

Scholars specialising in Brazilian development cooperation have remarked on the groundbreaking character of the first report, COBRADI 2005–2009 (Ayllón 2012), and described it as an unprecedented effort to collect and systematise official data in this area (Leite 2012b). It was also welcomed by international and national thinktanks and CSOs, though the latter criticised the government for failing to open COBRADI's database for consultation. COBRADI is presented as an evolving effort to represent the reality of Brazilian government cooperation practices and its institutional context. Although its data is framed by conceptual and statistical delineations, it should not be interpreted as the government official position on modalities and definitions (de Campos, Lima and Gonzalez 2012). An important role of the reports has been the mobilisation of a multitude of institutions that provide cooperation, in addition to improving Brazil's development cooperation transparency (Brasil 2013).

The second report (hereafter COBRADI 2010) (Brasil 2013) analysing 2010 data was published in 2013. Though it covered a wider range of institutions and modalities, it still does not give a complete picture of Brazilian official cooperation. For example, it does not account for financial cooperation such as loans, credit exports and debt relief.²³ Milani and Carvalho (2013) argue that through limiting the scope of development cooperation, the Brazilian government has committed to be accountable only for the modalities included in the report.

²⁰ The term 'provider' was chosen to specify initiatives in which Brazil commits human or financial resources, however small they might be. It also emphasises the descriptive rather than the normative; that is, absolute horizontality or bi-directionality in cooperation initiatives is difficult to achieve in practice and must be proven empirically (as discussed in Section 3). ABC also uses the term 'provider'.

²¹ The term COBRADI refers to *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional*, or Brazilian International Development Cooperation, and it is the working name for a research programme guided by IPEA involving, voluntarily, institutions of the federal public administration, who are responsible for systematising data on their cooperation inside IPEA.

²² The use of those different data sources does not translate into a triangulation strategy. IPEA and ABC quantitative data are incomparable. ABC data refer only to technical cooperation under the agency's coordination. However, ABC data are more comprehensive in terms of geographical and sectoral allocation of initiatives, something that is indispensable for analysing trends and priorities.

²³ The report was published with changes that make a rigorous analysis of trends and progression of Brazilian development cooperation unfeasible. The main differences between the two reports are: (1) COBRADI 2010 divides modalities differently, includes peacekeeping operations and expands the scope of humanitarian cooperation to encompass food aid (see Table 4.1); and (2) out of an estimate of more than 170 federal agencies engaged in international development cooperation (Brasil 2013), COBRADI 2005–2009 accounts for expenditure made by 66 federal entities, while COBRADI 2010 registers information on 91 institutions.

At the same time, initiatives that combine different modalities are becoming more common. For instance, the Food Acquisition Programme includes both humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation, while the More Food Africa programme combines technical and financial cooperation (see Box 4.4). Brazilian peacekeeping operations also show that Brazilian cooperation has been increasingly intertwined with peace efforts, for instance using Brazilian forces to reconstruct infrastructure and to deliver humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the agenda in public debate, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the relationships between different modalities are responding to a coherent strategy, or to analyse their impact in the field.

Taking into account the complexity of treating different kinds of data and the constantly shifting agenda of development cooperation in Brazil, the information given below may not represent an exact picture of Brazilian SSDC. To promote transparency and methodological dialogue, footnotes provide clarification of the methodological decisions taken by the research team in gathering and analysing data.

4.1 Brazilian development cooperation: overview

COBRADI's reports listed the costs and expenditures for the modalities shown in Table 4.1.

Under these modalities, data publicised by both COBRADI studies show that Brazilian development cooperation between 2005 and 2010 reached an approximate total of BRL4.5 billion in current values (or US\$2.3 billion),²⁴ having evolved from approximately US\$160 million in 2005 to more than US\$900 million in 2010. It is worth noting that in 2010, besides the higher number of institutions mapped, peacekeeping operations expenditures were included in total disbursements,²⁵ representing more than 30 per cent of cooperation flows. The bars in Figure 4.1 below (p.26) show the proportional annual progression of each modality's share, while the line shows the total expenditures.

Table 4.1 Modalities accounted for in COBRADI 2005–2009 and 2010

2005–2009	2010
1. Technical, scientific and technological cooperation ²⁶	1. Technical
2. Scholarships for foreigners	2. Scientific and technological cooperation
3. Contributions to international organisations	3. Educational cooperation (including scholarships and other bilateral academic exchange programmes)
4. Humanitarian assistance ²⁷	4. Contributions to international organisations
	5. Humanitarian cooperation (including food aid)

²⁴ Represents the sum of totals presented in current values by COBRADI 2005–2009 and COBRADI 2010.

²⁵ In COBRADI 2005–2009 disbursements made to peacekeeping operations were presented, but only technical hours dedicated by military staff were included in total disbursements.


²⁶ Though COBRADI 2005–2009 states that it included scientific and technological cooperation, as stated in Annex 2 (Basic Guidelines of the Survey), technical hours and disbursements related to participation in scientific and technological events were not accounted for. On the other hand, the report states that human and financial resources '[d]edicated to the production or adaptation of technology that has the main goal of responding to the needs of a particular country or group of countries individually or regionally', were included (Brasil 2010d: 54). By analysing the discourse of the particular section of COBRADI dedicated to scientific and technological cooperation, it is possible to see that it is in fact focused on technical cooperation ('transferring', 'sharing' and 'diffusing' Brazilian development experiences). Moreover, scientific and technological cooperation tend to involve initiatives in which not all funds are non-reimbursable (meaning they were not included in the first COBRADI).

²⁷ Spending with refugees in Brazil, as well as Brazilian contributions to UN specialised agencies such as UNHCR and UNRWA, was initially defined as a separate modality (IPEA 2010). However, in the final 2005–2009 report, the spending was included in two separate modalities of Brazilian international development cooperation: humanitarian assistance and contributions to international organisations.

	6. Refugee support and protection
5. Peacekeeping operations (yearly information available but not included in the total flows)	7. Peacekeeping operations (included in the total flows)

According to data presented by ABC’s former director, adding other modalities to the ones listed above and measured in constant values (debt relief – US\$474,23 million; food financing initiatives – US\$349,25 million; exports financing – US\$1,742,83 million) would lead to a total disbursement of more than US\$4 billion from 2005 to 2009 (Farani 2011b). Adding those three modalities would also lead to a substantive variation in the share of each modality in total disbursements (see Figure 4.2). Box 4.1 gives a brief description of Brazil’s financial cooperation.


Figure 4.1 Historical progression of modalities presented by COBRADI (2005–2010)²⁸



Source: Authors’ own, based on Brasil (2010d) and Brasil (2013).

²⁸ The category ‘Technical cooperation’ for 2005–2009 also represents expenditures for scientific and technological cooperation whereas 2010 figures apply to technical cooperation only (see footnote 26). The category ‘Scholarships and educational cooperation’ accounts for scholarships in 2005 and 2009 and educational cooperation in 2010 (where scholarships account for more than 80 per cent of total expenditures for educational cooperation). Peacekeeping operations expenditures were added to the total disbursements for 2005–2009. This figure was collected and presented in COBRADI 2005–2009 but not added to its analysis and aggregates.

Figure 4.2 Approximate variation in share of each modality in total disbursements comparing COBRADI 2005–2009 and data including other modalities for the same period



Source: Based on Cabral (2011) and Farani (2011b).

Box 4.1 A quick glance at Brazilian financial cooperation

Debt relief. Discounts granted to Brazil's developing country debtors amounted to US\$1.25 billion, of which more than US\$1 billion concerned heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) (Brasil 2010b). Mozambique, Nigeria, Gabon, Cape Verde and Bolivia were among the beneficiaries. For the Brazilian government, debt relief is part of a broader international development strategy in which increased funds being paid to heavily indebted poor countries by international financial institutions are considered to be key in coping with the structural indebtedness of such countries (Brasil 2010b). New debt relief efforts announced by Dilma (see Annex 9), also links such efforts to Brazil's intention to intensify trade relations with Africa.

Public loans. Since 2005 the volume of Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) loans increased by 391 per cent, reaching US\$96.32 billion in 2010 – more than three times the loans provided by the World Bank in that year (Garcia 2011). BNDES *Exim Automático*, for instance, is an export credit line for financing Brazilian products through accredited foreign banks hosted in the buyer country. Exim started its operations in 2011 and today more than 140 banks in 42 countries are accredited to operate BNDES Exim (BNDES 2013). BNDES Exim agreements were first made with Latin American partners, which represent the largest market for Brazilian industrial products. They are now reaching Europe, the Middle East and Africa, where credit lines have been opened with Nigeria and South Africa, with others being negotiated in Angola and Mozambique.


Private sector investments. BNDES also plays an important role in financing infrastructure development abroad. In a recent study on Brazilian financial cooperation and FDI (foreign direct investment), Masagão, Suyama and Lopes (2012) show how the largest engineering and construction conglomerates are able to use public export credits to expand their activities in Africa. According to the authors, funding has been directed towards the following countries: Mozambique (US\$80 million in 2009 for the construction of the Nacala airport), Ghana (where the Brazilian firms Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez will construct the eastern road corridor in a project budgeted at a cost of over US\$200 million), and Angola (where four Brazilian construction companies have an approved credit line of US\$3.5 billion for national reconstruction projects).

More research needs to be conducted on the relation between such BNDES loans, which support country national exports and investments abroad, and other official cooperation flows. The socioeconomic impact of those loans in developing countries, in the long run, also calls for further inquiry and research. It is also important to note that the relationship between financial cooperation and other modalities of Brazilian SSDC is still underexplored.

4.2 Technical cooperation

Measured in current values, technical cooperation provided by Brazil, and registered by both COBRADI, has more than tripled in six years: from approximately BRL27.6 million in 2005 (US\$11.4 million) to BRL101 million (US\$57.7 million) in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, Brazil executed projects to the value of approximately BRL396.3 million (US\$180 million).²⁹ Training and courses were responsible for 69 per cent of the total amount spent in 2005–2009, while related administrative costs and equipment amounted to, respectively, 28 per cent and 3 per cent (Brasil 2010d). As Figure 4.3 shows, except for 2004, there was a continuous rise in the number of actions initiated each year by ABC.³⁰

Figure 4.3 Progression of ABC budget allocation, execution and number of actions initiated in each year (2003–2010)



Source: Authors' own based on Abreu (2012) for budget execution 2003–2010, Barbosa (2011) for number of projects and budget allocation 2003–2010 and Abreu (2013) for number of projects and budget execution in 2011–2012.³¹

²⁹ Represents the sum of totals presented in current values by COBRADI 2005–2009 and COBRADI 2010.

³⁰ According to Puente, the ABC's percentage of MRE's total budget also rose. In 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 this percentage was, respectively, 0.05 per cent, 0.48 per cent, 0.43 per cent, 0.62 per cent and 2.4 per cent (Puente 2010). According to ABC's website, official priorities for technical cooperation are, respectively: commitments made by the president and the minister of foreign affairs during official visits; South American countries; Haiti; African countries, especially the PALOPs, and East Timor (PALOP stands for Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa and refers to the five African Portuguese-speaking countries, former colonies of Portugal – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe); other Latin American and Caribbean countries; support to the CPLP (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries); triangular initiatives. These priorities are attributed to the General Coordination of Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries, www.abc.gov.br/SobreAbc/Direcao/CGPD (accessed 7 April 2013).

³¹ There are discrepancies between the data presented by Abreu (2012) and Abreu (2013) regarding budget execution and between Barbosa (2011) and Abreu (2013) regarding number of projects.

COBRADI 2005–2009 states that the increase in disbursements on technical and humanitarian cooperation represents a ‘clear sign of the growing importance that Brazil attaches to international cooperation in a global framework of economic and social development’ (Brasil 2010d: 19). In the case of technical cooperation, this rise may be particularly related to: the growing presence of the subject in diplomatic and presidential speeches and missions; increased recognition of Brazilian development experiences abroad; growing diffusion of such experiences through publications and enhanced participation of ABC and of particular ministries and agencies in international forums; growing international commitments assumed by the Brazilian government in relation to international declarations and treaties and specific regional and sectoral commitments;³² and growing global diplomatic presence through the opening of 40 new embassies abroad during the Lula administration, 19 of them in Africa.³³

In this section we analyse the geographical and sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, including information on disbursements and number and type of projects.

4.2.1 Geographic allocation


As Figure 4.4 shows, Latin American and Caribbean countries were the main beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation between 2005 and 2010 (49 per cent), followed by Africa (35 per cent). Projects with North America and Europe represented at least 7 per cent of technical cooperation resources allocation.³⁴

³² A brief analysis of Brazilian commitments in expanding South–South cooperation in health can be found in Almeida, de Campos, Buss *et al.* 2010.

³³ The opening of new embassies has broadened official channels through which partner countries can take demands to the Brazilian government. In the case of Africa, data collected by BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Brazil in October 2011 highlighted that Brazil had embassies in 37 of the 54 African nations, ranking fifth (behind the US, China, France and Russia). The opening of new embassies in the continent has been accompanied by the inauguration of 17 diplomatic missions of African countries in Brazil since 2003, bringing the total to 33 (Fellet 2011). Since many of these new Brazilian embassies in Africa have insufficient diplomatic staff (see more details in Fleck 2013a), technical cooperation activities represent the most viable option for promoting ties with African countries.

³⁴ Represents 2005–2010 average for bilateral expenditures identified geographically. Multilateral expenditure is not identified by countries or regions.

Figure 4.4 COBRADI's information on budget execution per region in US\$³⁵



Source: Authors' elaboration based on Brasil (2010d, 2013).

Focusing on ABC's technical cooperation total disbursement shows us that, historically, Africa has been the main receiver of Brazilian technical cooperation financial resources managed by the institution. The predominance of Africa as the main destination for ABC's budget is not completely translated into number of projects. From 1995 to 2012, Latin America was the main destination of the majority of ABC projects, with a significant share of projects in Central America and the Caribbean countries.

³⁵ COBRADI disaggregates information into seven regions: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceania, North America, Europe, Asia, and Middle East and Northern Africa. Regions were aggregated in Figure 4.4 to facilitate visual representation and comparison with the other information presented in this section. 2010 data included disbursements for both Technical Cooperation and Scientific and Technological Cooperation, as these modalities were aggregated in COBRADI 2005–2009. 2010 values were calculated based on information regarding the percentage that each region represented in total expenditure. However, it is not clear if the percentages per region consider technical cooperation total expenditures (BRL101 million) or only the 81 per cent of expenditures designated to bilateral technical cooperation. COBRADI 2010 does not contain information regarding technical cooperation with Europe, North America or Oceania, except projects with Spain. Thus, disbursements to Europe and North America represent mainly science and technology projects. For 2005–2009 the chart excludes 20 per cent of total technical cooperation disbursements made through international organisations, as well as the 23 per cent of total resources presented as 'other/not specified', since they are not disaggregated geographically.

Box 4.2 Brazilian cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean

An in-depth analysis of 2010 Brazilian cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean shows that:

- 55 per cent of total disbursements in the region were destined for the mobilisation of military troops to Haiti;
- 26 per cent represented contributions to regional organisations (e.g. Mercosul Structural Convergence Fund, Pan-American Health Organisation, Organisation of American States);
- 13 per cent was spent on transport and logistics;
- 9 per cent were other expenses directly related to implementation of projects. Sectoral analysis of these expenses indicates that one third (3 per cent of total cooperation with the region) was destined for educational projects, followed by technology (2 per cent), health (0.9 per cent) and defence (0.7 per cent). Nevertheless, if organised by number of actions instead of disbursements, public security and defence represent 19 per cent of total actions registered, followed by education (15 per cent) and agriculture (13 per cent). Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay are the main partners in education and public security and defence activities.
- 1 per cent were donations, mainly health equipment and treatments. Main destinations are Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.

Source: Lima, de Campos and Neves (forthcoming).

4.2.2 Sectoral allocation


COBRADI 2010 states that 44 institutions executed technical cooperation projects (Brasil 2013: 33–4). The main executor is MRE (which includes ABC) with almost 80 per cent of the total amount disbursed (BRL101 million). The federal Police Department (Ministry of Justice) is the second largest executor, with 2.4 per cent and the health ministry with 2 per cent. However, the analysis by executing institution does not lead to a better understanding of sectoral allocation, since the MRE budget applies to all sectors. COBRADI 2005–2009 does not present systematised data on the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by sector, but it does mention the case of health, responsible for 9 per cent of total technical cooperation for 2005–2009 (BRL24 million or US\$12 million – 49 per cent of which came from MRE, followed by the Ministry of Health, 25 per cent, and by Fiocruz, 20 per cent).³⁶

To explore allocation by sector, this section will focus on technical cooperation coordinated by ABC. To identify which sectors may be experiencing a more significant growth in terms of number of projects, Figure 4.5 compares official data covering different periods of time (1995–2005 and 2006–2010), as annual records by sector are not available. However, an article published by ABC Director Fernando Abreu (2013) shows a table with the breakdown per sector, the top four being: agriculture (19 per cent), health (16 per cent), public security (11 per cent) and education (11 per cent).³⁷

³⁶ The reason for this growth in health sector spending is attributed to increasing demands resulting from the 'relatively recent development of a policy of universal free public health in Brazil and the visibility achieved by the country in international forums on the subject' (Brasil 2010d: 39). Specific issues addressed by technical cooperation activities include HIV/AIDS, malaria (prevention and control), yellow fever (training in the production of vaccines), Chagas disease (diagnosis and management), maternal and child health care, and human resource management for hospitals and clinics.

³⁷ It is not clear, though, if these percentages are based on number of projects or budget committed/executed.

Figure 4.5 ABC's projects by sector (1995–2005 and 2006–2010)



Source: Based on Puente (2010) and Barbosa (2011).

As Figure 4.5 shows, despite some variation between 1995–2005 and 2006–2010, agriculture, health and education (including vocational training) lead the distribution across both time periods. Embrapa, Fiocruz and SENAI are key institutions (see Box 4.3). Although sectoral engagement in environment and public administration had already started in the first period, ‘public security’ did not appear in the 1995–2005 period, and then ranked fourth in the period 2006–2010. However, data on the sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by region (Abreu 2012) shows that the predominance of each sector varies geographically (see Annex 8 for details).

Box 4.3 Key institutions of Brazilian development cooperation

Embrapa – Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation: The state-owned company Embrapa was created in 1973 with the aim of fostering the development of Brazilian tropical agriculture and agribusiness via knowledge and technology generation and transfer. International cooperation has consistently been a part of Embrapa's success history. Embrapa was a key player in Brazil's expansion of soya production, in partnership with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and today has virtual laboratories for collaborative work (Labex) in several countries. Despite the existence of some legal constraints for foreign disbursements, Embrapa has been active in providing technical cooperation in agriculture since the early 2000s (Barbosa 2011). It has opened offices in Ghana (since 2008), in Panama (since 2010) and in Venezuela (in partnership with the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development). Today it is responsible for Brazil's three main 'structuring projects' in African agriculture: cotton with Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; rice culture in Senegal; and agricultural innovation in Mozambique (Barbosa 2011).

Fiocruz – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation: The Ministry of Health designated Fiocruz as the focal point for Brazilian health-related South–South cooperation. Founded in 1900, Fiocruz now runs national activities including teaching, research, production and technological development. In 2009, Fiocruz set up its Centre for Global Health (Cris/Fiocruz), which coordinates the Fiocruz International Cooperation Technical Group. Fiocruz has been developing a series of structuring projects in health, notably with South American partners (through the Union of South American Nations - UNASUL) and in Africa (notably in CPLP members). These projects aim to foster 'capacity building for development' with partners through the strengthening of partner country health systems, combining concrete interventions with local capacity-building and knowledge generation, and promoting dialogue among actors. In 2009, Fiocruz coordinated 18 projects with CPLP countries and had a further ten projects under negotiation. The Foundation also explored new collaboration opportunities with Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Tanzania (Almeida *et al.* 2010).

SENAI – National Service for Industrial Training: SENAI is a professional education and vocational training company. Created in 1942 by official decree, it is organised and run by industrial entrepreneurs and today runs 809 sites in Brazil offering 3,000 courses. SENAI first started receiving foreign assistance from industrialised countries in the 1950s. Since the 1970s, it has also been active in providing development cooperation in Southern countries, especially in the Americas (Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname) and CPLP countries (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinéa-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor). Today, it implements official agreements coordinated by ABC and cooperates autonomously with partner organisations in developing countries (Gonçalves 2011). In 2011, SENAI was engaged in 13 technical cooperation projects and was the recipient of a further 13 projects. It was also negotiating another five projects, which were being worked out autonomously without the collaboration of any Brazilian governmental bodies.

The importance of vocational training in Brazilian cooperation is likely to diminish although, according to a diplomat, training centres led by SENAI have been positively evaluated in terms of results, effectiveness and social impacts (Puente 2010). This is due to constraints imposed on ABC's budgetary expansion by the current Dilma administration (see Box 5.3) and the fact that the training centres, however successful, are also the most expensive initiatives in Brazilian technical cooperation (as they also incur expenses for infrastructure and equipment).

Brazilian official actors involved in technical cooperation have been prioritising 'structuring' projects in sub-Saharan Africa³⁸ (see Box 4.4) that are capable of 'developing institutional

³⁸ The Brazilian government uses projects with a structural approach for 'projetos estruturantes', while Cabral and Weinstock (2010) talk about 'groundwork projects'. The majority of these projects are currently located in Africa and have a strong regional component. Greater emphasis is given to agricultural projects, but African countries also currently receive structuring projects in the health, food security and professional training sectors. More information is given on groundwork projects in Box 4.5. For

capacities with sustainable results in the benefited countries' (Brasil 2010d: 34). This change of focus on structural approaches reflects a learning process amongst Brazilian practitioners, as well as the recognition that isolated initiatives have reaped few results within fragile institutional contexts. Triangular and multi-stakeholder arrangements have also been prioritised in sub-Saharan Africa.

Box 4.4 Flagship Brazilian agriculture initiatives in Africa

Cotton-4 and Rice Project in Senegal: Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad are known as the 'Cotton-4' countries. Brazil's Cotton-4 programme, based in Mali, provides support to the development of the cotton industry in these countries through the testing and adaptation of productive cotton varieties in order to organise a regionally profitable supply chain. In 2013 Togo joined the initiative's second phase, which will include agriculture – cattle-raising integration, agricultural mechanisation, rural infrastructure, integrated pest control to reduce insecticide use and integration of other agents into the cotton chain. Brazil also runs a rice project in Senegal that provides assistance to technical staff in Mali, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Both projects aim to have a regional impact and together they cost US\$7 million. Embrapa plays an important role in both.

More Food Africa: Created in 2010 by the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), this project aims to encourage food production and productivity in the family farming sector in Africa, as well as facilitate access to food production-related machinery and equipment. This programme combines technical and financial cooperation with an inter-sectoral (agricultural and industrial) approach in order to increase family farming productivity in a sustainable way and to support national food security strategies. By 2012, eight African countries (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal, Kenya, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania) had formally asked to join this project.

ProSavana: ProSavana, in Mozambique's Nacala corridor, is Brazil's latest and most ambitious agricultural cooperation initiative. Organised as a trilateral programme with Japan, it has a budget of about US\$500 million over the next 20 years. ProSavana is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique's tropical savannah, based on the experiences of Brazil's *Cerrado* development, which is said to hold lessons for Mozambique due to a number of geographical and conceptual similarities between the two regions. Technical cooperation in the case of ProSavana is accompanied by private sector investment initiatives through the Nacala Fund. This fund, which is currently being established, is an initiative promoted by ABC, Fundação Getulio Vargas, JICA, Embrapa, FAO, Brazil-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Mozambique's Ministry of Agriculture. The aim is to attract private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.

Food Purchase Programme (PAA-Africa) – Brazil (MDA, Social Development Ministry-MDS, General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger-CGFOME), FAO, World Food Programme (WFP) and ten African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger and Senegal). This trilateral partnership, launched in 2012, aims to strengthen family farming by establishing local food supply chains, public networks of food and nutrition facilities and social assistance institutions, and food stocks. PAA Brazil was launched in 2004 as one of the pillars of Brazil's Zero Hunger strategy and has inspired PAA Africa.

4.2.3 Triangular cooperation

Brazil is also active in triangular cooperation. COBRADI 2005–2009 considers this modality as central to Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation as a key tool to 'scale-up and improve the impact', and to recognise the 'excellence and technical effectiveness' of Brazilian technical cooperation (Brasil 2010d: 34). For the Brazilian government, such

more on the structural approach in agriculture, see www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/cooperacao-tecnica-en/agricultura/ (accessed February 2013). For information on the structural approach in health, see Almeida *et al.* (2010).

initiatives must respect the principles guiding SSDC, namely being 'demand-driven', non-interfering in beneficiaries' internal affairs, and remaining untied (Brasil 2010a).

Official estimates suggest that Brazil invested US\$20 million in triangular cooperation between 2003 and 2010. In 2010 the total budget for triangular cooperation initiatives coordinated by the ABC (19 in total) amounted to US\$49 million, and Brazil financed at least 30 per cent of it (MRE, cited in Ayllón 2013).³⁹

Data released in 2011 show that the main partners were Japan, Germany, US, Italy, France, Spain, Israel and Australia.⁴⁰ Trilateral cooperation involving developed countries supported 31 cooperation projects in developing countries in the Americas and in Africa, including: Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Kenya, São Tomé and Príncipe and Uruguay. Most projects under triangular cooperation focus on public health, education and agriculture, and are aligned with Brazilian priorities in technical cooperation. This is particularly clear in engagement in food and nutritional security in sub-Saharan Africa, where the main current projects have FAO and WFP as the usual partners. Besides that, ILO and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) are also important multilateral partners for Brazilian trilateral initiatives in developing countries (PR 2011).

Triangular cooperation with traditional donors is complemented by innovative schemes engaging developing partners, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum) Poverty Alleviation Fund, created in 2004. Its main goal is to support projects contributing to wellbeing and the achievements of MDGs in least developed and/or post-conflict countries.⁴¹ With an annual fund of US\$3 million (US\$1 million contribution from each partner) and administered by the UNDP's Special Unit on South–South cooperation, the IBSA Fund has financed initiatives in Haiti, Palestine, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Laos and Cambodia,⁴² and has received a number of international recognitions for its South–South cooperation achievements.⁴³

For Brazil, scaling up its cooperation, while sharing some of the cost-related burdens and acting as a broker (Ayllón 2013; Barbosa 2011; Hirst 2011) can be a tactic for national self-promotion within a broader strategy of foreign relations (Abdenur 2007). Simultaneously, traditional donors see trilateral agreements as an alternative to providing direct aid to the country. In the long term, it means progressively disengaging from assistance to Brazil and using the country as a lever for reaching out to other Southern countries (Abdenur 2007).

4.3 Other modalities

Contribution to international organisations, peacekeeping operations and educational, humanitarian, and scientific and technological cooperation add up to more than 90 per cent

³⁹ Flows coming from triangular cooperation were not included in COBRADI as such. External funds received by the Brazilian government for enacting and implementing triangular projects were excluded from the general calculation. According to the report, 'the external resources received by the Brazilian federal government from sources such as agencies, banks, funds, countries or international organizations in triangular cooperation were not considered. The Brazilian counterpart in these projects was characterized as bilateral' (Brasil 2010d: 35).

⁴⁰ Abreu (2013) shows that the main partners remain the same, followed by Spain and Switzerland.

⁴¹ The criteria for selecting proposals include: reduction of poverty and hunger; national ownership and leadership; South–South cooperation; use of IBSA country capacities; strengthening local capacity; sustainability; identifiable impact; replicability; innovation. See www.ibsa-trilateral.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=29

⁴² More information on each project can be found at IBSA Fund Overview and Project Portfolio (2011), <http://tcdc2.undp.org/ibsa/Upload/IBSARreport.pdf>

⁴³ In recognition of its role in South–South cooperation, the Fund received in 2006 the 'South–South Partnership Award', the 'Millennium Development Goals' Award in 2010, and the UN-awarded 'South–South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award' in 2012.

of the total funds between 2005 and 2010. The following subtopics present key features of those modalities.


4.3.1 Contribution to international organisations

In terms of total amounts, the most significant modality is Brazilian contributions to international organisations. Between 2005 and 2010 it represented 51 per cent of Brazilian expenditures or BRL2,746 billion (approximately US\$1.4 billion).⁴⁴

This modality increased significantly in nett terms between 2005 and 2010, from BRL300 million to BRL548 million, but proportionally it decreased, from 53 per cent of the total flow in 2005 to 34 per cent in 2010.⁴⁵

The Brazilian government attributes this nett growth to its inclusion in new international organisations, as well as to its increasing commitment to and support for specific entities like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WHO and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) (Brasil 2010d). Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of Brazil’s contributions to international organisations between 2005 and 2010.

Figure 4.6 Ten largest contributions to international organisations (2005–2010)⁴⁶



Source: Authors’ own based on Brasil (2010d, 2013).

⁴⁴ Represents the sum of totals presented in current values by COBRADI 2005–2009 and COBRADI 2010. This includes regular contributions to organisations in which Brazil is a depositor and beneficiary (as with the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank). The percentage was calculated taking into account data on peacekeeping operations available in COBRADI 2005–2009.

⁴⁵ Calculations for 2005–2009 include peacekeeping operations.

⁴⁶ Numbers for 2005–2009 are available in Brasil (2010d: 40) and for 2010 in Brasil (2013: 90). ‘Others’ include: ILO; Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; African Development Fund (AfDF); UN Industrial Development Program; World Meteorological Organization; Ibero-American Programme for Science, Technology and Development; International Criminal Court; Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum; Latin American Integration Association; Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries.

Contributions to international bodies were relatively homogenous: 44.1 per cent went to international organisations while 55.9 per cent went to multilateral development funds. Among the latter, Mercosul was the key recipient - its structural convergence fund (FOCEM) alone received BRL565 million from the Brazilian government between 2005 and 2010. This represents 27.5 per cent of the total amount spent under this modality. The significant contributions to FOCEM reflect Brazil's focus on regional integration. A slight change in this trend can be observed in 2010, as IDA (International Development Association) received BRL30 million more than FOCEM. Table 4.2 below disaggregates the progression of the contributions to international multilateral development funds.

Table 4.2 Progression of the largest contributions to international multilateral development funds 2005–2010

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Mercosul/FOCEM	1.19	76.83	97.97	128.54	126.97	133.99
IDA	49.88	95.86	90.66	81.28	70.72	168.34
AfDF	1.03	6.06	5.45	4.26	3.60	4.40

In BRL million/current values.
Source: Brasil (2010d, 2013)

4.3.2 Peacekeeping operations⁴⁷

Brazil has been engaging in UN peace missions since 1948 and its participation in different missions around the world has been increasing. In 2012 Brazil contributed to UN peacekeeping operations with a total of 2,199 troops in the following missions: Western Sahara, Haiti, Central African Republic and Chad, Cyprus, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan, East Timor and Côte d'Ivoire (UN 2013). In 2010, the amount invested in peace missions increased to BRL585,000, out of which BRL467,000 were destined to Haiti only, mainly as a result of the earthquake that hit the country in that year (Brasil 2013).

Brazil does not have a specific strategy defining when to participate in UN peace missions, but it uses the National Defence Policy as a framework and the presidency and the foreign relations ministry ultimately make the decision. On a long-term basis, Brazil will continue to act in peace missions that are aligned with national interests and comply with the UN mandate (Brasil 2013: 87).

Brazil has also invested in increasing its involvement in, as well as sharing its experience of, preparing military and civilian personnel to participate in peace operations and mine clearance missions.⁴⁸ This was possible thanks to institutional improvements such as the creation of the Brazilian Joint Centre for Peacekeeping (CCOPAB), located in Rio de Janeiro, in 2010 (Brasil 2013).

4.3.3 Scientific and technological cooperation


According to COBRADI 2010, science and technology are strategic components of social and economic development in Brazil. Thus, Brazil has been investing in cooperation in these areas in order to contribute to domestic and partner countries' development. In 2010, its investment totalled US\$24 million (Brasil 2013).

⁴⁷ As mentioned previously, COBRADI 2005–2009 did not include peacekeeping operations in the total amount of Brazilian cooperation, because United Nations provide reimbursement to the Brazilian National Treasury expenditures and COBRADI 2005–2009 only registered resources invested by the federal government as non-recoverable funds. COBRADI 2010 accounted for expenditures made by public bodies in the consecution of responsibilities taken in international treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements, deals and commitments.

⁴⁸ See CCOPAB's mission: www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/index.php/en/ccopab/missao

As demonstrated in Figure 4.7, the regional allocation of scientific and technological cooperation is mainly focused in Europe and North America, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean, while technical cooperation is focused on Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa.⁴⁹ Argentina, Spain, US, Switzerland, India, Finland, Pakistan, the European Commission, France and Germany, in this order, are the ten countries to which Brazil allocated most of its resources in 2010.

Figure 4.7 COBRADI 2010 information on technical and scientific and technological cooperation



Brazil acts on three different levels of scientific and technological cooperation: (1) large scientific international cooperation programmes or projects; (2) regional and bilateral scientific and technological cooperation programmes or projects; and (3) partnerships or activities established directly between scientists. Brazil's cooperation covers a wide range of scientific areas and includes major international projects such as: the high energy physics project of the Large Hadron Collider; the international Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project; Planck satellite; Southern Astrophysical Research; the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope; and the Human Genome Project. South-South cooperation projects include the Centre of Structural Biology of Mercosul and the China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite, which aims to construct a satellite in partnership with China, through the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) (Brasil 2013).

