A Study on Public-Private Collaboration:

Motivations and Consequences, Measuring Success

with Key Dimensions, Comparing Leadership

Victòria Alsina Burgués

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona

This thesis is dedicated to my inspiring parents
for their endless love, encouragement and unwavering support.

Acknowledgements

As it is said in English, first things first. Neither this thesis would be a thesis nor certainly would be what it is if Professor Carles Ramió had not been involved from the very beginning.

It was the experience of knowing Professor Carles Ramió, during my college years, which made me understand that from the public sphere, from the proper approach to the management of the public sphere, we can really transform reality in a way that benefits the majority. His explanations and his passion for public administration, as well as his clairvoyance, made me understand the multiple dimensions that the administrative apparatus has and the possible ways of managing it and shaping it. He also convinced me that the Administration is a core element to make our contemporary societies better.

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responsibilities, not only opened spaces for teaching, but they had the modesty of celebrating the positive assessments provided by the students to me as if I were a consecrated professor. They have also been able to value in public and in private the efforts that I have made to the best of my abilities for the university and the noble teaching work. This is a source of inspiration that I must acknowledge.

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Preface

When I decided to study political science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, I already sensed that I wanted to dedicate my career to the world of public management. The person who proved to have a decisive influence was Professor Carles Ramió, who taught me in the third year of my undergraduate degree. With a strong vocation to public service, and intending to pursue an academic career when I finished my degree, I decided to work in public administration to gain first-hand knowledge of its workings, and to apply the knowledge I had acquired during my academic studies.

I worked for four years as a senior technician at the Department for the Environment and Housing for the Catalan Government. Being part of a unit dedicated to administrative reorganization and modernization gave me the opportunity to gain a holistic view of the challenges and problems of the public sector and to participate in many innovative projects. I subsequently worked for a year as assistant director at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies, helping to design and implement an organizational transformation plan.

Looking back, I reassure myself that I made a wise decision. I have no qualms concerning the appropriateness of commencing my doctorate immediately after finishing my studies in other academic disciplines, or even in other more theoretical areas of political science itself. However, having worked in executive positions in public institutions represented a period of training which has been crucial in enabling me to understand in depth the 'raw material' that has been the object of study in my research career.

During that period, I decided to take a master's degree in public management (ESADE's EMPA program). This allowed me to reflect on areas of knowledge of a more strategic nature that I had not worked on in my degree studies, and which have given me an overall view of the world of the public sector. It is also pertinent to point out that I have always been associated with the university world, actively participating in various academic studies, and in particular, those related to public management. This has allowed me to gain first-hand experience of other public institutions at an international,

state, regional and local level. Participating as a researcher, first on a project at the Ministry of Science and Technology (2006), and later on another transnational project at the European Commission (7th Framework Program 2011-2015) gave me the chance to see the dynamics of large competitive projects. I also won two competitive grants to develop my own research projects, and wrote a number of academic articles that I presented at national and European congresses.

Furthermore, entering the world of teaching as an adjunct professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at Pompeu Fabra University, and giving specialized training courses to officials, as well as some Master's courses, was a revelation: I discovered that I loved teaching. Finally, in addition to all of the above, I also worked for two years at SIGMA, a joint initiative between the European Union and the OECD, developing international consulting projects linked to public-private collaboration in the Balkans.

A number of factors led to my decision to finally undertake a doctorate. The most decisive ones were undoubtedly to indulge my aforementioned passion for teaching, and also to explore public-private collaboration, a topic which I decided to devote my thesis to without any hesitation. In this context, I completed a Master's in Public Administration at the UAB-UB-UPF and, after 7 years of intense professional experience both inside and outside academia, I formally began my PhD at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in October 2012.

It is worth emphasizing that this professional experience was key to my admission to the Harvard Kennedy School's Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government (M-RCBG) as a pre-doctoral fellow. I have been a full-time researcher at this institution since May 2014. To illustrate the uniqueness of this appointment, it is worth noting that during this period of more than three years, I have been the only pre-doctoral post holder in the center, the rest being postdoctoral researchers.

Throughout my doctorate I have worked extremely hard on investigation, combining my own doctoral research with participation in multiple research projects, initially at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra and later also at Harvard. It was an absolute pleasure to have the opportunity to work with Professor Carles Ramió. After many years of researching

together, I am still amazed at his analytical ability and originality. Moreover, meeting Professor John Donahue and working on his research team at the Harvard Kennedy School has been a multi-dimensional and enriching experience.

Beyond the recognized academic excellence of the institution itself, the M-RCBG is regarded as a pioneering world center in the study of collaborative relations between the public and private sector. In this respect, having the opportunity to work in this center has allowed me to work with academics responsible for creating internationally renowned conceptual and analytical frameworks, learning from their methodological approaches and enriching not only my doctoral research but also my training as a future researcher.

In addition, during my stay in the United States I have had the opportunity to teach and participate in research projects at other world famous centers of excellence such as Yale Law School, MIT Media Lab and the Governance Lab at New York University.

Abstract

Public-private collaboration (PPC) is a phenomenon that has grown spectacularly since the early 1980s. Currently, policy-making processes usually develop in complex networks of public and private institutions, and public service delivery requires the management of complex interorganizational relationships. In this context, this research aims to contribute to the study of PPC by analysing three key dimensions. Firstly, it reviews why the public sector decides to initiate PPCs, and examines how the nature of these reasons affects its success. Secondly, it proposes ways to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC processes, both overall and by key dimensions. Likewise, the study identifies those institutional and organizational contexts which are most favourable in successfully promoting and managing these collaborations. Lastly, this research establishes a connection between PPC and urban development; it compares public and private sector leadership in urban transformation initiatives in Washington D.C.; and it examines how this leadership differ in terms of social and economic consequences.

Resumen

El fenómeno de la colaboración público-privada (CPP) ha crecido espectacularmente desde principios de la años ochenta. De hecho, hoy en día, las procesos de formulación de políticas públicas generalmente se desarrollan mediante complejas redes de instituciones públicas y privadas. Así mismo, la prestación de servicios públicos requiere, cada vez en mayor medida, gestionar complejos entramados interorganizativos. En este contexto, la presente investigación pretende contribuir al estudio de la CPP analizando tres dimensiones clave. En primer lugar, estudiando los motivos por los que el sector público decide iniciar CPPs y, en que medida, su naturaleza afecta al éxito de la colaboración. En segundo lugar, examinando cómo medir objetivamente el grado de éxito de los procesos de CPP, tanto a nivel global como atendiendo a dimensiones clave. Asimismo, identificando qué contextos institucionales y organizacionales son más idóneos para promover y gestionar, con éxito, estas colaboraciones. Finalmente, conectando la CPP con el desarrollo urbano. En concreto, comparando el liderazgo público y el privado en diferentes iniciativas de transformación urbana en Washington DC, y comparando sus efectos sociales y económicos.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This introduction has four aims: to define what we should understand by public-private collaboration; to justify the theoretical and social relevance of my doctoral study; to clarify the conceptual and analytical coherence across the three articles that make up this dissertation report; and, to outline the research design and methodology I have used. In addition, in the concluding section I present some orderly reflections that seek to contextualize, relate and deepen the findings of these three papers, as well as pointing to future areas of research I intend to develop at a postdoctoral stage.

1.1. Defining what we should understand by public-private collaboration

Reviewing the historical evolution of public service design and delivery regimes, the literature identifies three different paradigms. Firstly, from the nineteenth century through to the late 1970s/early 1980s, the traditional Weberian bureaucratic Public Administration paradigm; secondly, until the beginning of the 21st century, the New Public Management paradigm; and lastly, since then, the New Public Governance paradigm (Osborne 2010a). The key elements of the traditional Weberian bureaucratic Public Administration paradigm can be defined as the dominance of the 'rule of law', a focus on administering set rules and guidelines, a central role for the bureaucracy in making and implementing policy, the politics-administration split within public organizations, a commitment to incremental budgeting, and the hegemony of the professional in public service delivery (Hood 1991; Suleiman 2003).

Against this paradigm founded on public law, the New Public Management paradigm comprises the public sector reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s (Hood 1991; Gaebler and Osborne 1992; Barzelay 2001). Although no broad consensus exists on the content of such reforms (Ferlie 1996; Dawson and Dargie 1999), many arguments coincide in criticizing the functioning of public administration and in promoting market-based mechanisms in public service provision with the assumption that the application of such techniques to public services delivery would automatically lead to improvements in the effectiveness of these services (Savas 2000). However, the New

Public Management has been questioned on a range of grounds (Metcalfe and Richards 1987; Hood 1991; Parker and Handmer 1992; Hood 1995; Farnham and Horton 1996; Kickert 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; McLaughlin et al. 2002).

Finally, the New Public Governance is firmly rooted within institutional and network theory and draws much from the influential work of authors like Powell (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), Nohria and Eccles (1994), and Robinson (2001). It is remarkable that Osborne (2010b) considers that, in fact, the New Public Management paradigm has actually been a transitory stage in the evolution from traditional Public Administration to this paradigm. In this sense, he believes that both Public Administration and New Public Management fail to capture the complex reality of the policy design and implementation and public service delivery in the twenty-first century and proposes a new analytical framework concerned with the institutional and external environmental pressures that enable and constrain these processes.

According to this, Osborne (2010b) also points outs that the New Public Governance is both a product of and a response to the increasingly complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation where the central resource-allocation mechanism is the inter-organizational network. In fact, the New Public Governance paradigm is directly related with the relational state model, which substitutes the traditional welfare state model distributing distributes roles, assignments and responsibilities among the state, the market and the civil society (Gaebler and Osborne 1992; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998; Salamon and Elliott 2002; Mendoza and Vernis 2008; Vernis and Mendoza 2009). Table 1 shows this evolution.

Table 1. Public sector reform. The evolution of paradigms

Traditional welfare state		Relational State
Traditional Public Administration	New Public Management	New Public Governance

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

In the framework of this relational state model (New Public Governance paradigm), considering the progressive outsourcing of public services, and the ensuing diversification of PPC practices, the first challenge we faced in this research was

directly linked to the "PPC" concept itself. In this sense, as is shown in Table 2, direct and indirect provision, together with privatization, are the three possible scenarios in the delivery of public services to citizens.

Table 2. Public service design and delivery regimes

Direct	Indirect	Privatization
Public provision Public production	Public provision Private production	Private provision Private production

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

In this context, if we focus our attention on the indirect provision of public services based on the prevalent type of discretionality (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; 2011),[1] we can distinguish two different scenarios: outsourcing, characterized by public discretionality; and PPC, characterized by a shared discretionality between the public and the private sector, also known as 'collaborative governance'. At this point, it is important to clarify that, when there is private discretionality, as happens with philanthropy or corporate social responsibility activities, we cannot speak about PPC, even if the objective of these activities is to pursue a public good (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; Osborne 2010; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011). All these elements are visualized in Table 3.

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[1] Discretion exists when the decision-maker has the power to make a choice about whether to act or not act, or to approve or not approve, with or without conditions. In this context, discretionality is the power or right of a public or private entity to make decisions based on their own judgment within general legal guidelines.

Table 3. Indirect provision of public services scenarios, based on the type of discretionality

Discretionality	Public discretionality	Shared discretionality (collaborative governance)		Private discretionality
Indirect provision typology	Outsourcing	Public-private collaboration (public-private partnerships)		Philanthropy and corporate social responsibility activities
Instruments	Contracts	Formalized	Non-formalized	
		Contracts Agreements New entities	Networks	
Legal formulas	Different legal formulas depending on the location			

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

Regarding the instruments that public managers can use to formalize these two indirect provision scenarios, outsourcing refers to contracting out and, depending on the location, there are often different legal formulas to formalize such contracts. It is important to remark that differences in national traditions make public services delivery an area of great diversity (Warner and Bel 2008). Likewise, when we speak about instruments to materialize PPC, we need to distinguish formalized and non-formalized formulas of PPC. In the former, we can find instruments like contracts, agreements or the creation of a new entity, among others. In the latter, we find a great diversity of networks depending on the objectives to be achieved and the actors involved (Powel 2003; Agranoff 2007).

Finally, it is important to highlight that although we consider the terms 'PPC' and 'public-private partnership' synonymous, following Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011, 256) approach, we prefer to use the former rather than the latter. Partnership, with its

connotation that the two parties are in roughly parallel situations, as with business partners who align their efforts to purse the commercial goals that motivate them both, has become a perniciously brad category spanning the whole spectrum of delegation, from cut-and-dried contractual outsourcing to the loftiest forms of philanthropy. As a consequence, in a lot of occasions misrepresents the nature of the relationship because the roles of government and private party are rarely even roughly parallel. Thus, the term partnership misses the essence of the situation all along the spectrum of public and private engagement.

Once clarified what we should understand by PPC, the second challenge we faced in this research was deciding which PPC dimensions were more relevant to study. In this sense, we decided to include the three following ones due to their theoretical and social relevance:

- Review why the public sector decides to initiate PPCs, and examine how the nature of these reasons affects its success (Paper 1).
- Propose ways to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC processes, both overall and by key dimensions. Likewise, identify those institutional and organizational contexts which are most favourable in successfully promoting and managing these collaborations (Paper 2).
- Establishing a connection between PPC and urban development; compare public and private sector leadership in urban transformation initiatives in Washington D.C.; and examine how this leadership differ in terms of social and economic consequences (Paper 3).

1.2. Theoretical and social relevance of my doctoral study

In order to face the challenges of globalization and the crises of the welfare state (Kaufmann 1991; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998), advanced democracies have evolved towards a model of relational state, which distributes roles, assignments and responsibilities among the state, the market and the civil society (Gaebler and Osborne

1992; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998; Salamon and Elliott 2002; Mendoza and Vernis 2008; Vernis and Mendoza 2009). In fact, public-private collaboration (PPC) is a phenomenon that has grown spectacularly since the early 1980s. Currently, policy-making processes usually develop in complex networks of public and private institutions (Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer 1995), and public service delivery requires the management of complex interorganizational relationships (Osborne 2010b). So great has this evolution been that, today, it seems unimaginable to conceive of public institutions operating alone (Osborne 2010a).

In this context, this research aims to contribute to the study of PPC by analysing three key dimensions. Firstly, it reviews why the public sector decides to initiate PPCs, and examines how the nature of these reasons affects its success. Secondly, it proposes ways to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC processes, both overall and by key dimensions. Likewise, the study identifies those institutional and organizational contexts which are most favourable in successfully promoting and managing these collaborations. Lastly, this research establishes a connection between PPC and urban development; it compares public and private sector leadership in urban transformation initiatives in Washington D.C.; and it examines how this leadership differ in terms of social and economic consequences.

In a strictly academic sphere, the relevance of this research rests on the fact that introduces the differentiation between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC, not only to classify all possible reasons for initiating PPCs, but also to understand how the proactive or reactive nature of these reasons affect its chances of success. Likewise, because no attempt to build a comprehensive conceptual and methodological tool to objectively measure the functioning of PPC has been made. The closest researchers have come to this issue is in studies linked to public-private partnerships that employ the concept of critical success factors (CSFs) to enhance the understanding and best ways of implementing PPPs (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015). However, together with the fact that these CSFs do not represent an integral assessment, there is no consensus among scholars about what the main CSFs are depending on circumstances. Last but not least, this research tries to overcome the existing gap in the literature on whether there is necessarily a difference in outcomes when urban development is led by the public versus the private sector.

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However, the relevance of this project goes beyond the academic sphere, strictly speaking, and positions itself on a social level. In this sense, it rests on the fact that, despite existing good practices in terms of PPC, there are not too many systematic studies on which institutional and organizational capabilities are required to properly manage these collaborations to increase their chances of success. Bearing in mind the significant organizational transformation processes which public administration will necessarily experience in the following years, it is important to build a conceptual and analytical framework to direct them. Thus, this research has important potentialities in terms of knowledge transference to public and private institutions.

1.3. Conceptual and analytical coherence across the three papers that make up this dissertation report

Like we mentioned above, the three papers included in the present doctoral dissertation report develop three different key dimensions of PPC:

- **Paper 1**, titled "Proactive and reactive reasons for initiating public-private collaboration and its consequences in terms of success," focuses on analysing why the public sector decides to embark on collaborations with private partners, and which is the existing link between the nature of these reasons and PPC success.

- Developing what we should understand by PPC success, **Paper 2**, titled "Understanding public-private collaboration processes: measuring degrees of success and identifying institutional and organizational contexts that contribute to success," examines how to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC processes, globally and by key dimensions. Likewise, this paper seeks to identify which institutional and organizational contexts are more favourable to successfully promote and manage these collaborations.

- Finally, **Paper 3**, titled "Comparing public and private sector leadership in urban development in Washington, D.C.," connects PPC with urban development and

compares a public sector-led redevelopment with a private sector-led redevelopment in two different geographical areas of Washington D.C. However, in this case, the investigation focuses on comparing public and private sector leadership and how they differ in terms of social and economic consequences.

From a methodological point of view, Papers 1 and 2 are closely related because both of them have been developed on the basis of an original database about public-private collaboration build from scratch, on the framework of the present Ph.D., and have a quantitative approach. On the other hand, Paper 3 has a qualitative approach, analysing and comparing two case studies, and it is the product of extensive data analysis, documentary review, and in-depth interviews. The following section describes in detail the research design and methodology of these three papers.

Finally, it is important to mention that the fieldwork linked to Papers 1 and 2 was carried out from October 2012 to April 2014 (19 months), in Barcelona, while the fieldwork linked to Papers 3 was carried out from July 2015 to May 2017 (23 months), in Washington D.C., during my visiting research appointment at the Harvard Kennedy School. In fact, the three papers have been enriched due to my stay at Harvard.

Firstly, because Professor John Donahue, one of the world's top specialists in public-private collaboration and my supervisor there, has reviewed the first two papers proposing ideas to improve them. In this sense, he considers that they make significant contributions and encourages me to send them to publish to top public administration journals included in the JCR Social Science Edition: "The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory" (top Quartile 1, for Paper 1) and "International Public Management Journal" (top Quartile 2, for Paper 2). After finishing the PhD and introducing the subsequent improvements these two papers will be submitted to these journals.

Likewise, the third article has been presented and discussed at the M-RCBG academic board, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and it is already published as a Harvard Kennedy School working paper. Likewise, I am planning to send it to the top academic journal in urban studies and planning "Cities. The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning" (JCR, top Quartile 1) as soon as I finish the PhD and I introduce the

subsequent improvements. In the following pages I include the abstracts of these three papers.

Paper 1: **Proactive and reactive reasons for initiating public-private collaboration and its consequences in terms of success**

Abstract: Public-private collaboration (PPC) is a phenomenon that has grown spectacularly over the last few decades. So much so that nowadays, it seems unimaginable to conceive of public institutions operating alone. In this context, this study seeks to analyse the existing link between public sector reasons for a PPC initiative and its chances of success. This study also develops the current theoretical framework regarding collaborative governance and asks the following questions: Why does the public sector decide to embark on collaborations with private partners? What are the main reasons behind these decisions? How does the nature of these reasons affect the collaboration's chances of success? To answer these questions, this paper differentiates between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC. We examine the conceptual robustness of these two approaches to classify all possible reasons for embarking on PPC, and also, to understand how the proactive or reactive nature of these reasons affect chances of success. The paper offers evidence in support that (1) PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (to improve efficacy, efficiency and quality of public goods and services), while reactive reasons (to cover internal deficits and problems) play a secondary but, in no case, residual role; and (2) PPCs initiated for proactive motives are more likely to be successful than those initiated for reactive ones. This paper also aims to contribute to the study of the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage and increase the chances of success of PPC initiatives, and to build a conceptual and analytical framework to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

Paper 2: **Understanding public-private collaboration processes: measuring degrees of success and identifying institutional and organizational contexts that contribute to success**

Abstract: Collaborative governance practices have grown since the early 1980s and, nowadays, policy-making processes usually develop in complex networks of public and

private institutions, and public service delivery requires managing complex interorganizational relationships. In this context, this study aims to develop the current theoretical framework concerning critical success factors, usually limited to the study of public-private partnerships, analysing how to objectively measure the degree of success of public-private collaboration processes (understood in a broad sense) by building one general index and four subindexes to measure success globally and by key dimensions. Likewise, calculating and comparing the obtained results in different administrative realities, this paper seeks to identify which institutional and organizational contexts are more favourable to successfully promote and manage public-private collaboration initiatives. Constructed on the basis of an original database built from scratch, this study demonstrates the importance of building a comprehensive conceptual and methodological apparatus to detect where significant areas for improvement lie, and suggests that public administrations, despite being affected by generalized uniformity and rigidity of their legal and organizational framework, fail more frequently in those areas that depend entirely on themselves: the role played by the public administration, human resources and internal organization. Another interesting insight from this research is that larger administrations, due to their greater economic, human and organizational resources, and executive agencies, due to their principal-agent approach, are better prepared to successfully promote and manage these collaborations, with the impact of this second dimension greater in terms of favouring success. Finally, this paper also aims to suggest strategic measures to ensure better functioning of public-private collaborations, and to inform the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

Paper 3: **Comparing public and private sector leadership in urban development in Washington, D.C.**

Abstract: Washington, D.C., the nation's capital, and dozens of other American cities were hit by riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King in April of 1968. Large parts of Washington, D.C. were looted and burned. The Fourteenth Street corridor, from Thomas Circle in the south to Columbia Heights approximately two miles to the north, was one of the areas most adversely affected. For the next thirty years or so, much of it was populated by burned-out and boarded up buildings and plagued by drug dealing, prostitution and other crimes. That changed only when developers in the late 1990s saw opportunities for private sector redevelopment dictated by a market that had not previously existed. Almost twenty years before, another part of

the District of Columbia was devastated too, but not by rioters. The government instead wielded the wrecking ball. In the first significant federally funded urban renewal project in country, the government in the early 1950s acquired almost all existing properties in the southwest quadrant of the city, some 521 acres in all, bulldozed its slums and forced virtually all who lived there to move elsewhere. It did so largely through the exercise of eminent domain, a process by which the government forcibly takes private property for public purposes constrained only by the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation. The redevelopment that ensued was largely a product of government planning supported by government subsidy. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the essentially public sector-led redevelopment of Southwest and the essentially private sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor, several decades later, had significantly different social and economic consequences and, if not, why not.

1.4. Research design and methodology

The first two papers included in the present doctoral dissertation report have been developed on the basis of an original database about public-private collaboration build from scratch, on the framework of the present Ph.D., and have a quantitative approach. In this sense, it is remarkable that the considerable effort of building this database has allowed me to have a complete research experience. In fact, this process lasted for years (October 2012 - April 2014) and, working closely with my thesis director, it has turned out to be a formidable formative process. Considering that there is, in fact, a lack of empirical research carried out on this particular topic,[2] this database is an attempt to overcome this limitation generating primary data of considerable value. At this point, it is important to highlight that the database itself constitutes a valuable product of this doctoral thesis offering comparable data about public-private collaboration. In fact, it contains several dimensions not analysed yet that I pretend to exploit in the framework of my postdoctoral research.

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[2] Even some scholars have pointed out that the complexity and dynamic nature of public-private collaboration hinders the possibility of a quantitative study (Agranoff and Radin 1991; Marshall 1995; Börzel 1998; Lewis 2000).

On the other hand, the third paper included in the present doctoral dissertation report has a qualitative approach, analysing and comparing two case studies, and it is the product of extensive data analysis, documentary review, and in-depth interviews. In this sense, the research process behind this qualitative paper (from July 2015 to May 2017) was tremendously challenging because it involved the analysis of historical data from the 1940s onwards and the reconstruction of undocumented political and social events in Washington DC. In this sense, it is remarkable that, in the framework of this project, I reviewed during months more than 150 boxes containing the primary sources available (mainly political documents and historical maps) in two different archives: the United States National Archives and Records Administration and the District of Columbia Office of Public Records. Moreover, the fact of interviewing relevant actors with extremely different backgrounds (politicians, major real estate developers, local business owners, and leaders in non-profits and social service) added an important complexity.

Below, I present the main steps followed and the central challenges faced in carrying out these two different research designs and methodologies.

1.4.1. Research design and methodology for Paper 1 and 2

As mentioned before, Paper 1 and 2 have been developed on the basis of an original database build from scratch, on the framework of the present Ph.D., and have a quantitative approach. In the following lines, I describe how I defined the study population and sampling strategy and how I proceeded to do the data collection and analysis.

1.4.1.1 Defining the study population and sampling strategy

The first challenge I faced in defining the study population was directly linked to the public-private collaboration concept itself. Taking into account the conceptual scheme presented in the conclusions of this dissertation report, the study population of this research comprises all public-private collaboration initiatives promoted by the Spanish public administration (at a central, regional and local level) using a specific contractual

figure called a "public-private collaboration contract." In 2007, the Spanish Parliament approved a new Public Sector Contracts Law[3] creating this innovative contractual figure. This figure, conceived to be used only subsidiarily when the public sector does not have the in-house knowledge needed to define the contract (for example, when there exists a high degree of specialization or an important technological component), involves a high level of collaboration between the public and the private sector, from the very beginning, to define the contract itself. Likewise, this contractual figure establishes a more sophisticated governance model than the one found in a simple outsourcing process, promoting shared discretionality to co-manage the contract and to co-decide subjects like amendments to the contractual conditions. Despite the fact that this legal formula is circumscribed to Spain, its characteristics enable us to make significant and innovative contributions to the international debate.

From the moment this contractual figure was created, in October 2007, to April 2013, when the fieldwork was carried out, the population referred to in this study consisted of 54 public-private collaboration contracts. With this in mind, and the conditions set out below, the decision was not to limit the study to a sample, but to study the entire population, given that it was possible to do so. Taking into account the great diversity of these public-private collaboration contracts, especially in terms of thematic scope and level of Government responsible to promote them, a representative sample would have been almost as big as the entire population. In addition, defining a sample equal to the population (n=N) reduces methodological problems of non-representativeness, avoiding problems linked to statistical sampling theory, thus leading to greater generalizability of the results obtained.

1.4.1.2. Data collection and analysis

After using the Spanish Official State Gazette[4] to identify all public-private collaboration contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations (from October 2007 to April 2013), I classified them taking into account three different dimensions: thematic scope, level of Government responsible to promote the contract, and whether

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[3] Article 11 of Law 30/2007, of 30th October, on Public Sector Contracts.

[4] In Spanish, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

the collaboration was managed or not by an executive agency. Table 1 shows the resulting distribution. At the thematic level, there is great diversity, although infrastructure contracts are clearly predominant, followed by contracts linked to IT services and social and health services. Likewise, if we analyse the existing distribution based on the level of Government responsible to promote the contract, we can see that local administrations, closely followed by Regional administrations, are the ones that mainly promote this contractual figure. Finally, if we take into account if the existing collaboration was managed or not by an executive agency, we realize that executive agencies have used this contractual figure but less extensively that traditional bureaucratic administrations.

Table 1. Public-private collaboration contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations, from October 2007 to April 2013

Thematic scope	Levels of Government			Executive agency		Total
	Central	Regional	Local	Yes	No	
Education, culture and leisure services	0	0	1	0	1	1
Infrastructure	8	5	14	5	22	27
IT services	0	6	3	7	2	9
Social and health services	0	8	0	8	0	8
Urban planning services	0	0	2	0	2	2
Utility services (water, gas, electricity)	0	2	5	1	6	7
Total	8	21	25	21	33	54

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

For each of these 54 public-private collaboration contracts, I conducted extensive documentary analysis, reviewing more than 3,000 pages of administrative and technical clauses to tenders, reports, newspapers, magazines, and website data to be able to contextualize each collaboration. In addition to this documentary analysis, I also administered an extensive questionnaire to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. The combination of different information sources allowed for triangulation, thereby enhancing validity, generalizability and transferability of the results obtained.

The questionnaire for the awarded contracts (successful) contained 35 questions, including dichotomous, multiple choice; rating scale, Likert scale, and open-ended questions. As regards content, following some introductory questions about the collaboration context, I included a detailed set of questions about the reasons for initiating the collaboration, and questions on the planning, monitoring and evaluation activities carried out. I also incorporated a number of questions regarding specific characteristics of the collaboration (relationship between the parties, risk sharing, leadership, etc.) and about their consequences. The questionnaire for the relinquished contracts (unsuccessful) contained only 24 questions (11 questions fewer than the questionnaire for the awarded contracts) because, as the contract process was over, questions about the collaboration functioning and consequences are not relevant (see the different models of the questionnaire included in Annexes I and II).

These questionnaires were created electronically (using Survey Monkey) and initially sent by email to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. Prior work had been done to verify, by email and phone, the highest ranking individual in charge in each case. Using this self-administered method, and after two reminders, I had a response from 41 out of 54 public managers. To get a response from the remaining 13, I scheduled telephone interviews (in 9 cases) and in-person interviews (in 4 cases). Finally, I used SPSS and Excel, depending on the case, to process the data.

1.4.2. Research design and methodology for Paper 3

As mentioned before, Paper 3 has a qualitative approach and analyses two case studies, from a comparative perspective. In fact, this research is the product of extensive data analysis, documentary review, and in-depth interviews. In the following lines, I describe all steps followed to collect all historical and present data on which the paper is based.

- First, I consulted the following United States Census Bureau data for each of the two geographical areas under review: total population; racial composition; average family income; residential property values; educational attainment; employment status; types of households; and age. Given the variation in available data collected

in different census years during the period of our study and the need to find comparable data points, I consulted the "Decennial Census of Population and Housing" to obtain data for the years 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. Because this survey takes place only every 10 years, I complemented it by consulting the "American Community Survey" (five-year estimates) to obtain annually estimated data from 2010 onwards. The identification of all census tracts, for which I gathered Decennial Census or American Community Survey data, is included in Annex III. For each area and year, I selected the census tracts necessary to cover each of the two geographical areas under review. I used the "Social Explorer" tool explore and analyse this data.

- Second, due to limited available online resources given the periods I studied, I went to two different archives: the United States National Archives and Records Administration and the District of Columbia Office of Public Records. Consultation with the National Archives was essential because many records relating to the District of Columbia before the District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973 are stored at the National Archives. During months, I reviewed more than 150 boxes containing the primary sources available (mainly political documents and historical maps). I did not, however, unearth all possibly relevant materials because doing so would have been impossible given the time available and the limitations of relevant cataloguing systems in identifying relevant materials. Additionally, to consult other remarkable primary sources, I went to two libraries: the U.S. Department of Transportation library and the D.C. Public Library.

- Third, I reviewed more than 5,000 pages of books, academic journals, newspapers, magazines, websites and other research materials pertinent to the general subject of urban renewal and the renewal activities that took place in the areas under review.

- Fourth, I consulted all official maps and documents approved by the District of Columbia Zoning Commission from 1950 until the present, including major changes in 1958; 1966; 1973; 1975; 1977; 1983; 1984; 1987; 1996; 2002; and 2016.

- Finally, between July of 2015 and June of 2016, I interviewed or consulted with thirty-three individuals, with extremely different backgrounds, who were involved in or otherwise knowledgeable about the matters under review or were otherwise

sources of pertinent information. Those interviewed were chosen so as to give me a range of perspectives and experiences relating to the transformation of the two geographical areas under review. They included politicians, major real estate developers, local business owners and leaders in non-profits and social service organizations who have long-served the D.C. area. A list of those interviewed or consulted appears in Annex IV.

2. PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE REASONS FOR INITIATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF SUCCESS

PAPER 1

(this paper constitutes an independent section and maintains its own structure)

Abstract: Public-private collaboration (PPC) is a phenomenon that has grown spectacularly over the last few decades. So much so that nowadays, it seems unimaginable to conceive of public institutions operating alone. In this context, this study seeks to analyse the existing link between public sector reasons for a PPC initiative and its chances of success. This study also develops the current theoretical framework regarding collaborative governance and asks the following questions: Why does the public sector decide to embark on collaborations with private partners? What are the main reasons behind these decisions? How does the nature of these reasons affect the collaboration's chances of success? To answer these questions, this paper differentiates between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC. We examine the conceptual robustness of these two approaches to classify all possible reasons for embarking on PPC, and also, to understand how the proactive or reactive nature of these reasons affect chances of success. The paper offers evidence in support that (1) PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (to improve efficacy, efficiency and quality of public goods and services), while reactive reasons (to cover internal deficits and problems) play a secondary but, in no case, residual role; and (2) PPCs initiated for proactive motives are more likely to be successful than those initiated for reactive ones. This paper also aims to contribute to the study of the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage and increase the chances of success of PPC initiatives, and to build a conceptual and analytical framework to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

Key words: public-private collaboration, public-private partnerships, collaborative governance, reactive, proactive.

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to face the challenges of globalization and the crises of the welfare state (Kaufmann 1991; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998), advanced democracies have evolved towards a model of relational state, which gives a new distribution of roles, assignments and responsibilities among the state, the market and the civil society (Gaebler and Osborne 1992; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998; Salamon and Elliott 2002; Mendoza and Vernis 2008; Vernis and Mendoza 2009). In fact, since the early 1980s, there has been a progressive outsourcing of public services and an ensuing diversification of PPC practices (Osborne 2010), so much so that nowadays, it seems unimaginable to conceive of public institutions operating alone.

