

The Dynamic Interplay between Followers and Leaders

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Dipòsit Legal:

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To my family and friends

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Abstract

This thesis includes three articles focusing on the dynamic interplay between leaders and followers. The first article revisits traditional areas of the leadership literature and builds on the emerging followership literature to reintroduce followers as part of the social context of leaders. In an attempt to build theoretical rationales for how followers influence leader behavior we draw on the social influence (e.g., Social Impact Theory, Latane, 1981) and the power literature to suggest individual (e.g., strength and immediacy of followers) and group-level (e.g., number of followers and unity of the group) characteristics that influence leader behaviors as a function of a leader's informational and effect dependence on followers. The second chapter employs a broader power perspective and examines how subordinates (or followers) can actually influence their outcomes, and conceptualize their feedback as an important trigger of powerholders' (or leaders') behavioral self-regulation. The third article reverses the lenses to examine the impact leaders have on followers. Specifically, it focuses on how two parameters of leader behaviors (the level of leader allocation behavior and leader's reaction to follower voice in response to that allocation) influence the emergence of shared follower fairness perceptions (also known as justice climate) over time.

Resumen

Esta tesis incluye tres artículos que se centran en la interacción dinámica entre líderes y seguidores. El primer artículo reconsidera las áreas tradicionales de la literatura de liderazgo y se basa en la literatura emergente de 'seguir al líder' para reintroducir seguidores como parte del contexto social de los líderes. En un intento de construir fundamentos teóricos de cómo los seguidores influyen el comportamiento del líder, nos utilizamos la influencia social (por ejemplo, la Teoría del Impacto Social, Latane , 1981) y la literatura de poder para sugerir las características en la

nivel individual (p. ej., la fuerza y la inmediatez de seguidores) y de grupo (p. ej., número de seguidores y unidad del grupo) que influyen los comportamientos del líder como una función de la dependencia informativa y de la dependencia del efecto del líder de sus seguidores. El segundo capítulo emplea una perspectiva más amplia de poder y examina cómo los subordinados (o seguidores) pueden realmente influir sus resultados, y conceptualizar sus comentarios como un desencadenante importante del comportamiento de auto-regulación de los poderosos (o de líderes). El tercer artículo invierte los lentes para examinar el impacto que los líderes tienen sobre los seguidores. En concreto, se centra en cómo los dos parámetros de comportamientos del líder (el nivel del comportamiento del líder en la asignación y la reacción del líder a la voz del seguidor en respuesta a esa asignación) influyen la emergencia de las percepciones de justicia compartidas por los seguidores (también conocida por la climática de justicia) con el tiempo.

Preface

Leaders are typically viewed as responsible for their organization's success or failure (Meindl, 1995). This perspective of leaders as drivers of organizational performance has resulted in a long tradition of leader-centric research that, in an effort to understand what makes for successful leaders, has emphasized leader traits, drives, behaviors (among others) as causes of organizational outcomes. As an unintended consequence, followers have been relegated to the role of passive recipients of leadership outcomes. The fact that the vast majority of leadership research over the past few decades has been focused on the effect of leader characteristics on individual- and group-level outcomes (or a downward effect) (e.g., Likert, 1961) is perhaps the inevitable result of this leader-centric orientation. However, this was not always the case.

Early in the literature, researchers understood that leaders are not isolated actors immune from contextual influences (e.g., Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) and incorporated followers into many of their theoretical models. For example, contingency theories of leadership emphasize that the success of a given leader behavior is contingent on follower traits, motivations, or abilities. Similarly, dyadic theory stresses the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. Theories like average leadership style or vertical dyadic linkage theory (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002) examine what affects the quality of leader-member relations. Leader-member exchange (LMX) theory (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975) took this a step further and modeled the effect of follower behaviors and attitudes on the quality of leader-member exchange. Nevertheless, despite this early interest in followers, the literature continued to neglect the potential effect of follower characteristics on leadership outcomes (other than the quality of the relationship). A truly

follower-centric approach did not re-emerge until Meindl's (1995) seminal work on followership, in which he argued that leaders are not lone actors affecting the fate of organizations, but that contextual factors such as followers play a crucial role as well.

Following Meindl's work (1995), a strong effect for followers on leader behaviors (e.g., Atwater, Roush, & Fischtal, 1995), perception of leadership styles (e.g., Grant, Gino & Hofmann, 2011), and on the quality of leader-member exchange (e.g., Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999) has been empirically demonstrated, but a significant amount of theoretical development remains to be done (and empirically tested) especially on the role of followers in creating conditions for leadership outcomes and shaping the process of leadership (i.e., leader decisions, behaviors, attitudes).

The first article (which is joint with Michael R. Bashshur) attempts to address some of the main theoretical issues in traditional leadership research and highlight how followers can influence leadership processes as a function of the leader's dependence on his/her followers. To help build new theory in this area, as well as to contextualize followership within earlier, seminal leadership theories the first article begins with an overview of the early work on followership and its place in traditional leadership research. Next it charts followers' slow emergence (and re-emergence) in the literature. Finally, it proposes a theoretical framework based on social influence (Social Impact Theory or "SIT": Latane, 1996) that reframes followers as a powerful source of motivation for leader behaviors and discusses how this perspective opens up new and fruitful approaches to studying followership and its role in leadership.

The second article (which is joint work with Michael R. Bashshur and Celia Moore), builds on the first article to determine whether subordinates (or followers), through the use of upward feedback, can influence powerholders (or leaders) to make them objectively more fair (or less selfish) over time. Drawing on the power and upward feedback literatures as well as moral self-regulation theories, this article demonstrates that subordinates who challenge unfair powerholders' behavior (i.e., squeaky wheels) make them become fairer over time compared with subordinates who constantly acquiesce to powerholders' decisions (i.e., stooges). This article further shows that powerholders in groups with at least one squeaky wheel become more fair than powerholders with all stooges. However, the results show that powerholders, despite becoming more fair towards their subordinates on average, favor stooges over squeaky wheels and reward them more when given the chance.

The third article (which is joint work with Michael R. Bashshur and E. Layne Paddock) employs a leader-centric approach to examine how different leader behavior patterns influence the emergence and strength of justice climate over time. Building from moral self-regulation theories, two independent variables were manipulated (1. How much a leader took from a common resource "Equals" vs. "Greedy" and 2. Sensitivity to follower fairness perceptions "Flat" vs. "Reactive") resulting in four possible leadership behavior patterns. These patterns were computationally modeled and the reactions of real followers were observed to explore the effect of leader behavior on justice climate emergence. Results suggest that both the level and reactivity (i.e., responsiveness) of leader behavior influence justice climate level as well as strength.

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1. FOLLOWERSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

1.1. Introduction

Leaders are traditionally treated as heroes or villains depending on how well their organization performs. They get credit for its successes and blamed for its failures (Kelley, 1988; Meindl, 1995). This focus on leaders as drivers of organizational performance has resulted in a long tradition of leader-centered leadership research that emphasizes leader traits (e.g., Fairhurst, 2007) and behaviors (e.g., Likert, 1961; Stogdill & Coons, 1957) as antecedents to leadership processes and outcomes (Meindl, 1995). As an unintended consequence of this emphasis, the impact of followers on leaders (also called a followership perspective, Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Shamir, 2007) has been largely ignored. Followers have instead been relegated to the role of passive recipients or, at best, moderators of leader influence and behaviors (Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999; Shamir, 2007). However, this was not always the case. Early in the leadership literature, researchers understood that leaders are not isolated actors immune from the influence of their followers (e.g., Fiedler, 1967; House, 1971; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). As such, this paper will revisit traditional areas of the leadership literature and build on the emerging followership literature to reintroduce followers as an integral part of leadership. To help develop new theory in this area, as well as to contextualize followership within earlier, seminal leadership theories this paper will begin with a brief overview of the early leader-centered focus of leadership and its treatment of followers and then “reverse the lenses” (Shamir 2007) to examine how followership research assigns followers to a more active role. Next, we will integrate a major theory of social influence (i.e., Social Impact Theory or “SIT”: Latane,

1981) to suggest a new perspective on power, influence and dependence in leadership by framing followers as important sources of social influence on leaders.

1.2. Followers in Leadership Research

Historically, leadership research has concentrated on leader personality, behaviors, attitudes and perceptions when studying the emergence of leadership and leadership outcomes (Collinson, 2005; Lord & Brown, 2004; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). From this leader-centered perspective, followers are treated as the passive recipients of leader influence and leadership outcomes (e.g., trait and behavioral paradigms of leadership), moderators of leader influence (e.g., contingency theories of leadership) (Shamir, 2007). In response to this leader driven perspective a more follower-centered view emerged (e.g., Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Meindl, 1995). These views argue that because leaders exist in the same social context as their followers, leadership and its outcomes are jointly constructed (Meindl, 1990, 1995). From this perspective, follower beliefs, traits and perceptions drive how followers construe leadership and are viewed as important to the leadership process as leader traits and behaviors (Shamir, 2007). Followership (Carsten et al., 2010; Collinson, 2006; Kelley, 1988), a new stream of leadership research, employs a similar follower-centered perspective, but broadens the focus to include follower decisions, behaviors and attitudes. In short, followership positions followers as actively and explicitly influencing leader perceptions, attitudes, behaviors or decisions. As will become clear in the following sections, this shift in perspective helps us build on traditional leadership theories to offer a theoretical framework for the impact of followers on leaders.

1.2.A. The role of followers in traditional leadership research

The traditional view of leadership framed followers as the passive recipients of leader characteristics (e.g., traits and skills) and behaviors and restricted itself to examining the flow of influence from leaders to followers (Graen & Uhl-bien, 1995; Hollander, 1980, 1992). This limited perspective began to change with situational theories of leader effectiveness (i.e., contingency models) that recognized the potential effects of followers on leader behaviors and identified when and for whom certain leader behaviors were optimal. In many of these theories, follower effects are either explicitly modeled (e.g., Fiedler, 1967) or implicitly hinted at (e.g., Evans, 1970). For example, Fiedler's Contingency Theory theorized that the relationship between leadership style and leader effectiveness was based on whether or not the leader's style matched the context, in particular the quality of the leader-member relations (the extent to which followers trust, respect, and have confidence in their leaders, Fiedler, 1967). Other contingency theories followed suit. Hersey and Blanchard's (1969) Situational Leadership Theory suggested that leaders should strike a balance between their task- and people-oriented behaviors depending on the confidence and skill set of their followers while Path-Goal Theory (Evans, 1970; House, 1971; House & Mitchell, 1974) argued that follower characteristics were key factors to shaping leader effectiveness.

In each of these approaches the role of followers is made clear. Their capabilities, traits or preferences are said to determine what type of leader is most effective (Achua & Lussier, 2007; Yukl, 2013). However, in each of these theories followers are still non-actors. They are not behaving or explicitly reacting to leader behaviors. At best they are simply features

(albeit important ones) of the leader's context. A truly explicit follower-centered approach did not appear until the emergence of implicit leadership theories (e.g., Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord et al., 1984; Offerman, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994) and Meindl's (1995) social constructionist approach to leadership (Shamir, Pillai, Bligh, & Uhl-bien, 2006).

1.2.B. Follower-centered approaches to leadership

Implicit leadership theories (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord et al., 1984; Offerman et al., 1994) argue that leadership actually exists in the minds of followers. These approaches represent the first shift from a leader-centered to a follower-centered perspective of leadership. They focus on how followers' implicit beliefs and assumptions regarding the characteristics of leader effectiveness (e.g., Lord et al., 1984) translate into prototypes for an ideal leader in a given situation or context. Leaders who match the prototype are expected to be assessed more favorably by their followers.

Meindl (1995) built on this approach to argue that leadership can be effective only when followers view it as such and highlighted two important issues regarding the extant leadership research. First, there is a reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers. Second, because leadership focuses on "the linkage between leaders and followers as constructed in the minds of followers" (p. 220), leadership outcomes should not be operationalized as the self-perceptions or self-reports of leaders, but as the perceptions of followers (Bligh & Schyns, 2007).

This follower-centered approach to leadership research did not assign an active role to followers, however it did argue that follower perceptions, preferences or attitudes (as influenced by their traits and emotional

arousal) can (passively) shape or even restrain leadership processes (e.g., Ehrhart & Klein, 2001; Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011; Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 2003). A good example of this is the recent work of Grant and his colleagues (2011) in which they demonstrated that employee proactivity and employee perceptions of receptivity moderate the relationship between leader extraversion and group performance such that when followers are more proactive leader extraversion is negatively rather than positively, related to group performance.

This new follower-centered approach triggered a series of theoretical extensions and empirical tests of the potential of followers to shape the leadership process. One of these lines of research argued that leadership is a social process or system and that leaders, as part of this social system, are subject to its influences (e.g., followers) (e.g., DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Lord et al., 1999; Lord, Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001). As we will discuss shortly, it is this emphasis on the social nature of leadership that makes social influence a logical framework for theorizing about the effects of followers on leaders. First, however, it is necessary to review the next step in the evolution of the literature on follower effects, followership.

1.3. Followership and Leadership

It seems obvious (in hindsight) that followers should be more than sum of their individual differences and attitudes. Followers behave, and their behaviors can have an effect on their leaders. In line with Shamir's (2007) perspective to followership and the definition of Carsten et al. (2010), "followership adopts the follower as the primary focus and explores how followership behaviors are related to organizational outcomes of interest (e.g., leadership, performance)" (p. 543). By expanding our examination of followers to include how their behaviors shape (and are shaped by)

leaders it becomes clear that the role of followers has been underestimated to date.

The emerging followership literature positions follower behaviors and reactions as a driver (as well as result of) of leader behaviors (e.g., Carsten, et al., 2010; Collinson, 2006). Followership also differentiates among types of followers to argue that some followers may be more beneficial, constructive, and influential in the leadership process and as a result should differentially impact their leaders. The followership literature, however, is still in its early stages and empirical studies are few and far between. As such, in this section we will discuss the ongoing theoretical work on follower taxonomies, but will switch to the power, influence and upward feedback literatures to develop specific propositions of how and why followers can influence a leader's perceptions, attitudes and behaviors.

1.3.A. Followership research

Unsurprisingly there is a growing body of theoretical work that develops follower typologies (e.g., Carsten et al., 2010; Kelley, 1988) and (crucially for our purposes) makes clear that some followers can be more influential than others.

For instance, Carsten et al. (2010) developed a typology of followers arguing that while some followers may proactively challenge a leader's assumptions and provide information and feedback without being asked to do so; others may voice their opinions to their leaders without challenging them, and still others may follow their leaders and execute their orders without question. This continuum from passive to proactive followership suggests that proactive followers, who voluntarily become a part of decision making and challenge leader decisions or behaviors, should have

more influence on leaders than passive or simply active followers. Although this and other typologies of followers (e.g., Carsten et al., 2010; Collinson, 2006; Kelley, 1988) highlight critical follower characteristics that distinguish among types of followers, the theoretical rationales for how these different types of followers influence their leader and the leadership process remain unaddressed. This may be one reason why empirical tests of these effects of these typologies remain scant. As such, to build theoretical rationales for the effect of followers on leaders we now turn to the literature on influence and power.

1.4. Followers and Social Influence

1.4.A. Power and influence in leadership

Work on leader power and influence is largely inspired by the influential work of French and Raven (1959). Similar to the aforementioned implicit leadership theories (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord et al., 1984; Offerman et al., 1994) and social constructionist view of leadership (Meindl, 1995), French and Raven (1959) focused on the linkage between the source of power and the target of influence to claim that one's potential influence is partly a function of the dependence of the target on the source of power (French & Raven, 1959). The authors identified seven different types of power and clustered them into two categories, personal (e.g., referent, expert, connection) and position power (e.g., legitimate, reward, coercive, information).

Although the broader power and influence literature does not focus on leaders, leadership research has drawn heavily from it to examine sources of leader power (e.g., Dosier, Case, & Keys, 1988; Yukl & Falbe, 1991) and the determinants (e.g., Barbuto Jr., Fritz, & Marx, 2002; Yukl & Falbe, 1990) or consequences (e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Fu & Yukl,

2000; Furst & Cable, 2008; Sparrowe, Soetjpto, & Kraimer, 2006; Yukl & Chavez, 2002) of the influence tactics a leader uses.

Leaders, by virtue of their hierarchical position have stronger position power than followers in organizations (Yukl & Fable, 1991). This position power gives leaders access to tangible (e.g., rewards) and intangible (e.g., information) resources. Although leaders may not possess greater personal power than followers (Yukl & Fable, 1991), as sources of resources and rewards they become interpersonally attractive to followers (Popper, 2011). This allows them to exercise significant influence over their followers (e.g., Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989; Yukl & Falbe, 1990, 1991). However, followers, despite their comparatively weaker bases of power (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Tjosvold, 1986), are not without their own influence.

1.4.B. Follower feedback and influence

Upward feedback. Independent of the followership literature, research on upward feedback (i.e. feedback from individuals lower in the organizational hierarchy upwards to those higher up in the organization), has proposed that followers, if heard by the leader, act as a source of social information for managers or leaders. For instance, upward feedback, regardless of the level of positivity or negativity, makes the discrepancy between an individual's self-perception and the perceptions of others salient (Ashford, 1989) and raises a person's self-awareness of what he/she does well or badly (Ashford & Cummings, 1983; Wicklund, 1975). A number of studies have shown that can lead to leaders adjusting their behavior in the direction of their followers' feedback. (e.g., Atwater, Rousch, & Fischtal, 1995; Hegarty, 1974).

Influence tactics. There is evidence for the power of followers in the influence tactics literature as well. A number of studies have examined what influence tactics are used most often by followers as well as the antecedents and outcomes of those tactics (e.g., Dulebohn, Shore, Kunze, & Dookeran; 2005; Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Wayne & Liden, 1995; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). For instance, Yukl and Tracey (1992) showed that rational persuasion is one of the more commonly used influence tactics by subordinates when interacting with supervisors. This approach is deemed effective because subordinates may have more relevant on-the-ground information than do their supervisors and become most persuasive when they use logical arguments and facts. Other common sources of follower influence run through a more interpersonal link. Research has demonstrated that self-focused (e.g., creating a positive self-image such as being nice and polite) or supervisor-focused impression management (e.g., doing personal favors for the supervisor) on the part of a subordinate can influence a leader's ratings of leader-member exchange (Wayne & Ferris, 1990) or subordinate performance (Wayne & Liden, 1995). Similarly, follower ingratiation tactics (e.g., flattery, favor doing) influence leader reward allocation as a function of increased relationship quality perceptions between leaders and their ingratiating followers (Dulebohn et al., 2005). As the social psychology literature tells us, people like to be liked (Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). By managing impressions or being ingratiating followers may be helping to fulfill their leader's affiliation needs (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).

Together the research on upward feedback and upward influence tactics empirically demonstrates the impact of followers on their leaders and suggests that tests of some of the ideas being generated in the followership literature should bear fruit. As such, over the next sections we will use the framework of a prominent social influence theory, Social Impact Theory –

SIT (Latane 1981), to argue how followers can influence their leaders. We will combine the work on power and social influence to base our arguments for the impact of followers on the specific determinants (e.g., strength, immediacy and number of the source of influences) and basic findings of SIT in an effort to clearly formulate how and when this effect plays out.