4.3.4 Educational cooperation and scholarships for foreign students

Another modality explored in COBRADI is the award of scholarships to foreign students in Brazil, a practice that has existed since the 1950s. Expenditures on scholarships reached US\$173 million between 2005 and 2010.⁵⁰ For 2010, COBRADI provides disaggregated data per recipient and academic degree, showing that the majority of bachelors' scholarships (73.7 per cent) are granted to PALOP students (especially Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau),

⁴⁹ COBRADI 2010, unlike COBRADI 2005–2009, did not register technical cooperation with developed regions (Europe, North America and Oceania), except projects with Spain, which were included.

⁵⁰ Represents the sum of totals presented in current values by COBRADI 2005–2009 and COBRADI 2010.

while postgraduate scholarships are mainly granted (70 per cent) to South American students (mostly from Colombia, Peru and Argentina).

Another aspect of Brazil's educational cooperation, as stated in the CAPES Institutional Guidelines, is the prioritisation of programmes with countries that have deficiencies in their higher education systems and countries prioritised by Brazilian foreign policy as development partners. Since 2004, the Brazilian Higher Education Coordination Agency's (CAPES) international cooperation policy has emphasised Southern countries, especially Latin America, Africa and Portuguese-speaking African countries (Brasil 2013). CAPES expenditures with specific educational bilateral programmes in 2010 amounted to around US\$5.3 million in projects with East Timor, Cuba, Argentina, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

The rationale behind scholarship programmes is the diffusion of Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language, which also has the objective of promoting good perceptions of Brazil and Brazilian people abroad (Brasil 2010a), developing human resources sympathetic to the Brazilian government and companies (Brasil 2012a), strengthening political and economic ties between partners (Rosa 2008), and seeking hegemony in the Southern Atlantic region (Gusmão 2011).

4.3.5 Humanitarian cooperation

Brazilian humanitarian assistance, or humanitarian cooperation as COBRADI 2010 terms it, is the modality that had the most significant increases between 2005 and 2010. While representing only 0.31 per cent of the total amount spent in 2005 (US\$487,990), it reached 18 per cent of the total in 2010 (US\$161 million). Especially noteworthy are the resources allocated to Haiti's reconstruction in 2010, which amounted to almost 70 per cent of all humanitarian cooperation (see Box 4.5 for more on Brazil–Haiti cooperation).

The MRE's General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFOME) has been playing, since its creation in 2004, an important coordinating role in Brazilian humanitarian cooperation. Created to reflect the government's national priorities on fighting hunger and poverty and to coordinate Brazilian foreign policy on food and nutritional security, CGFOME had its budget increased from US\$1.25 million in 2007 to US\$17.5 million in 2010.⁵¹

A shift in the means of delivery can also be observed. In 2005, Brazil channelled almost half of its humanitarian assistance through multilateral channels. By 2009, 97 per cent of such aid was given bilaterally. In 2010, the government channelled 56.8 per cent of its humanitarian cooperation through multilateral channels and the remaining 43.2 per cent bilaterally, reaffirming the belief in the UN as the central coordinator of humanitarian assistance (Brasil 2013).

Across the period 2005–2009, donations in kind (i.e. supplies) accounted for 65.7 per cent and financial cooperation for 21.4 per cent of the total invested in humanitarian assistance (Brasil 2010d). Similar data are not publicly available for 2010.

⁵¹ CGFOME comprises: food and nutritional security, including the right to food; agrarian development (agrarian reform and family agriculture); small-scale fishing; the Brazil–Argentina Social Institute; International Fund for Agriculture Development and the World Food Programme; World Social Forum; and dialogue with civil society. Achievements led by CGFOME include the realisation of two meetings of the Coordination of Brazilian Civil Society in Haiti (2010 and 2011), and the launch of a budgetary line in 2012 through which the MRE finances national CSO participation in international humanitarian assistance and international dialogue and negotiation forums in the area of Food and Nutritional Security (Budgetary Action number 20RE). See www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/o-ministerio/cgfome-coordenacao-geral-de-acoas-internacionais-de-combate-a-fome/.

Box 4.5 Haiti: a lab for Brazilian multisectoral engagement

Brazilian commitment to development worldwide can also be seen in the country's expanding engagement in UN peace operations, a modality seen as contributing to the country's efforts in becoming an important player in global peace and security affairs. Brazil currently takes part in 13 UN peace operations, with leadership roles in Haiti and Lebanon. In 2009 alone, the country invested BRL125.41 million in peace operations.

Brazil's leadership role in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004 is an example of the Brazilian multisectoral approach to security and development (Verenhitch, Deitos and Seitenfus 2007), notably because troops are involved in reconstruction efforts that go beyond traditional military activities. Besides peace-related activities, Brazil has cooperation projects in Haiti in six different areas (among them agriculture, health, infrastructure, security and environment). Between 2005 and 2010 around 25 per cent of the total humanitarian aid delivered by Brazil went to Haiti. During this period, it spent more than BRL160 million in the country – most of it on humanitarian aid and the remainder in technical cooperation and scholarships for Haitian students in Brazil (Brasil 2010d).

Brazilian cooperation activities in the country involve more than 50 entities (32 national state agencies, 10 Haitian agencies and 12 foreign partners and international organisations) (Hirst 2012). Among them, the Brazilian Ministry of Health, as well as Brazilian CSOs *Viva Rio* and *Alfabetização Solidária*, have been particularly active in Haiti.

Nevertheless, there is no consensus any more on MINUSTAH involvement in Haiti (Hirst 2012). There is also a growing internal debate in Brazil on whether the country should leave Haiti and what responsibilities it should bear towards the Caribbean country and its population (notably on the cholera outbreak and on the ongoing wave of Haitian migrants arriving in Brazil).⁵² This lack of consensus on what role MINUSTAH should play in future does not make it inevitable that Brazilian technical engagement in Haiti will be reduced. Increases in the flow of new incomers from Haiti to Brazil in the past two years, under government-created 'humanitarian visas' and beyond, tend to reinforce the need for continuing and deepening existing cooperation projects in the country.

According to COBRADI 2005–2009, the region that received the largest amount of Brazil's humanitarian cooperation was Latin America (76.27 per cent or BRL107.82 million), followed by Asia (BRL23.24 million) and Africa (BRL10.27 million). The main beneficiaries during the period were Cuba (BRL33.52 million), Haiti (BRL29.84 million), the Palestinian Territories (BRL19.94 million)⁵³ and Honduras (BRL15.65 million). Portuguese-speaking countries have together received 8 per cent of the amount given in this modality, with Guinea-Bissau ranked as the top recipient. Low-income countries have also grown as a destination for Brazilian humanitarian assistance. Their share grew from 6.2 per cent in 2005 to 35.2 per cent in 2009 (Brasil 2010d).

Such growth in humanitarian cooperation is attributed to logistical improvements, mainly through the creation of a humanitarian warehouse (*Armazém Humanitário do Galeão*) at Rio's international airport in 2009,⁵⁴ as well as developments in legislation and national coordination. A key innovation was the 2006 creation of the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI), which entitled MRE, through CGFOME, to 'coordinate efforts with other organs of the Federal Government and with countries and

⁵² For more on Haitian migration to Brazil, see the ongoing dialogue between the Brazilian NGO *Conectas Direitos Humanos* and the Brazilian government, www.conectas.org/institucional/conectas-manifesta-preocupacao-com-politica-migratoria-para-haitianos.

⁵³ Despite being outside Brazil's traditional regional priorities, Palestine mobilises Brazilian public opinion more than other situations worldwide and thus may have an influence on aid assistance choices, especially with a left-leaning government in power.

⁵⁴ For more information, see <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2009-03-02/armazem-humanitario-do-governo-brasileiro-sera-inaugurado-hoje>.

United Nations' specialised organs aiming at guaranteeing speediness in the realisation of Brazilian humanitarian actions'.⁵⁵ To implement this coordination, GTI-AHI has proposed new legislation authorising the Executive to undertake humanitarian activity, and has supported the creation of a specific budget element for humanitarian activity in the National Budget Guidelines Law (2D28 – *Operações de Assistência Especial no Exterior*).

One of the main shifts in Brazilian humanitarian assistance since 2012 has been the promotion of 'sustainable humanitarian cooperation', which defends a transition from humanitarian to 'structuring actions and local coordination', supporting socially sustainable development processes. During this period, CGFOME's actions have also been increasingly intertwined with technical cooperation and contributions to international organisations. Such a shift is explained in COBRADI 2010 as a strategy coherent with the domestic priority of ending hunger and poverty, and also aligned with a prioritisation within Brazilian technical cooperation towards sub-Saharan Africa and sectoral and inter-sectoral initiatives in agriculture (see Box 4.4). The flagship programme is Africa Food Purchase Programme (PAA Africa), involving Brazilian funding to UN FAO and WFP, which totals US\$2.375 million (FAO 2012). Nine out of ten countries participating in PAA are also involved in at least one other food and nutritional security initiative from the implementing agencies: the More Food Africa programme and/or the Home Grown School Feeding and Purchase for Progress (P4P/WFP) programmes (Leite, Pomeroy and Suyama 2013).

⁵⁵ GTI-AHI includes 15 Brazilian ministries. See the official decree establishing the Group, www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Dnn/Dnn10864.htm.

5 Technical cooperation: institutions, interests and decision-making

Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation is deeply influenced by the country's national institutional framework, as well as by decision-making processes in foreign policy, which are permeated by a variety of domestic interests. On the one hand, the increasing role of Brazil in technical cooperation has not been accompanied by institutional reforms, including the design of a national legal framework establishing priorities and aims, and guaranteeing the necessary flows of human and financial resources to guarantee effective engagement.⁵⁶

On the other hand, there is currently a strong dynamic of horizontalisation and politicisation in Brazilian foreign policy, with ministries, subnational governments, CSOs, thinktanks, the Congress, and private actors increasingly engaged in Brazilian international relations, and claiming to have their roles in SSDC recognised by the state. It is very difficult, however, to unpack particular interests from state-led initiatives.

Strategies that at first seem ambiguous may actually reflect Brazil's emerging position in international relations. While the country has been making efforts to accumulate traditional military and economic capabilities, it has also been trying to promote new values in the world order, mainly concerning the fight against poverty and hunger.

Both of these strategies have been influencing shifts in Brazilian sectoral and geographic allocation of all the SSDC modalities and also shifting its domestic system, as this section will show. While there is increasing engagement of a variety of domestic actors in debates regarding the allocation of Brazilian SSDC, it seems that particular strategies that are either induced by or converging with governmental proposals in particular sectors have in fact had more access to Brazilian official SSDC (see page 71 for hypotheses that may explain the actors' degree of influence in shaping SSDC). In the case of technical cooperation, which is the focus of this report, there is a clear move away from the central role of ABC as a coordinating and financing agency towards other official and non-official actors influencing the allocation of Brazilian SSDC.

5.1 Institutional framework

Brazil's engagement in technical cooperation is marked by a strong institutional dispersal. ABC, which is subordinated to MRE, is legally entitled to coordinate received and provided technical cooperation (Câmara dos Deputados 2012). It is estimated that the agency coordinates actions implemented by 120 national agencies, including agencies connected to the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature, NGOs, universities and local governments (MRE 2007a; Puente 2010). In the case of bilateral initiatives, besides offering technical advice, ABC covers the costs of their operationalisation, while partner national agencies usually cede the technical hours of their staff (as agencies pay for their salaries).

However, ministries and other official agents also engage in technical cooperation in an autonomous way. The main source of this dispersion is the lack of specific legislation in Brazil clearly defining the objectives, scope, mechanisms, competences and processes of

⁵⁶ Evaluating advances and challenges to the ABC's framework, a Brazilian diplomat has pointed out that '[...] there is no legal norm that clearly defines distinctions between financial cooperation and technical cooperation or between the latter and scientific and technological or educational cooperation, for instance. And that unequivocally established its scope, principles, aims, instruments of action, delimitation of competences and interministerial or interinstitutional coordination mechanisms [...]' (Puente 2010: 135).

development cooperation. The only existing instruments are Basic Bilateral Agreements, which encompass several modalities of cooperation (technical, scientific, cultural, economic) and have to be approved by the Congress as they involve the allocation of national resources.⁵⁷ Particular initiatives in technical cooperation gain content through Complementary Adjustments and Project Documents. Though the former have not traditionally been submitted to the National Congress,⁵⁸ this has been changing. In recent years, legislative decrees approving treaties and agreements that were signed in 2011 and 2012 have included a clause stating that any act or complementary adjustment that entails costs to the national treasury must be approved by Congress (Câmara dos Deputados 2012).

Not counting its own particular legislation, technical cooperation initiatives also fall under general restrictions imposed by Brazilian legislation, which is strictly followed by the judiciary and control agencies when overseeing the execution of initiatives. Relying on national labour and procurement laws, these organs have contested, for instance, the hiring of public staff involved in technical cooperation without public tenders. Though such decisions have mainly been targeted at received multilateral cooperation, which had a central role in ABC's activities in the 1990s,⁵⁹ they have challenged the whole Brazilian technical cooperation system (Puente 2010).

This system has been built by relying on transitory arrangements in which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which supported the creation of ABC, became the main agent in operationalisation of technical cooperation in Brazil. UNDP was entitled to hire and train ABC's staff and to manage and implement initiatives. Working with the intermediation of UNDP was thought of as a way to overcome MRE's limited staff, ABC's limited internationalised structure and constraints imposed by national legislation.

In 2001, decisions made by national judicial and control organs catalysed an attempt by the ministry to absorb ABC into its own structure ('*itamaratização*' or '*despenudização*' of ABC). This was undertaken through the creation of the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, and by progressively substituting consultants hired by UNDP by the Foreign Service's public servants, temporary staff and, to a lesser extent, outsourced staff.

That process, which was completed in October 2005, could not be sustained. After two years, according to MRE's internal rules concerning career progression, chancellery assistants and officials who had been hired to work at ABC started being transferred to posts abroad. The agency was re-staffed by UNDP consultants,⁶⁰ this time following procurement

⁵⁷ According to Article 49 of the Brazilian Constitution, '[i]t is exclusively the competence of the National Congress... to decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or acts which result in charges or commitments that go against the national property' (Brasil 1998: 54).

⁵⁸ The non-submission of Complementary Adjustments follows a position according to which 'international agreements would dispense Legislative approval and ratification by the President of the Republic in some hypotheses, among them the ones referring to agreements "that necessarily and logically result from a treaty in force and that complement them" (like the complementary acts resulting from a basic agreement)' (Accioly, cited in Câmara dos Deputados 2012: 4). According to the ABC, signed Basic Bilateral Agreements would be necessary only for projects. In the case of isolated activities, the criteria are the country having diplomatic relations with Brazil and negotiating a Basic Bilateral Agreement with Brazil (Abreu 2012).

⁵⁹ Multilateral received cooperation, accompanied by national funding usually in excess of 80 per cent, was used as an instrument to temporarily fill the shortfalls in governmental staff in various areas (following restrictions imposed by Brazilian adherence to the Washington Consensus). In 2001, when ABC had 180 hired consultants, only 40 of them were allocated to the Third Country Training Programme's (TCTP) activities, which had about 20 per cent of ABC's budget. Responding to judicial decisions, basic legal instruments containing specific mechanisms on project negotiation and management and hiring of consultants were designed in order to regulate multilateral received cooperation. Examples include Decree 5.151/04, *Portaria* MRE 732/08 and Law 10.667/03 (which reformed Law 8.745/93 in order to include international technical cooperation projects in regulations concerning the federal government's temporary contracts of no longer than four years) (Puente 2010).

⁶⁰ According to data from ABC accessed by Cabral and Weinstock (2010), in 2010 more than 50 per cent of ABC's staff were UNDP-hired staff.

procedures that had been harmonised with Brazilian national law.⁶¹ The problem of high staff turnover, however, persists in ABC, since UNDP employees have, in general, one to two year contracts (Abreu 2013).⁶²

Also responding to judicial and control decisions that considered the practice of UNDP consultants working temporarily in the field for 6 to 12 months irregular, Technical Cooperation Centres (*Núcleos de Cooperação Técnica* – NCTs) started being created in 2004 in Brazilian embassies. These focal points followed schemes designed for the Trade Promotion Centres (*Setores de Promoção Comercial*, SECOMs), allowing the hiring of local technical assistants through public selection processes (Puente 2010). However, the satisfactory fulfilment of their tasks as supporters of the operationalisation of initiatives in the field was also compromised by short-term contracts (Cabral and Weinstock 2010).

Box 5.1 A brief historical overview of the Brazilian system of technical cooperation

The design of the Brazilian technical cooperation structure started in the 1950s. While at first MRE was the main coordinating institution, at the end of the 1960s the Ministry of Planning assumed a central supervising role. This shift attempted to integrate received technical cooperation with domestic global development plans.

When Brazil started offering technical cooperation in the 1970s, the Ministry of Planning was still in a central position, although MRE supported it in the identification of partners, as well as being entitled to receive demands and negotiate initiatives. Nonetheless, the provision of technical cooperation had no interface in Brazilian embassies and official representations abroad. Without a legal framework authorising the allocation of national resources to technical cooperation, projects that involved capacity building activities in Brazil, carried out by national institutions, predominated.

As Brazil was 'graduated' by international development agencies, it increasingly had difficulties in accessing external resources to promote national development. Financial constraints were paralleled by rising demands for Brazilian provision of technical cooperation in the post-Buenos Aires Conference context, leading to the establishment of triangular mechanisms mainly with international multilateral organisations. Graduation led to the demobilisation of the whole institutional framework, headed by the Ministry of Planning, that had been designed to guarantee an adequate absorption of development cooperation by national institutions, culminating with the creation of ABC under MRE in 1987.

It was in that context that MRE reassumed the coordination of technical cooperation, while financial cooperation continued under the mandate of the Ministry of Planning. In 1987 ABC was created, linked to MRE's structure. While ABC assumed technical and executive functions, the formulation of the cooperation policy was MRE's responsibility. Firstly linked to the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG), an independent unit supervised by MRE, ABC would be financed by a Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC), and directed by the chief of the MRE's Technical Cooperation Division. In 1992 a decree established that ABC would have its own director, although its activities would still have to be closely coordinated with the Department for Scientific and Technological Issues (DCT). Four years later, FUNEC was abolished and ABC was formally linked to the MRE's General Secretariat of External Relations. A more detailed description of decrees establishing and reforming the Brazilian system of technical cooperation is available in Annex 5.

Source: Puente (2010).

⁶¹ *Manual de Convergência de Normas Licitatórias*, negotiated between the ABC and the UNDP and approved by the Federal Audit Agency in 2004 (Puente 2010).

⁶² According to Puente, before and especially after the 2002 crisis in the Brazilian system of technical cooperation, the creation of a specific category of professionals was debated, but MRE would have opposed it because they would not fit into the ministry's traditions, methods and hierarchic structure (Puente 2010).

In the face of constraints imposed by national laws concerning public procurement, budgetary execution and payments abroad, technical cooperation initiatives have been mainly executed through technical cooperation umbrella projects signed between ABC and UNDP, which usually cover a five-year period. These umbrella projects were established after the extinction of the Brazilian Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC) (see Box 5.1 above) and financed by the UNDP Fund, which was created in 1997, following a resolution made by MRE that public resources that were not being used for multilateral received cooperation were to be applied through a special (non-budgetary) fund. This allows national resources allocated to ABC to be retained after a year if not spent and not returned to the treasury, as required by law. Projects can thus be implemented on a multi-year basis.⁶³ However, from 2002 onwards, technical cooperation activities under ABC have additionally started to be financed via ordinary budgetary resources (Puente 2010).

ABC's budgetary enhancement, particularly during the Lula administration, was accompanied by the agency's demotion inside MRE's hierarchy. While in 1996 the ABC was linked to the Ministry's General Secretariat for External Relations, in 2004 it reported to the General Sub-Secretariat of Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad. Today it is part of the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion. Such a position contrasts, for instance, with that occupied by CGFOME. Figure 5.1 highlights the place of both ABC and CGFOME in the MRE's hierarchy, as well as of other departments involved in deliberative and decision-making spaces in other modalities of development cooperation (see Annex 6).

Besides the challenges described above, Brazilian technical cooperation implemented under ABC has experienced some advances in recent years. One such advance is related to the process of internal professionalisation, which has been deepened through a partnership between the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GIZ), ABC and the National School of Public Administration (ENAP) that aims to train staff from ABC and central implementing agencies.⁶⁴

Planning, monitoring and evaluation, however, have remained poor, which can be attributed to general deficits in public management in Brazil,⁶⁵ including in foreign policy, as well as to particular processes that hinder strategic planning in Brazilian technical cooperation. One such factor is the substantial extent to which actions continue to respond to visits made by the president and the Ministry of External Relations (Puente 2010). Although a few implementing agencies have been allocating internal resources to enhance the management of technical cooperation initiatives,⁶⁶ no overall plan connecting intra- and inter-sectoral actions (fundamental to guaranteeing effectiveness on the ground) has been prepared so far. Nonetheless, the new director of ABC, who took office in 2012, has pointed out in an interview that improving management practices within the agency will be one of his priorities. In 2012 ABC started designing a *Manual of Good Practices*, which might represent an important step in developing more comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

In terms of transparency, ABC has evolved through the launch of an open database on the actions it coordinates, although the specific resources invested in each one of them are not specified. CSOs, thinktanks and researchers also claim that they have not been able to access comprehensive information on specific projects, including on evaluation. Converging with this perception, the 2012 Aid Transparency Index classified the ABC as having poor

⁶³ According to Puente's estimates, of projects implemented between 1995 and 2005, 82.8 per cent of them were actually implemented over a 12-month period. Reasons for delayed implementation varied from lack of availability of permanent and trained staff in Brazilian implementing agencies to shifts in partner countries (Puente 2010).


⁶⁴ See www.enap.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1663&Itemid=271.

⁶⁵ For a more recent evaluation of advances and challenges to public management in Brazil, see Abrucio (2007).

⁶⁶ The Ministry of Health, for instance, has established an internal system to manage technical cooperation – the SISCOOP. Projects are being registered in the system, which is supposed to generate data for enhancing monitoring and evaluation.

transparency practice. With an overall below-average score, the agency ranked forty-ninth out of 72 donors.⁶⁷ The 2013 index placed Brazil in fifty-sixth position. According to the Brazilian Institute of Socioeconomic Studies (INESC), this position is not consistent with national legislation and international commitments made by the country to improve transparency and access to information (INESC 2013).

Figure 5.1 Position occupied inside MRE by organs involved in Brazilian provision of international development cooperation



Source: Based on MRE's internal regulations and simplified chart, and on information raised during the research.

5.2 Decision-making processes and interests

Since Brazilian engagement in SSDC is fragmented in several modalities and decision-making spaces (formal and informal), it is not possible to have a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of the allocation of public resources. During the 2000s, an increasing number of public and private national actors have organised themselves in order to have more influence over Brazilian SSDC; meaning that which actor has access to

⁶⁷ See 2012 *Publish What You Fund* index, www.publishwhatyoufund.org/index/2012-index/brazil/ (accessed April 2013). In the 2012 index Brazil was ahead of China (seventy-first) – the only other emerging donor that took part in the index. Brazil's score puts the country in the same group as traditional donors like Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland and Luxembourg, among others. Among the 41 indicators on information collection and publication, there are only three on which ABC does not collect information; for 24 indicators it does collect information, while for the remaining 17 the information collected is only published sporadically.

decision-making has, therefore, become a crucial issue. To explore this dimension, this subsection will focus on decision-making processes and interests influencing the geographical and thematic allocation of public resources to technical cooperation.

5.2.1 Foreign policy and the Ministry of External Relations

At first, looking at ABC as part of MRE's structure would point to an interpretation of technical cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy, as studies made by diplomats as well as by scholars have suggested (Ayllón and Leite 2009; Barbosa 2011; Cervo 1994; Puente 2010; Valler Filho 2007). Indeed, most interviewees believe that MRE is the main decision-maker in the allocation of resources.

However, apart from being informed by traditional principles of Brazil's foreign policy (Section 3), this research found no clear signs that ABC coordinates Brazilian technical cooperation following a single coherent and publicly stated diplomatic strategy led by MRE. MRE works with a broad international network of embassies and other official bodies, whose main task is to help identify partner institutions abroad, contact local authorities, support in the negotiation of instruments and, less commonly, to follow up actions in the field (Puente 2010). As one interviewee pointed out, some ambassadors may figure as active players in taking demands to ABC, but it is not clear that they do so following Brasília's instructions.

The fact that ABC is under MRE's General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion might mean that technical cooperation is closely linked to strategies aiming at diffusing the Portuguese language and at promoting or preserving Brazilian trade and investments abroad. This research found some coincidences in both cases – that is, some of the top recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation resources allocated under ABC between 2003 and 2010 (see Annex 7) are either Portuguese-speaking and growing receivers of Brazilian goods, services and investments (for instance, in the cases of Angola and Mozambique), or both – but only in the first case was it possible to identify causality. For instance, it is clear that meetings held under CPLP since its creation in 1996 have promoted demands for Brazilian national experiences in several areas.

On the other hand, diplomats tend to treat economic benefits as unintended consequences of technical cooperation (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010), since doing otherwise would contradict the whole discourse of Brazilian technical cooperation as having no relation with economic interests, despite the fact that diplomats also acknowledge Brazil's commercial interests in partner countries. Still, the coincidence among countries receiving Brazilian investments, services and products and technical cooperation might point to the latter as an instrument of either preserving or fostering Brazilian economic interests in partner countries.

While economic interests are not usually publicly stated in Brazil's diplomatic discourse, the same does not apply to political interests (Puente 2010). Gathering support for Brazilian candidacies and proposals related to global governance reform is indeed assumed to be one of the main diplomatic aims driving Brazilian technical cooperation. This might suggest further explanations for why technical cooperation does not follow traditional diplomatic priorities as far as geographical regions are concerned (see Section 4), but instead tends to be dispersed in dozens of different countries.

In general, sectoral and geographical allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation does not follow particular foreign policy strategies that match programming and adapt cooperation to specific bilateral settings. That is, sectoral cooperation initiatives are not planned according to the main issues that characterise Brazil's relations with each particular developing country. Some scholars and diplomats seem to indirectly recognise this, as they suggest Brazilian technical cooperation should focus, particularly in the regional domain, on cross-border issues, such as arms, drug trafficking and migration (Avellar, cited in Barbosa 2011; Spektor 2012).

Instead of being the central decision-making site related to the allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation, MRE seems to be more of a vetoing agency (for instance, denying cooperation demands from countries that do not host Brazilian diplomatic representations) and a facilitating agency for decisions made outside the ministry. Though MRE has a strong potential to lead coordination among several modalities of SSDC, as the only institution having seats across the main decision-making and deliberative arenas (see Annex 6), several factors hinder the ministry's influence. Besides the ones already mentioned in the previous subsection (legal, financial and operationalisation constraints under the ABC), the increasing role played by other national agents in Brazilian international affairs, and the demand-driven logic in Brazilian technical cooperation, also hinder the ability of MRE to plan and coordinate technical cooperation initiatives. The following subsections will explore the role of the main actors engaged in Brazilian technical cooperation.

Box 5.2 A new ABC? Announcement and reactions

On 25 May 2013, during the celebration of the African Union's fiftieth anniversary, Dilma Rousseff announced the creation of a new agency of cooperation, trade and investments for Africa and Latin America in a press conference (see Annex 9 for the transcript). The only information given on the occasion was that Brazilian cooperation would no longer be executed by multilateral organisations, though they may still be partners. Emphasising the importance of Brazil's cultural and economic relations with Africa and the continent's renaissance, Dilma also announced that the Brazilian government would forgive African debts as a way to guarantee a 'more effective relation'. The president stressed that if debts are not forgiven Brazil would not be able to promote investments and trade relations that involve higher value-added products, concluding that they benefit Brazil as well as African countries. She also expressed gratitude for Africa's support to the Brazilian WTO (World Trade Organization) candidate, Roberto Azevedo, and highlighted that South-South relations are based on mutual advantage and are not grounded on unequal relations ('feeling of superiority').

According to an official note published by *Casa Civil* (the Brazilian Presidential Chief of Staff Ministry), renegotiating the debts of 12 African countries, the establishment of the new agency, as well as negotiating new investment treaties and financing conditions, represents 'measures aimed at intensifying Brazil's relations with the African continent relying in reciprocal cooperation and mutual development'. These principles would make Brazil stand out in comparison with other countries acting on the continent (Rossi 2013).

News in the Brazilian media after the announcement added more details on discussions regarding the new agency, but there is no consensus on its institutional linkage. While one article mentioned that the new ABC would not be linked to the MRE due to high turnover rates in diplomatic careers and would be instead linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) (Paraguassu 2013), an article signed by a former ambassador stated that the new ABC would become an autarchy, attached to MRE, with its own staff and financial autonomy (Barbosa 2013). For the latter, such reform would aim at enhancing Brazil's soft power.

Informal interviews revealed that recently there were two models in dispute. The first would see the new agency with a cooperation, investment and trade remit linked directly to the presidency's General Secretariat (previously the rumour was that it could also be part of *Casa Civil*). The second model, defended by some diplomats, would involve strengthening the ABC, keeping its institutional anchorage at MRE. Technical work necessary for the creation of a new agency has been taking place in *Casa Civil*, although it seems that the debate has lost momentum and champions. Some argue that the change of Foreign Affairs minister may support the case for the agency to stay at MRE. However, with 2014 being election year, it is unclear how fast this debate will move forward.

(Cont'd.)

Box 5.2 (cont'd.)

During the conference on Brazil's foreign policy (see also Box 6.1) in July 2013, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota, did not give details of ABC's institutional linkage, but said that the new agency would have more financial resources and it would be renamed the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABCD) (Fleck 2013b). Articles that were published during Dilma's trip to Africa said that studies were being undertaken to review international models to contribute to the reform proposal (Barbosa 2013; Paraguassu 2013). More recently, an article stated that the so-called 'Africa Agenda' was elaborated by the African Working Group, an interministerial group coordinated by *Casa Civil* that included MDIC and MDA. The group was convened in the beginning of 2012 and concluded its tasks when the agenda was handed to Dilma a week before her trip to Ethiopia. According to the Executive Secretary of the Chamber of Foreign Commerce (CAMEX), André Alvim, the working group aimed at aligning ministries and establishing a national strategy towards Africa. The Africa Agenda includes various actions to strengthen Brazil's ties with Africa and, apart from exploring economic issues, also proposes increasing financial and human resources to humanitarian and technical cooperation, prioritising 'actions in which Brazil has accumulated specialized knowledge, such as poverty reduction, education, health and agriculture' (Rossi 2013).

Some diplomats and government officials have argued against an eventual withdrawal of ABC from MRE. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Lafer said that the way ABC works today makes it an agency based on solidarity and interested only in Brazil's international projection. Putting together investments and technical cooperation would lead to questioning the rhetoric of selfless cooperation. Moreover, it would narrow the MRE sphere of influence, which could have a negative effect on the institution and on Brazil's foreign policy. Luiz Felipe Lampreia, former chancellor and the first director of ABC (1987–1989), stated that all around the world technical cooperation is part of foreign policy. The current director of ABC, Fernando Abreu, praised the announcement of the new agency as an instrument to make it independent from international organisations, though he claimed that its reform would have to be discussed with MRE through the creation of a fourth career under the ministry. For him, it is technically possible to have investments and cooperation in one agency without conflict of interests or linking financing activities and equipment to investments.

A former ambassador, Rubens Barbosa, stated that attributing trade competences to the new agency would threaten Brazil's international projection. For him, there are already several other public agencies in charge of trade and investments, such as the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX), Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), and MRE's Department of Trade Promotion, and that what is lacking is coordination amongst them. Speaking in the name of the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), where Barbosa is the international advisor, he argued that CAMEX should be strengthened as the focal point for trade policy and directly linked to the presidency (Barbosa 2013).

Publicly, some key people linked to PT have supported linkages between technical cooperation and promotion of investment. For José Dirceu, it is not about linking aid to trade, but about building conditions to ensure partnerships have a broader remit and are more effective in a context marked by growing demands from African countries for investments and cooperation (Dirceu 2013). Deputies linked to PT also stressed, referring to Dilma's announcement of Brazil's debt relief to Africa, that 'it is a great gift to Africa ... a great gesture' (Benedita da Silva, PT-BA), that '[i]ntegration is better among equals' and that 'debts have been a great obstacle to their [African] development' (Amauri Teixeira, PT-BA) (Thomaz Jr. 2013).

Representatives of civil society and scholars have shared concern over the possibility of putting Brazil's development cooperation under the same umbrella as trade and investment. However, there is an overall consensus that ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency must be created, in order to overcome the current obstacles to Brazilian development cooperation. There are divergences regarding where the best locus for the new agency would be, but most emphasise the need for one institution responsible for data collection and accountability for all modalities.

5.2.2 The role of the presidency

According to information available on MRE's website, the ministry acts according to guidelines established by the presidency of the Republic.⁶⁸ This means that the presidency is responsible for foreign policy formulation. Literature on Brazilian foreign policy has also increasingly recognised the role of the president in the definition of foreign policy priorities, contradicting previous theses according to which the MRE would be seen as a state agency, thus isolated from governmental changes.⁶⁹

In the case of technical cooperation, presidential influence has paved the way for a greater appropriation of Brazilian provision of technical cooperation by domestic entities. During Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second administration (1999–2002),⁷⁰ leveraging the presentation of national experiences was undertaken in favour of his government's external priorities, such as diplomacy for peace and health diplomacy. These priorities were used, respectively, as tools to gather international support for the Brazilian candidacy for the Security Council and for the Brazilian position at the patents' litigation concerning antiretroviral drugs. Congressmen holding particular ideas about development issues in Brazil were also active during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration in using the presentation of experiences abroad as an instrument for strengthening them at home.⁷¹

In terms of geographic allocation, the creation of the CPLP in 1996, during Cardoso's first administration, resulted in movement within the Brazilian Congress towards technical cooperation, culminating in the creation of the *Frente Parlamentar Brasil-África* in 1999. One year later, a parliamentary amendment adding BRL2.5 million to the national budget was approved, aimed at financing technical cooperation with CPLP countries (Puente 2010).⁷²

During the Lula administrations (2003–2006; 2007–2010), Brazilian SSDC was brought to the centre of the foreign policy agenda. In the case of technical cooperation, presidential diplomacy was one of the main drivers of the exponential rise in demand for learning from Brazilian experiences. For instance, Lula visited 12 African countries during his two terms in office, while the minister of foreign affairs conducted 67 visits to 37 African countries during the same period (IPEA and World Bank 2011). These visits were crucial starting points for various SSDC projects. ABC's budgetary execution expanded, as well as the number of projects initiated each year.

