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Doctoral Thesis

FUTURE REFUGEE CAMPS AS ‘INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE SETTLEMENTS’

Case-Studies: Syrian Refugee Settlements in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"There are different kinds of displaced people, but they all have something in common: nearly 20 people are forcibly displaced every minute as a result of conflict or persecution"— (UN-Org, 2016)

The work done by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and other international and local humanitarian agencies, in collaboration with refugee hosting countries, is vital in providing humanitarian relief to highly vulnerable refugee populations in emergency situations. Yet there are also a number of problems and deficiencies with the current standard model of response to refugee situations, an approach which is largely defined and influenced by the conceptual and practical considerations of the UNHCR emergency guidelines.

This thesis outlines the advantages as well as the shortcomings of the current approach of international humanitarian agencies and host governments to refugee camps and to the planning, design, management and development of refugee settlements.

A comprehensive literature review sets out the historical development of thinking in these areas, highlighting key elements of different approaches and visions, lessons learned and how the current UNHCR approach has been shaped and developed. This historical policy context then informs and shapes a comparative analysis of four case-study refugee camps currently in operation as part of the models of response of three neighboring host countries to large influxes of Syrian refugees. This empirical investigation informs a critical evaluation of the practical implementation of UNHCR guidelines by host governments and the effects of this approach on refugees and hosting countries.

Based on the combined results and conclusions of this analysis, **we outline and propose a new paradigm of response and approach to planning, design, management and development of refugee settlements,** in order to address the issues identified through our analysis of the current model. Our proposal for ***'Integrated Sustainable Settlements (ISS)'*** in the final chapter aims to set out an approach which incorporates the advantages of the current UNHCR model for the emergency relief phase of refugee situations but which also addresses the need for a longer-term perspective and integrated planning of settlements in order to overcome the limitations of the current UNHCR model and respond more effectively to the real needs of refugee groups. These ISS communities aim to create favorable situations for all stakeholders in refugee movements and crises, providing sustainable development opportunities for host countries and ensuring better integration, living conditions, human rights and quality of life for refugees.

We identify possible limitations of the proposal but also its scope and viability, presenting a roadmap for moving towards this vision and towards a better future for refugees and host countries.

Introductory Chapter

I. Problem Statement

Since the start of the twentieth century, hundreds of millions of people have been forced to flee their countries to escape war and conflict, becoming refugees in asylum countries and living in refugee camps (Turner, 2016). The United Nations and humanitarian NGOs are the main agents responsible for care of refugees, working with host countries and providing emergency relief, including the provision of temporary emergency settlements whose size and growth is related to the duration of the refugee crisis and the number of refugees who arrive (Jertila, 2015).

The standard references for design, planning and construction of refugee camps are the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)[1] handbook and The Sphere project[2] handbook (Kennedy, 2005)[3]. They define refugee camps as 'emergency temporary settlements' and the focus is on providing emergency relief and aid to vulnerable refugee populations. These guidelines, particularly the UNHCR guidelines, define the dominant model and standard approach to refugee camps, influencing the policy decisions of host governments and shaping the conceptual vision of what refugee camps should be and what they should accomplish.

The emergency relief phase of a refugee camp represents a vital humanitarian response to meeting the basic needs of refugees. Yet refugee camps tend to become protracted, long-term settlements, in operation for many years or even decades (seventeen years on average – UNHCR, 2018), particularly in the case of refugee crises caused by conflicts. Unfortunately the 'temporary' and 'emergency' vision of refugee camps dominates the standard UNHCR approach, general thinking and policy decisions of host governments, limiting the conception of what a refugee settlement could *be* and could *do* and meaning that integrated, long-term planning is largely insufficient or absent. The conceptual limitations of the UNHCR guidelines, framework and vision shape all levels of camp design and the subsequent development and management of the settlement, creating the reality which is then physically manifested on the ground. This reality has negative impacts on the real needs of the refugee population, the actual inhabitants of the settlement, and requires *ad hoc* planning and costly, inefficient adaptations by camp management and humanitarian organizations in order to mitigate the problems which the initial limited vision causes.

This thesis argues that a key problem with the current approach followed by UNHCR and host governments is the failure to move beyond the conceptualization of refugee settlements as 'emergency', 'temporary', 'camps'. The research we present in the thesis supports the argument that the emergency relief phase is *necessary* as a humanitarian response to meeting basic needs but is *insufficient* to ensure the development of happy and flourishing communities of refugees integrated within the host country and contributing positively to the local society and economy (until they are eventually able to be repatriated). A more detailed statement and analysis of this problem is provided in Chapter 01.

The lack of this kind of developmental vision within the standard guidelines and paradigm of response means that the emergency phase of a refugee camp tends to give way to a continuous, seemingly unending 'charity and containment' phase, whereby refugees are placed in a relationship of long-term dependency with the camp, controlled within its boundaries and unable to integrate

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1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is the UN agency mandated to ensure respect for the rights of people fleeing war and persecution and to find lasting solutions to their plight.
2 The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 to develop a set of minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance.
3 In this thesis we generally refer to the UNHCR guidelines since they are slightly more complete than the Sphere guidelines in terms of development of refugee camps and are more influential in terms of their use by host governments and agencies.

with the wider host society or economy. These limitations result in a variety of problems both for refugees and host countries, as detailed through the course of this thesis.

The 'temporary', formulaic vision which currently dominates refugee camp design and management is *the* limiting factor in regards to creation of integrated sustainable settlements for refugees and is related to the wider conceptualization of refugee camps as isolated units of charitable containment rather than as holistic, integrated communities.

These shortcomings are highlighted both through our examination of the historical literature as well as through the presentation of empirical research and critical analysis of case studies in this thesis. The wide-lens view of the physical cycle of the development of refugee camps under the current humanitarian UNHCR paradigm presented in this thesis illuminates the limitations of this current approach and the associated problems it causes for refugees and host countries.

II. Research Hypothesis

This thesis argues that if refugee camps were considered and planned from the outset as potential long-term settlements, close to or within existing urban areas, with proper infrastructure, public use buildings, employment opportunities and other services, then they would be more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and would have a positive impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities. These settlements would also offer long-term benefits to the host country after repatriation of refugees. Implementation of such an integrated approach would raise many challenges (some of which are discussed and addressed in this thesis) however none of these challenges need be seen as insurmountable and our central hypothesis outlines a roadmap towards a new paradigm of approach which would improve development outcomes for refugees and host countries.

In order to prove the hypothesis two key elements must be convincingly established;

1. Firstly it must be established that the current model of refugee camps has important limitations and deficiencies which mean that it is not capable of, or suitable for, producing socially, economically and environmentally sustainable settlements and that it does not produce positive impacts for refugees and hosting communities.
2. Secondly it must be established that another approach is possible, viable and would produce more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable settlements and positive impacts for refugees and hosting communities.

Chapters 01, 02, 03 and 04 of this thesis establish the first of these key elements. The findings, considerations and conclusions of these chapters also inform the development of the Integrated Sustainable Settlements (ISS) proposal that we present in chapter 05, which aims to establish the second of these two key elements of the hypothesis. Through the course of this thesis we therefore aim to establish the need for a change of perspective and approach as well as to provide a possible vision of what this change might entail, intending to catalyze and inspire further coordinated research and discussion by policymakers in order to contribute to this change in paradigm and approach to refugee situations.

III. Research Aims

The main aim of this research and the motivation behind the thesis is to contribute towards improving conditions and outcomes for refugees and for refugee host countries by proposing a revisioning of what refugee settlements are and what they can do.

In order to contribute to this change the thesis has the following more specific research aims:

- to establish and make clear the current importance of the UNHCR guidelines in shaping the contemporary responses of humanitarian agencies and host governments to refugee situations (Introduction, Chapter 01 and throughout thesis)
- to enhance knowledge and widen critical perspectives by analyzing the historical development and contemporary context of different approaches and responses to refugee situations (Chapters 01 and 02)
- to present the antecedents and contributing influences that have shaped the UNHCR model as well as to analyze alternative approaches which present points of contrast and point towards possible alternative visions. (Chapters 01 and 02)
- to provide in-depth qualitative and quantitative analysis of current refugee camps in order to assess how the implementation of UNHCR guidelines in planning, design, management and development of refugee camps is actually carried out on the ground (Chapter 03 and 04)
- to establish and enhance understanding of the conditions faced by refugees living under the current UNHCR model of refugee camps (Chapter 03 and 04)
- to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the current approach in order to underscore the need for a new, more holistic and integrated approach (Chapter 03 and 04)
- to use the research findings in Chapters 01-04 to develop a proposal outlining this new long-term, developmental approach to refugee settlements, examining its possibilities and limitations as well as developing a 'roadmap' which sets out some of the necessary steps for achieving the adoption of this change of approach by UNHCR, host governments and other stakeholders (Chapter 05)

This thesis aims to contribute to inspiring this change to a developmental approach and to show how, although it would require significant commitment and investment, it would benefit both refugees and host countries. This requires a change of vision in terms of how responses to refugee situations are conceived and implemented, implying a progression beyond the standard UNHCR guidelines and approach in order to move towards and adopt this longer-term, developmental vision of refugee settlements. This new vision needs to be convincing (both in theory and in practice) in order for it to be adopted and promoted by UNHCR and implemented by host countries and governments.

IV. Scope and Limitations

The UNHCR guidelines provide a good model of vital humanitarian response in emergency situations but are limited in their scope by a temporary vision which does not view refugee settlements as long-term communities of people which can, and should be, integrated into the local development context of the host country.

The work presented in this thesis examines the impact of the limited UNHCR guidelines and governmental policies on the living conditions and eventual repatriation of refugees residing in

camps. The thesis is therefore intended to contribute to both conceptual and practical change at a global policy level. However the potential impact of the thesis is limited and is therefore intended as a contribution to a process of change towards this developmental approach and vision of refugee settlements.

While conducting field research, and compiling information and results for this thesis, several limitations impacted the progress of the work;

- Logistical limitations i.e. getting permits to access camps in order to conduct site assessments and observations and to collect first-hand materials.
- Limited existing literature on the topic of refugee camp planning and design.
- Most existing guidelines are influenced by the UNHCR and SPHERE handbooks.
- Some officials, humanitarian workers and refugee members in the areas of selected case-studies did not want to be interviewed because they had fears of retaliatory treatment from host governments and organizations.
- The camps change very quickly, particularly in terms of the number of inhabitants, transformation of spatial conditions, social life and economic situation, requiring continuous updating of information.
- During my internship with UNHCR in Jordan, I proposed different ideas to improve Zaatari and Azraq camps as well as new models for two new camps which were going to be established. These projects faced resistance, since UNHCR preferred to follow the standards and guidelines in their handbook. This prevented the possibility of examining the effects of novel initiatives in camp design.
- Some NGOs involved in the selected camps were unhelpful when asked for information.

Two additional limitations directly related to the literature review of this thesis are;

- The total number of refugees worldwide keeps changing, including the number of Syrian refugees. This also applies to the economic and social situation of host-governments under analysis, requiring continuous updating of information in the thesis.
- New humanitarian handbooks, guidelines and academic reviews have been developed in the last few years, which required revisiting or adding new sections to the literature review.

V. Research Background

The critical analysis and proposals of this thesis build upon previous academic research and a six month internship with UNHCR in Jordan:

Foundation of the Academic Research:

This PhD thesis is a continuation of academic research conducted as part of a Masters in International Cooperation in Emergency Sustainable Architecture at Universitat Internacional de Catalunya (May 2015) and expands on questions and themes discussed in the master's thesis, "*The Shift: Rethinking Refugee Camps. A Critical Perspective on Refugee Camp Planning*" Supervisor: Dr. Carmen Mendoza Arroyo.

This research analyzed the process of refugee camp planning and shelter design and examined how UNHCR standards and guidelines are actually implemented on the ground when different types of refugee camps are opened and managed in emergency and post-emergency situations.

The investigation highlighted the inadequacies of current UNHCR standards and guidelines which impose rigid structures and plans on refugee camp inhabitants, limiting their freedoms and failing to ensure the full spectrum of their human rights. The research also highlighted how the inhabitants of refugee camps play an active and organic role in subverting and transforming these limiting structures in order to meet their own needs and aims and to replicate, as much as possible, their previous lives and living conditions.

The discussion and critique was based upon and supported by a qualitative comparative analysis (social, physical and phenomenological on the macro and micro scales) of Al-Zaatari and Al-Azraq, two formal refugee camps built in Jordan by UNHCR in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The research involved numerous site visits to inspect both camps and to conduct interviews with refugees, UNHCR staff members, NGO workers, camp managers and administrators.



Figure 1: Outline of previous academic research 2014/15

The research and analysis highlighted how a large part of the suffering and hardship faced by Syrian refugees in the refugee camps in Jordan arises from the current UNHCR approach to refugee camp planning, design and management. The factors which contribute to this suffering in both camps can be summarized as follows:

Socio-Cultural Issues: Refugees usually stay in the camps for many years (an average of 17 years for refugee camps in general). Conditions are very different from the previous ways of life of the people, particularly in relation to issues of freedom of movement and personal and social dignity (Jertila, 2015). Camps are often dependent on the resources and interventions of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, whilst the food distribution systems and the voucher of $28/month are insufficient to satisfy the needs of refugees (Abu-Marwan, 2015). The lack of job opportunities (especially for women) is a major issue (Etyemezian, 2015) and families often lack male members. This results in increased child labor and consequent increased absence from formal education (Al-Shahma, 2015), with education systems in the camps already weak and inadequate (Alakra'a, 2015). The lack of leisure facilities and activities, for women, elders and men in the camps (children attend different programs at community centres), including the lack of recreational features is a key failure of the camps (Emtinan, 2015). Neither camp has green spaces/gardens nor shaded or paved areas (Abu-Mahmoud, 2015). Finally and most importantly, the stigma of being labelled a "refugee" and of having to live in a refugee camp is very hard for Syrian people who, despite the suffering and hardships, work to maintain their dignity (Al-Shahma, 2015).

Physical/Spatial Issues: Camp planning and shelter design is inadequate to respond to the harsh desert environment in which the camps are located (Abed-Al, 2015). The shelter unit design does not consider key factors of the cultural background of the refugees, the factor of organic family growth and the need for privacy and personal space (Jertila, 2015). There is a lack of infrastructure networks for private usage, such as electricity, drainage and sewage systems (Abu-Mahmoud, 2015; Elfawair, 2015). The lack of transportation networks in the camps means that refugees have to walk long distances to reach public use buildings such as schools, public health facilities and distribution centers (Al-Shahma, 2015). Finally, in regards to the status of public use buildings, the capacity of schools in Zaatari Camp is limited and hospitals are inefficient, providing only a very basic level of care (Alakra'a, 2015).

This summary of findings illustrates some of the inadequacies of camp planning at Zaatari and Azraq, as of 2015. The suffering and hardships which the Syrian refugees face each day as they crash against the rigid, dehumanizing systems of the camps only exacerbate the existing psychological trauma and distress caused by the war and the refugees' original need to flee their own homes and land (Al-Shahma, 2015).

Given that Zaatari and Azraq are two of the most recently established refugee camps in the world (2012&2014) and follow the current UNHCR standards and guidelines, the previous research concluded that a new perspective on and approach to refugee camp planning needs to be shaped and adopted in order to provide refugees with a decent quality of life. It concluded that refugee camps must be seen as a 'form of urbanization' (**Fig.2**) since these settlements are never actually temporary for refugees in any ordinary sense of the word. Since refugees usually stay in the camps for a number of years, these settlements —instead of isolating refugees in the dry desert— must provide them with dignified living conditions, freedom of movement and work opportunities in order to meet their human rights and eliminate unnecessary suffering.



Figure 2: A diagram explaining the critical perspective on Refugee Camp Design and Planning. (Chamma)

Internship:

The internship with UNHCR-Jordan covered a period of six months, from September 2015 to February 2016. During this time I had the chance to study and work on 4 camps (including 2 of the case studies of this PhD thesis): Zaatari and Azraq, and Hadalat and Rukban, the latter both informal refugee camps. Work included the following tasks:

- Analyzing the situation at Zaatari and Azraq and working on planning suggestions including proposals for shelter upgrading.
- The design of a Community Park at Zaatari.
- Analyzing the situation of Syrian refugees at Hadalat and Rukban and working on different proposals of emergency camp designs.

Work on these tasks was supported with interviews with refugee families, discussions with UNHCR colleagues and camp managers and meetings with humanitarian workers from other organizations and NGOs.

The internship offered me the opportunity to gain additional in-depth, first-hand experience of the two case-studies in Jordan (Zaatari and Azraq), to be in the right context and to meet the right people, including representatives of the Jordanian government, camp managers and staff, humanitarian organizations and the refugees themselves, all of which fed into and helped to shape this PhD thesis.

VI. Outline of Thesis

This doctoral thesis is structured in five chapters, beginning with a literature review assessing the current situation of refugee camps and host government policies and ending with suggestions and recommendations for a new vision of response to refugee crises. The five chapters of the thesis are summarized as follows, with each chapter addressing and responding to research questions that shape and guide the development of this thesis;

Chapter 01 | A Long History of Wars and Refugee Camps: This chapter highlights and discusses articles, books and field-reports in order to illustrate and place the current global refugee situation and its causes and effects in context, particularly since the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011. This chapter discusses how refugees are considered an "issue", how the "refugee crisis" affects different contexts, countries, societies and economies and expands on the current approach to response and its effects. Questions addressed in this chapter are;

What are the factors which influence the responses and decisions of hosting governments towards influxes of refugees?

Why do governments and humanitarian NGOS continue to consider most refugee camps as 'isolated temporary settlements'?

Would it be possible to change the way of thinking about refugee camp planning and the standardized refugee camp models in order to ensure better living conditions and futures for refugees?

What is the economic impact of refugees on asylum/host countries and how might a developmental approach make a difference?