1.4.C. Social influence and social impact theory

Early studies of social influence (e.g., Asch, 1951, 1956) demonstrated how a target's judgments or opinions were influenced by the judgments and opinions of others in the same group. Social influence is typically defined as the amount of social pressure felt by a target, what French & Raven (1959) called "resultant force" and Latane (1981) more poetically called the "force field". When presented with this force field the target of influence has two alternatives (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), to confirm or go along with others or to resist and make no changes (French & Raven, 1959; Latane, 1981).

Social Impact Theory (SIT) (Latane, 1981, 1996) is among the most frequently cited theories in social psychology (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990). Like other social influence theories (e.g., Social Influence Model: Tanford & Penrod, 1984 and Self-Attention Perspective: Mullen, 1983), SIT incorporates the number of individuals as a critical factor in determining the amount of social influence exerted in a given social setting. However, SIT includes two other determinants of influence (e.g., strength and immediacy) that distinguish it from other theoretical frameworks (Mullen, 1985). In its initial, most basic formulation SIT argues that the power of a social setting to shape an individual is a function of the strength (i.e., status, age, prior relationship with, or future power over the target), immediacy (i.e. closeness in space or time and

absence of intervening barriers or filters) and number of the sources of impact (i.e., the number of people) (Latane, 1981). As such, the stronger (Hass, 1981; Jackson & Latane, 1981), the more immediate (Basset & Latane, 1976; Knowles, 1980) and the larger the number (Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969) of sources in a social setting the more influence or impact (the greater the force field) the target will experience.

This initial formulation of SIT (Latane, 1981) attracted significant research attention and helped researchers to better grasp how a person's social environment acts as a source of influence (Nowak et al., 1990). However SIT at this early stage of its development failed to take into account two important possibilities, 1) that there are reciprocal influences such that individuals shape and are shaped by their social context in an ongoing, dynamic relationship and 2) that a social context (in this case groups of individuals) is not necessarily uniform in the direction of influence it exerts. Subsequent iterations of the theory addressed these issues by introducing minority versus majority perspectives in SIT (e.g., Latane & Wolf, 1981) and investigating the nature of the interactions between minorities and majorities in groups (e.g., Latane, 1996; Latane & L'Herrou, 1996). This later permutation of SIT was referred to as, "the dynamic formulation of SIT" (e.g., Latane, 1996; Latane & L' Herrou, 1996; Nowak et al., 1990).

Given earlier work around the social nature of leadership (e.g., Lord et al., 1999, 2001; DeRue & Ashford, 2010) and the arguments that leadership is a social process or system in which leaders interact with others and become exposed to social influence (Graen & Uhl-bien, 1995; Hollander, 1980, 1992), it seems clear that SIT should have powerful explanatory potential for how followers may shape the leadership processes. First, the

central tenant of SIT, “influence” is at the heart of most definitions of effective leadership (Achua & Lussier, 2007; Yukl, 1989). However, SIT allows us to broaden this scope beyond just leader influence to also look at the influence of followers on leaders. Second, predictors of social influence as proposed by SIT such as strength and immediacy offer theoretical connections to other relevant topics such as the position and personal power of followers (e.g., Yukl & Tracey, 1992) as well as leader distance (e.g., Antonakis & Atwater, 2002) and may provide insight into the relative social influence of a given follower. Third, SIT also helps us to theorize how followers, not only as individuals, but also as groups can socially influence their leaders. Fourth, the dynamic formulation of SIT highlights the fact individuals in a group may differ in their reactions to the target of the influence. This links neatly to the work in the followership literature which argues that there are different types of followership styles and that not every follower reacts to the leader in the same way. In short, an SIT framework allows us to speculate about the effects of individual followers and groups of followers on leaders, the importance of groups and norms in influencing leaders as well as the potential differential effects of followers. For these reasons we argue that SIT will help generate unique and useful propositions around why followership can and should have an effect on leaders.

1.5. Power, Follower influence and Leader Dependence on Followers

In our theoretical model, we will discuss the determinants of social influence in terms of follower characteristics and behaviors at both the individual and group level. We will also describe the potential moderating effect of group characteristics and behaviors on the relationship between the social influence of individual followers and leaders. Drawing on the

power and influence literature, we will further propose that the extent to which a leader depends on followers for information (“information dependence”; Jones & Gerrard, 1967), affiliation or positive self-regard (“effect dependence”, Jones & Gerrard, 1967) will act as an important boundary condition for these relationships (Please see Figure A.1).

[Insert Figure A.1 about here]

We will emulate the evolution of SIT from an individually focused theory (Latane, 1981) to one that included groups and minorities or majorities (Latane, 1996; Nowak et al., 1990) in this section and begin with an examination of SIT and individual follower social influence before moving on to examining the role of SIT in groups of followers. Drawing on the later, dynamic formulation of the theory, we will then focus on how group-level characteristics such as the number of followers and the unity among followers in a group moderate the impact of a particular follower’s influence over the leader.

After discussing the direct effect of followers on leaders, we will draw on research and theory in the broader social influence and power literature (e.g., French & Raven, 1959) to argue that the relationship between the determinants of social influence and leadership reactions is also moderated by the leader’s dependence on followers for information and affiliation. (Please see Table A.1, for a full list of propositions). Finally, in an effort to further bolster the relevance of SIT for followership we will attempt to expand the boundaries of the theory by 1) exploring the relationships among the three main determinants of social influence (as specified by SIT, strength, immediacy and number), 2) considering other potential moderators not covered by traditional SIT or other prominent social influence theories and 3) discussing other important outcomes

variables such as leader attitudes and self-image that, while not part of the traditional SIT domain, can be reasonably expected to be impacted by followers' social influence.

[Insert Table A.1 about here]

1.5.A. Individual level determinants of social influence

The followership literature makes clear that the image of followers as passive recipients of the leadership process is misconceived (Hollander & Offerman, 1990). Given that past experimental research has established that the decisions, behaviors, reactions or expectations of others influence individuals (Latane, 1981) this seems like an obvious point. However, it is one that is to date largely ignored. To address this issue we will begin by highlighting two individual level determinants in SIT theory (Latane, 1981), strength and immediacy that shed light on how an individual follower may exercise influence over a leader.

Strength. Researchers have operationalized the strength dimension of SIT in a number of ways including, “age, status, similarity to respondent, self-confidence, competence, credibility, bearing and demeanor” (Jackson & Latane, 1981, p. 417). Clearly, follower strength can come from a variety of sources. For instance, individuals who have more prestigious occupations are also perceived to have a higher status in their group (e.g. doctors versus nurses) (Bassett & Latane, 1976) and to have a stronger influence on the decisions of others (e.g., Bassett & Latane, 1976; Jackson & Latane, 1981; Sedikides & Jackson, 1990).

Within the working group, status-based differences in follower strength result in power differences (e.g. a more experienced business analyst in an IT-group compared with a recently hired IT technician) such that followers with greater position or personal power are assumed to be able to exert greater influence over others (Eagly, 1983; Yukl & Falbe, 1990, 1991). For instance, a higher status employee may have access to more valuable information (i.e., information power) and because of their expertise may be able to provide better rational and factual arguments (i.e., expert power) for important decisions to be made by leaders (French & Raven, 1959; Yukl & Falbe, 1990, 1991). As such, his or her suggestions and ideas would be more likely to be listened to by the leader and more likely to influence leader behaviors.

Followers can also acquire strength and exercise influence over leaders in an interpersonal manner. The so-called referent power (a type of personal power) of a follower is the extent to which leader is attracted to and identifies with the follower (French & Raven, 1959; Yukl & Falbe, 1990, 1991). Ferris and his colleagues (1991) stated that, “if demographic similarity leads to mutual attraction, then leaders who differ in age (or any other demographic characteristic) from their subordinates will be less liked; less respected, and therefore have lower power and influence.” (p. 9). The same may be true for followers. The higher the identification or similarity with the leader, the higher would be the referent power for a follower in contrast to other followers (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985). As such, we propose the following:

Proposition 1a: Followers with higher position or personal power exert greater social influence on leaders.

The possibility that group members may differ in their level of or even type of agreement with the leader constitutes another operationalization of the strength dimension of the SIT. Nowak et al. (1990) argued that individual followers, beyond a set of characteristics (age, gender, status, etc.) may have different amounts of strength by virtue of being either supportive (when agreeing with the target person) or persuasive (when disagreeing with the target person) in their arguments. This added feature of the theory entails a behavioral output on the part of the follower (e.g., Lee & Ofshe, 1981). Supportiveness implies the extent to which one supports an idea, decision, or behavior. In contrast, persuasiveness implies the tendency to challenge and change someone's idea, decision, or behavior (Nowak et al., 1990). Given that social influence is largely interested in how sources of influence can induce pressure to alter opinions or behaviors of the target; this has clear implications for work on followership. Although this may sound tautological ("persuasive" followership should be more persuasive and hence influential), it can be informative when one considers the different mechanisms by which persuasive and supportive follower behavior might influence leaders. As discussed, the followership literature specifically categorizes these two patterns of behavior as different types of followers. For instance, resistant (Collinson, 2006) or effective followers (Kelley, 1988) are assumed to stand against leader actions they disagree with, but stand by leader actions when they agree. In contrast, conformist (Collinson, 2006) or ineffective followers (Kelley, 1988) provide unconditional and constant support to leader actions regardless the content of the behavior. These types of followership suggest very different effects on leaders. For instance, similar to the aforementioned findings in the upward feedback literature (e.g., Ashford, 1989; Atwater et al., 1995) (negative feedback changes leader behavior while positive feedback does not) persuasive follower behavior would be expected to be a strong immediate source of influence

on the leader's behavior because they tend to engage in persuasively challenging the leader (instead of simply agreeing and providing positive feedback to the leader). In the face of persuasive follower behavior (especially one of higher status) leaders would be more likely to adapt or change their behaviors to close the gap between their self-perception and the perceptions of the follower. In contrast, supportive follower behavior may not challenge the leader as such, but could earn the follower credits for being loyal. This could result in increased referent power over time for that follower. Thus, supportive followership may not be particularly influential at that given moment, but being supportive may help a particular follower build his/her potential to influence the leader at a later date. As such, we propose the following:

Proposition 1b: Persuasive follower behavior as opposed to supportive follower behavior exerts greater social influence over leaders at a given point in time. However, supportive follower behavior can increase a given follower's personal power over time.

Immediacy. In the earliest formulation of SIT, Latane (1981) defined immediacy as "closeness in space or time and absence of intervening barriers or filters" (p. 344). Empirical tests of SIT treat this definition as physical/psychological distance (Sedikides & Jackson, 1990). A similar definition emerged in the leadership literature. In their extensive review of leader follower distance, Antonakis and Atwater (2002) categorized the amount of distance between leaders and followers as one of three types: 1) perceived psychological (or social) distance, 2) physical distance and 3) perceived frequency of leader-follower interaction. Given that SIT assumes immediacy to be positively related to the amount of social influence one can exert, more immediate followers should exert more social influence over their leader. However, the different types of distance

may influence leaders via different mechanisms. Next we will follow Antonakis & Atwater's (2002) categorization to talk about each type of distance in turn.

Perceived psychological (social) distance refers to "perceived differences in status, rank, authority, social standing and power" (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002, p. 682). Emerging theoretical work (e.g., Bass, 1990) and empirical evidence (Michaelis, Stegmaier, & Sonntag, 2009; Shamir, 1995) on close (or socialized) charismatic leaders suggests that they are psychologically (or socially) more immediate because they appear to be more human or similar to their followers. They do not mask their weaknesses as do psychologically distant leaders (e.g., distant charismatic leaders, Shamir, 1995). Hence, socially close leaders can build more rapport, a strong sense of trust and higher identification with followers which eventually leads to greater leader influence over followers (Michaelis et al., 2009; Shamir, 1995).

The extent to which a follower's psychological or social distance translates into influence over the leader should follow a similar pattern. Followers at lower social distance from their leader should also be able to build on this to establish better trust and rapport and as a result exert more influence over that leader. As such, we propose the following:

Proposition 2a: Followers who are psychologically (or socially) more immediate to their leaders exert greater social influence over them.

Physical distance is defined in both SIT (Latane, 1981) and the leadership literature (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002) as the spatial proximity between the source of influence and the target of influence. Physical distance has been shown to weaken the influence of leaders on their followers' unit-

level performance (Howell, Neufeld, & Avolio, 2005), decrease the ability of leaders to monitor follower behavior (Yagil, 1998) and assess follower performance (Judge & Ferris, 1993) and negatively affect the quality of the exchange relationship (Bass, 1990).

This is relevant for follower influence because at larger distances it also becomes difficult for a leader to observe or even hear follower reactions. Based on the work of Daft & Lengel (1984) and the effect of distance on communication in leadership (Yagil, 1998), this would suggest that a follower's opportunities for upward influence (upward feedback, impression management, or ingratiation) would be somewhat more limited as physical distance increases.

Physical distance may not only limit the information flow and possibilities of communication between followers and their leaders (Daft & Lengel, 1984) but it also reduces the amount of cues available regarding interpersonal relationships (e.g., how similar we are to each other, Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002). In fact, individuals have even been shown to use distance as a cue for comparison with others, tending to perceive proximate others as more similar than distant others (Mussweiler, 2003). Thus, leaders should be less likely to hear followers, see similarities, or identify with those followers who are more physically distant. As such we propose:

Proposition 2b: Followers who are physically distant to their leaders exert less social influence over them.

Leader distance is also measured as the frequency of interaction between a leader and followers (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002; Napier & Ferris, 1993). Frequency of interaction is associated with leader visibility (Napier &

Ferris, 1993). The more visible the leader the more followers believe they are interacting with that leader (Sundstrom, Burt, & Kamp, 1980). From a followership perspective, higher frequencies of interaction and visibility translate to more opportunities for a follower to exert social influence on the leaders (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Given that high quality relationships between leaders and followers are “characterized by exchange of information, resources, effort, and emotional support” (Davis & Gardner, 2004, p. 447), more frequent interactions will not only lessen the leader-follower distance for followers but also give followers the chance to develop higher quality leader-member relations (Bass, 1990). Therefore, we propose the following:

Proposition 2c: Followers who have more frequent interactions with leaders exert greater social influence over them.

1.5.B. Group level determinants of social influence

As pointed out earlier, most leadership theories treat followers as uniform, without distinguishing amongst them. In this section, we discuss the element of SIT relevant to the characteristics and behaviors of groups such as the number of followers in a group and the unity of the group (i.e., the amount of within-group agreement among followers). Later we will turn to the more dynamic version of SIT to discuss differences within groups and how that shapes the social influence of followers.

Group size (number of followers) and group unity. SIT treats the number of people in a group (e.g., group size) as another determinant of social influence and assumes that group size is positively related to the amount of social influence a group exerts (Latane, 1981). Presumably as the number of people in a group increases the social reality (a shared belief

that emerges through social interactions) is more accurately captured (Festinger, 1954). Once the majority of people in a group advocate for a given social reality, conformity generates great rewards and deviation great punishments (Asch, 1951). As the Asch studies (1951, 1956) and a slew of subsequent studies (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1968; Freeman, 1974; Milgram et al., 1969) show, the number of people in a group affects individual perceptions or decisions.

However, the simple number of followers in a group (group size) is not the whole story. Dynamic SIT (e.g., Latane, 1996; Latane & L' Herrou, 1996; Nowak et al., 1990) recognizes that groups are complex and consist of multiple individuals that may or may not agree with one another at any one point in time. Historically, leadership research has ignored this possibility of agreement or disagreements within a given group. However, as evidenced by the upward feedback literature, individuals in a group can disagree even when they rate the same person (e.g., Cardy & Dobbins, 1994; Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). The level of disagreement among group members has implications for the unity of the group and thus the potential influence of the group (and individual followers) on the leader. For instance, when there is disagreement in the group, leaders may attribute the feedback or influence attempts of a given follower (or subset of followers) to something specific to that follower and ignore the message (London & Smither, 1995). In contrast, unity in groups can magnify confidence and commitment to courses of action among followers (Julian, Regula, & Hollander, 1968; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000) and represents a “strong” source of social influence (Latané, 1981). As such, we propose the following:

Proposition 3: Larger groups will have more influence over their leaders as a function of their within group agreement. Specifically, unity among

followers moderates the relationship between group size (e.g., the number of followers in a group) and the magnitude of social influence such that the group size will be more positively related to social influence when group unity is high.

1.5.C. SIT-based Moderators of Social Influence

Dynamic SIT (e.g., Latane, 1996; Latane & L' Herrou, 1996; Nowak et al., 1990) also recognizes that influence is a dynamic and evolving construct. One consequence of this new approach to SIT was that some of the group level drivers of social influence were re-conceptualized as moderators of the effects of individual level antecedents (while retaining their status as group level antecedents). As such, SIT argues that the marginal impact of one individual in the group decreases as the number of people in the group increases. Yet, when adapting this general proposition to followership, two distinct (but related) propositions emerge.

Early work on average leadership style (ALS) (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002) assumes that leaders treat every member of the group more or less the same way. As such, as the number of followers in a group increases the leader will be less able to devote as much of their personal resources (time, attention, communication) to each individual follower. This fits with the marginal impact argument of SIT as specified above. As groups get larger each follower gets less time or communication with the leader and as such has less ability to influence their leader. As such, if ALS were to be supported one possible effect of group size on individual follower influence is the following:

Proposition 4a: The number of followers in a group will moderate the influence of any one follower such that the more people there are in a group the lower is the social influence of a given follower over the leader.

However, both Vertical dyadic linkage (VDL) (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002) and leader-member exchange (LMX) theory (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975) suggest a more subtle proposition. Both claim that leaders create in- and out-groups among their followers, depending on their relationship with them. Leaders, given their limited resources, will choose to reward, pay attention, offer support and consideration to in-group followers over out-group followers. In essence, leaders distribute personal or organizational resources strategically. Therefore, as group size increases and leader resources become more limited, these theories would predict that leaders will preferentially allocate time and resources to in-group followers. As a result in-group followers should have relatively more influence (compared to out-group followers) on their leader as group size increases. Note that this prediction is about the relative levels of influence not the absolute level of influence. It is difficult to imagine a situation where a particular member's absolute level of influence grows as the group size increases. Instead we argue that an in-group follower's level of influence decreases less relative to other followers. As such, we propose the following more subtle proposition derived from VDL and LMX theory that also incorporates SIT's argument of marginal influence as an alternative to Proposition 4:

Proposition 4a (alternative): The number of followers in a group will moderate the influence of any one follower such that the larger the group the higher (lower) is the marginal social influence of a given in-group (out-group) follower over the leader.

As discussed, individuals in groups do not necessarily agree with each other in their perceptions or decisions. This can lead to the emergence of subgroups within groups and eventually majorities and minorities (e.g., Latané & Wolf, 1981; Moscovici & Lage, 1976). Although minority

influence is frequently underestimated when compared with majority influence, research on minorities has shown that individuals or groups of individuals in the minority may have unique influence over others (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Nemeth, 1986). The arguments or views of minorities, as long as those minorities are consistent in their defense of views, should come to be seen as more clear and unambiguous (Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). In terms of implications for SIT, consistent minority members thus become more visible, attract more attention and become more influential in the group (Latane & Wolf, 1981; Moscovici & Lage, 1976). Indeed, Moscovici and Lage (1976) in their experimental study showed that consistent minority members were not only influential, but that they were more influential than was a given majority member. A more recent study showed a similar effect in a social dilemma context. Weber and Murnighan (2008) demonstrated that a lone group member who consistently contributed to the common good of the group in a series of social dilemma games (at a cost to themselves) caused other group members over subsequent rounds to also begin contributing to the common good of the group. Based on these findings, we propose the following:

Proposition 4b: A consistent minority members will have greater social influence on leaders than will a majority member.