In this context, this research seeks to analyse the existing link between reasons the public sector has for initiating PPC and its chances of success. We also aim to develop the current theoretical framework regarding collaborative governance and ask the following questions: Why does the public sector decide to collaborate with private partners? What are the main reasons behind this decision? How does the nature of these reasons affect the collaboration's chances of success? In this regard, this study can be considered theoretically relevant because we differentiate between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC, and we are able to verify the conceptual robustness of these two categories, not only to classify all possible reasons for initiating PPCs, but also to understand how the proactive or reactive nature of these reasons affect its chances of success. Additionally, this paper can be considered socially relevant too because it contributes to the study of the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage and increase the chances of success of these collaborations and to build a conceptual and analytical framework to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we examine the reasons for initiating PPC, we explore differentiation between a proactive and reactive strategic approach and we formulate the hypotheses that orientate our research. Secondly, we define the research population and sampling strategy, and we explain the methodology used for data collection and analysis. Thirdly, we present the empirical findings and the most relevant results of our analysis. Finally, we draw some conclusions and suggest further areas of research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

2.1. Why initiate public-private collaboration?

Collaborative governance experiences unfold within a multi-layered context of political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental, and other contexts that create opportunities and constraints, and influence the dynamics and performance of collaboration at the outset and over time (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012). However, beyond this context of reference, each PPC experience promoted by the public sector is initiated for a number of specific reasons. In this respect, the existing literature clearly identifies the following three main reasons: seeking a cost reduction to improve efficiency; taking advantage of private sector knowledge and experience; and providing higher quality services.[5]

Most authors agree that cost reduction to improve efficiency is one of the main reasons behind the decision to collaborate with the private sector (Hood 1991; Stiglitz 1999; Suleiman 2003; Young 2005; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006; Martínez 2006; Smith 2006; Sako and Tierney 2007; Hupe and Hill 2009; Silvestre 2010; McIvor, McCracken, and Mchugh 2011; Bel and Warner 2015; Garrone and Marzano 2015). In addition, these authors assume that governments rationally compare external versus internal provision choices and base their assessment primarily on efficiency arguments (Garrone and Marzano 2015). With this in mind, Silvestre (2010) puts forward the idea that the public bureaucratic apparatus is more expensive than private organizations, and Young (2007) affirms that there exists a general agreement that PPC reduces costs by 20%. However, the evidence is mixed as to the reasons why (Hartley and Huby 1985; Domberger 1994; Hodge 1996).

Especially interesting is how Donahue and Zeckhauser (2006) and Young (2007) develop the idea of PPC as an operational tool to reduce costs and enable an organization to focus on its core competences. Complementing this, Young (2005;

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[5] Taking into account that factors such as specialization are behind all these drivers, we can assume that all of reasons are, at some point, interrelated (Lacity 1993; Ang 1994). However, considering the objectives of this research, we will analyse them separately.

2007) adds that choosing the right services to contract (easy to measure, clearly non-core and with a low transaction frequency) can guarantee good outcomes, such as lower costs. Likewise, Garrone and Marzano (2015) and Hwang, Gay, and Zhao-Xianbo (2013) analyse productivity and emphasize the role played by the search for managerial efficiency and scale economies. Regarding which type of private collaborator can better improve efficiency; Owen (2013) interestingly and unorthodoxically claims that the not-for-profit model has managed to drive down operating and financing costs and customer bills faster than traditional private-sector utility management approaches. Lastly, it is important to highlight that some important studies on cost reduction provide inconclusive results (Ferris 1997; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2000; López-Casasnovas 2003).

Another reason for initiating collaboration, which is widely cited in the literature, is to take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience. Most authors link PPC to an improvement in service delivery by placing it in hands of private specialist suppliers (Cannadi and Dollery 2005; González, Cárcaba, and Ventura 2011; Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-Lorenzo 2012; Bel, Brown, and Marques 2013) and by transferring knowledge between these suppliers and the public sector (Norton and Blanco 2009). Nevertheless, other authors prefer to read this practice as a way to complement public sector capabilities (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Barthélemy 2003; Gazley and Brudney 2007; McIvor, McCracken, and McHugh 2011; Gonzalez, Llopis, and Gasco 2013). In this regard, Burnes and Anastasiadis (2003) describe a mutual learning process in which the private sector can learn lessons from the more structured approach of the public sector and the public sector can benefit from the private sector's ability to take a more strategic approach both to what to contract out and how to organize and manage the activity. However, other scholars point out that there is a unidirectional dependency by public agencies on private sector expertise (Milward, Provan, and Else 1993). Finally, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2006) prefer to speak about private sector information, rather than private sector knowledge and experience.

Closely related to this better private sector knowledge and experience, other authors prefer to emphasise how PPC can provide higher quality services (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Barthélemy 2003; Burnes and Anastasiadis 2003; Cannadi and Dollery 2005; Silvestre 2010; González, Cárcaba, and Ventura 2011; McIvor, McCracken, and

McHugh 2011; Gonzalez, Llopis, and Gasco 2013; Hwang, Gay, and Zhao-Xianbo 2013). Linked to this, an interesting perspective is provided by those who consider that PPC, as we saw above when we were reviewing cost reduction to improve efficiency. A number of scholars argue that public-private cooperation results in better quality in all public services, because public organizations can focus on strategic operations and delegate those considered less important (Brown and Potoski 2003; González, Cárcaba, and Ventura 2011; Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-Lorenzo 2012). However, there also exists an important academic debate about how PPC, due to a lack of control, may also undermine the quality of service delivery (Domberger 1994; Young 2007), though this is more related to the consequences rather than the causes of PPC.

In addition to these three main reasons, the literature also identifies other important explanations to take into account when we analyse why a public institution decides to initiate PPC. These include: improving management flexibility; the need for private funding; sharing risks with the private sector; political and ideological reasons; keeping up to date with technological innovation; and because PPC is fashionable. In the following paragraphs, we will analyse each of these in turn.

When we speak about management flexibility we refer to the capacity to adapt decisions depending on context. In this regard, some authors consider that PPC seeks to improve management flexibility (Lamothe and Lamothe 2016), labour flexibility being the most relevant issue (Rimmer 1993; Hodge 1996; Young 2005). With reference to labour flexibility, Lamothe and Lamothe (2016) say that policymakers and managers can terminate outsourced services, regardless of vendor type, without encountering strong resistance from public workers. However, Thurmaier and Wood (2002) explain that PPC is not the only way to achieve this management flexibility because inter-local collaborations, for example, can be a less formal option that managers can use to obtain almost the same result.

In terms of private funding, the internationalization of financial markets and the opening up of states to foreign investment has led to strong pressure in government administrations not to increase public budgets or incur deficits (Salamon 2002). In this context, disposing of private capital alleviates fiscal constraints and opens the door to maintaining or expanding key public services (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Barthélemy

2003; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; Martínez 2006; McIvor, McCracken, and McHugh 2011; Gonzalez, Llopis, and Gasco 2013). In addition, efficient private operators do have an indirect positive financial contribution to make by improving the creditworthiness of the public entity and allowing it, henceforth, to secure funding for investment more easily and at better terms (Marin 2009). Finally, from a societal perspective, Lodigiani and Pesenti (2014) understand private forms of funding as an opportunity to strengthen social ties, to re-socialize risks and to produce shared value.

Likewise, the literature identifies PPC as an opportunity to improve risk-sharing practices between the public and the private sectors (Marin 2009; Hwang, Gay, and Zhao-Xianbo 2013; Owen 2013; Lodigiani and Pesenti 2014; Yang et al. 2017). However, almost all authors have a critical view about how the public sector takes advantage of sharing risks with the private sector. Owen (2013), for example, points out that the role played by the actors involved in PPC need to be redefined, especially in relation to the allocation of operating risk between the actors. Similarly, Yang et al. (2017) conclude that risks should be taken by the party that is best suited to resolving them.

The importance of political and ideological reasons is a controversial topic. While Young (2005; 2007) explains that only by adding a political and ideological perspective can managers' decisions be understood, and Garrone and Marzano (2015) conclude that the ideology of the government in power plays an important role; other authors try to prove that governments are led by pragmatic rather than ideological motives and, therefore, there is no party-political or ideological bias in the decision to promote PPCs (Bel, Brown, and Marques 2013; Petersen, Houlberg, and Christensen 2015; Lamothe and Lamothe 2016).

In the same way, Ramió, Salvador, and García (2007) observe the impossibility of having a technologically updated public administration. Likewise, Gonzalez, Llopis, and Gasco (2013) point out that town halls generally admit that they are not very innovative or advanced either. Therefore, these authors conclude that PPC can help to introduce technological innovation by facilitating the incorporation of creative technological solutions from private firms. In fact, taking advantage of the consequential new management practices to generate innovation and technical progress is quite usual, yet the spread of pre-existing innovation may be a more relevant variable

(Worthington and Dollery 2000; Balaguer-Coll, Prior, and Tortosa-Ausina 2010; Yang et al. 2017).

Finally, trends followed in the past or in the immediate environment can also influence the decision to initiate PPC. Lamothe and Lamothe (2016), for example, find that prior delivery mode is very influential. Likewise, on the basis of their study they claim that the behaviour of neighbouring jurisdictions also matters because, if your neighbours tend to provide a service, you tend to continue to do so as well. This coincides with the results of Bel, Brown, and Marques (2013) when they explain that municipalities have a higher probability of outsourcing if this practice is widespread in neighbouring cities because, firstly, politicians have more available information on the results of outsourcing and, secondly, the contractors already operating in the nearby municipalities can exploit economies of scale and therefore offer attractive contracts to the city. Thus, all these studies show that public institutions can opt for this indirect type of provision because it is fashionable.

2.2. Proactive versus reactive public-private collaboration

Strategy can be defined broadly as the way an organization seeks to align itself with the environment (Meier et al. 2007). Consistent with the strategic-choice approach to the study of organizations (Cyert 1963; Thompson 1967; Weick 1969; Child 1972; Drucker 1974; Chandler 1975; Staw and Salancik 1977), the Miles and Snow (1978) model is the first reference to differentiation between a proactive organizational approach versus a reactive organizational approach. Examining organizational adaptation, they propose a strategic management theoretical framework to deal with alternative ways in which organizations define their strategy, structures and processes. Specifically, taking into account three key problems of organizational adaptation (the entrepreneurial problem, the engineering problem and the administrative problem), they define four strategic ideal types of organizations according to their strategy: defenders, prospectors, analysers and reactors.

Defenders are always looking for greater efficiency in existing operations and trying to minimize risk; prospectors are always exploring environmental change in search on new opportunities for profit; and the analysers are always looking for a balance between

these two approaches: they are always proactive with respect to their environment, though each is proactive in a different way. [6] However, the reactor is a residual strategic type, arising when one of the other three strategies is improperly pursued. Reactors exhibit a pattern of adjustment to their environment that is both inconsistent and unstable, performing poorly as a result, and then being reluctant to act aggressively in the future. Thus, the reactor is a form of strategic failure. In conclusion, the central contention of Miles and Snow's model is that prospectors, defenders, and analysers perform better than reactors, a finding supported in a number of private sector studies like the ones conducted by Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990) and Shortell and Zajac (1990). Finally, as Meier et al. (2007) point out, these strategic orientations are enduring, likely to change only slowly and gradually, and distinct from short-term tactical moves.

While true that very little research has been conducted on patterns of organizational strategy in the public sector (Boyne and Walker 2004); it is also true that Miles and Snow's model is one of the most often used in the study of the public sector. Greenwood (1987), for example, trying to describe how far structural variations throughout local government can be explained by differences in strategic style, used Miles and Snow's model to analyse the role and function of the chief executive office, the extent of overall differentiation and decentralization, and the complexity of the integrative structures. Further research has shown that, taking into account that public organizations are likely to pursue a mix of strategies at the same time, because they are expected to satisfy a range of conflicting and competing goals, it is inappropriate to categorize them as belonging solely to a single type (McDaniel and Kolari 1987; Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990; Boyne and Walker 2004; Desarbo et al. 2005). Consequently, the analyser category in redundant because it is an intermediate type between the defender strategy and the prospector strategy and all organizations are both prospectors and defenders to some extent (Ruekert and Walker 1987).

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[6] Considering that Miles and Snow (1978) define these ideal types with a view to the private sector, Greenwood (1987, 298) redefines these concepts exemplifying them in a very visual way. For example, he says that defenders are 'organizations that compete by solving today's problems and by meeting today's demands with today's product' and prospectors are 'organizations that pioneer new products and markets and seek success by providing tomorrow's product today.'

This modified version of Miles and Snow's model of strategy content has subsequently been tested by authors like Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2006), Meier et al. (2007), Enticott and Walker (2008), Andrews et al. (2009) or Gonzalez et al. (2013); for the analysis of local administrations, public schools or other types of public bodies. Three conclusions of these studies to highlight are the following: public services do have distinctive and coherent strategies, which fit the Miles and Snow categories of defender, prospector and reactor (Andrews et al. 2009); strategy can be separated out from other elements of management for a distinguishable assessment of its impact on organizational performance (Meier et al. 2007); and finally, the fact that there exists a hierarchy of strategy types, the impact of prospecting being positive, defending neutral, and reacting negative (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006).

In this study we propose to use the model created by Ramió, Salvador, and García (2007). They propose a modified version of the theoretical framework built by Miles and Snow, distinguishing between only two organization strategy categories to analyse public institutions: the proactive category, which brings together and replaces the prospector and defender categories, and the reactive category, which is equivalent to the reactor category. In this sense, the distinction between prospectors, always exploring environmental change in search on new opportunities, and defenders, always looking for greater efficiency in existing operations trying to minimize risk, only makes sense in the private sector. However, to analyse the public sector, it seems more convenient to focus our attention on the fact that both categories share a proactive approach with respect to their environment, though each is proactive in a different way. Likewise, the reactive category, originally named reactor and described as a residual strategy arising when the other strategies are improperly pursued, is here presented as a more intentional strategic failure. Table 1 sums up the evolution of Miles and Snow's original model to the model we use in this study.

Table 1. Proactive and reactive organizational strategies in the public sector

Models	Authors	Organizational strategies	
		Proactive categories	**Reactive categories**
Original model	Created by: <u>Miles and Snow (1978)*</u> Used by: Greenwood (1987)	Defender Prospector Analyser	Reactor
Adapted model	Created by: <u>Boyne and Walker, 2004</u> Used by: Andrews et al. (2006) Meier et al. (2007) Enticott and Walker (2008) Andrews et al. (2009) Gonzalez et al. (2013)	Defender Prospector	Reactor
Model used in this study	Created by: <u>Ramió et al. (2007)</u>	Proactive	Reactive

* The Miles and Snow model was originally applied to the private sector.

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

Applying this dual model to PPC, Ramió, Salvador, and García (2007) establish that a proactive organizational approach is characterized by a public sector that promotes collaboration with the private sector to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency and better quality in the provision of public goods and services. On the contrary, a reactive organizational approach is characterized by a public sector that promotes collaboration with the private sector not to improve management but to cover its own internal budgetary, technological and human resources deficits and problems. We suspect that this differentiation has important consequences in the chances of success of PPC initiative, based on the conceptual construction itself of these two categories – proactive and reactive. While a proactive approach facilitates the commitment of public institutions to strongly support planning, monitoring and evaluation activities, something that we understand increases the chances of success of PPC processes, a

reactive approach normally involves a rejection of those activities, thereby increasing the chances of failure. Thus, we are facing a dysfunctional model that produces worse results in terms of institutional effectiveness and efficiency, resulting in a decline in quality.

2.3. Research hypotheses

With this theoretical framework in mind, the two objectives of this research are:

- to identify the main reasons behind the public sector decision to initiate PPC (the descriptive objective);
- to explain how the nature of these reasons affect its chances of success (the explanatory objective).

We first aim to validate the following two hypotheses to verify the conceptual robustness of the categories proactive and reactive PPC.

- **Hypothesis 1 (H1):** In the case of proactive reasons for initiating PPC, there is a positive relationship between the assessment of the planning activities carried out prior to initiating collaboration and the importance given to these proactive reasons (at the time of making the decision to initiate a PPC). In other words, the more planning activities carried out, the greater the importance given to proactive reasons.

- **Hypothesis 2 (H2):** In the case of reactive reasons for initiating PPC, there is a negative relationship between the assessment of the planning activities carried out prior to initiating a collaboration and the importance given to these reactive reasons (at the time of making the decision to initiate a PPC). In other words, the fewer planning activities carried out, the greater the importance given to reactive reasons.

Secondly, after verifying the conceptual robustness of these categories, we will try to validate the last two hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 3 (H3):** PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (looking forward to improve effectiveness, efficiency and the quality of public goods and services) while reactive reasons (looking forward to cover internal deficits and problems) only play a residual role.

- **Hypothesis 4 (H4):** Taking into account the greater number of planning activities carried out, PPCs initiated for proactive reasons are more likely to be successful than PPCs initiated for reactive reasons.

Testing these four hypotheses allowed us not only to develop Ramió, Salvador, and García's (2007) model, validating the conceptual robustness of these two categories, but also to carry out an original analysis using this organizational strategy differentiation to classify all possible reasons for initiating PPC and to measure how the proactive or reactive nature of these reasons affects the collaboration's chances of success.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

Some point out that the complexity and dynamic nature of PPC hinders the possibility of a quantitative study (Agranoff and Radin 1991; Marshall 1995; Börzel 1998; Lewis 2000). There is, in fact, a lack of empirical research carried out on this particular topic. In an attempt to overcome this limitation, this research is constructed on the basis of an original database about PPC built from scratch by the authors. Below, we present the main steps followed and the central challenges faced in carrying out this research.

3.1. Defining the study population and sampling strategy

Considering the progressive outsourcing of public services, and the ensuing diversification of PPC practices, the first challenge we faced in defining the study population was directly linked to the 'PPC' concept itself. As is shown in Table 2, direct and indirect provision, together with privatization, are the three possible scenarios in the delivery of public services to citizens.

Table 2. Public service design and delivery regimes

Direct	Indirect	Privatization
Public provision Public production	Public provision Private production	Private provision Private production

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

In this context, if we focus our attention on the indirect provision of public services based on the prevalent type of discretionality (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; 2011),[7] we can distinguish two different scenarios: outsourcing, characterized by public discretionality; and PPC, characterized by a shared discretionality between the public and the private sector, also known as 'collaborative governance'. At this point, it is important to clarify that, when there is private discretionality, as happens with philanthropy or corporate social responsibility activities, we cannot speak about PPC, even if the objective of these activities is to pursue a public good (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; Osborne 2010; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011).

Regarding the instruments that public managers can use to formalize these two indirect provision scenarios, outsourcing refers to contracting out and, depending on the location, there are often different legal formulas to formalize such contracts. Likewise, when we speak about instruments to materialize PPC, we need to distinguish formalized and non-formalized formulas of PPC. In the former, we can find instruments like contracts, agreements or the creation of a new entity, among others. In the latter, we find a great diversity of networks depending on the objectives to be achieved and the actors involved (Powel 2003; Agranoff 2007). Finally, it is important to highlight that although we consider the terms 'PPC' and 'public-private partnership' synonymous, following Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011, 256) approach, we prefer to use the former rather than the latter. All these elements are visualised in Table 3.

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[7] Discretion exists when the decision-maker has the power to make a choice about whether to act or not act, or to approve or not approve, with or without conditions. In this context, discretionality is the power or right of a public or private entity to make decisions based on their own judgment within general legal guidelines.

Table 3. Indirect provision of public services scenarios, based on the type of discretionality

Discretionality	Public discretionality	Shared discretionality (collaborative governance)		Private discretionality
Indirect provision typology	Outsourcing	Public-private collaboration (public-private partnerships)		Philanthropy and corporate social responsibility activities
Instruments	Contracts	Formalized	Non-formalized	
		Contracts Agreements New entities	Networks	
Legal formulas	Different legal formulas depending on the location			

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

Taking into account this conceptual scheme, the study population of this research comprises all PPC initiatives promoted by the Spanish public administration (at a central, regional and local level) using a specific contractual figure called a 'PPC contract.' In 2007, the Spanish Parliament approved a new Public Sector Contracts Law[8] creating this innovative contractual figure. This figure, conceived to be used only subsidiarily when the public sector does not have the in-house knowledge needed to define the contract (for example, when there exists a high degree of specialization or an important technological component), involves a high level of collaboration between the public and the private sector, from the very beginning, to define the contract itself. Likewise, this contractual figure establishes a more sophisticated governance model than the one found in a simple outsourcing process, promoting shared discretionality to co-manage the contract and to co-decide subjects like amendments to the contractual conditions. Despite the fact that this legal formula is circumscribed to Spain, its characteristics enable us to make significant and innovative contributions to the international debate.

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[8] Article 11 of Law 30/2007, of 30th October, on Public Sector Contracts.

From the moment this contractual figure was created, in October 2007, to April 2013, when the fieldwork was carried out, the population referred to in this study consisted of 54 PPC contracts. With this in mind, and the conditions set out below, the decision was not to limit the study to a sample, but to study the entire population, given that it was possible to do so. Taking into account the great diversity of these PPC contracts, especially in terms of thematic scope and level of Government responsible to promote them, a representative sample would have been almost as big as the entire population. In addition, defining a sample equal to the population (n=N) reduces methodological problems of non-representativeness, avoiding problems linked to statistical sampling theory, thus leading to greater generalizability of the results obtained.

3.2. Data collection and analysis

After using the Spanish Official State Gazette[9] to identify all PPC contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations (from October 2007 to April 2013), we classified them taking into account three different dimensions: thematic scope, level of Government responsible to promote the contract, and whether the collaboration was managed or not by an executive agency. Table 4 shows the resulting distribution. At the thematic level, there is great diversity, although infrastructure contracts are clearly predominant, followed by contracts linked to IT services and social and health services. Likewise, if we analyse the existing distribution based on the level of Government responsible to promote the contract, we can see that local administrations, closely followed by Regional administrations, are the ones that mainly promote this contractual figure. Finally, if we take into account if the existing collaboration was managed or not by an executive agency, we realize that executive agencies have used this contractual figure but less extensively that traditional bureaucratic administrations.

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[9] In Spanish, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

Table 4. Public-private collaboration contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations, from October 2007 to April 2013

Thematic scope	Levels of Government			Executive agency		Total
	Central	Regional	Local	Yes	No	
Education, culture and leisure services	0	0	1	0	1	1
Infrastructure	8	5	14	5	22	27
IT services	0	6	3	7	2	9
Social and health services	0	8	0	8	0	8
Urban planning services	0	0	2	0	2	2
Utility services (water, gas, electricity)	0	2	5	1	6	7
Total	8	21	25	21	33	54

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

For each of these 54 PPC contracts, we conducted extensive documentary analysis, reviewing more than 3,000 pages of administrative and technical clauses to tenders, reports, newspapers, magazines, and website data to be able to contextualize each collaboration. In addition to this documentary analysis, we also administered an extensive questionnaire to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. The combination of different information sources allowed for triangulation, thereby enhancing validity, generalizability and transferability of the results obtained.

The questionnaire for the awarded contracts (successful) contained 35 questions, including dichotomous, multiple choice; rating scale, Likert scale, and open-ended questions. As regards content, following some introductory questions about the collaboration context, we included a detailed set of questions about the reasons for initiating the collaboration, and questions on the planning, monitoring and evaluation activities carried out. We also incorporated a number of questions regarding specific characteristics of the collaboration (relationship between the parties, risk sharing, leadership, etc.) and about their consequences. The questionnaire for the relinquished contracts (unsuccessful) contained only 24 questions (11 questions fewer than the questionnaire for the awarded contracts) because, as the contract process was over, questions about the collaboration functioning and consequences are not relevant.

These questionnaires were created electronically (using Survey Monkey) and initially sent by email to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. Prior work had been done to verify, by email and phone, the highest ranking individual in charge in each case. Using this self-administered method, and after two reminders, we had a response from 41 out of 54 public managers. To get a response from the remaining 13, we scheduled telephone interviews (in 9 cases) and in-person interviews (in 4 cases). Finally, we used SPSS to process the data we present in the following section, the main instruments of analysis being frequency tables, to show for each variable collected data values with their corresponding frequencies, and contingency tables, to show relationships between variables.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

After reviewing the main reasons for initiating PPC, together with studying the differentiation between proactive and reactive organizational approaches, we realized that the three main reasons traditionally identified by the literature (cost reduction to improve efficiency; taking advantage of private sector knowledge and experience; and providing higher quality services) could clearly be classified as proactive reasons. Likewise, other reasons traditionally recognized, like improving management flexibility or introducing technological innovation, are openly proactive too. In fact, only three of the reasons identified by the literature (sharing risks with the private sector; because PPC is fashionable; and political and ideological reasons) generate doubts about how to classify them from a conceptual point of view. On the one hand, it seems that these reasons are not directly linked to achieving greater effectiveness, efficiency and better quality in the provision of public goods and services. On the other hand, these reasons are not directly linked either to covering the internal budgetary, technological and human resources deficits and problems. Finally, it is important to highlight that the traditional literature only identifies one clear reactive reason for initiating PPC and it is the need for private funding.

Taking this into account, in order to be able to verify the conceptual robustness of the categories 'proactive PPC' (hypothesis 1) and 'reactive PPC' (hypothesis 2); we decided to introduce additional reactive reasons in our survey to provide a more realistic

overview of all elements that can influence public managers at the time of making the decision to initiate PPC. More specifically, in the question 'What were the main reasons for initiating PPC? Rate the importance of the following motives at the time of making the decision', we listed the traditional motives mentioned in the literature (mainly proactive) plus the following reactive ones: inability to provide the service internally; inability to recruit additional staff; scarce public value added by direct management; the public service did not work properly before PPC; the fact that it was a newly created service; and the economic crisis.

Some of these reactive reasons we introduced, like the inability to recruit additional staff or the inability to provide the service internally, are previously mentioned, respectively, by specific authors like Ramió, Salvador, and García (2007) or Warner (2010); but without specifically applying them to PPC. Finally, it is important to highlight that, considering the period of time we are analysing and the economic crisis affecting Spain in this period, we considered it necessary to include the economic crisis (in addition to need for private funding) as a specific reason. In this regard, there is a wide variety of opinions among authors. While Gonzalez, Llopis, and Gasco (2013) or Petersen, Houlberg, and Christensen (2015) consider this factor relevant, other authors like Garrone and Marzano (2015) think that public budget restraints do not play an important role.

4.1. Reasons for initiating public-private collaboration

Figure 1 summarizes the survey results to the question 'What were the main reasons for initiating PPC? Rate the importance of the following motives at the time of making the decision'. The four possible answers, for each reason were, 'Not important', 'Slightly important'; 'Moderately important' or 'Very important.' To facilitate the analysis of the results, we grouped these four categories into two: 'Not/Slightly important' and 'Moderately/Very important'. Figure 1 lists the reasons from most to least important.

Figure 1. Reasons for initiating public-private collaboration. Importance given by public managers at the time of making the decision

Reason	Orange (%)	Green (%)
Cost reduction to improve efficiency	5.6	94.4
Introduce technological innovation	5.6	94.4
Provide higher quality services	13	87
Need for private funding	14.8	85.2
Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience	18.5	81.5
Improve management flexibility	26	74
Share risks with the private sector	27.8	72.2
The economic crisis	37	63
Inability to provide the service internally	37	63
Scarce public value added by direct management	66.6	33.4
Political and ideological reasons	70.4	29.7
Inability to recruit additional staff	70.4	29.6
The fact that it was a newly created service	70.4	29.6
The public service did not work properly before PPC	75.9	24.1
Because PPC is fashionable	87	13

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Considering the percentage of public managers that rated each reason as 'Moderately/Very important' at the time of making the decision, we can divide these reasons into four different groups. Table 5 below summarizes this classification.

Table 5. Percentage of public managers that rated the following reasons as 'Moderately/Very important' at the time of making the decision to initiate public-private collaboration

[0,25]	(25,50]	(50,75]	(75,100]
• Because PPC is fashionable (**13%**) • The public service did not work properly before PPC (**24.1%**)	• Inability to recruit additional staff (**29.6%**) • The fact that it was a newly created service (**29.6%**) • Political and ideological reasons (**29.7%**) • Scarce public value added by direct management (**33.4%**)	• Inability to provide the service internally (**63%**) • The economic crisis (**63%**) • Share risks with the private sector (**72.2%**) • Improve management flexibility (**74%**)	• Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience (**81.5%**) • Need for private funding (**85.2%**) • Provide higher quality services (**87%**) • Introduce technological innovation (**94.4%**) • Cost reduction to improve efficiency (**94.4%**)

*Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis*

Reviewing these results, we can confirm that the three main reasons identified by the literature (taking advantage of private sector knowledge and experience; providing higher quality services; and cost reduction to improve efficiency) are situated in the fourth column, which confirms their importance. In addition, we can also verify that two other reasons listed by the literature (the need for private funding; and introducing technological innovation) are situated in the fourth column, while the other reasons are distributed between the third (share risks with the private sector; and improve management flexibility), second (political and ideological reasons) and first (because PPC is fashionable) columns.

Likewise, if we examine the importance given to the additional reasons we introduced, they are distributed between the third (inability to provide the service internally; and the economic crisis), second (inability to recruit additional staff; the fact that it was a newly created service; and scarce public value added by direct management) and first (the public service does not work properly before PPC) columns. While it is true that no reason is situated in the fourth column, it is also true that these results confirm the need

to include these additional reasons in our analyses to have a more realistic overview of all elements that play a role in this decision.

However, it is necessary to complement this analysis with the answers to the question 'What if you have to choose only one reason?' This question was included in the survey to force public managers to underline the determining factor for initiating the collaboration. Figure 2 shows that only 7 of the 15 possible reasons listed were cited as the main one. From most to least important, 50% of public managers pointed out 'Cost reduction to improve efficiency' as the main reason for initiating the collaboration. The second reason, at 22.2%, was 'Need for private financing'. It is important to highlight that cost reduction to improve efficiency is one of the three main reasons for initiating PPC traditionally identified by the literature, while the need for private funding is also cited as another reason to take into account. Other reasons given were: inability to provide the service internally (9.2%); introduce technological innovation (7.4%); share risks with the private sector (5.6%); take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience (3.7%); and, finally, provide higher quality services (1.9%).

Figure 2. Main reason for initiating public-private collaboration

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

It is noteworthy that the two main reasons ('Cost reduction to improve efficiency' and 'Need for private funding'), which together represent 77.2% of total responses, are linked to difficulties associated with funding. Likewise, the third reason ('Inability to provide the service internally') can be also indirectly linked to scare resources. Finally, the fact that anyone mentions the economic crisis, as the main reason, suggests structural funding problems, irrespective of specific budgetary cuts.

4.2. Conceptual robustness of the categories proactive and reactive public-private collaboration

From a theoretical point of view, we define a proactive approach as one that facilitates the commitment of public institutions to strongly support planning, monitoring and evaluation activities. In contrast, we define a reactive approach as one that involves a rejection of those activities. Taking this into account, in order to be able to verify the conceptual robustness of the categories 'proactive PPC' and 'reactive PPC', we generated contingency tables (column percentage) to provide a basic picture of the relationship between two variables: the assessment of the planning activities carried out (independent variable) and the importance given to each possible reason for initiating PPC (dependent variable). Exploring this relationship allowed us to test our first and second hypotheses, helping us to understand if the planning activities carried out can really help to explain if a reason for initiating PPC can be considered proactive or reactive.

The survey question we used to measure the importance given to each possible reason for initiating PPC was the same we used in Figure 1 and Table 5. Likewise, the survey question we used to measure the assessment of the planning activities carried out was the following: 'Assess, on a scale from 0 to 10, the planning activities carried out before initiating the PPC.' Taking into account the frequency distribution of this discreet numerical variable (which, in our sample, only takes the values 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9), to facilitate the analysis of the results, we grouped the answers creating an ordinal categorical variable with three categories: low {3,5}, medium {6,7} and high {8,9}. The following two tables show the results obtained.

Table 6 groups the reasons for initiating PPC that display proactive behaviour,

characterized by a positive relationship between the assessment of the planning activities carried out prior to initiating collaboration and the importance given to the reasons for initiating this collaboration. So, for each possible reason, we see that, when there is a low assessment of the planning activities, the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' is lower than the one we have when there is a medium assessment of the planning activities. Likewise, this percentage is lower than the one we have when there is a high assessment of the planning activities. Thus, we can conclude that the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' correlates positively with the assessment of the planning activities. To confirm these results, if we focus our attention on the 'Slightly/Not Important' row, we will see that the reverse also applies.

This data allows us to validate our first hypothesis (the more planning activities carried out, the greater the importance given to proactive reasons) because this relationship works in all cases. In this regard, we should note that all proactive reasons mentioned by scholars displayed proactive behaviour according to our definition. In addition, we confirmed that 'sharing risks with the private sector', one of the three reasons identified by the literature as difficult to classify (as not being directly linked to the characteristics of any category), displayed proactive behaviour too.