Chapter 02 | Refugee Settlements: Isolation vs Integration: This chapter highlights and analyzes different forms, models and standards of refugee camps which have been designed and adopted since 1977, making a critical review of the literature in order to deepen understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different models of response and camp designs. This literature review provides a theoretical and historical background to the development of the contemporary UNHCR guidelines and approach, to the analysis of the case study refugee camps analyzed in chapters 03 and 04, as well as to the ISS proposal presented in chapter 05 of this thesis. Key research questions in this chapter include:

After hundreds of wars and refugee camps, what are the current available designs, concepts and standards for refugee camps? How are they being used and implemented in reality? And do they contribute to the integration or isolation of refugees?

How can asylum countries and humanitarian NGOs be more prepared for potential refugee crises?

Chapter 03 | Syrian Refugee Settlements - Case-Studies: This chapter presents the evidence and results from our in-depth, empirical analysis of four Syrian refugee camps. Information was gained and compiled from site assessments, field evaluations, official data and from hundreds of qualitative interviews conducted with refugees and a range of technical staff, management, support staff and local stakeholders in each case. This empirical analysis provides the evidential basis of the thesis. The questions addressed in this chapter include:

What was the response of each of the three neighboring asylum countries (Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon) in regards to receiving mass influxes of Syrian refugees? What considerations informed these responses?

In what type of settlements do Syrian refugees currently live (2018) in these three countries; informal settlements, formal camps or urban areas, and why?

In what kind of context is each refugee camp located? What is the relationship between each camp and the surrounding urban area(s)?

What living conditions do Syrian refugees have in these camps: spatially, socially, economically and in regards to freedom of movement?

What transformations and adaptations do refugees apply at the level of shelter units, micro communities, sectors and the camps in general in order to improve their quality of life? What are the reasons behind these transformations?

And, are the Syrian refugees integrated into the local communities or are they seen as a burden on the hosting countries?

Chapter 04 | Synthesis and Comparative Analysis of Case-Studies: This chapter provides a comparison, and summary of the findings of the analysis of results presented in Chapter 03. Chapter 04 takes a thematic approach, deepening and sharpening the analysis by making a thematic comparison of the four case-study camps from six key terms of reference:

- Freedom of movement and location of camps
- Formality and informality of camps

- The right to work and generate income
- Spatial adaptations and improvement of living conditions; level of permanence, quality of living conditions and services
- Recreational facilities and green/public spaces
- Dependency and independency systems in the camps

Chapter 05 | A Developmental Proposal: Is a Roadmap to Integrated Sustainable Settlements Possible?: This final chapter defines a developmental proposal for a new vision of urbanized *Integrated Sustainable Settlements* (ISS) intended to offer refugees a better way of life and living conditions, whilst at the same time offering host countries both immediate and long-term benefits. This chapter also presents and incorporates recent feedback from three humanitarian experts on all phases of the ISS proposal and discusses the viability and limitations of the proposal as well as delineating a possible roadmap towards the implementation of such an approach. Questions addressed in this chapter;

Could refugees be seen as an opportunity instead of being seen as a burden/threat that contaminates local societies and host countries?

What alternative strategies could host governments consider in order to respond to influxes of refugees in a more durable and sustainable way, creating long-term benefits for local communities?

What phases should the roadmap to *ISS* follow and who are the stakeholders that should be involved in the development of these sort of settlements (what offices of government, etc.)?

Chapter 01

Paths of Refugees -
The Geo-Political Status

REFUGEES

A. Conflict area/country

B. Neighboring countries

C. Asylum/Host countries

D. Transit countries

E. Desired country of refuge

Decision Making

International Community

Donors

HOST GOVERN-MENTS

HUMANI-TARIAN NGOs

LOCAL COMMU-NITIES

Chapter 02

The different types of refugee settlements & models of response of host countries

M1: Refugees stuck on the borders

Isolation

M2: Refugees on their own in rural areas

M3: Refugee camps isolated out of urban areas

Models in Rural Areas

Refugees on the move as Asylum Seekers

Refugees in countries which they enter illegaly

Integration

M4: Refugee camps as extension of urban areas

M5: Small compounds of refugees inside cities

M6: Decentralized refugees over districts

Models in Urban Areas

Chapter 03

In-depth analysis of case-studies

Policies
Physical
Social
Economic
Adaptation

Jordan
Zaatari and Azraq camps

Turkey
Kilis camp

Lebanon
Deir Zanoun camp

Chapter 04

Comparitive analysis of results

Chapter 05

A Developmental Proposal: Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations

Figure 3: Thesis Structure: Moving from Refugee Camps to "Integrated Sustainable Settlements" (Chamma)

VII. Methodology

In support of the proposal of considering refugee camps as a form of urbanization and in order to help to define criteria for these new forms of refugee settlements (ISS), this doctoral investigation adopts the following research approaches:

1. A comprehensive literature review, providing an analysis of existing papers and academic contributions related to refugee movements and humanitarian responses, to the conceptualization, planning, design, management and development of refugee camps and settlements and to a range of associated issues related to participation, governance and integration. (chapters 01 and 02)
2. Presentation and analysis of empirical research gathered through visits, mapping projects, site assessments and evaluations of four specific formal and informal refugee camps in Syria's neighboring refugee-hosting countries; Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. (chapter 03)
3. Qualitative interviews with refugee individuals and families, NGO workers and government officials through on-site visits to each of the case-study refugee camps. (chapter 03 and annexes)
4. An analytical comparison of the case-study refugee camps (chapters 03 and 04) with a focus on the following key factors of analysis;

    a. **Political Situation**
        i. Refugee status
        ii. Freedom of movement

    b. **Physical-Spatial**
        i. Size and geographical/environmental context of the camp
        ii. Planning processes and existing transportation network and access (macro scale)
        iii. Internal road networks within communities and between shelter units (micro)
        iv. Infrastructure networks
        v. Shelter designs and typologies
        vi. Forms of adaptation by refugees at macro and micro scales

    c. **Social-Cultural**
        i. Camp population and statistics
        ii. Social fabric and interaction in the camps and with the surrounding urban areas /population
        iii. Impact of the camps on the wider social context of hosting communities
        iv. Aims and needs of camp residents

    d. **Economic**
        i. Sources of income for refugee families
        ii. Internal and external economic interaction and exchange
        iii. Existing market(s) and available employment opportunities
        iv. Hand-made products and/or agriculture within and surrounding the camp

Case-Studies Summary:

As shown on the map below (**Fig.4**), the four case-studies are located in three adjoining countries to Syria; **Zaatari** and **Azraq** in Jordan, **Kilis** in Turkey and **Deir Zanoun** in Lebanon. These three countries are considered the biggest refugee-hosting countries of Syrian refugees. Turkey is also the largest refugee hosting country worldwide with around 4 million refugees, followed by Afghanistan with 1.3 million and then Lebanon with over 1 million registered refugees (UNHCR).

Camp	Type	Number of Refugees	Location
1. Zaatari Camp	Formal/ Spontaneous	78,000	Jordan
2. Azraq Camp	Formal/ Pre-Planned	53,000	Jordan
3. Kilis Camp	Formal/ Pre-Planned	4,000	Turkey
4. Deir Zanoun	Informal encampments	1,500	Lebanon

Source of information: (UNHCR, 2018), (Interviewee K4, 2018), (Abou Zeinab, 2018)



Figure 4: Location of the selected case-studies and the number of Syrian refugees in each host country as of 2018. Map Source: Google Maps. Illustration developed by author

The main criterion behind the selection of the four camps was to be able to analyze and compare **how each government from three distinct developing countries reacted to the influxes of Syrian refugees received since 2012, the different types of settlements they provided and the forms of adaptation which refugees made in each camp in order to improve their living conditions.** This analysis allows us to assess how the current refugee camp planning and management paradigm is implemented and shapes the experience of refugees and host countries. It also provides the platform for development of our proposal for ISS, intended to improve current thinking and outcomes for refugees and host countries.



Figure 5: The shelter typologies of the four selected case-studies. (Chamma)

The four camps analyzed present a variety of different types of refugee settlements and shelter typologies (**Fig.5**). These differences are based on the political decisions taken in each host country and therefore present a good range of responses for analysis. The comparative analysis also covers the aspect of formality vs informality and how it impacts on the living conditions and quality of life of refugees as well as further highlighting the problems and shortcomings of the current international humanitarian approach towards refugees and refugee camp planning.

Chapter 01

Introduction: A Long History of Wars and Refugee Camps

Over the past century there have been more than 265 wars worldwide (Brunberg, 2014), including two world wars, the cold war and various civil wars and regional conflicts, several of which are still ongoing (HCSS 2015; UNHCR 2016). The graphic below (**Fig. 6**) illustrates the frequency of wars since 1400 and deaths from these wars. The graphic particularly highlights the number of wars and conflicts which have taken place over the twentieth century and which continue into the twenty-first century.



Figure 6: Global war deaths 1400-Today. Graph by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (Wall, 2014) Source: HCSS 2015

As a result of these wars and conflicts, tens of millions of people around the world have had to flee their homes and live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees in asylum countries. This has led to the creation of hundreds of refugee camps in different parts of the world, the majority of which are located in the Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR, 2016).



Figure 7: A deadlocked civil war made Syria the largest source of refugees in 2016. Source: (UNHCR, 2018)

This chapter begins by summarizing the situation regarding the current UNHCR standard model of refugee camps and their associated problems, briefly identifying the general causes of these issues and setting the scene and context for further discussion. We then consider the wider geopolitical context, the responses of host governments to refugee situations and how refugees are seen and understood. This then feeds into a further discussion of types of responses to refugee situations and the shortcomings of the current standard approach before we consider the impact of refugees on host countries under the current model.

1.1 Temporary Refugee Camps: Emergency Relief to Charity and Containment

As of June 2018, the number of refugees globally exceeded 25.4 million with around 25% of these refugees housed in refugee camps (UNHCR-Figures, 2018). UNHCR estimates the current average lifespan of a refugee camp as 17 years, while some camps can last for decades given the unpredictable nature of conflicts.

Whilst the establishment of temporary camps in the initial emergency response phase is vital, the UNHCR guidelines do not contemplate moving beyond this stage towards a truly developmental vision which integrates the refugee population into the society and economy of the host country. Rather the emergency camps are subsequently developed on a gradual basis, following a charity and containment model which leaves refugees isolated in these 'temporary' camps which offer a low quality of life, a low level of education and only basic health care services and infrastructure (Asensio, 2014).

The standard refugee camp planning processes of UNHCR and Sphere do not take sufficient consideration of the long-term perspective of refugee camps, the real needs, culture and background of refugees or the natural conditions of site locations (Kennedy J., 2005; Kennedy J., 2008). The guidelines shape the charity and containment approach adopted by host governments and by UNHCR, exacerbating the suffering of refugees as well as failing to benefit host countries.

Refugee camps usually start with tents, donated in the initial emergency response phase to provide shelter for the recently arrived refugee population. Over time these tents may be gradually replaced by temporary shelters with the addition of zinc roofs, or caravans and prefabricated units. Very occasionally these may be gradually replaced by concrete houses however this is unusual (Abed-Al, 2015).[4] This slow and often cumbersome process is costly, inefficient, difficult to manage, unpleasant for refugees and creates associated problems in terms of services, infrastructure and camp systems (see Chapters 03 and 04). It also means that refugees are housed for many years in sub-standard 'container unit' style accommodation.

This often leads to refugee camps being transformed and upgraded by the refugees themselves. Refugee agency can be an important factor in the dynamic process of adaptation and development of camps, both with and without the support of the camp management. Refugee camps which undergo processes of change and transformation can often develop to become comparable to cities in terms of geographical size, number of inhabitants, economic situation, shelter typology, infrastructure and other services/sectors (Abed-Al, 2015).

Management of space is a key factor in the development of refugee camps and settlements and a conceptual and practical shortcoming of the current humanitarian paradigm. Even where refugee camps start with a lot of space for each household, this tends to reduce over time as the number of refugees grows and new households take up the available space. The imposition of formulaic, one-

4 When refugee camps are no longer able to expand horizontally they may start growing vertically to become informal dense settlements with no clear identity, formal infrastructure or housing typology. A good example of this process can be seen in the Palestinian refugee settlements originating in 1948 in Lebanon and Jordan, initially as tented camps and today dense, informal urban slums of concrete buildings, yet still considered as 'temporary camps'.

size-fits-all, grid plan systems creates dehumanizing physical environments, negative public and private spaces and rigid physical structures, incapable of responding adequately to organic growth and limiting wellbeing and human and social development. The physical restrictions imposed on a spatial level are reflected in the range of policies implemented in camps at a social, economic and political level, as the analysis presented in chapters 03 and 04 of this thesis highlights.

Due to their position as victims of war and political conflict, refugees have a legal right to asylum and the protection of their human rights under international conventions and treaties[5]. Refugees housed in camps are therefore provided with basic shelter, food and health services, however many of the human rights[6] of refugees are not met and refugees are expected to accept their situation in the refugee camps, even if the conditions are basic and unsatisfactory. They are not supposed to make political demands (Turner, 2016, p. 143), or to ask for job opportunities or better living conditions (Al-Shahma, 2015). The current paradigm of humanitarian assistance essentially requires that, in order to be worthy of humanitarian assistance, the receiver must be a person without a past, without political will and without agency (Turner, 2016, p. 143) or the power to change things, but rather must accept what is provided and be grateful (Abu-Marwan, 2015).

This situation often causes physical and mental health issues such as malnutrition, depression and anxiety as refugees suffer from the limitations of the camps, compounding their existing trauma from fleeing conflict, worries about their unstable situation, about what is coming next and about the loss of opportunities to achieve their and their children's desired futures (Schimdt, 2003).

1.2 The Geopolitical Dimension of Refugee Crises and Host Government Responses

Whilst the dominant conceptual humanitarian paradigm attempts to standardize responses to refugee situations, in reality each situation and each refugee camp which is constructed as part of a program to aid that situation is unique (Kennedy, 2004 p.128). Every hosting community and government deals differently with an influx of refugees;

> *"In the past 30 years, millions have crossed international borders to escape conflict and disorder in their home countries [...]. Some hosting governments have received refugees with generosity, providing them with assistance and guaranteeing their safety. Others have tried to prevent refugees from entering, or have treated them harshly restricting their movements and even endangering their safety."* (Jacobsen & College, 1996, p. 655)

The consequences of a mass influx of people for a receiving country can include strains on economic resources and physical infrastructure, as well as security risks and threats to government authority—especially if a government is unable to control the flow of people across its borders (Jacobsen & College, 1996, p. 657). The sudden appearance of large numbers of asylum seekers can create urgent humanitarian problems and force governments to act quickly, something most governments are often reluctant or incapable of doing effectively (Clark, 1986, p. 2).

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5 A refugee has the right to safe asylum. However, international protection comprises more than physical safety. Refugees should receive at least the same rights and basic support services as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of thought, of movement, and freedom from torture and degrading treatment (UNHCR-Refugee, 2002).

6 Human rights are those activities, conditions, and freedoms that all human beings are entitled to enjoy, by virtue of their humanity. They include civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (IJRC, 2019).

Pressures and influences on how to respond to refugee crises are exerted on asylum countries from both external and internal sources. External organizations such as the 'International Refugee Regime'[7], act as the primary source of assistance for host governments in the event of a mass influx of refugees, as well as attempting to influence potential host governments and advocating for the rights of refugees through publicity and diplomatic pressure. Additional political and logistical factors influence the decisions and actions of host governments; these factors include the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the countries of origin of the refugees and wider national security considerations (Jacobsen & College, 1996, p. 655).

A further important factor shaping government responses comes from the demands and wishes of the local hosting communities which first receive the refugees and which are most affected by the population influx. A third source of pressure comes from the refugees themselves, placed in a very vulnerable situation, with few available resources but often desperate for support and asylum (Jacobsen & College, 1996, p. 657).

Conversely, in regards to internal factors, refugee policies can be affected by bureaucratic choices made by governments, the absorption capacity of the local host communities (Jacobsen & College, 1996, p. 660), and local residents' attitudes towards receiving refugees. For example, while some may want to protect refugees, others may want to protect themselves against refugees, whether for domestic political reasons, due to negative publicity or reporting, to protect their frontiers and local populations, or due to apathy towards refugees, which leaves some happy to simply abandon them (Agier, 2002, p. 4). After all these factors are considered, it is the host government which ultimately decides whether to settle refugees in urban areas or camps and which determines the size and location of those camps.

In a conflict situation, the flow of refugees over the borders of a country can often remain steady as more and more people are gradually displaced by the spread of the conflict or the increase in its intensity. As a result, the government of a host country has three options of response to a refugee situation: it can do nothing, it can respond negatively towards refugees and prevent them entering or it can respond positively by providing aid and shelter (Gordenker, 1987, p. 658). Acceptance of refugees for a host country also prompts the process of decision making that includes the questions of where to place refugees, in what type(s) of settlement(s) and with what services (Arabeyat, 2015).

A further important consideration to bear in mind is that humanitarian/refugee crises can lose importance in the eyes of the international community and receive less attention as the years go by, particularly where new crises arise which become the priority and focus of attention of the international aid communities and donors (i.e. the Yemeni war crisis 2015-present).

All of the factors presented in this section influence the policy decisions of host governments and humanitarian agencies, impacting on the lives of refugees who experience the effects of these decisions and who are at the centre of this context.

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7 The International Refugee Regime is composed of institutions and individuals in the international community concerned with refugee welfare and includes representation from UNHCR, international relief and refugee organizations, donor countries, volunteer agencies, the media, and individuals such as lawyers and academics involved in refugee advocacy.