1.5.D. Leader Dependence on Followers

To this point we have emphasized the social influence of followers on their leaders. However, as we have been arguing, the influence processes in leadership is not one sided. Leaders, like followers, are not passive recipients of follower influence. They have their own individual differences, preferences and perceptions that may amplify or attenuate the

influence of followers. Clearly, there are an array of leader characteristics that may act to moderate this process of social influence on leaders (and we will address some of these in a later section), but in an effort to hew closely to the SIT framework and the literature on social influence and power, here we choose to highlight one key leader characteristic that is central to the power literature; dependence (French & Raven, 1959; Lee & Tiedens, 2001).

Power is commonly defined as control over important outcomes or resources (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Individuals become more powerful or influential and “get others to do things they would not otherwise do” (Lee & Tiedens, 2001) because they have resources others need or depend on (French & Raven, 1959).

When a person is more dependent on the other for valued resources than the person he or she becomes less powerful or influential over the other (Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959). Although this view clearly underlines why leaders are and should be viewed as powerful and influential over followers, it also hints that followers may possess a certain amount of power over the leader as well.

Although formulations of SIT do not explicitly model dependence as a moderator of social influence, the social influence literature and work on majority influence describes two types of dependence when explaining when an individual will be more susceptible to the influence of others (Jones & Gerrard, 1967; Latane & Wolf, 1981), “information” and “effect” dependence that are relevant for followership. Information dependence occurs when someone depends on others for important information about the environment while effect dependence occurs when

someone depends on others for fulfillment of their personal needs (e.g., being part of a group, affiliation; Jones & Gerrard, 1967). Below we explore leaders' information and effect dependence as a moderator of both individual- and group level determinants of followers' social influence.

Leader dependence and individual level determinants of social influence.

As most definitions of effective leadership dictate, leaders are expected to lead their followers to a common or shared objective or goal (Achua & Lussier, 2009) which requires a certain amount of cooperation and interdependence between leaders and followers (Tjosvold, 1985). Given that leaders may not possess all the necessary resources they naturally depend on their followers (Tjosvold, 1986). For example, leaders rely on followers for (additional) information when making high-stakes decisions (Vroom & Jago, 1988) as well as when they need to assess their own performance (Ashford & Cummings, 1983). When leaders depend on their followers for information, followers with more strength (e.g. greater information power, more rational or persuasive arguments) will be more influential (Tjosvold, Andrews, & Struthers, 1991). However, when leaders believe they have all the necessary information, the influence of followers can be expected to wane.

Of course information dependence is not the whole story. Effect dependence is also relevant. Beyond concerns for efficiency or performance, leaders also have needs to build and maintain strong relations with others and to enjoy being part of a group (McClelland, 1975). They show consideration to others and in return expect to be respected, liked (McClelland, 1975) and in general seek to maintain a high positive self-regard (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984). McClelland (1975) argued that "people with a high need for affiliation exhibit a need for close interpersonal relationships with other people, including co-

workers, and are primarily driven by the need to be liked and loved” (Włodarczyk, 2011, p. 19). As such, when leaders are high on effect dependence, they depend on others for their affiliative or social needs, then followers with greater strength (e.g., referent power) will become more attractive to the leader and more influential. As such we propose the following:

Proposition 5a: Leader’s informational and effect dependence will moderate the impact of strength based social influence of followers such that the amount of social influence a follower can exert over the leader will be greater when leaders’ information or effect dependence is higher.

Earlier we examined the immediacy component of follower influence in terms of the psychological (or social) distance, physical distance, and frequency of leader-follower interactions. We will follow the same order when talking about the possible moderation effect of leader dependence. However, both types of dependence (informational and effect) should moderate all categories of immediacy in the same direction. As such instead of making six different propositions (two types of dependence for each of the three categories of immediacy), which all suggest the same effect, we will talk about the combined effects of each type of dependence on each separate category of in turn, but conclude with a general proposition for the moderating effect of dependence on the immediacy-based social influence of followers.

In terms of psychological or social distance, recall that followers who are psychologically (or socially) more immediate to the leaders are more likely to build rapport and have a higher quality relationship with the leader. This may be because these followers possess greater power or higher status than others and become more influential in terms of

legitimacy or expertise for a leader. As such, leaders should be more attracted to these psychologically more immediate followers for a number of reasons. First, when leaders need additional information before making a high stakes decision a follower who is psychologically more immediate is not only a more trustworthy source of information, but also someone that leaders can confide in and more easily rely on (Brower, Schoorman, & Tan, 2000). In addition, a leader who is more effect dependent will likely try to interact with or seek for approval from followers who are psychologically closer or more similar. In these cases, a psychologically more immediate follower will also become more influential.

Second, in terms of physical immediacy, recall that followers who are physically closer to their leader have greater influence because they may have more opportunities to engage in influencing tactics (e.g., impression management, ingratiation) (e.g., Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999; Napier & Ferris, 1993) and to provide cues regarding their relationship with leaders (Daft & Lengel, 1984). We expect both information and effect dependence to play a role in shaping the relationship between the follower physical distance and social influence. When leaders need more information it is easier to turn to those closest to them physically. Similarly, effect dependent leaders would also be more likely to interact frequently with their most immediate followers in an effort to diminish the social distance with those followers (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). It can be assumed that these types of leaders will seek to build relationships or gain the social approval of those around them. As such, physically closer followers will be more able to provide cues regarding their relationship with the leader.

Finally in terms of the frequency of interactions between leaders and followers recall that followers who have more frequent interactions with

the leader should be more influential because they gain visibility and opportunities to develop higher quality relationships with leaders. Followers who have more frequent interactions with leaders should have less difficulty in conveying information, resources, or emotional support to leaders. As such, leaders who are information or effect dependent will be more likely to solicit information, resources or the emotional support they need from the followers with whom they have the most frequent interactions.

Proposition 5b: Leader's informational and effect dependence will moderate the effect of immediacy-based social influence of a follower such that the amount of social influence a follower can exert over the leader will be greater when leaders' dependence for information and effect is higher.

Leader dependence and group level determinants of social influence. For both of the group level determinants of social influence (size and unity of the group) discussed earlier it is reasonable to expect that information rather than effect dependence of leaders should strengthen the effect of social influence.

We stated that a larger group with stronger agreement (or unity) will provide stronger norms, clearer cues and thus help the leader better "see" the social reality. For instance, larger, united groups will present stronger norms to the leader (Hollander, 1992); or make stronger arguments and provide better information to help the leader make a more effective judgment (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972). As such, a leader who is dependent on information will be more influenced by a large and united group.

Theoretically and intuitively, it makes sense that the larger the group and the more the group agreed in their liking of a leader that group should also be more influential for leaders who are high on effect dependence. However, practically speaking, based on the arguments of VDL of LMX theories (that as groups increase in size in-groups form and leaders become more strategic with their relationships with followers and the group becomes less cohesive), it seems implausible to propose that effect for larger and more united groups. Instead, we concentrate on effects for information dependent leaders and propose that:

Proposition 5c: Leader dependence for information will moderate the relationship between the group-level determinant (e.g., size and unity of the group) of followers' social influence and leader behavior.

1.6. Pushing the Boundaries of SIT

When Latane (1981) first introduced SIT, the aim was to provide a general, broad framework to test the influence of others on a target individual. For the bulk of this paper, we have hewn closely to the original definitions and structure of the theory. However, as we mentioned earlier, we believe there are at least three areas in which we can push the boundaries of SIT to make it more broadly applicable to leadership and followership; 1) interrelationships among the determinants of social influence, 2) moderators (other than power), and 3) outcomes (other than behavioral change).

1.6.A. Relationships among the Determinants of SIT

Although SIT theory treats the three determinants of social influence as distinct, upon consideration it seems clear that they are in fact closely

related to one another and may even interact. For example, strength seems to be closely related to immediacy. SIT defines strength as the amount of (personal and/or position) power a follower possesses (Jackson & Latane, 1981). In contrast, psychological (social) distance (a type of immediacy) is conceptualized as differences in status, rank, authority, social standing and power between a leader and a follower (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Given that power is a component of both definitions there is potential for a relationship among these two determinants. Followers of stronger position or personal power should have less psychological (social) distance with leaders because the perceived power difference between the leader and follower should be less for stronger followers. As such strength may be an antecedent to psychological (social) distance. As a follower gains in strength they become more psychologically or socially close to the leader. Alternatively, psychological or (social) distance could be construed as moderating the impact of follower strength. For instance, followers perceive close (socialized) charismatic leaders to be socially or psychologically more immediate (Michaelis et al., 2009; Shamir, 1995). It is conceivable that the effect of follower strength on social influence may be greater for stronger followers when psychological or social distance between the leader and followers is reduced.

Similar relationships within the three categories of immediacy (psychological (social) distance, physical distance, frequency of interaction) are also possible. Physical proximity may allow followers to more frequently engage in upward influence tactics and improve the quality of the relationship they build with leaders; reducing the psychological or social distance between them. Similarly, physically closer followers should be able to interact with their leaders more frequently than distant followers (Bass, 1998) potentially leading to higher rates of leader member interaction. Thus, physical proximity could be

positioned as an antecedent for both psychological distance and the frequency of leader-follower interactions. Interactions among the three categories of immediacy are also theoretically reasonable. For example, the extent to which physically closer followers exert social influence may be moderated by the extent to which that same follower is psychologically close to the leader such that physically close followers who are also socially close to the leader are more influential.

Obviously these are areas for future empirical exploration, but our arguments here suggest that when modeling the effects of social influence it may be useful to consider relationships among the determinants. By specifying these interrelationships in their statistical and theoretical models researchers should be better able to capture the full predictive power of these three determinants.

1.6.B. Moderators of SIT

Although to this point, we have not strayed from the power and social influence literature when exploring possible moderation effects, it is clear that any number of other possible contextual (e.g., technology) or individual-specific (e.g., leader humility) moderators exist and deserve our attention. Here, in an effort to tie SIT to more contemporary leadership issues (in addition to followership) we will consider two possibilities that have been gaining traction in leadership, technology in leadership (e.g., Avolio, Kahai, & Dodge, 2001) and newer leader individual difference such as leader ambition, narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and humility (Owens & Hekman, 2012).

Recent advances in technology may make physical proximity less of an issue than it might have been when SIT was initially developed. Although traditional leadership research (Kerr & Jermier, 1978) and SIT (Latane,

1981) assumed physical distance weakened leadership effectiveness or reduced the amount of social influence one can exert over others, advances in technology may neutralize this negative impact. A good example for this can be found in virtual teams and the fact that virtual communication can be more effective than face to face communication (see for a review, Kirkman & Mathieu, 2005). Recent advancements in information and communication technologies (e.g., e-mail, chat, or video-conferencing) may also increase visibility among group members (e.g., Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000) enable better information flow as well as increase the amount of leader-member interactions. As such, technology may moderate the negative effects of physical distance on social influence.

Another source of potential moderators comes from contemporary trait perspectives (e.g., leader ambition, Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; leader narcissism, Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; or leader humility, Owens & Hekman, 2012). For example, ambitious leaders may resist approaching their followers for information when they feel that success might be attributed to the follower rather than the leader. As a result ambitious leaders may be both less effect and less information dependent. Similarly, narcissistic leaders are more likely to exploit their followers simply because of their preference for taking credit for success, rather than sharing it with followers. As such, narcissistic leaders may be less effect dependent on followers and thus less affected by the follower influence. In contrast, humble leaders, who are characterized by being more open and accepting of feedback, more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of themselves and of others, and more appreciative of others' contributions (Owens & Hekman, 2012) can be reasonably expected to be more information dependent as well as effect dependent and more susceptible to social influence of their followers. Future research may fruitfully examine

how other contexts or leader characteristics may act to moderate the influence of followers (e.g., Antonakis, Day, & Schyns, 2012).

1.6.C. Outcomes of SIT

SIT originally focused on the judgments and decisions of others as the dominant outcome of interest (Latane, 1981). However, social influence certainly should drive other leader outcomes (that may be more proximal or distal as compared to behaviors) such as changes in self-perceptions, attitude, emotions, or cognitions of leaders influence (Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). Below, in an effort to spur thinking about the relationship of followership and SIT on other potential outcomes we will briefly touch on two of these possible leader outcomes, attitudes and self-image of leaders.

Attitudes. Attitude change (persuasion in the social influence literature, Van Kleef et al., 2011) occurs as a result of exposure to information from others (Olson & Zanna, 1993). Although attitude change has been treated as an important outcome in the social influence literature (please see for a review, Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Wood, 2000), SIT mainly focused on changes in decisions or behaviors. However, one of the seminal theories of attitudes, the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985) explicitly models subjective norms as an antecedent to attitudes (as well as having its own separate direct impact on behavioral intentions). As such it is easy to that imagine larger, unified groups of strong and immediate (the optimal combination of the three determinants of social influence) followers should help form the subjective norms that shape leader attitudes. Future research might explore how the determinants of social influence interact to shape leader attitudes towards a specific behavior.

Self-image. Changes in-awareness or self-perception may be yet another important outcome variable. Research on upward feedback confirms that views or perceptions from below raise an individual's self-awareness of what they do well or badly (Atwater et al., 1995). In combination with research on behavioral self-regulation (e.g., moral cleansing and moral licensing, see Monin & Jordan, 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009), follower social influence may also have a powerful influence on a leader's self-image. Given that negative feedback can cause changes in behavior (e.g., Ashford, 1989; Atwater et al., 1995) and that in general, people prefer to have a positive self-image (e.g., Franzen & Pointner, 2012), follower social influence may serve to shape a leader's self-image and as an important trigger for a leader's behavioral self-regulation.

While outside the scope of this paper we believe that the integration of SIT theory and followership can help subsequent research to further build out the theoretical rationales for how these outcome variables (and many others) may vary as a result of follower social influence and to develop empirical tests of these approaches.

1.7. Discussion

In this paper, we briefly reviewed both the traditional leadership and followership literatures to highlight the often overlooked active role of followers in leadership. We argued for the inclusion of followers into the complex equation of leadership and attempted to theoretically position them as important sources of (social) influence. Drawing from SIT (Latane, 1981) and the literature on power (e.g., French & Raven, 1959), we tried to model the individual- and group-level determinants of follower influence as well as how group characteristics may moderate the influence of individual followers. Finally, we argued that this (social) influence of

followers (and by extension followership) would only have an effect when leaders are dependent on followers for either information, affiliation or maintaining their positive self-regard (e.g., French & Raven, 1959; McClelland, 1975). Given the need for brevity and a relatively narrow scope, however, there were a number of issues we did not touch on or only mentioned in brief.

From social influence to leader outcomes. In this paper, we framed the impact of social influence as a positive response from the target. In general, research on social influence discusses the possibility of either a positive or a negative response on the part of the target of social influence. A positive response refers to a change in target's decisions, behaviors, or attitudes to become more in line with the source of social influence's thoughts, behaviors, suggestions or reactions. This can take three distinctive forms: compliance, identification and internalization (Kelman, 1958). Compliance occurs when the target changes in order to earn some sort of reward (e.g., approval or preventing punishments or disapproval) and not because they sincerely agree with the change; identification occurs when the target changes because he or she desires to build and have a strong, meaningful relationship with the source of influence; and internalization occurs when the target changes because they truly agree with source of social influence's ideas, reactions, behaviors or suggestions, and find them intrinsically rewarding. In contrast, a negative response (also known as resistance to social influence) refers to no change in target's decisions, behaviors or attitudes regardless what others think, suggest or react to (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Certainly each of these responses to social influence are possible for a leader. Those leaders high on effect dependence should be particularly likely to comply or identify with the social influence and adjust their behaviors (or decisions, attitudes, self-perceptions, etc.). However, as suggested by the definition of

compliance (and slightly less so for those who identify with the source of social influence) those changes for leaders only going along to get along may be only temporary or for appearances. Those leaders high on information dependency would be more likely to internalize the social influence and make an honest effort to adjust their behaviors (or decisions, attitudes, self-perceptions, etc.) and to do so for the long term. In contrast, leaders low in dependence would be less likely to perform any of those three behaviors and more likely to resist if they disagree.

There may certainly be other individual differences that attenuate or amplify the relationship between social influence and behavior however if we were to include each possible moderated positive or negative response in our model this would extend our paper beyond its current scope. Nevertheless the differential effects of the determinants of social influence (e.g. strength, immediacy) on the type of response they evoke could be quite interesting (for example, whether the typically extremely negative reactions to whistle blowing experienced by followers are attenuated by the immediacy or strength based social influence of the follower) and deserve further research.

Dynamic effects. Time is implicit in our model. When one considers certain sources of power or the effect of interactions this becomes even clearer. For example, the history of a given follower with a specific leader, for example whether they have been a source of valuable insight in the past (Shamir, 2011), will impact the amount of that followers information based and referent based power. In parallel, leader member interactions (a category of immediacy) unfold over time with positive and negative outcomes. How these play out over time should have implications for the amount of social influence of a given follower.

Finally, in the same way that followers react to leaders, leaders react to followers. Indeed, that is a premise of our model, that leaders choose to change (or not) their behaviors in response to social influence. However, these reactions should also feedback into the follower perceptions and shape subsequent follower reaction. In short, this is a dynamic relationship of bottom up influence and top down counterinfluence. While difficult to model and well beyond the scope of this paper it is important to acknowledge the temporal element of any model and the possibility of feedback effects.

1.7.A. Practical implications

Besides the theoretical propositions in this current paper there are also important practical implications of social influence of followers. Leaders are key players for organizations or societies; however, followers do seem to have a say in the way leaders lead them. As such, our research should help extend the scope of the traditional leadership research to examine the practical implications of how and when followers can exert social influence on leader (Carsten et al., 2010; Kelley, 1988).

Our research suggests that followers should be aware that they can affect leader behaviors through influence tactics drawing on their different sources of power (e.g., Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Wayne & Liden, 1995), or through different types of feedback (e.g., Atwater et al., 1995). Yet, a note of caution is merited. Challenging the behaviors of leaders or trying to influence leaders in the direction followers desire might be risky for them as well. Speaking up about issues you do not agree with may cause retaliation or unfavorable outcomes for individuals (e.g., the whistle blowing literature, e.g., Near & Miceli, 1985). A combination of SIT, the work of Asch and colleagues (1951, 1956) and some of the arguments we make here can provide valuable clues about how followers can exercise

their social influence in relative safety. Be aware of the needs of your leader. Build your strength accordingly (e.g. be persistent, show integrity and composure and have some positional or informational power) increase your immediacy (reduce social distance) and find safety in numbers (find a confederate, build coalitions).

2. SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE EFFECT OF CANDID FEEDBACK ON HOW INDIVIDUALS WITH POWER ALLOCATE RESOURCES

2.1. Introduction

Organizations and groups consistently face the challenge of how to manage finite resources (March & Simon, 1958). In these contexts, some individuals get to be in the position to allocate those limited resources, including compensation, plum assignments, budgets, expense accounts, and even office space (Barnard, 1938). As a result, these individuals have a great deal of power. In fact, most definitions of power focus on the extent to which an individual controls important outcomes or resources (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) or the extent to which others depend on them for valued resources (Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959).