Finally, it is important to highlight that there is considerable variability in terms of how these percentages grow. On the one hand, at the high end, reasons like 'providing higher quality services' present a variability of 52.4 percentage points among public managers that consider this reason 'Moderately/Very Important' and assess the planning activities as 'low', 'medium' or 'high'. On the other hand, at the low end, reasons like 'cost reduction to improve efficiency' present a variability of 1.2 percentage points. This may make us think that the reasons with greater variability show more proactive behaviour that those with lesser variability. This may has consequences, which we will analyse below. However, at this point, we list them from greater to lesser variability or more to less proactive.

Table 6. Reasons for initiating public-private collaboration that show proactive behaviour

PROACTIVE REASONS Importance attached when making the decision to initiate a public-private collaboration		Planning assessment		
		Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)
Provide higher quality services	Slightly/Not Important	57.7	20.2	5.3
	Moderately/Very Important	**42.3**	**79.8**	**94.7**
Improve management flexibility	Slightly/Not Important	40.8	36.9	11.6
	Moderately/Very Important	**59.2**	**63.1**	**88.4**
Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience	Slightly/Not Important	36.9	30.3	11.6
	Moderately/Very Important	**63.1**	**69.7**	**88.4**
Share risks with the private sector	Slightly/Not Important	40.5	38.2	15.4
	Moderately/Very Important	**59.5**	**61.8**	**84.6**
Introduce technological innovation	Slightly/Not Important	17.8	0.0	0.0
	Moderately/Very Important	**82.2**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Cost reduction to improve efficiency	Slightly/Not Important	3.9	3.6	2.7
	Moderately/Very Important	**96.1**	**96.4**	**97.3**

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Table 7 groups the reasons for initiating PPC that show reactive behaviour, characterized by a negative relationship between the assessment of the planning activities carried out prior to initiating collaboration and the importance given to the reasons for initiating this collaboration. So, for each possible reason for initiating PPC, we see that, when there is a low assessment of the planning activities, the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' is higher than the one we have when there is a moderate assessment of the planning activities. Likewise, this percentage is higher than that we have when there is a high assessment of the planning activities. Thus, we can conclude that there is a negative correlation between the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' and the assessment of planning activities. To confirm these results, if we focus our attention on the 'Slightly/Not Important' row, we will see that the reverse holds true.

This data allows us to validate our second hypothesis: the fewer planning activities carried out, the greater importance given to reactive reasons. This is because this relationship works in all cases except for one (scarce public value added by direct

management), where the value of the middle category is 3.5 percentage points lower than the value of the high category. In this respect, it is noteworthy that not only the reason mentioned in the literature as reactive (need for private funding), but also all potential reactive reasons that we added, in the framework of this research, show reactive behaviour according to our definition. Likewise, we confirmed that two of the three reasons identified by the literature as difficult to classify as not being directly linked to the characteristics of any category (because PPC is fashionable; and political and ideological reasons) show reactive behaviour too.

Finally, it is important to highlight that, regarding reactive reasons, there is also considerable variability, in this case, in terms of how these percentages decrease. On the one hand, at the high end, reasons like 'the fact that it was a newly created service' present a variability of 69.8 percentage points among public managers that consider this reason 'Moderately/Very Important' and assess the planning activities as 'low', 'medium' or 'high'. On the other hand, at the low end, reasons like 'the public service did not work properly before PPC' present a variability of 8.5 percentage points. This may suggest that those reasons with greater variability show more reactive behaviour that those with lesser variability. This may have consequences, as we will analyse further below. However, at this point, we list them from greater to lesser variability or from more to less reactive.

Table 7. Reasons for initiating public-private collaboration that show reactive behaviour

REACTIVE REASONS Importance attached when making the decision to initiate public-private collaboration		Planning assessment		
		Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)
The fact that it was a newly created service	Slightly/Not Important	23.1	84.3	92.9
	Moderately/Very Important	**76.9**	**15.7**	**7.1**
Inability to recruit additional staff	Slightly/Not Important	27.0	61.9	94.8
	Moderately/Very Important	**73.0**	**38.1**	**5.2**
Because PPC is fashionable	Slightly/Not Important	34.6	83.4	97.4
	Moderately/Very Important	**65.4**	**16.6**	**2.6**
Political and ideological reasons	Slightly/Not Important	30.8	84.3	85.8
	Moderately/Very Important	**69.2**	**15.7**	**14.2**
Scarce public value added by direct management	Slightly/Not Important	27.0	79.8	76.3
	Moderately/Very Important	**73.0**	**20.2**	**23.7**
Need for private funding	Slightly/Not Important	17.8	33.4	57.7
	Moderately/Very Important	**82.2**	**66.6**	**42.3**
The economic crisis	Slightly/Not Important	27.0	34.5	48.0
	Moderately/Very Important	**73.0**	**65.5**	**52.0**
Inability to provide the service internally	Slightly/Not Important	19.3	27.4	38.8
	Moderately/Very Important	**80.7**	**72.6**	**61.2**
The public service did not work properly before PPC	Slightly/Not Important	80.8	86.9	89.3
	Moderately/Very Important	**19.2**	**13.1**	**10.7**

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

4.3. Proactive and reactive reasons for initiating public-private collaboration

After verifying the conceptual robustness of these two categories, if we apply them to classify all possible reasons for initiating PPC, we have 6 proactive reasons and 9 reactive reasons. Table 8 shows this division.

Table 8. Proactive and reactive reasons for initiating public-private collaboration. Percentage of public managers that rated the following reasons as 'Moderately/Very important' at the time of making the decision to initiate public-private collaboration

	[0,25]	(25,50]	(50,75]	(75,100]
Proactive			• Share risks with the private sector (**72.2%**) • Improve management flexibility (**74%**)	• Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience (**81.5%**) • Provide higher quality services (**87%**) • Introduce technological innovation (**94.4%**) • Cost reduction to improve efficiency (**94.4%**)
Reactive	• Because PPC is fashionable (**13%**) • The public service did not work properly before PPC (**24.1%**)	• Inability to recruit additional staff (**29.6%**) • The fact that it was a newly created service (**29.6%**) • Political and ideological reasons (**29.7%**) • Scarce public value added by direct management (**33.4%**)	• Inability to provide the service internally (**63%**) • The economic crisis (**63%**)	• Need for private funding (**85.2%**)

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Analysis of the results leads us to conclude that the proactive reasons are clearly situated on the right side of the chart. They are all rated by more than 70% of public managers as 'Moderately/Very important'. In this respect, it is notable that two of them were rated as 'Moderately/Very important' by more than 90% of public managers: cost reduction to improve efficiency (94.4%), and introduce more technological innovation (94.4%). Likewise, the next two in order of importance, were rated as 'Moderately/Very important' by more than 80% of public managers: provide higher quality services

(87%), and take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience (81.5%). Finally, the last two were rated as 'Moderately/Very important' by more than 70% of public managers: improve management flexibility (74%), and share risks with the private sector (72.2%).

On the other hand, we can also conclude that the reactive reasons are mostly situated on the left side of the chart. In this respect, with the clear exception of the 'need for private funding', rated by 85.5% of public managers as 'Moderately/Very important', only two other reactive reasons were rated by more than 50% of public managers as 'Moderately/Very important': the economic crisis (63%), and the inability to provide the service internally (63%). Finally, the other six reactive reasons were rated as 'Moderately/Very important' by a low percentage of public managers: scarce public value added by direct management (33.4%), political and ideological reasons (29.7%), the fact that it was a newly created service (29.6%), inability to recruit additional staff (29.6%), the public service did not work properly before PPC (24.1%), and because PPC is fashionable (13%).

These results clearly allow us to partially validate our third hypothesis and conclude that PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (looking forward to improve effectiveness, efficiency and the quality of public goods and services). However, our initial hypothesis was that reactive reasons (looking forward to cover internal deficits and problems) only play a residual role. In this regard, our analysis clearly shows that they play a secondary but, in no case, residual role. Linking these results with our fourth hypothesis suggests that this may have important consequences, in terms of success. However, before concluding this section, we need to complement this analysis with the answers to the survey question 'What if you had to choose only one reason?'. Five of the seven reasons mentioned are proactive, while only two are reactive. From these reasons, if we only take into account the two most important ones, which together represent 72.2% of the answers, one is proactive (cost reduction to improve efficiency - 50%-) and the other reactive (need for private financing -22.2%-). Thus, these results reconfirm our third hypothesis.

4.4. Reasons for initiating public-private collaboration and their consequences in terms of success

To conclude this analytical section, we want to understand how the proactive or reactive nature of the reasons for initiating PPC affects its chances of success. To pursue this objective, we created contingency tables (row percentage)[10] to provide a basic picture of the relationship between two variables: the importance given to each possible reason for initiating PPC (independent variable), and the result of the contractual process (dependent variable). Exploration of this relationship allows us to test our fourth hypothesis, helping us to understand if the nature of the reasons for initiating PPC can really help to explain its results.

The survey question we used to ascertain the importance given to each possible reason for initiating a PPC was the same as the one we used in Figure 1 and Tables 5, 6, and 7. Likewise, the survey question we used to determine the result of the contractual process was the following: 'Determines the final result of the contractual process', the two possible answers being 'relinquished' (unsuccessful) and 'awarded' (successful). This variable has important limitations because it refers to the result of the contractual process and not to the result of the collaboration itself. Consequently, it does not properly measure, for example, the successful contractual processes that do not accomplish the collaboration objectives or fail in other parameters. It is also important to highlight that, in this contractual modality, the associated collaboration processes can last up to three years. Consequently, measuring the success of the contractual process itself, though far from ideal, is relevant.

Table 9 groups the reasons for initiating PPC that display proactive behaviour, characterized by a positive relationship between the importance given to the reasons for initiating the collaboration and the result of the contractual process. So, for each

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[10] We calculated row percentages taking into account the characteristics of the variables. In order to optimize space distribution we decided to put the independent variable labelling the rows and the dependent variable heading the top of the columns. Consequently, to show the frequency distribution of the values of the dependent variable, given the occurrence of the values of the independent variable, we converted the observations in each cell to a percentage of the row total.

possible reason, if we focus our attention on the 'Moderately/Very Important' row, we will see that the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' increases when the result of the contractual process is successful (awarded). Likewise, if we focus our attention in the 'Slightly/Not Important' row, we will see the reverse is true. In other words, proactive motives were considered more important in the awarded contracts than in the relinquished contracts.

Additionally, it is important to highlight that there exists notable variability in terms of how these percentages grow. On the one hand, at the high end, reasons like 'provide higher quality services' present a variability of 80.4 percentage points among the public managers that consider this reason to be 'Moderately/Very Important' in the relinquished contracts and in the awarded contracts. On the other hand, at the low end, reasons like 'share risks with the private sector' present a variability of 40.8 percentage points. This might lead us to think that those reasons displaying with greater variability are more influential that those with lesser variability. We might also speculate as to a possible relation with the intensity of respondents proactive behaviour observed in Table 6.

Table 9. Importance attached to the proactive reasons when making the decision to initiate public-private collaboration and result of the contractual process

PROACTIVE REASONS Importance attached when making the decision to initiate a public-private collaboration		Result of the contractual process	
		Relinquished (%)	Awarded (%)
Provide higher quality services	Slightly/Not Important	86.5	13.5
	Moderately/Very Important	**9.8**	**90.2**
Improve management flexibility	Slightly/Not Important	88.3	11.7
	Moderately/Very Important	**12.7**	**87.3**
Cost reduction to improve efficiency	Slightly/Not Important	88.3	11.7
	Moderately/Very Important	**14.7**	**85.3**
Introduce technological innovation	Slightly/Not Important	81.1	18.9
	Moderately/Very Important	**17.7**	**82.3**
Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience	Slightly/Not Important	64.7	35.3
	Moderately/Very Important	**21.6**	**78.4**
Share risks with the private sector	Slightly/Not Important	58.8	41.2
	Moderately/Very Important	**29.6**	**70.4**

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Table 10 groups reasons for initiating PPC that exhibit reactive behaviour, characterized by a negative relationship between the importance given to the reasons for initiating the collaboration and the result of the contractual process. So, for each possible reason, if we focus our attention on the 'Moderately/Very Important' rows, we will see that the percentage of public managers that consider the reason 'Moderately/Very Important' decreases when the result of the contractual process is successful (awarded). Likewise, if we focus our attention on the 'Slightly/Not Important' row, we will see that the reverse is also true. In other words, reactive motives are considered more important in relinquished contracts than in awarded contracts.

Additionally, it is important to highlight that there exists marked variability in terms of how these percentages decrease. On the one hand, at the high end, reasons like 'the public service does not work properly before PPC' present a variability of 89.2 percentage points between the public managers that consider this reason 'Moderately/Very Important' in the relinquished contracts and in the awarded contracts. On the other hand, at the low end, reasons like 'the economic crisis' present a variability of 27.4 percentage points. We list them from greater to lesser variability. This may suggest that those reasons with greater variability are more influential that those with lesser variability. This in turn might show a relation to the intensity of respondents' reactive behaviour (see Table 7).

Table 10. Importance attached to the reactive reasons when making the decision to initiate public-private collaboration, and result of the contractual process

REACTIVE REASONS Importance attached when making the decision to initiate a public-private collaboration		Result of the contractual process	
		Relinquished (%)	Awarded (%)
The public service did not work properly before PPC	Slightly/Not Important	29.4	70.6
	Moderately/Very Important	**94.6**	**5.4**
Inability to recruit additional staff	Slightly/Not Important	16.2	83.8
	Moderately/Very Important	**88.3**	**11.7**
Because PPC is fashionable	Slightly/Not Important	41.2	58.8
	Moderately/Very Important	**83.7**	**16.3**
The fact that it was a newly created service	Slightly/Not Important	47.0	53.0
	Moderately/Very Important	**78.4**	**21.6**
Need for private funding	Slightly/Not Important	32.4	67.5
	Moderately/Very Important	**76.5**	**23.5**
Scarce public value added by direct management	Slightly/Not Important	47.1	52.9
	Moderately/Very Important	**72.9**	**27.1**
Inability to provide the service internally	Slightly/Not Important	29.7	70.3
	Moderately/Very Important	**70.5**	**29.5**
Political and ideological reasons	Slightly/Not Important	37.8	62.2
	Moderately/Very Important	**64.7**	**35.3**
The economic crisis	Slightly/Not Important	37.8	62.2
	Moderately/Very Important	**63.7**	**36.3**

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

The data contained in Tables 9 and 10 confirms that proactive and reactive reasons have, in all cases, differentiated behaviour. On the one hand, proactive reasons were considered more important in awarded contracts than in relinquished contracts. On the other hand, reactive reasons were considered more important in relinquished contracts than in awarded contracts. Thus, these results allow us to suggest that PPCs initiated for proactive reasons are more likely to be successful than PPC experiences initiated for reactive reasons (hypothesis 4). However, in the validation of this hypothesis, we should assume the limitations of our dependent variable, which makes impossible to predict if, beyond the contractual process, the collaboration will be successful.

To conclude this analysis, it is interesting to combine these results with the ones we obtained when we were verifying the conceptual robustness of the proactive and reactive PPC categories. In this regard, one may expect that the reasons with more

proactive behaviour (the ones with a greater variability between public managers that consider them 'Moderately/Very Important' and assess the planning activities as 'low', 'medium' or 'high') are more likely to be successful that the ones with less proactive behaviour. Considering that the likelihood of being successful increases with greater variability, Table 11 shows the results obtained. As we can see, this assumption only works for the two reasons (in bold) with a more proactive behaviour.

Table 11. Proactive behaviour and likelihood of being successful

Proactive reasons	
Ordered from more to less proactive behaviour	**Ordered from more to less likelihood of being successful**
Provide higher quality services	**Provide higher quality services**
Improve management flexibility	**Improve management flexibility**
Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience	Cost reduction to improve efficiency
Share risks with the private sector	Introduce technological innovation
Introduce technological innovation	Take advantage of private sector knowledge and experience
Cost reduction to improve efficiency	Share risks with the private sector

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Likewise, one may expect that the reasons with a more reactive behaviour (the ones with a greater variability between public managers that consider them 'Moderately/Very Important' and assess the planning activities as 'low', 'medium' or 'high') are less likely to be successful than the ones with less reactive behaviour. Considering that the likelihood of being unsuccessful increases with greater variability, Table 12 shows the results obtained. As we can see, this assumption only works for the second and the third reasons (in bold) with more reactive behaviour.

Table 12. Reactive behaviour and likelihood of being unsuccessful

Reactive reasons	
Ordered from more to less reactive behaviour	**Ordered from more to less likelihood of being unsuccessful**
The fact that it was a newly created service	The public service did not work properly before PPC
Inability to recruit additional staff	**Inability to recruit additional staff**
Because PPC is fashionable	**Because PPC is fashionable**
Political and ideological reasons	The fact that it was a newly created service
Scarce public value added by direct management	Need for private funding
Need for private funding	Scarce public value added by direct management
The economic crisis	Inability to provide the service internally
Inability to provide the service internally	Political and ideological reasons
The public service did not work properly before PPC	The economic crisis

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Taking these results into account, one may accept that this assumption only partially explains the reasons that have a more proactive or reactive behaviour. This allows us to conclude that our hypothesis 4 works in global terms but not in terms of intensity.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This study confirms that the reasons for initiating PPC traditionally identified by scholars, mainly proactive, are meaningful. However, it also confirms the need for differentiation between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC in order to have a more realistic overview of all the elements that play a role in this decision. In fact, to better explain such a complex reality, data confirms the advisability of taking into account reactive reasons like the ones introduced in our analysis. Indeed, we can confirm that PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (looking to improve efficacy, efficiency and quality of public goods and services), while reactive reasons (looking to cover internal deficits and problems) play a secondary but, in no case,

residual role. This has important consequences, as we have verified, in terms of success.

Our analysis suggests that the nature of these reasons affect the collaboration's behaviour and chances of success, PPCs being initiated for proactive reasons more likely to be successful than the ones initiated for reactive reasons. And this is directly linked to how we conceptually built these two categories. On the one hand, we consider that a proactive approach facilitates the commitment of public institutions to strongly support planning, monitoring and evaluation activities, which increases the chances of success of PPC processes. On the other hand, a reactive approach normally involves a rejection of those activities, increasing, on the contrary, the chances of failure. However, as we have seen, this hypothesis only works in global terms but not in terms of intensity, the reasons with a more proactive or reactive behaviour not clearly likely to be more successful that the ones with a less proactive or reactive behaviour.

These results suggest that it is advisable to promote a proactive model of PPC, where the public sector invests in the functions of designing, planning, monitoring and evaluating these collaboration activities. In this regard, it is necessary to invest sufficient resources to build the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage these functions and to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

Finally, this research makes a considerable contribution in building an original database from scratch to be able to study this phenomenon. It is also remarkable the commitment to clarify what we should understand exactly by PPC. However, more research is needed in order to create better conceptual and methodological tools to assess the success of PPC processes and their final results.

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3. PROACTIVE UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION PROCESSES: MEASURING DEGREES OF SUCCESS AND IDENTIFYING INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESS

PAPER 2

(this paper constitutes an independent section and maintains its own structure)

Abstract: Collaborative governance practices have grown since the early 1980s and, nowadays, policy-making processes usually develop in complex networks of public and private institutions, and public service delivery requires managing complex interorganizational relationships. In this context, this study aims to develop the current theoretical framework concerning critical success factors, usually limited to the study of public-private partnerships, analysing how to objectively measure the degree of success of public-private collaboration processes (understood in a broad sense) by building one general index and four subindexes to measure success globally and by key dimensions. Likewise, calculating and comparing the obtained results in different administrative realities, this paper seeks to identify which institutional and organizational contexts are more favourable to successfully promote and manage public-private collaboration initiatives. Constructed on the basis of an original database built from scratch, this study demonstrates the importance of building a comprehensive conceptual and methodological apparatus to detect where significant areas for improvement lie, and suggests that public administrations, despite being affected by generalized uniformity and rigidity of their legal and organizational framework, fail more frequently in those areas that depend entirely on themselves: the role played by the public administration, human resources and internal organization. Another interesting insight from this research is that larger administrations, due to their greater economic, human and organizational resources, and executive agencies, due to their principal-agent approach, are better prepared to successfully promote and manage these collaborations, with the impact of this second dimension greater in terms of favouring success. Finally, this paper also aims to suggest strategic measures to ensure better functioning of public-private collaborations, and to inform the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

1. INTRODUCTION

Advanced democracies have evolved towards a model of relational state, which distributes roles, assignments and responsibilities among the state, the market and civil society (Gaebler and Osborne 1992; Minogue, Polidano, and Hulme 1998; Salamon and Elliott 2002; Mendoza and Vernis 2008; Vernis and Mendoza 2009). So great has this evolution been that, since the early 1980s, collaborative governance practices have proliferated (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006) and, nowadays, it seems unimaginable to conceive of public institutions operating alone (Osborne 2010a). In fact, public policy usually develops in complex networks of public and private institutions (Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer 1995) and the delivery of public services requires management of complex interorganizational relationships and multi-actor policy making processes (Osborne 2010b).

In this context, this research seeks ways to objectively measure the degree of success of a PPC (public-private collaboration) process. Successful collaboration depends on the simultaneous interaction of several conditions at appropriate phases in the process, with the inability to achieve those conditions being the best source of explanations as to why collaborative efforts fail (Gray 1985). However, given the ambiguous nature of success, a preliminary definition as to what constitutes success is required. In this respect, Huxham and Hubbert (2009, 46) differentiate between two types of success: accomplishing the collaborative mission, and getting the process to work. In this regard, considering that achieving the desired outcomes (the first type of success) may depend on third variables, from a methodological point of view it makes more sense to focus our attention on the collaborative process itself (the second type of success). With this in mind, this paper proposes an index which can objectively measure the degree of success of the collaborative process itself. This index, in turn, can be divided into four subindexes to separately measure this success in different key dimensions.

Additionally, this paper aims to calculate and compare the value of this index and subindexes in different administrative realities to find out which institutional and organizational contexts

are more favourable in the successful design and implementation of PPC initiatives. Firstly, by governmental level, we compare the degree of success of local, regional, and central administrations. Secondly, by administration type, we ask whether executive agencies are better allies than traditional public administrations in carrying out such collaborations. According to these two dimensions, we aim to determine if administration size and the principal-agent approach, characteristic of executive agencies, influences the ability to successfully lead PPC initiatives.

Although performance management[11] literature has made significant contributions in trying to assess the functioning of public services (Osborne 2010b), and even in service delivery environments through interorganizational networks (Agranoff 2003), this study can be considered theoretically relevant because it does not exist any previous conceptual and methodological tool to objectively measure the functioning of PPC. The closest researchers have come to this issue is in studies linked to public-private partnerships (PPPs) that employ the concept of critical success factors (CSFs) to enhance the understanding and best ways of implementing PPPs (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015). However, together with the fact that these CSFs do not represent an integral assessment, there is no consensus among scholars about what the main CSFs are depending on circumstances. Moreover, this paper can be considered socially relevant too because it contributes to the study of the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage and increase the chances of success of these collaborations and to build a conceptual and analytical framework to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

To accomplish the dual objective of this research, the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we examine the main CSFs identified by the literature. Secondly, we define the research population and sampling strategy, and describe the methodology used for data collection and analysis. Thirdly, we present the empirical findings and the most relevant results of our analysis. Finally, we draw some conclusions and suggest further areas of research.

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[11] Performance management can be defined as a system that generates performance information through strategic planning and performance measurement routines and that connects this information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions (Moynihan 2008, 5). In other sections of this same book, the author emphasizes the idea of success pointing out that performance management can be viewed as the application of systematic and standardized criteria to assess the success of some action undertaken at an individual, group, organization, or interorganizational level.

2. PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

The CSFs model, employed in management measures since the 1970s, can be defined as the key areas of activity where favourable results are absolutely necessary for a manager to reach his/her goals (Rockart 1982). However, given the wide spectrum and coverage of studies on CSFs for PPPs, it is difficult to identify the most important CSFs for implementing PPP projects irrespective of country, sector, stage or project model adopted (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015), and objectives (Chua, Kog, and Loh 1999). Consequently, the existing literature varies in scope and content and shows differences in focus, with very little consensus on such factors (Ameyaw and Chan 2014). Finally, the fact that PPPs usually pursue multiple goals makes it even harder to assess their success (Hodge and Greve 2011).

Taking this into account, together with our aim to objectively measure the degree of success of the PPC process, below we describe a set of CSFs that, regardless of project country, sector, objective, stage or organizational model adopted, command a broad consensus among authors as to their importance:

- Strong political and institutional support
- Strategic leadership in public administration
- Shared authority and responsibility between public and private actors
- Achievement of greater management flexibility
- Definition of shared objectives to create win-win situations
- Correct management of inherent risks to collaborative work
- Definition of monitoring mechanisms which, in the case of non-compliance, allow the introduction of corrective measures
- Existence of an evaluation system oriented to organizational improvement
- Public employees and managers with appropriate skills and knowledge for network management
- Implementation of organizational measures to adapt traditional bureaucratic units and procedures to network management
- Good communication between parties
- Existence of clear rules known by all parties

- Understanding of the mission and organizational culture of each organization and the search for compatibility between them
- Climate of trust and commitment between parties beyond legal obligations

Let us now comment on each factor in turn. If we focus our attention on the role played by public administration, several studies show that counting on strong political and institutional support is one of the most important success factors (Gray 1985; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Huxham and Vangen 2000; Jefferies, Gameson, and Rowlinson 2002; Bovaird 2004; Li et al. 2004; El-Gohary and El-Diraby 2006; Chen and Doloi 2007; Jacobson and Choi 2008; Babatunde, Opawole, and Akinsiku 2012; Cheung, Chan, and Kajewski 2012; Ng, Wong, and Wong 2012; Wibowo and Alfen 2014; Ameyan and Chan, 2015; Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015). Developing this same idea, other authors introduce interesting nuances like the need to have a stable political, economic, and social environment (Qiao et al. 2001; Chan et al. 2010; Zhao, Zuo, and Zillante 2013); the advisability of a high level of support especially in the early stages (Gentry and Fernandez 1997); or the positive effects of being able to count on a long-term political vision (Gentry and Fernandez 1997). Likewise, Dulami et al. (2010) confirm that this strong political support is especially necessary to boost confidence in the absence of past experiences and the lack of any legal framework to specifically support PPC.

In the same respect, it is important to consider the role that strategic leadership in public administration can play in favouring the success of PPCs (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Tiong 1996; Huxham and Vangen 2000; Qiao et al. 2001; Nijkamp, Burch, and Vindigni 2002; Bovaird 2004; Zhang 2005b; Cheung, Chan, and Kajewski 2012; Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015). In this regard, the public sector should be able to provide leadership in the design and implementation of PPCs, creating avenues for parties to benefit from the arrangement (Babatunde, Opawole, and Akinsiku 2012). Likewise, other scholars relate this leadership with commitment (Grant 1996; Li et al. 2004), or distinguish how this leadership should evolve in different phases of collaboration (Gray 1985).

Additionally, if we focus our attention on contract management and governance, promoting shared authority and responsibility between public and private actors is fundamental, not only to ensure real collaboration, based on shared discretionality, but also successful collaboration (Li et al. 2004; Chan et al. 2010; Cheung, Chan, and Kajewski 2012). In fact, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2006) point out that governments should share responsibility with other levels of

government, with private companies, and with non-profit organizations. In this context, Pongsiri (2002) speaks about co-responsibility and co-ownership for the delivery of public services, and Mendoza and Vernis (2008) point out what co-responsibility involves: first, the recognition of interdependencies and the identification of common interests that lead to shared objectives; second, common agreement on the respective contributions necessary for their attainment; and third, effective articulation of the responsibilities assumed by each party. Finally, the Efficiency Unit (2008) report complements this analysis by saying that this shared responsibility for the delivery of services is useful because public and private actors bring their complementary skills to the enterprise.

Moreover, the achievement of greater management flexibility is a general condition in almost all PPC success stories (Gentry and Fernandez 1997). In fact, collaboration and network management can create a dynamic new environment of change within entrenched government bureaucracies (Grant 1996). In this sense, scholars identify three different dimensions where this flexibility is fundamental: adaptation to technological change (Efficiency Unit 2008), adaptation to customer needs (Dulami 2010), and, considering the intrinsic cooperative nature of PPC, adaptation to any strategic change by any party (Klijn and Teisman 2003). In relation to this last dimension, renegotiation is a core characteristic in the dynamics involved in PPPs, because agreements tend to be incomplete and terms are usually long (Bel, Brown, and Marques 2013).

In this regard, another fundamental success factor is the definition of shared objectives to create win-win situations. Klijn and Teisman (2003) argue that networks emerge and continue to exist because actors are dependent on each other. In fact, it is the recognition of interdependencies and the identification of common interests that lead them to share objectives (Mendoza and Vernis 2008). However, while many governments and businesses goals overlap, their core objectives -promoting social versus shareholder wealth - are different (Gentry and Fernandez 1997). In this context, the government's prerogative to set public policy needs to be acknowledged, understood and respected by the private partner (Grant 1996). But this does not mean that it is impossible to create synergies to achieve convergent objectives between public and private partners (Pongsiri 2002) or, at least, a project's shared vision (Jacobson and Choi 2008). Developing this idea, Zhang (2005a) and Ng, Wong, and Wong (2012) advise promoting a win-win scenario between public and

private actors because, if the collaboration does not imply mutual benefit for both partners, it will not be sustainable (Grant 1996).

The correct management of inherent risks to collaborative work is another widely cited precondition for success. Several commentators insist on the necessity to establish appropriate, fair or at least reasonable risk sharing and risk allocation between public and private partners (Qiao et al. 2001; Hurst and Reeves 2004; Hodge 2004; Li et al. 2004; Ysa 2004; Marin 2009; Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2011; Babatunde, Opawole, and Akinsiku 2012; Cheung, Chan, and Kajewski 2012; Hwang, Zhao, and Gay 2013; Owen 2012; Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015; World Bank 2017). Additionally, other authors focus their attention on how risks, generally accepted in advance by the public sector, are transferred to the private sector. In this respect, the IMF (2004) speaks about adequate risk transfer from government to the private sector, Abdel-Aziz (2007) talks about how important it is to also allocate project risks to the private sector, and Forrer et al. (2010) state that collaboration should involve a negotiated allocation of risk between the public and private sectors, instead of government bearing most of the risk.

In this regard, Grant (1996) introduces an important distinction pointing out that for the private partner, the risk is usually financial, while for governments the liabilities and risks are just as likely to be in the political arena. Likewise, Bel, Brown, and Marques (2013) emphasise an important consequence of this risk sharing: when a private entity takes on a higher level of financial, technical or operational risk than it would in a straight outsourcing contract, by doing so, it stands to reap a significant pay-out or income stream if the project bears fruit. In fact, Hall (2014) estimates that such contracts cost about 25 per cent more than conventional contracts. Finally, the Commission of the European Communities (2004) claims that the precise distribution of risk should be determined case by case, according to the respective ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk.

According to the Commission of the European Communities (2004), the public partner should concentrate primarily on defining the objectives to be attained in terms of public interest, quality of services provided and pricing policy, and it should take responsibility for monitoring compliance with these objectives. Indeed, definition of monitoring mechanisms that, in the case of non-compliance, allow for the introduction of corrective measures, is an essential element to guarantee successful collaboration (Chua, Kog, and Loh 1999; Bovaird

2004; Zhang 2005b; Abdul-Aziz and Kassim 2011; World Bank 2017). In this regard, Hodge (2004) adds the importance of linking these monitoring mechanisms to accountability practices. Regarding monitoring of the collaboration, several authors advise creating a specific unit to coordinate and monitor the initiative (Abdul-Aziz 2007; Ameyaw and Chan 2014).

In the same way, organizational improvement should be part of the strategy of all organizations and initiatives (Potocki and Brocato 1995), with the maintenance or improvement of service levels always being one core objective to achieve (Babatunde, Opawole, and Akinsiku 2012). Thus, the existence of an evaluation system oriented towards organizational improvement is also a key element to facilitate collaboration success. In line with this idea, several scholars point out the need to dedicate ample time to evaluation (Abdul-Aziz and Kassim 2011), to implement a policy evaluation system (Bovaird 2004) or to introduce evaluation practices from the very first stage of the project (Qiao et al. 2001).

To continue with this review of CSFs, if we focus our attention on human resources and internal organization, network management implies jumping from direct to indirect provision, where skills linked to planning, monitoring, and evaluation activities, as well as negotiation abilities, are essential (Agranoff 2003; Abdul-Aziz and Kassim 2011; Alhomadi 2012; Babatunde, Opawole, and Akinsiku 2012). In fact, PPCs enable governments to benefit from private sector expertise, allowing them to focus on policy, planning and regulation by delegating day-to-day operations (World Bank 2017). Likewise, Lax and Sebenius (1986) point out that a successful manager is a strong, often subtle negotiator, constantly shaping agreement and informal understanding throughout the complex web of relationships. In this context, having public employees and managers with appropriate skills and knowledge available to set up and manage these collaborations is fundamental to guaranteeing their success (Jefferies, Gameson, and Rowlinson 2002; IMF 2004; Zhang 2005b; Efficiency Unit 2008; Dulami et al. 2010; Hwang, Zhao, and Gay 2013). Taking this framework into account, the IMF (2004) adds that particular attention need to be paid to skill development by subnational governments, since in many countries, the responsibility for spending in areas that are likely candidates for such collaborations is devolved to them.