⁶⁸ MRE is entitled to 'execute the guidelines of foreign policy established by the Presidency of the Republic' (see www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/conheca-o-ministerio/view).

⁶⁹ See, for instance, Cason and Power (2009); Cepaluni and Vigevani (2007); Preto (2006); Ribas and de Faria (2011). For MRE, technical cooperation, just as foreign relations in general, should be a state policy and not subject to political changes. See Danese (1999) and, particularly on MRE's critical reflections on the influence of the president and other ministries in TCDC, see Annex XIX in Puente (2010), which presents the minutes of interviews made with former directors of ABC. There seems to be an unresolved dispute between MRE and the presidency over the appointment of the director of ABC. While the decree that linked the ABC to MRE's General Secretariat for External Relations (2.070/1996) stated, in Article 53, that MRE would be responsible for naming ABC's director, a decree approved in 2001 (3.959) stated that the director had to be appointed by the president, while subsequent decrees from 2003 onward approving MRE's internal regulations were unclear on the issue.

⁷⁰ Since Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation only received broader attention in academic studies recently, there are still few studies that explore its historical dimensions in each of the presidential administrations. The most comprehensive study, undertaken by Puente, focuses on the 1995–2005 period, but the author also analysed other historical periods. For instance, he mentions the First National Development Plan of the New Republic (post re-democratisation), which already stated that technical cooperation should be stimulated, especially as an instrument to promote regional and sub-regional potentialities (Puente 2010).

⁷¹ For instance, a group led by senator Cristovam Buarque (Democratic Labour Party - PDT) created *Missão Criança*, an NGO focused on the promotion of the '*Bolsa Escola*' model in Brazil and in other developing countries, eventually leading pilot projects abroad as an instrument to strengthen domestic support for the *Bolsa Escola* programme (Morais de Sá e Silva 2011).

⁷² Before that, a four-year special fund amounting to US\$3.1 million had been approved relying on additional budgetary resources in the years 1997–1998. None of those complementary resources, however, entered into ABC's budget; they were allocated by the MRE itself through a specific umbrella project with the UNDP (Puente 2010).

The dimension that assumed more visibility under the Lula administration was the launch in 2004 of the Global Action against Hunger and Poverty. Resulting from a conjunction of international drivers (global efforts to fulfil the MDGs and the search for solutions to global disorder in the post-9/11 context) and domestic ones (the creation of the Zero Hunger Programme), that initiative led to shifts in the structure of Brazilian development cooperation, with the creation of CGFOME under MRE, also in 2004.⁷³

Though recognising macroeconomic and social advances in Brazil during her predecessor's mandate, the Dilma Rousseff administration has prioritised domestic issues, especially fighting extreme poverty (as expressed in her government's motto, 'a rich country is a country without poverty'). In foreign policy, on the one hand, the new president has renewed Brazilian relations with developed countries, in search of advanced technologies and training for Brazilians through initiatives such as the Science without Borders Programme.⁷⁴

On the other hand, in the context of national deindustrialisation, economic relations with other developing countries have been brought to the centre of the agenda, thus creating a more pragmatic and win-win view on South–South relations. Shifts in financial cooperation that started emerging during the last years of Lula's administration in order to widen the number of eligible countries⁷⁵ were deepened with measures aimed at rendering criteria for loans made by the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) more flexible.⁷⁶

Concerning technical cooperation in particular under ABC, two important shifts have happened during the Dilma administration: a greater focus on Latin America, as shown in the planning of ABC's budgetary allocation for the 2012–2015 period (see Section 4.2); the freezing of the agency's budget for technical cooperation in 2011 and its cut in 2012 and in 2013 (see Box 5.3). The new president, contrary to her predecessor, did not sign the foreword of the COBRADI 2010 report, which can be interpreted as a de-prioritisation of cooperation with other developing countries. Additionally, technical cooperation is not mentioned in the president's general foreign relations speeches.⁷⁷ Other shifts related to Brazilian engagement in development cooperation under Dilma's administration are explored in subsection 5.2.4.

In 2013 an important shift in Brazilian foreign policy took place with the nomination of a new minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo. Human rights were brought to the centre of the agenda, with a plan to prioritise themes such as child labour, gender, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) and other issues. Strengthening negotiating teams, to include not only diplomats but also other governmental institutions and civil society organisations, is part of his strategy (Oliveira 2013). Moreover, mainly driven by the need to promote trade and investments, president Dilma asked the new minister to lead on the formulation of a White Paper on Brazil's foreign policy. In order to meet this request, MRE's Department of Diplomatic Planning will be reformed to be able to produce strategic projects with the objective of guiding foreign policy (Leo 2013).

⁷³ Although CGFOME is known for its work in humanitarian assistance, as listed on the MRE website it is also active in: food and nutritional security, including the right to food; agrarian development (agrarian reform and family agriculture); small-scale fishing; the Brazil–Argentina Social Institute; International Fund for Agriculture Development and the World Food Program; World Social Forum; and dialogue with civil society. See www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/o-ministerio/cgfome-coordenacao-geral-de-aco-es-internacionais-de-combate-a-fome/.

⁷⁴ See www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf-eng/.

⁷⁵ For data on the evolution of disbursements made to sub-Saharan countries during the Lula administration, see IPEA and World Bank (2011) and Cabral (2011).

⁷⁶ See, for instance, www.comexbrasil.gov.br/conteudo/ver/chave/uso-do-acc-indireto-nas/.

⁷⁷ See Rousseff (2011, 2012).

Box 5.3 Possible determinants and perceptions of the interruption in growth of the ABC budget

In 2011, the first year of Dilma's administration, ABC's budget was BRL52 million (Barbosa 2011). In that year, the national government's compulsory and discretionary expenditure suffered a cut. MRE's budget, just like other agencies and units, had to cut by 50 per cent with expenses such as per diems and tickets, as well as suspend new contracts to rent, buy and reform properties and to rent cars, machines and equipment (Brasil 2011a).

In 2012, these restrictions were sustained, but MRE's budget was the only one, within discretionary expenditure, that was not cut. On the contrary, it was guaranteed an extra BRL151 million above what had been predicted in that year's Law of Budgetary Guidelines (Brasil 2012d). Still, ABC's budget for technical cooperation decreased to BRL36 million in 2012 and 2013 (Fleck 2013b).

All of the interviewed people from implementing agencies working under the coordination of ABC in technical cooperation activities, except for one person, were deeply dissatisfied with the interruption in the growth of ABC's budget and considered that it would compromise initiatives that were underway.

Interviewees had various opinions regarding the drivers of ABC's budgetary reduction from 2011 onwards, including reflections on:

- general cuts in governmental expenditure;
- the traditional realist rationale that dominates MRE, in which the promotion of development models is identified with an idealist position;
- ABC not having spent its technical cooperation budget during the previous years;
- technical cooperation not being a priority for the new president as it was for the previous one;
- the influence of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG), an agency that would prioritise national development and received cooperation and thus would be against the whole discourse and practice of Brazil having evolved from a donor to a provider of cooperation;
- the lack of domestic constituencies supporting technical cooperation.

5.2.3 Ministries and other implementing agencies

Ministries are also important actors in Brazilian foreign policy as they have the legal mandate to sign international cooperation agreements and officially represent the country in international forums.⁷⁸ By virtue of holding technical expertise in particular areas, national ministries have traditionally figured as important actors in the implementation of technical cooperation. However, the influence of each ministry on the decision-making process varies.

Though accumulated experiences in the field might strengthen their efforts to take an active part in the definition of the specific content of initiatives, the position occupied by each ministry in each administration's foreign policy priorities also seems to play a crucial role. For instance, the Ministry of Health has been very active since Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration, but during Lula's administration new ministries (Agrarian Development and Social Development) also started playing crucial roles. In the transition from the Lula to Dilma administrations, the Ministry of Defence has also gained a central role in decision-making concerning the allocation of technical cooperation actions. During the Dilma administration

⁷⁸ Research undertaken by Cassio França and Michelle Rattón Sanchez Badin identified that, from a universe of 170 ministerial organs (cabinets, state and executive secretaries, departments and 22 ministries), 61.4 per cent have some competency on international issues, 37 per cent have some initiatives being undertaken abroad and 30 per cent have the legal mandate to represent Brazilian interests internationally. All ministries, except one (National Integration) have international advisory units or secretariats directly linked to the Minister's Cabinet (França and Rattón Sanchez Badin 2011).

the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), and agencies linked to it, have intensified efforts to engage in South–South cooperation, for instance through negotiations to use FOCEM’s resources to finance activities related to research and development and the organisation of an international panel on Africa by CNPq in 2013.⁷⁹ The enhanced roles played by the Ministry of Defence and MCTI might explain why the second COBRADI has expanded modalities.

Key traditional actors in technical cooperation, Embrapa, Fiocruz and SENAI have not only accumulated experience in the field but also, faced with growing demands in the 2000s, autonomously developed criteria for selecting the demands on which they focus. Their international experience also results from the fact that they have previously experienced a higher degree of internationalisation due to having been privileged recipients of technical cooperation from traditional donors and having traditionally taken part in regional and international functional discussions that constituted a locus for diffusing their particular experiences and thus creating demands for them (though initially that was a spontaneous process rather than a strategic one). To what extent such demands will actually be approved, however, varies across administrations and also depends on each implementing agency’s internal institutional alignment related to the need to maintain engagement in technical cooperation across different administrations.

In the case of activities coordinated by ABC, this research has identified that the main mechanism through which an implementing agency or interest group can influence resource allocation is signing a protocol of understanding with ABC. Protocols have been signed, for instance, with: the National Front of Mayors (FNP) (see Box 5.4); the unit of the *Getúlio Vargas* Foundation dedicated to agribusiness (FGV-Agro) for the establishment of the Nacala Fund;⁸⁰ and with the Ministry of Defense, aiming at raising the number of military staff from developing countries trained in Brazil as an instrument to promote arms sales and doctrinal harmonisation (Antunes 2010b and 2010c; see also Abdenur and Marcondes 2013).⁸¹ The existence of a strong basis in the Brazilian Congress, as well as of representatives (attachés or *adidos*) in the field, might also configure as important drivers of the influence of defence and agriculture interests in the allocation of technical cooperation.

⁷⁹ During the Lula administrations CNPq had an important role in South–South cooperation through initiatives such as the South American and African Programmes of Support to Science and Technology Cooperation Activities (PROSUL and PROÁFRICA). However, both programmes were interrupted in 2011. According to da Silva and Furtado (2013), the interruption of PROÁFRICA, as well as of other initiatives, resulted from the decision to focus CNPq’s efforts on the Science without Borders programme.

⁸⁰ According to published information about the Nacala Fund, its aim will be to finance agro-industry and infrastructure projects in the north of Mozambique, including financing productivity of small and medium farmholders and associations among Mozambican and Brazilian food producers (Guarany 2012).

⁸¹ Initially focused on South American countries, aiming, according to the official discourse, at promoting a regional defence industry and strengthening the South American Defence Council, such initiatives have been recently expanded to western African countries, as data available on the ABC online database shows. The online database is available at www.abc.gov.br/ABC_por/WebForms/projeto.aspx?secao_id=132. By selecting ‘South–South cooperation’ in ‘Type of Cooperation’ and ‘Defense’ in ‘Sector of Activity’ it is possible to identify the recent expansion of military training, including in African countries.

Box 5.4 The role of Brazilian subnational governments in technical cooperation

Brazilian subnational governments have taken part, for decades, in decentralised international cooperation networks and initiatives in areas such as environment, regional integration and cross-border cooperation. Municipalities in particular have been collectively mobilising themselves in order to influence decision-making in foreign relations through national networks such as the National Front of Mayors (FNP), the Brazilian National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM), and the Brazilian National Forum of Municipal Secretaries and Managers (FONARI), having an interface at the MRE, through its Special Advisory Unit for Federative and Parliamentary Affairs (AFEPA), and especially at the presidency, through its Federal Affairs Under-Chief (SAF).

While such links have been more substantive in the regional domain (particularly in Mercosul and cross-border cooperation), there has been a broadening of their geographic engagement over recent years. One example was the mobilisation of Brazilian cities, articulated through the FNP, in order to support the reconstruction of Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake, which culminated in the signature of a Protocol of Intentions between the FNP and the ABC, aiming at enhancing decentralised cooperation between Brazilian cities and their Haitian counterparts (see Leite 2011).

Subnational governments' calls for enhanced engagement in Brazilian technical cooperation have culminated in the approval of two calls, in partnership with the ABC, to finance South–South decentralised technical cooperation initiatives. The first one, *Call for Proposals for Franco-Brazilian Decentralized Trilateral Cooperation Projects for Haiti and the African Continent*, was launched in April 2011, in partnership with the French Agency for Development (AFD). A total of 22 proposals were presented and two projects have been approved: one involving Fortaleza (Brazil), Porto Novo (Benin) and St Denis (France); and another involving Guarulhos (Brazil), Lyon (France) and Maputo and Matola (Mozambique). The second call, *Decentralized Technical South–South Cooperation Program*, was launched in several Brazilian cities, beginning in February 2012, having received more than 60 proposals and having approved four projects engaging the following municipalities: Bagé (Brazil) and Cerro Largo (Uruguay); Vitória (Brazil) and Xai-Xai (Mozambique); Canoas (Brazil) and Morón (Argentina); Curitiba (Brazil) and Rosario (Argentina).

The mobilisation of subnational governments has also culminated with the publication of a study, sponsored by the FNP, aiming to propose avenues, relying on other countries' institutionalised and non-institutionalised experiences of decentralised cooperation, for the establishment of a legal framework for decentralised cooperation in Brazil (see Rodrigues 2011). Increasing engagement in technical cooperation reflects subnational governments' will to export local policies as an instrument to strengthen such policies in Brazil, as well as the claim that national public policies and experiences that are being sought by other developing countries have their origins in local spheres. The insufficient capacities of central government to cope with increasing demands has also favoured the decentralisation of implementation, which is also seen as an instrument to broaden national constituencies supporting the increasing allocation of national resources to promote international development.

5.2.4 Trade and investment promotion agencies and the private sector

Though there is a tendency to treat the connection between foreign policy and SSDC and Brazilian private sector interests as resulting from the latter's mobilisation, such as in the case of ethanol and soy production abroad,⁸² the research found that the internationalisation of both agribusiness and industry to other developing countries has been mainly led by the state as an instrument to enhance Brazilian capabilities, to foster Brazilian development and to ground South–South cooperation in business alliances. Though this process was already

⁸² See, for instance, Antunes (2010a); Dolcetti (2012); Schlesinger (2012).

under way during Lula's second administration,⁸³ it has become more visible during the Dilma administration (as demonstrated by her announcement of a new agency, see Box 5.2).

The main way the private sector benefits from Brazilian development cooperation is through financial cooperation. Nonetheless, it is unclear if, and how, financial cooperation influences technical cooperation. In practice, what has been noted is that an increase in funding by BNDES for Brazilian companies carrying out infrastructure projects in Africa coincides with growing governmental technical cooperation projects in these countries (Masagão *et al.* 2012).

Although technical cooperation has experienced budgetary freezes (2011) and cuts (2012 and 2013) in the Dilma administration (see Box 5.3) there has been a growing interest in the theme in MDIC, as mentioned previously, particularly among sectors that have been dedicated to the promotion of Brazilian trade with African countries.⁸⁴ In 2013, led by the presidency's Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) organised a seminar on Brazilian soft power, and at that time it was suggested that the ABC should be strengthened (Barbosa 2013).

When compared with the outward-looking government programmes during ex-President Lula's terms, the current perception amongst government agencies working with the Brazilian private sector is one of slow disengagement with Africa. The Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), for instance, has redirected its efforts from countries like Mozambique and Angola to Mercosul and other parts of Latin America.

Commercial ties rather than grants or solidarity loans are the new orthodoxy with regards to Brazilian industrial engagement with Africa. A new focus on markets in the global North has also ensued, viewed as a way to upgrade Brazilian firms' capabilities by supporting them to export to the 'most sophisticated' (e.g. North America and Europe) markets and hence become more globally competitive. This shift is also thought to increase the export of manufactures instead of natural resource-based products to Asia, particularly to China. In October 2012 there was growing alarm that for the first time the balance of trade between China and Brazil had tipped to the benefit of the former.

The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) has been assigned fewer resources in general, but this is particularly true in the case of resources destined to support exports to Africa. This is compounded by reluctance amongst medium enterprises to venture outside of the large and lucrative domestic market which has been growing for over a decade. Medium-sized firms (usually the target for support from APEX) see few reasons to invest and take risks for the African market, leaving this task to the largest firms in Brazil in the sectors of construction, mining and natural resource-based products.

⁸³ Shifts in financial cooperation that had started emerging during the final years of the Lula's administration in order to widen the participation of Brazilian companies in exports (including medium and small enterprises), as well as the number of eligible countries, were increased by measures, for instance, aiming at rendering criteria for loans made by the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) more flexible. See, for instance, the legislation that authorised the use of lines of credit for indirect export made by Brazilian trading companies (www.comexbrasil.gov.br/conteudo/ver/chave/uso-do-acc-indireto-nas/). Such measures have been mainly proposed by specialised working groups created within the MDIC-headed *Brasil Maior* programme, which is presented on its official website as the current government's 'industrial, technological and foreign trade policy' (www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/conteudo/128). For more information on the development of mechanisms aiming at boosting Brazilian trade with Africa's sub-Saharan countries, and data on the evolution of disbursements made to sub-Saharan countries during the Lula administration, see Cabral (2011), and IPEA and World Bank (2011).

⁸⁴ Such interest is illustrated by the fact that the Africa subgroup that integrates the Technical Group of Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade (GTTEX), which has been created with the mandate of 'producing studies and elaborating proposals on foreign trade policy with specific countries or regions' (CAMEX 2012), has been inviting people from the ABC, as well as main TCDC implementing agencies, such as Embrapa, to take part at its meetings.

MDIC, which oversees ABDI and APEX, contends that the presence of Brazilian private and public industries in Africa has not been reduced nor have economic flows diminished. A shift from grants and low-interest loans to commercial relationships and investment that seeks higher returns for Brazil has ensued. The governmental position is that this will actually improve conditions for Brazilian investment in Africa which in turn will encourage higher numbers of projects and exports for the benefit of African economies whilst also promoting Brazilian economic interests.

Moving towards the private sector side of the complex Brazilian spectrum of organisations that provide support to businesses, there is SENAI. This is one of the flagship agencies of the CNI (Confederação Nacional da Indústria – National Confederation of Industries), which is a private sector-led organisation that was created by government policy and provided public goods to the employed Brazilian population. During President Lula’s two terms, SENAI spearheaded a number of centres for vocational training in several African countries but these projects are no longer being encouraged. The new priority for SENAI is to strengthen technical and vocational training and industrial innovation in Brazil.

5.2.5 Civil society and social movements

Currently, there are not many permanent spaces (either ‘invited’ or ‘claimed’) in which the policies and practices related to SSDC are discussed. Government engagement with civil society and the private sector on such issues tends to be limited or *ad hoc*.⁸⁵

An initial attempt to map spaces that have objectives directly related to SSDC or that have had discussions that were considered influential for the continued consolidation of the field shows that such spaces tend to have either a very broad remit (i.e. encompassing all or many aspects of the country’s foreign policy) or are too focused on specific aspects of SSDC. The research identified around 20 initiatives including *ad hoc* spaces, councils and permanent forums on sectoral issues, regional integration participatory initiatives, focused remit spaces and civil society spaces. Such spaces are registered below in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Government and civil society spaces related to SSDC

Type of space	Spaces identified
<i>Ad hoc</i> spaces	General foreign policy meeting held by MRE and SG-PR
Sectoral councils or permanent forum	Working group for the international agenda of the National Food Security Council (CONSEA), the Permanent Committee for International Affairs (CPAI) linked to the National Council of Rural Sustainable Development (CONDRAF MDA), the Amazonia Fund Council
Regional integration initiatives	CPLP Civil Society Forum, Social and Participative Mercosul programme, Mercosul Economic and Social Consultative Forum, BRICS and IBSA Academic Forums
Focused remit spaces	Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, CONARE (National Committee for Refugees), Conex (CAMEX’s private sector consultative council), Civil Society Forum in Haiti, GTI-AHI
Civil society claimed spaces	GR-RI, Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples (REBRIP), ABONG’s working group on Brazil–Africa relations, BNDES platform

Source: Own elaboration based on official documents and interviews.

⁸⁵ ‘Closed’ spaces are where decisions and discussions take place without broader consultation or involvement of other stakeholders; ‘invited’ spaces are government-sponsored participatory spaces, institutionalised or not, that create opportunities for involvement and consultation of different stakeholders; ‘claimed/self-created’ spaces are those that emerge out of sets of common concerns or identifications by civil society or the private sector, or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits (Gaventa 2006).

Box 5.5 Private sector perspectives on working in Africa

When talking to private firms in the mining, oil and gas, construction and agriculture sectors, notions of hardship, opportunity and accomplishment emerge. Hardship as firms express how investment and work conditions in Africa seem to them much more difficult than 'even in the poorest areas of the Northeast [of Brazil]'. For some of the interviewees these meant it has been a challenge to find staff willing to move to Africa to lead and implement projects. This challenge has been compounded by a labour shortage within Brazil, given the expansion of the economy over the last decade and the creation of new local jobs. Institutional challenges such as contract enforcement, facilitation of payments and competition with Chinese and Indian firms in Africa has added to this sense of hardship.

'Opportunity' was the other notion that firms expressed when referring to their work in Africa. Construction firms in particular view weak African infrastructure as an opportunity for investment and for obtaining support from BNDES's loans for internationalisation. Over the last decade 'many new Brazilian multimillionaires were created' according to some interviewees, because of large infrastructural projects but also thanks to the increased demand for engineering services and other technical maintenance services for mining and construction provided by small firms. Brazilian construction firms are the ones that have spent most time in Africa and had the most sophisticated view of Africa – they stayed in countries like Angola during war and conflict to the point that these companies are seen as 'local' with much local employment. This was also part of the model they wanted to foster, to be seen as 'African' construction firms instead of Brazilian. Odebrecht was frequently mentioned as the Brazilian construction firm that had the best reputation in Africa linked to high-quality standards and timeliness in finishing projects as well as involvement in social housing projects. Mining companies such as the giant Vale have also seen in Africa a land of opportunity with large projects in Mozambique leading the way. However, political instability and complex relationships with partners have seen their investments shadowed by scandal in other places such as Guinea (Simandou). Brazilian exporters of manufactures tended to be more conservative about their assessments of opportunities in Africa as local competition from South African and Chinese manufactures thwarted many ambitious plans such as those of Brazilian cosmetics firm O Boticario, which closed operations in Africa after a few years, or the many small and medium enterprises that did not benefit from the 'Brazilian content' clause included in BNDES internationalisation loans to large companies. Regardless of these limitations, a number of personal services franchises from hairdressers to language schools are now expanding to Africa according to the Brazilian Franchise Association (website and interviews in October 2012).

'Accomplishment' and 'responsibility' were also very often mentioned by interviewees from the private sector when referring to their operations in Africa. Several interviewees expressed that in Africa their social responsibility projects are even more important than in Brazil because of the dire social and economic conditions in which their African employees live. A mining company engineer explained how their company became involved in sponsoring orphanages for children whose parents had died of AIDS, which is something they would never attempt in Brazil to avoid being accused of creating projects that foster dependency (*assistencialistas* in the original Portuguese) instead of empowerment. In many geographically remote areas where these companies operate, they have decided to fill the vacuum left by the absence of a strong state (for health, education and security) to help their employees and their families. Given that Brazilian firms tend to employ African labour, these social initiatives for employees benefit the local community. Much has been said about the fact that Brazilian firms invest in training the local workforce and regardless of motive (Brazilian shortage of labour or genuine desire to build local capabilities) this is a key feature of Brazilian business practices in Africa with clear links to development objectives.

Surprisingly, the largest oil and gas company from Brazil (with a large percentage of government capital) never got involved in social programmes in Africa and is now disinvesting in order to focus on Brazilian domestic priorities. This finding goes against the assumption linking state-owned companies with social programmes and privately owned companies being associated with little investment in the area of social development.

However, it is important to note that in the last two years, concurrent with the increased role of the country in international cooperation and the growth in foreign investment, there have been more opportunities for reflection on the trends, motivations, contradictions and strategies of South–South cooperation.

There are incipient initiatives of civil society participation in cooperation decision-making and implementation. Even though these initiatives are very focused and numerically restricted they represent advances and recognise the role of civil society in development cooperation. Such initiatives have been led by two institutions: the presidency's General Secretariat (SG-PR), which started promoting technical cooperation initiatives partnered by civil society organisations and governments; and, particularly, by MRE's CGFOME.

The presidency's General Secretariat's International Affairs Advisory Department aims to foster citizen participation in Brazilian international agendas and international organisation participatory spaces. The department promotes meetings and seminars about social integration (Mercosul and CPLP), dialogues over civil society cooperation and other initiatives, like the *Mercosul Social e Participativo*, or consultations with civil society (i.e. Rio +20 and UNDP's Beyond 2015).

In the particular case of development cooperation, SG-PR's reflection about the experience of Brazil as an aid recipient, has led them to the conclusion that development impacts were more sustainable in cases where projects connected international actors to local CSOs and governments. This lesson informs, for instance, the project 'Implementation of Community Seed Banks and Capacity Building to Rescue, Multiply, Store and Use Native Seeds in Family-Based Agriculture', coordinated by the ABC and partnered in Brazil by the SG-PR, the Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE), the Popular Farmers' Movement (MCP) and the Women Farmers' Movement (MMC). The main partners of the projects in Africa are: the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Trust for Community Outreach and Education in South Africa; and the Ministries of Agriculture and Planning and the National Farmers' Union in Mozambique.

Overall, there are no indications of a government strategy to engage with society in SSDC policy formulation as a whole. One hypothesis is that the existing spaces and initiatives respond to civil society mobilisation on specific subjects (i.e. *Mercosul Social e Participativo* and the role of the labour union),⁸⁶ or PT's priorities on civil society and foreign policy. Those priorities are related to the party's agenda on enhancing the voice of CSOs in foreign policy as a means to: strengthen rights at home; ground domestic participatory mechanisms and the national consolidation of social rights on international practices and architecture; and ground Brazilian technical cooperation in domestic constituencies. Nevertheless, the research did not explore evidence on the extension of civil society influence and impact on the cooperation agenda debated in those forums. Also, the research did not investigate the relations between civil society and the sectoral ministries' initiatives on technical cooperation, which might present different dynamics and background.

Finally, the existence of civil society 'claimed spaces' (which are created by CSOs themselves) demonstrates that initial mobilisations that were focused mainly on international trade have now broadened their remit, following the country's increased international engagement in SSDC. The initiatives that were identified coordinate prominent non-governmental organisations and social movements dedicated to debating and monitoring Brazil's actions abroad. It is also important to mention that those groups and networks

⁸⁶ As mentioned in *Mercosul Social e Participativo* official documentation: www.secretariageral.gov.br/arquivos/imagens-publicacoes/Mercosul_volume2.pdf.

present a clear demand for foreign policy democratisation and the establishment of formal and institutionalised participatory mechanisms and spaces for deliberation.

5.2.6 Congress debates and public opinion

Initially the research tried to explore debates that have been taking place in the Brazilian Congress concerning engagement in international cooperation, but the influence of particular congressmen, lobbies and groups concerning the areas and countries of allocation for Brazilian development cooperation remains to be explored. Two debates that took place in the Chamber of Deputies have been analysed: debates on the new statute of Embrapa, which authorised its international operation; and debates concerning food aid.

The first debate was very brief and had an under-attended public audience, while the discussions on provisional measures 481/2010 and 519/2010, concerning food donations of public stocks to international humanitarian assistance through the World Food Programme, have been more extensive and complex.⁸⁷

Several deputies have pointed out that national needs should be prioritised, though solidarity towards the peoples of other developing countries was not being questioned. On the contrary, the deputies have considered solidarity as a principle that goes beyond the Workers' Party's foreign policy, mirroring international, religious and moral principles as well as values held by the Brazilian parliament and society as a whole.

Converging with this position, according to a national poll on Brazilian foreign policy (2010–2011), which interviewed 200 social and political leaders and a random sample of 2,400 people in Brazilian cities, 86 per cent of the Brazilian foreign policy community⁸⁸ considered helping to improve quality of life in less developed countries to be extremely or very important; while 92.5 per cent of the interested and informed public, and 81.5 per cent of the uninterested and non-informed public, considered it very important (IRI, n.d.).

More recently, the Brazil Public Opinion Monitor, an internet-based survey that engaged 2,189 opinion leaders, pointed out that only 37 per cent of them believed that Brazil receives aid from other countries, while 63 per cent said that Brazil should receive it. On the issue of provided cooperation, 61 per cent believed that the country provides assistance, 51 per cent said that they support such actions, while 40 per cent positioned themselves against it. When asked which factors should drive Brazilian provision of assistance to other developing countries, most respondents considered promoting national security as very important, followed respectively by reducing poverty, promoting peace and security in the world,

⁸⁷ Opposition did not centre on the donation of food itself, but on: (1) it being an instrument to affirm the international image of President Lula and his alignment with countries whose governments were found not to be respecting domestic human rights; (2) it being an instrument to promote compensatory programmes abroad, to the detriment of other policies targeting sustainable social inclusion (such as health and education); (3) it being decided by the Executive; (4) the possibility of directing seized merchandise at home to humanitarian assistance; and (5) the quantity and kind of grains that would be destined for other countries, having in mind their impacts on national prices. In the end, both provisional measures were approved. Their rapporteurs, respectively, deputies Maurício Rands (PT) and Luiz Carlos Heinze (PP), concluded in favour of the legality of food aid. The provisional measure has been considered an adequate instrument, given the urgency of the issue; the donation of food from public stocks has been found consistent with the Law of Fiscal Responsibility (which states that the utilisation of public stocks does not incur additional expense to the Union's budget, except expenses related to its operationalisation), as well as with the Brazilian people's spirit of solidarity towards populations that are affected by malnutrition, insufficient income, and natural catastrophes. Beyond solidarity, one of the factors that has stimulated support for food aid has been its convergence with the national minimum price policy. This rationale has been argued by Heinze's report, as well as in interventions made by other deputies, for instance, by Deputy Zonta (PP).

⁸⁸ Souza (2008) defines the Brazilian community of foreign policy (*comunidade brasileira de política externa*) as the group of 'people who take part in decision-making or contribute in a relevant manner to opinion formation concerning the country's international relations. It encompasses therefore not only members of the Executive and the Legislative, but also representatives of interest groups, leaders of non-governmental organizations, scholars, journalists and entrepreneurs who act in the international arena' (Souza 2008: 3).

promoting solidarity, responding to natural disasters, promoting human rights, promoting Brazil's economic interests, promoting the position of women in other countries, promoting Brazil's political interests and promoting better government (Henson 2013).

5.2.7 International actors

Traditional donors also have an important role in the diffusion of Brazilian policies, either because of the practice of replicating in third countries projects that had been implemented in Brazil previously, or because of their roles in collecting and diffusing information on Brazilian development experiences abroad. Sometimes they actively play a role in helping partner countries engage with Brazilian SSDC. Therefore, they have an indirect influence as they contribute to demands being developed by partner countries.

Additionally, many of the flagship technical cooperation projects form part of trilateral arrangements. How far the international organisations and bilateral donors influenced the agenda-setting and what their actual role is in implementation was not explored by this research.

Traditional donors still play an important role in supporting Brazilian technical cooperation capacity building. As recent examples, in February 2013 JICA and UNDP partnered ABC's project *Capacity Development in Management of South–South and Trilateral Cooperation* and DFID supports learning and knowledge exchange and consolidation in the framework of the Africa Food Purchase Programme led by the Ministry of Social Development and CGFOME. (Leite *et al.* 2013)

It is important to consider the role of international organisations and traditional donors as influential actors in Brazilian technical cooperation. This expands actors' field of political action, since national governmental and non-governmental actors can also mobilise knowledge and resources in international arenas. While this adds even greater complexity to the decision-making process, it also opens up possibilities for enriching Brazil's experience, since a wider range of actors can engage in SSDC initiatives.

5.2.8 Map of influences on Brazilian technical cooperation


Figure 5.2 below attempts to summarise this section's main findings. To simplify the understanding, national and international actors are represented in an aggregate manner. The size attributed to each actor represents the research hypothesis about the extent of the influence exerted over the technical cooperation decision process as a whole.

It should be pointed out that the graphical representation of ministries, implementing agencies, economic groups, non-governmental actors, international organisations, other countries and traditional donors as single actors hides their multiplicity and complexity (i.e. some ministries have much more international presence and/or influence over other actors and some international organisations or traditional donors are more influenced by/influence more than others). Also, all non-governmental and international actors were aggregated (in boxes) to facilitate the reading of the map. Again this aggregation may conceal more complex relations.