However, allocating finite resources involves difficult tradeoffs for the individual with the power to do so, not only about how to divide them, but also about how to balance his or her own self-interest with the interests of those over whom they have power (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997; Komorita & Parks, 1994). Every allocation they make requires them to make a choice about whether to serve the interests of the group or act to maximize their own self-interest, typically at the expense of others (Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010). How those in power resolve tradeoffs between their own and others' interests when allocating resources is thus a topic of significant importance in the power (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006) and organizational justice literatures (e.g., Adams, 1965; Leventhal,

1980; Tyler, 1989) as well as in research on moral and pro-social behavior (Bersoff, 1999; Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Goldstone & Chin, 1993).

A considerable amount of the research on power would lead to pessimistic conclusions about how individuals resolve these tradeoffs. Power appears to increase individuals' tendencies to take more for themselves, and feel legitimate in doing so (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; De Cremer, van Dijk, & Folmer, 2009; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006; Winter, 1973). Fortunately, there is also evidence to suggest that some contextual factors can moderate these tendencies (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf, van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001).

Interestingly, one contextual factor that has been neglected in the work on what reins in powerholders' tendency to take more for themselves when making allocations is the behavior of those affected by those allocation decisions (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003). Work on how power affects allocation behavior overwhelmingly focuses on the unidirectional effect of powerholders on those receiving allocations. This treats the exercise of power as a one-way street, assuming that powerholders are unaffected by the outcomes of their decisions. It also treats everyone on the receiving end of an allocation as impotent and incapable of shaping his or her outcomes. As Handgraaf and his colleagues note, a "strong bias exists towards research and theorizing about allocators, [and] recipients are usually mentioned only as some kind of afterthought and are often not elaborated upon extensively" (2003, p. 279). These researchers call this gap a "missed opportunity" (2003, p. 279).

In this paper, we address this missed opportunity and examine the influence that recipients of a powerholder's allocations can have over the allocations they receive over time (we will refer to these recipients as "subordinates", as they are subordinate to the powerholder making the allocation). We integrate knowledge about upward feedback processes and outcomes in organizations (Antonioni, 1994; Seifert & Yukl, 2010; Seifert, Yukl, & McDonald, 2003; Smither, Wohlers, & London, 1995; Smither, London & Reilly, 2005) with psychological theory on moral self-regulation (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001) to conceptualize subordinates as an important source of social information for those in positions of power. We argue that when subordinates' feedback is candid (i.e., when it accurately reflects the extent to which the powerholders' last allocation decision was self-interested), it can trigger powerholders' self-regulatory processes and function as an important check on their self-interested behavior over time. In doing so, we explore the ways in which those subject to powerful others can have a more profound influence over their ultimate outcomes than current understandings in the power literature account for (Handgraaf et al., 2003).

In addition, we examine allocation decisions as a dynamic interplay between those making the allocations and those receiving them (Bluedorn & Jaussi, 2008; Graen & Uhl-bien, 1995; Shamir, 2011). This approach adds an important dimension to our research, since the majority of studies about how power affects allocation decisions focus on one-shot contexts and ignores the temporal nature of most organizational decision-making (Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999). Attending to the temporal dimension in this process allows us to understand the behavior of those with power as part of an ongoing reciprocal dynamic: powerholders act, those subordinate to them and affected by their decisions react, leading to

subsequent reactions by the powerholder which may (or may not) reflect an adjustment in their behavior as a result of the subordinates' reaction (and so on). Even work that has looked at allocation decisions across multiple rounds has focused on overall (cross-time) averages or final round allocations as the ultimate outcomes of interest (e.g., Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). In contrast, we offer a richer understanding of this reciprocal dynamic, and examine changes in the patterns and trends of behavior in addition to averages and overall outcomes (Menard, 2002).

Specifically, we link research on moral self-regulation to existing theories of power to explain changes in the pattern and trend of powerholders' behavior as a function of subordinates' feedback to them. In addition, we examine the influence subordinates have when they provide feedback as members of a majority, as opposed to when they are a minority voice. Finally, we explore the role of emotion as a mechanism driving our effects, and show that when powerholders who behave self-interestedly receive honest feedback about their behavior, guilt—a moral emotion—is triggered, operating as a mechanism that dampens self-interested tendencies over time.

2.2. Power, Self-Interest, and Self-Regulatory Restraint

Historically, power has been considered a corrupting force (Kipnis, 1972) that encourages individuals to pursue their own self-interest (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). Individuals with greater power feel less inhibited about doing what they want (Keltner et al., 2003), are inclined to behave less generously towards others (Piff et al., 2010), feel more entitled to take resources for

themselves (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005), and experience less interference from others when they do so (Winter, 1973). There are three main reasons why having power will motivate higher levels of self-interested decision making. First, given their control over critical resources, individuals with power tend to perceive themselves as highly independent (Lee & Tiedens, 2001) and socially distant from others (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). Social distance increases self-interested tendencies in resource allocations (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996), and can exacerbate self-interested behavior more generally (Messick & Sentis, 1983).

Second, powerholders pay more attention to information relevant to their self-interest (Copeland, 1994; Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). Individuals given positions of power over others perceive that they have more input in a group and thus deserve of more of the common resource in return (Diekmann et al., 1997). They thus underestimate their own levels of self-interested behavior (Messick & Sentis, 1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and may not see violations of equality or equity norms as necessarily self-interested (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988; Wicklund, 1975).

Third, research on cognitive role schemas has shown that powerholders may be particularly likely to deceive themselves into thinking that self-interested allocation decisions are appropriate, particularly in the presence of incentives to behave in a self-interested manner (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Messick & Sentis, 1983). For instance, powerholders will deviate from an equality (or equity) norm and take more than their fair share from a common resource, even when they have done no more work than any of the other group members, simply by virtue of being named the

“leader” or “supervisor” of a group (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005). Even if their power was randomly assigned to them, the simple fact of being assigned that power leads people to feel entitled to behave in a self-interested manner (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006).

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that this general tendency for powerholders to take more will escalate over time, as individuals with power become accustomed to getting their own way and few people challenge their actions (Kipnis, 1972; Winter, 1973). As such, these psychological tendencies converge to a general conclusion that individuals with power will tend to take more for themselves, a tendency that will worsen over time.

However, powerholders do not always make self-interested choices (Chen et al., 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf et al., 2001). Certain contextual factors can influence powerful people to be more (rather than less) attentive to others’ interests as well as more willing to trade off their own self-interest and act in the interests of others (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf et al., 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001). Even when they have the power to behave in a self-interested manner and get away with it, powerholders can be subject to self-regulatory restraints that curb this tendency (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995). For instance, Dana and colleagues demonstrated how a deep-seated desire to appear moral helped mitigate powerholders’ self-interested tendencies in a dictator game (Dana et al., 2006). In their experiment, a substantial number of participants in the dictator role chose to exit the game for a lower amount than they could have received otherwise, in order to prevent others from realizing how self-interested they were being (Dana et al., 2006).

Like all individuals, those with power desire to see themselves as moral (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) and are motivated to be seen as fair, generous and less self-interested by others (Franzen & Pointner, 2012). This natural restraint against being seen as self-interested exists in tension with the desire of powerholders to maximize their own short-term self-interest. As powerholders seek to strike a balance between these opposing motivations, others have the opportunity to be a unique source of social influence to help tip the scales in either direction.

2.3. The Role of Subordinate Feedback in Powerholders' Allocation Decisions

Subordinates are positioned to be a relevant source of feedback for powerholders. Though powerholders may be less susceptible to the influence of others than some (Keltner et al., 2003), they are not immune to it (e.g., Atwater, Roush, & Fischtal, 1995; Heslin & Latham, 2004; Reilly, Smither, & Vasiljopoulos, 1996; Walker & Smither, 1999). Research on upward feedback—that is, feedback from individuals lower in hierarchy to those higher up—suggests that it can raise an individual's self-awareness of what they do well or badly (Ashford & Tsui, 1991; Atwater et al., 1995). Since subordinates are the immediate recipients of powerholder's decisions, feedback from them has the potential to affect a powerholder's positive or negative views about themselves.

However, feedback from subordinates is unlikely to be consistent across sources (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994; Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). Indeed, work on upward influence (e.g., Wayne & Liden, 1995; Yukl & Tracey, 1992) and implicit voice theories (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Detert & Trevino, 2010) suggests that subordinates will differ in terms of their

willingness to provide candid feedback to powerholders about how they are being treated. In particular, some subordinates will provide candid feedback about the decisions that affect them, while others will refrain from it, endorsing decisions that affect them regardless of whether those decisions have benefited or harmed them (Antonioni, 1994).

We refer to subordinates who provide candid feedback about their perceptions of how self-interestedly the powerholder allocates resources as “squeaky wheels”. The term “squeaky wheel” often refers to individuals who complain, but ultimately it refers to individuals who speak up about what affects them, in an effort to secure change (Winch, 2011). This means that they will provide negative feedback when they perceive a powerholder’s decision to have been self-interested, but will provide positive feedback when a powerholder’s decision has considered others’ interests. In contrast to squeaky wheels, other subordinates may simply attempt to ingratiate themselves with the powerholder to avoid any negative consequences (Detert & Edmondson, 2011, Detert & Trevino, 2010). We refer to subordinates who acquiesce to whatever decisions powerholders make and consistently provide positive feedback to powerholders regardless of the decisions they make as “stooges”. In Webster’s Dictionary, a stooge is defined as “an underling with no say of his own” and is alternately referred to as a “yes-man” (Kerr, 1975, p. 1266).

We expect that powerholders who receive consistently positive feedback about their decisions (i.e., from stooges) will be more self-interested on average compared with powerholders who receive candid feedback about their decisions (i.e., from squeaky wheels). However, as our primary interest is in how feedback affects how powerholders manage the competing motivations to be more or less self-interested in an ongoing

way, more specific hypothesizing about how different types of feedback will affect the trends and patterns of powerholders' allocation decisions over time is required.

2.3.A. Effects of Subordinate Feedback on Powerholders' Self-Regulatory Tendencies

Research on multi-source feedback claims that it helps individuals to perceive their work behavior more accurately, especially when the feedback comes from someone with a different perspective (Seifert et al., 2003; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993). Although a number of studies argue that individuals in positions of power are more likely to change their behavior in the presence of negative feedback and less likely to change their behavior in the presence of positive feedback (e.g., Atwater et al., 1995; Hegarty, 1974; Walker & Smither, 1999), many others report either inconsistent or weak results for the overall impact of subordinate feedback (e.g., Atwater, Waldman, Atwater, & Cartier, 2000; Reilly et al., 1996; Seifert & Yukl, 2010, Smither et al., 1995). However, when powerholders are navigating competing motivations to be more or less self-interested, the feedback of their subordinates may swing behavior in either direction, depending on whether it triggers their self-regulatory tendencies (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001).

Individuals regulate their behavior in many domains, from what they eat to whether they sin (Vohs, 2006). Theories of moral credentialing and compensation (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Jordan, 2009; Nisan, 1991; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009) argue that the moral self-concept is dynamic, and that we constantly navigate around an internal equilibrium that permits us to behave in a self-interested way, but only to the point at which our moral self-image would become unnecessarily tarnished by the behavior (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Individuals give

themselves moral ‘credits’ for ethical behavior, which provide them with a license to behave unethically subsequently (Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). After building up their moral ‘bank account’ with ethical behaviors, individuals then draw on this account and commit self-interested or unethical acts (Batson & Shaw, 1991). However, individuals also accrue moral ‘debits’ for behaving unethically, for which they compensate by behaving more ethically subsequently (Sachdeva et al., 2009). This moral compensation process is typically activated by the threat to the self-concept triggered by their prior unethical acts (Monin & Jordan, 2009).

We expect that powerholders with squeaky wheels will engage in more active moral self-regulation than powerholders with stooges. In other words, powerholders’ allocation decisions will fluctuate more over time for those with squeaky wheels than for those with stooges. The negative feedback that powerholders with squeaky wheels receive after a self-interested decision will threaten their ability to maintain a positive self-view (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), leading to subsequent compensation behavior (a less self-interested allocation). However, the less self-interested allocation will elicit a positive response from squeaky wheels, which will then bolster their moral self-image and license the powerholder to engage in behavior that is more self-interested again. This continuing self-regulation that squeaky wheels will trigger in powerholders means that, longitudinally, their decisions (or behavior) will follow neither a negative or positive trend. Instead, we expect it will vary around some equilibrium point as powerholders adjust their next decision based on the most recent feedback.

Hypothesis 1: Candid feedback in response to powerholder decisions (i.e., from squeaky wheels) will predict the change in a powerholder’s

allocation from one round (round T) to another (round T+1) such that when they are given positive (negative) feedback in one round, they will make more (less) self-interested allocations in the subsequent round.

In contrast, because powerholders with stooges are not confronted with negative feedback after self-interested decisions, their self-concept will be less threatened when they make those self-interested allocations, making compensation for this behavior less necessary. Instead, the constant positive feedback that powerholders receive from stooges will continue to boost their positive self-views (Atwater et al., 1995). Without being confronted by negative feedback that would trigger moral self-regulation and keep in check their motivation to behave in self-interested ways, we expect that powerholders with stooges will slide more smoothly down a slippery slope towards increasingly self-interested behavior (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Schrand & Zechman, 2011). In other words, we expect powerholders with stooges to show a steadily escalating trend towards more self-interested allocations over time.

Hypothesis 2: When subordinate feedback remains positive regardless of the prior allocation (i.e., from stooges), powerholders will make increasingly self-interested decisions over time.

2.3.B. Consequences for Majority and Minority Individuals

Thus far, our hypotheses have focused on how subordinate feedback shapes powerholders' allocation behavior. We have not yet addressed the possibility that subordinate feedback may not be uniform, an important boundary condition on upward feedback effects (e.g., London & Smither, 1995). In fact, a common finding in the feedback literature is that, due to several rater- and context-specific factors, subordinates can differ in their

ratings of the same target (e.g., Cardy & Dobbins, 1994; Greguras & Robie, 1998; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Given that feedback is unlikely to be uniform and consistent across sources (Greguras & Robie, 1998), this will translate into dissensus (variance in feedback) within a group. Here, we focus on one particular type of dissensus, when views are held by minorities (versus majorities) in the group.

Groups naturally consist of majorities and minorities that differ in their characteristics (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991), cognitions, and motivations (Messick & Mackie, 1989; Turner, 1987). Although minorities face the disadvantage of being fewer in number, they can still exert influence over majorities (e.g., Latane & Wolf, 1981; Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Nemeth, 1986). As Latané and Wolf state, “by standing out against the crowd, the minority gains visibility and becomes the focus of attention in the group” (1981, p. 440). Our next hypotheses consider how subordinates influence powerholders’ allocation behavior when they are a minority, and the differential consequences they face depending on whether they are a lone squeaky wheel or lone stooge.

Outcomes for the group. Research documents that minorities can affect group outcomes disproportionately to their number, as long as their behavior is consistent and they remain committed to their views (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974). Most of the studies in this area have focused on how a minority group member can shape other group members’ behaviors and attitudes in groups of relative equals. As the famous Asch studies demonstrated, the presence of a lone group member stating options that are counter to the majority view changes the likelihood that other group members will also contravene group norms (1951). Similarly, Weber and Murnighan (2008) showed how minority individuals who consistently contributed to the common good in a series

of social dilemmas (despite risking a personal financial loss) increased the average payout for all group members, compared to groups without such a lone actor.

How a minority group member can shape the behavior of another group member who has power over them is less well understood. Someone with power might simply ignore the feedback of one squeaky wheel in a group of stooges, treating their perceptions as an inconvenient outlier due to their existing power (or status) differences (Seifert et al., 2003). However, the fact that a squeaky wheel's feedback has the potential to threaten a powerholder's positive self-image means that it may still influence them to become less self-interested—even if the squeaky wheel remains a minority (Oc & Bashshur, 2013).

On the other hand, the constant positive feedback of a single stooge in a group of squeaky wheels is also likely to have an effect on powerholders' behavior, though in the opposite direction. Individuals tend to interpret information in the way that benefits them (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). Powerholders with an incentive to behave self-interestedly may interpret the positive feedback of a lone stooge as permission to behave that way. Thus, powerholders may attend to that piece of information more closely than the feedback provided by others in the group, because it confirms what they prefer to hear (Nickerson, 1998).

We propose that the addition of one squeaky wheel to a group of stooges will increase powerholders' responsiveness to feedback. In other words, the addition of one squeaky wheel will be enough to cause powerholders' to self-regulate their tendencies towards increasing self-interest. In contrast, the addition of one stooge to a group of squeaky wheels will

provide powerholders' with the license they need to increase the extent to which their allocations are self-interested over time, leading them to keep more for themselves as time goes on.

Hypothesis 3: A minority group member will change the powerholder's allocation behavior in the direction of the minority, such that (a) powerholders will become more (less) responsive to subordinate feedback in the presence (absence) of at least one squeaky wheel, and (b) powerholders will show a significant upward (flat [non-significant]) trend in self-allocations over time in the presence (absence) of at least one stooge.

Outcomes for the individual. While having a squeaky wheel in a group of stooges may make a powerholder less self-interested, the literature on whistleblowing suggests that standing alone in voicing negative views to those in power is fraught with risk (Miceli, Dworkin, & Near, 2008). In one study of 161 whistle-blowers, only 5% reported experiencing no retaliation for their actions (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989). Even the more innocuous behavior of exercising voice—proactively bringing up concerns to management—can be detrimental to the individual, both in terms of later career progression as well as salary (Seibert, Kraimer, & Crant, 2001).

In fact, recent work on employee voice (Burris, 2012; Burris, Detert, & Romney, 2013; Seibert et al., 2001) and upward feedback (Atwater et al., 2000) provides some important insight into why lone squeaky wheels may be penalized by powerholders. The type of feedback a subordinate provides seems to affect targets' perceptions of, and consequently their attitudes towards, the person speaking up. In particular, voice that is challenging (compared to supportive) may elicit different reactions from

targets. For instance, although challenging feedback from subordinates may help powerholders to improve existing procedures when making decisions, challenging a powerholder can make a subordinate look disloyal or threatening (Burris, 2012). In this way, providing negative feedback to a powerholder will detrimentally affect the powerholder's attitude towards that subordinate and make negative consequences for them more likely (Atwater et al., 2000; Burris et al., 2013; Seibert et al., 2001).

In contrast, refraining from negative feedback can make subordinates look loyal and unthreatening (Burris, 2012), engendering positive attitudes towards them (Atwater et al., 2000; Burris et al., 2013; Seibert et al., 2001). Given limited resources and the need to be selective when distributing them, individuals whom powerholders regard as loyal and unthreatening may be treated preferentially (Liden & Graen, 1980). We predict that powerholders will reward minority stooges with preferential allocations, and punish minority squeaky wheels with lower allocations. Hypothesis 4a. A stooge in a group of squeaky wheels will be awarded more of the common resource than the squeaky wheel members of their group.

Hypothesis 4b. A squeaky wheel in a group of stooges will be awarded less of the common resource than the stooge members of their group.

2.3.C. The Mediating Role of Guilt

A final goal of this paper is to unpack the mechanism behind the effect of subordinate feedback on powerholders' allocation decisions. To do this, we turn to theory on the moral self-concept (Monin & Jordan, 2009), as well as work on moral emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). As we have discussed already, morality is central to most

people's identities, and it is important that individuals are able to think of themselves as moral and fair people (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Franzen & Pointner, 2012). The ability to view oneself as moral and fair is obviously compromised when one makes decisions that contravene moral norms. In allocation tasks, the most common norm used to determine fairness is equitable distribution (Leventhal, 1976). Thus, when individuals make self-interested allocations that are less than equitable, they are violating a moral norm.