Likewise, this transformation of public administration core competencies and functions requires the implementation of organizational measures to adapt traditional bureaucratic units

and procedures to network management (Bovaird 2004). In fact, as Barragán (2005) points out, not having a proper organizational framework available is a clear barrier to the development and implementation of collaborative work initiatives in various countries. However, implementing all these changes is extremely complicated and, at this point, it is interesting to highlight one of the main reasons behind this difficulty: public officials' opposition to modifying internal structures and procedures due to their lack of technical knowledge and experience in network management. As Urio (2010) suggests, public officials normally build a discourse based on ideological preoccupations to stop these reforms, while their real concern is their lack of knowledge.

Finally, if we focus our attention on what the relationship between the parties is like, several authors point out that promoting good communication between the parties is a key element to achieving successful collaboration. In this regard, scholars focus their attention on different communicative dimensions, such as appropriate periodicity (Samii, Van Wassenhove, and Bhattacharya 2002; Jacobson and Choi 2008; Abdul-Aziz and Kassim 2011), format (Chua, Kog, and Loh 1999; Cooke 2006), content (Grant 1996; El-Gohary and El-Diraby 2006), or quality (Mohr and Spekman 1994) of these communications.

However, without the existence of clear rules known by all parties achieving a good relationship between public and private actors is unlikely. Like Abdul-Aziz and Kassim (2011) claim it is necessary to have robust and clear agreement, the absence of which is highly negative. In fact, almost all commentators relate this clear rules dimension with the existence of a favourable legal framework (IMF 2004; Li et al. 2004; Abdel-Aziz 2007; Jacobson and Choi 2008; Chan et al. 2010; Dulami et al. 2010; Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2011; Cheung, Chan, and Kajewski 2012; Zhao, Zuo, and Zillante 2013), an opaque and weak legal system being a clear impediment to collaboration success (Chen and Doloi 2007).

Moreover, it is also necessary to guarantee an understanding of the mission and organizational culture of each organization, and the search for compatibility between them (Grant 1996; Ysa 2004; El-Gohary, Osman, and El-Diraby 2006; Jacobson and Choi 2008; Abdul-Aziz and Kassim 2011). In developing this argument, Gentry and Fernandez (1997) conclude that acceptance of the needs of the other party is critical to achieve successful PPCs.

Finally, Pongsiri (2002) elaborates on the concept of trust, and points out that effective government regulation should be based on a stable and trusted system of enforceable laws concerning property rights, contracts, disputes, and liability. However, to ensure good functioning of PPCs, it is necessary to build a climate of trust and commitment between the parties beyond these legal obligations (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Grant 1996; Jefferies, Gameson, and Rowlinson 2002; Ysa 2004; Provan and Kenis 2007; Jacobson and Choi 2008).

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. Defining the study population and sampling strategy

Considering the progressive outsourcing of public services, and the ensuing diversification of PPC practices, the first challenge we faced in defining the study population was directly linked to the 'PPC' concept itself. Ruling out direct management and privatization, if we focus our attention on the indirect provision of public services, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2006, 2011) build a very useful conceptual framework based on the prevalent type of discretionality.[12] Using this approach, we can distinguish two different scenarios: outsourcing, characterized by public discretionality; and PPC, characterized by shared discretionality between the public and the private sector, also known as collaborative governance. At this point, it is important to clarify that, when there is private discretionality, as happens with philanthropy or corporate social responsibility activities, we cannot speak about PPC, even if the objective of these activities is to pursue a public good.

Regarding the instruments that public managers can use to formalize these two indirect provision scenarios, outsourcing refers to contracting out and, depending on the location, there are often different legal formulas to formalize such contracts. Likewise, when we speak about instruments to materialize PPC, we need to distinguish between formalized and non-formalized PPC formulas. In the former, we can find instruments like contracts, agreements or the creation of a new entity, among others. In the latter, we find a great diversity of

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[12] Discretion exists when the decision-maker has the power to make a choice about whether to act or not act, or to approve or not approve, with or without conditions. In this context, discretionality is the power or right of a public or private entity to make decisions based on their own judgment within general legal guidelines.

networks depending on the objectives to be achieved and the actors involved (Powel 2003; Agranoff 2007). Finally, it is important to highlight that although we consider the terms PPC and PPP synonymous, following Donahue and Zeckhauser's (2011, 256) approach, we prefer to use the former rather than the latter. All these elements are visualised in Table 1.

Table 1. Indirect provision of public services scenarios, based on the type of discretionality

Discretionality	Public discretionality	Shared discretionality (collaborative governance)		Private discretionality
Indirect provision typology	Outsourcing	Public-private collaboration (public-private partnerships)		Philanthropy and corporate social responsibility activities
Instruments	Contracts	Formalized	Non-formalized	Philanthropy and corporate social responsibility activities
Instruments	Contracts	Contracts Agreements New entities	Networks	Philanthropy and corporate social responsibility activities
Legal formulas	Different legal formulas depending on the location			

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

Based on this conceptual framework, the study population of this research comprises all PPC initiatives promoted by the Spanish public administration (at a central, regional and local level) using a specific contractual figure called a 'PPC contract.' In 2007, the Spanish Parliament approved a new Public Sector Contracts Law[13] creating this innovative contractual figure. This figure, designed to be used only subsidiarily when the public sector does not have the in-house knowledge needed to define the contract (for example, when there exists a high degree of specialization or an important technological component), involves a high level of collaboration between the public and the private sectors, from the very beginning, to define the contract itself. Likewise, this contractual figure establishes a more sophisticated governance model than the one found in a simple outsourcing process, promoting shared discretionality to co-manage the contract and to co-decide subjects like amendments to the contractual conditions. Despite the fact that this legal formula is exclusive

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[13] Article 11 of Law 30/2007, of 30th October, on Public Sector Contracts.

to Spain, its characteristics enable us to make significant and innovative contributions to the international debate.

From the moment this contractual figure was created, in October 2007, to April 2013, when the fieldwork was carried out, the population referred to in this study consisted of 54 PPC contracts. With this in mind, and the conditions set out below, the decision was not to limit the study to a sample, but to study the entire population. Taking into account the great diversity of these PPC contracts, especially in terms of thematic scope and level of Government responsible to promote them, a representative sample would have been almost as big as the entire population. In addition, defining a sample equal to the population (n=N) reduces methodological problems of non-representativeness, avoiding problems linked to statistical sampling theory, thus leading to greater generalizability of the results obtained.

3.2. Data collection and analysis

This research is constructed on the basis of an original database on PPC created from scratch by the authors. After using the Spanish Official State Gazette[14] to identify all PPC contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations (from October 2007 to April 2013), we classified them according to three different dimensions: thematic scope, and level of government and type of administration responsible for promoting the contract, Table 2 shows the resulting distribution. At the thematic level, there is great diversity, although infrastructure contracts are clearly predominant, followed by contracts linked to IT services and social and health services. Likewise, if we analyse the existing distribution based on the level of government responsible for promoting the contract, we can see that local administrations, closely followed by regional administrations, are the ones that mainly advocate this contractual figure. Finally, if we consider the type of administration responsible for promoting the contract, we realize that executive agencies have used this contractual figure but less extensively that traditional public administrations.

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[14] In Spanish, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

Table 2. Public-private collaboration contracts tendered by all Spanish public administrations, from October 2007 to April 2013

Thematic scope	Levels of Government			Type of Administration		Total
	Local	Regional	Central	Traditional Public Administrations	Executive Agency	
Education, culture and leisure services	1	0	0	1	0	1
Infrastructure	14	5	8	22	5	27
IT services	3	6	0	2	7	9
Social and health services	0	8	0	0	8	8
Urban planning services	2	0	0	2	0	2
Utility services (water, gas, electricity)	5	2	0	6	1	7
Total	25	21	8	33	21	54

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

For each of these 54 PPC contracts, we conducted extensive documentary analysis, reviewing more than 3,000 pages of administrative and technical clauses to tenders, reports, newspapers, magazines, and website data to be able to contextualize each collaboration. In addition to this documentary analysis, we also administered an extensive questionnaire to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. The combination of different information sources allowed for triangulation, thereby enhancing validity, generalizability and transferability of the results obtained.

The questionnaire for the awarded contracts (successful) contained 35 questions, including dichotomous, multiple choice; rating scale, Likert scale, and open-ended questions. As regards content, following some introductory questions about the collaboration context, we included a detailed set of questions about the reasons for initiating the collaboration, and questions on the planning, monitoring and evaluation activities carried out. We also incorporated a number of questions regarding specific characteristics of the collaboration (relationship between the parties, risk sharing, leadership, etc.) and about their consequences. The questionnaire for the relinquished contracts (unsuccessful) contained only 24 questions (11 questions fewer than the questionnaire for the awarded contracts) because, as the contract

process was over, questions about how well the collaboration functioned and its consequences are not relevant.

These questionnaires were created electronically (using Survey Monkey) and initially sent by email to the public manager responsible for promoting and managing each contract. Prior work had been done to verify, by email and phone, the highest ranking individual in charge in each case. Using this self-administered method, and after two reminders, we had a response from 41 out of 54 public managers. To get a response from the remaining 13, we scheduled telephone interviews (in 9 cases) and in-person interviews (in 4 cases). Finally, we used SPSS and Excel to process the data we present in the following section.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

It is important to distinguish the success of the contractual process from the success of the collaboration itself. We should bear in mind that we are analysing PPC initiatives formalized through one type of contract that involves a high level of collaboration between the public and the private sector, from the very beginning, to define the contract itself. To measure the success of the contractual process we used the following survey item: 'Determines the final result of the contractual process', the two possible options being 'awarded' (successful), and 'relinquished' (unsuccessful), depending on whether contracts do or do not come to fruition. Reviewing the results obtained, we observed that 37 of the 54 contracts included in our reference population/sample were awarded (68.5%), while the other 17 were relinquished (31.5%). Thus, bearing in mind that a successful contractual process is a prerequisite for the success of the collaboration itself, we calculated the index to objectively measure the degree of success of the PPC process only for the 37 awarded contracts. In the following sections, we describe how we created this index and subindexes, and the results we obtained. Afterwards, we compare objective and subjective measures of the PPC process success. To conclude this analysis, we categorise this index and subindexes by type of government and by type of administration.

4.1. How to objectively measure the degree of success of a public-private collaboration process

The aim behind building a 'Success of Public-Private Collaboration Process Index' (SPPCP Index) is to have a comprehensive conceptual and methodological tool to objectively measure the functioning of PPC. Actually, we consider only one set of CSFs around which there exists a broad consensus among scholars as to their importance (regardless of project country, sector, objective, stage or organizational model adopted); this SPPCP Index is a summary measure of achievement according to four key dimensions of PPC: the role played by the public administration, contract management and governance; human resources and internal organization, and the relationship between the parties. In fact, the SPPCP Index is the sum of fourteen CSFs (indicators), which in turn, can be grouped into four subindexes, one for each of those key dimensions. Table 3 lists all these indicators and groups them into these four dimensions.

Table 3. Index and subindexes to objectively measure the degree of success of a public-private collaboration process

Index: Success of a Public-Private Collaboration Process (SPPCP)
Subindex$_1$: Role played by public administration
Indicator 1: Strong political and institutional support
Indicator 2: Strategic leadership in public administration
Subindex$_2$: Contract management and governance
Indicator 3: Shared authority and responsibility between public and private actors
Indicator 4: Achievement of greater management flexibility
Indicator 5: Definition of shared objectives to create win-win situations
Indicator 6: Correct management of inherent risks to collaborative work
Indicator 7: Definition of monitoring mechanisms which, in the case of non-compliance, allow the introduction of corrective measures
Indicator 8: Existence of an evaluation system oriented to organizational improvement
Subindex$_3$: Human resources and internal organization
Indicator 9: Public employees and managers with appropriate skills and knowledge for network management

Indicator 10: Implementation of organizational measures to adapt traditional bureaucratic units and procedures to network management
Subindex₄: Relationship between the parties
Indicator 11: Good communication between parties
Indicator 12: Existence of clear rules known by all parties
Indicator 13: Understanding of the mission and organizational culture of each organization and the search for compatibility between them
Indicator 14: Climate of trust and commitment between parties beyond legal obligations

Source: Personal elaboration, based on literature review

The first dimension, the role played by the public administration, groups two CSFs: strong political and institutional support, and public administration strategic leadership. In this respect, collaborations are not short-term enterprises and political sway should not affect them. Likewise, to the extent that collaborations pursue the public good, the public sector must take the lead and private partners should acknowledge, understand and respect the government's prerogative to set public policy needs.

The second dimension, contract management and governance, groups six CSFs. The key concept behind five of these CSFs is shared discretionality (understood as defined in section 3.1). Thus, when we are faced with a PPC, shared discretionality means shared authority and responsibility between public and private actors. It also implies reasonable risk sharing and risk allocation between public and private partners and correct management of inherent risks to collaborative work. Additionally, shared objectives need to be defined through the recognition of interdependencies and the identification of common interests to create win-win situations. Only situations favourable for all parties avoid the existence of incentives to move away from the original agreement. Furthermore, two additional CSFs are the definition of monitoring mechanisms which, in the case of non-compliance, allow for the introduction of corrective measures, and the existence of an evaluation system oriented to organizational improvement; on the understanding that these monitoring and evaluation activities should also be shared between public and private parties. Finally, the last CSF is achieving greater management flexibility using collaboration and network management dynamics to overcome traditional bureaucracies constraints.

The third dimension, human resources and internal organization, groups two CSFs: public employees and managers with appropriate skills and knowledge for network management, and implementation of organizational measures to update internal organization to network management. Direct and indirect provision of public services requires different know-how and procedures because, jumping from one to the other, involves delegating day-to-day operations and focusing on policy planning, monitoring, and evaluation. In this context, PPC, due to shared discretionality, implies going one step further than regular outsourcing practices, where discretionality is only public, and involves new skills, like leadership and negotiation, and procedures to be able to manage non-hierarchical horizontal relationships.

The fourth dimension, the relationship between parties, groups four CSFs closely related to each other. Two of them, the existence of clear rules known by all parties, and an understanding of the mission and organizational culture of each organization and the search for compatibility between them, are clearly pre-conditions to generate good communication dynamics between the parties, another CSF included in this dimension. Likewise, generating a climate of trust and commitment between the parties, beyond legal obligations, is a CSF that can only be gained after having enjoyed a long period of good communication and mutual understanding.

Bearing these four dimensions in mind, we go on to describe the survey question used to calculate this index and subindexes. The survey question we used to measure these fourteen CSFs was the following: 'From your point of view, in the context of the present PPC, indicate if the following factors are given or not given.' Thus, each indicator for each case can have two values: 0 (if the answer is 'No' because the CSF is not given) or 1(if the answer is 'Yes' because the CSF is given).

Accordingly, our data determine a 37x14 matrix (X_{ij}) with $1 \leq i \leq 37$ (number of cases, awarded contracts) and $1 \leq j \leq 14$ (number of indicators, CSFs), where each column describes an indicator. Thus, the resulting fourteen columns have their own interest, not only individually, but also combined. In fact, to define this general SPPCP Index associated with our data, and after considering several possibilities,[15] we opted for the simple addition of

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[15] Other models of general indexes based on weighted arithmetic means, or means of means values, are possible and will be published elsewhere.

columns' arithmetic means. Likewise, the combination of these columns allowed us to define four subindexes and compute for them the arithmetic means of the associated columns. Below, we present the formulas and calculations in the original scale, which varies depending on the number of indicators included, and transformed into a 0-10 shared scale (0 being completely unsuccessful and 10 completely successful) to facilitate comparative analysis.

SPPCP Index:

$$M = \sum_{j=1}^{14} \left(\frac{1}{37} \sum_{i=1}^{37} Xi_j \right) = 9.3 \ (6.6 \ \text{escale} \ 0-10)$$

Subindex$_1$:

$$M_1 = \frac{1}{37} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{37} Xi_1 + Xi_2 \right) = 1.1 \ (5.5 \ \text{scale} \ 0-10)$$

Subindex$_2$:

$$M_2 = \frac{1}{37} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{37} Xi_3 + Xi_4 + Xi_5 + Xi_6 + Xi_7 + Xi_8 \right) = 3.9 \ (6.6 \ \text{scale} \ 0-10)$$

Subindex$_3$:

$$M_3 = \frac{1}{37} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{37} Xi_9 + Xi_{10} \right) = 1.2 \ (5.8 \ \text{scale} \ 0-10)$$

Subindex$_4$:

$$M_4 = \frac{1}{37} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{37} Xi_{11} + Xi_{12} + Xi_{13} + Xi_{14} \right) = 3.1 \ (7.8 \ \text{scale} \ 0-10)$$

Figure 1 shows the results obtained from applying these formulas to the 37 awarded contracts included in our database.

Figure 1. Success of the public-private collaboration process: index and subindexes

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

A first glance at the results reveals an important variability between the degree of success achieved in each of these four key dimensions. The first conclusion to highlight is the need to analyse them separately. In this way, by reviewing them individually, we can better understand where the strengths and weaknesses are and detect significant areas for improvement to increase these collaborations' chances of success . In fact, while the SPPCP Index has a value of 6.7, the results obtained in the different subindexes present major variability: $Subindex_1$ 'Role played by public administration' 5.5; $Subindex_3$ 'Human resources and internal organization' 5.8; $Subindex_2$ 'Contract management and governance' 6.6; and $Subindex_4$ 'Relationship between the parties' 7.8. Thus, although the disparity between $Subindex_1$ and $Subindex_3$ is relatively small (only 0.3 points), it becomes greater between $Subindex_3$ and $Subindex_2$ (0.8 points), and greater still between $Subindex_2$ and $Subindex_4$ (1.2 points), the accumulated variability being 2.3 points.

Analysing these same results by subindex, a second conclusion to emphasise is that public administrations fail more in those areas that depend entirely on them: the role played by the public administration ($Subindex_1$), and human resources and internal organization

(Subindex$_3$). Thus, to improve PPC chances of success it is first necessary to reinforce political and institutional support (CSF included in Subindex$_1$) and, secondly, to invest the proper resources to better train public employees and managers with appropriate skills and knowledge for network management (CSF included in Subindex$_3$). This required know-how is linked to policy planning, monitoring, and evaluation, along with negotiation and leadership skills, characteristics of non-hierarchical horizontal relationships. Then, as soon as public employees and managers overcome their lack of knowledge, public administration strategic leadership will improve (the other CSF included in the Subindex$_1$), together with their predisposition to implement organizational measures to adapt traditional bureaucratic units and procedures to network management (the other CSF included in Subindex$_3$).

Likewise, if we review the result obtained in the contract management and governance dimension (Subindex$_2$), we realise that it is higher than the previous two but lower than that obtained in the relationship between the parties dimension (Subindex$_4$). To understand why it is higher, we should take into account that, in some way or another, all CSFs in Subindex$_2$ are affected by the generalized uniformity and rigidity of the public administration's legal and organizational framework. In this regard, a third conclusion to underline is that this homogeneity and inflexibility generates some standards that, far from being excellent, leave no one far behind. Thus, a significant area for improvement is to introduce specific regulations which, by reinforcing management flexibility (CSF included in Subindex$_2$), allow better standards to be established in key areas like how to allocate and share responsibilities and risks, or how to define monitoring mechanisms and evaluation systems, all of them CSFs included in this dimension.

On the other hand, the fact that the results are substantially better for Subindex$_4$ than for Subindex$_2$ may be for two different reasons. Firstly, because these structural rigidities that affect CSFs in Subindex$_2$, do not affect CSFs in Subindex$_4$. Secondly, because all CSFs in Subindex$_2$ are also affected by the aforementioned lack of skills and knowledge. In this context, although this deficit also affects Subindex$_4$, it is to a lesser extent. The reason behind this is that, while skills linked to Subindex$_2$ are mainly hard skills, which involve changing the management model, the skills linked to Subindex$_4$ are mainly soft skills, which public employees and managers can own innately or learn more easily. This allows us to point out a fourth notable conclusion: the need to focus training resources to improve hard skills linked to CSFs in Subindex$_2$. Thus, while improving communication abilities linked to Subindex$_4$ is

desirable to maintain or even improve results; there is a greater need to promote instruction in other core areas like policy planning, monitoring, and evaluation that clearly affect CSFs in Subindex$_2$. Likewise, it is fundamental to invest in transversal hard skills like leadership and negotiation, which entail positive externalities for both dimensions.

Finally, it is important to remember that each of these subindexes, due to the fact that they contain a different number of CSFs as indicators, do not contribute to the same extent to overall success. In this respect, a final conclusion to highlight is the desirability of focusing improvement efforts not only on Subindex$_1$ and Subindex$_3$, which obtain the lowest results, despite both of them only having two CSFs, but also on Subindex$_2$, which although it does not obtain the lowest result, does contain six CSFs and has plenty of room for improvement. Likewise, even though Subindex$_4$ obtained the highest score, a powerful argument can be made for working on its improvement because it is already a strong point and contains four CSFs.

4.2. Comparing objective and subjective measures of public-private collaboration process success

In order to verify the degree of objectiveness on this measure, we include a comparison between the results obtained from the SPPCP Index and those obtained from asking public managers responsible for promoting and managing each collaboration how, from their perspective, to assess the collaboration. The survey question used to measure this subjective assessment was the following: 'Generally speaking, assess, on a scale from 0 to 10, the present PPC process.' To calculate this difference, we subtract the objective assessment from the subjective one. Thus, a positive result means that the subjective assessment is higher than the objective assessment. Conversely, a negative result means that the objective assessment is higher than the subjective assessment. Figure 2 displays the results.

Figure 2. Difference between subjective and objective measures of public-private collaboration process success

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

The results clearly provide evidence that, for almost all PPC contracts analysed (33 of 37), the subjective assessment is higher than the objective assessment. We found only four exceptions: two where the objective assessment was higher than the subjective assessment, and two where the objective and subjective assessments were exactly the same. Although we did not encounter a large difference between these two measurements (on average is only 0.6 points), the extent to which this overvaluation occurs in 89.2% of cases is significant. In conclusion, this minor but constant gap confirms a tendency towards overvaluation by public managers and the need for an objective measure of the degree of success of the PPC process. This objectiveness helps, from a methodological point of view, to conduct comparative studies and, from a practical point of view, to have solid arguments to boost organizational transformation processes to improve PPC practices.

4.3. Success of public-private collaboration process by level of government

The aim of calculating and comparing the value of this SPPCP Index and subindexes by level of government (local, regional, and central) is to carry out a comparative analysis into which institutional and organizational contexts are most favourable in successfully designing and

implementing PPC initiatives. Mintzberg (1979), in his paradigmatic book 'The structuring of organizations', mentions organization size as an important variable in the analysis of public institutions' structure and functioning. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding how administration size (in terms of budget, number of public employees, and structure) influences the public sector's capacity to promote and manage PPC initiatives. In this respect, our exploratory research hypothesis is the following: Larger administrations, due to their greater economic, human and organizational resources, are more capable of successfully promoting and managing PPCs.

With this framework and these objectives, we calculated the SPPCP Index and subindexes for the 37 awarded contracts in our database separating the results by level of government. However, together with these results, to have a complete picture, it is important to review the number of awarded and relinquished contracts by level of government. Table 4 shows these results.

Table 4. Contracts awarded and relinquished by level of government

Levels of government	Result of the contractual process		Total
	Awarded	**Relinquished**	
Local	20	5	25
Regional	17	4	21
Central	0	8	8
All levels	37	17	54

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Analysing the results of the contractual process by level of government we quickly realize that local and regional administrations promoted the vast majority of PPC initiatives (local - 25 / 46.3%), (regional - 21 / 38.9%), while the central administration only promoted 8 PPC initiatives (14.8%). In terms of success, while local governments were awarded 20 contracts out of 25, and regional governments, 17 out of 21, representing in both cases 80% or more, all PPC processes initiated by the central administration failed. Considering that the central administration only used this contractual modality to carry out renovations (infrastructure category in our database), the reason behind this general failure responds to a political decision to stop using this contractual modality to renovate to improve the energy efficiency

of public facilities. Thus, we will focus our analysis on local and regional administrations that together promoted 85.2% of the total number of PPC initiatives analysed. Taking this into account, Figure 3 presents the results for these awarded contracts.

Figure 3. Success of public-private collaboration process. Index and subindexes by level of government

* *'All levels' category includes awarded contracts from local and regional administrations.*

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Assuming that the vast majority of regional administrations are larger than local administrations, these results clearly confirm our preliminary hypothesis because regional administrations get a better (or equal in one case) score than local administrations, not only in the general index but also in all dimensions. In fact, while the SPPCP Index for regional administrations has a value of 7.1, for local administrations, it only has a value of 6.3. In this respect, as happened when we were previously analysing the general results, reviewing the scores in each subindex separately shed light on the reasons behind this overall difference of 0.8 points and helps to detect where significant areas for improvement lie, at each level of government, to increase the chances of success of these collaborations.

Analysing the existing differences between local and regional administrations by subindex, it is in $Subindex_1$ and in $Subindex_3$ where this difference is most dramatic (2.8 and 1.8 points, respectively). Thus, this helps us to understand why these two subindexes obtain lower scores. In fact, we claim that the tendency that public administrations fail more in those areas that depend entirely on them, described when we were analysing the general results, should be mainly limited to local government where economic, human and organizational resources are lower. Likewise, it is interesting to see that both levels of administration obtain the same result in $Subindex_2$. In this regard, this result confirms that both levels of government are affected, in the same way, by the generalized uniformity and rigidity of the public administration's legal and organizational framework. Finally, observing the results in $Subindex_4$, we realize that both levels of government obtained their maximum score on this parameter. However, the regional administrations' score being 0.8 points higher than local administrations score, the trend is the same. In this respect, one may expect that the proper soft and hard skills and knowledge to be able to successfully build a good relationship with private partners are more easily found in larger administrations.

In conclusion, these results allow us to suggest that regional administrations are more capable of successfully promoting and managing PPCs than local administrations due to their greater economic, human and organizational resources. However, considering the considerable variability of local administrations' size, this conclusion should be nuanced and it is more convenient to articulate it, regardless of the level of government, in terms of administration size. Thus, we can conclude that when possible, it is advisable to concentrate these PPC initiatives in larger administrations.

4.4. Success of public-private collaboration process by type of administration

Agency theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics, finance, political science, organizational behaviour, and sociology (Eisenhardt 1989). In this framework, some authors use its principal-agent approach to explain PPC dynamics (Sappington 1991; De Palma, Leruth, and Prunier 2009; Leruth 2012). However, there is a gap in the literature concerning how executive agencies can be better allies than traditional public administrations in carrying out PPC initiatives. In this regard, our exploratory research hypothesis is the following: considering that executive agencies have in their own nature a principal-agent

approach, they are more capable of successfully managing PPC initiatives, which follow this same principal-agent logic, than traditional public administrations.

In the absence of academic studies on this precise topic, the closest we can find are studies pointing out the advisability of managing PPC initiatives from independent specialized units like agencies and other assimilated organizational forms. In this regard, Farrugia, Reynolds, and Orr (2008) study whether it is appropriate to create new agencies exclusively focused on designing, implementing and monitoring complex PPC initiatives, creating internal expertise and assimilating lessons learned. Likewise, Dutz et al. (2006) emphasizes the need to count on specialized units as new agencies that concentrate all skills and knowledge necessary to promote and manage PPCs. In the same vein, the European Commission (2003, 10) suggests that allocating qualified and motivated staff to a dedicated unit can help to define the role of the public sector in PPPs and build institutional capacity to manage them at all levels of government. However, the executive agencies we are studying are not units which specialize in PPC.

Considering this framework and objectives, we calculated the SPPCP Index and subindexes for the 37 awarded contracts in our database, separating the results by type of administration to do comparative analysis as to which institutional and organizational contexts are more favourable to successfully design and implement PPC initiatives. However, together with these results, it is important to review the number of awarded and relinquished contracts by type of administration to have the whole picture. Table 5 shows these results.

*Table 5. Contracts awarded and relinquished by type of administration*

Type of administration	Result of the contractual process		Total
	Awarded	Relinquished	
Traditional public administrations	12	9	21
Executive agencies	25	8	33
Total	37	17	54

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

Analysing the results of the contractual process by type of administration we soon realize that more PPC initiatives are promoted by executive agencies (33 / 61.1%) than traditional public

administrations (21 / 38.9%). In terms of success, while traditional public administrations only achieved 12 contracts awarded out of 21(57.1%), executive agencies achieved 25 contracts awarded out of 33 (75.7%). Taking this into account, Figure 4 presents the results for these awarded contracts.

Figure 4. Success of public-private collaboration process. Index and subindexes by type of administration

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

The results clearly confirm our preliminary hypothesis because executive agencies get a higher score than traditional public administrations in all dimensions. In fact, while the SPPCP Index for executive agencies score 7.4, traditional public administrations only score 5.9. As with the general results, reviewing the scores in each subindex separately shed light on the reasons behind this overall difference of 1.5 points and helps to detect significant areas for improvement, in each type of administration, to increase these collaborations' chances of success.

Subindex$_1$ and Subindex$_2$ show the most dramatic difference (2.5 in both cases) between the two types of administration. This substantial disparity, due to the lower results in traditional public administrations, helps us to understand why these two subindexes obtain lower scores.

In fact, our claim, when we analysed the general results, that there is a tendency for public administrations to fail more in those areas that entirely depend on them, should be mainly limited to traditional public administrations. In this regard, it is clear that their bureaucratic structures and procedures have a comparative disadvantage for the reasons we list below.

Firstly, traditional public administrations are at a comparative disadvantage because the executive agencies' principal-agent approach helps to separate political responsibility from management responsibility (one CSF included in $Subindex_1$) and to count on strong political and institutional support without interference in day to day activities. Secondly, because this separation of responsibilities, together with the division of functions that also comes with this principal-agent approach, gives autonomy and management flexibility to the agent to execute the project, facilitating a more favourable context for a stronger strategic leadership, another CSF included in $Subindex_1$. Lastly, regarding $Subindex_3$, it is important to point out that a well-implemented principal-agent model, due to its division of functions, should involve not only the development of appropriate skills and knowledge for network management but also the implementation of organizational measures to adapt traditional bureaucratic units and procedures to network management.

In this regard, all public employees and managers linked to the executive agencies we are analysing necessarily made this transition, at least at some point,. Moreover, executive agencies' structure and procedures have been conceived from the outset on the basis of this approach, more or less successfully. By contrast, the fact that traditional public administrations in our analysis do not necessarily maintain a principal-agent relationship, together with poor implementation of the model in those cases where they maintain it, may explain why they do not benefit from this principal-agent model comparative advantage. Such poor implementation of the model is characterized by the delegation of the public service production to the executive agency without undertaking pertinent planning, monitoring, and evaluation prerogatives that this model requires for the principal. Thus, for one reason or another, the final result is the non-development of the proper skills and knowledge and the non-adaptation of public administrations' internal structure and procedures to network management.

Likewise, it is interesting to analyse why both types of administration obtain similar results in $Subindex_2$. In this regard, executive agencies' score is only 0.6 higher than that obtained by

traditional public administrations. Together with this narrower gap, the fact that it is in this Subindex$_2$ where executive agencies obtain their lower results is also of note. In this respect, the principal-agent model also favour all CSFs linked to Subindex$_2$. However, in this case, executive agencies obtain lower results because all these CSFs are also affected by the generalized uniformity and rigidity of the public administration's legal and organizational framework, from which the agencies do not escape either. Likewise, traditional public administrations, which are also subject to this framework, obtain slightly lower results because, for the reasons we previously described, they do not benefit from principal-agent model comparative advantage.

Finally, observing the results obtained in Subindex$_4$ we realize that both types of administration obtained their maximum score on this parameter. However, although the executive agencies' score is 2 points higher than traditional public administrations' score, the trend is the same. One might expect that the proper skills and knowledge to be able to successfully build a good relationship with private partners are more easily found in organizations that are built following a principal-agent approach. In conclusion, these results allow us to suggest that executive agencies are more capable of successfully promoting and managing PPCs than traditional public administrations due to their principal-agent approach. Thus, we can conclude that it is convenient to concentrate, when possible, these PPC initiatives in executive agencies or comparable organizations built around a principal-agent approach.

4.5. Comparing the impact of administration size and the principal-agent approach in terms of favouring the success of public-private collaboration processes

Finally, it is interesting to analyse which of these two dimensions, size or principal-agent approach, has a bigger impact in terms of favour success. In order to do it, Table 6 combines the results from Figures 3 and 4 for the SPPCP index and subindexes for the following categories: 'Local'; 'Regional; 'Traditional public administrations'; and 'Executive agencies.' Likewise, it ranks, by columns and between parentheses, the obtained values assigning them ordinal values from 1 (highest) to 4 (lowest).