1.3 Refugees: Second-Class or Transitory Citizens?

The refugee migrant "issue" is often heavily politicized, particularly when a high density of asylum seekers impacts local host communities. The management policies of host countries can help to either avoid, or to cause potential and often practical conflict or disruption with regards to employment, public services, culture etc. (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016). Host governments, as a first step, therefore sometimes problematize refugee migrants, defining the flow of people across the border as a specific problem with a specific name: refugees. In this discourse, "refugees are seen as an anomaly that needs a solution" (Turner, 2016 p. 140).

This leads to different forms of legislation which attempt to control the situation. The recent European Union (EU) Dublin III Regulation heavily affected countries with the main refugee-arrival shores across the Mediterranean such as Italy, Spain and particularly Greece. Regulation 604/2013 defines which state has the obligation to evaluate asylum claims provided by people who arrive to Europe, stating that the asylum request by a third country national is to be presented in the first European country the person arrives in and where he or she was identified by local authorities. Annapaola Ammirati on Open Migration, highlights that which country refugees arrive at in Europe is often different from where they want to go and where they wish to live, yet these factors are no longer taken into account (Ammirati, 2015).

Referring to Agamben, "*if refugees represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this is above all because by breaking the continuity between man [person] and citizen, nativity and nationality, they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis*". Agamben adds that "*the concept of the refugee must be resolutely separated from the concept of the rights of man [human beings], the refugee must be considered for what she/he is.*" (Agamben, 1998 p.78)

The separation of refugees from local populations and their placement in camps, —often on the poorest quality and least accessible land— exacerbates their marginalization and dehumanization (Black, 1998). In support of this view/argument, Agier states that refugee camps are places of social exclusion with inhabitants treated as not belonging to the host culture or society (Agier in Turner 2016). Furthermore, Zetter highlights how very few countries (Zimbabwe and Malawi represent exceptions) have attempted to implement an integrated approach to the provision of assistance for refugees and host communities within a developmental framework (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p.90). Thus, refugees in camps find themselves in a paradoxical situation, unable to settle where they are because they are supposedly 'on the move', on their way home, or going somewhere else in the future (Turner, 2016 p. 142). Yet, they are also unable to leave the camps where they are accommodated because of socio-political restrictions imposed upon them, or poor employment options and earning opportunities, which could allow them to leave and settle elsewhere.

International assistance agencies, especially UNHCR, have borne the brunt of criticism about the establishment of refugee camps (Black, 1998). Black argues that depending on one's point of view, these agencies are seen as either 1) favoring policies that help them to carry out their mandate to assist refugees or alternatively, 2) favoring policies that strengthen their control of camp populations and access to funds and support from donors (Black, 1998). The situation does not necessarily need to be cast in these binary terms, the truth is more nuanced. Demonizing international aid agencies including UNHCR ignores the vital humanitarian role they perform, particularly in emergency situations. Yet it is also valid and important to point out that if an 'aid focused' approach dominates the strategic vision then the reality on the ground quickly becomes a restrictive dependency model which is unable to move towards a developmental approach and creates problems for refugees and host countries.

This latter view of UNHCR refugee camps as places of internment and control is echoed by Turner who argues that the camp perimeter remains an important defining characteristic and shapes the lives of those who remain inside.

> *"Living inside a refugee camp- however invisible the line between the camp and its surroundings and despite ongoing contact between the inside and the outside- marks one's life and defines one's position: a position that is simultaneously excluded from and included into host society, excluded spatially and legally while simultaneously being defined and contained by the surrounding society"* (Turner, 2016 p. 142)

Al-Husban and Adams highlight that the major challenge facing many countries around the world is how to sustainably address the issues of increased numbers of refugee migrants (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 P.1). They argue that in the case of Zaatari camp, only very limited efforts have been made to enable refugees to support themselves and develop self-sustaining livelihoods, which, if not developed through the refugee camp lifecycle, undermine the refugees' livelihood skills, make repatriation more difficult and increase tensions with the host communities (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 p. 3).

Zetter discusses how there should be a shift in the approach towards refugee crises, from *relief* to *development.* He explains that the challenge to develop appropriate shelter and settlement policies for refugees brings up the dilemma central to all refugee policy making – *"relief or development? Temporary needs or permanent (sustainable) responses? […] Issues of participation or co-operation? Host country or international interests? (or both?)"* (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p. 33). Zetter states that the challenge is to develop appropriate shelter and settlement policies for refugees where they can participate in the formulation and implementation of their shelter provisions. He also notes how host governments and humanitarian assistance agencies have traditionally adopted short-term responses, while—in the transitions from relief to development—, longer term and more durable housing are needed beyond the emergency and care maintenance phases. Zetter also concludes that **there is a need for more research and policy development as well as new ways of thinking about the nature of refugee needs and assistance** (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p. 34).

For many refugees the ultimate aim is repatriation, being able to return to their homeland when the crisis is resolved. In the meantime, a positive, participative, and inclusive developmental approach would lead to the repatriated people having developed their skill sets, knowledge bases and capabilities (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 p. 3). Zetter quotes a Cypriot refugee speaking about the possibility of remaining permanently in their asylum homes, "We would not accept these houses, even if they were gilded: they are not ours"—the will to return remains. In other words, as Turner states, for individuals to remain socially alive, they need to be able to imagine a meaningful future for themselves- however miserable their present-day situation might be (Turner p145).

Refugee migration is an international issue, a lesson we can learn and relearn from history (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 P.2). Academics and policy makers have been arguing for a long time that 'camps' represent a poor solution for refugees (Black, 1998) and that refugee settlements should be seen differently, concerns which this thesis seeks to address.

1.4 The Current Forms of Refugee Camps

"Refugee camps, they often become places where people are born and die waiting to go home." (Petti, 2013)

The United Nations agencies and NGOs define the following forms of accommodation as refugee settlements: dispersed settlements (where refugees seek accommodation with householders in existing hosting communities), mass shelters (temporarily using public facilities such as schools, hospitals etc.), detention centres, informal encampments, transit camps and refugee camps. (Turner 2016; UNHCR-Handbook 2007).

Camps are usually built in response to large-scale influxes of refugees. Today these emergency refugee camps are generally classified into one of two categories, either *spontaneous* camps or *planned* camps (UNHCR-Handbook, 2007, p. 208). According to the UNHCR recommendations, *spontaneous camps* should be avoided where possible, since they have more disadvantages than advantages. Despite this, spontaneous camps are generally used in emergencies to allow humanitarian NGOs and host governments to meet the basic needs of the refugees as quickly as possible (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998, p. 28).

Refugee camps are often formed without adequate long-term planning (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p. 92) due to the large number of refugees which need to be resettled, within days in some cases. Elements of the UNHCR and Sphere guidelines are applied where possible and shape the design, management and development of the camp however, these models have many disadvantages and are often incompatible with the reality on the ground. The creation of these high density, emergency settlements makes the provision of services to the refugees housed within them cumbersome and costly (UNHCR H., 2007, p. 208), especially given that camps are often located far from existing urban areas (Turner, 2016, p. 141). Whether planned or spontaneous, these 'temporary' camps might remain in the same location for years and decades, even in the long, *post-emergency* phase.

The current Camp Manager of Zaatari camp, Hovig Etyemezian, states that it is often difficult and unfeasible for the hosting government and humanitarian NGOs to relocate the refugees or reopen the camp elsewhere (Etyemezian, 2015). This usually results in informal development of the initial temporary camp in terms of use of space, infrastructure and organization. This process is driven by the organic growth of refugee families, and the continuous transformations and adaptations the inhabitants make in order to improve living conditions, create job opportunities, minimize their suffering, upgrade the available basic services and replicate, as much as possible, the lives they had at home prior to the war (Jertila, 2015).

The development of these basic and temporary camps and the period refugees live in them is related to the political situation and decisions of the hosting government (Abed-Al, 2015). In spite of the huge impact of war and conflict in shaping refugee movements over the history of the last century, despite the tens of millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their home countries, despite the creation of hundreds of refugee camps all over the world, **hosting governments in general and aid organizations in particular are still not planning and designing refugee camps adequately or considering the long-term perspective.**

Referring to Al-Husban and Adams, the current responses are fairly short-term and reactive in nature, responding to events after they happen (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 P.2). Another factor is that long-term thinking, they argue, does not fit well with the short-term "containment and charity" approach that seems to be the dominant model to manage refugee crises (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016

P.3). Additionally, as described by UNHCR, the overall goal of the current standard refugee camp is to "balance the needs of refugees with the needs of the aid agencies" (Byler et al, 2015 p. 124).

In conclusion, the lack of adequate planning responses, underpinned by an inadequate understanding and consideration of the needs and rights of refugees, is, in most cases, only serving to compound the suffering of refugees and compounding the 'refugee crisis'. Refugees have to stay in these 'temporary camps' for years, even after the emergency phase has ended. Referring again to Turner, "the camp in other words is both the cause as well as being conceived as the cure." Thus, the question here is: how long will we allow this situation to persist? —What other radical solutions and strategies can be found and used?

1.5 The Impact of Refugee Populations on the Economies of Hosting Countries

UNHCR's annual Global Trends report (2017) states that worldwide forced displacement is at its highest level in decades (UNHCR, 2017). Charlotte Edmond from the World Economic Forum indicates that the world's poorest countries continue to shoulder the burden of the global refugee crisis; around 84% of refugees are located in developing countries (Edmond, 2017). It is therefore important to examine the impacts of the large number of refugee groups on these hosting countries in order to understand how they are affecting local economies, societies, public services and infrastructure and consequently in order to transform these impacts into positive factors of development and social cohesion.

Referring to the review of Kevin Shellito, refugee crises can have positive and negative economic effects on the host country;

> *"On the positive side, refugees can be a boon to the host country by (1) spurring long-term investment (2) filling needed demographic gaps (3) integrating effectively into the labor market (4) becoming productive economic consumers and producers and (5) by increasing bilateral trade with the country of origin. On the negative side, refugees can be a burden to the host country by (1) straining public and private services (2) causing physical and economic overcrowding and (3) increasing societal strife and the potential for civil conflict." (Shellito, 2016)*

As indicated in the following summary reviews, Syrian refugees are generally considered to be a burden on the local economies of the host-countries analyzed in this thesis (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey). They are considered generally to be causing negative impacts in different economic and social sectors.

Jordan

Khetam Malkawi in The Jordan Times states that the 630,000 Syrian refugees cost the Kingdom of Jordan over $2.5 billion a year, according to a report by the World Bank Group (WBG, 2016). This report also highlights that each refugee cost the Jordanian Government $3,750 per year (Malkawi, 2016). In a recent official info graphic on Twitter, the Jordanian Foreign Ministry said that hosting Syrian refugees has cost more than $10.3 billion by 2017 (JFM, 2017). That figure included additional expenses in different sectors; health, education, employment, subsidized food and other public services (TheNewArab, 2017).

According to the World Bank's Quarterly Economic Brief (QEB) in 2016, the Kingdom's debt is accumulating rapidly— estimated at 90 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015. The report added that according to a population census conducted in late 2015, 1.26 million of Jordan's population are Syrians, but only 50 per cent are registered as refugees (Malkawi, 2016).

In February 2016, an agreement was reached between the international community and Jordan (Reliefweb-Jordan, 2016). Seeking solutions to the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan, as part of the agreement, Jordan, through private investors, will set up several industrial zones across the country to produce goods to send to European Union (EU) markets free of taxes, customs and quotas. Taylor Luck says in his review, "their goal is to create as many as 200,000 jobs over the next five years" (for Syrian refugees). As part of this plan Jordan has already taken steps to attract Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund in order to develop a sustainable economy in which Syrians can play a part (Luck, 2016).

Lebanon

The situation in Lebanon is similar to that in Jordan; there are over 1.8 million Syrian refugees with 1.01 million registered. This is more than one-third of the local population of approximately 4.3 million, in a country that already hosts nearly 400,000 Palestinian refugees. Riad Salameh, The Governor of Banque Du Liban,the central bank of Lebanon, says that the substantial number of Syrian refugees costs the Lebanese economy $4.5 billion per year, based on a study by the World Bank[8] (Calì *et al*, 2015). Lebanon recorded government debt of 152% of GDP in 2018 equating to $80 billion (Trading-Economics, 2018). This number was just 131% in 2012, the lowest it has ever been, just before the influx of Syrian refugees. The graph below shows the annual increase of the debt to GDP ratio.



Figure 8: Lebanese Government Debt to GDP Ratio. Source: Trading Economics, Lebanese Ministry of Finance.

Referring again to Calì *et al*'s report, Lebanon is currently facing one of the toughest humanitarian, social and economic challenges in its history. The demographic weight of Syrian refugees is leading to competition in the labour market and to social dumping[9]. Furthermore, the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2016 shows that around 71% of Syrians remain below the

[8] World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (2015) 'The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Trade'

[9] Social dumping is a term used to describe the practice of employers using cheaper labor than that usually available, particularly through the unofficial employment of migrant workers to undercut minimum wage structures and employment rights.

poverty line. However, Syrian refugees have also contributed to the Lebanese economy as their demand (for products such as food and housing) alone generated 1.3% growth of GDP in 2014. Moreover, the Syrian refugee crisis has indirectly driven activity in the port of Beirut as the number of received containers increases every year, according to Kamal Hamdan, a Lebanese Economist (Calì *et al*, 2015).

Turkey

In the case of Turkey, the picture initially appears to be no brighter, with Syrian refugees costing the government $6 billion every year (Cetingulec, 2015). In a more recent review by the same author, Turkey had spent $25 billion on Syrian refugees by 2016, based on figures quoted in a speech by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his address to the UN General Assembly's annual meeting (Cetingulec, 2015).

Turkish officials proclaimed that the country has been welcoming Syrian refugees fleeing the brutal civil war in Syria since 2011. In 2014, Syrian refugees were granted free access to public services such as education and health care. This approach of the Turkish government did not envision long-term integration of the Syrian refugees in Turkish society given that nobody in Turkey expected the long duration and severity of the Syrian humanitarian crisis (Asik, 2017a). In the same review, Asik says that Turkey is badly in need of a long-term plan for Syrian refugees, particularly after many countries in the EU closed their borders to refugees, consigning Turkey to the task of handling millions of Syrian refugees.

On the other hand, in a recent review, Erol Yayboke talks optimistically about the fact that thousands of Syrian-owned businesses have already injected hundreds of millions of dollars into the Turkish economy and created tens of thousands of jobs for Syrians and Turks alike (Yayboke, 2017). He says that Syrians in Turkey are generally not considered a burden or a security risk; "*they are consumers, producers, investors and people who want to get back to contributing…*". At the same time, Syrians in Turkey are still considered 'guests'. Despite the contribution of Syrians to the Turkish economy, Asik says that "*Syrians no longer feel as welcome as they did when the Turkish border first opened to give them a safe harbor. But with the right policies, the spirit of hospitality that reigned in those early days can result in a better economic future for all involved*". (Asik, 2017a)

In another recent review by Asik, '*Can Syrian refugees become a boon to Turkey's economy?*' she explains that there are different sectors where Syrians could be employed to support the local economy such as the manufacturing sector and agriculture, in the latter case particularly given that Turkey is currently an importer of an array of agricultural products (Asik, 2017b). With around 3 million Syrians residing in Turkey today, approximately 1.8 million of working age, Turkey could consider different steps to empower the local labor force of Syrians and at the same time, provide them with a dignified life and livelihood.

Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are bearing the global responsibility of accommodating the Syrian refugees. As a result, they are facing tremendous fiscal and budgetary pressures (Malkawi, 2016), and in some statements, partially exaggerating the negative impacts of refugees to gain more support and funds from aid agencies and donor countries.

1.6 Chapter Conclusion - The Need for a Different Vision

Mass migration by asylum seekers and refugee migrants is invariably seen as a short-term "problem" that will consume resources and generally have a negative impact on the hosting communities. This is caused in large part by the dominant 'temporary' vision and charity and containment paradigm implemented towards management of refugees. Rather there needs to be a shift in this way of thinking and a move towards sustainable long-term solutions —particularly for developing countries— to replace the existing dominant and inadequate 'temporary' model which is currently failing both refugees and host communities (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016).

What if hosting governments, particularly in developing countries, considered refugees, in addition to vulnerable human beings in need of asylum, as an additional work-force with varied skills and professions that could boost specific sectors of the economy, instead of seeing refugees as a burden or a source of disorder?

A Syrian refugee teacher at Zaatari camp stated that what refugees are looking for, once they have settled, is an opportunity to feel productive and useful again. Refugees like to be busy and to do the same things they used to do in their home country, prior to the conflict (Alakra'a, 2015).

Most refugees are skilled people who used to run businesses and have professions. They have varied levels of education and often spectacular qualifications and talents. They have a wide history and a rich culture and mostly, have come from a life with full dignity and freedom, where they felt belonging and had autonomy over their lives (Al-Shahma, 2015).

In other words, refugees have to be seen differently, as they were prior to the war; as educated people, as students, as doctors, engineers, construction workers, farmers, carpenters, bakers, bankers, hairdressers, etc. Refugees have to be seen as skilled humans with unique stories and backgrounds, not as numbers. Today, hosting governments could see every refugee as a skilled worker and the refugee groups as skilled work forces that can boost economies and change countries' situations. Host governments could actually think of refugees as an opportunity and help them find the right place and conditions where they can work, perform at their best and realize their potential until they are able to be safely repatriated. This obviously has to be done with the consent and agreement of the refugees, ensuring labor rights and good employment conditions.

Having this perspective in mind might provide a real shift and change in the way governments consider refugee movements and perhaps lead to a more sustainable perspective (i.e. ISS) where *settlements can be built according to specific contexts and locations in order to support local agricultural production or industries.*

The following chapter presents and reviews the literature on how to respond sustainably to refugee crises and mass influxes of refugees in the long term, and specifically focuses on refugees living in camps and the different models of response.

Chapter 02

Could Refugee Camps Be Designed Differently?