MRE also represents ABC, the embassies and the diplomatic body. Along with the promotion agencies (like BNDES), MRE has been classified as a facilitator actor (represented by the grey colour) since they do not implement cooperation alone. Although promotion agencies only have an indirect impact on technical cooperation, as their actions are related to financial cooperation (represented by yellow lines), they have been included in the figure as a first attempt to explore their potential influence on technical cooperation. A deeper comprehension of mutual impacts and relations between financial and technical cooperation remains to be explored.

A blue line surrounds actors responsible for direct implementation of cooperation, while institutions with veto and control power are represented in red. The figure also shows information about the research hypothesis on the flow of influences (represented by connection arrows), pointing out unilateral or mutual influence and formal or informal relations.

Figure 5.2 Tentative map of influences over Brazilian technical cooperation



Source: Own elaboration based on official documents and interviews.

6 Policy debate

Although SSDC is still an incipient field in Brazil, the research attempted to identify some of the ideas, narratives and demands of civil society, academia and media that shape the domestic policy debate. We understand ideas as widely shared values, beliefs and narratives related to issues such as: international cooperation, the role of the country in engaging in SSDC, and how partner countries are perceived and known.

This section is based on views and opinions shared during the three civil society dialogues organised by the research team and interviews with the private sector.⁸⁹ It also references some of the key articles and papers published in recent years by representatives of NGOs or civil society networks, when they reinforce points raised during the civil society dialogues. Text boxes containing a short analysis of the academic debate and media coverage related to this theme complement these perspectives. Additionally, the box below unpacks some of the main discussions during a key foreign policy event in 2013.

6.1 Ideas and narratives

As mentioned previously, the policy debate around SSDC is embryonic and often fragmented. Many of the ideas and narratives are still being formed, and the concepts and boundaries of the debate are fluid. As opposed to traditional donor countries, in which the boundaries of what is considered international cooperation have been ingrained during the past 50 years, in Brazil competing perspectives are still being debated. Some of these converging and diverging views are presented below. Each of these issues, as well as the converging or diverging perspectives regarding the topic, could be further unpacked and debated to provide recommendations and possible ways forward. It is important to note that due to the lack of information and research, perceptions presented by participants and interviewees are often not backed by empirical evidence. However, there are an increasing number of debates and analyses taking place (for instance see Boxes 6.2 and 6.3), leading to a more informed and evidence-based discussion.

There was an overall consensus that Brazil is going through a transitional moment regarding its role in international cooperation. The country was seen to have reached a new international status due to its so-called 'inclusive growth'. This narrative – commonly used by government, international organisations and some civil society organisations – has been important in establishing Brazilian policies and programmes as 'best practices' to be shared with other developing countries.⁹⁰ The international recognition of certain policies and programmes has also led to further legitimisation of such experiences nationally.

⁸⁹ In civil society dialogues, participants were asked for their opinion on three main questions: (1) 'Which should be the main drivers of Brazilian engagement on SSDC?' (Why? For what? And for whom?); (2) 'What are the main forces that influence Brazilian engagement?' (actors, interest groups, drives, ideas); and (3) 'What are the main challenges and lessons learnt by the Brazilian SSDC?'

⁹⁰ This argument is also raised by Beghin (2012), who stresses that the positive impacts of social policies in Brazil led to their international recognition and increasing requests to share its experiences.

Box 6.1 2013 National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy

In July 2013, a groundbreaking National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy was held, entitled '2003–2013: A New Foreign Policy' (the timeframe coincides with the PT's rule in Brazil). The conference was organised by the Reflection Group on International Relations (GR-RI), a diverse assemblage made up of self-identified leftist or progressive stakeholders from the government, academia and civil society. The conference, which gathered approximately 700 people in person and more than 12,000 people online,⁹¹ aimed at reflecting on past priorities and achievements, current challenges and future perspectives for Brazilian foreign policy, as well as emphasising the need to democratise it. The group presented a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding the creation of a foreign policy council.⁹²

The starting point for thematic discussions was the conceptualisation of the so-called 'new' Brazilian foreign policy, described by former Ministers of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim (2003–2010) and Antonio Patriota (2011–2013),⁹³ as 'lofty' (capacity to defend one's own points of view) and active (*altiva e ativa* in Portuguese). Some of the foreign policy shifts that were mentioned under the PT administration were: renewing ties with the South without undermining its relations with the North; and willingness to actively engage in world affairs, including reforming global governance through normative and agenda-setting initiatives (the issues of food security and fighting hunger were highly emphasised).

Policymakers and analysts shared their perceptions on constraints and opportunities for Brazilian foreign action. These included concerns about the financial crisis and current developmental models, regional integration challenges and the national technological gap, among other topics. Particularly on Brazil–Africa relations, senior diplomats underlined enhanced political and commercial ties, arguing that there was still room for improvements (for instance, the need to expand BNDES credit lines to African countries and to promote better understanding in Brazilian society of the potential for closer relations with Africa). Many speakers raised the need to discuss the current development cooperation framework, encompassing policies, practices and flows.

As part of the debate on democratisation of foreign policy, speakers repeatedly stressed the need to treat the latter as a public policy. Speakers emphasised that participation is a principle guiding different policies in both current and past administrations, and should also inform foreign policymaking. Citizen participation was described as a 'creative tension' that should be fostered not only domestically, but in spaces such as Mercosul, G-20, BRICS, UNASUL, and CPLP. Finally, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Patriota mentioned the government's intention of establishing, until the end of 2013, a consultative body, most probably a dialogue forum, between government and civil society on foreign policy issues.⁹⁴

It is worth noting that the conference has sparked debate beyond the 'usual suspects'. Reactions from other groups have, on the one hand, shown how the notion of a 'new foreign policy' since 2003 is still contested in its novelty and essence.⁹⁵ On the other hand, it has confirmed a current emerging trend of increasing the political (and even partisan) debate around foreign policy issues, which reinforces the need for consolidating more permanent spaces for public debates on Brazilian foreign engagements.

⁹¹ See <http://blogbrasilnomundo.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/pela-criacao-de-um-orgao-institucional-permanente-de-consulta-participacao-e-dialogo-sobre-a-politica-externa-brasileira/>.

⁹² The letter putting forward this proposal can be found at <http://blogbrasilnomundo.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/pela-criacao-de-um-orgao-institucional-permanente-de-consulta-participacao-e-dialogo-sobre-a-politica-externa-brasileira/>.

⁹³ Patriota left his Chancellor position in August 2013. At the time of the conference, he was still Brazil's Foreign Minister.

⁹⁴ The longstanding demand from civil society groups, much inspired by other national participation mechanisms, has been discussed by MRE and the presidency for a long time, including in exchanges between the government and its close circles in civil society. Patriota had, however, mentioned briefly the government's willingness to create a type of body by the end of 2013 in a previous hearing at the Senate, back in April. See www.conectas.org/en/actions/foreign-policy/news/undefinedminister-iwantoknowundefined.

⁹⁵ One example of the public debate generated among foreign policy analysts is the dialogue between Matias Spektor and Sergio Fausto published in *Folha de São Paulo*. Spektor wrote 'O futuro em São Bernardo' [The future in São Bernardo] in his weekly column (24 July 2013), and a few days later there was a public reply, 'Palpite Infeliz' [Unhappy guess], written by Sergio Fausto (5 August 2013).

Interviewees and participants mentioned that the country is not prepared to take on this new position. They pointed out that Brazil wants to be seen as an emerging power but does not want to take on the responsibilities that come with the new status, including those related to international cooperation.⁹⁶ The obstacles and challenges to improving South–South cooperation and ensuring Brazil fulfils its new position mentioned during the civil society dialogues include the absence or deficiency of:

- a legal framework consistent with the country's role as a cooperation provider;
- a strong and autonomous coordinating agency, leading to fragmented strategies and no clear policy;
- funding channels for different stakeholders to engage in SSDC;
- absence of adequate information regarding Brazilian cooperation;
- social accountability mechanisms;
- a culture of monitoring and evaluation of SSDC projects, as well as unclear definition of what characterises effective SSDC projects;
- transparency and accountability of BNDES;
- knowledge of the 'Other', particularly the political, social and cultural realities of countries in Africa and Asia;
- trained personnel to work in SSDC.⁹⁷

During the revision of this research, scholars raised further challenges:

- lack of systematic dialogue with other Southern countries and regional blocs on issues of South–South cooperation, reducing the opportunities for learning and improving the quality of its SSDC;
- state bureaucracy is organised to deal with domestic issues, even though increasingly dealing with an international remit;
- lack of postgraduate courses in international development cooperation;
- weak understanding of who the actors are demanding the development of an international cooperation policy.

Although it is common to hear in global debates a discussion about 'the Brazilian development model', most interviewees and participants contested the ideal of a single model and talked about the different 'Brazils' that exist side-by-side. This duality, or multiplicity, is characterised by the persistence of poverty and social exclusion,⁹⁸ as well as policies and programmes that are based on distinctive development objectives. A good example of possible contradictions or complementarities is seen in agricultural development, in which official engagement promotes both agribusiness and family agriculture⁹⁹ (more about this discussion below).

A key issue raised by civil society is their relevance as actors in development and international development cooperation. Many public policies, which are shared by the Brazilian government with other developing countries, are seen as the result of social

⁹⁶ Beghin (2012: 58) remarks that 'the ambivalences and ambiguities of Brazilian engagement... are related to the fact that Brazil is still an emergent country in the international sphere: it knows that it has responsibilities towards others but it does not know how to exert them'.

⁹⁷ These obstacles are also raised by ABONG (2011), Bava (2011b), Beghin (2012), Masagão *et al.* (2012), Mello (2011).

⁹⁸ Luz and Wolff (2011) argue that internationally there is a simplistic and technocratic image of Brazil, and the official discourse often concurs, which suggests that the social problems in the country are effectively solved. However, the authors point to the continuation and even deepening of the structural problems that lead to poverty and social exclusion.

⁹⁹ Masagão *et al.* (2012: 1) mention that 'support of family agriculture and cooperative enterprises coexist with the promotion of mega projects for commodity production, energy and infrastructure, whose social and environmental benefits are rather controversial'.

dynamics and political struggles that had civil society as a key player.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, Brazilian civil society has developed experience and knowledge that supports the pursuit of alternative development paradigms, which is not being adequately incorporated into the portfolio of official cooperation. This fact and the accumulated experience of engaging with international cooperation, North–South or South–South, would allow civil society to contribute positively to the construction of other forms of cooperation based on solidarity.¹⁰¹

Additionally, one issue raised during the civil society dialogues is that although the country continues to use its traditional discourse of historical dispute with the North, the restructuring of the global system is no longer a policy priority. That is, whereas before Brazil was aligned with other developing countries demanding that global governance institutions become more representative and democratic, such as the UN and G8, now that the country is one of the ‘big players’ it seems to be more concerned with establishing its role as such.

A central narrative that is used across the spectrum – government, civil society and private sector from different political affiliations – is the potential uniqueness of the Brazilian international engagement *vis-à-vis* other donors or companies from other emerging powers. It is emphasised that democratic values and the capacity to establish horizontal relationships and engage in a more flexible way, differentiate Brazilian cooperation and commercial initiatives, allowing its presence to fit better with the realities of partner countries. Nonetheless, civil society is already questioning if this distinction from traditional aid relations is actually true, as will be further discussed below.

A few interviewees observed that this uniqueness narrative is based on aspects of the Brazilian identity intensely discussed by Brazilian literature and talked about on the streets. These include: the ‘little Brazilian way’ (*o jeitinho brasileiro*) – the tendency to improvise and be flexible, rather than to follow rules and procedures when trying to resolve an issue; the ‘cordiality’, which emphasises the informal and more horizontal character of Brazilians and stresses that they tend to act based on emotions and not rationality; and the ‘miscegenation imaginary’, a multiplicity of domestic realities that allows Brazilians to connect and relate to different cultures.

An initial point raised during the civil society dialogues is that the normative nature of debate regarding SSDC is not just a technical question but also a political issue. The need to promote an inclusive process to define what is understood as South–South cooperation and explore its relationships with other foreign policy strategies is a recurrent civil society demand. SSDC tends to be seen as broader than the traditional aid sphere, and includes issues that civil society and government representatives feel were sidelined by Northern countries as a way to maintain their status quo in global trade and industrial development. Only when there is conceptual clarity, and some level of consensus regarding the definition of South–South cooperation, can a path towards developing a clear policy be outlined.

Although there is a general agreement of the need for an SSDC policy, what these guidelines should look like and the process by which they should be developed remains contested. There is a historical demand for the creation of a foreign policy participatory council, linked to MRE, similar to councils that exist in other policy areas in Brazil.¹⁰² Another mechanism for participation, consultation and dialogue currently proposed is the organisation of a national

¹⁰⁰ Campolina (2011) mentions, for instance, the fact that the Zero Hunger programme was influenced by the Campaign for Eradication of Poverty, led by civil society, and that local civil society organisations in the Brazilian *cerrado* were responsible for constructing cisterns and piloting solutions to deal with drought.

¹⁰¹ Bava (2011a), Masagão (2011) and Luz and Wolff (2011) concur with this argument.

¹⁰² These demands are presented in policy papers from key NGOs and social movement networks, see ABONG (2011) and REBRIP (2011).

conference to discuss relevant issues, ensure citizens are heard and propose ways forward.¹⁰³ In order for the various stakeholders to have an informative debate, it is paramount that efforts to improve the accounting of financial flows and access to information are taken seriously by government.¹⁰⁴

The normative debate is intrinsically linked to what some interviewees named the ‘substantial debate’. That is, why should the country cooperate with others? What kind of development is Brazil trying to promote nationally and internationally? These are essential questions to be discussed in an attempt to elaborate an SSDC policy and improve the country’s practices. A key objective of civil society that emerged during the civil society dialogues was that cooperation should function as a means of consolidating and expanding rights, and deepening democratic practices. Redistributive justice and the responsibility of Brazil, as the world’s sixth-largest economy, to support low-income countries are also seen as justifications for SSDC. These views diverge from more pragmatic perspectives that emphasise the opening of new markets and expansion of diplomatic relations to fulfil foreign policy objectives.

Regarding the geographical engagement of Brazilian SSDC, the civil society dialogues showed divergences regarding the perceived characteristics of the Brazilian presence in Latin America and Africa. On the one hand, one narrative stresses ‘Brazilian imperialism’ in Latin America, which results from the expansion of Brazilian companies on the continent, often financed by public resources through, for instance, BNDES.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the presence in Africa is concentrated in a few countries, and mainly experienced through technical cooperation initiatives. Such differences, as stated by dialogue participants, result from factors such as proximity, historical engagement and regional integration policy. Nonetheless, some argue that the only difference between the two is that Africa is ‘the new frontier’ and that the impact of Brazilian companies there is still negligible (especially if compared to Chinese investments). However, civil society organisations that have been researching Brazilian engagement in Africa mentioned that this picture may change drastically in the near future, with the decrease in technical cooperation and expansion of mining and construction companies on the continent.¹⁰⁶

6.2 Contesting official discourses

Although civil society representatives point out that the expansion of rights and social justice should be the drivers of SSDC, in all three civil society dialogues it was stated that international cooperation is not above the conflicts and interests that exist in society. Thus, interviewees feel that the official discourse of solidarity creates obstacles for an honest dialogue about the interests of different stakeholders, and how these can, or cannot, be accommodated in an international development cooperation/SSDC policy. For some, such discourse is essentially hypocritical, as the driver of many cooperation initiatives is often commercial interest. South–South cooperation projects that focus on the promotion of soya and ethanol abroad were given as examples of cooperation driven by economic interests.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, private sector interviewees do not concur with this perspective.

¹⁰³ Mello (2012) puts forward experiences and proposals to contribute to the democratisation of foreign policy in Brazil, including the organisation of conferences.

¹⁰⁴ This argument is also emphasised by ABONG (2011), Bava (2011b) and Beghin (2012).

¹⁰⁵ The discussion about Brazil’s ‘imperialism’ or ‘neocolonialism’ and the key role played by BNDES is unpacked in REBRIP (2010), Garcia (2011) and Beghin (2012).

¹⁰⁶ This argument is also explored in Schlesinger (2012).

¹⁰⁷ Schlesinger (2012) maps and briefly analyses various different projects, such as ProSavannah in Mozambique, ProRenova, and the Technical Cooperation Agreement with Senegal to support their national biofuel programme.

Box 6.2 Media coverage on Brazil–Africa cooperation

Media coverage on international affairs and on Brazilian foreign policy has been traditionally modest. This reality, however, is changing rapidly. Op-eds on the country's foreign policy priorities and diplomatic activities are now much more frequent in the main written media (*Folha de S. Paulo*, *Estado de S. Paulo*, *Valor Econômico* and *O Globo*) than it used to be a few decades ago. In general, critical stances related to the view that Brazil should prioritise its domestic affairs have been complemented by increased interest and a will to improve the quality of media coverage, as Brazil becomes a more active player in the international arena.

Growing media interest on South–South relations in particular has shifted from views that connected them to a partisan/ideological agenda to the recognition, and even criticisms, of its pragmatic character. When analysing Brazilian behaviour in Africa, analysts seem to conclude that government is being pragmatic, while in Latin America the media are often critical of Brazil's 'ideological' engagement.

In the particular case of SSDC, the media have assessed it both as a moral obligation and an opportunity for the country, recognising that behind the solidarity narrative other national interests are at stake (such as the UN Security Council bid, the candidacy of Brazil for high-level leadership posts in international organisations, strengthening commercial ties, etc.). For instance, Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa was explicitly mentioned as having secured the support given by African countries to the election of Roberto Azevedo to the WTO. The idea that cooperation can also serve as a soft power-building strategy was mentioned a couple of times.

Between 2003 and 2013, cooperation between Brazil and Africa became a common topic in the mainstream media, though the content was often superficial, and mentions of ABC were initially rare. The majority of the stories on Brazil–Africa relations were linked to Lula's presidential agenda – and sometimes even with his own personal agenda. Lula's frequent (and sometimes considered 'excessive') travels to the continent actually helped keep the subject in the media. Articles also tend to find justifications for Brazilian relations with Africa in terms of potential gains. Alternatively, journalists do not seem to need to justify relations with emerging powers, notably IBSA/BRICS countries.

The Brazilian media often present Africa in a paternalistic way. The continent is seen as a homogenous bloc. Images of a messy and catastrophic place, but rich in minerals and opportunities are frequent. Newspapers also reproduce official discourses, though sometimes from a critical stance, frequently putting forward two main narratives: one focusing on Brazil's responsibility to help Africa's development; and the other of the commercial gains Brazil can also obtain from those relationships.

Agriculture (including biofuels and food security) and health were the main topics explored, and geographically the PALOP countries were in the spotlight. In the case of Mozambique, cooperation in agriculture and Embrapa's role were the main subject, while in the case of Angola the role of the private sector was much more emphasised. The media have described the expansion of the private sector in Africa as part of government policy priorities on the continent. BNDES's support to the internationalisation of Brazilian companies was mentioned a few times, with at first little analysis to support it. However, cooperation agreements made with African governments despite poor democratic and human rights credentials (such as in Congo, Zimbabwe, or Sudan) were more criticised.

Above all, the agenda of international development cooperation is still quite technical to make the news, and the main international events covered by the media are the ones related to the presidential agenda. Having a president like Dilma, considered as low-profile and willing to rule from the backstage rather than in the spotlight, meant losing part of the media coverage on international affairs in general. In the case of Africa, this pattern has actually changed in 2013, when Dilma visited the continent and made some important announcements concerning Brazilian cooperation with Africa, including on debt relief issues, the creation of an African group inside the government, and a proposal to reform ABC (see Box 5.2). Dilma's announcement of a plan to merge technical cooperation and trade promotion in one single agency has sparked an unusual, and very welcome, policy debate on Brazilian development cooperation and on reforming ABC, besides having fed media interest in ongoing initiatives in the field.

Beyond development cooperation and South–South relations, the hosting of a National Conference on foreign policy (see Box 6.1) and internal changes within MRE have also made the news in 2013. The arrival of the new Foreign Minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, has created a momentum for debating foreign policymaking, transparency, citizen participation, and policy priorities. This unprecedented amount of debate on foreign policy can raise the bar for policy debates in the coming years, including the way the media cover Brazil's development cooperation.

Moreover, many believe that the solidarity discourse is not enough to create a constituency for international development cooperation (IDC) and SSDC in Brazil. As the country still faces many social and economic problems, the government should be able to communicate the tangible benefits that the country and Brazilian society as a whole receive in engaging in SSDC. The current difficulties in articulating these have repercussions for governmental and societal support for SSDC. It was mentioned that only when IDC becomes linked with national debates and struggles would it become truly relevant nationally.¹⁰⁸

The government rhetoric of 'demand-driven' cooperation was also questioned. Participants of the civil society dialogues pointed out that it is not known where the demand originated, who elaborated it, or how it was interpreted and directed by the Brazilian government. The role of international organisations mediating the demands was mentioned, as well as the tendency of the government to direct the demands to certain agencies and focus the possible initiatives on specific policies. Regarding the latter, it was stressed that a demand for cooperation in agriculture is often directed to Embrapa, rather than exploring how other policies, such as those that promote family farming or agroecology, could be a better fit for the demand made.¹⁰⁹

Another common discourse is that an advantage of South–South cooperation, and Brazilian SSDC, is the similarity of the stage of development, and the social and economic dynamics, in partner countries. Nonetheless, especially in regard to Brazil's cooperation with Africa, participants in the civil society dialogues and private sector interviewees emphasised the difficulties of engaging in cooperation due to social, political and cultural disparities. The low capacity of the state, corruption and weak civil society were mentioned as aspects that complicate the sharing, or replication, of Brazilian experiences in African countries. The lack of knowledge of Brazilians engaging in SSDC regarding the particularities of African countries and the lack of clarity about the outcomes of such engagements to ensure 'mutual benefits' were also raised as obstacles to horizontal cooperation.

Finally, a key discussion is what SSDC entails. Policy transfer, technological transfer and export of social policies are concepts/terms frequently used regarding Brazilian SSDC. Nevertheless, some question how far these policies are transferable, as they were products of specific social and political processes. Additionally, it was suggested that such terms reproduce North–South dynamics (i.e. trying to replicate blueprints) that have been condemned by the Brazilian government and civil society. Another critique is that such terms do not encompass the idea of bi-directionality, of mutual benefits and interests that are supposedly principles of SSDC. Cooperation and knowledge-sharing would thus be better terms to use.

6.3 South–South cooperation strategies

Although there is a certain level of consensus that SSDC cannot be seen as separate from other foreign policy strategies, such as financial and commercial cooperation, there are divergences regarding how far different modalities and strategies are complementary or contradictory to each other. While financial cooperation and internationalisation of companies are seen as being pushed by 'big capital' – and in particular mining, infrastructure companies

¹⁰⁸ REBRIP (2011) in its evaluation of Brazilian foreign policy states: 'we know that this agenda will only become important in the external arena when it becomes important domestically. Therefore we are convinced of the importance of challenging the debates about Brazilian projects, a new energy matrix based on diversification, decentralization and clean sources, a new land and agriculture policy that prioritizes family and peasant agriculture and agroecology, a new rural-urban relationship, where the policies of supply and consumption invest in shortening [the] circuit between production, distribution and consumption; in the public management of water and the accountability of its uses. Brazilian foreign policy still seems not to have understood that these issues, which were previously seen as minor issues, today have become strategic themes'.

¹⁰⁹ This argument is also explored in Campolina (2012).

and agribusiness – technical cooperation is seen as multifaceted.¹¹⁰ Although it is unclear how far the expansion of technical cooperation to Africa is also supporting the internationalisation of Brazilian companies and the expansion of commercial cooperation, new government initiatives, such as the Nacala Fund and More Food Africa, are pointed to by some as blurring the line between the two. These initiatives are consequently being scrutinised by civil society organisations.¹¹¹

An overall concern during the civil society dialogues was that SSDC agricultural projects that support large landowners in developing countries may have a negative effect on the poor and vulnerable. The participants were concerned that these strategies were being shared through SSDC and may, as a result, be exporting Brazil's internal conflicts.¹¹²

One of the main problems pointed out by civil society representatives is the lack of transparency and public debate regarding financial cooperation, especially as BNDES loans given to companies consist of taxes paid by citizens.¹¹³ In order to explore how far these combined strategies lead to partner countries' inclusive and sustainable development, civil society organisations claim they need to be able to analyse the desired objectives and impact of different cooperation modalities.¹¹⁴

Another important debate concerns regional integration, though the relationship between integration and technical cooperation is still unclear. Integration has been an important foreign policy strategy in Latin America, especially due to initiatives such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Mercosul, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL). However, participants of the civil society dialogues raised the issue that this drive has not been accompanied by a public debate regarding the objectives and action of integration, and how it can contribute to a new regional development project.¹¹⁵ The rationale tends to be on productive integration and economic outcomes, and civil society representatives declared that BNDES is a key instrument for raising Brazilian influence in the region.¹¹⁶ However, the mobilisation of civil society has ensured that social issues have not been dropped from the agenda. These actors stress that their logic of integration is different from that of the government, and emphasise that integration should promote active citizenship, democracy and 'people's sovereignty'.

¹¹⁰ The power of mining and infrastructure companies is discussed in Schlesinger (2012) and Masagão *et al.* (2012), and agribusiness in REBRIP (2010).

¹¹¹ Masagão *et al.* (2012) is an example of where civil society is reflecting on the public–private boundaries of international cooperation.

¹¹² This concern is shared by Campolina (2012), REBRIP (2010) and Mello (2011).

¹¹³ This point is also raised in Mello (2011) and Beghin (2012).

¹¹⁴ For demands raised see, for instance, ABONG (2011) and Masagão *et al.* (2012).

¹¹⁵ This issue has been also raised by REBRIP (2010).

¹¹⁶ For a more detailed discussion, see Beghin (2012).

Box 6.3 The academic debate

In Brazil, unlike many Northern countries, the development studies field has not been consolidated. As the country's international cooperation expands, research on Brazilian cooperation has started gaining visibility within the field of international relations (IR) and beyond. The number of studies produced each year is expanding considerably. With almost nonexistent autonomous higher education programmes on international development cooperation,¹¹⁷ most of the teaching and research is done inside the IR discipline. IR itself is a fairly new field in Brazil¹¹⁸ and its undergraduate and graduate programmes marginally touch upon development cooperation as a subject. South–South relations, in general, are becoming a hot topic, but as described by Bruno Ayllón (2006), the country still lacks research on the technical dimension of South–South cooperation.

Nevertheless, research on Brazil in the international development cooperation system can be found in two main hubs. The first hub is composed of government-related knowledge production centres, such as the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Rio Branco Institute (attached to the MRE and responsible for selecting and training Brazilian diplomats) and the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation. The second one is composed of a range of public and private universities and research institutes in the country.¹¹⁹ Subjects and approaches can vary a lot. Although the COBRADI provided a push for universities and thinktanks to start developing research in the area, such research will be compromised by the recent veto on public access to updated data (as explained in Section 2). Other difficulties include the poor state of the official documentation available, especially when it comes to Brazil as a donor (Cervo 1994; Lopes 2008; Valler Filho 2007). When it comes to the content of the available data, documentation tends to be very descriptive (type of project, activities and actors) but with little or no technical details (challenges, impacts, risks, etc.) (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). At the same time, few studies published so far carried out fieldwork exploring the actual impact and efficiency of initiatives in recipient countries. These types of studies are crucial to help the country consolidate critical thinking on its engagement in development cooperation (Hirst 2012).

The arrival of new studies coming from anthropology may help to fill some of these data gaps and bring up new empirical sources for the debate. However, the excessive criticism coming from anthropologists seems to be contributing more to undercover power relations than to improving Brazilian cooperation practices. As Brazilian cooperation expands and diversifies, there is also a need to go beyond much-quoted sources and conventional study cases in order to generate new and critical thinking on the matter.

Results of the thesis mapping

In an attempt to capture the current state of the debate inside the academy, exploratory mapping using the data from the Brazilian Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations was made.¹²⁰ The research has been limited to Masters' and PhD theses completed in Brazilian institutions from 2008 to 2012, coming up with a list of approximately 70 works (two thirds of them were Masters theses). Theses have been mainly written in the field of international relations, political science and law. There were almost none from economics and history.

While clustering the research topics, one can find a significant group of sectoral works (notably on health, agriculture, and education issues). Another emerging cluster is the geographical one – with works mainly on Latin America and Portuguese-speaking Africa. There is also growing interest in IBSA relations, but the nature of these works is more on South–South cooperation than on SSDC. There is also another cluster on the policy process, notably on South–South cooperation as a foreign policy instrument. Analyses of policymaking (actors, policy priorities and institutional change) are still rare. Civil society agency in development cooperation was explored more than that of private actors.

As a tendency, an increasing number of works on humanitarian aid were identified, and a greater role was played by the disciplines of anthropology, geosciences and environmental studies. There are still significant gaps in studies on the efficacy/results of Brazilian South–South cooperation and on decision-making processes.

¹¹⁷ Currently, there is only one graduate programme on International Cooperation (*Development, Society and International*

7 Conclusion

Due to its recent development path that combined economic growth, social inclusion and democracy, Brazilian policies and experiences have gained unprecedented international attention. Even though Brazil has been engaging as a provider of development cooperation since the 1970s, disbursements scaled up dramatically in the last few years in a context marked by global efforts to achieve the MDGs and by the emergence of South–South cooperation as one of the main pillars of Brazilian foreign policy. However, Brazil’s prominent role has been accompanied by persistent national development challenges and by the lack of an institutional framework that can ensure overall planning, coordination and a sustainable flow of resources.

This study has shown that the principles of horizontality, non-conditionality, being demand-driven, as well as narratives guiding Brazilian engagement in SSDC, can only be understood in the light of: the country’s Southern identity; its traditional foreign policy principles (non-intervention, autonomy, pragmatism, pacifism and universalism); shifting national development models; and Brazil’s dual engagement in development cooperation. On the one hand, its background as a recipient of foreign assistance and its perception of a somewhat disappointing experience with traditional donors, combined with the country’s relatively low dependency on Northern funds, contributed to create and sustain a critical approach towards traditional aid. On the other hand, there is a perception that received cooperation has contributed to fostering human and institutional capacities in key sectors. Some of the agencies that have benefited from foreign assistance — such as Embrapa and Fiocruz — have been engaging actively in development cooperation, and their positive and negative experiences in receiving aid have shaped their actions, and provided them with a network/platform from which to share knowledge. These actors have also started to form national coalitions that can support their engagement in SSDC, though institutional alignment is still a challenge.

As Section 4 pointed out, the lack of information and the non-comparability of data create challenges for a rigorous analysis of the political domestic dynamics regarding technical cooperation, as well as other modalities of development cooperation. Nonetheless, it was still possible to identify some trends, such as the intertwining of different modalities as a central recent shift in Brazilian cooperation, as is the case in the Food Purchase Programme, ProSavannah, and Brazil’s engagement in Haiti. While these arrangements can represent better coordination between modalities and the promotion of holistic approaches, they can also export contradictory development models (a main civil society concern).

The challenge of building a coherent national public SSDC policy is a result of the institutional dispersion of Brazilian development cooperation and of the lack of a regulatory framework. Elements of a public policy, as per discussions in the civil society dialogues,

Cooperation from the Universidade de Brasília (UnB)). Short courses and MBAs also exist in other universities such as Caxias do Sul, Fundação Armando Álvares Penteado (FAAP) and PUC-Minas.

¹¹⁸ The first international relations course was established in the early 1990s at UnB and today the country has more than 100 IR graduate courses. Additionally, from the existing 11 graduate programmes, only three offer PhD programmes (de Faria 2012).

¹¹⁹ Here we could include public universities such as UnB, USP, UNESP, UFBA, UFPE, UFRGS, Unicamp, UERJ, but also private ones such as PUC-Rio and PUC-SP – Catholic Universities in Brasília – among others. Thinktanks such as Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) from FGV and the BRICS Policy Centre (BPC) have been also active in promoting debates on Brazilian cooperation.

¹²⁰ The Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (<http://capesdw.capes.gov.br/capesdw/>) is the responsibility of CAPES, a public foundation within the Ministry of Higher Education, responsible for postgraduate evaluation, access to and dissemination of scientific production, investment in the training of high-level expertise and promoting international scientific cooperation.

could include: (1) a definition of the boundaries of South–South cooperation and SSDC policy and practice; (2) a set of coherent laws and a regulatory framework that set out the objectives of such a policy, as well as how it should be evaluated and adopted by different government actors to provide coherence and coordination; (3) the definition of how objectives should be achieved (the instruments of a policy); and (4) mechanisms for participation and accountability of other stakeholders. These points were all raised during the civil society debates as conditions for a public policy.

As Section 5 has demonstrated, decision-making spaces are highly fragmented and informal; thus, findings could not fully capture who defines and/or influences resource allocation. Nevertheless, identifying which institutions and interest groups have been able to access decision-making and how they do it is crucial. One of the main findings of this report is that, although ABC is part of the structure of MRE, the ministry is not the only decision-making actor defining technical cooperation priorities. The influence of traditional donors and of some implementing agencies has been complemented, over the last 15 years, by the increasing influence of the presidency and some ministries, and by the mobilisation of subnational governments, the private sector and CSOs.