Table 6. Success of public-private collaboration process: index and subindexes by level of government and by type of administration

Public administrations, by level of government and type of administration	SPPCP Index	Subindex$_1$	Subindex$_2$	Subindex$_3$	Subindex$_4$
Local	6.3 (3)	4.3 (4)	5.0 (3)	6.6 (2/3)	7.4 (3)
Regional	7.1 (2)	7.1 (1)	6.8 (2)	6.6 (2/3)	8.2 (2)
Traditional public administrations	5.9 (4)	4.5 (3)	4.8 (4)	6.2 (4)	6.7 (4)
Executive agencies	7.4 (1)	7.0 (2)	7.3 (1)	6.8 (1)	8.7 (1)

Source: Personal elaboration, database analysis

As we can see, executive agencies have the highest score, not only in the general SPPCP Index but also in all subindexes except in Subindex$_1$, where they have the second highest score. By contrast, regional administrations have the second highest score not only in the general SPPCP Index but also in all subindexes except in Subindex$_1$, where they have the highest score. Thus, apart from this one-off exception, this data suggests that the principal-agent approach has a bigger impact than size in term of favouring success. These results are reinforced by the fact that, at the low end, local administrations obtain better results than traditional public administrations in all cases except one. Thus, the relative impact of these dimensions is the same.

One may think that these results may be biased by a non-uniform distribution resulting from the intersection of these two dimensions. However, the results for the 37 awarded contracts show a fairly equitable distribution.

- By level of government: 20 Local and 17 Regional. Local -Traditional public administrations (7 cases, 35%); Local - Executive agencies (13 cases, 65%); Regional - Traditional public administrations (5 cases, 29.4%); Regional - Executive agencies (12 cases, 70.6%).
- By type of administration: 20 Traditional public administrations and 17 Executive agencies. Traditional public administrations – Local (7 cases, 35%); Traditional public administrations – Regional (13 cases, 65%); Executive agencies – Local (5 cases, 29.4%); Executive agencies – Regional (12 cases, 70.6%).

5. CONCLUSIONS

This study confirms the importance of constructing an index as a comprehensive conceptual and methodological tool to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC process. It also ratifies the advisability of separately analysing achievement by key PPC dimensions to detect where significant areas for improvement to increase chances of success of these collaborations lie. In this regard, the results suggest that public administrations, despite being affected by the generalized uniformity and rigidity of their legal and organizational framework, fail more in those areas that entirely depend on them: the role played by the public administration, and human resources and internal organization. At some point, this is good news because it means that, if there exists the political and administrative will, it is relatively easy to introduce changes to ensure better functioning collaborations.

In this respect, three strategic measures to implement are the following: 1) reinforcing political and institutional support; 2) investing the proper resources to better train public employees and managers with appropriate soft and hard skills, and knowledge for network management, as a precondition to adapting structures and procedures; and 3) establishing higher standards, and adapting and complementing the current legal and organizational framework in key areas. In this regard, fundamental competencies for managing non-hierarchical horizontal relationships are leadership and negotiation. Likewise, crucial fields to develop with the approval of these standards are how to allocate and share responsibilities and risks, and how to define monitoring mechanisms and evaluation systems

Another interesting insight from this research is that there are some institutional and organizational contexts which are more favourable than others in successfully promoting and managing PPC initiatives. In this respect, larger administrations, with their greater economic, human and organizational resources, and executive agencies, and their principal-agent approach, are better prepared to manage these collaborations. In this context, we need to draw attention to the fact that public administrations' failure in those areas that depend entirely on them can be ascribed to two institutional and organizational contexts that present a comparative disadvantage: small public administrations and traditional public administrations that do not incorporate a principal-agent approach. Finally, the results suggest that the principal-agent approach has a greater impact than administration size in terms of favouring success.

Finally, this research makes a considerable contribution in building an original database from scratch to be able to study PPC phenomenon. Also noteworthy is the commitment to clarify what exactly we understand by PPC. However, further research is needed in order to incorporate private sector insights into this analysis.

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4. PROACTIVE COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEADERSHIP IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

<u>PAPER 3</u>

(this paper constitutes an independent section and maintains its own structure)

Abstract: Washington, D.C., the nation's capital, and dozens of other American cities were hit by riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King in April of 1968. Large parts of Washington, D.C. were looted and burned. The Fourteenth Street corridor, from Thomas Circle in the south to Columbia Heights approximately two miles to the north, was one of the areas most adversely affected. For the next thirty years or so, much of it was populated by burned-out and boarded up buildings and plagued by drug dealing, prostitution and other crimes. That changed only when developers in the late 1990s saw opportunities for private sector redevelopment dictated by a market that had not previously existed. Almost twenty years before, another part of the District of Columbia was devastated too, but not by rioters. The government instead wielded the wrecking ball. In the first significant federally funded urban renewal project in country, the government in the early 1950s acquired almost all existing properties in the southwest quadrant of the city, some 521 acres in all, bulldozed its slums and forced virtually all who lived there to move elsewhere. It did so largely through the exercise of eminent domain, a process by which the government forcibly takes private property for public purposes constrained only by the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation. The redevelopment that ensued was largely a product of government planning supported by government subsidy. The purpose of this study was to determine whether the essentially public sector-led redevelopment of Southwest and the essentially private sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor, several decades later, had significantly different social and economic consequences and, if not, why not.

Key words: public-private collaboration, urban development, redevelopment, leadership, Washington D.C.

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1.   INTRODUCTION

Washington, D.C., the nation's capital, and dozens of other American cities were hit by riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King in April of 1968.[16] Large parts of Washington, D.C. were looted and burned.[17] The Fourteenth Street corridor from Thomas Circle in the south to Columbia Heights approximately two miles to the north was one of the areas most adversely affected.[18] For the next thirty years or so, much of it was populated by burned-out and boarded-up buildings and plagued by drug-dealing, prostitution and other crimes. That changed only when developers in the late 1990s saw opportunities for private sector redevelopment dictated by a market that had not previously existed.[19]

Almost twenty years before, another part of the District of Columbia was devastated too, but not by rioters. The government instead wielded the wrecking ball. In the first significant federally-funded urban renewal project in country, the government in the early 1950s acquired almost all existing properties in the southwest quadrant of the city, some 521 acres

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[16]Camp, P. (1978, Nov. 6). New Hope on 14th Street. *The Washington Post*, Retrieved in 2016 from the D.C. Archives; Spinner, J. (2007. Mar. 27). Miracle on 14th street: The 14th Street corridor virtually shut down after the riots of 1968. Today businesses and theater are giving it new life. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2000/03/27/miracle-on-14th-street/116370a0-be9e-4928; Comptroller General of the United States (1976, Feb. 9). Letter to Lawton Chiles, Chairman, subcommittee on the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate, re: efforts to rebuild the Fourteenth Street corridor following the riots in 1968; D.C. Council. (1968, April). Report of city council public hearings on the rebuilding and recovery of Washington, D.C. from the civil disturbances of April, 1968; U.S. Senate, Committee on the District of Columbia. (1968, April 18, 30; May 20, 28, 29 hearings, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess). Rehabilitation of District of Columbia areas damaged by civil disorders. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office; Roberts, C. (1952, Jan.27 – Feb. 15); Progress or decay: 'downtown blight' in the nation's capital. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Spinner, J. (2000, Mar. 27). Miracle on 14th Street; The 14th Street corridor virtually shut down after ruinous riots of 1968. Today, businesses and theater are giving it new life. *The Washington Post*, p. F15, Retrieved from https://cf.dropboxstatic.com/static/javascript/pdf-js/pdf-js-9e9df56/webviewer-vfluVX6Bl; Levy, P. B. (2011). The Dream Deferred: The Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Holy Week Uprisings of 1968. In J. Elfenbein et al (Eds) *Baltimore '68*, pp. 3-25; Risen, C. (2009). *A Nation on Fire: America in the Wake of the King Assassination.* Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

[17]*Id.*

[18]Talbert, C., Deputy Mayor of Baltimore, Pickett III, Assistant Deputy Mayor of Baltimore, Day, J., Deputy Commissioner, Land Resources, City of Baltimore (2016, Feb. 17) [Personal Interview]; Fanning, J. (2016 February 19). [Personal Interview]; Griffiths, G. City Partners. (2015, May 27). [Personal Interview]; Nozar, J. JBG Companies. (2015, July 14). [Personal Interview]; Rivlin, A. The Brookings Institution. (2015, August 11) [Personal Interview]; Zinoman, J. Studio Theatre. (2015, August 3) [Personal Interview]; Pockros, P. (2015, Oct. 13). [Personal Interview]; Jawer, M. Developer. (2015. Dec. 21) [Personal Interview]; [Wiltshire, J. SJG Properties, Gerstenfeld, J. SJG Properties. (2016, Jan. 1) [Personal Interview]; Shaw, E., Silver, J., Cochran, S., D.C. Office of Planning. (2016, March 9). [Personal Interview]; Eaman, J., Higginbotham, H., Sack S. (1998). A capital plan: Government inertia and urban revitalization on U street. *Policy Perspectives 1998, the George Washington University School of Public Administration,* Retrieved from http://www.policy-perspectives.org/article/viewFile/4198/2948; Ruble, B. (2010). *Washington's U Street: A biography.* Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University Press.

[19]O'Connell, J. (2016, Jun. 2). After transforming U Street, JBG aims to take Manhattan. *The Washington Post*, p. A16, Retrieved from https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20160602/281805693186408; Ault, A. (2006, Apr. 14). U street: The corridor is cool again. *The New York Times,* Retrieved from http://travel12.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/travel/escapes/14washi.html?pagewanted. See also: Levy, B. & J. (2000). *Washington album.* Washington, D.C. Washington Post Books; Gutheim & Lee, F& J. (2006). *Worthy of the nation.* Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press.

in all, bulldozed its slums and forced virtually all who lived there to move elsewhere.[20] It did so largely through the exercise of eminent domain, a process by which the government forcibly takes private property for public purposes constrained only by the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation.[21] The redevelopment that ensued was largely a product of government planning supported by government subsidy.[22]

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the essentially public sector-led redevelopment of Southwest and the essentially private sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor several decades later had significantly different social and economic consequences and, if not, why not. To this end, we reviewed information from a variety of different sources, both primary and secondary, to get as close as possible to a complete and accurate picture of the consequences and their causes.

Our research indicates that the government's principal interest in the case of Southwest was to rid the area of its slums, re-populate the area with middle- and upper-income residents, increase the city's tax base and otherwise deal with attendant concerns. The poor, as a consequence, were moved out and not expected to return.[23] The outcomes were the intentional result of government policy.[24]

Our research also indicates that the District of Columbia government was simply incapable until the early 2000s of doing anything significant to shape fundamentally the way in which the Fourteenth Street corridor was transformed. This was due in part to the loss of almost a third of the city's population in the fifty years between 1950 and 2000, a lack of financial resources due to overspending and the erosion of the city's tax base, governance by a non-elected, congressionally-appointed financial control board whose principal mandate was to restore the city's financial viability, the imprisonment of the city's mayor for criminal

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[20]National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856.

[21]Id; United States Constitution, Amendment Five.

[22]*Id.*

[23]National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856.

[24]*Id.*

offenses and the city's overall inability to fully manage its affairs.[25] Redevelopment was, thus, largely left to the private sector and attendant market forces.

For purposes of discerning outcomes, we reviewed data pertaining to changes in population, racial composition, average family incomes, owner-occupied residential property values, educational attainment, participation in the workforce, household types and age. What we found is that the social and economic outcomes of redevelopment in the two areas, while different in degree, were similar to each other despite being led by the public sector in one instance and the private sector in the other and that both differed for the most part from what was occurring in the city as a whole during comparable periods. The outcomes are somewhat surprising because one might have expected government-led redevelopment to have produced significantly different outcomes given a possibly different mixture of motivations from those propelling private sector initiatives alone. In each instance, for example, whites and other races or ethnic groups replaced blacks; families with higher incomes replaced those with lower incomes; property values increased dramatically over what they were before; residents with higher educational attainments replaced those with lower educational attainments; the percentage of those who were part of the labor force increased to a significant degree; unmarried heads of households replaced married heads of households; and younger residents replaced older residents.[26]

It is unclear whether different outcomes would have been pursued in the case of Southwest had the D.C. government rather than the federal government been the prime mover. It is also unclear whether the D.C. government would have made efforts to affect in a significant way the private sector's redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor had it been capable of doing so.Whether the result of explicit policy in the case of Southwest or implicit policy in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor, however, the city has enjoyed the benefits of an increase in the tax base and an influx of middle- and upper- income residents to previously unattractive neighborhoods. The resulting gentrification is something about which there are understandably different points of view.[27]

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[25]Rivlin, A. (2003, April). Revitalizing Washington's neighborhoods: A vision takes place. *A Brookings Institution Discussion Paper*.

[26]We use the term "replaced" with reference to demographics only in the sense of what the changes in the data indicate, not in the sense of one demographic forcing changes on another.

[27]Hymowitz, A. (2016) *The new Brooklyn: What it takes to bring a city back*. New York, NY. Rowman & Littlefield; Bomey, N. (2016). *Detroit resurrected*. New York, NY: WW. Norton & Co; Williams, J. (1988, Feb. 21). There was a time.

Further research on the process by which the city explicitly or implicitly adopted policies that shaped the transformation of Southwest and the Fourteenth Street corridor, respectively, should be of interest to historians, political scientists, economists and those seeking lessons for the future. Our hope is that our research on what eventuated in these two very different circumstances in the District of Columbia will serve as a useful starting point. It should, in any event, prompt questions about choices that can be made and what is required politically and financially to achieve them.

The material in this paper that follows describes our research design and the literature we reviewed, provides background information about the history and character of the areas we studied, describes elements of the political environment that drove and ultimately affected how those areas were transformed, analyzes the available data depicting the socio-economic outcomes of their transformation, identifies the conclusions that can be drawn from what transpired and contains suggestions for further research.

2.   RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis on which this article is based is the product of extensive data analysis and documentary review as well as in-depth interviews and consultations with knowledgeable individuals as follows:

- First, we consulted the following United States Census Bureau data for each of the two geographical areas under review: total population; racial composition; average family income; residential property values; educational attainment; employment status; types of households; and age.

  Given the variation in available data collected in different census years during the period of our study and the need to find comparable data points, we consulted the "Decennial Census of Population and Housing" to obtain data for the years 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. Because this survey takes place only

The Washington Post, p. 2; Franke-Ruta, G. (2012, Aug. 10). See aso: The politics of the urban comeback: gentrification and culture in D.C. *The Atlantic.* Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/the-politics-of-the-urban-comeback-gentrification-and-culture-in-D.C./260741/; See also: Yes, 14th Street may be better these days, but something vital is missing. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/yes-14th-street-may-be-better-these-days-but-something-vital-is-m; McCartney, R. (2015, Aug. 16). *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from https://www.google.com/#q=McCartney%2C+Washington+post%2C+Baltimore+loses+its+political+lu.

every 10 years, we complemented it by consulting the "American Community Survey" (five-year estimates) to obtain annually estimated data from 2010 onwards.

Annex III identifies all the census tracts for which we gathered Decennial Census or American Community Survey data. For each area and year, we selected the census tracts necessary to cover each of the two geographical areas we reviewed. The "Social Explorer" tool was used to explore and analyze the data.

- Second, due to limited available online resources given the periods we studied study, we went to the United States National Archives and Records Administration, the District of Columbia Office of Public Records, the U.S. Department of Transportation library and the D.C. Public Library to review the primary sources available for historical and political information. Consultation with the National Archives was essential because many records relating to the District of Columbia before the District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973 are stored at the National Archives. We did not, however, unearth all possibly relevant materials because doing so would have been impossible given the time available and the limitations of relevant cataloguing systems in identifying relevant materials.

- Third, we reviewed more than 5,000 pages of books, academic journals, newspapers, magazines, websites and other research materials pertinent to the general subject of urban renewal and the renewal activities that took place in the areas under review. (For more information, see our list of References.)

- Fourth, we consulted all official maps and documents approved by the District of Columbia Zoning Commission from 1950 until the present, including major changes in 1958; 1966; 1973; 1975; 1977; 1983; 1984; 1987; 1996; 2002; and 2016. (For more information, see our list of References.)

- Finally, between July of 2015 and June of 2016, we interviewed or consulted with thirty-three individuals who were involved in or otherwise knowledgeable about the matters under review or were otherwise sources of pertinent information. Those interviewed were chosen so as to give us a range of perspectives and experiences relating to the transformation of the Fourteenth Street corridor or Southwest. They included major real estate developers, local business owners and leaders in non-

profits and social service organizations who have long-served the D.C. area. A list of those interviewed or consulted appears in Annex IV

Studies like this are, of course, imperfect. Geographical boundaries can be drawn differently from the way we have drawn them here. Doing so, could produce a somewhat different picture, although we have no reason at present to think it would.[28] Available data, moreover, are imperfect because they offer snapshots every five to ten years and do not illuminate year-by-year differences. We have worked with what we have, nonetheless, and invite others to suggest refinement. Despite inherent limitations like these, our analysis of extensive data sources, our review of relevant documents and other primary and secondary information sources and our interviews of and consultations with knowledgeable individuals give us a high degree of confidence that the material presented in this paper conveys a reasonably accurate picture of the situation and can be useful in understanding not only what actually transpired in the areas under review but also generalized and transferred to other settings where urban transformation is on the horizon.

3. THE AREAS UNDER REVIEW

The map immediately below depicts how the areas under review relate to each other. The areas under review are geographically close to each other but worlds apart.[29]

[28]Pendll, R., Tatian, P. (2016. Jan. 21). [Personal Interview]; Tatian, P., Lei, S. (undated). Washington, D.C.; Our changing city, Retrieved from http://apps.uirban.org/features/OurChangingCity/demographics/indes.html.

[29]Washington, D.C." Map. *Scribble Maps*. ScribbleMaps.com. Web. 5 March 2017.

3.1. The Fourteenth Street Corridor

The Fourteenth Street corridor for purposes of this study encompasses the entire area depicted in the map immediately below.[30] It begins at Thomas Circle in the south and runs for a distance of approximately two miles to Columbia Heights in the north. It is bounded on the west by Fifteenth Street; on the east by Thirteenth Street; on the south by Massachusetts Avenue; and on the north by Irving Street at Columbia Heights. Fourteenth Street is its spine.

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[30]Washington, D.C." Map. *Scribble Maps*. ScribbleMaps.com. Web. 5 March 2017.

The area encompasses roughly 304 acres (0.48 square miles) of land and 52 city blocks and is covered by the U.S. Census Tracts set forth in Annex III

3.2. Southwest

For the purposes of this study, Southwest encompasses the entire area depicted in the map below.[31] It is bounded in the north by Independence Avenue between Twelfth Street and Washington Avenue (formerly Canal Street); on the northeast by Washington Avenue between Independence Avenue and D Street; on the east by South Capitol Street between D and M streets; on the southeast by Canal Street between M and P streets; on the south by P Street between Canal Street and Maine Avenue; on the southwest by Maine Avenue and the Washington Channel between P and Fourteenth streets; on the west by Fourteenth Street

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[31]"Washington, D.C." Map. *Scribble Maps*. ScribbleMaps.com. Web. 5 March 2017.

between D and F streets; on the northwest by D Street between Fourteenth and Twelfth streets; and Twelfth Street, between D Street and Independence Avenue.

The area encompasses 521.40 acres (0.81 square miles) of land and 59 city blocks and is covered by the U.S. Census Tracts set forth in Annex III.

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

Urban governance, as a theory and research field in urban politics, can be defined simply as the formulation and pursuit of collective goals at the local level.[32] G. Stoker (1998), for example, argues that "governance refers to the development of governance styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred." "The essence of governance," he contends, "is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government." In this sense, one might expect political institutions and elected office-holders to play a leading, if not dominant, role in urban governance by defining goals, ensuring the provision of financial resources and establishing organizational mechanisms for the pursuit of those goals.[33]

Urban governance is different from national governance in that political institutions and their leaders at the local level often tend to be less dominant than at the national level.[34] City governments, to a much greater degree than national governments, are deeply embedded in a web of institutional, economic and political constraints that are said to create a set of complex contingencies that profoundly affect the process of governing.[35] The pursuit of city objectives involves a wide variety of actors among which public actors are but one.[36]

The core research issues in urban governance, as a consequence, tend to relate to the differing roles of the public as compared to private sectors in effecting or affecting urban transformation. The urban governance debate, in fact has proven quite fruitful in contributing to an understanding of the transformation of cities, particularly to understanding new modes of governance and contrasting different models of transformation.[37] There is, as a

[32]Pierre, J. and Guy Peters, B. (2012). Urban Governance. In: John Peter, Karen Mossberger and Susan E. Clarke (Eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics* (pp. 71-86). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
[33]Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as Theory: Five Propositions. *International Social Science Journal* 50(155), pp. 17–28. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2451.00106.

[34]Stoker, G. (2000). Urban Political Science and the Challenge of Urban Governance. In J. Pierre (Ed). *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy* (pp. 91-109). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. See also: Pierre, J. and Peters, B. G. (2005). *Governing Complex Societies.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave McMillan.

[35]Pierre, J. and Guy Peters, B. (2012). Urban Governance. In: John Peter, Karen Mossberger and Susan E. Clarke (Eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics* (pp. 71-86). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[36]Clarke, S. E. (2001). The Prospects for Local Governance: The Roles of Nonprofit Organizations. *Policy Studies Review* 18 (4), pp. 129–45.

[37]Pierre, J. and Peters, B. G. (2000). *Governance, Politics and the State.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. See also: John, P. (2001). *Local Governance in Western Europe*, London, UK: Sage. See also: Jouve, B. (2005). From Government to Urban Governance in Western Europe: A Critical Perspective, *Public Administration and Development*, 25(2), pp. 285-294. DOI: 10.1002/pad.385. See also: ll, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2009). *Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in*

consequence, something of a shift in the debate from government to governance as a key conceptual difference.[38]

In this context, Ian Cook (2009) identifies the private sector and its business elites as the most actively welcomed outsiders to the new governance structures and identifies five frequently used ways in which local government and its partners have sought to involve the private sector, namely: contracting for public services; the privatization of public services and assets; the provision of private financing for public and public–private services and other activities; the use of private auditors, financial advisors and consultants; and the development of public-private partnerships of various kinds. He points out that thinking about who governs, delivers and finances public services has led to a blurring of the lines between the public and private sectors with a substantial grey zone emerging where, as Flinders (2006) says, the public–private distinction becomes opaque and the established framework for ensuring legitimacy, accountability and control becomes less clear.[39]

It, therefore, makes sense to analyze the roles that have been and should be played by the public and private sectors in the urban transformation process and how these roles affect the legitimacy, efficacy, efficiency and consequences of redevelopment. Dahl (1974) was a pioneering student of these dynamics under the umbrella of two key concepts: power and influence.[40]

Trends in mobility and neighborhood segregation should be reviewed, he argues, before analyzing two of the most important issues currently linked to urban transformation, namely, gentrification and diversity and the role that intentions play in the resulting outcomes. Zuk et al. (2015) emphasize how slow neighborhoods are to change, highlighting the fact that, "over individual decades, the change that researchers are discussing amounts to a few percentage

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Modern Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. See also: Borraz, O. and Le Galès, P. (2010). Urban governance in Europe: the government of what? *Pôle Sud* 1(32), pp. 137-151.

[38]Ward, K. (2000). A critique in search of a corpus: re-visiting governance and reinterpreting urban politics. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 25 (2), pp. 169–185. See also: Kjaer, A.M. (2009). Governance and the urban bureaucracy. In: J.S. Davies, D.L. Imbroscio (Eds.), *Theories of Urban Politics*, second ed. (pp. 137-152), London, UK: Sage.

[39]Cook, Ian R. (2009). Private sector involvement in urban governance: The case of Business Improvement Districts and Town Centre Management partnerships in England. *Geoforum* 40(5), pp. 930-940. See also: Flinders, M. (2006). Public/private: the boundaries of the state. In: C. Hay, C. Lister, and D. Marsh (Eds.) *The State: Theories and Issues* (pp. 223-247). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

[40]Dahl, R. A. (1974). Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. Yale University Press.

points; neighborhood transformation takes decades to complete."[41] Along the same lines, Wei and Knox (2014) contend that neighborhoods are surprisingly stable.[42] So a key question is what role exogenous factors play in actions deliberately aimed at achieving the transformation of any given urban area.

Following decades of public and private initiatives to regenerate the inner city, scholars are increasingly paying attention to the causes and consequences of a neighborhood's upward trajectory, also known as neighborhood ascent or upgrading.[43] In this sense, the most frequently studied form of neighborhood ascent is gentrification and involves the racial and economic transformation of low-income neighborhoods. The phenomenon is also described as "the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential or commercial use."[44]

The vast majority of the gentrification literature has focused on private actors in a market context and how gentrification is experienced by local residents.[45] The public sector, however, also plays an important role in neighborhood transformation.[46] In fact, government investment in neighborhood infrastructure and services (public housing, schools, parks, highways and the like) can have a significant impact on property values and neighborhood change. Government investment can make a real difference in the establishment of transformational tipping points.[47]

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[41]Zuk, M., et al. (2015). *Gentrification, displacement and the role of public investment: a literature review*. (WP No. 2015-55). San Francisco, CA: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

[42]Wei, F. and Knox, P. L. (2014). Spatial Transformation of Metropolitan Cities. *Environment and Planning A*, 47(1), pp. 50-68.

[43]Zuk, M., et al. (2015). *Gentrification, displacement and the role of public investment: a literature review*. (WP No. 2015-55). San Francisco, CA: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

[44]Lees, L., Slater, T. and Wyly, E. K. (2008). *Gentrification*. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

[45]Zuk, M., et al. (2015). *Gentrification, displacement and the role of public investment: a literature review*. (WP No. 2015-55). San Francisco, CA: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

[46]Smith, N. (1979). Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by Capital, not People. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 45(4), pp. 538–548. See also: Louwaars, S. (2011). Public leadership styles: How attitude affects the realization of strategic projects (Master's thesis, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands). Retrieved from http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A8c6e1532-e686-4cde-9ca3-4680c3b71a95/. See also: Hambleton, R. and Sweeting, D. (2004). U.S.-style leadership for English local government. *Public Administration Review*, 64(4), pp. 474-48.

[47]Adams, D. and Tiesdell, S. (2010). Planners as Market Actors: Rethinking State-Market Relations in Land and Property', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 11: 2, pp.187- 207.

Diversity has become something of a new orthodoxy in city planning.[48] As Fainstein (2005) explains, the term has multiple definitions (a varied physical design, a mixture of uses, an expanded public realm and multiple social groups exercising what they might call their "right to the city"). The impetus for emphasizing diversity as a value, according to Fainstein, lies in the postmodernist/poststructuralist critique of modernism's master narratives and more specifically in reactions to the urban landscape created by segregation, urban renewal, massive housing projects and highway building programs. There is no a clear consensus in the literature, however, about the trade-offs between or among equity, diversity, growth and sustainability.[49]

Public-private partnerships are another new orthodoxy in city planning. Public organizations are shifting from a hierarchical, top–down command-and-control approach to shared authority across horizontal network arrangements—from government to governance.[50] Some of this is a consequence of limited public resources. Some is a consequence of the ability of the private sector to influence resource-starved governments.[51]

In this context, public–private partnerships and the networks in which they operate are said to be crucial to urban entrepreneurialism.[52] Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are the most common and well-known public–private partnerships for promoting the redevelopment needs of a designated business area.[53] BIDs may represent the most formal and localized public–private partnerships to emerge in the twentieth century as a reaction to the social and

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[48]Fainstein, Susan S. (2005). Cities and diversity: Should we want it? Can we plan for it? *Urban affairs review* 41(1), pp. 3-19. See also: Fincher, R. and Iveson, K. (2008). *Planning and diversity in the city: Redistribution, recognition and encounter*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. See also: Landry, Ch. and Wood (2012), Ph. *The intercultural city: Planning for diversity advantage*. London, UK: Earthscan.

[49]Fainstein, Susan S. (2005). Cities and diversity: Should we want it? Can we plan for it? *Urban affairs review* 41(1), pp. 3-19.

[50]Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W. (2004). Governing by network: The new shape of the public sector. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. See also: Ruffin, F. A. (2010). Collaborative network management for urban revitalization: The business improvement district model. *Public Performance & Management Review*, *33*(3), 459-487.

[51]Donahue, J., Zeckhauser, R. (2011). Collaborative governance; private roles for public goals in turbulent times. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

[52]Morçöl, G., & Zimmermann, U. (2008). Metropolitan governance and business improvement districts. In G. Morçöl, L. Hoyt, J. Meek, & U. Zimmermann (Eds.), Business improvement districts: Research, theories, and controversies (pp. 27–50). New York: CRC Press. See also: Ruffin, F. A. (2010). Collaborative network management for urban revitalization: The business improvement district model. *Public Performance & Management Review*, *33*(3), 459-487.

[53]Mitchell, J. (2008). Business improvement districts and the shape of American cities. Albany: State University of New York Press. See also: Grossman, Seth A. (2010) "Business Improvement Districts: Promise and Performance: Editor's Introduction." *Public Performance & Management Review* 33.3: 355-360.

economic fragmentation caused by suburbanization and the consequent neglect of America's downtowns.[54]

On the issue of sectorial leadership in urban renewal, several authors examine the consequences of a public-sector top-down approach and distinguish it from a more interactive bottom-up approach. The majority of authors who have examined this issue agree that the top-down approach presents limitations because it may alienate the local community and fail to capture locally significant factors that can affect the outcome and, ultimately, success.[55]

A number of authors also examine the difference in concept between urban development led by the public sector versus development led by the private sector. In this sense, some of them study the transition from public sector-led development to more private sector-led urban development while others examine the differences between public sector leadership styles.[56]

A few authors tackle this question by differentiating between public and private leadership in urban development. Some of these authors study this as a transition issue, while others examine it as an issue relating to how different public leadership styles affect subsequent urban development policies.[57]

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[54]Morçöl, G., Hoyt, L., Meek, J.W., & Zimmermann, U. (Eds.). (2008). Business improvement districts: Research, theories, and controversies. New York: CRC Press. See also: Grossman, Seth A. (2010) "Business Improvement Districts: Promise and Performance: Editor's Introduction." *Public Performance & Management Review* 33.3: 355-360.

[55]Purdue, D. (2001). Neighbourhood governance: leadership, trust and social capital. *Urban Studies*, 38(12), pp. 2211-2224. See also: Cooksey, B. and Kikula, I. S. (2005). When bottom-up meets top-down: The limits of local participation in local government planning in Tanzania (Special Paper No. 17), Published for Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) by Mkuki na Nyota Publishers. Retrieved from: http://www.repoa.or.tz/documents/Special_Paper_No._17_.pdf. See also: Roy, U. K. and Ganguly, M. (2009). Integration of Top down & Bottom up approach in Urban and Regional Planning West Bengal Experience of Draft Development Plans (DDP) and beyond. Conference paper presented at the National Town & Country Planners Congress, Goa, India. Retrieved from: http://www.atiwb.gov.in/U1.pdf. See also: Barber, A. and Pareja Eastaway, M. (2010). Leadership challenges in the inner city: Planning for sustainable regeneration in Birmingham and Barcelona. *Policy Studies* 31(4), pp. 393-411. See also: Sivan-Geist, Y. and Kallus, R. (2010). Planning versus Plan: A Comparative Analysis of Revitalization Process in Two Inner Cities. *Open House International* 35(4), pp. 39-50. Retrieved from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289789245_Planning_versus_plan_A_comparative_analysis_of_revitalization_process_in_two_inner_cities. See also: Dias, N., Curwell, S. and Bichard, E. (2014). The current approach of urban design, its implications for sustainable urban development. *Procedia Economics and Finance* 18, pp. 497-504.

[56]Giddens, A. (1998). *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. See also: Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (2001). *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. See also: Borraz, O. and John, P. (2004). The transformation of urban political leadership in western Europe, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28(1), pp. 107-120. See also: John, P. and Cole, A. (1999). Political Leadership in the New Urban Governance: Britain and France Compared. *Local government Studies*, 25(4), pp. 98-115. See also: Virtanen, V. P. and Verlaat, J. van't (1999). *Urban Land Policy, Goals and Instruments*. The Hague, Netherlands: IFHP. See also: Hambleton, R. and Sweeting, D. (2004). U.S.-style leadership for English local government. *Public Administration Review*, 64(4), pp. 474-48. See also: projects (Master's thesis, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands). Retrieved from http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A8c6e1532-e686-4cde-9ca3-4680c3b71a95/.

[57]*Id.*

Still other authors analyze how public tools can be used to influence the market when development is led by the private sector.[58] They conclude, in general, that public sector tools can be used consciously and strategically to secure important public objectives. To do so, however, they conclude that it is vital to create congenial conditions for effective private sector behavior and that that requires flexibility and certainty.[59]

There seems, however, to be a gap in the research on whether there is necessarily a difference in outcomes when urban development is led by the public versus the private sector. The case study presented in this paper suggests that there is no inherent reason why that should be so and illustrates by two different examples in the city of Washington, D.C. that the explicit or implicit goals being pursued and the political and economic environment in which they are pursued are more important than which sector is actually pursuing them. The practical and operational may, thus, overwhelm the theoretical as this paper suggests.