This chapter highlights and analyzes different forms, models and standards of refugee camps which have been designed and adopted since 1977 in order to provide a summary of the historical development of thinking in refugee camp planning, design, management and development and a review of experiences of implementing these plans and designs. This also provides a background for the analysis of the four camps presented in chapters 03 and 04 and for assessment of the viability of our proposal for *Integrated Sustainable Settlements* (ISS), presented in chapter 05.

The range of approaches detailed in this chapter are presented in chronological order and include different refugee camp plans, typologies, points of view, technical reports, drawings, site plans and concepts. The review of humanitarian guidelines starts with the book '*Refugee Camps and Camp Planning: The State of the Art*' (Intertect 1977) and ends with the contemporary standards and guidelines based on the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, the main source of guidance used today to plan refugee camps.

The second section of this chapter presents a summary table of key features and lessons learned from each of the humanitarian guidelines and handbooks. The third section expands upon these findings by examining academic literature which suggests improvements for refugee camp design and addresses some of the wider issues relating to participation, integration and governance raised in Chapter 1.

2.1 A Review of Humanitarian Guidelines for Refugee Camp Models

A variety of humanitarian handbooks and guidelines were selected for review, focusing on key models of refugee camps, based on designs that are or have been widely used or which offer practical solutions to problems faced when building a new camp, such as camp growth and local terrain. Even though there is currently a dominant refugee camp planning model in the humanitarian field (the UNHCR guidelines, included in this chronological review) there have been many different interventions, proposals, designs and ideas advanced and implemented over the years, many with an architectural and urban planning identity, by a variety of humanitarian NGOs and agencies. Many of these key ideas have been proposed and implemented within the last fifty years and make interesting points of comparison with the UNHCR model.

2.1.1 Intertect (1977)

Based on the review by Frederick C. Cuny, in 1971, a group of engineers and planners formed a team called Intertect to undertake a detailed study and analysis of different refugee camps, analyzing how they operated in order to assess whether alternative designs could be more cost-effective. They also examined social issues and health problems, economic constraints faced by humanitarian organizations and local governments and reviewed the camp management, administration and organization of each camp. In the research program the Intertect team relied heavily on the personal experience not only of their own team but also of the field staff of the various governments and relief agencies involved (Cuny, 1977).

International refugee camps of Bengalese refugees in India 1971

Bengalese camps in India were the first type which the Intertect study covered. The study recognized three distinct classes of camps, identified by the degree of pre-planning and the stage of crisis in which it was built. The three classes are as follows:

- ***Phase I:*** *A camp which is often used as a processing center, located near a railroad or a major highway. Due to the expansion of its population and its temporary status, living conditions in the Phase I camp are the worst of the various types.*
- ***Phase II:*** *Phase II camps are those set up with limited planning and designed to be semi-permanent. These camps are usually in much better physical shape than Phase I camps since authorities have time both to realize the magnitude of the refugee problem and to learn from the initial mistakes of Phase I camps.*
- ***Phase III:*** *A Phase III camp is a permanent camp built from the outset as a refugee camp; it is designed to maximize control and administration, reduce overall costs and facilitate the delivery of relief services. The principal characteristics are an advanced and comprehensive master plan for the camp, developed before the refugees begin occupying the site. The critical elements to success in the development of Phase III were: resources for balanced delivery of services, adequate drainage, shelter and sanitation planning integrated early on in the development stage* (Cuny, 1977 p. 126-127).

The review states several important lessons learned from the study of camps in India.

1) Successful operation of a camp is directly related to the layout of the camp. Camps which were disorganized or unplanned in their layout were more costly and harder to manage than similar or larger camps which were laid out in an orderly scheme.

2) Camps continue to grow after establishment and become more like towns or small cities, which brings problems. Thus, it is important to develop plans for refugee camps with the same detail as a master plan for a town.

3) All components and systems of a refugee camp as well as the plan itself, must be installed before the refugees occupy the site (Cuny, 1977 p. 126-127).

Coyotepe Camp

In 1972, Intertect studied a number of refugee camps, following natural disasters in various countries in Africa and the Middle East, and a further case study in Nicaragua. During this period, Intertect began to develop a series of standard camp plans which could be widely used. One of these was from Coyotepe in Nicaragua. The selected plan for the camp was called a *modified cross-axis plan*. It consisted of a series of small communities of 10-16 housing units, grouped around an administrative core (administration units, clinics, storage facilities etc.).



Figure 9: The early stages of Coyotepe Camp in Nicaragua 1972. Source: Cuny 1977

This camp layout had different advantages. Every community was designed to provide private space for each shelter unit as well as a large common area for community use. The staff of OXFAM and the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR) provided assistance to refugees for registration, social services and community organization, including organizing a camp newspaper. In addition, refugees were included in all plans of the construction program and to a limited extent, assisted in developing modifications to the *cross-axis plan*.

Cuny compares Coyotepe camp to another two refugee camps of the same size built by the US Army in other locations, using a grid layout with no pre-planning or progression of development. The differences between their camps and Coyotepe were significant even though refugees in both areas were all from the same socio-economic background, held the same level of skills, and received the same general social services, housing units, latrines and water supply. For example;

- *Coyotepe cost 37% less to operate*
- *There were no major health problems in Coyotepe. The Army camps' inhabitants were plagued with skin infections, various waterborne diseases and other minor ailments.*
- *A strong refugee council evolved at Coyotepe and informal organization abounded. At Army camps, participation was weak and volunteers working there reported prevalence of extreme apathy amongst refugees.*
- *Coyotepe was a relatively happy and industrious camp (cottage industries, children's playgrounds, women working together on household chores), while the Army had to forcibly segregate one segment of their camps to keep order as thefts were prevalent.*

As a result of an examination of data collected, it was concluded that the layout and organization of the camp as well as the active participation and inclusion of refugees in camp development and management facilitated community organization, promoted a feeling of group security, reduced the incidence of disease and reduced the level of administration necessary to operate the camp. This also enabled refugees to recover faster and look after their own welfare sooner. Cuny argues this implies that flexible, pre-planned layouts are necessary from the outset to provide a framework (Cuny, 1977 p. 129).

Mirpur Redevelopment Project

Another type of camp which Intertect worked on was '*Redevelopment program camps*'. These camps attempt to tackle and transform the worst aspects of Phase I or II camps, i.e. limited or no pre-planning. In order to make a physical change, planners must redesign the existing camp. With proper planning, redevelopment programs can be successful, according to Cuny. A case study which Intertect worked on was the redevelopment project of the worst area of Mirpur camp, opened in Dacca, Bangladesh in 1971. The one-acre plot had 108 families residing in 56 makeshift houses with dozens of open latrines around the edge of the pond which resulted in enormous health hazards within just three years.



Figure 10: Mirpur redevelopment project (Bangladesh 1975). Source: Cuny 1977

Under the auspices of OXFAM, a demonstration redevelopment plan proposal was prepared by Intertect (**Fig. 10**), in which all the agencies were able to participate. Based on this project, Cuny argues, to initiate the redevelopment of a refugee camp, a detailed master plan should be prepared. Integrated into the planning process are social objectives, determination of administrative structures, and an economic and cost profile. Intertect recommended that the new camp should be self-contained with a high percentage of development work carried out by inhabitant refugees themselves. Moreover, an investigation should be conducted to determine if suitable programs or items are available which can assist in making the camp partially self-sufficient. Cuny suggests such programs would include agriculture/garden projects, cottage industries, etc., similar to what was implemented at Mirpur, creating opportunities for refugees and enabling them to help to support themselves (Cuny, 1977 p. 133).

According to Cuny, the project was successful as it provided a strong argument for the integration of social, health and physical programs in an existing camp by using integrated re-development programs and planning new typologies of community units.

Use of Standard Layouts

Standard camp plans are classified according to the limiting factors in each refugee situation and context. Referring to Cuny, the major limiting factor to determine the layout is either the terrain or the type of housing. Thus, the three classifications of camps are 1) open camps which require a large, flat and open area; 2) terrain-dedicated camps which offer the only viable plan in a particular site; and 3) integrated site-housing camps whose layouts must conform to the type of shelter units being used.

One of the main goals of Intertect was to develop different standard layouts of refugee settlements based on the different models of response outlined above. These standard layouts helped to facilitate and speed up construction, as well as to integrate the objectives/lessons mentioned previously (Cuny, 1977 p. 137).

1. Community Unit Camps: This classification consists of camps whose layouts utilize a small cluster or community of units as the primary planning component. The area must be relatively flat with only enough slope to adequately drain the site in a heavy rain. Among the developed plans are the cross-axis, modified cross-axis and a third camp type designed by Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU)/Intertect (Cuny, 1977 p. 138).



Figure 11: Cross-Axis Plan. Source: Cuny 1977

> "The *cross-axis camp* (**Fig. 11** above) *takes its name from the design of the principal planning units, which make up the whole camp. The idea consists of grouping four housing units into one planning unit, creating a "+"-shaped grouping wherein one axis serves as a road and the other as a footpath. The groups are located around a central activity, creating a closed system with decentralized points for providing services. At each development stage, additional units can be added as necessary without conflicting with the initial planning principles.*"

Cuny explains the most outstanding feature of this plan is the way open space can be provided without substantially increasing the density of the living plan—a small plot of open space remains at the centre of each adjoining cluster (group). Another advantage is the expansion flexibility. It can be carried out in a uniform pattern of growth with retention of balanced installation of site improvements, as well as the provision of various areas which can be used for decentralization of services (Cuny, 1977 p. 140).

The second type of community unit camps is the *modified cross-axis plan* (**Fig. 12**-left below). It utilizes the same general site plan as the standard cross-axis, namely the road and pathway systems, but diverges in two key aspects; individual/two-family housing and units arranged to form small communities with a central common area for cooking, washing etc. This arrangement proved to be the best possible balance of land use and density. It is especially useful for planning of tented camps and provides the highest level of safety. In fact, this type was constructed in Nicaragua in 1973 (see **Fig. 9**) using only a hand-held compass and 1,000m of string (Cuny, 1977 p. 140).

The third type is *CMU community unit plan* (**Fig. 12**-right). It was developed by CMU team for use in Bihari camp in Bangladesh. The main design elements are the long "U"-shaped areas, forming community units of large multifamily shelters. The plan takes advantage of local winds for cooling and still provides protection from extreme winds, while providing ample open space.



Figure 12: Modified Cross-Axis Plan (left) and CMU Plan (right). Source: Cuny 1977

<u>*2. Terrain-dictated camps:*</u> The second classification of camp designs consists of three types; the *Circular Camp Plan* or *Eaton*, *Linear Camp* and the *Triangular* plan. Cuny explains that these are not the best designs but, given topographical constraints, are the most balanced.

The circular camp (**Fig. 13**) is designed for use in hilly or mountainous terrains. Cuny describes that, if necessary, repetitions of the circular plan can be built in close proximity as a group to form one

major camp (5-village satellite camps). Each village is built and operated separately, while all five are co-ordinated by a central administrative complex. The modular satellite village can be developed on its own or in any number up to seven, without losing the design features (Cuny, 1977 p. 141).

The advantages of this concept are: the ability of planning members to control development; the circular plan is easy to adapt to terrain; it permits the retention of interior lands that can be used to develop resources which contribute to the camp's maintenance; it allows the installation of the road, drainage and sanitation systems to follow logical terrain features; the concept of a regional camp with clusters permits the integration of various groups of refugees into a single camp; in such camp it is possible to establish villages for groups, such as people from the same origin, and/or religion/ethnicity/background.



Figure 13: Eaton/Circular Camp Plan. Source: Cuny 1977

The second type of terrain-dictated camps is the *linear* plan (**Fig. 14**-left below). These are camps which—due to flooding, standing water or restrictive land uses— must be built adjacent to roads or on a long, narrow rectangular site. The third type is the *triangular* plan (**Fig. 14**-right). It is designed for use on a peninsula or on irregular plots in urban areas (Cuny, 1977 p. 142).



Figure 14: Linear Plan (left) and Triangular Plan (right). Source: Cuny 1977

3. *Integrated site-housing plans*: Referring to Cuny, in the early 1970s, *there were many breakthroughs in the field of low-cost housing for use in refugee camps. In many camps, the design of housing units will determine the camp plan; thus the term "integrated-site housing" applies to any plan which is influenced by the design of housing units*. **Figure 15** below presents one of the most adaptable designs; it utilizes a completely standard building unit for all the buildings in the camp, both shelters and administrative structures. Cuny notes, however, *that this type of construction is more costly as units must be built of permanent materials (wood, metal sheets, concrete etc.), whilst the main advantage is that a high density can be achieved and yet adequate open space can be retained* (Cuny, 1977 p. 142).



Figure 15: Integrated Site-Housing Plan. Source: Cuny 1977

Cuny summarizes that the above designs outlined by Intertect (since 1977), can be used to guide refugee camp planners and provide them with alternatives to the existing humanitarian plans/models, keeping in mind that each refugee situation needs a particular design and planning work, and no pre-set plan can be made to fit each case. He argues that "***a refugee camp is essentially a town and must be planned and constructed under the same design criteria but with greater consideration for the occupants***". He concludes that a decent environment can be built for refugees if planners use their imaginations, follow a balanced plan, integrate services properly and maximize the use of every available material. "***If the camp planner does his job well, many former refugee facilities can be converted to other uses by the host country once they have ceased to house refugees"*** (Cuny, 1977 p. 142).

2.1.2 University of Cambridge Shelter Project (UCSP) and Oxfam: Transitional Settlement Displaced Populations (2005)

This book was published for co-ordinators and specialists working in the humanitarian field who are concerned with the transitional settlement needs of refugees and their hosts. It gives a broad overview of the issues relating to transitional settlements and six settlement options available for housing displaced populations. It also offers technical information as reference for the implementation of transitional settlement options (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005).



Figure 16: Six transitional settlement options. Source: (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005 p. 9)

The main approach to the transitional settlement of displaced populations in this book is based on a holistic interpretation of the need for 'shelter'. The authors argue that the provision of well-planned settlement solutions for refugees is crucially important. They add that bad planning of refugee settlements can have a number of negative effects, in the worst cases destabilizing whole countries or even entire regions, as has happened in Africa, (Dadab camp in 1992 for example). On the contrary, well-planned settlements can have a positive impact which extends beyond the provision of basic shelter (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005 p. 7).

Even though this book provides a wide range of important technical information on transitional settlements in regards to refugee camp planning, it still has one major issue: it follows all of the standards and guidelines of UNHCR and Sphere handbooks which, as we have argued and will show in further analysis, are restrictive planning tools which do not allow for natural progression of settlements and interfere with many aspects of refugee well-being. The book does, however, provide a slight improvement in regards to the layout options for camp communities seen in the *hollow square planning* option (**Fig. 17** right). If this were planned from the micro to the macro scales, it might create the possibility of improvement upon the UNHCR grid camps by offering a more community-oriented approach.



Figure 17: Community planning layouts. Source: (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005 p. 381-391).

Another important point of divergence from the UNHCR/Sphere model in the book is provided by the suggestion of a different approach in regards to planning strategies of communities and shelter units. The proposed approach is "*cluster planning*" which respects and follows the topography lines when camps are built on hills or gullies (**Fig. 18**).



Figure 18: Advantages of cluster planning over grid planning. Source: (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005 p. 384).

Cluster planning is also preferable to grid planning because it can have the following effects:

- Reinforcing viable social communities by creating 'private' areas;
- Encouraging communally shared activities and practices, from water collection to cooking;
- Supporting social hierarchy which can improve the acceptance of extension programs and the representation of the needs of the displaced population through committees. (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005 p. 384)

2.1.3 International Rescue Committee (2005)

The shelter manual handbook of the IRC provides an essential settlement approach to site design based on best practices of humanitarian experts. The following factors summarize this approach;

- Envision the camp as a small town and not a penal or military institution (echoing Cuny's argument)
- Assign symbolic centers such as areas for religious institutions, schools, gardens and markets
- Use clusters of houses as basic organizational units and avoid long, repetitive stretches or rows of housing
- Allow room for expansion as the settlement grows by migration and birth, about 3% to 4% annually
- Allow room for expansion for the housing unit as it grows to include additions or gardens (Dublin, 2005 p. 8)

Lisa Dublin in the IRC Manual raises important questions which planners should ask in advance at the early stages of the planning and site design work in order to create suitable settlements both for refugees and for host communities. These questions can be applied to the refugee groups and their hometowns, as well as to the hosting community and its towns and villages;

- *What do the local villages look like?*
- *How are houses and streets planned?*
- *Do people value visual/aural privacy?*
- *What is the climate like —do people spend most of their time outside or inside?*
- *Where do people gather? Are courtyards, plazas, streets or sidewalks important public gathering places?*

- *What institutions are central to the culture? Are there outdoor/indoor markets, religious institutions, schools, sporting venues?*
- *What are the special needs of children? What sorts of schools, care and play areas would they need?*
- *Is gardening an important activity? Can individual or communal gardens be provided?* (Dublin, 2005 p. 13)

The following site plan was developed for one sector of a refugee settlement in West Africa, where the population spends much more of their time outside. Surrounded by individual shelters, a central courtyard is the main space where people gather to work, play and socialize. Latrines are located at the back of each shelter unit, while bathing and laundry facilities are located centrally to all sectors. Tree lines maintain the privacy of shelters from the surrounding main roads.



Figure 19: Site plan for a typical IRC block. Source: IRC Shelter Manual Handbook p. 13

2.1.4 UNHCR Handbook (2007-3rd edition) & The Sphere Project (2011)

Over the previous century, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has been a leading partner in the humanitarian field, responding to mass refugee movements, providing aid and services and opening most refugee camps in different parts of the world through coordination with host governments. The UNHCR and Sphere handbooks have the same dominant camp model. It can be illustrated as follows;

Camp module = 4 Sectors = 16 Blocks = 256 Communities = 4096 Families = 20,000 people 20,000 people x 45 m²/refugee = 900,000 m² = 9 Hectares (a site measuring 750 m x 1200 m).