Even though decision-making processes are dispersed and fragmented, some hypotheses that may explain the degree of influence in shaping SSDC priorities of different national actors are:

- the degree of a national institution’s internationalisation in terms of participation in international networks and forums, which are important spaces for the diffusion of particular experiences abroad, and thus for the creation of demands;
- the existence of global instruments and international commitments in each particular area and Brazil’s adherence to them;
- the proximity of the national institution to the presidency;
- the ability of the institution to match its engagement in technical cooperation with each administration’s priorities;
- the degree of cohesion inside the institution regarding the necessity and legitimacy of providing technical cooperation;
- the presence of technical cooperation components involving the institution in broader sectoral and national plans.

These findings and hypotheses imply that the profile of Brazilian development cooperation is not solely a result of a technical endeavour (‘champion’ institutions receiving more requests), but increasingly a product of the interplay between the foreign policy agenda and domestic politics. Nevertheless, a comprehensive understanding of how sectoral and geographic priorities vary according to shifting domestic coalitions remains to be constructed.

The tentative mapping of the various actors involved in technical cooperation indicates the complexity of the interests at play, beyond the narrative of being demand-driven. The findings seem to indicate that technical cooperation is not exactly an instrument of a single foreign policy directive developed and led by MRE in isolation from other actors, but its overall direction is the result of forces that compete in the decision-making spaces. Although the domestic politicisation of Brazilian cooperation has promoted increased ownership by national implementing agencies, due to changes in governments, the shifting domestic drivers can compromise the dissemination of lessons learnt, the medium- and long-term engagement of the country in SSDC, and the effectiveness of cooperation efforts in partner countries.

Efforts, such as the two official reports that systematise data on Brazilian development cooperation, are helping to assess the complex puzzle that represents the diversity of Brazilian cooperation and at the same time set the basis for the construction of a national

public policy. The fact that the main features of Brazilian development cooperation provision are still under construction can be seen as an opportunity to reflect on lessons learned by the various agencies involved in development cooperation. It is also an opportunity to engage various stakeholders in the debate and to build a system that is both coherent in its guiding principles and realistic about the challenges imposed by Brazil's national agenda and the tension amongst multiple domestic interests.

However, building consensus over a national public policy will not be a straightforward task. Literature and official discourse endorse the idea that Brazilian technical cooperation can be both altruistic and beneficial to Brazil, contributing to fostering multifaceted relations between partners. Dilma's speech in Ethiopia announcing the new development cooperation agency and debt relief efforts is an example of this narrative. Mutual gains have been increasingly recognised as crucial to ensuring domestic support. Nonetheless, civil society has raised concerns regarding the blurred boundaries between cooperation activities and trade and investment interests.

Lula's administration saw, in the gaps opened by shifts in the global economic and political architecture, an opportunity to influence international practices and norms through the projection of the government's ideals and policies. The priority given to South–South cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy during his administration, as well as growing recognition of the country's international experiences abroad, led to an unprecedented mobilisation of national actors involved in technical cooperation and in other modalities of development cooperation. The demobilisation of Brazilian engagement in technical cooperation during Dilma's administration has been seen as a challenge by practitioners and experts, since it imposes discontinuity in initiatives that might compromise development impacts in recipient/partner countries. Nevertheless, it can also be understood as an opportunity for deepened reflections on the new Brazilian position as a development cooperation provider, exploring lessons learnt and the main challenges and opportunities attached to future engagements.

It became clear throughout the research process that there is a growing number of national institutions, businesses, civil society organisations and thinktanks directly involved in and/or debating SSDC in Brazil and, thus, there is an opportunity to involve a larger group of stakeholders in the public debate. Moreover, civil society's demand for an inclusive process to define what is understood as South–South cooperation, to explore relationships with other foreign policy strategies, and to define the objectives of a national development cooperation policy should be seen as a building block for the consolidation of a development cooperation constituency. Recent announcements of a new agency, a White Paper on foreign policy and the creation of a foreign policy council, all point to the fact that the SSDC agenda is at a critical juncture in the country. It is now essential to draw on the recent history and current challenges and opportunities facing Brazil's SSDC to inform debates and political choices.

7.1 Avenues for future research

This report has mainly focused on the ideas, interests and institutions related to Brazilian official technical cooperation with developing countries. It can be furthered expanded and deepened through:

- opening the black box of decision-making concerning financial cooperation and contributions to international organisations;
- understanding Brazilian 'uniqueness' through research on 'structuring projects' and projects that cannot be categorised through traditional modalities;
- deepening the understanding of civil society engagement in SSDC, including their role as practitioners, as participants of 'invited spaces' of policy debate and formulation, and their contribution to Brazilian social development;

- country studies to understand partners' perceptions and the broader context in which Brazilian cooperation is inserted;
- case studies in order to trace legislative instruments in each modality (since Brazilian legislation is fragmented, case studies would help to track and map instruments);
- systematising information related to the experiences accumulated by traditional donors, as well as by the emerging ones, in terms of designing national policies in international development cooperation, professionalisation, lessons learnt in the field, and how to conciliate international development cooperation with national interests;
- case studies on the sectors that have experienced enhancement in actions in recent years in order to understand particular influences;
- unpacking how Brazil is engaging in dialogue around South–South cooperation with neighbouring countries;
- analysis of the decision-making processes and practices of specific implementing agencies, and comparative studies of these agencies;
- deepening the understanding of factors promoting and hindering the capacity of Brazilian bureaucracy to engage in South–South cooperation, including regional integration initiatives;
- comparative studies that explore Brazil's policies and practices in relation to other Latin American and emerging countries.

Annexes

Annex 1: List of interviews

Name	Organisation/Function
Adriana Ramos	Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) and member of COFA/Fundo Amazônia
Alberto Kleiman	Health Ministry/International Advisor
Ana Claudia Caputo Fabricio Catermol Júlia Silva Dolato Tundidor Francisco Ohana Pinto de Sant Ana	BNDES/Economist, Internationalisation Unity BNDES/Manager, International Trade Unity BNDES/Manager, International Unity BNDES/Economist, International Division, Financial and International Affairs Department
Ana Flávia Barros	Brasília University (UNB)/International Advisor
Ary Quintella	SAE/International Advisor
Bruno Sadeck	SAF/PR/International Advisor
Carlos Milani	IESP/Professor, Coordinator LABMUNDO
Celso de Arruda França Luís Antônio Balduino Carneiro	MRE/Chief of Division, Financial and Tributary Cooperation MRE/Chief of Department, Financial and Services Affairs
Conselheira Almerinda Carvalho	MRE/Chief of Division, DAE
Fernando Rossetti	GIFE/Director
Frederico Lamego	SENAI/Sesi/IEL/Executive Director/Uninter
Jacques Marcovitch	São Paulo University (USP)/Professor
Julio Baena	MMA/Coordinator for Bilateral and Regional Affairs
Kjeld Jakobsen	Consultant
Luís Henrique D'Andrea	ENAP/Chief of International Cooperation Division
Marcelo Costa and team (Maria Cristina Sampaio, Carlos Considera)	General Secretariat of the Presidency/International Advisor
Marcio Correa	ABC/Coordinator of Multilateral Cooperation
Marcio Porto	Embrapa/Chief of the International Relations Unity (SRI)
Maria Augusta Montalvão Ferraz	ABC/Coordinator for Latin America, North America and East Europe
Mauro Teixeira de Figueiredo	Health Ministry/Chief of Project Division/International Advisor
Michelle Moraes de Sá e Silva	Human Rights Secretary/Chief of International Cooperation
Milton Rondó	External Relations Ministry/CGFOME Coordinator
Nathalie Beghin	INESC/Coordinator
Paulo Barbosa Lima	ABC/Manager for Bilateral Cooperation with PALOPs and East Timor
Pedro Veloso	ABC/Coordinator for French-speaking Africa
Peter Stossel	MDIC/International Advisor
Ricardo Luís Paixão	Bacen/Chief of International Technical Cooperation (Coope/Derin)
Roberto Alvarez	ABDI/International Affairs Manager
Tullo Vigevani	UNESP/Professor
Vinícius Lages	SEBRAE/International Relations Unity Manager (UAIN)

Annex 2: List of participants in the focus groups: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Brasília


Name	Function	Organisation
Adriana Abdenur	General Coordinator	BRICS Policy Centre
Adriana de Queiroz	Executive Coordinator	CEBRI
Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa	Professor and Researcher	USP e CEBRAP
Amir Clementino Niv	Intern	BRICS Policy Centre
Ana Flávia Barros	Professor and International Advisor	IREL e UnB
Artur H. S. Santos	President of International Cooperation Institute	CUT
Cândido Grzybowski	Director	IBASE
Carlos Aguilar	BRICSAM-G20 Programme Coordinator	Oxfam
Carlos Roberto Fernandes	Project Coordinator	Viva Rio
Celso Marcondes	Coordinator for Africa	Instituto Lula
Claudia Antunes	Journalist	Revista Piaui
Claudia Hoirisch		Global Health Centre/Fiocruz
Cleber Guarany		Fundação Getúlio Vargas - Projetos
Denise Lima	Consultant	Aldeia-Mundo
Edgar Aparecido Moura	Representative of the International Working Group	CONSEA
Edneia Gonçalves	Consultant	
Elizário Toledo	Environment Advisor	CONTAG
Fátima Mello	Executive Secretary	REBRIP
Fernanda Nanci	Consultant	
Filipe Urias Novaes	Intern	BRICS Policy Centre
Georges D. Landau	Professor	FAAP
Giovana Zoccal	Research Assistant	BRICS Policy Centre
Jaime Conrado de Oliveira	Director	Caritas
Janina Onuki	Professor	USP
Joana Amaral	International Advisor	Unilab
João Moura da Fonseca	Research Assistant	BRICS Policy Centre
Juana Kweitel	Programmes Director	Conectas Direitos Humanos
Júlia Esther Castro França	Executive Coordinator	Processo de Articulação e Diálogo (PAD)
Luara Lopes	International Advisor	ABONG
Luciene Burlandy	Representative	CONSEA
Luiz Eduardo Fonseca	International Advisor to Africa	Global Health Centre/Fiocruz

(Cont'd.)

Annex 2: (cont'd.)

Name	Function	Organisation
Marcos Antonio Matos		Fundação Getúlio Vargas – Projetos
Maria Ligia Migliorato Saad	International Advisor	Alfasol
Melissa Andrade	Director	Rede de Humanização do Desenvolvimento
Mila Dezan	SSC projects officer	Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação
Nathalie Beghin	Advisor	INESC
Paulo Esteves	Science and Technology And Technical Cooperation Coordinator	BRICS Policy Centre
Paulo Speller	Dean	Unilab
Renata Boulos	Director	INCIDE
Renata Reis	International Advisor	Doctors without Borders (MSF)
Rosângela Cordeiro	Coordinator	Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas
Silvio Caccia Bava	Director	Le Monde Diplomatique

Annex 3: Historical series of total DAC countries aid (ODA) disbursements to Brazil



Source: OECD Database, oecd.stat (accessed April 2013).

Annex 4: Historical series of Brazilian received ODA by sector (in US\$ millions)

Donor: DAC Countries, Total

Recipient: Brazil

Sector	Year						
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1000: Bilateral ODA Commitments by Purpose (CRS)	266.30	252.22	323.14	345.58	568.86	976.52	1,013.18
100: Social Infrastructure and Services	128.48	162.54	147.35	182.71	219.94	417.52	562.46
110: Education	34.15	63.29	71.97	79.21	96.31	98.92	98.59
140: Water Supply and Sanitation	20.78	7.45	3.00	4.03	33.33	243.95	381.97
200: Economic Infrastructure and Services	5.05	8.46	11.47	28.25	171.34	157.74	33.95
215: Transport and Communications	3.13	4.08	3.44	1.41	5.09	8.44	3.47
230: Energy	0.66	1.46	2.92	22.56	153.48	87.39	10.11
300: Production Sectors	22.35	23.40	92.51	29.27	78.85	272.15	250.55
310: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	15.50	15.67	86.62	23.89	72.14	231.56	245.19
320: Industry, Mining and Construction	6.11	6.69	4.94	3.56	5.03	39.67	4.73
330: Trade and Tourism	0.74	1.04	0.95	1.82	1.68	0.92	0.64
400: Multisector	91.14	44.15	52.25	81.78	78.02	115.58	154.88
500: Programme Assistance	–	0.02	–	1.63	0.00	0.34	–
520: Food Aid	–	0.02	–	1.61	0.00	0.34	–
600: Action Relating To Debt	–	–	–	–	0.00	0.17	0.48
700: Humanitarian Aid	2.29	3.08	1.52	4.80	1.08	1.21	3.72
998: Unallocated/Unspecified	17.00	10.58	18.04	17.14	19.62	11.81	7.14

Source: OECD Database, oecd.stat (accessed April 2013).

Annex 5: The Brazilian framework in international technical cooperation in decrees

Decree (number/year)	Subject
28.799/1950	Establishment of the National Commission on Technical Assistance (CNAT), presided over by the MRE and composed of 11 members named by the president. The CNAT was responsible for raising, receiving and coordinating demands from Brazilian institutions for technical cooperation from developed countries and the United Nations. It was regulated by Decree no.34.763/1953 and restructured by Decree no.54.251/1964.
45.660/1959	Establishment of the Technical Office of Coordination for Point IV's Administrative Projects, composed of a Council of Coordinators directed by the Brazilian Representative for the Point IV Programme. Its actions covered five sectors: health, education, agriculture, diverse issues and general administration.
56.979/1965	Establishment of the Council for Technical Cooperation of the Alliance for Progress (CONTAP), presided over by the Minister of Planning.
65.476/1969	Extinction of previous organs and creation of Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN/Ministry of Planning) and the Division of Technical Cooperation (DCP/MRE). While the Ministry of Planning was responsible for the establishment of the domestic policy for technical cooperation and for coordinating its execution, MRE was responsible for the design of the technical cooperation foreign policy, negotiating its instruments and forwarding national demands to international organisations and cooperation agencies.
94.973/1987	Extinction of previous organs and creation of the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC) under the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG/MRE), with financial autonomy. ABC's responsibilities were to: collect resources for the Special Technical Cooperation Fund (FUNEC) in Brazil and abroad; co-finance initiatives; and support cooperation initiatives with financial resources.
2.070/1996	Extinction of FUNEC, delinking of ABC from FUNAG and submission of ABC to MRE's General Secretariat for External Relations. ABC is entitled to coordinate, negotiate, follow and evaluate received and provided cooperation, as well as to administer national and international financial resources that are allocated to the activities coordinated by the agency.
5.032/2004	ABC is integrated with the General Sub-Secretariat of Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad, which also included Trade and Cultural Promotion.
5.979/2006	ABC is integrated into the General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation and Trade Promotion, renamed General Sub-Secretariat for Cooperation, Culture and Trade Promotion in 2010.

Source: Based on Puente (2010) and legislation consultation on the Sub-Chief for Juridical Issues' online database.

Annex 6: Tentative list of decision-making and deliberative spaces related to Brazil's provision of international development cooperation

Name of decision-making space, institutional location and specific legislation	Responsibilities	Presidency and membership
Export Financing and Guarantee Committee (COFIG) Chamber of Foreign Commerce (CAMEX/MDIC) Decree 4.993/2004 ¹²¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Frame and follow the operations of the Export Financing Programme (PROEX) and of the Export Guarantee Fund (FGE); - Establish the parameters and conditions to the Union's concession of financial assistance to Brazilian exports and of guarantees to operations related to the exports' credit insurance; - Guide the Union's intervention in the Fund of Financing to Exports (FFEX). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Executive Secretary of the Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, who will preside over COFIG; - Representative of the Ministry of Finance, who will be COFIG's Executive Secretary; - Ministry of External Relations; - Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply; - Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management; - Staff of the presidency; - Secretary of the National Treasury/Ministry of Finance.
Committee of Evaluation of Overseas Credit (COMACE) Ministry of Finance Decree 2.297/1997 ¹²²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Define the parameters and analyse alternative modalities to the renegotiation of Brazilian credits; - Analyse country risk; - Establish criteria for the concession of new credit lines; - Point out limits of exposition by country; - Point out limits to the contingent obligations of the National Treasury in export credit guarantees and insurance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, who will preside over COMACE; - International Affairs Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, who will be COMACE's Executive Secretary; - International Affairs Secretary of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management; - General-Subsecretary of Integration, Economic and Foreign Trade Affairs/Ministry of External Relations; - Secretary of the National Treasury/Ministry of Finance; - Secretary of Foreign Trade/Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade; - Prosecutor-General/National Treasury; - Director of International Affairs/Central Bank; - Director of International Area/Banco do Brasil; - Director of National and International Operations/Institute of Reinsurance Institute.

(Cont'd.)

¹²¹ See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2004/Decreto/D4993.htm.

¹²² See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2297.htm.

Annex 6: (cont'd.)

Name of decision-making space, institutional location and specific legislation	Responsibilities	Presidency and membership
National Committee for Refugees (CONARE) Ministry of Justice Law 9.474/1997 ¹²³ Decree 3.768/2001 ¹²⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analyse and grant, at first instance, requests for refugee status received by the Brazilian government; - Decide the termination, at first instance, ex officio or by requiring competent authorities, of refugee status; - Determine the cancellation, at first instance, of refugee status; - Guide and coordinate the actions needed to provide effective protection, assistance and juridical support to refugees; - Approve normative instructions clarifying the execution of Law 9.474. 	<p>The Ministry of Justice is responsible for designating CONARE's members, which must include one representative of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the Ministry of Justice, who will preside over CONARE; - the Ministry of External Relations; - the Ministry of Labour; - the Ministry of Health; - the Ministry of Education and Sports; - the Department of the Federal Police; - one non-governmental organisation that is involved in activities of assistance and protection to refugees in Brazil.
Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI) Decree of 21 June, 2006 ¹²⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordinate Brazilian efforts in international humanitarian assistance; - Formulate draft bill's proposals to authorise international humanitarian actions undertaken by Brazil. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staff of the presidency; - the Ministry of External Relations, which will coordinate GTI-AHI; - the Ministry of Defence; - the Ministry of Justice; - the Ministry of Financing; - the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply; - the Ministry of Health; - the Ministry of National Integration; - the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger; - the Presidency's General Secretariat; - the Presidency's Staff of Institutional Security; - the Ministry of Education; - the Ministry of Agrarian Development; - the Ministry of Communications; - the Presidency's Special Secretariat of Human Rights.

Source: Based on legislation consultation on the Sub-Chief for Juridical Issues' online database.¹²⁶

¹²³ See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9474.htm.

¹²⁴ See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3768.htm.

¹²⁵ See www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Dnn/Dnn10864.htm.


¹²⁶ See

<https://legislacao.planalto.gov.br/legisla/legislacao.nsf/fraWeb?OpenFrameSet&Frame=frmWeb2&Src=/legisla/legislacao.nsf%2FFrmConsultaWeb1%3FOpenForm%26AutoFramed>.

Annex 7: Further details on the geographical allocation of Brazil’s development cooperation

Analysis of disbursements made only by the ABC shows that Africa has historically been the main destination for technical cooperation spending, as Figure A7.1 shows. This finding contrasts with COBRADI’s data on official technical cooperation, in which Latin American and Caribbean countries appear as the main destination of disbursements made between 2005 and 2009.

Figure A7.1 ABC total disbursements by region (1995–2005 and 2006–2010)¹²⁷



Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Puente (2010) and Barbosa (2011).

In October 2012, the director of ABC, Fernando José Marroni de Abreu, presented a three-year budget framework for ABC. This marked a shift in ABC’s geographic priorities, giving greater priority to Latin America and the Caribbean. The plan announced by Abreu for 2012–2015 was for ABC spending to be distributed as follows: US\$40 million for Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly for one-off initiatives; US\$36 million for Africa, with priority given to ‘structuring’ projects and a focus on Portuguese-speaking countries; and US\$4.5 million for Asia, Oceania and the Middle East (Abreu 2012).

During fieldwork for this study, interviewees engaged in official Brazilian technical cooperation were asked about which regions they thought should receive priority. While some stated that greater interdependence among Brazil and its neighbours would require an intra-regional focus, others stated that the growing presence of other powers in Africa, especially China, would push Brazil to prioritise the African continent. There was a consensus, however, that initiatives with other South American countries were proving more

¹²⁷ Puente (2010) analyses the first period (1995–2005), while Barbosa (2011) the second one. Barbosa has included Eastern Europe along with Asia, the Middle East and Oceania, while Puente has not.

effective than initiatives targeting sub-Saharan African countries. One suggested reason was that South American institutions are stronger and therefore more able to absorb technical cooperation.

Disaggregating data by destination country, out of the 11 'key countries' identified by the Brazilian presidency as benefiting from technical cooperation (see Table A7.1 below), six are Portuguese-speaking countries (Mozambique, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola), and four are in 'fragile situations' (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and East Timor).¹²⁸ In the particular cases of East Timor and Haiti, Brazil's involvement in peace missions in both countries has been accompanied by strong engagement in technical cooperation. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, besides being part of the CPLP, development cooperation might reflect the fact that Brazil was chosen to head the Configuration of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission for the country in 2007.¹²⁹ Finally, in the cases of Paraguay and Uruguay, the relevance of Brazilian technical cooperation may be related to the emphasis given to regional integration under Mercosul. There is, however, a lack of evidence establishing the exact role played by technical cooperation in all of these cases.

Table A7.1 Key recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation (2005–2010/July)

Country	ABC spending (in US\$)
Mozambique	4,007,276.80
East Timor	3,849,373.05
Guinea-Bissau	3,663,076.03
Haiti	3,328,468.68
Cape Verde	2,485,591.09
Paraguay	1,891,868.68
Guatemala	1,617,114.72
São Tomé and Príncipe	1,773,788.96
Angola	1,208,871.91
Uruguay	828,201.41
Cuba	735,181.58

Source: Based on PR (2011).

This list of 'key countries' benefiting from Brazilian technical cooperation matches regional geographic priorities established by ABC. However, when identifying priority countries and regions, it is important to cross-reference data on budgetary allocation with data on the number of actions (projects and isolated activities). As Puente (2010) states, Brazilian technical cooperation activities with Africa and Asia are more expensive because of higher operational costs and because of the existence of more ambitious projects in both regions. The lack of systematic public data on the costs of each action, however, makes it difficult to


¹²⁸ The World Bank classifies Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and East Timor as states in 'fragile situations', being those 'countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict'.

¹²⁹ A press release from MRE stated: '[i]n coordinating the PBC work on Guinea-Bissau, Brazil will seek to ensure that the Commission offers effective aid to the political reconciliation and economic consolidation processes in Guinea-Bissau, with a focus on actions aiming at development and peacekeeping. Brazil will thus intensify its contribution to the development of Guinea-Bissau, a nation to which it is connected by historical political and cultural bonds. Brazilian support has also been provided through bilateral cooperation (in the areas of health, professional training, agriculture, reform of the security sectors, public administration and electoral assistance), as well as through contributions in partnership with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and the IBSA Fund – a mechanism which brings together India, Brazil and South Africa in South–South Cooperation projects' (MRE 2007b).

arrive at a more accurate account of the geographic priorities of Brazilian technical cooperation.

The most recent data on the number of bilateral actions per region in 2012 shows that Central American and Caribbean countries and Mexico hosted 231 actions (169 projects and 62 activities); followed by South American countries, with 218 actions (187 projects and 31 activities); African countries, with 145 actions (110 projects and 35 activities); and Asia, Oceania and the Middle East, with 25 actions (12 projects and 13 activities).¹³⁰

Figure A7.2 Number of projects per region, 1995–2012



Source: Abreu (2012) and Puente (2010).

Analysing the figures for projects and activities by country shows us that in 2012, Peru ranked first, followed by El Salvador, Haiti and Cuba, as shown in Table A7.2.

With the exception of Mozambique, Portuguese-speaking countries do not figure among the countries with the highest number of projects in 2012. South American, Central American and Caribbean countries dominate the list. While Cuba, Haiti and Paraguay appear in both the list of ‘key countries’ and the list of those with the largest number of actions, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic are not among the largest recipients of technical cooperation spending.

This means that, while Africa receives the largest share of ABC’s budgetary allocation, Latin American and Caribbean countries lead in terms of the number of projects and initiatives. The diplomat Carlos Puente came to a similar conclusion when he analysed data for 1995–2005. While Portuguese-speaking countries, including East Timor, absorbed 70 per cent of ABC’s budget, Latin America and the Caribbean appear as the main destinations for actions (67 per cent).

¹³⁰ Abreu (2012) does not clarify if the list refers only to ongoing actions or if it also includes those that have been completed. The data are said to refer to 2012, though the presentation was given in October that year. In the case of Central America, data related to regional actions with CARICOM (30 initiatives) were also presented; in data related to the Americas there are an additional 14 regional actions (one project and 13 initiatives) and 167 initiatives in the defence sector. The data presented here only cover bilateral initiatives (thus excluding regional ones) and also exclude the initiatives in defence, because the distribution of the latter actions by country and specific region was not provided.

Table A7.2 Number of projects and activities by country (2012)

Country	Number of projects	Number of activities	Total
Peru	38	4	42
El Salvador	33	1	34
Haiti	26	10	36
Cuba	32	3	35
Paraguay	20	9	29
Colombia	26	2	28
Ecuador	21	5	26
Bolivia	20	5	25
Dominican Republic	20	3	23
Suriname	16	6	22
Mozambique	18	2	20

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

What is curious about historical trends and even current patterns in the geographic allocation of Brazilian actions in technical cooperation is that they do not necessarily reflect Brazilian traditional foreign policy priorities in South–South relations. While South America, and particularly Mercosul, are usually presented in diplomatic discourse as the main priority, neither Paraguay nor Uruguay figure as the top recipients in terms of actions or budgetary allocation. Argentina does not figure at all in either list. However, as we saw in Section 4.3, Mercosul is the main destination for Brazilian contributions to international organisations.

Portuguese-speaking countries also occupy an important place in Brazilian diplomatic discourse, particularly after the launch of the CPLP in 1996. In Africa, they are indeed the main recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation in terms of total actions (Cabral 2011), as well as in terms of budgetary allocation (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). However, since 2001 Brazilian technical cooperation with non-Portuguese-speaking African countries has increased (Puente 2010).

Why do Central American and Caribbean countries figure at the top of the list of recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation in terms of actions? The reasons are perhaps clearer in the case of Haiti, which overtook Cuba as the main destination for Brazilian technical cooperation with the region in 2004, driven by Brazil assuming leadership of the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, in 2004, as well as in the case of Cuba, a country with which Brazil has been strengthening relations since the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration.¹³¹

The fact that Guatemala occupies sixth place in the list of ‘key countries’ benefiting from ABC’s budgetary allocation (2003–July 2010), while El Salvador and the Dominican Republic occupy, respectively, second and ninth place in number of actions (Abreu 2012), makes it clear that the distribution of ABC’s budget and number of actions does not necessarily converge with Brazilian geographic diplomatic priorities. The most likely driver for this disconnect is ABC’s ‘demand-driven logic’, which includes a tendency for countries that made ‘good use’ of received cooperation from Brazil in the past to continue to receive positive responses from ABC to their demands (Barbosa 2011; Puente 2010). The capacity of the recipient country to cover part of the costs of these actions may also be an important driver in the selection of requests. In both cases, there is a clear convergence with specific

¹³¹ According to Puente, Cuba was the main recipient between 1995 and 2004 due to Brazilian commitments to support the Cuban Special Programme for Economic Recovery.

guidance that the ABC has adopted since 2004: to prioritise projects with greater multiplication effects, greater impact and more effective engagement of partner institutions.

Annex 8: Sectoral allocation of Brazilian technical cooperation by region, 2005–2012 (%)

Sector	Region		
	North, South and Central America and the Caribbean	Africa	Asia, Oceania, Europe and the Middle East
Agriculture	19	26	18
Health	20	22	5
Environment	13	5	5
Vocational training and education	11	14	29
Public administration	9	4	5
Energy	6	5	N/S
Social development	5	2	5
Industry	2	1	N/S
Public security	N/S	N/S	5
Labour	2	2	3
Urban development	N/S	3	N/S
Justice	N/S	N/S	11
Technical cooperation	N/S	N/S	8
Communications	N/S	2	3
Legislative	N/S	N/S	3
Civil defence	2	N/S	N/S
Planning	N/S	2	N/S
Transports	2	N/S	N/S
Sports	N/S	2	N/S
Culture	N/S	2	N/S
Livestock	N/S	1	N/S
Others	9	7	N/S

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

Annex 9: Transcript of the announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma

Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013

For us, the relationship with the African continent is very important. As they say here, you know, we also consider that there is an African renaissance in recent years, I would say even, in the last decade. This African renaissance is responsible for significant growth rates in Africa, including, reviews of the IMF show that among the countries that will grow, are African countries. We have had an intense relationship with African countries, both in the bilateral relationship as the bi-regional relationship. This applies to relationships that we have established between Africa and Latin America, between the African Union and Mercosul. But above all, I believe that, here in Africa, we have had a strong commitment to expand our cultural, commercial and investment relations. Many Brazilian companies invest here in Africa, and also increases our business relationship. To make possible and to make this relationship more fluid, including Brazil, which had a number of debts with African countries, who were debtors of Brazil since the 70s and 80s, we came systematically solving this problem for a more effective relationship. That is why we have sent debt forgiveness, not full the full debt, but part of the debt. We have forgiven the debt of nine countries and forward three more. Nine are now, I would say, the complete process, some of them being submitted to the Senate, and three are nearing completion. This is very important so that we can indeed establish new standard of relationship at this time, that is, the twenty-first century, and not be charging so much debt that we and they consider, actually, passed. Also, today I'm here to announce two major instruments so that we can expand relations with Africa. One of them, Brazil will create... We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department of the Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade agencies. We will create an international trading agency for Africa and Latin America. It is a funding agency, but also a commercial agency, it is also an agency to enable investments. In short, it is an agency that has a very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through which the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral bodies. You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions in Africa are performed by one of these international agencies, and not by us directly, even though they are our resources. Hence the reason for this agency cooperation, trade and investment with African countries. Further concern is to enable adequate funding. There is no one in the world who expands their trade relations without supplier credits. And those who are selling [right?], ensure the buyer, which is another key element of this relationship. We... I believe we just had a very intense process of expanding both the Brazilian private investment here in Africa, with Embrapa, with bus production companies, and even large contractors, as well as those companies that set forth, for example, to ensure construction material, as explained to me in a meeting earlier today. Anyway... it all has to set a framework for expansion of investment. And we are very grateful to African countries because we believe that for the election of our representative at the WTO we had a great support. I do not know how much, but we have a review of a great support from these countries. I had four bilateral meetings: with Guinea, with Gabon, Kenya and Congo Brazzaville. I could not do more because we had no time, despite having several countries asking us for schedule, which shows that we also have a relationship, I think so, seen by Africans as qualitatively adequate. A relationship that we call South-South, in which you see mutual benefits, and no relation of superiority, or that uses business relationship for other purposes. So, I also believe that this aspect, of being extremely friendly, in the Brazilian relationship, is very important. Now one thing is true. We are the largest country of the African descent of the African Diaspora. We admittedly have half our population of African descent. Also why we have common roots. A very important vein in the formation of our nationality, it has a strong root in diverse culture, too, because Africa is not a single, but diverse culture here in this region of the world. That's basically it.

Source: www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d7tPg39k2XE

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**ANEXO 5. SUYAMA, B., POMEROY, M. (2014). SUPPORTING
AUTONOMY AND RESISTANCE - THE BRAZIL-MOZAMBIQUE-SOUTH
AFRICA NATIVE SEED BANK PROJECT. BRIGHTON: INSTITUTE OF
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES.**



Supporting 'Autonomy and Resistance'

The Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa
native seed bank project

Bianca Suyama and Melissa Pomeroy

April 2014

The Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa Native Seed Bank Project

Countries: South Africa, Mozambique

Time Period: 2011-2014

Sector: agriculture; food

Primary Actors: Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE), Brazil; Popular Peasant Movement (MPC), Brazil; Peasant Women's Movement (MMC), Brazil; UNAC (Mozambique); Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE), South Africa.

Summary

This case study explores an innovative multi-stakeholder project led civil society in three countries: Brazil, Mozambique and South Africa. The “community native seeds banks in family farming areas” knowledge-sharing initiative is the first Brazilian South-South Cooperation (SSC) project to be delivered by social movements working in coalition with an NGO and two different government agencies. The project has the overall objective of contributing to the economic and organisational strengthening of family farming in South Africa and Mozambique. Guided by the concept of food sovereignty and practices of agroecology, the project promotes the exchange of experiences between family farmers, technicians and rural leaders to rescue, use and multiply native seeds, and establish community native seed banks.

The project was first propelled and mobilised by IBASE, an NGO known for its work in democracy, food sovereignty and alternative development models, with the support of the Presidency General Secretariat (SG-PR). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) provides funding and overall management of the project. The Women's Peasant Movement (MMC) and the Popular Peasant Movement (MPC), both with extensive experience in establishing native seed banks and fairs in Brazil, are responsible for carrying out the capacity building with the support of two agronomists. African civil society partners, responsible for project implementation, include in Mozambique the national peasant movement organization UNAC and in South African six NGOs affiliated with TCOE (the Trust for Community Outreach and Education).

The Seed Bank project aimed to counter a dominant agribusiness model of development, presenting an agricultural development alternative that allowed farmers to choose their own agricultural practices and increase their autonomy.

Methodologically, the project is based on popular education and intercultural dialogue, ensuring mutual respect in regards to the diversity of knowledge and traditional wisdom existent in the different countries. Cooperation was facilitated through several dialogue and networking events, including the People's Dialogue (established in 2004), and in 2009, the “Africa-Brazil: Social Participation and International Cooperation” programme.