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[58]Adams, D. and Tiesdell, S. (2010). Planners as Market Actors: Rethinking State-Market Relations in Land and Property', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 11: 2, pp.187- 207. See also: Heurkens, E. (2012). *Private Sector-led Urban Development Projects: Management, partnerships and effects in the Netherlands and the UK*. Vol. 4; Rotterdam, Netherlands, Sirene Ontwerpers.

[59]Louwaars, S. (2011). Public leadership styles: How attitude affects the realization of strategic projects (Master's thesis, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands). Retrieved from http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A8c6e1532-e686-4cde-9ca3-4680c3b71a95/.

5. PERSPECTIVES

5.1. The Fourteenth Street Corridor

5.1.1. Current Characteristics

The Fourteenth Street corridor as we have defined it embraces a mix of residential and commercial uses. Fourteenth Street itself, while also residential, is the area's commercial core. The east-west streets are largely although not exclusively residential.

Lower Fourteenth Street, starting at Thomas Circle and running for approximately a mile north to Florida Avenue, was primarily commercial and industrial prior to the riots in 1968.[60] There were few, if any, high-rise residential buildings. Automobile dealerships and automobile repair shops were a significant presence, as were small grocery, liquor and other stores serving the needs of the residents on the east-west streets.[61]

The automobile dealership and repair shops were housed in large industrial-type buildings with wide, uncluttered spaces, making them ideal for stage theaters like Studio Theatre and Wholly Mammoth when they came to Fourteenth Street in the 1970s and the automobile dealership and repair shops were then largely gone. The large open spaces that the automobile shops created meant that much less work was required to make them useable for stage productions and audience seating than would otherwise have been the case.[62]

Fourteenth Street today would be unrecognizable to those who lived and worked there or came there for other reasons in the sixties, seventies, eighties and nineties. Gone are the auto dealerships and mom and pop stores. Upscale grocery stores, luxurious apartments and high-end retail outlets, restaurants and bars now predominate. The Central Union Mission, a large homeless shelter at the corner of Fourteenth and R streets has been converted into luxury apartments for upper-income households and is now ironically named just "The

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[60]14th Street Project Area Committee, Inc. (Undated). Facts You Should Know, Retrieved in 2016 from the D.C. Archives.

[61]*Id.*

[62]Zinoman, J., Studio Theatre. (2015, August 3). [Personal Interview]; Muse, D., Burkus, M. Studio Theatre (2015, July 9). [Personal Interview].

Mission."[63] Studio Theatre, known for producing thought-provoking new plays, is often cited by developers and realtors as a reason to locate in the Fourteenth Street corridor.[64]

The area above Florida Avenue on Fourteenth Street running approximately a mile to Columbia Heights in the north was and still is primarily residential until Columbia Heights itself is reached. Columbia Heights is primarily commercial and is the site of a heavily used subway stop. Otherwise, Fourteenth Street north of Florida Avenue is characterized by stately older apartment buildings, new upper-income high-rise apartments and a number of public and subsidized housing units.[65] There are subsidized and public housing units on lower Fourteenth Street as well, but they are a somewhat lesser fixture of the landscape.[66]

At Columbia Heights in the northern-most part of the Fourteenth Street corridor, the landscape changes once again. For a short distance north, it contains a number of restaurants, bars and retail establishments often on the ground floor of two and three story residential buildings.[67] Fourteenth Street then becomes even more residential with a number of single-

[63] Dickens, S. (2004). 14th street NW - The transition continues. A walking tour presented by the Washington Chapter of the American Institute of Architects; Wildman, S. (2010, Mar. 3). Stimulus Programs that Roll at Night. *The New York Times, Fashion & Style,* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/fashion/04Washington.html; Black, J. (2009, Apr. 15). The hip and hungry hit 14th street. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20009/04/14/AR2009041400742.html; Ault, A. (2006, April 14). U Street: The corridor is cool again. *The New York Time,* Retrieved from http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/travel/escapes/14washi.html?pagewanted=print; Black, J. (2009, April 15); The hip and hungry hit 14th street. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from http;//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/14/AR2009041400742.html; O'Sullivan, M. (2010, Aug. 6). Exploring Washington, D.C., neighborhoods:14th Street NW. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080502926.html; Mintz, J. (1988, June 25); Former crime hub of 14th and U turns bohemian. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/realestate/1988/06/25/former-crime-hub-of-14th-and-u-turns-boh; Badger, E. (2017, Jan. 6). To predict gentrification, look for falling crime. *The New York Times*, pp. A11; Horowitz, J. (2016, Nov. 14). Newly vibrant Washington fears Trump's effect on its culture. *The New York Times*, p. A13; O'Connell, J. (2016, Sept. 18). High-rent district. *The Washington Post*, pp. G1, G3; Badger, E., Cameron, D. (2016, June 28). Once-abandoned city centers now fetching top dollar. *The Washington Post*, p. A12; Abrams, A. (2012, May 1). In D.C., a street's grit gives way to glamour. *The New York Time*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/realestate/commercial/in-washington-14th street-nw-attracts; Washington, D.C. Chapter, the American Institute of Architects. (2012). 14th street NW – The transition continues; a walking tour, Retrieved from https://D.C.aiga.org/event/walking-tour-D.C.dw2012/.

[64] Fanning, J. D.C. Advisory Neighborhood Commissioner. (2016, February 19) [Personal interview]; Zinoman, J. Studio Theatre. (2015, August 3) [Personal interview]; Muse, D., Burkus, M. Studio Theatre. (2015, July 9) [Personal interview].

[65] D.C. Office of Planning. (2012, July 12). Central 14th Street. Vision Plan and revitalization strategy; Cooper, K. et al. (undated). A community-based plan for the Columbia Heights Metro station area. A Washington Architectural Foundation publication; D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (2001, July). Request for proposals: the redevelopment of seven parcels in the 14th Street urban renewal area; D.C. Office of Planning. (2008, April). *Columbia Heights investment plan*. Washington, D.C. Office of the Deputy Mayor, Planning and Economic Development.

[66] D.C. Office of Planning. (2008, April). *Columbia Heights investment plan*. Washington, D.C. Office of the Deputy Mayor, Planning and Economic Development; Cooper, K. et al. (undated). A community-based plan for the Columbia Heights Metro station area. A Washington Architectural Foundation publication; D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (2001, July). Request for proposals: the redevelopment of seven parcels in the 14th Street urban renewal area.

[67] D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (2001, July). Request for proposals: the redevelopment of seven parcels in the 14th Street urban renewal area.

family homes sheltered by a substantial tree canopy. The area north of Columbia Heights was to a large extent unaffected by the riots.[68]

Fourteenth Street is intersected by east-west streets that, except for P and U streets, are largely residential. Many of the residences on the east-west streets in the area south of Florida Avenue consist of elegant row houses from the Victoria era and earlier periods. They provide significant radial support for the Fourteenth Street spine. Many of the residences on the east-west streets north of Florida Avenue consist of large apartment building that are, for the most part of, high quality and date from the early twentieth century.[69] They, too, support the spine of the corridor.

The restoration of the Fourteenth Street corridor's high quality residential bones by gays is part of the story of the Fourteenth Street's eventual transformation after the riots because the gay population provided some of the spending power that helped fuel the corridor's revival. Their work in restoring the buildings also played a role in the willingness of developers to invest in the construction of new residential high-rises along Fourteenth Street itself.[70]

5.1.2. Before the Riots: From White to Black, From Middle-Class to Poor

Before 1950, the Fourteenth corridor was mainly a white neighborhood. During the 1950s, however, things began to change. Whites began leaving for the suburbs, and blacks moved in. At the start of the decade, blacks accounted for approximately 45 percent of the city's population as a whole and 50 percent of the population of the Fourteenth Street corridor. By 1960, they accounted for 71 percent of the city's total population and 84 percent of the Fourteenth Street corridor's population.[71]

In the 1950s and 1960s, in addition, the Fourteenth Street corridor was an important center of black culture and commerce and home to one of America's largest African-American urban

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[68]*Id.*

[69]*Id.*
[70]Blanchon, D. The Whitman-Walker Clinic. (2016, Jan. 11). [Personal Interview]; Wiltshire, A. SJG Properties; Gerstenfeld, J. SJG Properties. (2016, Jan. 11). [Personal Interview]; Jawer, M. Developer (2015, Dec. 21). [Personal Interview].

[71]U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010; American Community Survey, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates; generated by Victoria Alsina; using Social Explorer; (25 November 2015).

communities, a sort of a "city within a city" for D.C.'s black middle class.[72] The area around the intersection of Fourteenth and U streets was known as "Black Broadway," filled with theaters, jazz clubs and restaurants, as well as a variety of other businesses.[73] Unlike those in many other parts of the city, many of the clubs and businesses were owned and operated by blacks.[74]

In a 1988 article in The Washington Post Magazine section of the Post's Sunday newspaper, Juan Williams, a reporter, wrote that "there was a time when just being there meant being somebody in black Washington, a time when U Street itself was known as 'the colored man's Connecticut Avenue.'" "There was a time," he wrote, "when gangsters and president's wives and soul singers could be seen in the same nightclub at the same time." Pearl Bailey, a famous black jazz and blues singer, is reported to have considered it home. [75]

By the late sixties, however, tensions began to mount in black neighborhoods throughout the District of Columbia. They revolved around issues of poverty, housing and education. Roughly 92 percent of public school students in the city at this time were black. Black community leaders expressed considerable concern about the quality of the schools in particular.[76]

Black community leaders were also increasingly vocal about poor living conditions in general throughout the city, including vastly different rates of unemployment between blacks and whites, segregated and dangerous housing and discrimination in law enforcement. About

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[72]Franke-Ruta, G. (2012, Aug. 10). The politics of the urban comeback: gentrification and culture in D.C. *The Atlantic,* Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/the-politics-of-the-urban-comeback-gentrification-and-culture-in-D.C./260741/; Milloy, C. (2015, Jul. 21). Yes, 14th Street may be better these days, but something vital is missing. *The Washington Post*, Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/yes-14th-street-may-be-better-these-days-but-something-vital-is-m; Bui, L. (2015, Aug. 16). Mending ties in a fractured city. *The Washington Post*, pp. C1, C5, Retrieved from https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post-sunday/20150816/282248074295735; Ruble, B. (2010). *Washington's U Street: A biography.* Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University Press; Levy, B. & J. (2000). *Washington album.* Washington, D.C. Washington Post Books; Williams, J. (1988, Feb. 21). There was a time. *The Washington Post, p. 21.*

[73]*Id.*

[74]Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]. See also: "Greater U Street Historic District." Department of the Interior, United States National Park Service. [Fact Sheet]. Retrieved on February 1, 2016. Available at: http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/was/D.C.63.htm.

[75]Williams, J. (1988, Feb. 21). There was a time. *The Washington Post,* pp. 21.

[76]Filson, Susan (June 10, 1967). "School Aid System Creates Inequities". Retrieved February 1, 2016.

80 percent of the police force was white.[77] By early 1968, the city was something of a cauldron rapidly approaching a boiling point.

The situation was compounded ironically by desegregation. Once blacks were allowed to shop at major department stores downtown or purchase groceries at supermarkets in parts of the city that had previously been off-limits to them, many black-owned businesses lost a significant portion of their clientele. Businesses along the Fourteenth Street corridor began to fail. Their failure was accompanied by a gradual erosion of the black middle class as many of its members moved to suburbs that had previously been inaccessible.[78]

5.1.3. The 1968 Riots

On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated. That evening, riots broke out in cities across the country. Many occurred in cities with large, impoverished black populations.[79] The District of Columbia probably suffered the most.[80]

The rioting in D.C. began in the heart of "Black Broadway" at the corner of 14th and U streets, with a brick thrown through the window of a People's Drug Store. The area became the center of rioting during the four days that followed and experienced among the worst of the city's resulting violence and destruction.

In just a few days, 4,000 homes and structures housing 270 businesses in the Fourteenth Street corridor were destroyed. The destroyed businesses represented over 80 percent of the businesses that had previously operated along 14th Street between Thomas Circle and Columbia Heights.[81]

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[77]"Unemployment Unchanged". July 22, 1969. Retrieved February 1, 2016. See also: Gilbert, B. *10 Blocks from the White House*. Praeger. 1968. See also: "HUD prolongs segregation in housing, ACCESS says." Washington Post. August 19, 1967. Retrieved February 1, 2016.

[78]Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview].

[79]Levy, P. B. (2011). The Dream Deferred: The Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Holy Week Uprisings of 1968. In J. Elfenbein et al (Eds) *Baltimore '68*, pp. 3-25.

[80]City Council, Government of the District of Columbia. (1968, May 10). Report of city council public hearings on the rebuilding and recovery of Washington, D.C. from the civil disturbances of April, 1968, Retrieved in 2016 from the D.C. Archives; The Dream Deferred: The Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Holy Week Uprisings of 1968. In J. Elfenbein et al (Eds) *Baltimore '68*, pp. 3-25; Risen, C. (2009). *A Nation on Fire: America in the Wake of the King Assassination*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

[81]Spinner, Jackie. "Miracle on 14th Street." The Washington Post. March 27, 2000. Retrieved February 1, 2016.

5.1.4. A City Constrained

5.1.4.1. The Loss of Population

Even before the riots, the city had begun to experience a steady decline. Its population, which stood at a little over 800,000 in 1950, fell by 38,000 to 764,000, in the ten years between 1950 and 1960. The decline continued for the next forty years. By 2000, D.C.'s population had fallen to 572,000, an almost 30% decline in the space of fifty years.[82]

The population decline is attributed in varying degrees to, among other things, the end of the World War II economy; the growth of the suburbs; white flight following desegregation; inferior public schools; an epidemic of drug use and crime; the city's management and financial problems; and, especially in the 1970s, the 1968 riots. The 14th Street corridor quickly became known as an epicenter of drug trafficking, prostitution and violent crime, rather than one of culture and vibrant economic activity.[83] Its population shrank from nearly 47,000 in 1960 to 33,000, or nearly 30%, by 1990 as those who could afford to leave the area did so as quickly as possible following the devastation of the Martin Luther King riots.[84]

Washington, D.C., of course, was not alone in its decline over the last half of the 20th century. Other U.S. cities experienced similar declines. The federal highway program, the home mortgage interest deduction and the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education* forcing school desegregation led many to leave America's cities and seek life in the suburbs.[85] But the 1968 riots played a major role in accelerating D.C.'s economic decline, as they did in many cities across the country.[86]

5.1.4.2. The District's Awareness of Its Challenges

A 1976 report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) at the request of a Senate Subcommittee on the District of Columbia attempted to assess what could be done by

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[82]U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010; American Community Survey, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates; generated by Victoria Alsina; using Social Explorer; (25 November 2015); Abrams, A. (2015, Sept. 6). A slow exodus. *The Washington Post*, pp. B1, B6, Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/changes-at-florida-avenue-market/2015/09/06/1978f246-319f-11e5-.

[83]Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]; Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview].

[84]U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010; American Community Survey, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates; generated by Victoria Alsina; using Social Explorer; (25 November 2015).

[85]Lowe, J. (1968). *Cities in a race with time*. New York, NY and Canada: Random House.

[86]Risen, C. (2009). A Nation on Fire: America in the Wake of the King Assassination. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

the District to deal with the aftermath of the riots and other problems associated with abandoned and damaged properties. Among other things, it noted that there was a critical need for improvements in the city's property management systems to deal with these issues and recommended that the city create a system for identifying buildings for demolition in the riot-torn areas of the city, tracking tenants of problem properties and improving the rate at which new housing units were constructed and existing units rehabilitated.[87]

In 1976, the city also released various plans for revitalizing several neighborhoods, including the 14th Street corridor. Like the GAO report, the plans concentrated on issues relating to property management, planning for the demolition of vacant and dilapidated properties and the rehabilitation of existing properties. Changes were made to what the D.C. Department of Planning called the Urban Renewal Plan for the 14th Street Urban Renewal Area at various times in the 1980s and 1990s.[88] All these plans essentially did, however, was to express a series of aspirations and guidelines for redevelopment that would be generated by the private sector when and if market conditions made redevelopment attractive.

In the early 1980s, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry made attempts to use what levers he had to spark improvements along the Fourteenth Street corridor. He engineered the creation of the Franklyn D. Reeves Center of Municipal Affairs, referred to locally as the Reeves Center, at 14th Street and U streets in 1986 to house a variety of municipal functions. Around this time, a Metro subway also opened nearby at 13th and U streets.

Mayor Barry also began encouraging nonprofit organizations providing services to the poor to locate in the neighborhood, perhaps with the hope this would increase the workforce in the area and that the influx of workers would in turn attract businesses. His efforts, however, proved ineffective because Reeves Center employees were too few and the staff of the non-

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[87]"Recommendations to Improve Urban Renewal Activities in the District of Columbia." The United States Government Accountability Office (formerly the United States General Accounting Office). 7 May, 1976.

[88]Executive Director (unnamed), National Capital Planning Commission. (1973, April). Draft Environmental Statement for the First, Second and Third Action Years of the District of Columbia Neighborhood Development Program for the Fourteenth Street Urban Renewal Area. Digitized by Google; Comptroller General of the United States (1976, Feb. 9). Letter to Lawton Chiles, Chairman, subcommittee on the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate, re: efforts to rebuild the Fourteenth Street corridor following the riots in 1968; National Capital Planning Commission. (1968, Aug. 28). Alternative approaches to rebuilding Seventh and Fourteenth Streets, NW., and H Street, NE; City Council, Government of the District of Columbia. (1968, May 10). Report of city council public hearings on the rebuilding and recovery of Washington, D.C. from the civil disturbances of April, 1968, Retrieved in 2016 from the D.C. Archives; District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency. (Date unknown). Urban renewal in Washington, D.C. How it functions, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; National Capital Planning Commission. (undated). Urban renewal plan for the 14th Street urban renewal area, Retrieved on July 7, 2016 from the D.C. Department of Transportation Library.

profits in the area, too small to attract a significant business community. Few of the Reeves Center employees, moreover, are believed to have lived in the Fourteenth Street corridor.[89]

5.1.4.3. A Fiscal Crisis

By the early 1990s, the city began to face a fiscal and financial crisis due to declining tax revenues and overspending. According to a 1994 GAO report, the city borrowed over $330 million in 1991 in order to meet a cash shortfall, but the city's cash position had, nonetheless, continued to decline. The city, according to the GAO, would be unable in coming years to meet a number of existing financial obligations and had no plans to do so. Its access to the financial markets for assistance by way of short-term borrowing, said the GAO, was not likely to be favorably received.[90]

At that point, Congress stepped in and created a financial control board to manage the city's finances and generally oversee its affairs.[91] As reported by *The New York Times* at the time, "the five member financial control panel … would have vast authority over municipal spending, financial planning, borrowing, hiring and contracts.[92] The financial control board, headed at first by Andrew Brimmer and then by Alice Rivlin, was in existence from 1995 through most of 2001 and held a tight reign over the city's expenditures and other financial affairs.[93]

5.1.4.4. An Ineffective Government Unable to Step In

The District of Columbia Home Rule Act enacted in 1973 gave the District of Columbia a modicum of self-government for the first time in its history. The creation of the financial control board largely took that away. Again, as reported by *The New York Times* at the time, the authority given to the financial control board "to overrule decisions of [the mayor] and

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[89]Blanchon, D. Whitman-Walker Health. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview].

[90]General Accountability Office, Financial Status: District of Columbia Finances (Briefing Report), 6/22/94, GAO/AIMD/GGD-94-172BR.

[91]HR 1345, District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, HR 1345, 104th Cong. (1995-1996).

[92]Congress creates board to oversee Washington, D.C., (April 7, 1995), *The New York Times*, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/us/congress-creates-board-to-oversee-washington-D.C.html.
[93]Rivlin, A. The Brookings Institution. (2015, Aug. 11). [Personal Interview]; Rivlin, A. (2003, April). Revitalizing Washington's neighborhoods: A vision takes place. *A Brookings Institution Discussion Paper*.

the City Council" gave "unelected officials the largest influence over the District since limited home rule was granted by Congress more than 20 years ago."[94]

Compounding the problem, were the corruption and scandals that plagued the city for most of the eighties and nineties under Mayor Marion Barry. He was first elected Mayor in 1978, was arrested and convicted while Mayor on drug charges in 1990, subsequently spent six months in prison and was reelected as Mayor for another four-year term in 1994.[95] The D.C. Planning Office was essentially non-existent under Mayor Barry.[96]

5.1.5. The Private Sector Steps In

5.1.5.1. *Early Positioning by Developers*

The city's fiscal and financial crisis, its inability to manage its own affairs, its corresponding inability to deal with the aftermath of the riots and the crime, poverty and other issues that plagued the city, coupled with a dramatic decline in the city's overall population, meant that the government could do little to bring about or shape the renewal of the Fourteenth Street corridor even if it had wanted to.[97]

Developers and speculators, in the meanwhile, saw opportunities that might evolve in time. Developers, like SJG Properties and JBG properties, which would become central to the transformation that eventually took place in the Fourteenth Street corridor, began acquiring properties in the corridor as early as 1977. Prices were low due to the high crime rates and the dilapidated nature of many buildings in the area, but speculators guessed, with the corridor's location so near downtown and the White House, that it was only a matter of time before things would begin to change.[98] While many did not expect that change would take nearly thirty years before it began to take hold, many were willing to wait.[99]

In 1985, People's Drug later to become CVS, began working with JBG Properties to re-enter the neighborhood after the 1968 riots destroyed its 14th & U streets location.[100] JBG, which

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[94] *Id.*

[95]"Timeline: The Life of Marion Barry," *The Washington Post*. Retrieved April 16, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/local/timeline-the-life-of-marion-barry/1094/.
[96]Altman, A. (2016, Jan. 21). [Personal Interview].
[97]Ryan, E. (2015, July 30). [Personal Interview].

[98]Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]
[99]Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview]. Shallal, A. (2016, Jun. 17). [Personal Interview].
[100]*Id.*

had acquired properties in the area in the late seventies and early eighties while prices were low, then developed a stretch of shops on a block-long site on 14th Street between T Street and Wallace Place that eventually housed the People's Drug Store as well as a laundromat, post office, Chinese food restaurant and other businesses to provide basic services to the neighborhood.[101] SJG Properties, another major property owner in the neighborhood, also began exploring opportunities.[102]

A major development in the late eighties was the relocation in 1987 of the Whitman-Walker Clinic (now Whitman-Walker Health) from the Dupont Circle area along Connecticut Avenue several blocks to the west of the Fourteenth Street corridor to the corner of 14th and S streets when the HIV/AIDS crisis in the gay community was reaching a peak. Other non-profit and cultural organizations serving the gay and lesbian communities followed suit. The influx of gays and lesbians into the neighborhood accelerated. Many purchased historic homes on the cross-streets and spent considerable sums on their rehabilitation.[103] Many had the wherewithal to do so in part because they lived in two-earner households without the need to meet the expenses that schools and other aspects of family life with children entail.

5.1.5.2. *The Beginning of the End*

By the early 1990s, the larger business community began to take notice of the spending power of the area's gay community, enhanced as it was by two-earner childless couples and the physical and aesthetic improvements to the neighborhood they brought about.[104] As early as 1991, for example, two major grocery store chains expressed an interest in opening stores on or near the corridor.[105]

One, Shopper's Food Warehouse, considered opening a store at 14th and Belmont streets in the northern end of the corridor, while another, Safeway, explored possibilities at the historic Tivoli Theatre site at 14th Street and Park Road, also at the northern end of the corridor. At

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[101] Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]

[102] Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview]

[103] Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]; Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview]; Blanchon, D. Whitman-Walker Health. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview].

[104] Jawer, M. JBG Properties. (2015, December 21). [Personal Interview]; Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview].

[105] *Id.*

the time, the Deputy Mayor of Economic Development, Austin Penny, also indicated in public statements that the administration of then Mayor Sharon Pratt-Dixon was committed to working with these stores in helping them to advance their plans.

While these developments never came to fruition, partly due to opposition from historical preservation interests in the case of the Tivoli Theatre site, they were an early indication, albeit more than twenty years after the riots, that things were happening in the area that might be attractive to business interests.[106]

Beginning in the early 1990s, nightclubs also started to reenter the corridor, drawn in part by cheap rents and the presence of stage theaters like Studio Theater, Woolly Mammoth and the Source Theater. Howard Kitrosser, a co-owner of The Eleventh Hour, a nightclub that came to the neighborhood during this period, referred to the area's bohemian, "artsy" feel as a source of appeal. While he acknowledged the risk in establishing a business in the area, he guessed that the corridor might be poised to "take off."[107] The take-off, however, was still some distance away. It was not until the late 1990s that things really began to stir in a significant way.

5.1.6. The Turning Point

The turning point is often seen as occurring when another major grocery chain, Fresh Fields, later to become Whole Foods, began in the 1990s to explore the possibility of locating a store within the Fourteenth Street corridor. It did so in part at the urging of the Q Street Association, a local group of community residents which had itself been purchasing and revitalizing homes along the corridor.[108] The site Whole Foods eventually chose was on the south side of the P Street block between 14th and 15th streets on a parcel owned by SJG Properties, encouraged in part by redevelopment of the north side of the block and the planned redevelopment of adjacent blocks into middle to upper income apartments. Those blocks had previously been the scene of violent drug-trafficking activity. Nearby at the corner

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[106]"A Supermarket for 14th Street?" The Washington Post. November 2, 1991. Retrieved February 1, 2016; Zinoman, J. Studio Theatre. (2015, Aug. 3) [Personal Interview].

[107]Spinner, Jackie. "Miracle on 14th Street." The Washington Post. March 27, 2000. Retrieved February 1, 2016.

[108]Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview]; Kashino, M. (2015, Jul. 14) See also: "How Whole Foods decides if your neighborhood is worthy; The science behind the chain's real-estate decisions." *The Washingtonian*, Retrieved from *https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/07/14/how-whole-foods-decides-if-your-neighborhood-is-worthy/*.

of Fourteenth and P streets, was the cultural attraction of Studio Theatre, the site of well-regarded theatrical stage productions.[109]

Whole Foods may have been a turning point, but it was not altruistic. It came because others had laid a foundation.[110] It was, nonetheless, a symbol that things were on the upswing and undoubtedly encouraged others to believe that the Fourteenth Street corridor was not as it used to be.

The five years between 2000 and 2005 marked significant increases in the number of major residential developments under way in the corridor. Harrison Square Townhomes, for example opened to new residents in 2002, the Ellington apartments in 2004 and Union Row in 2005.[111] The number of building permits issued for projects in the corridor increased more than sevenfold from 2003 to 2004.[112]   That period can easily be identified as the point when the transformation of the Fourteenth Street corridor really began to take hold. Since then, redevelopment has only accelerated. In their own organic way, market forces piggy-backed on each other and changed the equation for risk-takers.

5.1.7. The Fourteenth Street Corridor Today

The Fourteenth Street corridor today is nothing like its former self. It has been completely transformed. It is now dominated by elegantly refurbished Victorian-era townhouses and new middle and upper-income, high-rise residential housing units and high-end restaurants, bars, food stores and other retail establishments although some effort has been made to recall the area's African American history.[113]   One of the best examples of this is Busboys and Poets, a combination bookstore-café, featuring book readings and poetry recitations that opened in

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[109]Gerstenfeld. J and A. Wiltshire. SJG Properties. (2016, January 11). [Personal Interview]. See also: Spinner, Jackie. "Miracle on 14th Street." The Washington Post. March 27, 2000. Retrieved on February 1, 2016.

[110]Kashino, M. (2015, Jul. 14) "How Whole Foods decides if your neighborhood is worthy; The science behind the chain's real-estate decisions." *The Washingtonian,* Retrieved from *https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/07/14/how-whole-foods-decides-if-your-neighborhood-is-worthy/.*

[111]Franke-Ruta, Garance. "The Politics of the Urban Comeback: Gentrification and Culture in D.C." *The Atlantic.* August 10, 2012. Retrieved on February 1, 2016.

[112]Building permit records, 2002 - 2015. D.C. Office of Planning. Retrieved on November 12, 2015.

[113]Franke-Ruta, Garance. "The Politics of the Urban Comeback: Gentrification and Culture in D.C." *The Atlantic.* August 10, 2012. Retrieved on February 1, 2016.

2003 and whose name recalls Langston Hughes, an African-American poet who began writing poetry while working as a busboy and living in the neighborhood.[114]

Accompanying these physical changes were dramatic changes in demographics. The area had been 84 percent black in 1970, for example, but was just 28 percent black in 2010 and 26 percent black in 2014. By 2010, 52 percent were white, and 20 percent consisted of other races or ethnic groups, including Hispanic/Latino and Asian, a demographic that had traditionally comprised a very small minority of the area's population.[115]By 2014, just four years later, 59 percent were white. Average family incomes in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1970 in 2013 dollars were $44,000, $24,000 below average family incomes at that time for the city as a whole. By 2014, they were on a par with the city as a whole at approximately $128,000.

The Fourteenth Street Corridor has come a long way.

5.2. Southwest D.C.

5.2.1. Current Characteristics

Southwest D.C. is much less complex than the Fourteenth Street corridor. It occupies the entire southwest quadrant of the city and is bounded on its west side by the Washington Channel, which is part of the Potomac River.

Throughout its history, Southwest was physically, socially and demographically somewhat distant from the rest of the city.[116] It remains somewhat physically isolated today because it is cut off from the rest of the city along its northern boundary by an eight to ten lane freeway. South Capitol Street on its eastern boundary is essentially a six-lane highway. The Washington Channel completes the surround.

The area contains a mixture of newly built high-rises and townhouses, a handful of historic structures and a number of pre-existing public housing units. Many of the newly built high

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[114]Busboys and Poets. Retrieved on February 1, 2016 from http://www.busboysandpoets.com/about/. See also: Roberts, K. "Langston Hughes in Washington, D.C.: Conflict and Class." *Beltway Poetry Quarterly, 12(*1). Winter 2011.

[115]U.S. Census Bureau; Census 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010; American Community Survey, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates; generated by Victoria Alsina; using Social Explorer; (25 November 2015).

[116]Gutheim & Lee, F& J. (2006). *Worthy of the nation.* Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press.

rises are in or resemble the Brutalist style. The well-known Arena Stage Company is located in Southwest, as are a number of federal government office buildings. Apart from a super market and a handful of restaurants, there is little in the way of other retail establishments. There is correspondingly, little in the way of street life.

Unlike the Fourteenth Street corridor, moreover, Southwest's physical character is lacking in significant architectural diversity.[117] There are exceptions in the case of the handful of historically significant structures that were preserved against the onslaught of urban renewal in the 1950s. But no Victorian-era townhouses and the like or other intricate residential streetscapes from the past add character or diversity to the area in ways like those that are provided by the east-west streets of the Fourteenth Street corridor.

Uniformity in appearance may not have been what the urban renewal planners had in mind when they bulldozed the old Southwest and made plans for its reconstruction. Indeed, the government staged a series of significant competitions among well-known architects to encourage innovative designs before awarding development rights.[118] But uniformity in look and feel is largely what emerged.[119] Current private-sector efforts to renew Southwest along its waterfront may change that, but the redevelopers are working around the edges of what government-led urban renewal in the 1950s brought about.[120]

5.2.2. Before Urban Renewal: Poor, Black and Overcrowded

Prior to the arrival of urban renewal, Southwest was predominantly poor and overcrowded. Sixty-four percent of its population in 1950 was black; 36 percent of its population was white. The area contained approximately 6,000 dwelling units for a population of 25,000, or 4.2 persons per dwelling unit as compared to 3.5 persons per dwelling unit for the city as a whole at that time. Southwest's housing was largely of poor quality and often lacked basic

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[117]*Id.*

[118]National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856; National Capital Planning Commission (1955, Apr. 8). Redevelopment plan for Southwest redevelopment project area B, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; National Capital Planning Commission. (1952, May). Redevelopment plans for Southwest survey area in the District of Columbia, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Lewis, R. (1963. Mar. 3). Citizen plan unveiled for S.W. waterfront. *The Sunday Star.* pp. A1, A12, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives.

[119]Ammon, F. (2009). Commemoration amid criticism: The mixed legacy of urban renewal in Southwest Washington, D.C. *Journal of Planning History,* 8 (3), 175-220. Downloaded from jph.sagepub.com at Harvard Libraries on May 16, 2016; Kanigel, R. (2016). *Eyes on the street; The life of Jane Jacobs.* New York, N.Y. Knopf Doubleday.

[120]National Capital Planning Commission. (2014, Sept.). The SW ecodistrict plan.

amenities such as indoor plumbing and toilets and sometimes even electricity. Many of its residents worked as domestics or in fishing and a variety of other relatively low-paying jobs. Many were former slaves or children of slaves. Many came from the deep South.[121]

It was a city within a city, much like the Fourteenth Street corridor, and significantly isolated. Unlike the Fourteenth Street corridor, however, there were no nightclubs, theatres, other cultural attractions or businesses that enticed people from other parts of the city to visit. No celebrities, president's wives, entertainers or soul singers had reason to go there. It was widely and correctly regarded as a slum. Those who lived in Southwest lived within an enclave.[122] It was a swampy, low-lying area, adjacent to and often invaded by the Tiber River which traversed the area on its way to the Potomac.