Transgressions of normative behavior are often accompanied by emotions (Blasi, 1999). While many emotions can follow from behavior that violates moral norms, one of the most common is guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; McGraw, 1987). Guilt involves a negative evaluation of specific behaviors (Tangney et al., 2007). It is a self-conscious emotion, which involves self-awareness and originates from interpersonal interactions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Lewis, 2008; Tangney et al., 2007). Thus, feedback from those with whom one interacts will likely exacerbate guilt if that feedback is negative, or dampen guilt if that feedback is positive. Specifically, we expect that following their allocation decisions powerholders will feel guiltier when they receive negative feedback and less guilt when they receive positive feedback from others.

The question then becomes whether or not powerholders change their allocation behavior based on their level of guilt. Existing research suggests that they will. A key attribute of guilt is that it can motivate individuals to repair the damage caused by the action that triggered the aversive emotion. As Nelissen and Zeelenberg put it, "guilt motivates compensatory pro-social behavior to repair social bonds" (2009, p. 118). Both manipulated and self-reported guilt have been found to predict

increases in cooperative behavior in social dilemmas (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijkster, & deVries, 2007). In addition, work on moral compensation theory (Monin & Jordan, 2009) indicates that guilt constitutes a threat to a powerholder's moral self-regard. Hence, if the self-interested nature of powerholders' actions is highlighted for them by others, as negative feedback would do, they will feel guilty and subsequently make a less self-interested decision in an attempt to repair their positive self-concept.

Hypothesis 5. The relationship between subordinate feedback at round T and the change in a powerholder's allocation behavior at round T+1 will be mediated by the powerholder's felt guilt after receiving the subordinate feedback.

2.4. Overview of Studies

We are interested in the effect of subordinate feedback on the allocation behavior of powerholders over time, whether that effect is moderated by the type and uniformity of the feedback and whether guilt mediates the relationship between the feedback and later changes in allocation behavior. To have precise empirical control over the independent variables in which we are interested, and to ensure these predictors drive the effects we hypothesize, in the two studies that follow we employ a multi-party, multi-round dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) to examine how dictators (powerholders) react to feedback from differentially configured groups of recipients (subordinates). In Study 1, we investigate how different types of feedback about allocation decisions, averaged across the group, influence the trend and patterns of powerholders' decisions over time (Hypothesis 1 and 2). In addition, we extend our findings to a more heterogeneous group environment, and

examine the role of minority group members in shaping these same outcomes (Hypothesis 3), as well as powerholders' differential responses to majority or minority group members (Hypothesis 4). In Study 2, we replicate results for our first two hypotheses and explore the role of guilt as a mediator of the impact of subordinate feedback on powerholders' allocation behavior (Hypothesis 5).

The use of a multi-round dictator game provided a number of advantages in studying our research question. This paradigm allowed us to activate the tension between a powerholder's motivations to make more or less self-interested decisions (e.g., Dana et al., 2006, for a review see Camerer, 2003), and to tap actual behavioral consequences of the subordinates' feedback. The multi-round format further allowed us to examine trends over time in a nuanced way (e.g., Andrade & Ariely, 2009). Manipulating subordinates' responses in real time as allocation decisions were being made allowed us to create groups of individuals that mapped our predictions precisely and to test the immediate effect of feedback on a powerholder's actual allocations (becoming more or less self-interested during each round). Finally, participants' decisions had meaningful outcomes for them: powerholders who kept more of the common resource during the studies received more money or credit at their end.

2.5. Study 1

2.5.A. Sample

One hundred sixty-nine participants (56.2% female, $M_{age} = 27.83$ years, $SD = 9.14$, 48% currently employed) from a paid, community-based subject pool earned £10 for participating in the study, and could earn up to £10 more, depending on how much they kept of the common resource during the course of the experiment.

2.5.B. Experimental Setting and Procedure

Upon their arrival, participants were guided to cubicles containing a computer, a blank piece of paper and a set of instructions. All instructions were read aloud. Consistent with work on instant entitlement bias (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006), participants were informed they would be assigned to either a ‘powerholder’ (dictator) or a ‘subordinate’ (recipient) role. However, each participant was actually assigned the role of dictator, while a computer program modeled the reactions of the subordinate (we elaborate this aspect of the procedure under “Measures and Operationalization”, below). Each group (consisting of 1 powerholder and 3 subordinates) was endowed with 100 points for each of 10 rounds. Participants were told that the powerholder’s task was to take as much of the resource as they desired, and the remaining resources would be divided equally among the three subordinates. They were also told that the identity of participants was anonymous, and that subordinates had no option but to accept the allocation of powerholders. However, subordinates would provide feedback to the powerholder about their views of the fairness of the allocation decisions. Furthermore, we included a final round of the game in which powerholders had the opportunity to allocate resources to subordinates individually. This 11th round gave us the opportunity to see whether powerholders used their power to punish or reward individual subordinates, after having received their feedback for the prior 10 rounds.

Participants were told they would receive points amounting to a proportion of the total allocation over the ten rounds that they kept for themselves, and that these points would translate into higher earnings (up to an additional £10). During the debriefing, we checked whether

participants understood the dynamics of the experiment and also probed them for suspicion. Six participants failed to correctly reply to the questions designed to check whether they understood the game, and eight participants reported suspicion that the subordinate feedback was fake. In addition, nine participants failed to correctly answer three attention filters embedded in the questionnaire (i.e., “This is just to make sure you are reading this question carefully. Please select, ‘very likely’ below”). We excluded these participants from the analyses.

Powerholders then allocated their initial endowment. After this and each subsequent round’s allocation, they received (programmed) subordinate feedback based on the extent to which the allocation decision of the powerholder in the previous round was more or less self-interested. At the end of all the rounds, the total points the powerholder retained for themselves, as well as the total points they had allocated to each of the “recipients” were calculated and recorded. We then debriefed the participants, and paid them their £10 base pay as well as an additional cash payout amounting to £0.01 for each point they had retained for themselves. These additional payouts ranged from £0 to £10 ($M = £4.75$, $SD = £3.07$).

2.5.C. Conditions

The experiment had four conditions. We included both an “all squeaky wheel” condition (where all subordinates reacted candidly to powerholders’ allocations, more or less positively based on whether the powerholder was more or less equitable in the previous round) and an “all stooge” condition (where subordinates reacted in a consistently positive way to the powerholders’ allocation decisions). Subordinate feedback was modeled such that the three computer-generated subordinates gave individual feedback to the powerholder. This feedback was randomly

generated around a fixed value that was dependent on the powerholder's prior allocation decision (described below). In addition, we added two minority subordinate conditions. The "minority stooge" condition consisted of two squeaky wheels and one stooge. The "minority squeaky wheel" condition consisted of two stooges and one squeaky wheel.

2.5.D. Measures and Operationalization

Classification of powerholders' allocation behavior. To program subordinate feedback, the powerholder's allocations had to be categorized such that the computer-generated subordinates responded appropriately after each round (the calculations used to ensure the feedback was realistic are available from the first author). Given that how powerholders resolve tradeoffs between their own and their subordinates' interests when allocating resources is a key indicator of how fairly they treat their subordinates more generally (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Lind, 2001) subordinate feedback to powerholders was framed in terms of "fairness". We used equal division as the benchmark to determine whether powerholders' allocation behavior was evaluated as fair or not by subordinates, based on prior work using dictator game paradigms (e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, Rijkhoff, & van Dijk, 2013).

In the first round, an allocation of an equal or more than equal share (giving at least three-fourths of the 100 point endowment to the three subordinates) was seen as a positive (fair) allocation, and an allocation of less than an equal share was seen as a negative (unfair) allocation. Our simulated subordinates responded to powerholders' allocations on a round by round basis. After the first round, the allocation behavior of powerholders was classified by a combination of the amount they kept in that round and by the change in their behavior from the previous round.

Allocations of (1) an equal or more than equal share, with a positive change compared to the previous round were labeled “very positive” (++);

(2) a less than an equal share, with a negative change compared to the previous round were labeled “very negative” (--); (3) a more than an equal share, but a negative change compared to the previous round were labeled “positive” (+); (4) and of a less than an equal share but with a positive change compared to the previous round were labeled “negative” (-).

Subordinate feedback. Based on their prior round’s allocation, powerholders (our participants) received a rating of the fairness of their allocations as perceived by the (computer-generated) recipients on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very unfair, 5 = very fair). In this experiment, powerholders saw the average rating across all group members (reported as a mean between 1 and 5), as well as individual evaluations. To create realism, we used an algorithm that randomly varied the perceptions of squeaky wheels around a fixed value based on how self-interestedly the powerholder had behaved in the previous round. We randomly varied the perceptions of stooges around a fixed value (from 3 to 5) regardless of how self-interestedly the powerholder had allocated the previous round’s resources. As an example, a powerholder in the minority stooge condition behaving negatively (that is, allocating a less than equal share to participants but nevertheless allocating more than they had in the previous round) would (as a function of the algorithm used by the program to create realism in the modeled subordinate feedback) receive ratings varied around a value between 2 and 3 from two squeaky wheels and one rating varied around a value between 3 and 5 from the stooge.

Analytic strategy. We wanted to make use of the statistical power afforded by the multiple observations we had for each individual, while accounting for the fact that the observations (allocation decisions) were nested within

individuals and thus were non-independent. A random effects panel data approach allowed us to control for non-independence among the observations while utilizing all our data points, and also permitted an examination of trends and change over time (e.g., Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012). We used a maximum-likelihood algorithm to derive parameter estimates with robust standard errors.

2.6. Results

2.6.A. Manipulation check

To assess the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation, we asked a subsample of participants (54 participants) to indicate the extent to which they perceived the ratings of their subordinates to be negative (on a 7-point scale). A two-tailed t-test revealed that powerholders in groups with squeaky wheels perceived the feedback they received as more negative than powerholders in groups of stooges, ($M_{\text{stooges}} = 1.70$, $SD = 1.13$ vs. $M_{\text{squeaky wheels}} = 5.37$, $SD = 1.64$), $t(53) = 9.53$, $p = .00$.

2.6.B. Hypothesis tests

Although not part of our formal hypotheses, we wanted to confirm that, on average, powerholders with stooges as subordinates took more of the common resource than powerholders with squeaky wheels as subordinates. We ran a panel data regression, controlling for the first round allocation, and including a dummy variable for the subordinate condition (stooges = 1, squeaky wheels = 0). In line with findings in the upward feedback literature (Atwater et al., 1995; Hegarty, 1974; Walker & Smither, 1999), it revealed a positive and significant coefficient for condition, indicating that powerholders with stooges as subordinates took significantly more on average ($M_{\text{stooges}} = 53.50$, $SD = 33.47$) than powerholders with squeaky

wheels as subordinates ($M_{\text{squeaky wheels}} = 43.05$, $SD = 31.76$), $\beta = 4.68$, $p = .036$.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that subordinate feedback in a given round would predict the change in how self-interested powerholders' allocations would be in the following round. This requires a test of the effect of subordinate feedback at time $t-1$ on the size of the change in the allocation decision of powerholders at time t , while controlling for non-independence among observations. A random effects panel data regression with feedback ($t-1$) as the independent variable provides an estimation of the effect of a given round's feedback on the size of the change in the next round's allocation decision, after parsing out the variance that can be attributed to time-invariant characteristics of the individual. Table B.1 (Study 1) presents these regression results. The coefficients for feedback ($t-1$) were positive and significant for powerholders in the "all squeaky wheels" condition, showing that these powerholders significantly *changed* their allocations as a result of the feedback of squeaky wheels in the prior round.

Moreover, this change was sensitive to the valence of the feedback they had received. Powerholders made less self-interested allocations (took less of the common resource) after being rated as unfair in the previous round, and made more self-interested allocations (took more of the common resource) after being rated as fair in the previous round ($\beta = .34$, $p = .00$, please see Table B.1). In contrast, powerholders' allocation decisions in the "all stooges" condition did not significantly change as a result of the subordinates' feedback. These results suggest that powerholders use candid feedback from subordinates (squeaky wheels) to regulate their behavior, with positive feedback functioning as a license to increase their share of the common resource, and negative feedback as a signal to compensate for prior, more self-interested allocation behavior.

[Insert Table B.1 about here]

Hypothesis 2 predicted that powerholders with stooges as subordinates would become more self-interested over time, compared to powerholders in groups of squeaky wheels. This is a hypothesis about the trend of how self-interested their allocations became over time. Specifically, our prediction is that the overall slope of powerholders' allocations will be significant and positive in groups of stooges (their allocations will become more self-interested over time), but not in groups of squeaky wheels, whose feedback will influence powerholders to keep their self-interested inclinations in check. A panel data regression with time as the independent variable estimates the behavioral trends of powerholders' allocations over time within the two different unanimous subordinate conditions (*all squeaky wheels* versus *all stooges*). Table B.2 (Study 1) presents these regression results. The coefficient for time was positive and significant for powerholders in the "all stooges" condition ($\beta = .16, p = .00$) but non-significant for powerholders in the "all squeaky wheels" condition. These results show that there was a positive and significant trend towards more self-interested allocations for powerholders with stooges. Powerholders whose subordinates provide no meaningful feedback about how their allocation choices are perceived take an ever-larger proportion of the common resource over time. In contrast, powerholders with squeaky wheels as subordinates do not start along a slippery slope towards increasingly self-interested behavior.

[Insert Table B.2 about here]

In order to test the impact of minority subordinates on powerholders' allocation behavior (Hypothesis 3), we compared the regression coefficients

in Table B.1 (Study 1) for powerholders with squeaky wheels with powerholders without them (with all stooges). The coefficient for an effect of subordinate feedback at time $t-1$ on powerholder's behavior at time t was significant in all three conditions where there was at least one squeaky wheel. These coefficients demonstrate that the presence of even one squeaky wheel ($\beta = .32, p = .00$) makes the powerholder responsive to feedback in a way they are not without them ($\beta = -.01, p = ns$). Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported. In contrast, an examination of the regression coefficients in Table B.2 (Study 1) for powerholders with stooges demonstrates that the presence of a single stooge makes the trend (slope) towards more self-interested allocations for powerholders positive and significant over time ($\beta = .11, p = .049$), compared to a non significant slope ($\beta = .06, p = ns$) when no stooges are present (in the all squeaky wheels condition). In other words, all it takes is one stooge for a powerholder to keep significantly more as time goes on. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is also supported.

Hypothesis 4 focuses on whether a minority stooge is individually rewarded for his consistently positive feedback (Hypothesis 4a), and whether a minority squeaky wheel is individually penalized for his candid feedback (Hypothesis 4b). To test these hypotheses we examined powerholders' allocations to individual subordinates during the 11th round of the game. Since there is only one observation per participant in this analysis, we tested these hypotheses using a mixed ANOVA, with last allocations as the within-subjects factor, and the subordinate condition as the between-subjects factor. We found a significant interaction between the allocation and condition, $F(6, 284) = 7.56, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .14$, that was driven entirely by the minority conditions. Powerholders' allocations to their subordinates significantly differed from each other in the minority stooge, $F(2, 141) = 13.38, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .16$, and minority squeaky wheel

conditions, $F(2, 141) = 7.69, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .10$. Powerholders' allocations to their subordinates did not significantly differ in either the all squeaky wheel, $F(2, 141) = .04, p = .96, \eta^2_p = .00$, or the all stooge conditions, $F(2, 141) = .22, p = .80, \eta^2_p = .00$.

To test whether the minorities were individually rewarded (stooge) or punished (squeaky wheel) compared to the members of the group majority, we ran a second mixed ANOVA, comparing the allocations made to the majority members to those made to the minority member. Given the opportunity to allocate to individual group members, a minority stooge in a group of squeaky wheels is allocated six more units than his peers ($M_{\text{minority stooge}} = 21.40, SD = 13.20$ vs. $M_{\text{squeaky wheels}} = 15.33, SD = 9.68$), $F(1, 142) = 26.36, p = .00, \eta^2_p = .16$, while a minority squeaky wheel in a group of stooges is allocated two fewer ($M_{\text{minority squeaky wheel}} = 14.97, SD = 10.03$ vs. $M_{\text{stooges}} = 16.89, SD = 9.29$, please see Figure B.1). However, the penalty of two units only represents an actual “penalty” using most generous standards of statistical significance, $F(1, 142) = 2.78, p = .097, \eta^2_p = .02$.

[Insert Figure B.1 about here]

2.7. Study 2

In Study 1, we examined how subordinate feedback shapes powerholders' allocation behavior over time, depending on the type of feedback (Hypothesis 1 and 2) as well as the uniformity of the feedback in heterogeneous groups (i.e., the role of the minority subordinate) (Hypothesis 3). In addition, we examined how powerholders reward or penalize minority subordinates, depending on feedback they provide, compared to their other group members (Hypothesis 4). In Study 2, we positioned guilt as the mediating mechanism explaining the relationship

between subordinate feedback and powerholder's allocation behavior (Hypothesis 5).

2.7.A. Sample

One hundred and eleven undergraduate students in an introductory organizational behavior class (72% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.40$ years, $SD = 1.48$) participated in the experiment in order to earn bonus marks (up to 4% added to their final grade). In this study, the bonus marks added to their final grade ranged from 0% to 4% ($M = 2.13\%$, $SD = 1.16\%$).

2.7.B. Experimental Setting

The procedure and the introduction of the experiment were the same as in Study 1, with one exception. As in Study 1, after powerholders made the initial endowment, subordinate feedback was received at the end of every round. In Study 2, immediately after powerholders received the subordinates' feedback but before making their next allocation, they responded to additional questions about their feelings. During the debriefing, we checked whether participants understood the dynamics of the game with the same two questions as in Study 1, and also probed them for suspicion. One participant failed to correctly reply to the questions designed to check whether they understood the game, and five participants reported suspicion that the subordinate feedback was fake. We excluded these participants from the analysis.

2.7.C. Conditions

In order to explore the mediating mechanism explaining the relationship between subordinate feedback and changes in powerholders' allocation behavior, in this experiment we included only the "all squeaky wheel" and the "all stooge" conditions.

2.7.D. Measures and Operationalization

Classification of powerholders' allocation behavior. In order to simulate subordinate feedback, powerholders' allocation behaviors were categorized in the same way as in Study 1.

Subordinate feedback. In this study, subordinates' reactions to powerholders' allocation decisions were computationally modeled and reported back to the powerholder as an average rating across all group members.

Guilt. After making an allocation decision and receiving the feedback from subordinates but before proceeding to the next round, participants (i.e., powerholders) completed scales assessing their emotional state. Consistent with the measurement of guilt in previous research (e.g., Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2009; Ilies, Peng, Savani, & Dimotakis, 2013; Judge, Ilies, & Scott, 2006), we assessed guilt using a subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). Although we only theorized about guilt as a mediating mechanism, in order to reduce demand characteristics, we also included one positive emotion (happiness), one basic emotion (self-assurance) and one affective state scale (surprise) in the set of items. We randomized the order of the items across rounds. Given that participants were going to be asked these items at the end of each round, to reduce participant fatigue we limited the items used to the three with the highest loadings for each subscale (Watson & Clark, 1994). Participants thus responded to twelve adjective-based items (e.g., "I feel guilty after the previous round") on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Reliability for the guilt items was $\alpha = .76$ at Round 1 and $\alpha = .78$ at Round 10.