Figure 20: From family scale to a camp module. Information Source: (UNHCR H. , 2007, p. 216). Diagram produced by author.

In both handbooks, the assumed area granted to each refugee in planning a refugee camp, irrespective of age or gender, is a space of 45m², including kitchen area and vegetable gardening space. From one refugee to a family of 4-6 persons, every 16 families form a community of 80 persons, and every 16 communities form 1 block of 1,250 persons. Every 4 blocks form a sector of 5,000 persons and every 4 sectors form 1 complete camp module.

As outlined previously, a refugee camp is a form of temporary settlement created through a collaborative process between humanitarian organizations/NGOs, host governments, donors and refugees themselves. In the case of both spontaneous refugee camps and planned refugee camps, for UNHCR there are major principles of response followed by steps of actions for each case:

- *In addition to meeting the immediate needs,* ***planning should take into consideration the long-term provision of services, even if the situation is expected to be temporary.***
- ***Avoidance of high population density congestion in settlements and accommodation;***
- ***Avoidance of very large settlements;*** *refugee camps should normally be considered as* ***the last option*** *(*large camps of over 20,000 people should generally be avoided)
- ***Involvement of refugees in all phases of settlement layout and shelter design and construction***
- ***Use of a bottom-up planning approach, beginning with the smallest social units,*** *preserving traditional social arrangements and structures as far as possible.*
- *Development of a comprehensive master-plan with spatial layout* ***based on open community forms and location of community services such as water points, latrines, showers, clothing washing facilities and garbage collection points in order to promote ownership and maintenance of the services.*** (UNHCR H. , 2007, p. 206)

For UNHCR, all forms of refugee camps are provided with facilities and infrastructure services which vary in scale of usage, ranging from use by one family unit to services which are used by the complete camp module:

- ***1 latrine per family (6-10 persons)***
- ***1 water and 2 refuse drums per community (80-100 persons)***
- ***1 school per sector (5,000 persons)***
- ***1 health centre per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***distribution points of food per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 market per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 feeding centre per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 referral hospital per 10 sites (200,000 persons),*** (UNHCR H. , 2007, p. 215)

In the two handbooks there are also a set of valuable recommendations regarding *water supply, size of campsites, land use and land rights, topography, drainage and soil conditions, vegetation, accessibility, climatic conditions, local health* and other risks (UNHCR H., 2007, p. 206). But what about refugees themselves?

Kennedy reflects on the space allocated to each refugee according to these two handbooks and the consequences of this planning approach in his review by saying,

> *"Faced with the challenges of designing a refugee camp, most professionals turn to UNHCR's Handbook for Emergencies and/or Sphere's Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. It is often the case that within a year or two the camp is already overcrowded, denying both dignity to its inhabitants and space to pursue livelihoods. This is not usually the result of unexpected additional influxes of displaced people but a consequence of flaws within the guidelines themselves."* (Kennedy, 2014, p. 46)

The UNHCR and Sphere principles are very well defined and documented in the handbooks for refugee emergencies, however, in addition to their limitations, highlighted throughout this thesis is the question of **how are they actually used in the refugee camp planning processes?** (This question will be addressed in Chapter 03 of this thesis in relation to the case-studies under consideration).

Moreover, the standards and guidelines of UNHCR/Sphere on refugee camp planning are very basic and standardized resulting in the one-size-fits-all dominant 'grid' camp, with no design approach for refugee settlements based on either the camp location or cultural background and needs for the camp's future inhabitants—refugees. These factors were the main points in Cuny's approach to designing camps and his recommendations drawn from the Coyotepe Camp experience. UNHCR's approach by contrast is more similar to the grid approach of US Army camps.

Given that the word '**culture**' is mentioned only once in the planning section of the UNHCR handbook (p.210), it is clear that a very important parameter is missing. It is crucial to realize that every refugee situation is a sensitive and unique case which relates to the background and culture of the refugees, their previous society, the level of urbanization that they have come from, their day-to-day lives and basic needs and lastly and most importantly, their desires and expectations.

2.1.5 IFRC (2013)

The book of the International Federation Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) is an important reference resource for approaching shelter design and understanding the transitional process of shelter units over time. It is also useful in terms of detailing the different shelter typologies and terminologies, from emergency tents to permanent housing. The book contains the findings of technical reviews of ten shelter ideas. It argues that *shelter is more than a design*; it explains that every context is different, thus shelter ideas in the book must be adapted based on the context's factors as well as the refugees/IDPs' needs.

Moreover, the book argues that sheltering is a process, not a product, and therefore defines five shelter terminologies/types explaining the overlapping areas between types and showing their chronological order as a timeline.

- Emergency shelter: Short-term shelters that provide lifesaving support. It can be provided immediately after the disaster (natural or man-made)
- Temporary shelter: Household shelters designed as rapid shelter solutions. By prioritizing speed of response and construction costs, the lifetime of this type may be limited.
- Transitional shelter: Rapid, post-disaster household shelters made from materials that can be upgraded or re-used in more permanent structures, or can be relocated from temporary sites to permanent locations.

- Progressive shelter: Planned and designed to be later upgraded to a more permanent status.
- Core shelters: Planned and designed as permanent dwellings, to be part of future permanent housing, allowing and facilitating the future process of extension by the household, following its own means and resources. The aim of this type is to create structures with one or two rooms, providing a safe shelter that reaches permanent housing standards. It also aims to facilitate future development (IFRC, 2013 p. 8).



Figure 21: Illustration of overlaps between some of the different shelter terminologies in use. Source: IFRC 2013 p. 9

In regards to which terminology to use, the decision is a mixture of contextual factors such as the level of permanence expected, the materials used, the site on which they are built and local political considerations.

This manual gives a long-term perspective on shelter design, keeping in mind that sheltering is a transitional process which has to be developed over time. This idea raises the question of using sustainable permanent housing at some point instead of sticking to the temporary shelter unit model which inhibits improvement of living conditions and quality of life of inhabitant refugees.

2.2 Summary: Key Features and Lessons

The summary table below lists the key features and lessons learnt from analysis and review of each of the humanitarian handbooks and guidelines discussed in the previous section. The table highlights a diverse range of camp layouts and designs as well as numerous factors that should be considered when designing and opening a refugee camp or settlement.

Camp Model/Project	Key features & Typologies	Lessons Learnt & Notes
Intertect - The study of International refugee camps of Bengalese refugees in India 1971	Phase I - a processing centre Phase II - camps with limited planning, designed to be semi-permanent Phase III - a permanent camp built from the outset as a refugee camp	-Successful operation of a camp is directly related to the layout of the camp. -Disorganized camps were more expensive and difficult to manage than similar sized or larger camps which were well organized. -Camps' growth after establishment brings potential problems, which is why it is important to develop plans ahead of time. -All components and systems of a refugee camp, as well as the plan itself, should be installed before the refugees occupy the site.
Intertect - Modified cross axis plan (i.e. Coyotepe) 	-Small communities of 10-16 housing units, grouped around an administrative/service core. -Every community was designed to provide private space for each shelter unit as well as a large common area for community use. -Refugees were included in all plans of the construction program and to a limited extent, assisted in developing modifications to the cross-axis plan.	Comparing Coyotepe camp to another two refugee camps of the same size built by the US Army (in similar areas with similar backgrounds of refugees), using a grid layout (like UNHCR's) with no pre-planning or plans for growth, they found: -Coyotepe cost 37% less to operate -There were no major health problems in Coyotepe, whereas the other camps had many -A strong refugee council evolved at Coyotepe; at Army camps, participation was weak and volunteers reported extreme apathy -Coyotepe was a relatively happy and industrious camp, while the Army had to forcibly segregate one segment of their camp to keep order.
Intertect - Mirpur Redevelopment Project 	108 families residing in 56 makeshift houses with dozens of open latrines around the edge of a pond.	-A detailed master plan should be prepared which incorporates social objectives, administrative structure, and an economic and cost profile. -The new camp should be self-sufficient with a high percentage of development work carried out by inhabitant refugees themselves. -Suitable programs such as agriculture/garden project, cottage industries, etc. can create opportunities for refugees and help them support themselves and thus, can assist in making the camp

		semi-self-supporting.
1977: Intertect - Cross-axis plan 	Camp whose layouts utilize a small cluster or community of units as the primary planning component. Flat area with enough slope to adequately drain the site in heavy rains. Grouping four housing units into one planning unit, creating a "+"-shaped grouping wherein one axis serves as a road and the other as a footpath. Groups are located around a central activity space.	-Open space can be provided without substantially increasing the density of the living plan—a small plot of open space remains at the centre of each adjoining cluster (group) Expansion can be carried out in a uniform pattern of growth with retention of balanced installation of site improvements, as well as the provision of various areas which can be used for decentralization of services .
Intertect - Modified Cross-axis plan 	Individual/two-family housing and units arranged to form small communities with a central common area for cooking, washing etc.	-This arrangement has proved to be the best possible balance of land use and density. It is especially useful for housing in tented camps, and provides the highest level of safety. -Easy to construct
Intertect - CMU Community Plan 	The main design elements are the long "U"-shaped areas, forming community units of large multifamily shelters.	The plan takes advantage of local winds for cooling and still provides protection from extreme winds, while providing ample open space.
Intertect - Eaton/Circular Camp Plan 	Designed for use in hilly or mountainous terrains. Repetitions of the circular plan can be built in close proximity as a group to form one major camp (5-7 village satellite camps) while all villages are co-ordinated by a central	The ability of authorities to control development; the circular plan is easy to adapt to terrain; it permits the retention of interior land that can be used to develop resources which contribute to the camp's maintenance; -It allows the installation of road, drainage and sanitation systems to follow logical terrain features;

	administrative complex.	-The concept of a regional camp with clusters permits the integration of various groups of refugees into a single camp; -In such camps it is possible to establish villages for groups, such as people from the same origin, and/or religions/ethnicity/background.
Intertect - Linear Plan 	Terrain-dictated camp	Due to flooding, standing water or restrictive land uses— this camp must be built adjacent to roads or on a long, narrow rectangular site.
Intertect - Triangular Plan 	Terrain-dictated camp	It is designed for use on a peninsula or on irregular plots in urban areas
Intertect - Integrated Site-Housing Plan 	Low-cost housing for use in refugee camps. The design of housing will determine the camp plan-influenced by the design of housing units.	-One of the most adaptable designs; it utilizes a completely standard building unit for all the buildings -A high density can be achieved and yet adequate open space can be retained -This type of construction is more costly as units must be built of permanent materials (wood, metal sheets, concrete etc.)
2005: UCSP and OXFAM: Transitional Settlement Displaced Populations 	-Transitional settlement needs of refugees and their hosts. -Six settlement options for displaced populations -Cluster planning vs grid planning	-Pre-planning for stages of growth prevents the negative effects seen from poor planning, such as destabilizing whole countries or even entire regions. -Cluster planning is preferable to grid planning; respects and follows topography lines when camps are built on hills or gullies; reinforces viable social communities by creating 'private' areas; encourages communally shared activities and practices; supports social organization which can improve the acceptance of extension programs and the representation of the needs of the displaced population through committees.

2005: IRC Shelter Manual 	Each community consists of a central courtyard surrounded by individual shelters. The central space is where people gather to work, play and socialize. Latrines are located at the back of each shelter unit, while bathing and laundry facilities are located centrally to all sectors.	-For a sense of community assign symbolic centers such as areas for religious institutions, schools, gardens and markets; -Use clusters of houses as basic organizational units; -Allow room for expansion as the settlement grows by migration and birth, about 3% to 4% annually, also to include an addition or garden.
UNHCR (2007) and Sphere (2011) Handbooks 	-A dominant model of grid camp. 45m² per person and 900,000m² area of a camp for 20,000 people. Managed camps where refugees are dependent on humanitarian aid, support and handouts. Camp module = 4 Sectors = 16 Blocks = 256 Communities = 4096 Families = 20,000 people	-Planning should consider long-term provision of services, even if expected to be temporary; -Avoid high population density; large camps of over 20,000 people should generally be avoided -Involve refugees in all phases of settlement layout and shelter design and construction; -Use a bottom-up planning approach; -Develop a comprehensive master-plan based on community forms, location of community services (water points, latrines, showers, clothes washing facilities and garbage collection points) in order to promote ownership and maintenance to the services.
2013: Post-Disaster Shelter Manual: Ten Designs by IFRC 	-Shelter design -Understanding the transitional process of shelter units over time. -Different shelter typologies and terminologies from emergency tents to permanent housing. -Ten shelter ideas and six shelter terminologies	-Shelter is more than a design; every context is different, thus shelter ideas must be adapted based on the context's factors as well as refugees/IDPs' needs. -Sheltering is a process not a product; it is a transitional process and must use sustainable, permanent housing at some point instead of sticking to the temporary shelter unit model which inhibits improvement of living conditions and quality of life for refugees/IDPs.

The guidelines above include many recommendations of areas and aspects that should be considered when planning a new refugee camp, including developing a master plan before construction begins, using a bottom-up planning approach, considering long-term perspectives and sustainability, as well as involving refugees in order to incorporate their desires for use of space and common areas. However, these lessons have not been fully adopted by UNHCR as we will see

reflected in the analysis of the selected case-studies presented in chapter 03. A framework for incorporation of these ideas into camp planning methods is needed. (The ISS proposal presented in chapter 05 attempts to do this and some of the main advantages of the models and concepts above inform the development ISS).

2.3 Common Themes from Academic Literature for Improving Planning and Design of Refugee Camps and Settlements

Following on from our examination of a range of academic literature on refugee camp planning and design, this section summarizes what is missing from current planning, design and management processes for refugee camps and settlements and discusses how future refugee settlements can be better designed to meet the needs of refugees and other stakeholders, viewed from four different perspectives and areas of intervention: spatial, social, economic and political. These analytical perspectives are also employed to construct the conceptual framework used for analysis of the case study refugee camps in chapters 03 and 04. They are also used for development of our proposal for ISS, presented in chapter 05, both in terms of the structure of the proposal as well as in terms of incorporation of the considerations discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

2.3.1 Physical/Spatial: The Need for Chronological Spatial Planning and Design

One main step that should be taken into consideration by humanitarian agencies in order to build better settlements and to provide better living conditions for refugees is to understand the different phases of development of refugee settlements. It is important to differentiate between the emergency phase, post-emergency and post-post-emergency phases (semi-permanent, permanent etc.). A common mistake which camp managers and host governments continually make is to deal only with progressive phases of refugee camps once they have begun, instead of considering long-term growth and transformation from the outset; this is the direct reason why most camps in the world look chaotic and unorganized. Even if the different phases are not planned, refugees always upgrade these settlements with time, from the micro to macro scale, in order to respond to their needs.

Bektacs suggests that a clear-cut division of time spans between forming both temporary and permanent settlements is needed for proper budget allocation that comprises technology use, design task and material selection (Bektacs, 2015). This would also give refugees a clearer vision about what would come next, after the emergency phase. Otherwise, without clear time spans and phases, refugee settlements can get lost with no identity between 'temporary' and 'transformative' settlements which can, according to Bektacs, result in them transforming into "premature slums".

Better planning to ensure long-term growth and stability of settlements is necessary. In order to provide better initial support, meet the long-term needs of humanitarian crises and improve the quality of life within contemporary refugee settlements, settlements must be able to grow with their inhabitants and support long-term sustainability (Byler et al, 2015). Site plans and environmental planning can limit settlement densities, while efficient provision of infrastructure such as water

points, clinics and facilities for waste disposal can go a long way towards making life more 'sustainable' at higher densities (Black, 1998). If the possibility of growth is considered in the early stages, the settlement can be a sustainable, safe habitat that properly provides for all inhabitants.

The following subsections highlight and discuss some key contemporary ideas on how settlements can be better designed and planned, thus functioning more effectively and becoming more integrated within the surrounding environments.

Camp Location and Identity

The accessibility of a camp to the adjacent communities and services can have a large impact on the refugees residing there. James Kennedy (2004) compares refugee camps to urban areas based on the similarity of spatial nature, interactions with neighboring communities, size and function. He states that refugee settlements are like towns because their evolving existences have a great impact upon the inhabitant refugees and upon a complex, far-reaching network of surrounding towns, provinces and even countries.



Figure 22: Comparing camps to towns. Source: James Kennedy 2004

Kennedy explains that for a normal town, the main road is its lifeblood and its connection to the rest of the world. In regards to establishing a refugee settlement, he suggests that it is an advantage to place the settlement along a main road since this ensures economic connections, as well as facilitating access to information and to meeting other people. Kennedy suggests that even if the analogy between town and camp could not be drawn, there would still be a number of compelling reasons to relocate refugee camps on pre-existing roads and have them run right through the camp, instead of connecting camps with a short access to main roads (Kennedy, 2004 p. 26).

Impacts of Refugee Settlements on Environmental and Ecological Systems

It is beneficial for both hosting communities and the inhabitants of refugee settlements to mesh well with the local environment. Large and densely populated settlements are more likely to have negative impacts on the natural environment than smaller, better planned settlements (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). Battistella and Buonocore argue that for different ecological areas, different solutions must be found based on the available resources and the capacity of the territory to support human settlements. They add that ecological diversity can promote new ways of conceiving refugee settlements, promoting their integration in the surrounding environment (Battistella & Buonocore, 2013).



Fig. 6: Possible design strategies in the short and long term based on site's environmental features.

Figure 23: The process of environmental and ecological camp integration (Battistella & Buonocore, 2013)

Furthermore, they add that refugee camps are continuously transforming and the way they develop raises the question of how to allow and guide this process in a sustainable way. They refer to one of the UNHCR standards; "*Environmental damages caused by unwise camp design leads to loss of natural resources, which eventually turns against refugees' well-being*" (UNHCR, 1996, p. 2)". They suggest that different phases of the refugee settlement growth need to be addressed in different ways, using ecology as a common framework to embrace social and health aspects (**Fig. 23**) (Battistella & Buonocore, 2013). Planning for the natural environment to support the settlement can promote the longevity of the community by taking advantage of natural resources.