Key lessons:

- **Drawing on traditional practice:** easy adaptation of the Brazilian experience is due to the fact that the process of rescuing native seeds is based on respecting and remembering the traditional practices of farmers. Additionally, it articulates the knowledge of the farmers with technical agronomical aspects, taking also into account the knowledge and capacity of the farmers who attended the courses.
- **Mutual learning and dialogue:** the civil society partners already shared a similar ideological background, which was crucial to the project's success. The People's Dialogue helped build trust and common understanding amongst the partners, and mutual respect and listening was a central part of participant training sessions, fostering intercultural understanding. The need for humility and "historical patience" is paramount to ensure equal partnerships.
- **Working with governments:** government buy-in and support, with civil society autonomy regarding the context and approach of the courses, was essential. However a culture of distrust for civil society within governments in South Africa and Mozambique proved a stumbling block. Partners had to constantly convince government officials of the project merits and bureaucratic complexity of involving various government agencies often had negative impacts in the fulfilment of project activities.
- **Political and strategic aspects:** a crucial part of the courses focused on the MMC, MCP and IBASE's experience around political mobilisation, emphasising that development is a political and not merely technical effort. Partners believe that sustainable and inclusive development can only be achieved by creating alliances and coalitions, as well as increasing people's political consciousness and autonomy.

Key Successes

- **Mutual mobilisation and activism:** while not an intended outcome from the project, the cooperation between social movements in Brazil and African counterparts had an 'inspirational factor', creating ripple effects of increasing political activism and adaptation of their rural extension approaches. The strengthening of relationships between movements has also been a key outcome, improving mutual perceptions on their commonalities, as well as broader consciousness on the importance of native seeds.
- **Mobilisation of women's movements:** the use of women's seminars and sharing of experiences from MMC mobilised the creation of a women's movement within UNAC in Mozambique and the establishment of the Rural Women's Assembly, led by TCOE. The, Assembly is currently active in 8 countries in Southern Africa and more than 7000 rural women have participated in their regional activities.
- **Piloting new approaches and relationships:** As well as being the first time ABC supported a project that was developed and implemented by civil society and the first partnership between UNAC and the Mozambique government; this initiative was also the first time farmers in South Africa and Mozambique learned about techniques to rescue and multiply native seeds.

Supporting ‘autonomy and resistance’:

The Brazil-Mozambique-South Africa native seed bank project

Bianca Suyama and Melissa Pomeroy¹

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The international development cooperation architecture has changed dramatically over the last decade. This context represents a window of opportunity to revise its policies and practices to build more just, equitable and sustainable societies and to contribute to an international system committed to socio-cultural diversity. The proliferation of cooperation providers and approaches brought about new debates, and challenged old consensus, on how to improve its effectiveness. Additionally, traditional development models have been increasingly challenged due to the current financial, food and climate crises, thus questioning the capacity of such models to generate sustainable and inclusive development. The influence of emerging countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is also rapidly increasing, including their role as providers of South-South Cooperation (SSC).

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Brazilian SSC has been gaining increased attention in the last years. This has been a result of the international recognition of the development trajectory of Brazil, which has seen economic growth accompanied by poverty reduction and social inclusion. However, national and international debates have been mainly focused on government-to-government initiatives. Nonetheless, many of the policies and initiatives being shared through Brazilian SSC have been the result of social struggles and political processes that had civil society as a key actor. Moreover, civil society organisations and social movements have been engaging in international cooperation for decades, as recipients and providers. The rich experience accumulated can greatly contribute to current debates on development effectiveness.

This case study explores an innovative multi-stakeholder project led by social movements and organisations in three countries: Brazil, Mozambique, and South Africa. The “community native seed banks in family farming areas” knowledge-sharing initiative is the first Brazilian SSC project to be delivered by social movement organisations working in coalition with an NGO and two different government agencies. The project has the overall objective of contributing to the economic and organisational strengthening of family farming in South Africa and Mozambique.

Guided by the concept of food sovereignty and the practice of agroecology, the project promotes the exchange of experiences between family farmers, technicians and rural leaders to build the capacity for rescuing, multiplying, stocking and using native seeds, as well as establishing community native seed banks and fairs. It seeks to support both agricultural biodiversity (through the preservation of seed varieties adapted to different agro-climatic contexts) and cultural diversity (through valuing the identities and knowledge of rural communities), as well as promoting income-generation and resilient rural livelihoods.

It was firstly propelled and continuously mobilised by IBASE (the Institute of Social and Economic Analysis), a leading Rio-based NGO with the support Presidency General Secretariat (SG-PR, in Portuguese).² The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in Portuguese), as project coordinator, provides funding for the Popular Peasant Movement (MPC) and Peasant Women’s Movement (MMC), two Brazilian social movement organisations linked to the transnational peasant movement Via Campesina. MPC and MMC have experience and proven results in establishing community seed banks and organizing seed fairs in the Brazilian states of Santa Catarina and Goiás. IBASE has been a leading NGO, since the 80s, in national and international debates around radicalisation of democracy, hunger, food sovereignty and alternative development models. African civil society partners, responsible for project implementation, include in Mozambique the national peasant movement organization UNAC and in South African six NGOs affiliated with TCOE (the Trust for Community Outreach and Education). The South African Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and the Mozambican Ministries of Agriculture and Planning and Development are the government counterparts responsible to support project’s logistic, such as transport and accommodation.

Although the dialogue amongst partners has a longer history, the project started in 2011 and is due to finish this year. Therefore, the case study is an initial reflection on: what has happened to so far; the principles and concepts in which the project is based; the emerging lessons, results and challenges; as well as relate the experience to the Busan principles and put forward recommendations for

² The Presidency’s General Secretariat was established in 2003 and is responsible for federal government’s relations with civil society. Its International Affairs Advisory Department aims to foster citizen participation in Brazilian international agendas, such as meetings and seminars about social integration (Mercosul and CPLP), Mercosul Social e Participativo or consultations with civil society (i.e. Rio +20 and UNDP’s Beyond 2015).

development cooperation. It is based on interviews with IBASE, MMC, SR-PR, ABC and UNAC, as well as review of project documentation and relevant reports produced by partner organisations. It is important to note that, as the project is still in its implementation phase, a rigorous analysis of results has not been possible. Some of the words used to describe the principles and lessons learned are not used in English with the same meaning as in Portuguese. They were, however, written with a literal translation, as part of the importance of SSC is bringing about new narratives.

1. Setting a solid foundation for horizontal cooperation

The social movements, civil society network and NGO involved in this project had a long history of engagement before the project was developed. It was through their participation and networking in the World Social Forum (WSF) that their relationship was built, based on similar ideological background. In 2004 the People's Dialogue was established, led by IBASE, with the objective of bringing Latin American and African civil society organisations and movements together to “discuss and promote activities to strengthen the foundations for changes towards new models of development and democratic processes to confront the capitalist system, while incorporating aspects related to the organisational experiences and struggles, as well as ethnic, cultural, political and gender diversity”³. The Dialogue was an important space to bridge cultural differences, allowing the actors to better understand each other and seek commonalities of interests and challenges they faced. It was also in this space that some of the approaches used in this project were developed,

In February 2009 the “Africa-Brazil: Social Participation and International Cooperation” program was organized with the participation of an 11 country African delegation. The objectives of the visit included (i) the participation of the African delegation in the WSF and the Local Authorities Forum that took place previously in Belem; (ii) public policy experience's exchange between Brazil and African countries; (iii) exchange between Brazilian and African civil society organizations, local governments and trade unions; (iv) identify potential cooperation projects to be developed with civil society organizations. The event was coordinated by SG-PR, in partnership with ABC and the Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies. IBASE was responsible for mobilising and inviting civil society representatives. The meeting was the starting point of the project, as the civil society working group developed recommendations and areas of mutual interests, including food sovereignty and sustainable environment.

The SG-PR had a decisive role in mediating the demand elaborated by the civil society partners with ABC. This was the first, and only, time ABC took on board a project brought by civil society, and not a governmental demand. The SG-PR hoped this would be a pilot project, which could be later replicated to ensure civil society was part and parcel of official SSC. Unfortunately, these efforts have not led an increase of participation of civil society in Brazilian SSC so far.


A prospecting mission was organised to better understand the partners' realities before finalising the project proposal. A Brazilian delegation that included representatives from ABC, SG-PR, IBASE, MMC and MPC, went to Namibia⁴, South Africa and Mozambique to visit the partners and potential beneficiaries, discuss the initiative with government officials and reflect on the specificities of each context

³ See: www.dialogodospovos.org

⁴ Namibia was initially the third partner which joined the first proposal, but at the end the government did not accept the project.

before the proposal and methodology was developed. In South Africa the delegation met with government officials from different levels, national regional and municipal. The Brazilian embassies in the countries were essential to coordinate with government and ensure buy-in to the initiative.

Figure 1 – Project Phases



Source: Own elaboration based on project documentation and interviews

2. Building blocks: concepts and approaches

The project's conceptual framework combines four main pillars that guide and embed practices politically and methodologically, used and developed by MMC, MPC and IBASE. Principles of food Sovereignty and agroecology express partners' world vision and frame the overall objectives to be obtained, while popular education and intercultural translation set the ground for how to obtain them.

Food Sovereignty

As the Peoples' Food Sovereignty Statement advocates "food sovereignty is the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict the dumping of products in their markets, and; to provide local fisheries-based communities the priority in managing the use of and the rights to aquatic resources".⁵

⁵ See: http://www.nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/Peoples_Food_Sovereignty_Statement.pdf

It is important to note that food sovereignty goes beyond the concept of food security, since the first prioritizes farmers, at the household or collective level, as well as diversified and agro-ecologically based production systems and local markets. The former does not include discussions on where or how that food is produced or traded. Food Sovereignty as a concept is intrinsically linked with the critiques of current economic policies which favour agribusiness, causing problems of market speculation and food price volatility, and often increasing food insecurity. Food Sovereignty also refers to the redistribution and equitable access to productive resources, including agrarian reform and protecting seeds from patents.

Agro-ecology

The discipline of Agro-ecology combines the promotion of peasants and family agriculture with ecological concerns, as it provides principles for how to manage sustainable agro-ecosystems such that they: (is) combine production with natural resource conservation and ecological sustainability, (ii) are culturally sensitive, socially just and economically viable, (iii) guarantee food and nutritional security.

To put agro-ecology into practice, multiple and interdisciplinary strategies are required, such as the strengthening of farmers organization, mobilization and partnerships to reinforce the effects of their actions; the promotion of farmers' autonomy and agency; the respect and promotion of different gender or age perspectives; the provision of continuous training to raise producers' education levels; and influencing public policy formulation. Above all, agro-ecology requires a deeper understanding of the complex long-term relationship between natural resources, people and their environment, where agriculture must be conceived as an ecological system as well as a human dominated socio-economic system.

Popular education

A key aspect of the project is that its knowledge exchange is based on popular education. Popular education methodology differs from most technical cooperation projects, in which one has the knowledge to be shared and the other is the "recipient". Popular education values prior/traditional knowledge, learning-by-doing and construction of knowledge based on the cultural, social and political realities of those involved. It blurs the lines between teacher and student, stimulating horizontal dialogue and exchange. It is grounded on the notion of class, political struggle and social transformation. Cinnelli explains that it builds new identities, individual and collective, and other practices of cultivation and conservation of seeds (2012: 15). Justina, an MMC leader emphasises that:

"Popular Education does not require a person with university degree, but takes place among people themselves, from knowledge they transmit to each another, from shared experiences. In the workshops, women exchange knowledge among themselves. Of course there is someone responsible for the workshop that has the knowledge, but she is a popular educator, that brings knowledge to the others, and so it becomes an exchange, an education that takes place among women." (*Ibid* p.42)

Intercultural dialogue

Intercultural dialogue methodology aims to facilitate the exchange and formulation of knowledge and action based on the differences, diversity and complementarity of participants engaged in the political process that strengthens social movements and social struggles.

Intercultural dialogue is inspired by the concept of intercultural translation, which

finds reciprocal understanding between diverse experiences, providing a horizontal dialogue among diverse forms of knowledge, either between different cultures or different forms of knowledge. Awareness of the incompleteness of one's culture motivates further dialogue, as it is assumed that cultures can be enriched through exchange and confrontation with other cultures

3. Emerging lessons

The Seed Bank project is ground-breaking in many ways. It is the first time ABC supported a project that was developed and implemented by civil society; it is the first partnership between UNAC and the Mozambique's government and, most importantly, the first time peasants in Mozambique and South Africa learned about techniques to rescue and multiply native seeds. In the case of Mozambique, peasants obviously used native seeds but depended mainly on hybrid seeds that came from South Africa. The importance of preserving and multiplying native seeds, as well as the technical aspects to do it, was unknown to UNAC. In South Africa the situation the initial context was very different. Due to the breakdown smallholder agriculture during the Apartheid period, farmers lost part of their farming practices and knowledge. The project is contributing to the resurgence of their traditional wisdom.

This section will unpack the lessons learned so far: what worked well, some of the challenges faced, as well as the perceived results. Without the circumstances as described above, many of the results and learning of this project would not have happened. In contrast to other issues that have many donors and organisations working on them, members of UNAC and TCOE would not have accumulated the knowledge and awareness of cooperative farmer strategies and native seeds without this cooperation project.

What worked well

Interviewees emphasised the importance of the various moments of engagement, starting with the Peoples' Dialogue, in **slowly building trust and common understanding** amongst partners. Moreover, civil society partners shared a **similar ideological background**. This was seen as the foundation that allowed the project to be successful. The inclusion of **context analysis** (i.e. global trends in agricultural development and consequences to family farming) in the trainings was paramount to link the local realities and challenges to global issues - such as the green revolution and the competing agricultural development models, creating a sense of solidarity between movements and a better understanding of the structures they were mobilising against. The context discussed during courses has given more evidence to and understanding of their political demands.

An interesting aspect of this initiative is the apparent **easy adaptation** of the approach being shared by the Brazilian partners. This is partially due to the fact that the process of rescuing native seeds is based on **respecting and remembering the traditional practices of farmers**. The reflection is how these practices can be improved, or the seeds can be improved, without changing the traditional practice per se. Thus, it articulates the knowledge of the farmers with technical agronomical knowledge of soil, climate, and reproduction of plants and production of native seeds. The fact that the farmers involved have **strong embedded, but not commercial, interest** in making the project work is also seen as a factor to the project's success. For instance, it was mentioned that other SSC projects that involve training of government staff may not be as sustainable due to turnover rates.

As **cultural, social and political differences were taken into consideration from the onset**, through a workshop to jointly define the methodology; potential adaptation problems were constantly being reflected on. Moema from IBASE explained “*there is respect for the history and accumulated knowledge, we share what we know and the partners can analyse what interests them, we do not take a blue-print approach. There is **freedom of ‘apropriação’ through inspiration and not imposition***”. “Apropriação” could be translated as ownership but, as the way it was used by interviewees differs from current mainstream discourse, we will use the Portuguese word.

In practice, the courses involved group work to allow participants to share and reflect on their contexts and practices. These sessions were followed by presentations of MMC and MCP experience, sharing what they have learned in terms of best instruments and the results they achieved. It is important to note that a crucial part of the courses were focused on **political and strategic aspects** of the MMC, MCP and IBASE’s experience. The consultants hired also presented more technical issues around rescuing and multiplication of traditional seeds. **Listening and respecting everyone’s experience and knowledge is a cornerstone of their trainings.**

Moreover, the social movements and agronomists involved in the courses had **first-hand experience** of the issue, and have had positive results with seed banks in Brazil. Although two agronomists carried out part of the training, these had strong background in working with social movements in Brazil and the trainings were mainly seen as **peasant-to-peasant exchanges** and, thus, allowed for mutual learning. This was also seen as the result of the dialogue and exchange of knowledge methodology (popular education and intercultural dialogue) that ensured a **more egalitarian relationship**.

Government buy-in and support without interfering with the leadership of the movements in creating the curriculum and methodology of courses was also mentioned as essential. In the case of the Brazilian government, the SG-PR was key to ensuring the initiative happened, both negotiating with ABC but also constantly liaising with all the partners. On the other hand, IBASE’s role was emphasised in liaising with the various civil society partners and keeping the pressure throughout the implementation to ensure the bureaucratic complexity (see below) did not bring the project to a haul. The role of the embassies in the negotiation of the process was also crucial. Nevertheless, commitment during negotiations did not lead necessary to active support during implementation, as it will be discussed below. In the case of Mozambique, although there have been challenges regarding government support, UNAC sees this project as **strengthening their relationship**, as it was the first project of this kind. Thus, even if there is still conflict, the lessons learned in the project could be the basis for future ones.

Stumbling blocks

Although the multi-country and multi-stakeholder character of this project is seen as positive and innovative, in practice it brings a **bureaucratic complexity** that often had negative impacts on the fulfilment of project activities. Interviewees have raised **challenges in coordination and communication** as affecting the project. For instance, agreeing on dates for the visits has been no simple task, often leading a **mismatch between project activities and the agricultural calendar**. There was a one-year gap between visits in 2013 and 2014. In the last visit in 2014 participants planted new seeds and they were supposed to be harvest in the next visit, which was not possible. As a result, the learning-by-doing aspect of this project has been compromised. Timing differences between government bureaucracy and the

dynamics of the civil society partners involved, who want to get things done quickly, were also emphasised.

Communication and logistical issues, such as language difference, lack of translation, transport and adequate infrastructure have also posed difficulties. Twice the Brazilian delegation arrived in Mozambique to find out the government did not provide infrastructure and transport for participants, and as a result the training did not happen. Government stated that their main impediment has been budgetary. Moreover, the **lack of systematic visits** also means that the follow-up courses often have to go over the last material, as farmers may have already forgotten part of the curriculum.

Another issue raised is that the **constant change of government focal points** to the project requires project staff to continually keep “convincing” new people need on the merits of the project. In South Africa, a hand-out discourse, stressing the farmers should be glad that the government is providing the support to trainings, often permeated the attitude of some government officials involved. That underlines that the recognition of civil society’s role in development has not been entirely taken on board. Hence, the **initial buy-in did not lead to unreserved implementation support**. Government mistrust of civil society often prevails.

There is a serious **ideological dispute** between agricultural development models within the countries involved in the seed bank project. While the perception amongst interviewees is that their governments support and promote large-scale agriculture, civil society partners are explicitly resisting the agribusiness export-led model and searching for alternatives. In the case of Mozambique this dispute has been even stronger as the result of another Brazilian SSC project, the ProSavana⁶.

Although there is an overall feeling that the adaptation of practices has not been a challenge, there were a number of **contextual differences raised**. These include: the mobilisation of rural movements in the African partners’ countries was significantly different than the Brazilian reality (i.e. the lack of a peasant movement with national reach in South Africa); lack of dialogue between technical and popular knowledge (e.g. in Brazil agro-ecology has been based on this interchange) and technical support; quality of dialogue and interactions with government; and levels of suspicion and hierarchy between government and civil society..

Finally, **gender** work was also raised as something to be strengthened in future projects. Though they organised a seminar just with women, leaders of MMC felt that this should have been a continuous practice to ensure women did in fact took leadership of process. Nevertheless, it was recognised that the seed bank project is not expected, or have the ambition, to change gender relations but to share the experience and history of mobilisation and social struggle of the women in MMC and of Brazil more broadly.

Perceived results

In this section we will share some of the results the project had so far, though it is important to state that the initiative is still being implemented and the seed banks and fairs have not been created. We would like to point out that the “perceived results” are based on what interviewees found as positive outcomes of the project, even if

⁶ ProSavana is focused on the agricultural development of Mozambique’s tropical savannah, based on the experiences of the Brazil’s *Cerrado* development, which is said to hold lessons for Mozambique due to a number of geographical and conceptual similarities between the two regions. Technical cooperation in the case of ProSavana is accompanied by private sector investment initiatives through the Nacala Fund. The aim is to attract private investment to promote the development of agribusiness and food production in the Nacala region.

they were not predicted or commonly seen as impact indicators. The latter has implications for development cooperation monitoring and evaluation, as explored in section four.

One key message from interviewees is that the “**inspirational factor**” led to results considered extremely important but not included in the project proposal. That is, the trajectory and experience of Brazilian social movements had ripple effects in their counterparts in Africa. For example, it led to **increased political activism** of UNAC not only in regards to their engagement with government but also internationally through stronger links to Via Campesina. UNAC also **changed their approach towards rural extension**, inspired by what they perceived as a strong level of solidarity and “volunteerism” within Brazilian movements. Thus, as before those working in rural extension were usually linked to a project and received some sort of benefit (not necessary financial), they have now created a network of “multipliers” so that people from the same community can train their peers.

Another exciting outcome has been the **mobilisation of women’s movements**. This was a result of the women’s seminar that was organised but also the sharing of experiences from MMC. Based on what they saw and learned, peasant women from Mozambique created a women’s’ movements within UNAC. Also inspired by the project, TCOE was one of the lead organisations in establishing the **Rural Women’s Assembly**, which is currently active in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. A TCOE report (2012) emphasises that the Assembly’s main achievements have been encouraging local and self-organised activities in these countries. Moreover, more than 7000 rural women participated in the Assembly’s activities in the region. They have also been gaining profile and experience in issues such as climate change and climate justice

The strengthening of relationships between the movements was a key result raised by interviewees, as it **allowed a broader coalition** in their common fight/resistance against the agribusiness agricultural development model. For instance, UNAC mentioned that the project **improved each other’s perception** on the universality of their struggle and allowed them to better understand the political aspect of food sovereignty and its relationship with preservation and use of native seeds. Although TCOE worked on similar issues beforehand, it was through the engagement with MMC and MPC that they became more conscious of the importance of native seeds. As a result, they carried out a study to understand the impacts of large-scale production and GMOs in Eastern Cape to guide their policy influencing work.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the main result the project is trying to achieve is the **autonomy of farmers, food sovereignty and sustainable agricultural practices**. The bank seed and fairs are hoped to decrease the market dependency of this farmers and, although initially improve their food for subsistence; the experience in Brazil is that it later lead to increased income through trading the excess of production. After the initial purchase of seeds for the establishment of the banks, seeds are lent to various farmers who start producing using and multiplying them and then seeds are lent to others. Thus, it has a snowball effect.

Though the project still needs to be evaluated to be able to demonstrate how many seeds have been rescued and the impact of the project in various communities, a TCOE report points that that in various areas where the project has been implemented, producers have been working with several types of traditional seeds and 8 nurseries have been established (TOEC, 2012). In Mozambique, the lasted project visit has collected a list of varieties that have been rescued and multiplied.

4. Busan principles into practice

This session explores how Busan principles were exercised in the Seed Bank project. The study found that although interviewees use the same concepts, for instance ownership, they have a very different understanding of what they mean. This aspect will be further explored in the conclusion by proposing a set of principles more aligned with their perspectives.

Ownership: “countries should define the development model they want to implement”

The study shows that the idea of a “chosen development model” is problematic. As demonstrated, there are two agriculture development models in dispute. The civil society partners see themselves as creating “resistance” to the agribusiness model. As there are various forces and interests that influence policy-making, public debate and participation is essential to ensure the voices of different interests groups are taken into consideration, especially the most marginalised. Democratic ownership might therefore be a more useful principle, as it encompasses the idea of different actors working together to design and implement development policies to ensure inclusive and sustainable outcomes.

Focus on results: “having sustainable impacts should be the driving force”.

It can be said that the project main focus is to ensure sustainability. Firstly, the goal of the project is to promote sustainable agricultural practices, both in terms of the farmers being less market dependent and ensuring ecological sustainability. Secondly, the methodology used - training the trainers that have a strong embedded interest in continuing the work beyond the project timeframe – hopes to have a multiplier effect. As an interviewee said *“the project is itself a seed, as the approach is constantly being multiplied”*

The conceptual framework and declared objectives of the project highlights other concerns, such as the valorisation of the peasant identity and their autonomy, increased awareness of global context and greater diversity on food production. In this respect, the usefulness of a results-based-management approach to understanding the impact and sustainability of the initiative can be questioned. How far do current monitoring and evaluation approaches can capture the perceived results described above? What are other ways of measuring that are more suited for this type of project?

Partnership: “of all actors respecting their diversity”

The Seed Bank Project is indeed an example of different actors working together and, in theory, respecting their diversity and expertise. However, their involvement does not necessarily lead to equal partnerships between civil society and government. Justina from MMC emphasised “the need of humility and historical patience”, to ensure different backgrounds and historic moments are respected and a certain level of equality can be established.

Transparency and shared responsibility: “cooperation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens”

There is no systematic and comprehensive information about the project publicly accessible online, though there is some basic information on the project available on ABC’s website. However, both the government and civil society partners have shared all the project documentation with the research team. The lack of publicly available

documents can be seen as a result of the absence of an institutionalised information system and has an impact on how far Brazilian SSC is accountable to their citizens.

5. Conclusion: lessons for effective development cooperation

The transnational crisis – financial, food, climate and fuel – brought new challenges to development cooperation efforts and led to the questioning of how far traditional development models are able to generate sustainable social inclusion in the South. This reality reinforces the importance of international development cooperation not only as a field of action but, also, as a dynamic space for political debate. In this context, civil society and Middle Income Countries have triggered significant changes in the global economic, political and security agenda. Initiatives such as the Seed Bank project offer “social technologies” that respond to some of the development problems we are facing. Moreover, they dispute traditional models and approaches, hoping to build new consensus and ensure the interests and perspectives of the most marginalised and excluded influence policy and practices.

Even though many of the characteristics of this project are very unique – from the focus on native seeds to the ideological standpoint of civil society partners – the lessons learned can be generalised to development cooperation efforts more broadly. Firstly, the approach itself to rescuing and multiplying seeds, which has had extremely positive results in Brazil, and its links to food sovereignty can be easily adapted to very different environments and require small amounts of funding. Secondly, the methodology used for the knowledge exchange seems to offer a number “best practices” that may help to ensure more horizontal partnership and mutual learning. Finally, the political and more strategically aspect of the project reinforces the argument that development is not a technical but a political effort. Below are four principles that emerged as the pillars of this project and can contribute to development effectiveness debates:

- **Intercultural dialogue:** all development partners should have mutual respect in regards to the diversity of knowledge and traditional wisdom existent in society to promote social, including gender, equity and sustainable development.
- **“Apropriação”:** development efforts should allow for freedom of “apropriação” of policies and practices by partners, encouraging dissemination by inspiration and active participation of stakeholders.
- **Autonomy:** sustainable impacts depend on ensuring governments and citizens have increased self-reliance and political consciousness, so that they are protagonists of their own development.
- **Political mobilisation:** sustainable development can only be attained and sustained by creating alliances and coalitions, in government and in society.

These principles represent a very different worldview and focus than the ones developed through the aid effectiveness processes, which were mainly led by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. To ensure the development cooperation architecture is committed to socio-cultural diversity, and thus have more legitimacy in the eyes of the many actors currently involved in international development efforts, a more structured and horizontal dialogue between different perspectives is crucial.

6. People Interviewed

Moema Miranda, director, IBASE

Justina Cima, leader, MMC

Catiane Cinelli, leader, MMC

Fabio Tagliari, project analyst, ABC

Maria Cristina Sampaio Lopes, International Relations Advisor, SG-PR

Bartolomeu Antonio, leader, UNAC

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Role of Civil Society in South-South Cooperation

This case study report was produced as part of a project highlighting how civil society organisations (CSOs) contribute to the roles middle income countries play not just as recipients of aid, but also as innovators and providers of development cooperation. The project drew on a review of available literature, evidence from BRICS countries and Mexico collected by the IDS Rising Powers in International Development programme, and four case studies. These case studies, undertaken by number of partners and organisations including Articulação SUL, PRIA and Shack/Slum Dwellers International, illustrate the role of civil society organisations cooperating across a range of contexts. These include fragile and post-disaster situations, as well as cooperation between middle and low income countries. The case studies examine CSOs' international roles in providing services, promoting social accountability, supporting post-disaster reconstruction and sharing rural and urban development knowledge that derives from their own domestic experiences.

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ANEXO 6. LEITE, I., SUYAMA, B., POMEROY, M., (2013). AFRICA-BRAZIL CO-OPERATION IN SOCIAL PROTECTION: DRIVERS, LESSONS AND SHIFTS IN THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY WORLD INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH WORKING PAPER. HELSINK: UNU-WIDER

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Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection

Drivers, lessons and shifts in the engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development

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March 2013

Abstract

The Brazilian Ministry of Social Development's co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa has shifted from an initial engagement in cash transfers to a recent engagement in food and nutritional security. This paper aims at understanding the main drivers for such shift considering lessons drawn from first initiatives and from growing involvement in South-South Development Co-operation, as well as changes in the mobilization of domestic coalitions in Brazil. By doing so this paper aims at contributing to the international debate on the effectiveness of South-South Development Co-operation, unpacking challenges and opportunities faced by developing countries when allocating growing domestic human and financial resources to promote international development.

Keywords: South-South development co-operation, social protection, food and nutritional security, Brazil, sub-Saharan Africa

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List of Abbreviations¹

ABC – Brazilian Co-operation Agency
BCP – Brazilian Continuous Cash Benefits
BPF – Brazilian Bolsa Família Programme
CAISAN – Brazilian Inter-ministerial Board on Food and Nutritional Security
CGFome – Brazilian General Co-ordination for International Action against Hunger
CNAS – Brazilian Social Assistance National Council (CNAS)
CONAB – Brazilian National Food Supply Company
CONSEA – Brazilian Food and Nutritional Security National Council
CPLP – Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries
CRAS – Brazilian Social Assistance Reference Centres
CSOs – Civil Society Organizations
DAC/OECD – Development Assistance Committee/Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development
DFID – United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
FAO – United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization
FNAS – Brazilian National Fund for Social Assistance
FNDE – Brazilian National Fund of Education Development
FNS – Food and Nutritional Security
HGSF – Home Grown School Feeding
IBSA – India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
IPEA – Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research
IDC – International Development Co-operation
IO – International Organization
IPC – International Poverty Center, renamed International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)
LEAP – Ghanaian Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty
LOAS – Brazilian Social Assistance Organic Law
LOSAN – Brazilian Food and Nutritional Security Organic Law
MDA – Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
MDS – Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger
MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations
P4P/WFP – Purchase for Progress
PAA – Brazilian Food Purchase Program
PETI – Brazilian Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI)
PNAE – Brazilian National School Feeding Programme
PNAS – Brazilian Social Assistance National Policy
SAGI – MDS’s Department of Evaluation and Information Management
SAIP – MDS’s Department of Productive Inclusion
SISAN – Brazilian National System of Food and Nutritional Security
SSA – sub-Saharan Africa
SSC – South-South Co-operation
SSDC – South-South Development Co-operation
SENARC – MDS’s Department of Citizenship Income
SESAN – MDS’s Department of Food and Nutritional Security
SNAS – MDS’s Department of Social Assistance
SUAS – Brazilian Social Assistance Unified System
TCDC – Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
WFP – United Nations World Food Programme

¹ Acronyms referring to Brazilian institutions are maintained in Portuguese.

1 Introduction

South-South co-operation (SSC) has re-emerged in the 2000s as a multifaceted force in international relations. Its modalities include multiple-geometry coalitions among developing countries, such as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the G20, South-South trade and investments, technological and scientific co-operation, regional and inter-regional integration and South-South Development Co-operation (SSDC), to mention a few.

SSDC, which will be the modality of SSC focused here,² has been boosted by several factors, including disappointment towards economic globalization and the social impacts of neoliberalism; the emergence of progressive governments in several southern countries; efforts made by traditional donors to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development co-operation (IDC); and a global convergence around the belief that the transfer of experiences, knowledge and policies among southern countries would be more effective in the promotion of international development (Morais 2009).

Although many studies point to distinctive tendencies of SSDC in its current phase, calling the attention to its more pragmatic character (e.g. Abdenur 2009; Yassine 2008; Morais 2009), its political rhetoric is still influenced by the normative approaches of the 1970s, assuming horizontality common interests, and mutual and equitable distribution of its gains.

Scholars, international organizations (IOs), and journalists have been converging in the view that SSDC is also influenced by political and economic interests (e.g. ECOSOC 2008; Rowlands 2008; Glennie 2012), but there still predominate widespread narratives of: assuming that the degree of effectiveness is inversely proportionate to the incidence of donors' interests over co-operation; treating states as anthropomorphic units, thus not capturing the influence of domestic drivers over SSDC;³ presuming that, in facing similar development challenges, policies adopted by developing countries can be transferred to other southern regions.

Such narratives have been feeding a process of technification of Southern experiences and policies, through which results are disconnected from their legal, institutional, social, economic and political background. Moreover, global and domestic stimuli for SSDC have not been necessarily backed, in southern donors, by constituencies and by capacities to implement actions in an effective way. These all risk the potential for the distinctive aspects of SSDC, the elements of inspiration and trust, to actually contribute to international development.

The case of Africa-Brazil SSDC is a good illustration not only of the challenges related to the current phase of SSDC, but also of how they have been faced in search for sustainability and

² Although in parts this paper will refer to technical co-operation among developing countries (TCDC), there was a preference for the use of the term SSDC, since Brazilian TCDC is increasingly intertwined with other modalities, such as contributions to international organizations, financial co-operation and humanitarian assistance.