5.2.3. Urban Renewal: No Riots, but Destroyed Nonetheless

Southwest was destroyed in the 1950s, some fifteen years before the riots in the Fourteenth Street corridor, but not by rioters. The federal government was the moving force. Southwest was a slum that the federal government, which largely ran the city at that time, could eliminate under federal urban renewal programs with little effective local opposition.[123]

Unlike the mindless destruction that occurred along the Fourteenth Street corridor during the riots, those in charge of Southwest's transformation knew what they were doing. Southwest was a poor but stable community. There were no drug wars or other overwhelming incidents of crime so far as available information suggests. But because Southwest was undeniably a slum at the doorsteps of the Capitol building, federal government officials felt it could not be ignored.[124]

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[121]Gutheim & Lee, F& J. (2006). *Worthy of the nation.* Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press; National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856.
[122]*Id.*

[123]Mathe, R. (1956, Oct. 19). Memorandum to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia re: urban renewal educational program, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Editorial. (1963, Mar. 30). Rehearing for renewal. *The Washington Post.* p. not identified, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Sawyer, D. (1961, Jan. 19). Memorandum to the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia re: urban renewal, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Lane, T. (1955, Feb. 7). Memorandum to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia re: urban renewal, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Adams, E. (1965, Mar. 1); Memorandum to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia re: request for adoption of resolution. Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; Speaker not identified. (1957, June 4). Address entitled "Our Living Future" on behalf of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; National Capital Planning Commission. (1964, April). An historical review of renewal goals and objectives in the District of Columbia 1934 to 1962, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives.

[124]*Id.*

When destruction came, therefore, it was at the hands of the urban renewal wrecking ball.[125] The federal government believed that the best way to eliminate the slums was to remove the poor from the area and start all over again. The welfare of existing inhabitants and the preservation of their communities were not priorities. The top priorities were getting rid of eyesores and substandard living conditions and improving the tax-base.[126]The government gave those who were displaced a small sum to help them relocate.[127]Almost the entire area was razed to make way for new buildings and an almost entirely new array of inhabitants.

5.2.4. A Federal Government in Control and Able to Act

The District of Columbia had not yet begun its steep decline when urban renewal first came to Southwest. The 1949 Urban Renewal Act, which Congress enacted in order to deal with decline in a number of American cities, provided the funding. Eradicating the slums of Southwest was an inviting first-project because the slums were so obviously visible to tourists visiting the Nation's capital and often appeared in the foreground of photographs of the Capitol building itself.[128]

Little political groundwork needed to be laid for the federal government's plans for Southwest because the District of Columbia had no home rule. The city, moreover, had and still has, no representative in Congress with voting rights. The consequence was that the federal government was able to proceed in the eradication of Southwest's slums without serious worry politically about the effect on its existing residents and businesses or their possible opposition.

The government thus proceeded to acquire properties largely via eminent domain and priced the land by and large in ways that made private-sector development appealing without regard to evolving market forces.[129] There was no need, as there was years later in the Fourteenth

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[125]*Id.*

[126]Gutheim & Lee, F& J. (2006). *Worthy of the nation.* Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press; National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856; Author not identified. (1963, Mar. 21). Arts commission backs plan for waterfront. *The Evening Star.* p. not identified, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives.

[127]D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (1952, Oct. 27). Report on plans for the rehousing of families living in Southwest project area B, Retrieved in 2016 from the National Archives; D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (undated). Community services and family relocation, Retrieved on July 7, 2016 from the D.C. Department of Transportation Library.
[128]*Id.*

[129]*Id.*

Street corridor, to wait for external factors like market demand to cover the government's acquisition costs. The government resold or leased the land it had acquired at prices designed to attract demand that an unsubsidized market would not support.[130]

5.2.5. Southwest Today

Southwest today, of course, is nothing like it was in 1950. High-rises, neatly-ordered dwellings, government office buildings and the absence of mom and pop grocery and convenience stores bespeak its fundamental transformation. Many critics regard Southwest as sterile.[131] Unlike the Fourteenth Street corridor, it does not bustle with street life or present the eye with much in the way of architectural diversity. But the eradication of slums through government planning was seen at the time as the paramount objective. The diversity that organic development might bring about was not a high priority and, in any event, would have taken more time than wholesale reconstruction starting from scratch could achieve. It remains to be seen whether the redevelopment currently occurring along the Southwest waterfront will eventually make a significant difference.[132]

6. COMPARING OUTCOMES

Despite the significantly different roles played by the public sector in the two situations, the socio-economic consequences as suggested are similar and differ from what was occurring in the city as a whole over parallel periods. It seems not to have made a difference whether transformation was led by the public sector in the case of Southwest or led by the private sector in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor when looked at from the standpoint of changes in population, race, family income, residential property values, educational attainment, participation in the workforce or types of households, although the transformation of Southwest occurred over a considerably shorter period, from the mid-1950s to 1980, as compared to the period from 1968 to 2014 for the Fourteenth Street corridor.

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[130]D.C. Office of Policy and Planning, Dep't. of Public Works. (1982, Feb. 22). Report of the waterfront task force of the Federal City Council, Retrieved on July 7, 2016 from the D.C. Department of Transportation Library; D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency. (undated). Administrative history of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency –the Southwest projects, Retrieved on July 7, 2016 from the D.C. Department of Transportation Library.

[131]Thompson, J. (2015, Sept. 24). [Personal Interview].

[132]Courtney, S. (2017, Feb. 27). Wharf is finally on the horizon. *The Washington Post*, p. A11.

Making comparisons between renewal taking place in calendar periods that do not overlap is, of course, difficult because the comparisons involve different starting and ending points. The comparisons also involve different economic, social and governing situations during the periods being compared. Comparing what occurred in each situation with what was occurring at the same time in the city as a whole, however, helps. It makes it possible to determine whether the outcomes were unique or simply reflective of what occurring in the larger picture.

We have taken 1950 as the starting point in the case of Southwest because that is the latest date for which Census data are available before the government began clearing out Southwest's slums. We have taken 1970 as the starting point for the Fourteenth Street corridor because that is the earliest date following the riots for which Census data are available. Both are the points at which the old order was being swept away.

We use two ending points in the case of Southwest. One is 1980 because that is the date by which there seems to be a consensus that the renewal of Southwest in accordance with government plans was largely complete.[133] The other ending point we use in the case of Southwest is 2014 in order to see whether the trends that appeared in the 1950-1980 period continued to the present day. 2014 is latest date for which the Census Bureau's American Community Survey data are available.

For the Fourteenth Street corridor, there is no completely satisfactory ending point because the transformation of the Fourteenth Street corridor is still on-going. We have, thus, used 2014 as an ending point in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor and compared the socio-economic consequences of its on-going transformation with those that occurred in Southwest over the 1950-1980 and 1950-2014 periods. Because of renewed developer activities in Southwest, the area, too, is in the process of further transformation.

In all cases, we have examined what happened in the city as a whole during the 1950-1980, 1950-2014 and 1970-2014 periods in order to see whether what occurred during those periods in Southwest and the Fourteenth Street corridor, respectively, was similar or different from what occurred in the city as a whole.

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[133]National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior. (2004). Historic American building survey: Southwest Washington, D.C., urban renewal area. HABS. No. D.C.-856.

A final note: As mentioned in the research design section above, Census data impose limitations on analysis because they come in decennial segments except for the annual and other periodic data estimates generated by the American Community Survey. We are, thus, constrained by lumpy data whose snapshot pictures could mask significant details. All such data should, therefore, be seen as indicators of trends and direction and not necessarily as definitive reflections of reality at any given point.

7. RESULTS

7.1. Population

The population of the Fourteenth Street corridor in 1970 just after the riots was 42,000. It declined to 33,000 ten years later but reversed itself by 2014.[134] According to Census Survey data, the population in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 2014 stood at 42,000, the level it was at just after the riots. So, nothing had changed as measured by the data though there was a dramatic decline in the forty-four-year interim.

The population of Southwest prior to the start of urban renewal in 1950 was 25,000. It declined dramatically to 9,000 by 1980 as a consequence of deliberate government policy but experienced no further declines over the period from 1980 to 2014. It is, of course, not surprising that there was a population decline because vast tracts of high-density residential dwellings were torn down.

Like Southwest, the city as a whole experienced significant population declines over the period from 1950 to 1980, going from 802,000 in 1950 to 638,000 in 1980, a decline of 20 percent. Unlike Southwest, however, the decline in population over that period for the city as a whole was unintended. Unlike the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, moreover, the city's population decline continued into 2014 when the population stood at 634,000, a decline of another 4,000 from what it was in 1980.

The picture is, thus, one in which in 2014 the population of the Fourteenth Street corridor was at a level that was essentially the same as it was in 1970, the population of Southwest in 2014 was at level that was a little bit higher than it was in 1980 and the population of the city

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[134]We round the numbers that appear in the text in accordance with standard rounding conventions text in order to make them easier to absorb. The actual, unrounded numbers appear in the charts and graphs.

as a whole in 2014 was smaller than it was in 1970 and 1980. Renewal in Southwest and the Fourteenth Street corridor, thus, bucked the trend for the city as a whole once renewal had taken hold.

The bar graphs and charts immediately below illustrate these data on a comparative basis using the renewal periods described above. The line graph depicts these data on a strictly calendar basis in order to show trends.

Figure 6.1: Total Population

7.2. Racial Composition

In the Fourteenth Street Corridor, 84 percent of the population was black in 1970. Fourteen percent of the population was white, and only 1 percent was of another race. By 2014, only 26 percent of the population was black, a reduction of 58 percentage points from 1970; 59 percent was white, an increase of 45 percentage points from 1970; and 15 percent was of another race, an increase of 14 percentage points from 1970. The area, thus, became considerably whiter over the period starting with the riots.

In Southwest, 64 percent out of a total population of 25,000 was black in 1950 immediately before urban renewal began; 36 percent of the population was white; and less than 1 percent was of another race. By 1980, only 48 percent of the population was black, 49 percent of the population was white and 3 percent of the population was of another race. By 2014, the percentage of the Southwest population that was black had declined by another 10 percentage points, to 38 percent out of a total population of 9,000, a decline of 26 percentage points from 1950; 52 percent of the population was white, an increase of 15 percentage points over 1950; and 11 percent was of another race, an increase of 10 percentage points over 1950. The change in Southwest, thus, moved in the same direction as the changes in the Fourteenth Street corridor although somewhat less dramatically.

For the city as a whole, 35 percent of the total population was black in 1950. It jumped to 54 percent in 1960, a 19 percentage-point increase. By 1970, it had climbed to 71 percent, a 36 percentage-point increase over 1950. By 2014, 51 percent of the city's total population was black, an increase of 15 percentage points over 1950.

The racial composition of the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest thus ran counter to what was happening in the District as a whole. The Fourteenth Street corridor was 45 percentage points whiter than it was in 1970. Southwest was 13 percentage points whiter in 1980 compared to 1950 and 15 percentage points whiter in 2014 in comparison to 1950.

The white percentage of the population in D.C., meanwhile, declined. It was 37 percentage points lower in 1970 than it was in 1950, 38 percentage points lower in 1980 than it was in 1950 and 25 percentage points lower in 2014 than it was in 1950. The population of the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, thus, became whiter while the District as a whole became blacker.

The charts and the graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

Figure 6.2.1: Racial Composition

Fourteenth Street Corridor

Southwest

Washington, D.C.

Figure 6.2.2: Percentage of Population that is Black/African American

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	39.8%	44.9%	70.4%	84.3%	78.9%	62.3%	44.7%	27.9%	26.3%
Southwest	53.9%	63.8%	63.1%	38.3%	48.1%	51.1%	58.8%	47.8%	37.6%
Washington DC	28.2%	35.0%	53.9%	71.1%	70.3%	65.8%	60.0%	52.9%	49.6%

7.3. Family Income

In the Fourteenth Street Corridor, average family income in 1970, the first year for which Census data on family income are available, was approximately $44,000 in 2013 dollars.[135] By 2014, average family income in the Fourteenth Street corridor in 2013 dollars had grown to $128,000, an increase of a little over 290%.

We do not have family income data for Southwest in 1950, just before urban renewal began, but in 1970, average family income in Southwest was approximately $106,000. In 2014, it had grown to $143,000, an increase of 74 percent.

Over the same period, average family income in D.C. grew from $68,000 to $129,000, an increase of 46 percent.

The growth in family incomes in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, respectively, over the period from 1970 to 2014 thus outpaced the growth of family incomes across the city even though there was a significant difference in degree between the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest: 290 percent in the Fourteenth Street corridor and 74 percent in Southwest compared with 46 percent for the District as a whole.

The graphs immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

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[135]The term "Family Income" is defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as "[t]he sum of the income of all family members 15 years and older living in the household. Families are groups of two or more people (one of whom is the householder) related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together; all such people (including related subfamily members) are considered as members of one family". The term "Household Income" is defined by the Census Bureau as "[t]he sum of the income of all people 15 years and older living in the household. A household includes related family members and all the unrelated people, if any, such as lodgers, foster children, wards, or employees who share the housing unit. A person living alone in a housing unit, or a group of unrelated people sharing a housing unit, is also counted as a household." We use "Family Income" data to analyze changes in income over time because data on Household Income for the Census tracts under review are not available for all time periods studied.

Figure 6.3: Average Family Income, in 2013 Dollars

14th Street Corridor	1970	2014
14th Street Corridor	43,982	127,739
Washington DC	68,469	128,837

Southwest	1980	2014
Southwest	116,546	142,667
Washington DC	77,016	128,837

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	43,982	48,524	58,397	70,989	107,737	127,739
Southwest	106,001	116,546	107,752	83,929	115,614	142,667
Washington DC	68,469	77,016	96,226	109,315	124,064	128,837

7.4. Residential Property Values

Accompanying these changes were significant changes in property values and other indicators of social and economic well-being.

The median value of owner-occupied housing in the Fourteenth Street Corridor in 2013 dollars, for example, was approximately $97,000 in 1970, just after the riots in 1968. By 2014, it had risen to approximately $535,000, or more than five and half times what it was in 1970.

The median value of owner-occupied housing in Southwest in 2013 dollars in 1950 before urban renewal began was approximately $63,000. By 1980, it had risen to $296,000, a 470

percent increase. By 2014, it had risen another $21,000 to approximately $317,000, an increase of almost 500 percent over 1950.

For the city as a whole, the median value of owner-occupied housing in 1970 was $143,000 in 2013 dollars. In 2014, it was $449,000, an increase of 313 percent over 1970. In 1950, the median value of owner-occupied housing for the city as a whole was $121,000. In 2014, it was $449,000, an increase of almost 371 percent over 1950.

The 550% increase in the median value of owner-occupied housing in the Fourteenth Street corridor in the period from 1970 to 2014 thus outpaced the 313 percent increase in the median value of owner-occupied housing over the same period throughout the District. The almost 500 percent increase in the median value of owner-occupied housing in Southwest from 1950 to 2014 equally outpaced the 373 percent increase in the value of owner-occupied housing for the District as a whole over the same period.

The charts and graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city overall.

Figure 6.4: Median House Value for All Owner-Occupied Housing Units, in 2013 Dollars

14th Street Corridor	1970	2014
14th Street Corridor	96,792	534,926
Washington DC	142,868	448,616

Southwest	1950	1980	2014
Southwest	63,153	295,839	316,699
Washington DC	120,588	200,269	448,616

	1940	1950	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	114,767	121,309	96,792	204,482	282,602	243,680	552,939	534,926
Southwest	72,205	63,153	294,716	295,839	300,711	150,767	314,763	316,699
Washington DC	109,623	120,588	142,868	200,269	213,698	206,941	466,977	448,616

7.5. Educational Attainment

Changes in educational attainment were equally dramatic. In 1970, approximately 17 percent of those over 25 years of age in the Fourteenth Street Corridor had attended college. By 2014, that number had risen to 67 percent or 50 percentage points higher than what it was just after the riots.

In 1950, before the start of urban renewal, only 3 percent of those over 25 years of age in Southwest had attended college. By 1980, over 79 percent had attended college, an increase of 76 percentage points over 1950. By 2014, that number had declined somewhat to a little over 75 percent, but still 72 percentage points higher than it was before urban renewal began.

For the city as a whole, only 13 percent of those over the age of 25 had attended college in 1950. By 1980, that number had risen to 42 percent, a 29 percentage-point increase. By 2014, the number of those over 25 years of age who had attended college rose to 70 percent, a 57 percentage-point increase over 1950. In the period from 1970 to 2014, the percentage of the population over 25 years of age who had attended college rose from 29 percent to 70 percent, a 41 percentage-point increase.

The percentage of those over 25 years of age in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, respectively, who had attended college, thus, grew faster than it did for the District as a whole. For the Fourteenth Street corridor, the increase was 50 percentage points over the period from 1970 to 2014, compared to an increase of 41 percentage points for the city as a whole over the same period. In Southwest, the 72 percentage-point increase from 1950 to

2014 in those who had attended college compares with the 57 percentage-point increase for the District as a whole over the same period.

The charts and graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

Figure 6.5.1: Cumulative Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over

Fourteenth Street Corridor

Southwest

2014

Washington D.C.

1950


1970

1980

2014

Figure 6.5.2: Percentage of Population with College or More Education

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	10.9%	11.2%	17.3%	17.4%	32.7%	27.0%	33.8%	58.8%	67.1%
Southwest	2.4%	2.8%	24.9%	71.1%	79.0%	62.2%	56.8%	62.9%	75.4%
Washington DC	11.0%	13.0%	25.9%	29.0%	41.5%	33.3%	57.2%	66.6%	70.3%

7.6. Employment Status

Not quite as dramatic but still significant were changes in employment status. In 1970, only 65 percent of those over sixteen years of age in the Fourteenth Street Corridor were in the labor force. By 2014, that figure had risen to 83 percent, an 18-percentage point increase.

In 1950, only 59 percent of those over sixteen year of age in Southwest were in the workforce. By 1980, that number had risen to 82 percent, a 23 percentage-point increase. By 2014, 79 percent of those over sixteen years of age were in the workforce in Southwest, only slightly lower than in 1970 but still a 20 percentage-point increase over 1950.

For the city as a whole, 62 percent of those over sixteen years of age were in the workforce in 1950. By 1970, that number had risen to 64 percent, a 2 percentage-point increase. By 1980, that number had declined by a percentage point to 63 percent. By 2014, that number had improved to 69 percent, a 7 percentage-point increase over 1950 and a 5 percentage-point increase over 1970

The increases in workforce participation by those over sixteen years of age in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, thus, exceeded the increases for the city as whole. In the Fourteenth Street corridor, the 18 percentage-point increase over the 1970 to 2014 period compares with the 5 percentage-point increase for the city as a whole over the same period. For Southwest, the 20 percentage-point increase from 1950 to 2014 compares with 7

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percentage point increase for the city as a whole over the same period. The pie charts and graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

Figure 6.6.1: Labor Force Participation for Population 16 Years and Over

Fourteenth Street Corridor

Southwest

Washington D.C.

Figure 6.6.2: Labor Force Participation for Population 16 Years and Over, 1940-2014

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	71.0%	70.4%	70.7%	64.7%	59.10%	67.7%	68.2%	79.0%	82.6%
Southwest	60.1%	59.4%	61.7%	80.8%	81.5%	77.3%	69.3%	74.4%	78.7%
Washington DC	62.2%	62.2%	63.7%	64.2%	63.1%	66.3%	63.6%	67.1%	68.5%

7.7. Types of Households

In 1970, just after the riots in 1968 and the first year for which Census data on household types are available, approximately 47 percent of those living in the Fourteenth Street Corridor were part of a family, defined as consisting of married couples, male heads of households and female heads of households. By 2014, that number had declined to 27 percent, a 20 percentage-point decline.

We do not have data on household types for 1950 for those living in Southwest, but, in 1970, 41 percent of those living in Southwest were living in a family household. By 2014, that number had declined to 29 percent, a 12 percentage-point decline. For the District as a whole, 62 percent were part of a family in 1970. By 2014, that number had declined to 43 percent, a 19 percentage-point decline.

While the percentage point decline in family households in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor was on a par with the District as a whole and the percentage point decline in the case of Southwest was smaller than for the District as a whole, in each case the percent of family households in 2014 in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, respectively, was substantially smaller—27 percent and 29 percent, respectively—than for the City as a whole (43 percent). Put another way, 73 percent of the households in the Fourteenth Street corridor and 71 percent of the households in Southwest were headed by unmarried couples or single male or female heads of households compared with only 56 percent for the District as a whole. The charts and graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

Figure 6.7.1: Types of Households

Fourteenth Street Corridor

Southwest

1980	2014
Family Households ■ Nonfamily Households	Family Households ■ Nonfamily Households
29% / 71%	29% / 71%

Washington, D.C.

1970	1980
Family Households ■ Nonfamily Households	Family Households ■ Nonfamily Households
38% / 62%	47% / 53%

2014

Family Households ■ Nonfamily Households

43% / 58%

Figure 6.7.2: Percentage of Households that are Family Households, 1970 - 2014

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	46.7%	38.5%	34.8%	34.7%	26.3%	26.8%
Southwest	40.8%	29.1%	29.2%	28.5%	28.0%	29.2%
Washington DC	62%	53%	48.9%	46.0%	42.4%	42.5%

7.8. Age

In 1970, approximately 65 percent of the population in the Fourteenth Street corridor was between 18 and 65 years of age. The rest, approximately 35 percent were either under 18 or over 64 years of age. By 2014, the percentage of those living in the Fourteenth Street corridor who were between 18 and 65 years of age had risen to almost 83 percent, an increase of 18 percentage points over 1970, and the percentage of those living in the area who were either under 18 or over 64 years of age had declined from 35 percent to 17 percent, an 18 percentage-point decline.

In 1950, just before urban renewal began, approximately 59 percent of those living in Southwest were between 18 and 64 years of age. The rest, approximately 41 percent, were either under 18 or over 64 years of age. By 1980, the number of those living in Southwest who were between 18 and 65 years of age had risen to approximately 81 percent, a 22 percentage-point increase. By 2014, the percentage of those living in Southwest who were between 18 and 64 years of age remained at approximately 77 percent, an 18 percentage-point increase over 1950. The rest, approximately 23 percent, were either under 18 or over 64 years of age.

For the city as a whole, a little over 67 percent of the total population was between 18 and 65 years of age in 1950. That number had fallen to approximately 61 percent by 1970. By 2014, the percentage of the total population that was between 18 and 65 years of age in the city overall had risen to approximately 72 percent, a 5 percentage-point increase over 1950, and a

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11 percentage-point increase over 1970. The remainder, or 28 percent, was either under 18 or over 65 years of age.

The increases in the proportion of the population in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest, respectively, who were between 18 and 65 years of age were, thus identical and outpaced the increases for the District as a whole during the periods under review. This suggests that the population in each of these areas based on age differed in possibly significant but hard to define ways from those living in other parts of the city. The charts and graph immediately below depict these data for the Fourteenth Street Corridor, Southwest and the city as a whole.

Figure 6.8.1: Age Distribution

Fourteenth Street Corridor

Southwest

2014

Under 18 years · 18 to 64 years · 65 and over

6% · 17% · 77%

Washington D.C.

1950

Under 18 years · 18 to 64 years · 65 and over

26% · 67% · 7%

1970

Under 18 years · 18 to 64 years · 65 and over

30% · 61% · 9%

1980

Under 18 years · 18 to 64 years · 65 and over

3% · 15% · 82%

2014

Under 18 years · 18 to 64 years · 65 and over

17% · 11% · 72%

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
Figure 6.8.2: Percentage of Population Between 18 - 64 Years of Age

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
14th Street Corridor	76%	76%	69%	64.7%	68.5%	72%	74.1%	82.0%	82.8%
Southwest	60.2%	58.5%	53.8%	76.7%	80.7%	78.0%	73.0%	75.0%	77.2%
Washington DC	68.6%	67.3%	62%	60.9%	65.9%	67.9%	67.7%	71%	71.6%

8. CONCLUSIONS

Private sector-led redevelopment as compared to public sector-led redevelopment might be expected to produce significantly different socio-economic outcomes at least in some circumstances given inherent differences in objectives and constraints, political and otherwise. Our analysis indicates that they did not in the case of the private-sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor in Washington, D.C. following the riots in 1968 as compared to the government-led redevelopment of D.C.'s Southwest quadrant starting in the 1950s. The socio-economic indicators we examined exhibit a striking similarity in trends and direction despite the difference in redevelopment led by the private versus public sectors. It is in many ways, however, not surprising that the outcomes were similar given the similarity of animating interests and objectives and the constraints under with the city labored in the period following the riots.

The private sector in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor was responding to market forces. It was not significantly constrained by a city that had to contend with the loss of almost a third of its population from 1950 to 2000, suffered from a financial crisis during the most of the 1990s because of overspending and declining tax revenues and was subject to rule from 1995 through most of 2001 by a congressionally appointed, unelected financial control board.

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Nor was the private sector significantly constrained by a city plagued by corruption and scandal for most of the 1980s and 90s during the administration of Mayor Marion Barry, who was first elected in 1978, arrested and convicted while mayor on drug charges in 1990, subsequently spent six months in prison and was reelected mayor for another four-year term in 1994 despite his previous record.

It is little wonder under the circumstances that the D.C. government was not in a position to stimulate, control or shape significantly the transformation of the Fourteenth Street corridor even if it had desired different outcomes. It is also little wonder under the circumstances that redevelopment took so long.

Eradication of the slums, removal of the poor, resettling the area with middle to upper income residents and improving the area's tax base, moreover, were the federal government's principal goals in its urban renewal program for Southwest. Goals like these, desirable in and of themselves, inevitably produce consequences that are similar to unconstrained redevelopment by the private sector.

Southwest's urban renewal program was, in addition, conceived and executed before the District of Columbia gained what little home rule it was accorded by Congress in 1973. As was the case in the Fourteenth Street corridor, the city, as a consequence, was not really in a position to control or shape the transformation of Southwest even if had desired different outcomes.

Among the more profound issues these examples of redevelopment in Washington, D.C. raise is whether city governments can reasonably be expected to seek or are realistically capable of producing outcomes that are any different from those the private sector would produce and, if so, how the financial resources to produce different outcomes can be mustered.

Kay Hymowitz argues in "The New Brooklyn, What It Takes to Bring a City Back" that there is, in the words of a "New York Times" reviewer, a whiff of hypocrisy" in how cities think about redevelopment.[136] "Ask mayors what they wish for in their city centers," says the reviewer, "and they will give you similar answers – safe streets, bustling sidewalks, busy stores and restaurants, and a healthy and growing residential population with plenty of money

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[136]The New Brooklyn, What It Takes to Bring a City Back, Rowman & Littlefield (2016); Alan Ehrenhalt, a senior editor of "Governing" magazine. Review in "The New York Times Book Review" for Feb. 5, 2017.

in its pocket." He goes on to observe that "mayors and city planners spend much of their time maneuvering to create these things, but with one inevitable disclaimer: They don't want it to lead to gentrification." "What they choose not to admit," he observes, "is that the change they are seeking and the change they claim to fear are exactly the same thing."[137] The word "hypocrisy" is jarring because it implies a sinister motive. But something different may often be involved.

Those who live in cities wish them to be beautiful, attractive and crime-free. They wish them to provide high-quality and effective schools, transportation, garbage collection and other services. They wish the city to have a tax base that will support objectives like these. Achievement of these goals, however, may be in conflict and sometimes incompatible with a city's need to deal with poverty and the issues they present. Ignoring persistent, underlying social and economic ills may merely shift the problems they present to others. To know that is not necessarily to desire that.[138] It is merely to recognize what is actually happening.

It is a mistake to believe that market forces will produce in the course of renewal or otherwise socio-economic outcomes other than those exhibited in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest D.C. unless regulatory forces and financial resources can be mustered in the service of different outcomes. Doing so is no easy task, however, because it inevitably involves a reduction in the financial and other benefits that might otherwise accrue.

The reality is that overall property values and resulting tax revenues will be lower than they would otherwise be if the transformed neighborhood contains low income residents or low income housing and the city needs to expend resources to support social service facilities for the poor or disadvantaged. An attempt to deal with issues like these and generate different outcomes from what we have seen in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest D.C. would also likely require an increase in tax revenues from other sources in order to provide subsidies for or otherwise fund low-income housing and the construction and staffing of social service facilities. Lower tax revenues and the need for increased expenditures are thus on something of a collision course.

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[137]Alan Ehrenhalt, a senior editor of "Governing" magazine. Review in "The New York Times Book Review" for Feb. 5, 2017.

[138]Donahue, J., Zeckhauser, R. (2011). Collaborative governance; private roles for public goals in turbulent times. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Factors like these in and of themselves present political and financial obstacles to producing outcomes that are different from those resulting from redevelopment driven by private-sector or private-sector-like interests. More importantly, factors like these require city officials, planners and citizens to face up to the fact there is an inherent tension between wanting to transform slums and undesirable neighborhoods and the ability to attract desired residents and business to those areas. Diversity versus gentrification are enduring issues along the Fourteenth Street corridor, in Southwest D.C. and elsewhere.[139]

As at least one developer observed in an interview, there are tipping points that have a powerful effect on the redevelopment process.[140] Until prospective residents and business are convinced that the characteristics they desire will predominate in previously undesirable neighborhoods, they will not come. The corollary is that residents and businesses a city wishes to have will leave if characteristics they do not want begin to predominate. Tipping points are hard to recognize, however, and are often not obvious until after they have occurred.[141]

This suggests at least six important areas for further research:

When do a city's efforts to achieve social and economic diversity in a neighborhood defeat the goal of attracting to the neighborhood the residents and businesses needed for the neighborhood's revival?

When do those who say social and economic diversity is desirable feel threatened by diversity when diversity reaches a tipping point sufficient to make them want to leave? Put another way, what are the tipping points?

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[139]Haynes, D. (ed). (2016, Jul. 16). Affordable rentals planned in the 14th Street corridor. *The Washington Post.* Real Estate News and Notes, p. 3; Lerner, M. (2016, Jul. 11). Bucking bent toward the upscale, developers to offer 96 affordable rentals in D.C.'s trendy 14th Street corridor. *The Washington Post,* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/where-we-live/wp/2016/07/11/bucking-bent-toward-the-upscale-de; Bernardo, R. (2016, Mar. 15). 2015's most & least ethno-racially diverse citie, Retrieved from https://wallethub.com/edu/cities-with-the-most-and-least-ethno-racial-and-linguistic-divers; Stein, P. (2016, Oct. 3). Quality of life is better in diverse areas, residents say in survey. *The Washington Post,* p. B1; Lee, B., Spain, D., Umberson, D. (1985, Nov.). Neighborhood revitalization and racial change: The case of Washington, D.C. *Demography* 22(4), 581-602; Logan, C. (2012). Beyond a boundary: Washington's historic districts and their racial contents. *Urban History Review*, 41(1), 67-68, Retrieved from http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1013764ar; Bui, L. (2015, Aug. 16). Mending ties in a fractured city. *The Washington Post*, pp. C1, C5, Retrieved from https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post-sunday/20150816/282248074295735.

[140]Jawer, M. (2015, Dec. 21). [Personal Interview].

[141]Gladwell, M. (2002). *How little things can make a big difference.* New York, NY. Little Brown; Sanneh, K. (2016. Jul. 11 & 18). There goes the neighborhood. *The New Yorker*, p. 80; Levy, R. (2015, Jan.20). [Personal Interview]; Smith, T. (2016, Jan. 11). [Personal Interview]; Kaplan, L. (2016 Jan. 13). [Personal Interview].

Is there a sound analytical framework for identifying and measuring tipping points of this kind? Or must city planners and others simply wait to see what the market is telling them? A related question is whether it will be too late at that point to keep the point from tipping?

How can a city persuade those not concerned about diversity to incur the financial burdens required to achieve diversity? Put another way, will residents of D.C.'s posh Northwest agree to property and other tax increases to achieve diversity in an area alien or unfamiliar to them and to which they may never go? Recent adverse neighborhood reactions to D.C.'s efforts to spread homeless shelters around the city are not encouraging.[142]

Are the two situations analyzed in this study so different in time and circumstances as to invalidate any attempt to develop generalizable principles that might be useful in other circumstances?

What are the mechanisms by which the public, private and non-profit sectors can reconcile differences to achieve a common objective in the transformation of urban environments in need of or undergoing transformation?

These are important issues because, unless a way is found to balance competing interests, gentrification and resulting homogeneous neighborhoods may be the only outcomes that are realistically possible. The result would be the continued migration of a neighborhood's social and economic ills, such as poverty, poor housing, unemployment, low educational attainment and the like, from one neighborhood to another or from one jurisdiction to another and the continued segregation of a city's population by race, class and experience. "Beggar thy neighbor" concepts whereby the solution to a problem comes at the expense of others readily come to mind.[143]

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[142]For example, see Gambrione, A. (2016, Dec. 14). "Some Ward 3 Neighbors Remain Uneasy About a Planned Homeless Shelter." Washington City Paper. Retrieved on April 23, 2017. Available at: http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing-complex/article/20846848/some-ward-3-neighbors-remain-uneasy-about-a-planned-homeless-shelter.

[143]O'Connell, J. (2017, Apr. 17). "Aftermath of the influx of the "Creative Class." *The Washington Post*, pp. A13. Retrieved on April 17, 2017. Available at: https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20170417/281775629030444.