Distribution of Public Services and Spaces in Refugee Settlements

When refugee settlements are not designed and/or growth is not considered from the outset, many refugee families who settle in new districts (extensions), find themselves far from the initial public services and facilities, located when the settlement was originally opened. Jim Kennedy argues that those who live towards the edge of a refugee settlement usually feel excluded, having a greater possibility of social instability (Kennedy J., 2005). Conversely, refugee families who live at the edges of residential communities, facing directly onto the spaces of public services, commercial activities, clinics, schools, administrative offices etc., may have privacy issues, as their homes and the surrounding facilities have no transitional space in between. He highlights that even though those families may get some benefit from being close to services and be able to place kiosks or businesses close to these busy areas, they also suffer considerable loss of privacy and security.

He suggests that rather than planning a settlement by placing a series of physical structures onto an empty plan, the planner should start to think of the camp as a hierarchy of different interlocking spaces (shelter units, communities, neighborhoods/districts, public spaces and facilities etc.), keeping in mind that, even if needed, there should not be extreme adjacent contrasts of private and public (Kennedy J., 2005).

2.3.2 Social: Reflection of Design on the Wellbeing of Refugees

Based on the literature review outlined in this chapter (and particularly following the conclusions of Cuny, 1977), refugee settlement design plays an important role in changing and improving the social life of refugees as well as their livelihoods, sense of community, sense of dignity and belonging. It can also directly affect refugees' health and psychological wellbeing, including their resilience, mental health and physical wellness (Byler et al, 2015 p. 123).

Freedom of Movement

Referring to Crisp and Jacobsen, refugees are not always permitted to leave settlements, whether to visit their homeland or to take advantage of wage-earning, trading or farming opportunities in the host country. This clearly has a huge bearing on their quality of life and sense of freedom. Thus, the layout of a camp must facilitate freedom of movement of refugees within and outside the settlement.

Moreover, in regards to camp location, refugees prefer to settle in specific areas where they have some ethnic, linguistic or cultural affinity with the local population. They may also prefer to live close to the border with their country of origin so that they can visit their homes and farms when it is safe to do so, as well as to engage in cross-border trade and generally keep in touch with the situation as it develops in their homeland (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998 p. 28-29). Thus, refugees' desires over settlement location should be considered and guaranteed if possible, in order to maximize the well-being of inhabitants and aid settlement self-sufficiency.

Participation of Refugees

Referring to Byler *et al*, it was found that a community-centric design allows for localized participation and governance in "community" activities, fostering a sense of dignity for long-term residents. This participative model is expected to improve community resilience and alleviate the implicit human right violations informed by the current rigid UNHCR/Sphere standard design/model (Byler *et al*, 2015 p. 127).

Zetter argues that refugees can and should participate in the design and implementation of their own shelter provisions. He says, "Participation of refugees is advocated as one of the most crucial elements in a viable shelter strategy." He also notes that refugee participation in humanitarian-funded upgrade processes of shelter units is an essential element (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p. 33&44). These arguments are also similar to the findings of the Coyotepe example as they further back up the idea of supporting refugees' participation and ensuring they are active agents and not passive recipients.

The Need for Higher Education

Education is a key factor in well-being and community stability. As quoted in Crea and MacFarland, one refugee woman stated, "We do not seek higher education for a job; we seek higher education to fight ignorance." This quote epitomizes the will of refugees to learn and to improve in order to get involved in advocating for their rights and needs. Refugees undertaking higher education often view it as a hope for a better future—a way to give back to their hosting community as well as to their home country when they are able to return (Crea & McFarland, 2015 p. 11).

In general, the desire for work is different for refugees as they are in many cases prohibited from working for a living wage by the host country. The question "why educate refugees if they can't work?" is asked frequently (Crea & McFarland, 2015 p. 11). Referring to Cuny (1977), "all levels of education must be provided within refugee settlements" and refugee students/youth should have the chance to freely practice their desired fields/professions in the asylum country. This right to education and livelihoods is enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and is reflected in the desire of refugees to ensure education for their children and families (Article 26).

Maternal health

Since such a large percentage of the refugee population is usually made up of children (up to 50%), and many families are headed by single mothers, maternal health can play a large factor in the

health of the community as a whole. Indeed, as maternal health is highly correlated with child health and infant mortality, mentally and physically healthy mothers result in healthier children and settlement populations as a whole (Byler et al, 2015 p. 127).

Byler *et al* explain that the two structural design components that could have a great impact on maternal and child health outcomes are the use of semi-permanent, metal housing instead of tents, as well as the resultant built community environment from the camp's "village" layout. They add, "*Child and maternal health can be improved by improving household structural components and altering the standard refugee camp environment to better support a sense of community, identity and dignity*". A supporting argument by Black explains that the review of Tara Rao[10] has shown how better settlement design can reduce or eliminate features that have a negative impact on the situation of women (Black, 1998).

2.3.3 Economic: Refugee Settlements as Productive, Sustainable Communities

The current UNHCR model of physical and economic isolation of refugee settlements from hosting communities creates a burden on host resources and negative outcomes for refugees. Referring to Zetter, evidence suggests that planning for utilization of refugee work forces could turn humanitarian crises into potential boosts for local economies and infrastructure and lead to sustainable new communities.

Preparation for the influx of mass numbers of refugees often focuses on the resultant pressure on land use, housing resources, settlement structures and the expected overall burden of refugee populations on the hosting government. This strategy ignores macro-level camp design considerations for location and economic contribution as well as formation of government policy accounting for refugees' participation in stimulating supply and demand in the national economy (Baker & Zetter, 1995).

The potential strain on the hosting communities can be exacerbated if they already have limited resources or have their own areas of unrest. Despite the potential drawbacks, planning and preparedness can help alleviate challenges. Al-Husban and Adams suggest history provides clues: **many countries, including the USA, were built on the labor of migrant populations;** these migrant populations were some of the most capable people, entrepreneurs **able to contribute to economic development**. They also note that the economies of the **refugees' countries of origin can be further devastated by refugee migration since they lose people providing key skill sets within their communities** (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016).

In the case of Syrian refugees, Al Husban and Adams found that refugees offer new skill sets and new business start-ups at Zaatari camp, which in 2019 hosts more than **3,000 different shops** and businesses. The refugee-based economy is generating an estimated 10 million Jordanian dollars in revenue per month. Additionally, they have found Syrians filling jobs that local Jordanians do not want in the city of Mafraq, adjacent to the camp, such as lower-paid jobs or jobs looked down on by the locals. This employment provides the refugees with a sense of dignity by providing for their families whilst also supporting and boosting the local economy. In fact, in many cases, local communities perceived refugees as better at doing business than Jordanians themselves (Al-Husban

[10] Tara Rao 'An unsettling settlement: the physical planning of refugee settlements: a gender perspective' MA thesis, 1997. School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

& Adams, 2016). Clearly, refugee contributions to the local work force and trade can be a huge benefit.

Future plans for refugee settlements should **consider sustainability by incorporating the local host communities. Plans should include how to support local food production, commerce, and development as well as meeting the needs of the settlement and promoting self-reliance by contributing to the local host community** (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016 p.8). This developmental model would ensure longevity of the community by improving physical and social infrastructure, and environmental sustainability, which are often undermined by short-term and quick-fix responses (Baker & Zetter, 1995).

2.3.4 Political: Temporary vs. Long-Term

84% of the world's refugees are hosted in developing countries and existing instabilities in these areas may be exacerbated when receiving large influxes of refugees. The added numbers of refugee populations are often considered a burden that will consume resources, create social tension and cause disruptions in the local hosting communities and economies.

One of the main issues is that refugees living in camps are expected to be dependent on the humanitarian assistance provided, which is often insufficient for their needs. For instance, refugees —in most cases— do not have the legal right to work or access the labor market, contradicting the UN Declaration of Human Rights—Article 23 "the right to work"; this puts them directly into a desperate economic situation. Many of these refugees try to offer cheap labor, working illegally in nearby urban areas in order to cover some of their needs. This practice often creates competition between refugees and locals, leading to a social conflict that results in the 'unwelcoming attitude' often directed towards refugees. Because of the perception that the refugees' stay will be temporary, their exclusion from the work force can create social and economic tensions in the host communities.

Referring to the review by Zetter in 1995, confronted with large refugee influxes, host governments and humanitarian assistance agencies have usually adopted short term, pragmatic responses such as tented camps (Baker and Zetter, 1995). These 'short-term fixes' have been found still in place even two decades later (2018), with host governments and humanitarian agencies still considering them as refugee camps and temporary settlements. This leads us to the question: how long is it appropriate to consider camps "temporary"?

Even though refugee camps have many disadvantages, they are essential and necessary; they are emergency spaces created that are a physical representation of politics (Howayek, 2014). Howayek explains that refugee camps are uniquely paradoxical settlements: they must be temporary yet allow for growth; they should ensure basic needs of refugees as well as provide security and a sense of belonging in order to encourage residents to invest in the camp, yet refugees should also be encouraged to return back home once it is safe again (Howayek, 2014 p. 27).

In refugee camps, **there is always a conflict between the supply that humanitarian organizations offer and the demand of what refugees consider essential; there is a mismatch between requirements and provided elements** (Bektacs, 2015 p. 13). If the existence of camps is unavoidable, the real challenge, therefore, is how to ensure that camps meet the highest possible standards and provide refugees with optimal living conditions appropriate to the environment where they are founded (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998 p. 27).

The review of Crisp and Jacobsen summarizes that refugee policy in the Global South has been largely driven by the demands of donors and humanitarian organizations. Additionally, they note that where host governments have maintained control of refugee policy, it has benefited both refugee and local populations. They also conclude (as of 1998) that greater efforts must be made to prepare for future refugee influxes, particularly in those regions which are most affected by armed conflict and large-scale population displacements; further efforts to ensure the physical, material and psychological security of refugees in camps should be a priority to host governments, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998 p. 30). In a supporting argument, Zetter says that **refugee assistance can only truly be called developmental if it contributes to building capacity of the host country**, as in most cases, host country institutions need to be strengthened to cope with the unique pressures of refugee influxes (Baker & Zetter, 1995 p. 92).

2.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusions

In general, humanitarian organizations, refugee settlement planners and host governments still tend to think of refugee camps as temporary emergency settlements, even in respect to refugee situations caused by conflicts which can often last for years or even decades. They fail to consider the transitional phases of a settlement and the process of transformation it undergoes over time due to the actions of different stakeholders, particularly the refugees themselves. In fact, the process of transformation of a refugee settlement often begins from the moment refugees start to occupy it. Kilian Kleinschmidt, the former UNHCR Camp Manager of Zaatari camp, says in his TED talk about Syrian refugees in Jordan, *"We were building a camp, they were building a city,"* (Kleinschmidt, 2014).

Based on the outlined analysis of reviews and literature in this chapter, it can be concluded that there is a crucial need to think of refugees and refugee camps differently. Emergency camps should be implemented where needed but should be designed with the understanding that in the post-emergency phase they will be developed to become unique refugee settlements, flourishing refugee communities integrated into the local society and economy. There is thus a need for holistic planning models which can be carefully tailored to meet the specific needs of each refugee situation and host country context. Referring again to Kennedy (2008), the design of refugee settlements and shelter units presents an extreme form of urban architectural practice, supporting the argument of this thesis for considering refugee settlements as a form of integrated sustainable urbanization.

Kennedy argues that the current standards in refugee camp and settlement design take insufficient consideration of the way in which refugees use camps and settlements and of the way in which camps and settlements actually perform. He adds that only a few efforts have focused on the topic of camp and settlement design, while humanitarian organizations have usually adopted short-term solutions.

> *"Despite the large numbers of those who are forced to live in such camps, their vulnerability, and the emergency nature of camps' construction, relatively few texts to date have been focused upon camp design, and the state-of-the-art (camp model) commonly used by humanitarian organisations reveals an emphasis upon short-term rather than long-term solutions, and an emphasis upon camps being a delivered collection of shelter objects, rather than being considered in the light of the social performance of the settlement as a whole"* (Kennedy, 2008 p. 3)

Kennedy also supports the argument of Cuny (1977), saying that many of the standardized guidelines or elements used in the current designs of refugee camps and settlements, have been borrowed or adapted on an *ad hoc* basis from other fields (i.e. army handbooks).

If adequate resources are committed at the outset, and if refugee camps and settlements are properly planned, laid-out and organized, problems can be substantially reduced, and camps can become cost-effective investments (Cuny, 1977). Cuny adds that the total costs of designing and building a liveable refugee settlement are less than the continuing operational costs of a sub-standard one. He further explains that refugee settlements can be run with minimal administrative costs, with the refugees operating most, if not all, of the camp sub-systems. Based on the comparison of Coyotepe and the army camps, Cuny says that well-designed physical layout and planning can save lives and designs which facilitate good sanitation and encourage refugee organization reduce the incidence of disease and promote participation, leading to self-dependence, empowerment and development of skills and resilience.

One of the main lessons is that before planning and opening a refugee camp, it is important to understand the background and culture of the refugees and their previous lives in their country of origin. Not only it is vital 1) to consider the level of urbanization of the home settlements of refugees and their culture but also 2) to consider the geographical context and natural conditions of the location of the camp as fundamental parameters in the camp design, as well as 3) the needs and expectations of refugees. As Manuel Herz[11] mentions in an interview with Christina Ruta of Deutsche Welle (DW) broadcasting, "We have several hundred refugee camps in every part of the world and in every kind of climate zone, but the same plans are used to build the camps," (Ruta, 2012). It would be beneficial to anticipate refugees' needs in the prospective camps in order to ease the transition of their resettlement.

Another review suggests **improving conditions by introducing technology and improving design**. It highlights that over the last ten years, architects have been increasingly concerned with how humanitarian organizations respond to refugee movements, highlighting the need for a different approach (Al-Azhari, 2012). The review also explains the sentimental value of housing as it relates to culture, the foundation for community establishment. Thus, the sense of community should be reflected in the design process of refugee settlements, suggesting that there should be a unique design for every settlement in every part of the world;

> *"Housing is that place for a certain community where it lives and exercises its culture. This community dominates its environment by its cultural forces. The culture in its material aspects is directed towards physical structures and its form; the non-materialistic aspect is directed towards cultural ethics and social values"* (Al-Azhari, 2012 P.27)

They also add that housing in refugee camps has become a ready-made product for an average human who has no opportunity to state her/his opinion or to participate in the design. Whereas when residents get involved in producing a structure for shelter, the structure-human relationship is formed.

> *"Houses are products by people. From refugee camps, we, as architects, could learn a lesson from the relationship between the house as a physical unit and the family as a social unit. This relationship allows them to grow and develop together. The availability of the house helps the family in its life and members of the family help themselves to produce and develop the house (belonging). It is a balance relationship"* (Al-Azhari, 2012 P.44)

[11] Manuel Herz is an architect and author of "From Camp to City"

As Manuel Herz told Ruta (DW), *"The [current] planning is very hierarchical and designed for functionality. Hygiene and security are very important, but what is left out of the equation are aspects of daily life, questions like: 'What do you do to enjoy yourself in the camp?' This purely technical way of looking at refugee camps often turns the people into passive recipients of aid and it makes them unable to live independently." (*Ruta, 2012)

Prior to conflict, the refugees were 'normal people', workers, teachers, students, builders, bakers, farmers etc., people of all age groups from a unique society and a complex community fabric. They come from a society where they used to enjoy their leisure time, to travel and create good memories, to study, search and have ambitions, to have open space such as gardens, beaches and mountains, to enjoy a busy life full of meaningful relationships. Limiting them inside a camp area with 45m^2 space is surely not fair.

The UNHCR and Sphere handbooks are the elite guidelines on which most humanitarian planners count as a main source of knowledge and information in emergencies. Yet they both lack the conception of planning a resilient integrated sustainable settlement, tailored appropriately for different backgrounds, cultures, and site conditions and the fact of long-term conflicts. *This thesis argues that humanitarian organizations, governments and planners must rethink the importance of space, family, culture, livelihoods, social integration and the growth of refugee settlements from a social perspective*. It is important in every settlement design and planning process to create and define crucial components related to leisure and to the commercial, economic, and cultural life of a settlement. Moreover, humanitarian organizations and host governments should both allow refugees to open businesses and generate their own incomes in order to feel free and dignified and later at some point, to be able to resume their previous lives.

Chapter 03

Case-Studies: Syrian Refugee Settlements in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon

This chapter presents analysis of four Syrian refugee camps, both formal and informal camps, built between 2012 and 2014 to accommodate the influxes of Syrian refugee families to three of the countries adjoining Syria. Evaluation of the camps includes the presentation of the evidence and results of in-depth, empirical analysis, with information gained and compiled from site assessments, field evaluations, official data and from hundreds of qualitative interviews. Zaatari and Azraq camps, both located in Jordan, provide the first and second case-studies; Kilis camp, located in Turkey provides the third; and Deir Zanoun, located in Lebanon provides the fourth case-study. Section 3.1 of this chapter details the criteria used for selection of the camps, section 3.2 outlines research methodology and analysis objectives and section 3.3. provides additional contextual information relevant to discussion of the Syrian refugee camps.

The main criteria behind the selection of the four camps was to be able to analyze and compare, **1) how each government from three distinct developing countries reacted to the influxes of Syrian refugees received since 2012; 2) the different types of settlements they provided; 3) how the UNHCR guidelines shaped the development of the camp and how the host government implemented these guidelines; 4) what impact this approach had on the lives of the refugees; and 5) the forms of adaptation which refugees made in each camp in order to improve their living conditions.**

The four camps analyzed present different types of refugee settlements and shelter typologies. These differences are based on the political decisions taken in each host country and therefore present a good range of responses for analysis. This analysis allows us to assess how the current refugee camp planning and management paradigm is implemented and shapes the experience of refugees and host countries. It also provides the framework for development of the proposal for ISS in chapter 05 to improve current thinking and outcomes for refugees and host countries.