2.8. Results

First, consistent with Study 1, we ran a panel data regression, controlling for the first round allocation, and including a dummy variable for the subordinate condition (stooges = 1, squeaky wheels = 0). It again revealed a positive and significant coefficient for condition, indicating that, on average, powerholders with stooges as subordinates took significantly more of the endowment for themselves ($M_{stooges} = 64.28, SD = 27.32$), compared to powerholders with squeaky wheels as subordinates ($M_{squeaky\ wheels} = 43.12, SD = 27.99$), $\beta = .29, p = .00$ (please see Figure B.2).

[Insert Figure B.2 about here]

We also replicated the results for Hypothesis 1, such that in groups of all squeaky wheels, subordinate feedback in one round predicted the size of the change in how self-interestedly powerholders allocated their resources in the following round ($\beta = .41, p = .00$, please see Table B.1, Study 2). We also replicated Hypothesis 2, such that powerholders in groups of all stooges showed a positive and significant trend in their allocations, taking increasing amounts of the common resource over the course of the experiment ($\beta = .24, p = .00$, please see Table B.2, Study 2).

Hypothesis 5 predicted that guilt mediates the relationship between subordinate feedback at the previous round and the change in the allocation behavior of powerholders in the current round. We conducted a mediation analysis suitable to our multilevel panel data, following the procedure described by Krull and MacKinnon (1999, 2001). This multilevel mediation analysis computed both direct and indirect effects of the subordinate feedback on the changes in powerholders' allocation behavior. However, since this method only produces the effect sizes or the estimates ($\beta_a * \beta_b$), not

standard errors or confidence intervals, we used an additional bootstrap procedure (with 1000 repetitions) to report standard errors ($\sigma_{\beta_a\beta_b}$) and the significance test results (z statistic). First, for the indirect effect of subordinate feedback on changes in allocation behavior through guilt, the analysis revealed an estimate of $\beta_a*\beta_b = .0424$ and a standard error ($\sigma_{\beta_a\beta_b}$) of .0108. The z statistic was significant ($z = 3.92, p = .00$). This result suggests that guilt was a significant mediator of the relationship between subordinate feedback and changes in powerholders' allocation behavior. In other words, powerholders felt guiltier (less guilty) when subordinate feedback was more (less) negative and subsequently took less (more) of the common resource. However, even in the presence of this significant indirect effect, the direct effect of subordinate feedback on changes in powerholders' allocation behavior remained significant. The analysis revealed an estimate of $\beta_a*\beta_b = .2167$ and a standard error ($\sigma_{\beta_a\beta_b}$) of .0411 and a significant z statistic ($z = 5.26, p = .00$), suggesting that guilt only partially mediates this relationship.

2.9. General Discussion

Predicting when those with power will chose to serve their own or others' interests is a topic of significant importance in social sciences (DeCelles et al., 2012; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006). The outcomes of these tradeoff decisions also have important implications for employees (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), organizations (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005) and wider stakeholders (e.g., Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Meija, 1997). Although researchers have discovered a number of individual and contextual factors that help explain when powerholders will make more or less self-interested decisions, the possibility that those affected by those decisions may, in turn, shape powerholders' subsequent decisions has been largely neglected (Handgraaf

et al., 2003). This is a crucial possibility, as it provides subordinates with some personal agency and control over how they are treated.

In this paper, we examine how subordinates' feedback to those with power over them reciprocally shapes the way powerholders later allocate resources to them. We examine these effects in the presence of different types and configurations of subordinate feedback. More importantly, our design allowed us to explore behavioral trends rather than only looking at average levels of powerholders' allocation decisions. In two experiments, conducted in different countries, played for different stakes and with different samples (one community-based sample and one student sample), we showed that powerholders with subordinates who provide candid feedback about their prior allocation decisions (squeaky wheels) behave very differently than those with subordinates who provide constantly positive feedback (stooges).

Our results in both Study 1 and 2 suggest that powerholders who made allocations to all squeaky wheels—subordinates who provided candid feedback about whether the powerholders' prior allocation was self-interested—made actual behavioral changes as a result of this feedback. Squeaky wheels keep powerholders' inclinations towards self-interest in check. Additionally, when those groups are unanimous (all squeaky wheels) they ensure that the trend in self-allocations remains flat over time. Thus, groups of unanimous squeaky wheels appear to trigger powerholders' moral self-regulation, preventing them from going down a slippery slope (cf., Gino & Bazerman, 2009) towards increased self-interest. These findings suggest that providing candid feedback about a powerholder's behavior is a good strategy if subordinates, as a group, want to encourage powerholders to pay more attention to others' needs. In contrast, powerholders in groups of all stooges—who provided consistently positive feedback to their

powerholders, regardless of how self-interested their prior allocation was—failed to regulate their behavior and simply became more self-interested in their allocation decisions over time.

We also explored the role of minority members on allocation outcomes. The minority effects we hypothesized were both supported, but the relationship between them is a complex one. In general, adding a squeaky wheel to a group of stooges mitigated a powerholder's self-interested tendencies while adding a stooge to a group of squeaky wheels exacerbated it. One stooge is enough to make a powerholder go down a slippery slope of self-interest. When powerholders receive no feedback that their behavior is being perceived as unfair, powerholders seem happy to take increasingly more for themselves over time (creating a significant upward slope in self-allocations). However, one squeaky wheel will cause them to self regulate along the way (and take less on average). In other words, the lone voice of either a stooge or a squeaky wheel does affect outcomes in meaningful ways.

In terms of how these minorities were themselves affected, when given the chance, powerholders tended to allocate more of the resources to stooges than to squeaky wheel subordinates. In other words, it does seem to pay to be a minority stooge. Squeaky wheels also are individually penalized (but to a much lesser extent than the minority stooge is rewarded). In addition, while there is a penalty for being a minority squeaky wheel, it is not a statistically significant penalty. The advantage of making a powerholder responsive to feedback may be worth it.

Finally, we examined whether guilt mediates the relationship between subordinates' feedback and changes in powerholders' allocation decisions. Our results provide evidence that, when they receive more negative

feedback, powerholders feel more guilt and as a result they decrease the proportion of the common resource they take. In contrast, when they receive more positive feedback, they feel less guilt and as a result take more of the common resource than they took at the previous round. The fact that this relationship is mediated by guilt fits with the findings in the moral emotion (Tangney et al., 2007) and moral self-regulation literature (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Subordinate feedback triggers powerholders' moral self-regulatory processes and determines their later behavior through the effect the feedback has on their affective state.

2.9.A. Theoretical Contributions

Our research has important theoretical implications for a number of research areas. First, this paper represents one of the few attempts to demonstrate how subordinates can affect powerholders' allocation strategies, showing that subordinates can have an active influence on how they are ultimately treated. In this respect, these two experiments speak to prior research on power, particularly around whether power mitigates (Chen et al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2001) or intensifies (Keltner et al., 2003) powerholders' self-interested tendencies. Our work advances this research by highlighting the role of an ever-present contextual factor for powerholders: the behavior of those over whom they hold power. More importantly, we are able to show how subordinates can exercise agency in their ongoing relationship with people who hold power over them, rather than simply receive their outcomes in a passive way.

Our work also represents one of the few efforts to examine powerholders' behavior over time (e.g., Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir 2002). We relate literature on feedback and self-regulation to the power literature to explore the behavioral trends of those with the power to allocate resources. In doing so, we show that powerholders use the feedback they receive from their

subordinates in different ways depending on the type (or favorability) of the feedback (e.g., Smither & Walker, 2004). The results also suggest that subordinates are an important but neglected factor in powerholders' moral self-regulation, providing them with moral credentials (in the case of stooge subordinates) or triggering moral compensation (in the case of squeaky wheel subordinates) (Nisan, 1991; Monin & Jordan, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Merritt et al., 2010).

Existing work in the feedback literature reports inconsistent results regarding the impact of upward feedback on authorities (e.g., managers, supervisors, leaders) (Seifert et al., 2003; Seifert & Yukl, 2010). One of the main arguments for these inconsistent results is that recipients of feedback may find feedback less useful when it is from their subordinates as compared to when it is from their managers or peers (Bernardin, Dahmus, & Redmon, 1993). However, our theoretical focus on moral self-regulation (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009) and our experimental design helps to improve our current understanding regarding the behavioral reactions of recipients of feedback. In our study, negative feedback triggers guilt, which causes the powerholders who receive that feedback to adjust their subsequent allocation behavior in line with this affective reaction.

2.9.B. Practical Managerial Implications

Practically speaking, our research shows that providing unquestioning, positive feedback to powerholders can increase their self-interested behavioral tendencies over time. Subordinates aiming for more equitable collective outcomes are better served by speaking up rather than placidly accepting their powerholders' decisions. Providing candid feedback as a group does come with risks, but ones that are not as substantial as data on speaking up about serious ethical concerns (the whistleblowing literature) might suggest. Our data show that having others by your side when you

speak up goes an important part of the way to protecting you from a vengeful powerholder, and has a stronger overall impact on their behavior. In terms of being a minority, it really does seem to pay to be the stooge providing consistently positive feedback in a group of squeaky wheels. However, this strategy may turn more subordinates into stooges (e.g., Asch, 1951), eliminating the benefits of being a lone one. And, while being a lone squeaky wheel does get noticed, the punishment the lone squeaky wheel receives is not as severe as one might expect (their allocations are not significantly different from the others in their group). Moreover, being a lone voice providing candid feedback also leads to better overall outcomes for one's group.

Still, the question remains why a subordinate would speak up and challenge the powerholder for more favorable outcomes on behalf of others, especially if the possibility of retribution exists. When powerholders react harshly or are unwelcoming towards subordinate feedback, subordinates tend to develop implicit assumptions that voice is harmful, which prevent them from expressing their concerns or challenging powerholders (Detert & Edmondson, 2011). Given our findings for the strong effects of feedback on powerholders' later behavior, it seems important to build channels through which this information can flow more easily. This suggests that feedback from subordinates should perhaps be filtered through some sort of mediator (or facilitator) (e.g., Seifert et al., 2003) or be anonymous (e.g., Antonioni, 1994). This would eliminate the possibility that individual subordinates could manipulate the situation to their own benefit, and mitigate their suffering when they are a lone candid voice.

2.9.C. Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions

The present study has several strengths. Longitudinal research on the reciprocal dynamic that powerholders and subordinates co-create is still

emerging and lacks well-developed theories as well as strong empirical evidence. By conducting a controlled experimental study we are better able to unpack complicated processes such as how powerholders can be triggered to become less self-interested over time. Our paradigm allowed us to build and test specific theoretical predictions, while controlling for unmeasured variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). It also allowed us to test the effect of different group configurations of subordinates on the trends in powerholder behaviors over time.

One of the important strengths of our experimental design was the fact that in our studies, a simple expression of subordinate perceptions shifted powerholders' allocation decisions. This is an even more interesting finding in light of the fact that the subordinates in our studies had no prior relationship with the powerholders, the powerholders were not dependent on them, and they would never know who the subordinates were. Hence, one might have expected our experimental manipulation to have no effect on how powerholders allocate resources at all. Nevertheless, participants were still influenced by those to whom they were making allocations, relinquishing allocations that affected their own ultimate payouts from the study in response to feedback.

Despite its strengths, a number of limitations remain. One limitation is that we focused, in line with our theoretical framework, only on two specific types of subordinates, those that consistently provided candid feedback (i.e., squeaky wheels) and those that consistently acquiesced to whatever allocation they were given (i.e., stooges). We chose these two because they represent the most obvious ways to respond to the decisions of those who have control over the resources one receives and because they are the most dominant subordinate (or follower) types in the followership literature (e.g., Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Kelley, 1988).

However, in the real world, individuals are more heterogeneous, and the processes we examine here likely play out in a noisier way.

In addition, in our experimental design we did not manipulate any type of interdependence between powerholders and subordinates. Interdependence was minimal or nonexistent. However, had we done so one would expect an even stronger effect than our studies demonstrate. In fact, powerholders are dependent on their subordinates in many ways and have ongoing relationships (of different qualities) with them (O'Connell & Bashshur, 2013; Tjosvold, 1986). Thus, in the real world, powerholders are more obligated to take their subordinates' interests into consideration given that the consequences for subordinate dissatisfaction may be severe. When subordinates feel their voice (or feedback) is not acknowledged or does not lead to change (i.e., the frustration effect, Folger, 1977), they can develop negative attitudes, become less satisfied with outcomes, and show more dislike of authorities. Given our results, this suggests that real world subordinates may be even more influential over powerholders than we demonstrate here.

Another potential weakness is that we used an equal division rule as the objective fairness criteria when manipulating subordinates' reactions towards powerholders' decisions. However, unequal allocations may not have necessarily seemed self-interested to powerholders due to biased perceptions of their own behavior (e.g., underestimating of the level of their self-interested behavior, feeling entitled). Indeed, the powerholders in our study generally felt entitled to take at least 40% of the common resource. This mirrors results in other literatures that use the same paradigm. For example, De Cremer et al. (2009) in their work on the instant entitlement bias showed that dictators, simply by being in the position of power took more than an equal share on average. Furthermore, our group

configurations sometimes included both squeaky wheels and stooges, which may have complicated powerholders' ability to determine what was or was not fair. Future research examining different allocation rules (e.g., equity- or need-based) and focusing on how different types of group formations (e.g., stronger or weaker fault lines; e.g., Lau & Murnighan, 2005) affect powerholders' perceptions of their allocation decisions may be fruitful.

In addition, our subordinates differed from one another only in terms of their fairness perceptions. Their influence on powerholders' allocation behavior was a function of the guilt they triggered in the powerholder. However, there are a variety of other characteristics that distinguish subordinates and can make one more influential than another (Oc & Bashshur, 2013). For instance, some subordinates can exert greater power due to their status in the group (e.g., Eagly, 1983) or their relationship with the powerholder (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Subordinate influence also increases as a function of powerholders' dependence on them (Oc & Bashshur, 2013). As such, future research may benefit from considering other subordinate characteristics that moderate the effect of feedback on powerholders' behavior.

All in all, we believe subordinate feedback is an important tool that can be used to align powerholders' self-interest with the collective interests of others. Of course, the story is likely to be more complex than it appears. Powerholders may adjust their behavior and become less self-interested in groups of squeaky wheels due not to some internalized belief that their actions were wrong, but more because they desire to be seen as fair (Dana et al., 2006) and earn credits in the eyes of subordinates (perhaps so they can spend them afterwards). However, knowing the role that subordinate feedback can play in this process—the power they have to affect the moral self-regulation of those who have power over them—

presents a first step in providing those who aren't in the fortunate position of controlling the resources more say in their ultimate outcomes.

3. CONSISTENCY AND REACTIVITY: LEADER BEHAVIOR AND FOLLOWER REACTIONS IN THE FORMATION OF GROUP FAIRNESS CLIMATE PERCEPTIONS

3.1. Introduction

Recent theoretical and empirical organizational justice research points to an accepted yet almost entirely overlooked fact: justice can be a very social construct (e.g., Colquitt, 2004; Deutsch, 1983; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Workplace fairness perceptions or judgments do not emerge in a vacuum. Context impacts their generation and development, and they evolve over time.

The social side of fairness is perhaps most evident in research on team justice perceptions (e.g., Colquitt, 2004; Roberson, 2006a, 2006b; Roberson & Colquitt, 2005; Roberson & Williamson, 2012). Justice climates, or group level perceptions, are “shared fairness perceptions of treatment by organizational authorities,” (Whitman, Caleo, Carpenter, Horner, & Bernerth, 2012, p. 777), and because they are shared, they are by definition socially constructed. They drive and are driven by individual-level fairness perceptions (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao 2007) and they influence an important array of group level outcomes including performance, effectiveness, procedures and attitudes (Whitman et al. 2012). Given what we know about the importance of justice climates it is perhaps surprising that we still have a very limited understanding of how they emerge. This is not to say that studies on climate formation do not exist. They certainly do, but they remain sparse in number (e.g., Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Ehrhart, 2004; Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 2007;

Walumbwa, Hartnell, & Oke, 2010) and more importantly they do not model the emergence of shared perceptions over time.

We take a temporal, lab-based approach to examine how justice climates emerge within groups. Drawing primarily on fairness heuristics theory (FHT, Lind, 2001), sense-making processes (e.g., Roberson, 2006a; Weick, 1995) and research on voice (e.g., Folger, 1977), we explore whether followers' perceptions of justice climate converge or diverge as a function of their leaders' behavior. To do so, we manipulate leader behaviors that are theoretically relevant to fairness perceptions, including the average fairness of leader behavior (drawing on social value orientation theory; van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997) and leaders' reactions to voice attempts (drawing on moral self-regulation theories; Zhong, Ku, Lount, & Murnighan, 2010). Specifically, we examine the effects of leaders who 1) allocate resources in either a "Greedy" (unjust) or "Equal" (just) style and 2) react to follower feedback "Reactive" or ignore follower feedback, "Flat". In the next sections, we describe the temporal nature of justice climate emergence and define the relevant constructs. We then discuss the theoretical rationale for how justice climates may emerge based on the specific leader behaviors of interest in this study.

3.2. Justice Climate

Justice climate is typically defined "as a distinct unit-level cognition regarding shared fairness perceptions of treatment by organizational authorities" (Whitman et al., 2012, p. 777). In the earliest study of justice climate, Mossholder, Bennet and Martin (1998) made the argument that when group members believe they are treated with similar levels of fairness, "justice perception may emerge in the aggregate" (p. 132) and showed that these aggregated perceptions have an incremental (beyond individual level justice perceptions) impact on individual level outcomes.

Naumann and Bennett (2000) built on these findings and the general organizational climate literature to argue that, just as they do in other areas of organizational life, group members may acquire, “a distinct, group-level cognition about how a work group as a whole is treated” (p. 882). They posited that this group-level cognition emerges as a function of policies, practices, and procedures of the organization. A series of studies subsequently demonstrated the viability of the justice climate construct, including its relationship to important team-level organizational outcomes such as team performance and absenteeism (Colquitt et al., 2002), team affective commitment and satisfaction (Simons & Roberson, 2003), and team-level organizational citizenship behaviors (Ehrhart, 2004). In general, justice climate and positive team outcomes show a moderate to strong relationship with a recent meta-analysis reporting an average relationship of .40 (corrected for unreliability) between justice climate and unit-level effectiveness (Whitman et al., 2012). We argue that given this strong positive effect for justice climates it is important to understand how they emerge.

3.2.A. Climate emergence

Work examining the drivers of justice climates is accumulating, unfortunately most studies seem to share a common methodological approach (cross sectional design), making it difficult to explore the process of climate emergence. As Jones & Skarlicki (2013) point out, “researchers have focused almost exclusively on how fairness perceptions form or exist at a single point in time” (p. 139). This is problematic since theories of justice emergence include a temporal element and cross-sectional approaches may miss a number of important process based effects. For example, research on the well-established voice effect that uses a repeated measures design demonstrates that the voice effect persists but weakens over repeated exposure to unfavorable outcomes (Paese in Lind & Tyler,

1988). We argue that other well-established justice effects will also demonstrate a dynamic element (e.g., increasing or decreasing trends, fluctuation around an average) when studied over time (e.g. the frustration effect, Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979) and that future studies of justice climate emergence should incorporate time.