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5. CONCLUSIONS

In the following lines we will review the main conclusions of the three papers. Paper 1 confirms that the reasons for initiating PPC traditionally identified by scholars, mainly proactive, are meaningful. However, it also confirms the need for differentiation between proactive and reactive approaches to PPC in order to have a more realistic overview of all the elements that play a role in this decision. In fact, to better explain such a complex reality, data analysed in this paper confirms the advisability of taking into account reactive reasons like the ones introduced in our analysis. Indeed, we can confirm that PPCs are mainly initiated for proactive reasons (looking to improve efficacy, efficiency and quality of public goods and services), while reactive reasons (looking to cover internal deficits and problems) play a secondary but, in no case, residual role. This has important consequences, as we have verified, in terms of success.

In fact, our analysis suggests that the nature of these reasons affect the collaboration's behaviour and chances of success, PPCs being initiated for proactive reasons more likely to be successful than the ones initiated for reactive reasons. And this is directly linked to how we conceptually built these two categories. On the one hand, we consider that a proactive approach facilitates the commitment of public institutions to strongly support planning, monitoring and evaluation activities, which increases the chances of success of PPC processes. On the other hand, a reactive approach normally involves a rejection of those activities, increasing, on the contrary, the chances of failure. However, as we have seen, this hypothesis only works in global terms but not in terms of intensity, the reasons with a more proactive or reactive behaviour not clearly likely to be more successful that the ones with a less proactive or reactive behaviour.

Finally, these results suggest that it is advisable to promote a proactive model of PPC, where the public sector invests in the functions of designing, planning, monitoring and evaluating these collaboration activities. In this regard, it is necessary to invest sufficient resources to build the institutional and organizational capabilities required to properly manage these functions and to direct the processes of organizational transformation that this entails.

Likewise, developing what we should understand by PPC success, Paper 2 confirms the importance of constructing an index as a comprehensive conceptual and methodological tool

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to objectively measure the degree of success of PPC process. It also ratifies the advisability of separately analysing achievement by key PPC dimensions to detect where significant areas for improvement to increase chances of success of these collaborations lie. In this regard, the results suggest that public administrations, despite being affected by the generalized uniformity and rigidity of their legal and organizational framework, fail more in those areas that entirely depend on them: the role played by the public administration, and human resources and internal organization. At some point, this is good news because it means that, if there exists the political and administrative will, it is relatively easy to introduce changes to ensure better functioning collaborations.

In this respect, three strategic measures to implement are the following: 1) reinforcing political and institutional support; 2) investing the proper resources to better train public employees and managers with appropriate soft and hard skills, and knowledge for network management, as a precondition to adapting structures and procedures; and 3) establishing higher standards, and adapting and complementing the current legal and organizational framework in key areas. In this regard, fundamental competencies for managing non-hierarchical horizontal relationships are leadership and negotiation. Likewise, crucial fields to develop with the approval of these standards are how to allocate and share responsibilities and risks, and how to define monitoring mechanisms and evaluation systems.

Another interesting insight from this research is that there are some institutional and organizational contexts which are more favourable than others in successfully promoting and managing PPC initiatives. In this respect, larger administrations, with their greater economic, human and organizational resources, and executive agencies, and their principal-agent approach, are better prepared to manage these collaborations. In this context, we need to draw attention to the fact that public administrations' failure in those areas that depend entirely on them can be ascribed to two institutional and organizational contexts that present a comparative disadvantage: small public administrations and traditional public administrations that do not incorporate a principal-agent approach. Finally, the results suggest that the principal-agent approach has a greater impact than administration size in terms of favouring success.

In another order of things, Paper 3 concludes that, although private sector-led redevelopment as compared to public sector-led redevelopment might be expected to produce significantly different socio-economic outcomes, given inherent differences in objectives and constraints,

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our analysis indicates that they did not in the case of the private-sector-led redevelopment of the Fourteenth Street corridor in Washington, D.C., following the riots in 1968, as compared to the government-led redevelopment of D.C.'s Southwest quadrant starting in the 1950s. In fact, the socio-economic indicators we examined exhibit a striking similarity in trends and direction despite the difference in redevelopment led by the private versus public sectors. It is in many ways, however, not surprising that the outcomes were similar given the similarity of animating interests and objectives and the constraints under with the city laboured in the period following the riots.

The private sector in the case of the Fourteenth Street corridor was responding to market forces. It was not significantly constrained by a city that had to contend with the loss of almost a third of its population from 1950 to 2000, suffered from a financial crisis during the most of the 1990s because of overspending and declining tax revenues and was subject to rule from 1995 through most of 2001 by a congressionally appointed, unelected financial control board. Nor was the private sector significantly constrained by a city plagued by corruption and scandal for most of the 1980s and 90s during the administration of Mayor Marion Barry. It is little wonder under the circumstances that the D.C. government was not in a position to stimulate, control or shape significantly the transformation of the Fourteenth Street corridor even if it had desired different outcomes. It is also little wonder under the circumstances that redevelopment took so long.

Eradication of the slums, removal of the poor, resettling the area with middle to upper income residents and improving the area's tax base, moreover, were the federal government's principal goals in its urban renewal program for Southwest. Goals like these, desirable in and of themselves, inevitably produce consequences that are similar to unconstrained redevelopment by the private sector. Southwest's urban renewal program was, in addition, conceived and executed before the District of Columbia gained what little home rule it was accorded by Congress in 1973. As was the case in the Fourteenth Street corridor, the city, as a consequence, was not really in a position to control or shape the transformation of Southwest even if had desired different outcomes.

Among the more profound issues these examples of redevelopment in Washington, D.C. raise is whether city governments can reasonably be expected to seek or are realistically capable of producing outcomes that are any different from those the private sector would produce and, if so, how the financial resources to produce different outcomes can be mustered. It is a mistake

to believe that market forces will produce in the course of renewal or otherwise socio-economic outcomes other than those exhibited in the Fourteenth Street corridor and Southwest D.C. unless regulatory forces and financial resources can be mustered in the service of different outcomes. Doing so is no easy task, however, because it inevitably involves a reduction in the financial and other benefits that might otherwise accrue. Factors like these in and of themselves present political and financial obstacles to producing outcomes that are different from those resulting from redevelopment driven by private-sector or private-sector-like interests. More importantly, factors like these require city officials, planners and citizens to face up to the fact there is an inherent tension between wanting to transform slums and undesirable neighbourhoods and the ability to attract desired residents and business to those areas. Diversity versus gentrification are enduring issues along the Fourteenth Street corridor, in Southwest D.C. and elsewhere.

These are important issues because, unless a way is found to balance competing interests, gentrification and resulting homogeneous neighbourhoods may be the only outcomes that are realistically possible. The result would be the continued migration of a neighbourhood's social and economic ills, such as poverty, poor housing, unemployment, low educational attainment and the like, from one neighbourhood to another or from one jurisdiction to another and the continued segregation of a city's population by race, class and experience. "Beggar thy neighbour" concepts whereby the solution to a problem comes at the expense of others readily come to mind (O'Connell 2017).

Finally, after reviewing the main conclusions of each paper, I want to point out some future areas for research linked to PPC I will intend to develop at a postdoctoral stage. Linked to the work I have been doing in Papers 1 and 2, a preliminary objective will be expanding the current database to incorporate private sector insights. Likewise, I pretend to exploit new dimensions included in this database like the impact that PPC has in terms of institutional innovation or explore the efficacy and efficiency of all monitoring options available.

Additionally, I am planning to develop a conceptual and methodological framework to evaluate PPC initiatives. In fact, the Harvard Kennedy School, who has already hired me for the next three academic courses, already approved my research project called "Discovering who transforms Barcelona: Redefining public and private roles in urban transformation. Collaboration models and community impact". This project, developing the research presented in Paper 3, will develop this evaluation framework applying it to urban

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transformation experiences. In this context, this research aims to study the roles that governments, businesses, non-profits, citizen groups and other stakeholders play in urban transformation processes; analysing how the roles they play affect the character, composition, pace of redevelopment and final results. To do so, I will study the following urban transformation policies promoted by the Barcelona City Council: Barcelona's Food Markets, Barcelona Right to Housing Plan 2016-2025, Barcelona Strategic Tourism Plan 2016-2020, and Barcelona Neighbourhood Plan for South Raval.

Moreover, linked to this topic, I will continue my work with Professor John Donahue to create new conceptual and analytical frameworks to adapt and extend the study of PPC in Southern Europe and Latin America. The most relevant work about this field has traditionally been developed analysing Anglo-Saxon administrative realities characterized by institutional constraints that are very different to the ones that you can find in other latitudes. Therefore, adapting this traditional framework to other realities allow us to take an important step forward to discover which institutional and organizational capacities are necessary to successfully manage these collaborations around the world.

Finally, I am planning also to expand my incipient research about how technology can improve people lives creating more effective collaborative forms of governance and strengthening the ability of people and institutions to work together to solve problems, make decisions, resolve conflict and govern themselves. In this sense, I am interested in expanding my work on crowdsourcing, in general, and in crowdlaw, in particular. Likewise, on May 2017 I started to formally work in one Harvard Kennedy School's flagship project, "Transparency Project", where I will be doing research on empowering patients through data and technology.

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7. ANNEXES

7.1 Annex I. Model of questionnaire, awarded contracts (successful) – Paper 1 and 2

1. Nombre y apellidos de la persona encuestada:
   (respuesta abierta)

2. Nombre de la Administración de referencia:
   (respuesta abierta)

3. Unidad de adscripción de la persona encuestada:
   (respuesta abierta)

4. Cargo actual:
   (respuesta abierta)

5. Antes de ocupar el cargo actual, ¿ha tenido responsabilidades de dirección en alguna entidad del sector privado?
   (Sí / No)

6. ¿Cuáles son sus responsabilidades en relación al servicio contratado?
   (elegir una opción de respuesta)
   • No tengo responsabilidades directas sobre el mismo
   • Responsabilidades sobre el proceso de contratación
   • Responsabilidades sobre la gestión del servicio contratado
   • Responsabilidades sobre el proceso de contratación y sobre la gestión del servicio contratado

7. ¿Por qué se decidió contratar este servicio? Valore la importancia de los siguientes motivos en el momento de tomar la decisión:
   (Muy importante / Bastante importante / Poco importante / Nada importante)

- Reducir costes para conseguir una mejora de la eficiencia

- Compartir los riesgos con el sector privado

- La imposibilidad de prestar el servicio internamente

- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad

- Introducir innovación tecnológica

- La moda administrativa de colaborar con el sector privado

- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado

- La imposibilidad de contratar más personal

- Razones político-ideológicas

- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión

- La necesidad de financiación privada

- El servicio no funcionaba correctamente

- El poco valor público añadido que aportaba la gestión directa de este servicio

- El hecho de que fuera un servicio de nueva creación

- La crisis económica

8. ¿Y si tuviera que elegir solamente un motivo?

(elegir una opción de respuesta)

- Reducir costes para conseguir una mejora de la eficiencia

- Compartir los riesgos con el sector privado

- La imposibilidad de prestar el servicio internamente

- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad

- Introducir innovación tecnológica

- La moda administrativa de colaborar con el sector privado

- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado

- La imposibilidad de contratar más personal

- Razones político-ideológicas

- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión

- La necesidad de financiación privada

- El servicio no funcionaba correctamente

- El poco valor público añadido que aportaba la gestión directa de este servicio

- El hecho de que fuera un servicio de nueva creación

- La crisis económica

9. ¿Cómo se gestionaba este servicio anteriormente?

   (elegir una opción de respuesta)

   - Internamente
   - A través de una agencia y/o entidad pública empresarial
   - Ya estaba contratado

10. ¿Por qué se optó por esta fórmula específica de contratación? Valore la importancia de los siguientes motivos en el momento de tomar la decisión:

    (Muy importante / Bastante importante / Poco importante / Nada importante)

    - La existencia de informes de carácter técnico que así lo recomendaban
    - La complejidad del servicio prestado
    - La necesidad de desarrollar soluciones específicas no existentes en el mercado
    - Las características de las potenciales empresas proveedoras
    - La falta de conocimientos específicos por parte de la Administración para definir los pliegos de cláusulas
    - La existencia de motivos de carácter político-institucional

11. ¿Se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado en varios contratos?

    (Sí / No)

12. ¿En cuantos contratos se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado?

    (respuesta abierta)

13. ¿Por qué motivo se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado en varios contratos?

    (Sí / No)

    - Para evitar la relación de dependencia con un único proveedor
    - Para garantizar la competencia entre proveedores
    - Por motivos político-institucionales
    - Porque la complejidad técnica del proyecto así lo aconsejaba
    - Porque las características del potencial mercado de proveedores así lo aconsejaba

14. ¿La contratación de este servicio implica la creación de un nuevo organismo?

    (Sí / No)

15. Señale las actividades que se llevaron a cabo antes de empezar el proceso de contratación:

    (Sí / No)

    • Se estudiaron otras posibles fórmulas de gestión indirecta

    • Se estudiaron otras posibles fórmulas de contratación

    • Se realizó un análisis previo de las potenciales empresas proveedoras

16. ¿Cuántas empresas o uniones temporales de empresas participaron en la fase de diálogo competitivo?

    (respuesta abierta)

17. ¿Cuántas empresas o uniones temporales de empresas fueron elegidas finalmente como adjudicatarias?

    (respuesta abierta)

18. Una vez finalizada la fase de diálogo competitivo, en la redacción de los pliegos de cláusulas finales del contrato:

    (Sí / No)

    • No se incluyeron las ideas y/o sugerencias aportadas por las empresas

    • Se incluyeron las soluciones aportadas por las empresas en relación a los requerimientos técnicos de prestación del servicio

    • Se incluyeron las soluciones aportadas por las empresas en relación al modelo de relación entre estas y la Administración

19. Valore, en términos generales, las actividades de planificación del proceso de contratación y de las condiciones de prestación del servicio:

    (del 0 al 10)

20. ¿Qué mecanismos de control se utilizan para verificar el cumplimiento de las condiciones del contrato? Señale las actividades que se llevan a cabo:

(Sí / No)

- Controles periódicos formales de carácter administrativo legal
- Controles periódicos formales de calidad
- Controles periódicos formales de rendimiento
- Controles periódicos formales de costes
- Controles periódicos formales de demanda del servicio
- Reuniones periódicas de seguimiento del contrato entre la Administración y los proveedores
- Existencia de órganos específicos permanentes de control
- Intercambios de información de carácter informal entre la Administración y los proveedores
- Espacios de trabajo de carácter informal entre la Administración y los proveedores
- Redacción de Carta de Servicios en las que la administración adquiere compromisos de calidad
- Existencia de un sistema de información específico para controlar el servicio contratado
- Existencia de personal especializado

21. Estos controles son realizados:

(Sí / No)

- Por personal de la propia empresa proveedora que se encarga de informar de los mismos a la Administración
- Por personal especializado de la propia Administración
- Por otra institución de carácter público
- Por otra institución de carácter privado (consultoras, etc.)

22. En caso de incumplimiento:

(Sí / No)

- Se activa un protocolo formalizado de resolución de conflictos/controversias entre los proveedores y la administración
- La Administración activa informalmente una serie de medidas no protocolizadas para la resolución del conflicto

- Se aplican las cláusulas de penalización por incumplimiento de los compromisos adquiridos

23. Valore, en términos generales, las actividades de control realizadas
    (del 0 al 10)

24. ¿Cómo se evalúa el funcionamiento del servicio contratado? Señale las actividades que se llevan a cabo:
    (Sí / No)
    - Se realiza una evaluación sistemática y periódica integral en base a la fijación de objetivos, estándares de calidad e indicadores
    - Sólo se realizan evaluaciones de carácter puntual en caso de detecta problemas importantes de funcionamiento
    - Existen buzones específicos para la recepción de quejas y sugerencias por parte de los usuarios
    - Se realizan encuestas de satisfacción a los usuarios
    - Se realizan reuniones periódicas con los destinatarios o con alguna entidad que los representa
    - Se realiza una evaluación de carácter político-institucional sobre el funcionamiento del servicio contratado

25. Esta evaluación es realizada:
    (Sí / No)
    - Por personal de la propia empresa proveedora que se encarga de informar de los mismos a la Administración
    - Por personal especializado de la propia Administración
    - Por otra institución de carácter público
    - Por otra institución de carácter privado (consultoras, etc.)

26. ¿Qué repercusiones tiene una evaluación negativa? Valore la probabilidad de las siguientes consecuencias:
    (Muy probable / Bastante probable / Poco probable / Nada probable)
    - Puede suponer un cambio de proveedor

- Puede suponer cambios en la política de control y seguimiento del contrato
- Puede suponer el rediseño del servicio contratado
- No tiene consecuencias

27. En términos generales, ¿usted cree que se evalúan más las servicios prestados directamente o bien los servicios contratados?

    (elegir una opción de respuesta)

- No se evalúan ni los servicios prestados directamente ni los servicios contratados
- Solamente se evalúan los servicios prestados directamente
- Solamente se evalúan los servicios contratados
- Se evalúan tanto los servicios prestados directamente como los servicios contratados

28. Valore, en términos generales, las actividades de evaluación realizadas
    (del 0 al 10)

29. Desde su punto de vista, ¿qué consecuencias conlleva la presente contratación? Valore la probabilidad de las siguientes consecuencias:

    (Muy probable / Bastante probable / Poco probable / Nada probable)

- Reducir los costes destinados a la prestación del servicio
- Una relación de dependencia con los proveedores
- Altos costes de coordinación con los diferentes agentes implicados en la prestación del servicio
- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad
- Una pérdida de control sobre el proceso de producción y prestación del servicio
- Mejorar en innovación tecnológica
- Altos costes de control de los proveedores para asegurar el cumplimiento de las condiciones del contrato
- Una toma de decisiones más compleja y lenta
- Mejorar la transparencia en la gestión
- La difuminación de responsabilidades entre los diferentes agentes implicados en la prestación del servicio
- La existencia de conflictos de intereses entre la administración y los proveedores
- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado

- La vulneración de la confidencialidad de datos importantes
- Separar las responsabilidades políticas y de gestión
- Asegurar unos resultados mínimos finales
- El retraso en el inicio de la prestación del servicio
- Aumentar la credibilidad frente a la ciudadanía
- Una correcta gestión de los riesgos inherentes al trabajo colaborativo
- Incrementar la productividad

30. En el contexto de la presente contratación, ¿usted cree que el sector privado realmente comparte riesgos y beneficios con el sector público?
(Sí / No)

31. Desde su punto de vista y en el contexto de la presente contratación, señale si los siguientes factores se dan o no se dan:
(Sí / No)
- La existencia de unas reglas claras y conocidas por todas las partes
- La definición de unos mecanismos de control y seguimiento que, en caso de incumplimiento, permitan corregir la desviación
- La existencia de un sistema de evaluación orientado a la mejora organizativa
- La implementación de las medidas organizativas necesarias por parte de la Administración para adaptar los órganos y procesos tradicionales a la gestión en red
- Un apoyo político e institucional firme
- La existencia de un liderazgo estratégico por parte de la administración
- La definición de objetivos compartidos (situaciones win-win)
- Disponer de empleados y directivos públicos con las competencias y los conocimientos necesarios para la gestión en red
- Un entendimiento de la misión y la cultura organizativa de cada organización y una búsqueda de la compatibilidad entre ellas
- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión
- Compartir los riesgos económicos de la prestación del servicio con el sector privado
- Autoridad y responsabilidad compartidas con el sector privado
- La existencia de un clima de confianza y compromiso entre las partes (más allá de las obligaciones estrictamente legales)

- Una buena comunicación entre las partes

32. Señale en cuáles de los siguientes ámbitos la presente contratación ha supuesto la introducción de innovaciones:

   (Sí / No)

   - En las características del propio servicio ofrecido
   - En el proceso de producción del servicio ofrecido
   - En el sistema de financiación
   - En el sistema de toma de decisiones
   - En el sistema de gestión de la calidad
   - En el sistema de relación con los usuarios finales del servicio
   - En el sistema de evaluación
   - En el sistema de rendición de cuentas
   - En el sistema de gestión del personal
   - En el sistema de gestión de la información
   - En el fomento de la participación ciudadana
   - En el fomento de las relaciones de coordinación con terceros actores

33. Valore, en términos generales, el proceso de conratación y los resultados finales obtenidos en su conjunto

   (del 0 al 10)

34. ¿Es la primera vez que esta Administración utilizaba esta modalidad de contratación para contratar un servicio?

   (Sí / No)

35. Desde su punto de vista, ¿considera conveniente volver a utilizar esta modalidad de contratación en futuras ocasiones?

   (Sí / No)

7.2 Annex II. Model of questionnaire, relinquished contracts (unsuccessful) – Paper 1 and 2

1. Nombre y apellidos de la persona encuestada:
   (respuesta abierta)

2. Nombre de la Administración de referencia:
   (respuesta abierta)

3. Unidad de adscripción de la persona encuestada:
   (respuesta abierta)

4. Cargo actual:
   (respuesta abierta)

5. Antes de ocupar el cargo actual, ¿ha tenido responsabilidades de dirección en alguna entidad del sector privado?
   (Sí / No)

6. ¿Cuáles son sus responsabilidades en relación al servicio contratado?
   (elegir una opción de respuesta)
   * No tengo responsabilidades directas sobre el mismo
   * Responsabilidades sobre el proceso de contratación
   * Responsabilidades sobre la gestión del servicio contratado
   * Responsabilidades sobre el proceso de contratación y sobre la gestión del servicio contratado

7. ¿Por qué se decidió contratar este servicio? Valore la importancia de los siguientes motivos en el momento de tomar la decisión:
   (Muy importante / Bastante importante / Poco importante / Nada importante)
   * Reducir costes para conseguir una mejora de la eficiencia
   * Compartir los riesgos con el sector privado
   * La imposibilidad de prestar el servicio internamente

- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad

- Introducir innovación tecnológica

- La moda administrativa de colaborar con el sector privado

- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado

- La imposibilidad de contratar más personal

- Razones político-ideológicas

- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión

- La necesidad de financiación privada

- El servicio no funcionaba correctamente

- El poco valor público añadido que aportaba la gestión directa de este servicio

- El hecho de que fuera un servicio de nueva creación

- La crisis económica

8. ¿Y si tuviera que elegir solamente un motivo?

   (elegir una opción de respuesta)

- Reducir costes para conseguir una mejora de la eficiencia

- Compartir los riesgos con el sector privado

- La imposibilidad de prestar el servicio internamente

- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad

- Introducir innovación tecnológica

- La moda administrativa de colaborar con el sector privado

- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado

- La imposibilidad de contratar más personal

- Razones político-ideológicas

- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión

- La necesidad de financiación privada

- El servicio no funcionaba correctamente

- El poco valor público añadido que aportaba la gestión directa de este servicio

- El hecho de que fuera un servicio de nueva creación

- La crisis económica

9. ¿Cómo se gestionaba este servicio anteriormente?

   (elegir una opción de respuesta)

   - Internamente
   - A través de una agencia y/o entidad pública empresarial
   - Ya estaba contratado

10. ¿Por qué se optó por esta fórmula específica de contratación? Valore la importancia de los siguientes motivos en el momento de tomar la decisión:

    (Muy importante / Bastante importante / Poco importante / Nada importante)

    - La existencia de informes de carácter técnico que así lo recomendaban
    - La complejidad del servicio prestado
    - La necesidad de desarrollar soluciones específicas no existentes en el mercado
    - Las características de las potenciales empresas proveedoras
    - La falta de conocimientos específicos por parte de la Administración para definir los pliegos de cláusulas
    - La existencia de motivos de carácter político-institucional

11. ¿Se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado en varios contratos?

    (Sí / No)

12. ¿En cuantos contratos se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado?

    (respuesta abierta)

13. ¿Por qué motivo se decidió fraccionar el servicio contratado en varios contratos?

    (Sí / No)

    - Para evitar la relación de dependencia con un único proveedor
    - Para garantizar la competencia entre proveedores
    - Por motivos político-institucionales
    - Porque la complejidad técnica del proyecto así lo aconsejaba
    - Porque las características del potencial mercado de proveedores así lo aconsejaba

14. ¿La contratación de este servicio implica la creación de un nuevo organismo?

    (Sí / No)

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15. Señale las actividades que se llevaron a cabo antes de empezar el proceso de contratación:

(Sí / No)

- Se estudiaron otras posibles fórmulas de gestión indirecta
- Se estudiaron otras posibles fórmulas de contratación
- Se realizó un análisis previo de las potenciales empresas proveedoras

16. ¿Cuántas empresas o uniones temporales de empresas participaron en la fase de diálogo competitivo?

(respuesta abierta)

17. Valore, en términos generales, las actividades de planificación del proceso de contratación y de las condiciones de prestación del servicio:

(del 0 al 10)

18. Desde su punto de vista, ¿cuáles hubieran sido las consecuencias de la firma de un contrato de colaboración entre el sector público y el sector privado? Valore la probabilidad de las siguientes consecuencias:

(Muy probable / Bastante probable / Poco probable / Nada probable)

- Reducir los costes destinados a la prestación del servicio
- Una relación de dependencia con los proveedores
- Altos costes de coordinación con los diferentes agentes implicados en la prestación del servicio
- Prestar servicios de mayor calidad
- Una pérdida de control sobre el proceso de producción y prestación del servicio
- Mejorar en innovación tecnológica
- Altos costes de control de los proveedores para asegurar el cumplimiento de las condiciones del contrato
- Una toma de decisiones más compleja y lenta
- Mejorar la transparencia en la gestión
- La difuminación de responsabilidades entre los diferentes agentes implicados en la prestación del servicio

- La existencia de conflictos de intereses entre la administración y los proveedores
- Aprovechar los conocimientos y experiencia del sector privado
- La vulneración de la confidencialidad de datos importantes
- Separar las responsabilidades políticas y de gestión
- Asegurar unos resultados mínimos finales
- El retraso en el inicio de la prestación del servicio
- Aumentar la credibilidad frente a la ciudadanía
- Una correcta gestión de los riesgos inherentes al trabajo colaborativo
- Incrementar la productividad

19. En el contexto de la mencionada firma de un contrato de colaboración entre el sector público y el sector privado, ¿usted cree que el sector privado realmente hubiera compartido riesgos y beneficios con el sector público?
(Sí / No)

20. Desde su punto de vista y en el contexto de la mencionada firma de un contrato de colaboración entre el sector público y el sector privado, señales si los siguientes factores se hubieran dado o no: *(Sí / No)*
- La existencia de unas reglas claras y conocidas por todas las partes
- La definición de unos mecanismos de control y seguimiento que, en caso de incumplimiento, permitan corregir la desviación
- La existencia de un sistema de evaluación orientado a la mejora organizativa
- La implementación de las medidas organizativas necesarias por parte de la Administración para adaptar los órganos y procesos tradicionales a la gestión en red
- Un apoyo político e institucional firme
- La existencia de un liderazgo estratégico por parte de la administración
- La definición de objetivos compartidos (situaciones win-win)
- Disponer de empleados y directivos públicos con las competencias y los conocimientos necesarios para la gestión en red
- Un entendimiento de la misión y la cultura organizativa de cada organización y una búsqueda de la compatibilidad entre ellas
- Conseguir una mayor flexibilidad en la gestión
- Compartir los riesgos económicos de la prestación del servicio con el sector privado

- Autoridad y responsabilidad compartidas con el sector privado
- La existencia de un clima de confianza y compromiso entre las partes (más allá de las obligaciones estrictamente legales)
- Una buena comunicación entre las partes

21. ¿Es la primera vez que esta Administración utilizaba esta modalidad de contratación para contratar un servicio?
   (Sí / No)

22. ¿Por qué motivo se decidió abandonar la contratación del mencionado servicio mediante la firma de un contrato de colaboración entre el sector público y el sector privado?
   (elegir una opción de respuesta)
   - El concurso se declaro desierto al no presentarse ninguna empresa
   - El concurso se declaro desierto al no presentarse ninguna empresa que cumpliera con los requisitos exigidos
   - Otro (especifique)

23. ¿Qué paso después?
   (elegir una opción de respuesta)
   - El servicio finalmente no se contrató
   - El servicio se contrato utilizando otra modalidad de contratación
   - El servicio se contrato utilizando la misma modalidad de contratación pero se abandonó el procedimiento del diálogo competitivo y se utilizó el procedimiento propio del negociado con publicidad.
   - Otro (especifique)

24. Desde su punto de vista, ¿considera conveniente volver a utilizar esta modalidad de contratación en futuras ocasiones?
   (Sí / No)

7.3 Annex III. Census tracts used to define the two geographical areas included in Paper 3

U.S. census tracts for Fourteenth Street Corridor (U.S. Census Bureau)

Decennial Census of Population and Housing (1940-2010):

- 1940: 28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52
- 1950: 28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52
- 1960: 28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- 1970: 28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- 1980: 28; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- 1990: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- 2000: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- 2010: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52.10

American Community Survey (five-year estimates):

- Census 2010: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50; 52.10
- Census 2011: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52.10
- Census 2012: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52.10
- Census 2013: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52.10
- Census 2014: 28.02; 30; 36; 37; 43; 44; 50.01; 50.02; 52

U.S. census tracts for Southwest (U.S. Census Bureau)

Decennial Census of Population and Housing (1940-2010):

- Census 1940: Census tracks: 60; 61; 62; 63
- Census 1950: Census tracks: 60; 61; 62; 63
- Census 1960: Census tracks: 60; 61; 62; 63
- Census 1970: Census tracks: 60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01

- Census 1980: Census tracks: 60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01

- Census 1990: Census tracks: 60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01

- Census 2000: Census tracks: 60.01; 60.20; 61; 62; 63.01

- Census 2010: Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

American Community Survey (five-year estimates):

- Census 2010: Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

- Census 2011: Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

- Census 2012: Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

- Census 2013: Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

- Census 2014 Census tracks: 102; 105; 110

7.4 Annex IV. Personal interviews, Paper 3

Date	Name	Affiliation
07/07/15	Otto J. Hetzel	Former Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
07/09/15	David Muse Meridith Burkus	Artistic Director, Studio Theatre Managing Director, Studio Theatre
07/14/15	James Nozar	Developer with the JBG Companies, one of the largest developers in Washington, D.C.
07/30/15	Edward Ryan	Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Marriott International Inc.
08/03/15	Joy Zinoman	Founder of the Studio Theatre now located at the corner of Fourteenth and P Streets in Washington, D.C.
08/11/15	Alice Rivlin	Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution. Previously Director, the Congressional Budget Office, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Chair of the D.C. Financial Control Board.
09/02/15	Gene Sofer	Partner in the Susquehanna Group, a public policy consulting firm
09/24/15	Jane Thompson	Designer and Urban Planner, Co-Founder of Design Research, involved in numerous well-known revitalization projects with her architect husband, Benjamin Thompson. Included are those involving Faneuill Hall in Boston, the Grand Central District in

Date	Name	Affiliation
		New York, the South Street Seaport in New York City, the Navy Pier in Chicago, Baltimore's Inner Harbor and Union Station in Washington, D.C.
10/13/15	Perry Pockros	Facilis LLC, a D.C. management consulting firm
12/21/15	Marvin Jawer	Washington D.C. real estate investor and lawyer
01/11/16	Tamara Smith	CEO, YWCA for the National Capital Area
01/11/16	Ashley Wiltshire Jon Gerstenfeld	Principal, SJG Properties Founder, SJG Properties
01/11/16	Donald Blanchon	Executive Director of the Whitman-Walker Clinic
01/13/16	Lori Kaplan	CEO and President of the Latin American Youth Center in Washington, D.C.
01/20/16	Bob Levy	Previously a columnist for "The Washington Post" reporting mainly on the Washington scene.
01/21/16	Andrew Altman	The head of the D.C. City Planning Office after Mayor Marion Barry
01/21/16	Rolph Pendall Peter Tatian	Center Director, the Urban Institute Senior Fellow, the Urban Institute
02/17/16	Colin Tarbert Leon Pinkett, III Julie Day	Deputy Mayor, City of Baltimore Assistant Deputy Mayor Deputy Commissioner, Land Resources
02/19/16	John Fanning	D.C. Advisory Neighborhood Commissioner

Date	Name	Affiliation
03/03/16 by email	Terence Fitzgerald	Former attorney and developer for the Mills Corporation, Tishman and other developers.
03/09/16	Eric Shaw	Director, D.C. Office of Planning
	Joshua Silver	Ward 1 Neighborhood Planner, D.C. Office of Planning
	Stephen Cochran	Zoning & Special Projects Planner, District of Columbia Office of Planning
05/27/15	Geoffrey Griffis	City Partners, a design and development firm in D.C.
06/01/16	Andre Byers	President and CEO of the Development Corporation of Columbia Heights
06/16/16	Rebecca Katz	Administrator, D.C. Office of Public Records
06/17/16	Andy Shallal	Owner of Busboys and Poets in the District of Columbia, a bistro and gathering place in D.C. with locations on Fourteenth Street and elsewhere in D.C.; Recent candidate for mayor of D.C.
06/29/16	William Creech	Archivist, The National Archives