The three countries are the largest host countries of Syrian refugees. Additionally, Turkey currently hosts the largest total refugee population in the world, around 4 million refugees. These figures are the official numbers, undoubtedly lower than the actual total refugee populations in each of the three countries.

Following the literature review outlined in Chapter 02 and through examining the different situations of Syrian refugees in each of the three countries in question, reactions to refugee settlements can be categorized into six models of response. These six categories are a result of the interactions and decisions of different agents such as governments, NGOs, UN agencies, local populations, refugees, funding organizations etc. The six models of response were listed earlier in **Figure 03** and can be outlined as follows (**Figure 24**):



Figure 24: Different types of refugee settlements and models of response. (Chamma)

- *Model 1*: where the hosting government does not allow refugees to cross the borders; *i.e. Hadalat and Rukban areas, on the Syrian-Jordanian borders.*
- *Model 2*: where refugees can cross the border but are then left unsupported as the host government is unwilling or unable to build refugee camps/settlements for the hundreds of thousands of unsheltered refugees. This results in scattered refugee settlements dispersed through rural areas and/or surrounding urban areas i.e. the case of Deir Zanoun in Lebanon;
- *Model 3*: where refugee camps are established out of the existing urban areas of the hosting country, in some cases (such as Zaatari Camp) close to main urban areas, or far from them (such as Azraq and Kilis);
- *Model 4:* refugee settlements are built within urban areas or as extensions of existing urban areas; *i.e. Borj El-Barajne refugee camp, located in the suburbs of Beirut, sheltering Palestinians and Syrians.*
- *Model 5:* refugee groups are divided out through all of a city's poor neighborhoods, staying in refugee compounds, i.e. Syrian refugees in Nabaa, Lebanon.
- *Model 6:* where refugees are spread out over various districts of the region/country and resettled within vacant apartments and housing units which they can afford; i.e. Beirut, Amman, Gaziantep

With these models in mind, some of the important aspects that were considered in each case study were:

1. How each government from the three distinct developing countries reacted to the influxes of Syrian refugees received since 2012;

2. The different types of accommodation and/or aid they provided to refugees; what layouts/designs or standards were used in each case;
3. The impact of the selected layouts/standards/shelter designs on the well-being and quality of life of refugees (spatial, social, economic etc.), as well as the location of settlements;
4. The forms of spatial adaptation which refugees made in each case in order to improve their living conditions, social life and economic situation.

The information presented in this chapter relating to these four aspects of analysis highlight the various issues which arise from the dominant UNHCR paradigm of refugee camp planning, and the need for an alternative approach. These aspects also help to shed light on the current state of the camps, and how refugees perceive them, in order to answer the research hypothesis.

This thesis argues that if refugee settlements were designed and planned from the outset as long-term settlements with proper infrastructure, public use buildings, work opportunities and other services, they would be more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and would have a positive impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities. They would also offer long-term benefits to the host communities and countries after the repatriation of the refugees through providing permanent housing or temporary accommodation for local citizens, whilst ensuring the human rights of refugees during their stay in the settlements.

In other words, instead of building temporary isolated camps, hosting governments could actually consider refugee settlements as productive settlements of social housing units close to existing urban areas. In this case, the design and planning process would also incorporate the Economic and Social Housing departments of local and national governments as key stakeholders, in addition to humanitarian organizations and NGOs, as well as the refugees themselves.

3.1 Selection Criteria of Case-Studies

The four selected case-studies present a variety of types of 'temporary' refugee camps and shelter typologies, chosen and built based on the political decisions taken in each of the three countries, and therefore present a good range of responses for analysis. They also highlight many of the problems with the current UNHCR paradigm of refugee camp planning and management.

- **Zaatari and Azraq Camps:** are the main refugee camps in Jordan. The camps were planned and established by UNHCR in 2012 and 2014 respectively, using grid layouts based on the UNHCR guidelines. The distance between the two is around 100 km.

  Zaatari, located in Mafraq governorate was originally opened as a spontaneous emergency camp and its growth was planned in phases to receive new arrivals of refugees, however refugees did not fully respect or agree with the UNHCR grid model and made micro adaptations based on their needs, resulting in the informal look of the camp. This continued until the second camp was opened as an extension to the first. Azraq, located in Zarqa, was planned one year in advance before its opening (Abed-Al, 2015).

  The reasons behind the selection of these two camps for analysis in this doctoral thesis were;

  1) Zaatari and Azraq are currently two of the most recent, largest and most advanced in the world;

2) both camps are considered 'temporary' and were planned and built based on the UNHCR standards and guidelines while Azraq incorporates lessons learned after the establishment of Zaatari;

3) in both camps, the refugee inhabitants have adapted and upgraded their shelter units based on their cultural beliefs and social values; additionally, at Zaatari, refugees were able to create a large market after the opening of the camp; and,

4) both camps already have existing maps, zonal drawings and general infrastructure layouts due to being well-known and well-funded and having received a lot of media attention.

The fieldwork at the two camps lasted for 10 months, from April 2015 to February 2016, consisting of 10 site visits to Zaatari and 3 to Azraq. Most of these visits were carried out while undertaking an internship with UNHCR-Jordan for 6 months from September 2015 to February 2016. Furthermore, establishing connections in the camp and sharing contact information with refugee inhabitants as well as conducting phone/video calls with them every couple of months were crucial in order to remain up-to-date regarding the development and transformation of the camps and to get news from the inhabitants.

- During site visits to Zaatari, around (52) group interviews were conducted and around 250 refugee interviewees were involved as well as (10) humanitarian staff including the Camp Manager from UNHCR.
- At Azraq, (24) group interviews were conducted and around 70 interviewees were involved, (1) national security agent and (2) humanitarian staff from UNHCR.

Qualitative interviews were conducted at the market, inside shops, inside or next to shelter units, at schools and community centers, health centers and hospital; these on-site interviews were then supplemented by numerous recent interviews conducted remotely via phone and video calls. The age and gender of interviewees varied accordingly with the family members in each shelter unit. The interviews included children, elders, school teachers, physicians, police officers, etc.

- **Kilis Oncupinar Camp:** is a pre-planned temporary camp located in Turkey. It was established in 2012 by The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), a government-run institution. It has been selected as a case-study for five different reasons;

  1) it is considered one of the best refugee camps in the world, based on the statements of Turkish officials, humanitarian workers and news articles;

  2) it is a well-known and well-funded Syrian refugee camp in Turkey, (similar to Zaatari and Azraq in Jordan), with a good range of services provided and modern infrastructure, which the Turkish government is very proud of;

  3) the container/trailer shelter typology at Kilis has been expanded vertically in some sectors of the camp to include two story structures;

  4) even though the camp was planned, built and run by the Turkish government, it still followed the grid model and guidelines of UNHCR; and,

5) it is located just next to the Syrian/Turkish border and situated directly on a main transit road, fitting with models and ideas analyzed in the literature review.

Due to the sensitive situation in Turkey and the many restrictions placed by the Turkish government, only (5) interviews were conducted, three in person in November 2016 and two remotely in August and September 2018. The interviews involved (1) camp inhabitant, (1) government official, (1) humanitarian staff member, (1) university professor and (1) Syrian translator who has visited the camp.

- **Deir Zanoun Camp:** is an informal self-settlement camp located in Lebanon, built by Syrian families themselves. Deir Zanoun is a compound of six small informal encampments of Syrian families, located near Deir Zanoun village, Lebanon. The camp name used in this thesis is taken from the village's name, since there is no official name for the settlement. It is one of many informal Syrian encampments, spread all over Bekaa Valley, a province located in Eastern Lebanon, adjacent to the Lebanese-Syrian border. It is also located just next to the current Beirut-Damascus International Road.

  The reasons behind the selection of this camp were;

  1) its location on a main road, fitting with models and ideas analyzed in the literature review (chapter 02);

  2) the size of the camp—it appeared to be a large camp in comparison with other informal encampments in the same region, making it closer in size to the other case-studies whilst also providing an example model of this specific type of informal settlement and;

  3) its identity as a temporary self-built encampment, entirely constructed and run by the Syrian refugees themselves.

  During the site visit in July 2018, (12) collective qualitative interviews were conducted and (95) interviewees were involved in providing information and site assessments, with participation of women, men and children. The sectors at Deir Zanoun were very dense and during interviews refugee families often gathered together.

3.2 Research and Fieldwork Methods

The methods and techniques described below were developed and implemented in order to collect information and materials, to conduct interviews and to carry out site assessments. Based on the information obtained, a comparative analysis between the four case studies was developed. This allows us to advance some conclusions as to how these temporary camps have been transformed and upgraded over time, mainly by refugees, in order to add additional structures and/or permanent elements and to make them more liveable. It also allows us to ascertain whether these changes have been positive or negative for the refugees as well as for the host communities.

The following steps ensured collection of all of the required qualitative and quantitative information and technical materials for analysis and comparison:

1. **Background and contextual information:** Conducting research on each camp in the selected region through background reading of academic articles, online articles and reports.

2. **Historical evolution of each camp:** Researching and consulting existing historical and current maps, layouts and drawings of each camp. Where there were no existing maps, creation of new ones was undertaken through tracing of high-resolution satellite images (from Google Maps, OpenStreetMap, Reliefweb and/or other platforms).

3. **Building local connections:** Contacting relevant humanitarian NGOs, government ministries, universities and academic institutions in each region/country in order to arrange site-visits, site interviews, permits and facilitation of fieldwork.

4. **Preparation of mapping materials:** Developing of interview forms, spatial mapping sheets, AutoCAD maps/drawings and mapping tools.

5. **Visiting case-study camps and gathering of first-hand materials:** After steps 1-4 were completed, visits to each of the three countries where the case-studies are located were arranged to conduct fieldwork. This included planned qualitative interviews with refugee individuals and families, NGO workers and government officials while visiting the region of the case-study refugee camps for a duration of 5-10 days.

6. **Field reports:** Development of a comprehensive field report that includes the day-by-day notes, covering the information collected daily on-site and a summary of results and key points of the site-visit findings, interviews and assessments.

7. **Recruiting local mapping teams:** In the case of personal travel difficulties, the other possibility to map case-studies and conduct interviews was to contact local architects, develop mapping teams and networks and provide the team with specific mapping materials (2D maps, interviews forms, spatial mapping sheets etc.). Following completion of mapping of the camp, field maps/drawings, completed interview forms and mapping sheets, photos, as well as personal opinions and reflections of the team members were collected. This was the case of Deir Zanoun camp where four local architects were prepared, assigned and funded to undertake the site-visit, map the camp, conduct interviews and carry out site assessments in July 2018.

Using the collected information and materials, the next step was to analyze and detail the general context and conditions of each camp, including the natural conditions, population, existing road network(s) and infrastructure, source(s) of water/resources, relations with the host community and nearby urban and rural areas.

Executive Summary of the Analysis Process

Each of the four case studies was analyzed following two scales of analysis, macro and micro, in order to understand the socio-cultural issues, physical-spatial issues and economic situation.

Macro-Scale Analysis

This includes the analysis of existing maps, humanitarian reports and satellite images as well as the materials collected on site in order to identify the general layouts and spatial conditions of each camp including existing infrastructure and public use buildings. This also includes the analysis of the location of these services in comparison with the demographic layout of the camp districts. The key factors of analysis can be detailed as follows;

- Size, camp population and statistics, geographical/environmental context of the camp

- Camp layout and sectors; existing transportation network and access to the camp; planning process and historic evolution (if available)
- Secondary road network within sectors, communities and between shelter units
- Infrastructure networks and public facilities
- Social fabric and interaction within the camps and with the surrounding urban areas and population
- The economic exchanges within the camp and available job opportunities
- Impact of the camp layouts/designs on the wider social context of the host communities
- Forms of adaptation by refugees at macro scale

Micro-Scale Analysis

The micro scale analysis mainly focuses on on-site observations, spatial assessments and qualitative interviews. This was specifically useful at the community level and family/users scale. The data collection work also helps in understanding the differences between informal self-built camps, emergency spontaneous camps and formal planned camps, providing insights into how refugees deal with each model and adapt to different types of camps as well as furthering an understanding of the living conditions and demands of, and on, refugees.

The key points can be detailed as follows;

- Impact of the camp layouts/designs on the camp inhabitants
- The missing services and public facilities
- Aims and needs of camp inhabitants
- Forms of adaptation by refugees at micro scales
- The impact of spatial adaptations on the social fabric and economic situation
- The possibility of reusing the UNHCR temporary camps after repatriation of refugees and what services they would need to become neighborhoods. The concept of 'neighborhood' might be an interesting analytical perspective since the UNHCR containment model lacks different fundamental features such as the concept of community, social organization, decision-making structures, community councils, networks and associations as well as economic areas and job opportunities. This key analytical point would also help building arguments for the ISS proposal in ch 05 and explains how it contrasts with current outdated model.

Objectives of Analysis and Expected Outcomes

The main objectives of the analysis were:

- to provide a critical evaluation of the models of response of the three neighboring host countries to the large influxes of Syrian refugees;

- to understand which aspects of the approaches taken of the three countries work best for refugees and hosting communities
- to highlight how each camp design has integrated, or failed to integrate lessons from the past in refugee camp design, planning, management and development.

This comparative analysis highlights the real needs and views of Syrian refugee inhabitants in each camp. It also shows the impact of the layout of each camp on the well-being of the refugees (three of the four camps under analysis followed UNHCR planning guidelines, Deir Zanoun being the exception). The comparative analysis also covers the aspect of formality vs informality on the living conditions and quality of life of refugees, and it further highlights the problems and shortcomings of the current international humanitarian approach towards refugees and refugee camp planning.

3.3 A Glimpse of Pre-Conflict Syria in 2011

Before presenting the analysis of the four case-studies, this sub-section highlights and discusses the context of Syria prior to the eruption of conflict in 2011. This provides a better understanding of the cultural background, urban settings and social context of the Syrian refugee groups and their hometowns and cities as a point of comparison with the reality they have faced in the refugee camps.

The United Nations' *2017 Revision of World Population Prospects* and the Worldometers review (2018), show that since the eruption of civil war in Syria in 2011, the population of Syria has dropped from 21 million to 18.2 million (estimate, 2018). Moreover, 78.2% of the population today is urban (14.2 million in 2018) with a general population density of 100 people per km², whereas in 2010, the urban population was 57.0% (around 12 million) with a density of 114 per km² (Worldometers, 2018).

According to the World Bank report *Syria Country Brief* (Sept 2010), prior to the conflict, Syria was dependent on the oil and agriculture sectors; the oil sector provided about 40% of export earnings and the agriculture sector contributed about 20% of GDP and 20% of employment (Yamouri, M, 2010). Since then Syria has actually become a net oil importer and oil reserves are expected to decrease in the coming years. Referring to *Growth Lab at The Center for International Development at Harvard University (Atlas 2.2)*, Syria's main exports in 2010 included mineral fuels, oils and waxes (50.13%); vegetables, foodstuffs, dairy products, wood and live animals (22.2%); cotton, textiles and furniture (13.12%); chemicals, soaps, waxes, paints and plastics (8.3%); metals (2.6%); machinery (1.6%) and others (Harvard Growth Lab, 2016).

It is a country with a very rich culture and history and blessed with great antiquities, architecture and heritage sites. The urban fabric in most of the Syrian cities that lived, flourished and developed in the past was still very much alive prior to the conflict, distinguishing itself through its intimacy and density (Fakouch *et al,* 2004). Urban areas are planned and roads wind between residences, narrowing as they shift from public to private areas; private spaces open onto inside courtyards, allowing for a restrained amount of sun to come in, ensuring the right amount of ventilation in hot summers and in villages where lands stretch outwards, houses extend horizontally, instead of vertically as seen in urban areas (Fakouch *et al*, 2004).

The historical urban centres of the main cities Damascus, Aleppo and Bosra are listed as world heritage sites, underscoring the importance of the traditional residential architecture of Syria, which can be seen in **Figure 25**. The urban fabric is in the immediate surroundings of historical monuments,

blending in to create a harmonized conglomeration of culture as explained by Dr. Tammam Fakouch, former Director of the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums of the Syrian Arab Republic. He adds,

> *"other towns and villages also have their own particular and characteristic residential architecture, made by simple people to serve daily needs. These builders and users have exploited the locally available building materials and the construction techniques they inherited from thousands of years of civilization."*

Syrian communities rely heavily on the typology of their homes and the use of space in their towns to create their cultural identity and social fabric. Their cultural identity is rooted in family and friends gathering in public squares based in the centers of town districts. The people socialize while heading to the market or agricultural lands together, or arranging activities for their children. Cultural ceremonies relied on the beautiful public spaces including parks and gardens they incorporated into their towns and cities. Moreover, their homes had dedicated areas built for hosting and entertaining guests, where extended families could meet for religious celebrations. The spatial layout of their environments in Syria is hugely important to their identity and daily life.

In comparison with their current living conditions, different refugee interviewees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have described how beautiful Syria was. They describe their hometowns and cities before the war where they had wide streets, proper infrastructure, free education and healthcare, efficient public services, affordable housing, efficient transportation networks with cheap fares, gardens and parks, numerous busy souks, agricultural lands, job opportunities, a rich culture and heritage and dynamic social interaction with big families in the same area and many friends. They add that they feel saddened by being displaced, living a servile life as refugees and seeing Syrian cities, historical monuments and homes destroyed, while they have lost many family members and friends because of the war.

This gives an overview of the quality of life, the sociocultural context and the living conditions of Syrians prior to the conflict as well as economic, spatial, social and demographic information which paints a picture of pre-conflict Syria which can be kept in mind and provides a backdrop to the following analysis of the four selected refugee camp case-studies.