Top down and bottom up. Theoretically, the process of climate emergence can be roughly categorized into two perspectives: bottom up and top-down (Rupp et al., 2007). Because the concept of justice climate was grounded in the broader organizational climate literature, it drew on some of the same theories to explain how justice climates emerge (Li & Cropanzano, 2009). Consequently the majority of justice climate studies draw from the more bottom up oriented attraction–selection–attrition (A-S-A, Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995) and social information processing (SIP) paradigms (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to describe justice climate emergence. Bottom up processes postulate that climate perceptions begin at the level of the individual. Over time and through a process of either information sharing or group sense making (e.g., Roberson, 2006a) among individuals within the group (SIP), or simply by virtue of evolving intergroup similarity (via a process of A-S-A), justice perceptions become shared and emerge at a collective level.

In contrast, top down processes argue that the system of group-encountered rewards and punishments shapes group level justice perceptions (Naylor, Pritchard & Ilgen, 1980). This approach assumes that group members are exposed to somewhat similar contingencies and as a result their perceptions of fairness converge over time to form a group level perception of justice.

However, arguing for top-down versus bottom up processes is something of a false dichotomy. Existing theoretical work suggests that in reality there

are reciprocal effects over time. For example, Kozlowski and Doherty (1989) pointed out that leaders act as the filter for organizational practices and policies. As such, leaders become the source of top-down justice perceptions that feed into the bottom up processes. In fact, many studies implicitly recognize this fact and position leaders as sources of the normative values that influence bottom up process such as information processing and the attraction, selection and attrition (A-S-A) in organizations (Schneider et al., 1995). However, before delving deeper into the role of leaders in climate emergence it is first necessary to explore what climate is and how it has been measured in previous studies.

Climate Operationalization. Justice climate is typically operationalized as the climate level within a group or as the climate strength of a group. Climate level refers to the average amount (or level) of fairness with which the team or group believes they are treated (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007). Teams with high justice climates tend to believe (on average across all team members) they are treated fairly. Climate strength relates to the amount of variability in fairness perceptions within a team or group (Rupp et al., 2007). The stronger the climate the less variability in fairness perceptions there is within that team. Essentially, a team with a strong justice climate is one in which the team's climate perceptions have converged.

There are practical differences between these two operationalizations of justice climate (Li & Cropanzano, 2009). They have different antecedents (Colquitt et al., 2002) and can interact with one another to influence outcome variables. For example, Colquitt et al. (2002) showed that when justice climate level was low and the strength was high team outcomes were especially negative. Similarly, Moliner and colleagues (2005) showed that the negative relationship between justice climate level and burnout in a team was stronger when justice climate strength was higher. Despite these

differences, climate level and climate strength are also not fully independent of one another. For example, simply because of restriction of range at higher and lower climate levels, strength at these levels also has to be high (Lindell & Brandt, 2000).

Leaders and Justice Climate. Leaders shape both the level and the strength of justice climate perceptions. For example, Naumann and Bennett (2000) argued that procedural justice climates could emerge in a team merely due to their exposure to the same policies or leaders. They demonstrated that more visible supervisors functioned as “climate engineers,” such that teams with more visible supervisors also had stronger climates. Ehrhart (2004) and Walumbwa et al. (2010) point out that a leader’s fair behavior directly impacts subordinate perceptions of fairness and showed that the level of a supervisor’s servant leadership was related to the level of justice climate in their work group. Finally, Mayer and colleagues (2007) built on a common finding in the general climate research that leaders shape their subordinates’ general climate perceptions (Schneider & Bowen, 1985; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2004) to demonstrate that leader personality was related to the level of justice climate. Clearly then, leader behaviors play a role in shaping the climate perceptions of their subordinates. The question that remains is to understand how this impact plays out over time. Given this impact of leaders on justice climate it becomes important to understand how and why leaders chose to behave more or less fairly.

3.3. This Study

This paper focuses on the corollary of this situation. It takes a temporal approach to examine how group members come to hold (dis)similar climate perceptions purely as a function of leader behavior. To evoke follower fairness-related reactions, we manipulate leaders’ allocation of resources and leaders’ reactivity to follower voice attempts, two important leader

behaviors that are related to fairness and which allow us to assess justice climate average and temporal change, respectively. Specifically, we examine the effect of the level of leader allocation behavior (equal versus greedy) on the average amount of climate level and strength; and examine the effect of the pattern of leader allocation behavior (reactive versus flat) on the pattern or emergence (slope) of climate level and strength.

It is important to note that this study represents an initial step in attempting to untangle the climate emergence process. As such, we elected to keep a number of variables constant and limit our number of hypotheses. Most importantly we chose not to manipulate within group socialization. Given theoretical work suggesting the importance of socialization to bottom up climate emergence, we realize that we are holding constant a strong potential driver of climate emergence. However, our intention is to first model the effect of leader behaviors on individual level perceptions of group treatment. Our next step in this program of research will be to introduce socialization to see how this moderates (or as expected, accelerates) climate formation.

3.3.A. Hypotheses

We will begin with our hypotheses related to the effect of leader allocation level on the average justice climate level and the effect of leader responsiveness on climate level over time. Following this, we will proceed to discuss our hypotheses for the effect of leader allocation level on the average justice climate strength and the effect of leader responsiveness on justice climate strength over time.

Justice climate level. Recall that climate level is simply the average group perception of how the group is treated. Given that we are eliminating socialization in our design to account for the independent effect of leader

behavior on follower perceptions, climate level will not be a function of any group sense making process (e.g., social information processing theory). Instead, it will be driven by how the leader is seen to be treating the group. In organizational contexts, rewards are distributed using one of several methods, including equity-based or equality-based allocation norms (Martin & Harder, 1994). The equity norm states that individuals perceive more fairness when inputs are in proportion to their received rewards (Adams, 1963, 1965). The equality norm states that individuals perceive more fairness when allocations are distributed equally to everyone (Deutsch, 1975). While the equity norm seems to be widely accepted in business settings (e.g., Walster, Walster, & Bescheid, 1978) and is the most commonly studied (Greenberg, 1982), in many group situations, the equality norm is considered fairer (e.g., De Cremer, 2003; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997).

Given that leadership takes some effort and leaders may also complete a portion of a group task, leaders allocating based on equality or equity should be perceived as reasonably fair. In contrast, leaders blatantly over-allocating rewards to themselves and allocating far less, but equal amounts, to group members likely will be perceived as greedy, or less fair. In his introduction of Fairness Heuristic Theory, Lind (FHT, 2001) notes that “since Adam’s (1965) seminal work on the effects of feelings of inequity on work attitudes and performance, a great deal of research has accumulated showing that feelings of just or unjust treatment play an important role in guiding behavior and shaping social attitudes” (p. 57). According to FHT, fairness perceptions provide a heuristic that addresses two primary concerns stemming from the “fundamental social dilemma,” including being taken advantage of by others who take more than they give (in effect, a greedy leader) and being rejected by an important social group. Thus, leaders who use an equality norm send a reassuring message to all group members of

their status, and they should perceive higher fairness for the group. In contrast, greedy leaders send a less reassuring message to group members, and should lead each group member to perceive lower levels of fairness for the group. Given individual perceptions are the bases of the climate level¹ (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007), this leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Followers of leaders exhibiting equal allocation behavior will report higher levels of justice climate on average than followers of leaders exhibiting greedy allocation behavior.

In addition, leaders' reactions to followers, and specifically to followers' voice attempts, are expected to impact followers' perceptions of justice climate level. Individuals value the opportunity to voice their opinions or provide feedback; something termed the voice effect (Folger, 1977). The organizational justice literature provides two theoretical reasons for this voice effect, often divided into non-instrumental and instrumental explanations (Lind & Tyler, 1988). As Korsgaard and Roberson (1995) point out, the non-instrumental explanation suggests that voice holds intrinsic value to followers as an indication of group status (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The second, instrumental explanation suggests that followers value voice because it provides an indirect way to exert some control over decisions where they have no direct control (Shapiro, 1993; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and gives them a chance to influence the decision (ref. Shapiro, 1993).

However, merely having voice is likely not enough: leaders must also hear the voice. As Harlos (2001) points out, some research suggests that voice is

¹ We measure individual perceptions of how the group is treated (a referent shift approach) as such we treat individual- and group-level of justice as an example of functional isomorphism; i.e., "group-level construct predicts the same variables as its individual-level counterpart" (Li & Cropanzano, 2009, p. 571).

important not just because it impacts the outcome, but because it allows individuals to be heard (Tyler, 1987). In fact, from an instrumental perspective if voice attempts remain unheard, followers will not benefit from it. Thus, theoretically leader reactions (or lack thereof) to voice attempts are important to followers' fairness perceptions, and especially so when they receive unfavorable outcomes.

While existing empirical research helps to explain what happens when voice is heard, we know far less about the frustration effects that occur when unheard voice results in perceptions of less fairness (or unfairness; Folger et al., 1979). Presumably, individuals who repeatedly offer unheard voice should perceive less fairness over time, if not unfairness. Corollary research on grievance reporting provides some support for this conjecture; "the deaf-ear syndrome (i.e., organizational inaction once sexual harassment is reported) results in substantial costs.... Growing evidence indicates that the deaf-ear syndrome exacerbates injustice perceptions" (Harlos, 2001, p. 325).

As such, we anticipate that non-reactive leaders, regardless of the favorability of outcomes, will cause a drop in level of group fairness perceptions over time as followers become increasingly frustrated by not being heard (Folger et al., 1979). In contrast, reactive leaders who change their behavior in response to followers' voice should not cause such frustration effect as the situation evolves and this will be evidenced in a more stable (neither increasing nor decreasing) justice climate level. This is summarized in Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: Non-reactive, flat leader behavior will be seen as more unfair over time (i.e., will show a decreasing trend over time); whereas, reactive

leader behavior will not be seen as more unfair over time (i.e., will show no trend over time).

Justice climate strength. Recall that we are not allowing socialization to occur in our groups. As such, only leader behavior will drive the convergence of justice climate perceptions. We argue that given an isolated top down situation; followers will have to make some sense on their own of leader behavior. However, the literature suggests two opposite, competing possibilities for the effects of leader behavior (including both the level of fairness and the amount of reactivity) on the strength of climate perceptions.

In terms of the predicting the effects of the level of a leader's fair behaviors on justice climate perceptions, it is important to note that extreme experiences of unfairness, such as having a greedy leader, are very important in shaping individuals' reactions to unfairness (Gilliland, 2008). Existing research suggests negative information leads individuals to start sense-making processes more so than positive information (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind & Lissak, 1985; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). This is evident in many of the foundational theories of justice, including fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), which suggests that negative situations lead individuals to search for information in the form of counterfactuals and that the magnitude of the discrepancy relates to the emotional and motivational strength of individuals' responses to it (Gilliland, 2008). This is also evident in social information seeking, as individuals faced with a negative outcome likely will seek and attend to more information regarding others around them (Roberson, 2006a).

Based on this theoretical evidence, we argue that individuals faced with a greedy leader will seek to make sense of their outcomes to a greater extent than will individuals faced with an equal leader. In the absence of information about how others are reacting to the unfairness, each follower will have to make sense of the group treatment (i.e., how much they and other participants are receiving) individually. Given the greater importance of unfair events (greedy leaders) and the tendency of individuals to focus on these events, we argue that for individuals with greedy leaders – who provide a negative outcome based on greedy division – how the group is treated will become more salient and groups will show higher levels of group agreement and stronger climate strength than groups with equal leaders.

In contrast, leaders who allocate resources equally provide their groups with a relatively positive outcome. As Gilliland (2008) suggests, experiences judged as neutral or fair are less important to individuals; they recall such experiences less and spend less effort on assessing the fairness of these experiences. In effect, such events are a weak situation. In these situations group members will process leader behavior more individually, and thus as a group exhibit weaker climate strength.

Proposition 1a: Followers of leaders exhibiting equal allocation behavior will report weaker justice climate strength (i.e., disagree more on average) than followers of leaders exhibiting greedy allocation behavior.

The attribution of blame literature, however, suggests an opposite prediction. This literature, which helps explain individuals' fairness reactions (e.g., Ployhart & Ryan, 1997), posits that when faced with negative outcomes individuals are especially motivated to understand the reasons for those outcomes (Van den Bos et al., 1997). In the absence of

social information and faced with a greedy leader followers will struggle to explain that unfairness. In a similar pattern as suggested in proposition 1a, greedy leaders will cause followers to start sense-making processes more so than equal leaders (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind & Lissak, 1985; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Van den Bos et al., 1997). However, instead of attending to the social information of how others in the group are treated, the attribution literature suggests that followers with greedy leaders are more likely to actively engage in making a variety of different attributions (Mayer et al., 2007), from taking blame for the leader's behavior, to blaming the situation, to blaming the leader to simply remaining ambivalent. In the current context this divergence of attributions for leader allocation behavior should result in weaker in-group agreement or higher variation in perceptions for followers of greedy leaders. As such we make the competing proposition that:

Proposition 1b: Followers of leaders exhibiting greedy allocation behavior will report weaker justice climate strength (i.e., disagree more on average) than followers of leaders exhibiting equal allocation behavior.

Similar competing propositions can be made for the effects of leader's reactivity to follower feedback on the strength of climate perceptions over time. Existing cross-sectional empirical work shows that leaders create stronger climates when they behave more consistently (Zohar & Luria, 2004). While these studies did not isolate the effect bottom up processes such as group members' interaction or socialization on the strength of climate perceptions, they do suggest that groups of followers with flat (or consistent) leaders should converge in their climate perceptions more quickly than do groups of followers with reactive (or inconsistent) leaders. This situation is akin to a "strong" situation in which the rules are clear and reactions can be predicted. As Meyer, Dalal and Hermida (2009) argue,

high levels procedural justice can be seen as examples of strong situations. Specifically, maintaining consistent procedures should increase the compatibility of one's expectations and responsibilities. As such, followers with flat, consistent leaders should tend to converge in their perceptions over time more quickly those with reactive leaders.

Proposition 2a. Groups with flat leaders who are consistent in their allocation patterns over time will show more agreement over time in their justice climate perceptions than will groups with reactive or inconsistent leaders.

However, the opposite may also be possible. Flat leaders who do not react to follower voice may instead generate a search for answers in a manner similar to the one we suggested in proposition 1a. A situation in which followers repeatedly voice their justice perceptions, but the leader shows no signs of hearing them may be especially negative and cause frustration. Given that the experience of frustration is related to motivation (e.g., frustration theory, Amsel, 1992), individuals with a flat leader may make a more vigorous effort to make attributions for why the leader is ignoring them. As such we make the counterproposal that:

Proposition 2b. Groups with flat leaders who are consistent in their allocation patterns over time will show less agreement over time in their justice climate perceptions than will groups with reactive or inconsistent leaders.

3.4. STUDY

3.4.A. Sample

Three hundred and twelve undergraduate students in an introductory organizational behavior class participated in the experiment (56% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 21.39$ years, $SD = 1.79$) and were put into one of 109 groups (15 two-member groups and 94 three-member groups).

3.4.B. Experimental Setting and Procedure

Upon their arrival, participants were guided to cubicles containing a computer and a set of instructions. Participants were told they would be assigned to a role either as a 'leader' or a 'follower'. However, participants were actually only assigned the role of follower while a computer program modeled the allocation behavior of the leaders. Each group was endowed with 100 points for each of 8 rounds. Consistent with the dictator game paradigm, participants were told that the leader's task was to take as much of the resource as they desired and to divide the remaining resources equally among the followers (followers knew what they and the other followers in their group were allocated). Followers were also told that they had no option but to accept the allocation leaders made, but that they would provide feedback to the leader about their views on the leader's allocation choices and that this feedback would only be visible to leaders (in this study followers did not see how other group members rated the leader). Participants were told their actual earnings would amount to a proportion of the total allocation the leader made to them over the eight rounds. At each round participants saw the amount that the leader kept and the amount that was assigned to their group. At the end of the experiment, we probed participants' suspicions of the experimental context using two open-ended questions regarding the leader behavior. None of the participants indicted any suspicion that the leader was faked.

3.4.C. Conditions

The experiment employed a 2 (Leaders' allocation style: Equal versus Greedy) by 2 (Reaction to voice: Flat versus Reactive) between participants design. As such, we had a total of four types of leader behavior over the course of the game: 1) Equal–Flat (leaders consistently took 25 points out of 100), 2) Equal–Reactive (leaders took on average 20 points out of 100, but the amount taken at each round was dependent on the expressed climate perceptions of the group at the previous round), 3) Greedy–Flat (leaders consistently took 60 points out of 100), and 4) Greedy–Reactive (leaders took on average 60 points out of 100, but the amount taken at each round was dependent on the expressed climate perceptions of the group at the previous round).

3.4.D. Measures and Operationalization

Justice Climate Level. Justice climate level was operationalized as social entity justice perceptions (leader fairness) of followers (Choi, 2008; Colquitt, 2001) using a referent-shift approach. Leader fairness was measured with three items referring to the extent to which followers perceive their leaders to be fair ($\alpha = .98$ at the first round and $\alpha = .99$ at the last round; e.g., “Our leader is a fair person.”). Justice climate level was calculated as the average of fairness perceptions within the group.

Justice Climate Strength. Climate strength of both outcome fairness and leader fairness is calculated using the Average Deviation (AD) index (Burke, Finkelstein, & Dusig, 1999) for two reasons (Roberson, Sturman, & Simmons, 2007). First, given that some groups consisted of two participants (14%), we need to control for the number of raters within a group. Second, in our experiment we created conditions of extreme leader behavior and thus the usage of indexes which divide the sum of the deviation from the

mean by the mean itself would be inappropriate (e.g., coefficient of variation).

Modeling leader responsiveness. To model the appropriate leader behavior by condition, we programmed computer-generated leaders to behave in a certain way after each round. In the two flat leader behavior conditions leader behavior was a constant regardless of follower feedback. However, in the two reactive leader conditions we modeled leader allocation behavior as a function of follower feedback following a moral self-regulation approach (Zhong et al., 2010). As such these leaders responded such that when there was a negative change in justice climate level from the previous round ($t-1$) to the current round (t) leaders kept less of the common resource. When there was a positive change in justice climate level from the previous round ($t-1$) to the current round (t) leaders kept more of the common resource.

3.5. Results

3.5.A. Manipulation checks

To assess the effectiveness of the leader fairness level (equal vs. greedy) manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived their leader behavior to be fair (on a 7-point scale). A one-way ANOVA suggested that followers of leaders making equal allocations perceived their leaders as more fair than followers of leaders who were greedy, $F(1, 314) = 570.08, p = .00$. Similarly, to test the effectiveness of the leader reactivity (flat vs. reactive) manipulation, we asked our participants to report (on a 5 point scale) the extent to which they felt they had impact on their leader (e.g., “our impact as followers on what happened in our group was large”). Again, a one-way ANOVA revealed that participants in reactive leader conditions reported that they had more

impact than participants in non-reactive leader conditions, $F(1, 314) = 5.22, p = .02$.

3.5.B. Hypotheses Tests

Recall that Hypothesis 1 focused on the effect of leader fairness level on justice climate level such that followers' justice climate level was expected to be higher for equal leaders than for greedy leaders. In support of Hypothesis 1 a panel data regression, including a dummy variable for the leader's fairness level (equal = 1) and controlling for the effect of leader responsiveness, revealed a significant and positive coefficient for equal leader behavior ($B = 2.59, p = .00$) ($M_{\text{equal}} = 4.15, SD_{\text{equal}} = .56$; $M_{\text{greedy}} = 1.57, SD_{\text{greedy}} = .37$, Please see Table C.1).