³ Treating states as anthropomorphic units also predominates in literature on IDC. For an exception, see Lancaster (2007).

mutual gains. Although Brazilian engagement in SSDC dates back to the 1970s,⁴ it was only during the Lula administration that it became a bulwark of the country's foreign policy. Presidential diplomacy played a leading role in the exponential expansion of international demands for Brazilian experiences, but it was not the only driver of it. National macroeconomic recovery and advances in social inclusion have allowed Brazilian foreign policy to be more active, while at the same time the country became a reference for governments, IOs, and other actors engaged in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly the first one which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. Brazil's involvement in SSDC has also caught international attention for its narratives of solidarity, demand-drivenness, non-conditionality, non-incidence of economic interests and non-interference in partners' domestic affairs.⁵

One of the mostly internationally recognized Brazilian experiences was the *Bolsa Família* Program (BPF), which is co-ordinated by the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) as part of the country's system of social protection. International and domestic drivers have led to attempts to export the BPF to SSA, and the MDS was directly involved in that process from 2007 onwards through the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development, supported by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and by the International Poverty Center (IPC). After a few years, the programme has experienced a demobilization, and the main channel for MDS's co-operation with SSA, from 2012 onwards, became the Africa Food Purchase Program (PAA Africa), partnered by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' General Co-ordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFome), by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), by the World Food Programme (WFP), and by the DFID.

This paper aims at understanding the international and domestic drivers of such a shift, as well as how lessons learnt by the MDS and the Brazilian government during the Lula administration have influenced the design and institutional framework of PAA Africa. By doing so, the paper intends to contribute to broader discussions on the challenges and opportunities for SSDC to be effectively implemented. Effectiveness, here, is not interpreted through the lenses of the Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD), but through the lenses of SSC's mutual gains. This means that the paper presumes that the effectiveness of SSDC depends on it bringing benefits to both partners, although lessons learnt by traditional donors, as well as co-ordination with them, are still extremely valuable and should be considered by emerging donors.

This paper starts by offering an overview of social protection policies in Brazil, analysing its main domestic drivers and focusing on the policies that are co-ordinated by the MDS. The third section will explore shifts in the sectorial involvement of MDS in SSA and in its methodology of work by drawing on lessons learnt from the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development, on responses to challenges faced by Brazilian SSDC in general and on shifts in the Brazilian domestic coalitions engaged in SSDC. The fourth section is focused at

⁴ For more information on the history of Brazilian engagement in TCDC, see Valler Filho (2007); Cervo (1994); and Leite (2011).

⁵ The principles of Brazilian SSDC are listed in Abreu (2012). Such principles result mainly from the Brazilian government's self-perceptions as a receiver of co-operation. The discourse on solidarity, by its turn, gained ground with the emergence of the Workers' Party in the Presidency, from 2003 onwards, but it has also been influenced by the mobilization of civil society organizations in foreign policy issues.

understanding the main drivers of PAA Africa, also trying to capture to which extent lessons drawn from MDS's previous co-operation in SSA have influenced the programme's design.

The findings presented here were based on literature review, discourse and data analysis, informal conversations and semi-structured interviews, mainly with MDS's staff involved in SSDC.⁶ The second part of this research will include fieldwork in two countries included in PAA Africa in order to capture domestic dimensions of partner countries and to analyse main factors contributing or hindering the scalability of PAA to SSA.

2 Social protection processes and policies in Brazil: domestic drivers

Just like in the case of traditional co-operation, Brazil's official engagement in social protection initiatives in SSA cannot be simply treated as a pure technical endeavour. Social protection, as every social policy, represents a field in which diverse conceptualizations, interests, perspectives and traditions compete against each other (Sposati 2009: 15).⁷ The boundaries of policies and programmes that are defined as social protection vary between countries, and change over time.

In Brazil, as first instituted by the 1988 Constitution, social protection encompassed social security, health and social assistance. Recently, the centrality of food and nutritional security (FNS) policies to ensuring comprehensive social protection has been gaining ground. Nonetheless, the social protection system in Brazil is, in many ways, a work in progress and still faces many challenges. Increasing demands for sharing experiences with other countries has actually contributed to shift reflections on the drivers of Brazilian experiences themselves.

This section aims at exploring key domestic determinants that are currently perceived as the building blocks of Brazilian social protection system:⁸ the 1988 Constitution, social participation and accountability, political co-ordination allowing the rationalization and integration of services and policies and institutional and legal frameworks.

2.1 Main definitions and the evolution of the social protection system in Brazil

Social protection is the collective of public, or public regulated, initiatives that provide services and benefits to tackle social risk and deprivation (Jaccoud 2009: 58). It is often argued that the focus on risk and vulnerability relates not only to a more dynamic understanding of poverty, capabilities and resilience (Cook and Kabber 2009), but also frames the issue without creating the 'victimization of the poor' (Sposati 2009). Additionally,

⁶ The list of interviewees is available at Annex I. The interviews were mainly focused on literature gaps, lessons, challenges and opportunities for a more effective co-operation among Brazil and SSA. Interviewees' particular speeches and opinions have not been identified in the course of the paper in order not to compromise them vis-à-vis their respective institutions and externally.

⁷ Social protection systems are not automatic and mechanic responses to the needs presented in a society. They represent historical forms of political consensus, which are constantly being negotiated, to respond to the following questions. Who should be protected? How should they be protected? How much protection should they receive? (Silva et al. 2004).

⁸ In the Brazilian case, we use the term 'system' due to the fact that comprehensive and permanent policies and programmes were created, catalysing stable institutions, and human and financial resources (Jaccoud 2009: 61).

it emphasizes the need to a contextualized understanding of the realities faced by various groups within a country and to develop appropriate responses to permanent or temporary shocks and vulnerabilities.

Social protection programmes in Brazil encompass both vulnerability and poverty dimensions. Jaccoud (2009) points out that even though there is often an understanding that the main objective of social policies is tackling poverty, they should be seen as part of the consolidation of the Brazilian welfare state. Nonetheless, there are still debates in the country on whether social protection should be linked to poverty, as thus targeted, or based on rights that entail universal policies and services tackling specific needs (Sposati 2009).

Poverty and vulnerability alone did not motivate the establishment of social protection policies in Brazil, but the social and political threat that resulted from the contradiction between an economic system that reproduces poverty and a political system that affirms equality between citizens (Jaccoud 2009: 66).

This section focuses on non-contributory social protection; that is, services and benefits that the beneficiary does not directly make contributions to (as is the case in social security or pensions). It can be seen as a redistributive policy, as it uses collected taxes to provide for those in situation of risks and vulnerability. In particular, we will explore social assistance and food security policies and programmes, focusing on the ones that are co-ordinated by the MDS.

The Brazilian model of non-contributory social protection has five main characteristics: it has social assistance as a rights and citizenship-based policy; it involves co-ordination and integration between municipal, state and federal levels; it operates through a unified and decentralized system; it relies on social participation and accountability mechanisms; and it is based in a division of responsibilities between different federative agents framed by legislation and implemented by managers and commissions that include civil society and the private sector (Sposati 2009: 46-7).

The foundation of the social protection system in Brazil is the 1988 Constitution, which established the provision of human and social rights as a responsibility of the state and represented a milestone in guaranteeing universal rights in social security. The promulgation of the Constitution was followed by a process of re-organization and re-definition of the country's social policies in the 1990s, but due to the impact of the structural adjustment policies the social protection system was focalized and sub-financed, thus denying the universalist agenda in certain social areas. After the macroeconomic stabilization, social financing was recovered, but with a focus in poverty (Vaitsman et al. 2009: 734).

Although decentralization of the social protection system advanced in the 1990s, the implementation of the policies and services did not change radically in the way it operated. Non-profit organizations and the private sector continued to be the main service providers and the state played the role of a philanthropy provider instead of incorporating social assistance as a public police (Vaitsman et al. 2009; IPEA 2007).

In the 2000s, a new cycle of social assistance starts with significant changes, such as the promulgation of different laws and norms, the creation of co-ordinating agencies, increased resources invested in social programmes and the unification of cash transfer programmes, which rationalized the management of social protection policies and allowed them to achieve

national coverage. Another important initiative was the creation of the Social Assistance Reference Centres (CRAS), which encompasses federal units offering social protection services, preventing vulnerability and risk situations and forwarding the public to other services in the most vulnerable areas of every Brazilian city.

The fight against hunger became an object of public policy in 2003, when the Zero Hunger strategy was launched to articulate public policies, programmes and actions to ensure access to food, especially to the poorest people. The strategy articulates policies and programmes under four main axes: access to food, family farming promotion, income generation, and social accountability and mobilization.

In 2004, a definition of FNS was formulated by the Brazilian FNS Forum, approved by the II National Conference of FNS and incorporated in the FNS Organic Law (Losan) in 2006. It is defined as ‘the fulfilment of the right of all to access regular and permanent quality food in sufficient quantity without compromising access to other essential needs, based on health-promoting food practices that respect cultural diversity and that are socially, economically and environmentally sustainable’ (CONSEA, cited in Costa and Bógus 2012).

The network of social protection has been expanded having FNS at its core and in articulation with social assistance and cash transfer programme (MDS 2008). The main actions to promote FNS are: the Food Purchase Program (PAA), the *Bolsa Família* Program (BPF), family farming strengthening, the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), the Cisterns Program, food and nutrition education, urban and periurban agriculture and public equipment of such as low-cost restaurants, collective kitchens, and food banks.

In 2011, the Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan was launched aiming to reach the extremely poor households that had not been included in the government’s social programmes. The plan is developing tools to find and reach those families so they can have access to cash transfer programmes and to public services in education, health, social assistance, electricity, sanitation and productive inclusion. The main facts related to the evolution of the Brazilian system of social assistance and food security are summarized in Box 1.

The creation of the Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS) in 2004 set the conditions to integrate and streamline national policies related to social development, social assistance, FNS and cash transfer. Besides co-ordinating those policies, the MDS was entitled to articulate with all federal units and with civil society for the establishment of policy and programme guidelines, as well as for integrating all the initiatives, headed by official or non-official entities, in Brazil.⁹

⁹ The following MDS’s Departments implement policies and programmes: Citizenship Income (SENARC), Food and Nutritional Security (SESAN), Social Assistance (SNAS), Evaluation and Information Management (SAGI), and Productive Inclusion (SAIP).

Box 1: Social assistance and food security legal framework and main programmes

1988 – Promulgation of the Constitution. New federative pact defines roles and responsibilities of the three levels of government, paving the way for municipalities to assume a central role in managing and implementing social policies. Fulfilment of human rights established as a responsibility of the state.

1993 – Establishment of the Food and Nutritional Security National Council (CONSEA)

1993 – Endorsement of the Social Assistance Organic Law (Loas), an integrated and decentralized policy that delineates planning, management, financing and social accountability mechanisms. Creation of the National Fund for Social Assistance (FNAS) and of the Social Assistance National Council (CNAS).

1995 – Creation of Solidarity Community Program, extinction of the CONSEA, creation of Ministry of Social Security and Assistance (MPAS) and, linked to it, of the National Council on Social Assistance (CNAS).

1996 – Launching of the Continuous Cash Benefits (BCP), providing a minimum wage to the elderly and people with disabilities, and of the Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI), which sets inter-sectorial actions aimed at eradicating child labour.

2001 – Creation of the Fund to Fight and Eradicate Poverty, the federal sectorial cash transfer programme (education, health and energy) and the Unified Registry for Social Programs.

2003 – Creation of the Social Assistance Ministry, the Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security (MESA), the Zero Hunger Program, and reinstatement of CONSEA. Creation of PAA (aiming at strengthening family farming by establishing local food supply chains, public networks of food and nutrition facilities and social assistance institutions, and food stocks), of the food banks (aiming at reducing wastes in the food chain), and of the Cisterns Program (aiming at providing clean water for population living in the semi-arid region).

2004 – Creation of the MDS, Publication of the Social Assistance National Policy (PNAS), expanding the guarantees regarding citizens' access to social assistance, instituting a hierarchical organization of the policy in the territory and ensuring a single entry door to the user. It also goes beyond the social protection programme and it emphasises the role of social accountability and the defence of rights. Launching of the BPF, which unified all federal cash transfer programmes. Creation of the Social Assistance Unified System (SUAS), which promoted decentralized assistance, integrating the levels of government to standardize various services and creating a new financing logic.

2005 – Basic Operational Norm (NOB-SUAS) is approved, organizing the social protection system in two social protection levels, basic and special, and recognizing three management levels for the municipalities, each one associated with responsibilities and incentives.

2006 – Food and Nutritional Security Organic Law (LOSAN) approved, creating the National System of Food and Nutritional Security (SISAN).

2008 – Establishment of the Inter-ministerial Board on FNS (CAISAN).

2010 – Inclusion of the right to food in the Constitution.

2010 – Decree establishing the National Policy of FNS.

2011 – First National Plan for FNS launched. SUAS legislation approved.

2011 – Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan is launched targeting extremely poor households. The State becomes responsible for finding these households and to provide them with public services and social programmes.

2.2 The role of social participation, accountability and managing capacities

The Brazilian social protection system cannot be understood without exploring the role of citizen participation and the establishment of social accountability mechanisms. Since the 1970s, numerous social movements have proliferated in the country pressuring for democratization and the defence of human rights. These movements have deeply influenced the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution. Additionally, the labour movement and left-wing political parties were key actors since the 1960, demanding the creation of a social security legislation (Pochmann 2004).

In 1993 the Action against Hunger and Poverty and for Life Campaign was launched under the leadership of Hebert de Souza. The action was decentralized, autonomous and spread across the country, with around 3,000 committees and mobilizing three million people. It sparked a broad debate on the relationship between economy and rights, social policy and quality of life. In the same year the CONSEA was created.

In 1993, the Social Assistance Organic Law (LOAS) instituted municipal, state and federal-level councils with deliberative powers, with 50 per cent of seats to be filled by civil society representatives. The municipal and state councils were entitled to discuss, propose and approve Social Assistance Plans and to plan and oversee the Social Assistance Fund. National conferences on social assistance started taking place every two years (except during 1997-2001), and were always preceded by broad local mobilizations.

The reactivation of CONSEA in 2002 and the II National Conference on Social Assistance in 2004 had an important role in affirming FNS as part of the Brazilian system of social protection. The conferences have been pivotal in consolidating different social policies, creating new consensus and ensuring social pressure to the continuous expansion of social protection policies.

Another essential feature of the evolution of social protection in Brazil was the development of knowledge, data, and methodologies to better understand risks and vulnerabilities improving the state's planning capacity and ensuring social policies legitimacy through evidence-based information.

The Unified Registry for Social Program, which was created in 2001 as a tool to identify poor families and manage federal cash transfer programmes, was later revised with the unification of such programmes under the PBF. The tool allows socioeconomic analysis of households and identification of potential beneficiaries. Georeference systems are also used as a tool to understand the vulnerabilities of specific areas, integrating data and maps for the construction of indicators and crossing over information on MDS' actions and programmes, thus improving the effectiveness of decision-making.

The MDS has conducted several actions to improve PBF management, among them the Decentralized Management Index (IGD), which monitors municipal administrations' performance and sets the basis for fund transfers to municipalities. A National Social Assistance Information System was also created to institutionalize, monitor and evaluate practices and ensure multi-dimensional knowledge. Finally, a Department of Evaluation and Information Management (SAGI) was created in the MDS to develop and implement monitoring and evaluation activities (Paes 2009).

3 The Africa-Brazil co-operation in social development: evolution and lessons

Brazil's development trajectory in the last decade, which led to a decrease in poverty and inequality levels, has drawn the world's attention to the country's social protection policies. As a result, the MDS, whose creation represented a milestone in the construction of social development in Brazil, started being increasingly demanded to engage in SSDC.

According to the MDS, the international community has expressed interest in knowing in depth the BFP, the Program for the Eradication of Child Labour (PETI), the Zero Hunger

Strategy, the PAA, the Cisterns Program, the Public Equipment for Food Security, the National Policy for Social Assistance (PNAS), especially the actions aimed at children, adolescents and the elderly, and Monitoring and Evaluation.

International demands, however, are not the only element determining which technical co-operation initiatives are later implemented. The institutional dispersion of Brazilian official engagement in SSDC,¹⁰ as well as the inexistence of a public database on the sectorial and geographic evolution of expenses made by several agencies, actually hinders a more complete account on the domestic drivers of Brazilian engagement in SSDC, and on how initiatives in social protection in SSA stand as part of it.¹¹

This section aims at exploring domestic and international drivers of the evolution of MDS's engagement in SSA. It starts with an attempt to consolidate and briefly analyse available data on Brazil's engagement in technical co-operation in social development, as well as the particular profile of the MDS. Then it assesses how lessons drawn from the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development and from broader Brazilian official engagement in SSDC during the Lula and the current administrations, have influenced the emergence of new priorities and methodologies in MDS.

3.1 The profile of MDS's engagement in SSDC

According to diplomat Carlos Puente, who has analysed initiatives in Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC) implemented under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Agency of Co-operation (ABC) during 1995-2005, co-operation in social development¹² has experienced an increase during 2001-05. Counting the whole period (1995-2005), initiatives in the sector represented 6.1 per cent of total projects, ranking 6th, and 9 per cent of total activities, ranking 4th (Puente 2010: 161).¹³

¹⁰ For more information on the institutional dispersion of Brazilian co-operation, see Vaz and Inoue (2008).


¹¹ By means of a partnership among the Presidency's Chief of Staff Office, the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the ABC, the Brazilian government took unprecedented steps towards collecting and systematizing data on the country's official engagement in international co-operation. The result of this effort came in 2010 with the publication of the report *Brazilian Co-operation for International Development: 2005-2009*, which gathered data on the central government's expenses with humanitarian assistance, scholarships for foreign students, technical and multilateral co-operation (IPEA and ABC 2010). However, as the report's database is not open to public access, it is not possible to rely on data on expenses made by specific ministries. Only data from technical co-operation initiatives co-ordinated by the ABC can be accessed thanks to increasing national and international interest in the agency's work. So, this section will focus on the number of initiatives and expenses made by the ABC, as well as in systematization of data related to the number of initiatives engaging the MDS.

¹² ABC's internal database does not have a specific entry for social protection. According to Puente, Brazilian co-operation in social development includes the following areas: poverty reduction, social inclusion, human rights, protection of minorities, reduction of child mortality, elimination of child labour, gender policies, enhancement of local capacities, income and employment programmes, and promotion of social integration through the practice of sports, among others. Although actions in social development have traditionally been partnered by Brazilian NGOs, such as *Pastoral da Criança* and *Missão Criança*, the *Bolsa Família* Program (BFP), which is co-ordinated by the MDS, became the flagship of Brazilian co-operation in social development during the Lula administration (Puente 2010: 165).

¹³ An isolated activity is defined as 'an instrument created with a well-defined and specific objective, which is complete in itself, a precise undertaking, which aims to meet one single demand, with a reduced budget. It is not linked to any other activity, is less complex, on a small scale and lasts a short period of time'. A project is defined as 'an operational working unit of co-operation activities, by which means external funding is

Updated data referred to ABC's budgetary allocation shows that social development represented only 3 per cent of expenses made between 2003 and August 2012 (Figure 1). Breaking data by region, only 2 per cent of initiatives undertaken in Africa during the same period referred to social development, while in other regions that percentage was of 5 per cent (Annex II).

Figure 1: ABC's budgetary distribution by sector (2003-August/2012)



Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

The MDS does not work solely with initiatives classified as 'social development' by the ABC, neither is the agency the only budgetary source for the ministry's involvement in TCDC. MDS's engagement in TCDC is as diversified as its domestic competencies, which include the national policies of Social Development, FNS, Social Assistance and Citizenship Income. Actually, initiatives in FNS, many of which are classified by the ABC under the sector 'agriculture', are predominant (Figure 2).

In terms of modalities, MDS's engagement in SSC involves knowledge exchange (such as these happening in the IBSA initiative, which are beyond the strict scope of SSDC), technical assistance, construction (involved in the Cisterns Programs), internships, field visits in Brazil, training activities, seminars, workshops and informational materials. Due to limited human and financial resources, there is a tendency to concentrate activities in Brasília, with the support of traditional donors, gathering international delegations for seminars and field visits, some of which are followed by pairing individuals from international delegations to individuals in MDS, so they can accompany the ministry's daily work.


Traditional donors are important partners in MDS's engagement in SSDC. Main partners include FAO, WFP, IPC-IG and DFID. According to the MDS, these organizations play multiple roles: promoting Brazilian experiences abroad; mediating demands; funding SSDC;

transformed into a joint fund to be used for a single objective, organized and programmed to meet previously identified requirements' (MRE 2007: 7, footnote).

partnering in multi-country projects; giving technical advice; monitoring and evaluation; and supporting learning and research. Also in face of limited Brazilian human and financial resources to plan, implement and evaluate actions, there is a growing tendency to partner triangular and multi-stakeholder initiatives.

In terms of regional allocation, most of MDS's initiatives are targeted at Latin American and Caribbean countries, where its sectorial profile is also more diversified (Figure 2). The predominance of the region as the main destiny of MDS's co-operation is related to the existence of regional arrangements and networks,¹⁴ as well as to the Brazilian leadership in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).¹⁵

Figure 2: MDS's SSDC by regions and sectors¹⁶



Source: Based on MDS internal documentation/data.

In the case of Africa, the region from which the MDS mostly receives demands,¹⁷ only two initiatives have been registered in the ministry's internal documentation: one in cash transfer

¹⁴ One example of regional social protection network is the Inter-American Social Protection Network, created in 2009 under the OAS. In the case of food and nutritional security, the main initiative is the FAO-supported Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger, which was launched in 2005. In the case of Evaluation and Monitoring, a brokering mechanism for identifying demands from countries integrating the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is currently being designed.

¹⁵ The concentration of the provision of technical co-operation in post-conflict countries, mainly Portuguese speaking ones, is related to Brazilian efforts to show the international community that sustainable peace depends on initiatives promoting development.

¹⁶ This figure is based on data provided by MDS referring to concluded and on going projects, from 2007 to 2012. Paper authors created the categories. Projects under FNS include cisterns construction, technical assistance on FNS initiatives and the Food Purchase Program. Cash transfer category includes projects related to Bolsa Família and the Unified Register (as support to cash transfer). Under Social Protection System, Management and Program Monitoring and Evaluation category we included all other knowledge exchange projects based on MDS institutional experience oriented to support partners' social protection institutions and practices.

¹⁷ According to the MDS, communication difficulties with counterparts in African countries hinder an adequate response to demands from SSA. Working in partnership with traditional donors and with the Brazilian embassies are seen as supportive.

with Ghana (2007-09) and another in FNS being implemented in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal (PAA Africa).

3.2 Main drivers for the emergence of the agenda of social protection in the Africa-Brazil relations

Co-operation in social protection became one of the main flagships of South-South and Triangular co-operation. It was particularly fed by the realization of the World Summit of Social Development (1995), the launching of the MDGs (2000) and the global consensus on the need to align economic growth with social policies (Andrade 2008).

IOs, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Programme's Special Unit on South-South Co-operation (SU-SSC/UNDP), IPC and FAO (Andrade 2008), as well as foreign development agencies, especially the DFID (Barros 2011), played an important role in the diffusion, advocacy and funding SSDC in social protection. The launching of cash transfers programmes in Latin America in the second half of 1990s and the first half of the 2000s¹⁸ have attracted the attention of such organizations, which increasingly supported the establishment of similar programmes in other Latin American countries and in Africa (Andrade 2008; Morais 2011).

In the case of Brazil, such push fed and was fed by the Brazilian turn to Africa during the Lula administration, expanding the focus in Latin America, particularly in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), that had dominated the country's relations with other Southern regions during the 1990s.¹⁹ Closer links were expressed in the economic domain as well as in TCDC. In the last case, as data on ABC's budgetary allocation points, African countries were the main destiny of Brazilian TCDC between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 3).²⁰


It is important to stress, however, that available data from previous years show that, in terms of ABC's budgetary allocation, Africa had already started ranking first in the period that goes from 1997 to 2001 (Puente 2010), during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) administration. Although relationships with the continent as a whole were not a priority to Brazilian foreign policy, the creation of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996 has opened spaces for the diffusion of Brazilian experiences and for catalysing technical co-operation with SSA.

¹⁸ Cash transfers programmes in Latin America were pioneered by the *Progres*a in Mexico (1997), the Chile Solidario (2002) and initiatives that culminated with the establishment of the *Bolsa Escola* in Brazil (2001).

¹⁹ The importance of Africa to Brazilian foreign policy is expressed, for instance, by the fact that Lula visited 21 countries during his 8-year administration and received visits of representatives of 27 African countries (World Bank and IPEA 2011). For more information on the history of Brazil-Africa relations; see Saraiva (2012), and World Bank and IPEA (2011).

²⁰ Regional priorities, however, have shifted in the ABC with the emergence of the Dilma administration. According to data presented by the new director of ABC, Ambassador Fernando José Marroni de Abreu, the agency's budgetary allocation for the 2012-15 period point to a greater focus in Latin America (US\$40 million budget and a focus in TCDC activities), followed by African countries, notably Portuguese-speaking ones (US\$36 million budget, and a focus on structuring projects), and finally Asia, Oceania and Middle East (US\$4,5 million budget) (Abreu 2012). Official arguments for the renewed distribution of ABC's budget, however, have not been published.

Figure 3: Country allocation of Brazilian TCDC (2005-jul/2010), in US\$



Source: Brazilian Co-operation Agency, cited in Presidência da República (2011).

In sectorial terms, Brazilian engagement in TCDC during the FHC administration has experienced a shift in terms of it being increasingly used as an instrument to strengthen domestic support to specific coalitions and ideas. Such a shift was clear in the domain of social protection and cash transfers. By claiming to have directly influenced the establishment of similar initiatives in Latin America and in Africa, domestic coalitions supporting *Bolsa Escola* and minimum income programmes have used the promotion of their ideas abroad as an instrument to earn legitimacy at home (Morais 2011).²¹

In the case of the PBF, despite the role played by Lula's presidential diplomacy in catalysing the signing of international agreements in technical co-operation in social development and poverty reduction, the programme was politically strong in Brazil. Its promotion abroad responded to requests that arose exponentially due to the programme's rich documentation in international literature and to its international diffusion by organizations such as the World Bank, which funded exchanges and financed the creation of similar initiatives in other countries (Morais 2011).

Next section will analyse more deeply such process by focusing the case of Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development. It will also explore lessons drawn from the implementation of this programme.

²¹ In the case of *Bolsa Escola*, the creation of the NGO *Missão Criança*, headed by Senator Cristovam Buarque, supported pilot programmes in Africa and Latin America. Advocates of the minimum income were headed by Senator Suplicy, who promoted his proposals abroad aiming at strengthening them in Brazil (Morais 2011).

3.3 The Africa-Brazil programme on social development and the case of Ghana: overview, drivers and lessons

In January 2006, the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development was launched during a study tour organized by the MDS and the DFID that gathered delegations from African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia) in Brasília to exchange experiences in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (Barros 2011). This programme was both preceded and proceeded by contacts among the MDS and African delegations, facilitated and supported by the DFID, as well by the publication of documents by the latter recognizing the role of PBF and of SSC as relevant to tackle poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and as a means to achieve the MDGs.²² The chronology of the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development is described in Annex III.

Such contacts resulted in the formalization of an agreement among the MDS and the DFID in February 2007, to implement the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) in Ghana. Its execution encompassed three missions of ten days each composed by Brazilian technicians specialized in registry design, policies against child labour and evaluation and monitoring.²³

In terms of results, the success of the Brazil-Ghana co-operation has been attested by the fact that the LEAP has been implemented after the co-operation project was finished (Barros 2011). The political commitment of the Ghanaian government has been pointed as crucial.²⁴ The inspiration offered by internationally recognized achievements made in another developing country, Brazil, was seen by the Ghanaian government as having helped to legitimize the LEAP in Ghana (Andrade 2008; Souza 2007).

From the point of view of the MDS, engagement in technical co-operation with Ghana has contributed to leveraging the Ministry's experience in social protection and in other country's realities (Souza 2007). The contact among the MDS and the DFID has also contributed to professionalize MDS's International Unit²⁵ in terms of planning, monitoring and evaluation (Barros 2011), and developing co-ordinating mechanisms that allowed it to liaise with MDS's line units (Souza 2007).

²² See DFID (2005, 2006).

²³ The Ghanaian Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment demanded a cash transfer specialist with experience in designing implementation modalities and payment systems; an economist specialized in social security issues; a social development expert with background experience in orphan and vulnerable children and people living with HIV/AIDS. Relying on the Ghanaian National Social Protection Strategy Paper, on the official demand and on the Brazilian expertise, the MDS proposed sending experts in *Bolsa Família*, child labour and instruments in Brazil's Conditional Cash Transfers (unified registry, conditionalities and M&E) (Souza 2007).

²⁴ Political commitment was expressed by the fact that Ghana's Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment deputy minister has attended the January 2006 study tour in Brasília, as well as by the fact that the LEAP was planned as part of a National Social Protection Strategy, which by its turn integrates a broader strategy (the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II).

²⁵ Since the creation of MDS, in 2004, its structure counts with an International Unit (*Assessoria Internacional*), which is entitled to: advise the Minister's Cabinet and other units in international actions in the bilateral and multilateral domains, in co-operation and in fulfilling international agreements; co-ordinate, follow and supervise the international actions related to the Ministry's units, including the execution of international co-operation initiatives; devise and propose bilateral and multilateral agreements with international organizations, entities and foreign governments aimed at social development of economic, social and strategic relevance to Brazil; and analyse and issue technical opinions on invitations, communications and other international documents received by the Ministry's authorities (MDS 2012, 10th Article).

By strengthening each involved institution's goals and strategies, including the fulfilment of missions of the financing institution, the DFID, and the operational and advisory one, the IPC,²⁶ both of which aimed at enhancing SSC in poverty reduction, the Ghanaian case is pointed as representing a 'typical win-win situation' (Souza 2007).

In terms of processes, however, the Ghanaian case posed important challenges. The first one was related to the unavailability of MDS's experts to work as consultants to the LEAP, something that had been considered by the Ghanaian team as necessary, and initially agreed with the MDS, to speed up the programme's activities. Although MDS's technical support was later evaluated as positive by Ghana's counterparts, the challenges of it being understaffed, absorbed by domestic demands and unfamiliar with the Ghanaian reality and language (Souza 2007) point that there was a gap among decisions made by high-level authorities and implementing capacities. Just like in other areas concerning Brazil's engagement in SSDC, it had not been accompanied by the design of a clear strategy matching will with an adequate structure and institutional alignment in implementing agencies, which is expectable given the novelty of the theme in Brazil.

After the experience with Ghana, the continuance of the Africa-Brazil Program depended on periodical meetings of the Steering Committee composed by the three stakeholders (MDS, DFID, IPC), which did not happen in the proposed timeline because the MDS was overwhelmed with the tasks of both managing the committee²⁷ and directly delivering technical assistance. One possible avenue was that the MDS facilitated co-operation instead of directly delivery it, following the Brazilian Ministry of Health's strategy in HIV/AIDS co-operation, where implementation involved NGOs and experts (Andrade 2008).²⁸

Co-ordination among eleven different partners²⁹ and unclearness of specific roles since the beginning of the programme was also pointed as challenging (Souza 2007). Such diagnosis converges with findings made by other studies on triangular co-operation calling the attention to its high transaction costs, but also to poor involvement of beneficiary countries in the planning and execution of co-operation.³⁰

One of the main lessons learnt by the MDS was that something working in Brazil would not be a guarantee for it to automatically work in Africa. Effectiveness would depend on both partners understanding each other's particular realities. One of the difficulties Brazilian government experts met was to refine demands and guarantee ownership, since the Ghanaian programme was being designed not by public servants, as in the case of Brazil, but by consultants mainly hired by IOs supporting the MDGs. One of the alternatives that has been presented in one of the programme's follow-up workshops was that co-operation initiatives

²⁶ IPC's involvement has been suggested by Saul Morris (DFID's headquarters) when he visited Brasília in order to help DFID Brazil identify means to support the MDS in expanding its technical assistance to Africa. Since the MDS's International Unit lacked staff, Mr Morris suggested that the IPC, then linked to the Brazilian governmental think tank IPEA, assumed the dialogue with the Brazilian government, gathered programme documentation and provided administrative support for travels and events (Souza 2007).

²⁷ The Committee was firstly managed by the IPC, and from September 2008 onward by the MDS.

²⁸ As a result of this learning process, the IPC has established a roster to identify Brazilian experts in social protection.

²⁹ DFID Brazil, DFID UK, the IPC, then headed both by IPEA and by the UNDP's headquarters, which had to co-ordinate with UNDP Brazil office, and five MDS's departments.

³⁰ See, for instance, Fordelone (2009).

were preceded by the exchange of missions and study tours among African and Brazilian delegations in order to present each other's policies and realities (Souza 2007).

Later, in 2008 the advocacy process undertaken under the African Union with the support of the DFID called to the need to integrate social transfer plans within National Development Plans as a means to promote social protection as a right in contexts marked by poor institutionalization. Promoting exchanges among African countries themselves was also seen as an avenue for facilitating adaptation (Andrade 2008).

Working with the support of traditional donors was confirmed as an avenue to bridge gaps of knowledge, operationalization, financial and human resources. The Brazilian team involved in co-operation with Ghana has indeed found the participation of both DFID and IPC as contributing to better results vis-à-vis the case of Peru, a country with which MDS was bilaterally co-operating (Andrade 2008; Souza 2007).

After the co-operation project with Ghana was concluded, the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development continued in 2008 through the realization of another study tour of African delegations to Brasília and the involvement of MDS's representatives in Regional Events in Social Protection in preparation for the First African Union Ministerial Meeting of Social Protection (Andrade 2008).

Andrade points that MDS's participation in those events, firstly thought of as an instrument to fostering technical assistance, was later valued as an advocacy tool, going beyond pure technical assistance and grounding co-operation in high-level political alliances. By doing so it would have contributed to foster both Brazil's strategy of expanding relations with other Southern countries and DFID's new strategy of becoming more politically-advocacy-oriented and less programme-based in SSDC (Andrade 2008).