[Insert Table C.1 about here]

Hypothesis 2 examined the effect of leader reactivity on justice climate over time. We argued that groups would perceive flat (non-responsive) leader behavior as more unfair over time because of the frustration effect. In contrast, we did not expect to see such a decrease in group-level fairness perceptions for reactive leader behavior. A panel data regression with time as the independent variable provides an estimation of the trends in group-level fairness perceptions (i.e., climate level) within both leader conditions (reactive or flat). Table C.2 presents these regression results. In support of Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for time was negative and significant for flat leaders ($B = -.04, p = .00$), showing that the group-level fairness perceptions in the flat leader conditions decreased over time, while the group-level perceptions of followers in the reactive leader conditions remained stable over time ($B = .01, p > .05$) (please see Figure C.1).

[Insert Table C.2 and Figure C.1 about here]

Our competing Propositions 1a and 1b focused on the effect of leader fairness level on justice climate strength. Specifically, we proposed that followers in groups of equal allocation leader behaviors would show either weaker (Proposition 1a) or greater (Proposition 1b) justice climate strength than followers in groups of greedy allocation leaders. Again, a panel data regression, including a dummy variable for the leader's fairness level (equal = 1) and controlling for leader responsiveness, revealed a positive coefficient for equal leader behavior ($B = .12, p = .095$) ($AD_{\text{equal}} = 1.86, SD_{AD\text{-equal}} = 1.16; M_{\text{greedy}} = 1.51, SD_{AD\text{-greedy}} = 1.02$) indicating that, in support of Proposition 1a, climate strength weakened over time for followers with equal leaders (because strength is operationalized as the average deviance "AD," higher AD values indicate weaker climate strength, please see Table C.1).

Our competing Propositions 2a and 2b examined the effect of leader reactivity on climate strength. We proposed that either the justice perceptions of followers in groups of flat, non-reactive leaders would show more agreement (*Proposition 2a*) or less agreement (*Proposition 2b*) than justice perceptions of followers in groups of reactive leaders. Similar to the analysis of *Hypothesis 2*, a panel data regression with time as the independent variable provides an estimation of the trends in group-level fairness perceptions (i.e., climate level) within both leader conditions (reactive versus flat). Table C.2 presents these regression results. The coefficient for time was positive and significant for reactive leaders and a non-significant for non-reactive leaders. This indicates that, in support of proposition 2a, the level of disagreement in group-level fairness perceptions of followers in the reactive leader behavior conditions increased over time, while the group-level perceptions of followers in the

non-reactive leader behavior conditions remained flat over time (leader fairness: $B = -.01, p = .00$) (please see Figure C.2).

3.6. DISCUSSION

Empirical work on top-down processes has long shown how contextual effects such as a leader's style (Ehrhart, 2004; Walumbwa, Wu, & Orwa, 2008) or personality (Mayer et al., 2007) influence shared fairness perceptions of individuals at the group level. However this research has typically studied these phenomena with a one shot or cross-sectional approach. Consequently, little is known about the process of justice climate emergence (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Holtz & Harold, 2009). As such, our research attempts to show how different types of leaders' allocation behaviors and reactions to voice shape the process of climate emergence (both justice climate level and strength) over time (multiple rounds).

Leaders given control over outcomes and procedures are influential sources of fairness. By engaging in different types of behaviors leaders can shape follower fairness perceptions and the extent to which followers' agree in those perceptions. To discuss our findings we will first review our results for the effects of leader resource allocation style (equal vs. greedy) on the average justice climate level and strength (Hypothesis 1 and Proposition 1a) followed by the results for the effects of leader responsiveness (reactive vs. flat) on trends in justice climate level and strength over time (Hypothesis 2 and Proposition 2a).

With respect to level of allocation behavior, our results suggest that followers in groups of leaders allocating resources equally perceive those leaders as more fair than did followers with greedy leaders (Hypothesis 1). This relatively obvious finding parallels existing empirical findings that

fair leadership results in higher levels of justice perceptions. For instance, leaders who serve their followers and encourage their personal development and success tend to have teams with positive fairness perceptions and strong agreement in those perceptions (Ehrhart, 2004; Walumbwa et al., 2010). However, what is less obvious is that the amount of fairness with which a leader treats his/her group not only impacts the average perceptions of fairness in the group, but also the average extent to which members of the group agree with each other's fairness perceptions. Leaders who treat their group fairly cause higher levels of disagreement than do leaders who treat their group unfairly (in support of Proposition 1a). This suggests that greedy leaders constitute a stronger (negative) situation (Meyer et al., 2009) and the experience of the group as a whole becomes more salient. As such, groups with greedy leaders, perhaps because they pay more attention to how others in the group are treated, tend to agree with one another more on average than groups with fair leaders (who create a weaker situation).

Our results regarding the effect of leader reactivity or responsiveness to voice on justice level (Hypothesis 2) and justice climate strength (Proposition 2) over time suggest a somewhat more complicated, albeit interesting story. Non-reactive leaders as opposed to reactive leaders caused lower levels of justice climate over time (Hypothesis 2). This is in line with the so-called frustration effect (Folger et al., 1979). In indirect support for this finding, a post hoc test on the emotions our participants felt (these results are preliminary and as such were not included in the main text of the paper) showed that on average across eight rounds; there were no differences between reactive vs. non-reactive leaders for the amount of pleasantness reported. The slopes for all conditions were negative (all participants felt less pleasantness in the study over time). However, a comparison of the coefficients for reactive, equal leaders ($B =$

-.17) and non-reactive, equal leaders ($B = -.06$) shows that the slope is less negative for reactive leaders than non-reactive equal leaders ($Z = 3.63$)². This suggests that perhaps leader reactivity ameliorates the decrease of positive affect to some extent. However, this should be interpreted with caution as there was no significant difference in slopes across greedy leader conditions.

Regarding our Proposition 2a, which focused on the justice climate strength or the level of disagreement over time, our results revealed that followers in groups of reactive leaders disagreed more round by round. In contrast, agreement in the perceptions of followers with flat, non-reactive, leaders remained relatively stable over time. Although the results demonstrate the proposed difference between the level of agreement among groups of followers with reactive and non-reactive leaders, the trend of agreement was unexpected. Instead of climate convergence we had either climate dissolution (followers with reactive leaders) or climate stability (followers with flat leaders). This result may point to the importance of socialization processes (i.e., bottom up processes) in groups, especially for the emergence of stronger climates.

Finally, although we did not hypothesize about the effects of leader responsiveness on average justice climate level or strength nor did we hypothesize about the effect of leader fairness level justice climate level or strength over time, because this study is an initial step, we conducted some additional post hoc analysis related to these ideas.

The resulting picture for the effect of leader responsiveness is muddled somewhat by an exploration of the effects leader responsiveness on

² Z-test to compare regression coefficients across the two models (Clogg, Petkova & Haritou, 1995)

average justice climate over time (see the results of the panel data regression analysis conducted earlier for Hypothesis 1 in Table C.1). These revealed a negative coefficient for the effect of leader reactivity (reactive =1) on follower fairness climate perceptions for equal leader behavior ($B = -.16, p = .083$) (please see Table C.1). Although reactivity seems to have a weak impact on the level of justice perceptions there seems to be a stronger and significant effect for equal leaders. A panel data regression analyses performed only on equal leaders, resulted in a negative coefficient for leader reactivity ($B = -.30, p = .044$). Basically, reactive, equal leaders ($M_{\text{equal, reactive}} = 4.00; SD_{\text{equal, non-reactive}} = .66$) were perceived to be less fair on average than non-reactive, equal leaders ($M_{\text{equal, non-reactive}} = 4.30; SD_{\text{equal, non-reactive}} = .64$). Although we expected a stronger frustration effect for non-reactive leaders, in hindsight it seems possible that reactive (but equal) leaders may also be perceived more negatively. It may be that equal and reactive leaders in our experimental design, despite being equal in their allocations on average, are always in violation of the equality rule. They always take either more or less than an equal share of the common resource (dependent on follower reaction to their allocation in the previous round). In contrast, equal but non-reactive leaders hew closely to the equality rule (they always take an equal share). It may be important for a leader to listen and react to followers in line with their demands, but perhaps not to the extent that it makes the leader violate allocation rules. When reaction to voice results in constant violation of well-established norms (e.g., equality), it can make followers feel more frustrated than in situations where there is a flat reaction to voice. In contrast, a responsive leader does not seem to really matter to followers if the leader is greedy in the first place. Results imply that followers did not perceive greedy leaders more fairly even when they react to the voice (the same panel data regression for greedy leaders does not reveal a statistically significant coefficient for leader reactivity; M_{greedy} ,

non-reactive = 1.58; $SD_{\text{greedy, non-reactive}} = .37$; $M_{\text{greedy, reactive}} = 1.56$; $SD_{\text{greedy, reactive}} = .38$). These results raise an important issue regarding the reaction to voice for greedy leaders. It seems like leaders cannot use reaction to voice as a remedy to greedy, selfish behavior. Although the voice effect suggests that individuals perceive outcomes more fairly when they are given the chance to voice their concerns (Folger, 1977), similar to earlier findings (Paese in Lind & Tyler, 1988), for our participants voice loses its impact when treated unfavorably repeatedly over time.

We also wanted to explore how repeated exposure to unfair allocations impacted the level of fairness perceptions of followers (the impact of allocation style on climate level over time). The literature on learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) suggests that repeated exposure to negative situations can cause people to give up and no longer resist. In essence the poor treatment becomes the new normal. A post hoc analysis of quadratic panel regression with time as the independent variable points to a possible learned helplessness argument for greedy and non-reactive leaders. The coefficient of the quadratic term for period is positive and statistically significant ($B = .02, p = .00$) while the coefficient of the quadratic term for greedy reactive leaders was non-significant. This suggests that followers in groups of greedy leaders initially rated their leaders poorly, but over repeated interactions gradually increased their fairness ratings. Whether this is actually learned helplessness or not is clearly up for discussion and would be an interesting area for further exploration.

Overall, our results point to a number of interesting implications. Clearly, leaders have an impact on the level of a justice climate on average and over time as well as the strength of that climate on average and over time. However while some of our results were expected (e.g., Hypothesis 1) others were more surprising. For example, followers did not agree more in

their perceptions of leader fairness over time. Rather, instead of climate convergence, we had climate stability or dissolution. Similarly, reactive, equal leaders were perceived as less fair on average than non-reactive, equal leaders; while greedy, reactive leaders were not perceived as significantly more fair than greedy, non-reactive leaders (the attenuated voice effect).

These results support our argument for the importance of examining justice climate emergence as a process. Unexpected trends and boundary conditions are likely to continue to emerge as we continue to probe these issues, but this can only help enrich our knowledge of this important organizational phenomenon.

3.6.A. Limitations

As with any other study, this one has its limitations. First, we did not incorporate any individual-specific variables into our analyses. Several personality traits related to self- or other-related fairness such as equity (Van Lange et al., 1997), justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) or cross-cultural differences such as power distance (Brockner et al., 2001) would be interesting to assess in future work. Instead, for this initial step of the study we chose to focus strictly on the leader effects. Second, we chose only to focus on four possible combinations of types of leader allocation behavior (equal versus greedy) and reactions to voice (non-reactive versus reactive). Different behavioral styles are clearly possible to introduce. Third, we minimized the possibility of any socialization processes taking place. In organizations employees discuss events and collectively make sense of events, especially negative events. However, in this initial study we sought to isolate the leader effect and simply look at the initial top down effects.

Future work should examine how the sense-making processes change as a function of leader behaviors. Finally, although the level of leader fairness explained a good bit of variance in justice climate level, the very low R-squared values for the effect of leader responsiveness are concerning. These results may point to the fact that there may be other explanatory factors (e.g., socialization) that more powerfully affect the emergence of justice climate (or perhaps that our manipulation of responsiveness was not strong enough. Although the F values for both manipulations checks were significant, leader fairness, $F(1, 314) = 570.08, p = .00$, was substantially larger than responsiveness, $F(1, 314) = 5.22, p = .02$).

3.6.B. Future directions

One important future direction includes an assessment of the role of followers in the process of justice climate emergence. The existing literature makes clear that just as leaders shape follower behavior, followers too can shape the fairness of leader behaviors (e.g., Oc et al., under review). In our current study followers are told that they could not be individually identified by the leader (the leader only saw averaged group member's ratings). As a next step, we are gathering data to examine whether climates emerge differently when followers feel like their feedback is confidential (averaged group members' ratings) or not (individuals' fairness ratings). By making feedback non-confidential we suspect that followers will be more likely to manage impressions and thus we expect more variance in their agreement levels especially in absence of any socialization process.

As a subsequent step, we are also exploring how exposing followers to the reactions of others may change the level and strength of climate over time. One element of sense-making processes may play an important role: shared justice related information among team-members (Roberson &

Colquitt, 2005). As we theorized in Propositions 1a and 1b, followers may make very different attributions for leader behaviors in absence of any social interactions. In our current design followers only saw how other group members were treated, they did not see how other followers rated the leader. To address this, we plan to let followers see each other's ratings. Drawing on Weber and Murnighan's (2008) empirical study, we believe that the rating of one follower may significantly influence the ratings of other group members and thus increase climate strength on average and over time.

Notwithstanding, these limitations we feel that this study has demonstrated the feasibility and importance of studying climate emergence over time. Empirical exploration of the temporal nature of justice is in its infancy. However, we agree with Fortin (2008) that this will be a crucial area for the field; one that is ripe with exciting (and perhaps unexpected) possibilities.

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A. APPENDICES TO ARTICLE 1

A.1. Tables and Figures

Table A.1 List of Propositions


Proposition 1a:	Followers with higher position or personal power exert greater social influence on leaders.
Proposition 1b:	Persuasive follower behavior as opposed to supportive follower behavior exerts greater social influence over leaders at a given point in time. However, supportive follower behavior can increase a given follower's personal power over time.
Proposition 2a:	Followers who are psychologically (or socially) more immediate to their leaders exert greater social influence over them.
Proposition 2b:	Followers who are physically distant to their leaders exert less social influence over them.
Proposition 2c:	Followers who have more frequent interactions with leaders exert greater social influence over them.
Proposition 3:	Larger groups will have more influence over their leaders as a function of their within group agreement. Specifically, unity among followers moderates the relationship between group size (e.g., the number of followers in a group) and the magnitude of social influence such that the group size will be more positively related to social influence when group unity is high.
Proposition 4a:	The number of followers in a group will moderate the influence of any one follower such that the more people there are in a group the lower is the social influence of a given follower over the leader.
Proposition 4a (alternative):	The number of followers in a group will moderate the influence of any one follower such that the larger the group the higher (lower) is the marginal social influence of a given in-group (out-group) follower over the leader.
Proposition 4b:	Consistent minority member will have greater social influence on leaders than will a majority member.
Proposition 5a:	Leader's informational and effect dependence will

moderate the impact of strength based social influence of followers such that the amount of social influence a follower can exert over the leader will be greater when leaders' information or effect dependence is higher.

Proposition 5b: Leader's informational and effect dependence will moderate the effect of immediacy-based social influence of a follower such that the amount of social influence a follower can exert over the leader will be greater when leaders' dependence for information and effect is higher.

Proposition 5c: Leader dependence for information will moderate the relationship between the group-level determinant (e.g., size and unity of the group) of followers' social influence and leader behavior.

Figure A.1 A model of followers' social influence on leaders



B. APPENDICES TO ARTICLE 2

B.1. Tables and Figures

Table B.1 Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Round-by-Round Changes in Powerholders' Self-Allocations

	Effect of prior round's feedback on the absolute level of change in powerholder's allocation in the following round					
	Study 1				Study 2	
	3 Squeaky Wheels	3 Stooges	2 Squeaky Wheels and 1 Stooge	1 Squeaky Wheels and 2 Stooge	3 Squeaky Wheels	3 Stooges
Feedback(t-1)	7.87*	-0.79	9.86*	17.13*	10.75*	5.30
SE	1.21	3.36	1.74	2.78	1.60	2.79
β	.34*	-.01	.30*	.32*	.41*	.06
R ² Overall	0.12	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.17	0.00
Wald chi ²	42.27	0.05	32.09	38.10	45.10	3.61
Prob > chi ²	0.00	0.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22
# of observations	315	351	315	333	468	486
# of powerholders (N)	35	39	35	37	52	54

Note. "Feedback(t-1)" refers to the feedback given by subordinates in the previous round. SE refers to standard errors and β refers to the standardized coefficients.

* $p < .05$.

Table B.2 Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Powerholders' Self-Allocations over Time

	Trend of the average amount of resources powerholders allocate to themselves, across the rounds of the experiment					
	Study 1				Study 2	
	3 Squeaky Wheels	3 Stooges	2 Squeaky Wheels and 1 Stooge	1 Squeaky Wheels and 2 Stooge	3 Squeaky Wheels	3 Stooges
Time	0.69	1.84*	1.10*	0.98*	0.54	2.23*
SE	0.36	0.31	0.34	0.45	0.30	0.28
β	.06	.16*	.11*	.09*	.06	.24*
R ² Overall	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06
Wald chi ²	3.63	34.72	10.44	9.91	3.21	62.01
Prob > chi ²	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00
# of observations	350	390	350	370	520	540
# of powerholders (N)	35	39	35	37	52	54

Note. “Time” refers to rounds in the experimental game. *SE* refers to standard errors and β refers to the standardized coefficients.

* $p < .05$.

Figure B.1 Powerholders' resource allocation to individual subordinates in the 11th round, by condition, Study 1





Figure B.2 Individual powerholder self-allocations in groups with Squeaky Wheels and Stooges over time, Study 2



C. APPENDICES TO ARTICLE 3

C.1. Tables and Figures

Table C.1 Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Leader behavior on Justice Climate Level (Justice Climate Level and Strength of Leader Fairness)

	Average scores across experimental rounds			
	Justice climate level		Justice climate strength	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Leader's allocation style (<i>equal=1, greedy=0</i>)	2.59*	.09	.12 [†]	.07
Reactive to voice (<i>reactive=1, flat=0</i>)	-.16 [†]	.09	-.00	.07
R2 Overall	.8405		.0176	
Wald chi2	826.75		2.78	
Prob > chi2	0.00		0.2486	
# of observations	872		872	
# of groups	109		109	

Note: * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$. SE refers to standard errors. Justice climate strength is operationalized as the variation in perceptions. Higher values of variation in perceptions relate to weaker climates. Justice climate level is operationalized as an average value of the group members' fairness perceptions.

Table C.2 Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Leader Behavior on Justice Climate Level and Strength

	Trend of Justice Climate Level and Strength, across the rounds of the experiment			
	Justice climate level		Justice climate strength	
	Flat	Reactive	Flat	Reactive
Time	-.04*	-.01	.01	.01*
<i>SE</i>	.01	.01	.00	.01
R2 Overall	0.0040	0.0004	.0026	.0046
Wald chi2	50.54	2.13	3.72	5.04
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.1445	0.0539	0.0248
# of observations	432	440	432	440
# of groups	54	55	54	55

Note: * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$. *SE* refers to standard errors. Justice climate strength is operationalized as the variation in perceptions. Higher values of variation in perceptions relate to weaker climates. Justice climate level is operationalized as an average value of the group members' fairness perceptions.

Figure C.1 Group-level perceptions of leader fairness in groups (Justice Climate Level) of reactive and flat leaders over time




Figure C.2 The variation in within-group agreement on leader fairness in groups (Justice Climate Strength) of reactive and flat leaders over time