Disseminating experiences to partners, to a global audience and to Brazilian domestic actors was also learnt as crucial to enhance capacity-building, to promote synergies and to guarantee the sustainability of co-operation initiatives. It was carried out under the Africa-Brazil Program through the elaboration of international training materials targeted at audiences of managers,³¹ launching the Programme's webpage, issuing newsletters and engaging Brazilian civil society's representatives in the Seminar Social Protection in African Countries, which opened the August 2009 study tour (Andrade 2008).

There was also an attempt to expand the DFID-MDS partnership in order to promote technical co-operation with other four African countries: Angola, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia.³² The project with Kenya was the only one that was advanced under the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development. As part of lessons learnt, a consultant has been hired to adapt MDS's experiences in Cash Transfers, but the co-operation was not implemented as

³¹ However, such materials have not been used by the MDS due to communication problems among its departments and foreign audiences.

³² Although it was expected that the countries would be identified by a mapping study financed by the DFID and contracted out by the IPC (Souza 2007), the list ended up being defined by high-level decision makers considering personal contacts MDS's individuals already had with counterparts in Africa (Angola and Mozambique), and two countries that were expressing interest in receiving MDS's co-operation (Kenya and Zambia).

fast as in the case of Ghana.³³ Follow-ups are currently being undertaken through monthly videoconferences, but the initiative is not included in MDS's internal documentation.³⁴

Despite having been considered the major initiative in the area, the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development was not given a mandate to co-ordinate all MDS's co-operation with Africa (Andrade 2008). Independent talks ended up being undertaken with Mozambique with the support of the World Bank. According to the MDS, although missions have indeed been exchanged, the Mozambican government has never formalized a demand for co-operating with Brazil in cash transfers. The same happened with Angola.

Therefore, the initial expectation that the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development would encompass technical co-operation with other African countries has not been totally fulfilled. While, despite particular institutional goals, the convergence of interests among the DFID, the UNDP and the MDS in fighting poverty in Africa had set a favourable scenario for the creation of the programme (Souza 2007), the convergence around the means for it to be accomplished has change afterwards.

With the launching of the PAA Africa in 2012, the main Brazilian strategy engaging MDS in Africa has shifted to FSN, also counting with the support of the DFID but replacing the IPC's operational support by the WFP's Centre of Excellence against Hunger. Still, as the next section will show, lessons drawn from the Africa-Brazil Program have partially influenced the renewed engagement of the MDS in Africa and in its SSDC in general.

3.4 Shifts in the MDS's engagement in South-South development co-operation

Even though many of the obstacles faced by the MDS are intrinsic to the Brazilian engagement in TCDC in general, and thus depend on more structural changes to be surpassed, the MDS has been making incremental changes to respond to growing demands for sharing the policies it co-ordinates in a context of limited human and financial resources. Those changes have been partially influenced by lessons drawn from the implementation of the Africa-Brazil Programme in Social Development, but it is important to mention that they also responded to shifts in the mobilization of Brazilian domestic coalitions, including the ones holding particular views about social protection.

On the one hand, understanding that the African contexts were a lot different from the Brazilian one, the PBF coalition decided to back up, leading to a demobilization of co-operation in Cash Transfers in SSA. As seen earlier, such engagement had mainly been a reactive one, and not grounded in a clear strategy and in the availability of the instruments needed to do so. The PBF's team decided to prioritize working the programme in Brazil (Morais 2011), a decision that has been strengthened during the Dilma administration.³⁵

³³ In fact, the MDS's co-operation with Ghana is the one that has presented an exceptional character in terms of timing. According to data raised by Puente, the average for the execution of projects under co-ordination of ABC between 1995 and 2005 was of two years (Puente 2010).

³⁴ For more information of the initiatives undertaken in partnership with the World Bank, see World Bank (2010).

³⁵ While recognizing macroeconomic and social advances in Brazil, the Dilma administration has prioritized facing domestic problems, extreme poverty among them. Her government's motto is 'a rich country is a country without poverty'. According to the MDS, due to the renewed priority in eradicating extreme poverty, SENARC was absorbed with the domestic agenda.

On the other hand, there was a remobilization of coalitions that had been weakened in face of PBF's positive impacts and popularity in Brazil. One of them was the social assistance coalition, which claims that social assistance services must be at the core of the policy of social protection and is currently defended by the SNAS and supported by municipal governments' departments of Social Assistance (Cotta, cited in Morais 2011). The SNAS has been mobilizing itself to gain access to international co-operation, including SSDC, and hiring consultancies to support the internationalization the experience of the Unified System of Social Assistance (SUAS). What is interesting about that process is that the SNAS has been trying to carefully plan its engagement relying in gathering and systematizing data and lessons from MDS's previous and current engagement in SSDC.³⁶

The second and strongest coalition at the moment is the one that has also been the strongest during the first year of the Lula administration: the one supporting the Zero Hunger Program. Including the MDS's SESAN, but also backed by Brazilian CSOs, this coalition claims that FNS should be the focus of social protection in Brazil (Cotta, cited in Morais 2011). The current force of such coalition in SSDC is related to the fact that it is backed by other coalitions permeating the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With a restricted team, and one mainly dedicated to the domestic agenda,³⁷ the MDS started working with consultants in the delivery of SSDC, as well as promoting periodic seminars gathering international delegations in Brasília. The hiring of consultants results from the learning that working with public servants delays the implementation of SSDC, something that converges with findings made by Puente (2010) when analysing the reasons for delays in the implementation of Brazilian TCDC in general. Also, differently from public servants, consultants have the availability to stay in field and understand better each partner's circumstances and demands.

Receiving international delegations for periodical seminars held in Brasília has also been faced as a way to deal with the unavailability of staff to receive particular delegations and to send MDS's staff to missions abroad, as well as for them to get in contact with Brazilian policies and the complexities of their background. There is currently a great interest of multiple Brazilian agencies engaged in TCDC in emulating MDS's model because of budgetary cuts in ABC (Annex IV), as well as cuts in national budget in 2011 and 2012, mainly targeted at expenses with allowances and tickets.³⁸

In 2012, the MDS organized five seminars, which were entitled 'Social Policies for Development', having received 30 delegations from 25 countries (Annex V). The events encompassed three types of activities, respectively: a series of lectures delivered by Brazilian programmes' managers that addressed the main programmes co-ordinated by the MDS,

³⁶ Four products were produced as a result of the consultancies hired by the SNAS: a scoring system aiming at guiding the prospection of demands; a publication about SUAS for foreign audiences; a mapping of challenges the SNAS needs to face, matched with the mapping of what other countries could offer the SNAS in terms of professionalization; an analysis of multilateral debates in social assistance accompanied by a strategy of action for promoting SNAS's engagement in them. A fifth product was previewed, but was not produced. It was about a systematization of what each particular country could learn from SNAS. Relying on those products, the SNAS is elaborating a strategy to guide its internationalization.

³⁷ The MDS has 200 employees, whereas the *Oportunidades* Programme alone, in México, has 1,000 employees (Morais 2011).

³⁸ See Brasil (2011a); and Brasil (2012).

opened up by a lecture on socio-political organization in Brazil and the strategic role of the Ministry in the country's social development; field visits aimed at showing foreign delegations how Brazilian policies are operationalized; and, a novelty of the last seminar, the design of action plans by the visiting delegations aiming at exploring how Brazilian experiences seen during the seminar could be adapted to their respective countries.³⁹

The themes presented and field visits varied from seminar to seminar, reflecting particular demands from delegations, but also the mobilization of different coalitions in Brazil aiming at playing a more active role in SSDC. There was also an increasing recognition by the MDS, which was fed by the transversal character of the policies it co-ordinates, on the need to engage other national actors in the face of increasing international demands for Brazilian social policies.

Those changes actually converge with broader lessons drawn from Brazilian SSDC in general. On the one hand, insufficient human resources in federal implementing agencies that were mostly demanded during the Lula administration has favoured the involvement of other national agents, including local governments and CSOs, which were many times the origin of national demanded policies. On the other hand, CSOs and local governments have formed coalitions in order to play a proactive role in the design and delivery of SSDC. Both processes have converged with the growing consensus on the need to ground Brazilian engagement in SSDC in a strong domestic constituency, as well as to strengthen the voice of Brazilian CSOs and subnational governments in the country's foreign policy.

The main narrative presented during the last seminar converges with those shifts. The social impact of the policies co-ordinated by the MDS is attributed to the participation of civil society in the design of the 1988 Constitution, which has launched a system of rights in health, education and social assistance and the basis for decentralization of public policies and responsibilities to municipal governments. During the presentations, the role of civil society and the inter-sectorial approach of social protection were emphasized. There was also a tendency to conciliate disputes among economic and social development (mainly agribusiness and family agriculture) by recognizing that both, which have all been demanded by SSA countries, are complementary and have played an important role in Brazilian development.

³⁹ The last seminar included speeches made by managers of the National System of Food and Nutritional Security, the National Program of School Feeding (PNAE/FNDE), politics of promotion of family farming led by the MDS, the BFP, the SUAS, the PAA, and Technical Assistance and Rural Extension for Family Agriculture. Field visits were undertaken to the following programmes: the CRAS, a popular restaurant, the PAA, the PNAE, and technical rural assistance. A novelty of the October seminar was that it was realized in partnership with the WFP, its Centre of Excellence Against Hunger and supported by the ABC and the National Fund of Education Development (FNDE). Tasks were distributed the following way: the MDS was responsible for delivering the lectures and offering the meeting room; the WFP has financed the coming of a delegation from Bangladesh, besides having been responsible for the logistics of the seminar; the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger was responsible for facilitating intercultural dialogue and for proposing the methodology of the action plans, which aimed at matching Brazilian experiences with those of each partners' in order to design short, medium- and long-term objectives considering the following elements: legal and political framework; institutional structure and management capacity; how their respective programmes were designed and implemented; how Brazil could support them; financial capacity and political will; social participation in the programmes. Bilateral meetings of two hours were held with each delegation for them to present their respective plans of action. According to the MDS, this document will fundament requests for technical co-operation with Brazil, which should be addressed through diplomatic channels, and not directly to its International Unit.

What those narratives show is that, instead of technifying Brazilian development programmes, there was a tendency of public managers delivering speeches during the seminar to go beyond Brazil's engagement in SSDC as an expression of best-practice transfer and to explore the complexity and historical evolution of the various policies and programmes in Brazil. As we will see in the following section, those narratives have also been influencing the practice of Brazilian co-operation in SSA.

4 Africa-Brazil co-operation in food and nutritional security: the case of PAA Africa

This session aims to elucidate the main drivers of the shift of MDS's co-operation with SSA to FNS based on PAA, as well as how lessons learnt during the implementation of Cash Programs have influenced the design of PAA Africa. To do so we will first analyse how PAA takes part on Brazilian FNS Strategy, emphasizing its institutional arrangement and implementation design. Second, we will briefly analyse how such strategy has been elevated to the international domain and how it stands vis-à-vis challenges and opportunities to sustainable social protection in Africa. Third, we will explore how PAA Africa stands in the Africa-Brazil Co-operation framework on FNS. Finally, we will explore PAA's design, highlighting elements that respond to challenges faced not only by the MDS, but also by the Brazilian official engagement in SSA in general.

4.1 The role of PAA in the Brazilian system of food and nutritional security

The right to food was included at the Brazilian Constitution in 2010, but, as shown in Section 2, it was the culmination of strong social mobilization in the 1990s and of several institutional and legal advances in the 2000s. The National FNS System (SISAN) was created in 2006, and, in 2007, its co-ordination was entitled to an Inter-ministerial Board on FNS (CAISAN), encompassing 19 ministries that are also members of CONSEA. Led by the MDS, that transversal and participatory arrangement has enabled advances in regulation and inter-sectorial policy formulation, as recognized in 2012-15 National Food and Nutritional Security Plan.⁴⁰

The policies formulated by CAISAN are characterized by a concerted action targeting at agricultural value chain's supply and demand dimensions, including family farming strengthening, credit lines, technical assistance, agriculture insurance, price guarantee and public purchase. The nodal programmes are the More Food Program (MFP), the School Feeding Program (PNAE) and the PAA (Patriota and Pierri forthcoming).

Launched in 2008, at the onset of the food crisis, the MFP is a credit line provided by Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) to raise family agriculture production through infrastructure modernization and technical assistance. Credits, which are provided under preferential terms, are destined to purchase equipment and machinery at subsidized prices.

PNAE's main objective is to guarantee school meals for all students enrolled in public basic education.⁴¹ It is implemented through the Ministry of Education's National Fund for Educational Development (FNDE), allowing financial resources to be transferred from the Brazilian federal government to states and municipalities. In 2009, with the determination

⁴⁰ See Brasil (2011b).

⁴¹ Basic education in Brazil includes kindergarten, elementary, and high school.

that at least 30 per cent of programme purchases should be of family farming products (Law. 11.974), PNAE became a cornerstone for the implementation of SISA and PAA.⁴²

Finally, the PAA was instituted in 2003, and along with PNAE, constitutes an important bastion of the Zero Hunger Strategy. Through the PAA, family farming products are purchased for distribution to social assistance networks and populations in food insecurity and for the establishment of public stocks and price regulation.⁴³ The programme is executed with resources from both MDS and MDA in partnership with states, municipalities and the National Food Supply Company (CONAB), and its legislation ensures multi-level participatory and social accountability mechanisms (including the National CONSEA, decentralized Food Security councils, Social Assistance Municipal Councils, Sustainable Rural Municipal Councils and School Feeding Councils).

Patriota and Pierri (forthcoming) point out that those programmes were crucial to the reduction of food insecurity and of rural poverty in Brazil. They also highlight their role in the increasing recognition of family farming as a national development actor,⁴⁴ contributing to the achievement of goals beyond FNS, such as inflation control, balance of payments equilibrium, sustainable rural development and reducing rural exodus.

4.2 Brazilian position in international food and nutritional security and in the social protection debates in Africa

The increase of commodities' prices that culminated on the 2007/08 world food crisis and the perspective of population growth have contributed to the re-emergence of food security at the top of the international agenda (Patriota and Pierri, forthcoming). Brazil's achievements in FNS have put the country at the centre of global discussions, thus contributing to the international promotion of its FNS paradigm. Relying on its Zero Hunger Program, Brazil defends a new paradigm on food assistance that articulates emergency measures with the promotion of social sustainable development, hence promoting sustainable humanitarian assistance (MRE 2006).

In the case of SSA, public investments in Agriculture are insufficient and have been mainly oriented to large-scale agriculture. Since most poverty in SSA is concentrated among smallholder families there is a growing recognition of the potential of actions targeted at FNS and family farming as effective tools to promote poverty reduction and productivity gains (Devereux 2012).

Growing interest of SSA in the Brazilian agricultural models have been accompanied by a dissatisfaction with the dominance of co-operation in social development by cash transfer programmes, which, despite evidences of positive impacts, are perceived as costly, as demanding a complex delivery structure and as a donor-driven agenda (Devereux and White 2008).

⁴² The law determines priority should be conferred to purchases from agrarian reform beneficiaries, indigenous people and traditional communities.

⁴³ Public stocks are also allocated for international food aid.

⁴⁴ Data from the National Agriculture Census shows that family farming responds for 84 per cent of all Brazilian agriculture and livestock farms and occupies a quarter of total area used to production nowadays. It also responds for 75 per cent of employments in the sector. Data indicates the 70 per cent of the domestic food consumption is supplied by family agriculture (IBGE 2009).

Contemporary studies point out three important shifts on the analysis and comprehension of social protection in SSA that can contribute to guide Brazilian engagement in Africa in FNS. The first one refers to the passage from the paradigm of emergency aid to the paradigm of sustainable social protection. Investments on medium- and long-term productivity are recognized as having a potential to contribute to strengthen states' capacities to fund social insurance institutions that could evolve to social protections systems. They also respond to African elites concerns on economic growth as the main strategy for national development (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

Second, dialogue between foreign proposals and domestic political processes are seen as crucial. Political constituencies, ownership and political will are pointed as important as financing development (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Behrendet 2008). Strategies promoting the role of states as bearing the main responsibilities for social protection initiatives are seen as more effective than depoliticized policy transfers (Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

Finally, the importance of social participation and community management of social protection is widely recognized as an alternative to states' limited capacity on designing, delivering and evaluating social protection. Civil society engagement is also important to hold states accountable, to contest power relations and to claim rights. This rights-based approach cannot be accomplished when social protection initiatives are politically headed by international donors and NGOs (Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

4.3 The Africa-Brazil co-operation on food and nutritional security

The *Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development*, which convened more than 40 African ministers in Brasília in May 2010, established areas for future dialogue and co-operation. They included the implementation of ten pilot-projects on public food purchase, broader coverage of existing school meal programmes and the support to family farming modernization.

The search for a more articulated and comprehensive co-operation strategy to cover the supply and demand sides of SSA's agriculture value chains has been favouring multi-stakeholder arrangements involving both the MDS and the MDA, but also FAO, WFP and DFID, such as Purchase for Progress (P4P) and Home Grown School Feeding Initiative (HSFG) (Souza and Klug 2012).

An important lesson of the Brazilian FNS Strategy is precisely that, for it to be effective, multiple components must be addressed and co-ordinated. Currently, Brazilian co-operation initiatives in SSA incorporate, on the supply side the More Food Program Africa, which: (a) provides agricultural machinery and equipment items through an export finance concessional loan under preferential terms;⁴⁵ (b) facilitates technical assistance during fields visits; and (c)

⁴⁵ The Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX)'s Council of Ministers approved a credit line to finance Brazilian exports of family agriculture machinery and equipment to Africa amounting at US\$240 million for 2011 and US\$400 million for 2012. The credit line, which has a concessional character, was approved under the Export Finance Program (PROEX)'s buyer's credit. CAMEX has established the following conditions for the allocation of the More Food Africa Program's budget: reimbursement in 15 years, which can be extended to 17 years for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) recipients; 3-year grace period, which can be extended to 5 years for HIPC recipients; 2 per cent interest rate (or Libor, if this rate is below 2 per cent at the time of

embraces a price negotiation between MDA and the Brazilian industrial sector.⁴⁶ On the demand side, there is the Food Purchase Program (PAA), which: (a) provides direct purchases from smallholder farmers to supply people in food and nutritional insecurity through food assistance programmes; and (b) facilitates knowledge strengthening for longer-term local food purchase strategies within national policy frames.⁴⁷

Efforts to articulate initiatives respond to the growing comprehension of the need to complement and co-ordinate technical and financial co-operation between agencies, partners and donors in order to promote sustainable agricultural development in SSA. As we can see in Table 1, nine out of ten countries participating of PAA (shaded in grey) are also involved in, at least, another FNS co-operation initiative: More Food Africa, the HGSF and P4P.

Table 1 Intersection of PAA and other FNS programmes in SSA

Country	PAA	More Food Africa	P4P	HGSF
Ghana	X	X	X	X
Mozambique	X	X	X	X
Zimbabwe	X	X		X
Kenya	X	X	x	
Côte d'Ivoire	X			X
Rwanda	X		X	
Ethiopia	X		X	
Malawi	X		X	
Senegal	X	X		
Niger	X			
Zambia			X	X
São Tomé and Príncipe				X
Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda			X	

Source: Authors' elaboration based on Patriota and Pierri (forthcoming); MDA (2011); WFP N/D.

approval); each country will receive the credit in three six-month tranches, each of which will rely on a particular financing contract (Patriota and Pierri, forthcoming; and MDA 2011).

⁴⁶ Together with the Brazilian organizations representing industrial sector, MDA has elaborated a detailed methodology encompassing eliminatory and classificatory variables in order to certificate and rank firms which produce machinery and equipment for family farming in Brazil. Firms which offer machine and equipment following the FINAME code (at least 60 per cent of the product's market value and weight must be produced in Brazil) are ranked according to their capacity to export to the demanding country and to guarantees such as convergent technological quality, first-aid repair kits and after-sale services. Certificated and ranked firms must also inform their three-monthly production capacity for each product, so that offering capacities are matched with African demands for machinery and equipment. A unique price for each item, regardless of brand, is collectively negotiated, and items must be bought from a minimum number of different companies to ensure fair market access (MDA 2011).

⁴⁷ Eight African countries have formally requested to be included on the More Food Africa Program (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal, Kenya, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania), five of them have signed Technical Co-operation Projects with Brazil (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Kenya and Mozambique), and, by 2012, three of them had export credits approved by the CAMEX's Council of Ministers: Ghana (US\$95.4 million), Zimbabwe (US\$98.6 million) and Mozambique (US\$97.59 million) (Leite forthcoming).

4.4 The PAA Africa

PAA Africa targets ten pilot projects in SSA, half of them undertaken through a partnership among ABC, MDA and FAO and the remaining undertaken through a partnership among MDS, CGFome, FAO, WFP and DFID. Because of ABC's budgetary cuts (Annex IV), the execution of the first has been delayed.⁴⁸

The pilots in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal started at mid-2012 as a three-year initiative. Responsibilities were distributed the following way: the Brazilian government funds the project through contributions to both the FAO (US\$1.55 million) and the WFP (US\$800,000); and shares expertise drawn from PAA; FAO mobilizes Brazilian expertise, provides seeds and fertilizer and supports small-scale farmers' capacities to grow, associate, process and sell their products; WFP organizes food purchase and delivery to schools and vulnerable groups (FAO 2012); DFID supports learning and knowledge exchange and consolidation through the promotion of seminars. A consultant based in Brasília also supports PAA Africa, co-ordinating the programme and acting like a communication bridge among partners. Drawing on multi-stakeholder arrangements, as we saw in section 3, reflects recognition of Brazil's limited structure to plan, deliver, monitor and evaluate SSDC.

A key determinant for the success of PAA in Brazil was the social accountability and mobilization exercised by CONSEA and local actors, such as decentralized participatory spaces, farmers, school directors, students, parents, nutritionists, and supply agencies (Chmielewska and Souza 2011). Differently from PBF, that requires solid bureaucratic and institutional structures, PAA is seen as more scalable to SSA for fostering local development networks, for which social mobilization in partner countries is seen as crucial.

From this perspective PAA Africa also presents an opportunity to strengthen articulation between Brazilian and partner countries' civil society in FNS and family farming. In parallel to the launching of PAA Africa, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has started financing engagement of Brazilian CSOs in humanitarian assistance. Linking itself to other Brazilian fronts acting in SSDC is not only a promising avenue to reinforce PAA Africa's implementation, but also to foster the elevation of partner countries' civil society as a political actor in policy-making.⁴⁹

Including Brazilian CSOs in co-operation also responds to their pressures for more participation in the country's foreign policy and relies in lessons drawn from MDS's and other national agents' previous engagement in the region, as shown in section 3.4. The same can be said concerning the hiring of consultants to work in field, in an attempt to understand each partner's realities in order to promote articulated co-operation initiatives, besides providing an alternative to restricted teams and the predominance of domestic issues in Brazilian public servants' agenda.⁵⁰ Consultants are expected to foster adaptability,

⁴⁸ The countries included in the ABC-MDA-FAO partnership were Ghana, Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda.

⁴⁹ Since 2012, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs counts with a budgetary action (20RE) financing Brazilian CSOs' participation in international humanitarian assistance, in international dialogue and in negotiation forums in the area of FNS. The CONSEA has also been invited to present its experience during the International Conference that launched PAA Africa in Brasília in July 2012.

⁵⁰ The consultants have been selected jointly by FAO, MDS and WFP. One of the consultants has grown in a Brazilian agrarian reform settlement, one is Senegalese and the other three are Brazilian agronomists.

ownership and sustainability by dialoguing with national policies and working side-by-side with partner countries' representatives in designing mid and long-term strategies for public purchases.

Brazilian FNS system relies upon a multi-dimensional, multi-sectorial, multi-stakeholder and multi-tier design (Souza 2012). National initiatives aiming at tackling food insecurity and poverty in SSA cannot be transferred in pieces. Deep knowledge of each partner's particular context and co-ordination among Brazilian actors engaged in the region, as well as with other donors, will be crucial to promote an effective adaptation of Brazilian experiences to SSA.

5 Conclusion

MDS's engagement in SSA has shifted from an initial involvement in Cash Transfers to a focus in FNS. Several factors have contributed to that shift, including technical as well as political dimensions: a more encompassing understanding of Brazilian programmes themselves and of the multiple and complex drivers of their advances, which were not found as already operating in African counterparts; a perception that initiatives in FSN would be more appropriate to SSA's reality and would deal more effectively with the urgency of fighting hunger; shifting coalitions related social protection and to SSDC in Brazil; a passage from a reactive to a more assertive position vis-à-vis traditional donors.

Brazilian activism in SSDC is new and the country has been learning by doing. The PAA Africa's design has incorporated some of the lessons drawn from MDS's and other Brazilian agents previously engaged in SSDC. Working with consultants in field is seen as an instrument to deal with insufficient human resources in the Brazilian government, but also responds to the awareness that sometimes having worked in Brazil is not a guarantee that it will automatically work in other contexts. Having deepened knowledge of partners' conditions and multi-level demands in order to better adapt Brazilian experiences will certainly be crucial to effectiveness. Without this, other lessons learnt, such as dissemination and grounding co-operation in high-level political alliances, will be useless. Co-ordinating actions in field with other co-operating partners is a promising avenue for PAA Africa to benefit from knowledge accumulated them and to complement actions in field.

Effectiveness also depends on understanding the multiple factors that have allowed the social protection system, including the FNS one, to be built in Brazil. Civil society participation was a fundamental building block in that process, and promoting closer ties among Brazilian CSO's and their African counterparts is a promising avenue not only for grounding partners' development in a rights-based approach, but also to strengthen FNS policies in Brazil. This is indeed one of PAA Africa's goals, thus the expectation of mutual benefits is present at the initiative. Engaging a growing number of Brazilian CSOs is also fundamental for broadening domestic constituencies supporting the allocation of public resources to promote international development.

However, demands put by the civil society will only be met by their respective governments if they hold a political will towards social development and if they count with a tax structure to do so. Economic development is crucial for the latter, as it has been in Brazil. The priority conferred by the Rouseff administration to economic co-operation with Africa has a great potential of matching Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection with initiatives that promote economic development. Doing so, however, will demand balancing incentives to the

internationalization of the Brazilian private sector, including agribusiness, with initiatives aiming at promoting awareness on corporate responsibility. Without doing so Brazil risks breaking social expectations of mutual and equitable gains, thus compromising the inspiration it has been bringing to SSA.

Concerning official SSDC, one of the main lessons drawn from MDS's and other Brazilian actors involved in SSA is that merely responding to high decision-making instances does not guarantee sustainable engagement. Implementing capacities need to be considered and built upon relying on strong intra-institutional and inter-institutional alignment. As development is a long-term and multi-faceted process, co-operation needs to be implemented in a co-ordinated and multi-annual basis. Risking suboptimal engagement due to discordances among Brazilian partners, and disengagement due to political and economic turns, is not desirable.

Besides still being a developing country, Brazil has also experienced low historical levels of internationalization, which hinder not only the existence of sufficient capacities to engage in SSDC, but also a non-conditioned incorporation of international experiences and policies in the domestic realm. Just like in any other country, policies for development need to be constantly innovating in face of renewed challenges, and international exchanges are crucial. Externalizing domestic disputes does not leave space neither for such innovation to take place nor for recognizing how complex development is and how crucial partnerships among state, society and markets are. Engagement in SSDC, as well as in international forums, will favour Brazilian institutions as long as they are aligned around how important their internationalization is to forward domestic development.

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Annex I: List of interviewees

- Aline Ribeiro Dantas de Teixeira Sousa, Head of International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Ivone Alves de Oliveira, technical advisor, International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Luis Gabriel Dupret Carvalhal, technical advisor, International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Carmem Priscila, Monitoring Co-ordinator of Food and Nutrition Security, SESAN/MDS
- Leonardo Prudente, International Co-operation focal point, SNAS/MDS
- Cristiane Godinho, Advisor and International Co-operation focal point, SAGI/MDS
- Fabio Veras, Co-ordinator of IPC-IG's Research Program on Cash Transfer.

Annex II: Sectorial allocation of Brazilian TCDC by region, 2005-August/2012, %

Sector/region	North, South and Central America and the Caribbean	Africa	Asia, Oceania, Europe and the Middle East
Agriculture	19	26	18
Health	20	22	5
Environment	13	5	5
Vocational training and education	11	14	29
Public administration	9	4	5
Energy	6	5	N/S
Social development	5	2	5
Industry	2	1	N/S
Public security	N/S	N/S	5
Labour	2	2	3
Urban development	N/S	3	N/S
Justice	N/S	N/S	11
Technical co- operation	N/S	N/S	8
Communications	N/S	2	3
Legislative	N/S	N/S	3
Civil defense	2	N/S	N/S
Planning	N/S	2	N/S
Transports	2	N/S	N/S
Sports	N/S	2	N/S
Culture	N/S	2	N/S
Livestock	N/S	1	N/S
Others	9	7	N/S

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

Annex III: The history of the Africa-Brazil programme in social development

May 2005: With DFID's support, MDS makes a study tour to South Africa, Nigeria and England to present the BPF in meetings organized by the African Union.

September 2005: Minister Patrus Ananias (MDS) and Mrs. Miranda Munro (director of DFID Brazil) meet to discuss the possibility of co-operation among MDS and DFID.

October 2005: DFID finances the participation of a representative of South Africa's government in the seminar '*Bolsa Família: Two Years of Successfully Fighting Hunger and Poverty in Brazil*', held in Brasilia; Publication of DFID's practice paper '*Social transfers and chronic poverty: emerging evidence and the challenge ahead*'.

January 2006: Representatives of Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia take part at a study tour in Brazil on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs. Ghana declares its interest in receiving technical co-operation from Brazil in social grants.

March 2006: With the support of DFID, two representatives of the MDS take part in the 'Workshop on Social Protection: a transformative agenda for the twenty-first century', held in Zambia. The meeting, which gathered representatives of 13 African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), of Brazil, of UN agencies, of development partners and of NGOs, results in the 'Livingstone Call for Action', through which member states of the African Union committed themselves to implement social protection initiatives, including cash transfers, in the following three years.

July 2006: Publication of DFID's White Paper, '*Eliminating world poverty: making governance work for the poor*'.

October 2006: Three representatives of the MDS take part in the 'Regional Workshop on Cash Transfers' in Johannesburg.

February 2007: MDS-DFID co-operation with African countries is officially agreed upon during the visit of DFID's Statistical Advisor, Saul Morris, to Brasilia. It is decided that its first initiative would be providing technical assistance to Ghana in the implementation of the LEAP, with the support of the IPC.

2-6 July 2007: Technicians from MDS's National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Single Registry for Social Programs (First mission).

13-24 August 2007: Technicians from MDS's Department on Evaluation and Information Management go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Monitoring and Evaluation (Second Mission).

16 August-3 September 2007: Technicians from MDS's National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Single Registry (Second Mission).

25 August-3 September 2007: Technicians from MDS's National Department on Social Assistance go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Child Labour (Second Mission).

2-17 September 2007: Technicians from MDS's National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Conditionalities Management and Single Registry (Third Mission).

March 2008: the LEAP starts in Ghana as a 5-year pilot experience in which the main components are conditional and unconditional cash transfers to orphans and vulnerable children, the elderly above 65 years old and the disabled. MDS and DFID agree to include four other African countries in the Africa-Brazil Program.

April 2008: experts from MDS take part in the Regional Meeting of Experts in Social Protection from the African Centre-South Region in Uganda, in preparation for the First African Union's Ministerial Meeting in Social Protection. The regional meetings were organized with the funding of DFID and the assistance of Help Age International.

June 2008: experts from MDS take part in the Regional Meeting of Experts in Social Protection from the African Western Region in Senegal.

August 2008: Delegations of Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Namibia and representatives of the African Development Bank, the New Economic Partnership for African Development and the

African Union take part at another study tour in Brasília. Brazil initiates bilateral dialogues to identify demands of each country.


October 2008: the Brazilian Minister of Social Development, Patrus Ananias, takes part at the Conference 'Towards a Sustainable Social Development Agenda for Africa', held in Namibia under the African Union.

August 2009: the seminar 'Social Protection in African Countries' opens another Study Tour in Brasília, gathering an audience of 220 people.

May 2011: The Kenyan government and representatives of the ABC, MDS and DFID sign a co-operation work plan to structure their partnership, set a schedule and agree responsibilities of each party. A delegation of 14 permanent secretaries and civil servants from five ministries visit Brazil to learn about Brazilian social protection policies and systems and assess how Brazil could support Kenya in designing and implementing an integrated social protection single registry.

Sources: Andrade (2008); Barros (2011); Souza (2007); World Bank (2010);
<http://ukinmontserrat.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=PressR&id=599900382>;
<http://www.ipc-undp.org/ipc/PageAfrica-Brazil2.do?id=25>

Annex IV: Progression of ABC budget execution per region, 2003-August 2012



Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

Annex V: MDS's social policies for development seminars in 2012

Date of the seminar	Representatives that took part on it
17-20 January	<p>South Africa, Egypt, India, Kenya, Palestine and Tunisia</p> <p>Also attended by representatives of the UNDP, the DFID, the Federal District's Department of Social Development and Cash Transfer (SEDEST) and IPC-IG</p>
27-29 March	<p>Cape Verde, El Salvador, Honduras, Uganda, and Venezuela</p> <p>Also attended by representatives of ABC, the Brazilian Ministry of Education, Social Security, Health and Defense, and SEDEST</p>
7-10 May	<p>Guinea Conakry, Indonesia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru</p> <p>Also attended by representatives of the WFP's Centre of Excellence Against Hunger</p>
27-30 August	<p>Belize, China, Ghana, Guiana, Haiti, Honduras, Nigeria and Suriname</p>
8-11 October	<p>Niger, Bangladesh, Congo, Haiti, South Africa and Italy</p>

Source: Based on MDS internal documentation.