Figure 25: One of the public squares that has been destroyed in the old city of Aleppo (Before & After). Source: (Walia, 2017)

3.4 Zaatari Refugee Camp, Jordan

Figure 26: Zaatari, the largest Syrian refugee camp in Jordan. Source: Google Earth (2018)

Jordan has been heavily affected by the influx of Syrian refugees since 2012: socially, economically and in regards to infrastructure and public services. According to the Operational Portal of UNHCR, there are around 670,430 registered refugees in Jordan with the majority living in urban areas; Amman, the capital of Jordan, hosts the most with 196,487, followed by Mafraq Governorate with 163,384 then Irbid with 140,246, Zarqa with 97,354 and other governorates hosting between 20,000 and 1,700. The numbers listed for Mafraq and Zarqa include refugees living in camps. The number of registered refugees who live in camps is 126,345, around 18.8% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Ayman Arabeyat, Director of Jordanian Government Media & Press Office, explained during an interview we conducted in April 2015 that the Syrian refugees are a burden on the Jordanian government, economy and society because of the huge number of refugees compared to the total population of about 6.5 million. He gave an example to illustrate the size/magnitude of the issue by saying, "It is like moving all of Canada's citizens to the US, all of them." He also added that the large influx of Syrians has required the opening of different refugee camps across Jordan in order to limit the impact on the demographic density on Jordanian citizens (Arabeyat, 2015).

Arabeyat also pointed out that the government is only responsible for the protection of camps and that they have no responsibility over what happens inside them or over the refugees' needs. The Jordanian government was involved at the beginning of the conflict by ensuring the basic needs of the refugees were met when the first waves of people arrived to Jordan, and until humanitarian organizations arrived to take over responsibility.

3.4.1 The Spatial Conditions of Zaatari

Figure 27: An aerial view of Zaatari's most dense sectors. Dathan, M., & Wilkes, D. (2016)

Zaatari was established in 2012 as an emergency camp to host the influx of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees into Jordan. Even though the camp was built based on UNHCR guidelines, Zaatari has always hosted at least four times the number of inhabitants recommended by UNHCR (20,000), while at one point the camp had as many as 155,000 inhabitants. This resulted in the establishment of Azraq camp in April 2014, leading to the Zaatari population decreasing by half.

As of August 2018, Zaatari refugee camp hosted a population of around 78,500 registered refugees, taking into account that this number continues to change as refugees continue to arrive and depart from the camp (Estimate 2018-UNHCR). Zaatari camp today is one of the biggest refugee camps in the world with a 5.3 km^2 area (Reliefweb, 2018d).

Layout and Location

Arabeyat pointed out that access to water was the main parameter and primary consideration regarding the location of the camp, as is usually the case for any new settlement. They provided the site in Zaatari village since it has a good underground water supply, thereby avoiding the need to transfer water from elsewhere at high cost (Arabeyat, 2015).

Zaatari is located 10 km east of Mafraq city in Jordan, 3km from Zaatari village, and 500m from Baghdad International Highway, while the closest Syrian crossing border point is 25km away. Around 90% of the camp inhabitants are from Daraa governorate, in southern Syria (Jertila, 2015). According to the UNHCR platform, there are 41 humanitarian organizations working in the camp. After its opening, demonstrations were repeatedly held by the camp residents because of major concerns related to the living conditions, lack of sufficient food supply and poor accommodation, although this situation has gradually improved (Kleinschmidt, 2014).

Between 3rd September and 15th November 2012, the camp expanded significantly in both size and capacity adding over 2,400 tent shelters. In 2013 the camp grew at a frenetic pace, increasing in size every month due to the high number of refugees arriving. The growth of the camp was planned

phase by phase to receive new refugees as shown in **Figure 28**. Between 15th November 2012 and 4th May 2013, shelters in the camp increased by 450% and the total area increased from 2.16 km^2 to 5.31 km^2 (Reliefweb, 2013).



Figure 28: Evolution of Zaatari Refugee Camp. Image 3 shows the pre-planned post-emergency phase of the camp based on the UNHCR grid model. The red dots represent the new caravans added to accommodate the new waves of Syrian refugees. Source: (Reliefweb-Zaatari, 2013/2014)

As of 21st July 2014 (image 8, bottom right), the camp space was almost fully occupied, comprising 12 districts (**Fig. 28**). Four of these districts are within the original areas of the camp and are the most densely populated areas. The space allotted for each district is meant to ensure the population is a maximum of around 10,000, a half camp module according to the guidelines (Sullivan & Tobin, 2014).

As various refugees mentioned during the field interviews, the camp today is more advanced and better than it was during the first year of its opening. Mohamed Jertila, former UNHCR Associate Site

Planner of Zaatari camp, explained that the first phases of the camp were emergency phases, presented as districts 1, 2, 3 and 4, where the camp received the initial influx of people, which has since also extended south to impact districts 12 and 11(**Fig. 28; Fig. 29**) (Jertila, 2015).



Figure 29: Districts of Zaatari Camp. (Chamma)

"Zaatari camp was planned by UNHCR in Amman. The design followed the guidelines. A rectangular grid system, blocks and main streets. Firstly, there was a lot of movement in the camp and the construction process did not respect the design of the master-plan because of the influx of refugees and the emergency situation. At some point we were receiving around 4,000 refugees/day. Later on, in the new phases, it was very challenging maintaining the initial skeleton of the master plan." (Jertila, 2015)

As Jertila points out, the UNHCR guidelines were used in both the emergency and post-emergency phases but were insufficient in responding to the situation of Syrian refugees in the post-emergency phase, with refugees consequently transforming the camp and mobilizing shelter units based on their needs, leading to the informality of communities. Jertila adds,

> *"It would be easier to manage the camp if it had only 20,000 refugees as mentioned in the guidelines. But when the government provides only one piece of land to receive refugees there is no other choice. UNHCR is facing difficulties managing the camp and containing all these refugees in one place, but we are trying our best."* (Jertila, 2015)

The current UNHCR Camp Manager at Zaatari, Hovig Etyemezian states that;

> *"What happened in Zaatari camp is that UNHCR had a master plan, but as people arrived they refused to settle according to the plan. The plan can be on paper, but the implementation on the ground does not meet the design. Then people want space but they also want to be close to their neighbors, and they want to be close to services. And if later they are asked to be moved somewhere else, they say no because they have become established." (Etyemezian, 2015)*

The statements of Jertila and Etyemezian show that refugees were not involved in the planning process of the post-emergency phase, resulting in tens of thousands of refugees moving their shelter units based on their needs and perceptions of space. The mobilizing process of shelters happened over a wide range at a micro scale and thus transformed the macro look of the camp as shown in **Figure 28**.

Infrastructure and Public Facilities

Different humanitarian organizations including OXFAM and UNICEF amongst others have been working together with UNHCR to provide necessary services in the camp. The provision of these public services depends on the population density and needs in each district. The general infrastructure networks that currently exist in Zaatari are paved roads, electricity and lighting, drinking water distribution points, sewage and drainage networks for public use buildings, WASH facilities[12] and shelter units.

The following information was gathered through reviewing UNHCR's reports/factsheets, on-site assessments and interviews.

Road Network: All the main streets between districts are asphalted with no sidewalks or paved spaces, while the areas and passageways between blocks, communities and shelter units are made of sand/gravel. The sand/gravel is reported to affect the inhabitants during summer when it is very hot and dusty and during winter, when it rains, areas between units get muddy and pools of water collect.

Infrastructure Networks: Regarding water, refugees' needs are covered as the camp was built on top of a water reservoir, as Arabeyat mentioned. There are plastic water tanks for drinking and service water just next to shelter units.

With regards to electricity, in partnership with the Government of Jordan, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Government of Czech Republic and funded by KFW Development Bank, UNHCR has established the largest solar plant ever built in a refugee camp, covering the electricity needs of Zaatari's inhabitants. 100% of shelter units now have access to electricity, receiving 12 hours of electricity daily.

Referring to the UNHCR Electrification Factsheet of Zaatari (Aug 2018), this plant produces around 23,000 MWh's of clean energy every year which reduces the annual electricity bills by 80%, saving around $5 million USD in 2018. Moreover, there are 2,556 street lights installed across the camp. The UNHCR factsheet notes this project has provided refugees with different opportunities, offering around 200 inhabitants the opportunity to get internationally recognized training by JICA to undertake the maintenance of the network, while 47 trained refugees connected the network to shelter units. The factsheet also states that 38% of the solar plant was built by refugee labour, and the total area is over 20 hectares, equivalent to 33 football fields.

In 2015, during an interview with Hovig Etyemezian, the camp manager of Zaatari, he pointed out, "One thing about the [UNHCR] guidelines is that they do not take into account electricity and it is one of the first demands of refugees." At that point, the camp only had electricity for public lighting and facilities, and did not have electricity in every household, so it was the main topic refugees talked about.

Etyemezian added that other problems are water, sewage and drainage (Etyemezian, 2015). Lack of adequate planning and the haphazard development and evolution of the camp meant that installation of all these networks only happened in 2015/16, four years after the establishment of the 'temporary' camp. This created a tough and very expensive challenge for UNHCR, trying to build infrastructure networks in an established settlement, as well as trying to connect these to every shelter unit located in chaotic communities (**Fig. 28-8**). Referring to Jertila and Diana Elfawair-UNHCR WASH, refugees used to relocate and move their shelters in the camp closer to service building;

[12] WASH is an acronym that stands for "water, sanitation and hygiene".

others replaced their tents with prefabricated shelters and built private bathrooms. The WASH services that the inhabitants added had no sewage or drainage networks, creating a negative environmental impact on soil and the underground water source (Elfawair, 2015).

Public Toilets and WASH Centers: It is important to mention that in 2016, Zaatari camp still had hundreds of individual latrines and shower units as well as dozens of public WASH centers across the camp, including kitchens and bathrooms. However, Syrian refugees barely used any of these, as the 'public' system went against their religious and cultural practices. Instead, refugees dismantled the centers, taking pipes, plumbing fixtures, tilling materials etc., in order to build private bathrooms in their shelter units as mentioned above.

Figure 30: One of the WASH centers in 2015. Photographed by Mahmoud Helal

These unused public centers were later removed from the districts in 2016, compounding the initial cost of the buildings with the additional cost of demolishing them. This episode provides a valuable lesson of the importance of understanding the background, culture and needs of refugees prior to planning and development of facilities, as well as the importance of involving them in the planning of the camp, as recommended by Cuny in the work detailed in the previous chapter.

Public Use Buildings: Most of the first service buildings in the camp are located in the area of the first phase of construction of the camp, districts 1, 2, 3 & 4. The camp grew very quickly, so most of the new service buildings were added on to a rapid expansion (District 5) or added next to the surrounding ring road (Districts 6-12) in order to respond to the high density of refugees in the new districts 5-12 (**Fig.31**). (Jertila, 2015)

Figure 31: Location of main service buildings at Zaatari. Source of information: (Reliefweb, 2018). (Chamma)

According to information gained through a recent video call (Aug 24, 2018) with Fadi Al-Shahma, one of the camp inhabitants today the camp has dozens of public use buildings which cover most of the needs of the inhabitants in the camp.

During interviews in 2015, refugees in the camp complained about the long distances that they had to walk to reach these services due to lack of public transportation, especially distances to health facilities for the elderly and the ill, food distribution points and schools for children. In general, the distribution of services seems to have improved after three years. The maps below show the different types of these buildings in each district as of 2015 (**Fig. 32**).

Figure 32: Public use buildings at Zaatari. Information source: (Data.UNHCR, 2015) (White, 2015). (Chamma)

Community Typologies and Shelter Units

As Jertila mentions, every family of up to 7 members gets one shelter unit. There are three types of shelter provided as accommodation for refugees in Zaatari, a) tents, b) small containers (caravans

3x4m) and c) prefabricated units (3x6m) that have a living room, a bedroom, a private kitchen and bathroom.

At each phase of growth of the camp, as new refugees arrived, shelters were provided according to what was available at the time of their arrival. Some existing shelters were also replaced and upgraded by UNHCR. This *ad hoc* development of the camp led to the mixture of shelter types we see in the camp today (**Fig. 33**).

Figure 33: Types of shelter at Zaatari. (Chamma)

> *"The initial plan of Zaatari camp was for a tented refugee camp context but then we received new donations from the Arabic Gulf countries, that changed the direction of the camp from tents to caravans and later to prefabricated-units with a kitchen and a bathroom. We had a challenge of changing to and providing this new model. Today all the camp has the prefabricated model." (White, 2015)*

In the emergency phase there was no planned typology and tents were spread in a disorganized way in order to host people as quickly as possible, leading to the dense informality of communities in districts 1, 2, 3, 4 & 12. An example of this informal topology is shown below (**Fig. 34**), as of 3rd September 2012 (Image 1) and as of 15th November 2012 (Image 2); Average tent size was 30 m^2 (Reliefweb, 2013).

Figure 34: Spacing of tents in the emergency phase. Image 2 shows how tents were regrouped around added service blocks. Source: (Reliefweb, 2013)

In the other districts/phases, the block design followed the guidelines (**Fig. 35**). Each community had 10 shelter units organized in a grid, supported by community kitchens and public toilets for men and women, which all were later transformed by refugees.



Figure 35: Spacing of caravans along UNHCR grid pattern guidelines. Source: (Reliefweb, 2013)

The map below (**Fig. 36**) shows the transformation of one block over a five month period from January-May 2013, representative of the entire camp and typical of the informality of districts.



Figure 36: Transformation of blocks by refugee communities. Maps source: (Reliefweb, 2013). (Chamma)

Based on the site assessments and interviews, none of the three shelter types has satisfied the needs of the inhabitants in terms of size and available services. The Syrian refugees were used to living in spacious homes in Syria with many dedicated spaces (large bedrooms, multiple living rooms, kitchen, washrooms, guest rooms, storage space, inner courtyards and/or rooftop terraces). This has led many families to mobilize shelter units and mix typologies in order to replicate some of their previous lifestyles and improve living conditions (**Fig. 37**). Many other families could not handle the quality of life at Zaatari and left the camp after selling their shelter units to remaining families. This has created a shelter business in the camp, with each typology having its own price set by the inhabitants (Al-Shahma, 2015).

Figure 37: Mixing and transforming shelter unit typologies by mobilizing unused units. (Chamma)

The images below show different typologies of the blocks at Zaatari in different locations and districts, indicating the variation of shelter types, also connected to the location and placement of public use buildings.

Figure 38: Satellite images of Zaatari's shelter typologies. Source: (Data.UNHCR, 2015)(Openstreetmap, 2015) - All images have the same scale.

During an interview with Etyemezian, Zaatari's manager, he stated that

> "*Any model of a camp needs to fit some conditions: response and post-response. The response for the first 48 hours, for the first week, for the first month, and the post-response after that first month. During the first weeks, the priority is to save lives, so camps implement tents. After that period, they need alternatives to the tents. The idea is to implement the Sphere standards for the first weeks, and then the UNHCR standards which are a little bit higher. But for this transition, camps need money, the challenge is funding and to do it in a way that responds to the emergency.*" (Etyemezian, 2015)

Kilian Kleinschmidt, the former UNHCR camp manager of Zaatari camp has stated in his TED Talk that the Syrian refugee crisis has been the most funded humanitarian response in history. Even though the money was available and the transition of shelter units has been addressed and implemented by

UNHCR, the outcome does not seem to comply with the Syrian refugees' needs, which has resulted in the camp transformations, outlined here, both at the micro and the macro scales.

3.4.2 The Economic Situation at Zaatari

UNHCR provides refugees with a 20 Jordanian dinar (JOD) voucher each month (equivalent to $28 US dollars- a similar amount to the monthly allowance provided to refugees in Lebanon and Turkey) in order to buy food and basic necessities from the existing grocery stores in the camp.

When the camp was initially established, the Syrian refugees found life difficult. However, once they realized the long-term nature of the situation, they began to adapt to the available living conditions. They prepared to make the best of the situation until the conflict ended , leading to opening of shops and creation of souks after the first 3 months (Al-Shahma, 2015). Many refugees complain, stating that their monthly allowance is not even enough to cover necessities for 10 days. This was one of the main reasons many inhabitants started shops in the camp, in order to survive and return to what they used to do before the war, working and running businesses.

Figure 39: Road network of Zaatari Camp. Source: (Data.UNHCR, 2015). (Chamma)

The map above shows the existing road network including the two main axial streets, Al-Sooq running north-south (originally Champs Elyses) and Al Yasmine running east-west. These were the first two streets to be constructed, they are the most active routes of transit and form the heart of the camp. They serve as souks, with all commercial activity created and generated by the inhabitants themselves. In the recent interview with Al-Shahma, he stated that the camp today has over 3,000 shops spread across all of the main roads dividing districts. As shown in **Figure 39**, the orange dots represent the souk size of Zaatari as of Aug 2018, while the extension of souks and commercial activity is spreading east to cover most areas in the camp (Al-Shahma, 2018).



Figure 40: The original market area at Zaatari. Photo source: (McLaren, 2015). Developed by author.

Based on site observations, there are now many types of shops in the camp which would be found in a typical Syrian city, such as bakeries, a barber shop, a perfume shop, clothing shops, home appliance stores, construction materials and many others. Moreover, there are opportunities every three months to do collective work for the camp such as street cleaning, construction work or other labor to earn a little extra income from humanitarian NGOs (Abu-Abdallah, 2015).

During interviews conducted in 2015, **Ayham,** a professional mechanical engineer in Syria working as a cashier in a falafel restaurant in Zaatari camp, pointed out the lack of job opportunities in the camp other than those created by refugees. However, he also mentioned some occasional opportunities to work with humanitarian organizations to benefit the camp with his expertise (Ayham, 2015).

Two shoe shop owners, friends for decades before the war began, described their concerns with the living conditions in the camp and the difficulty finding dignified living space. They were used to living a very good life before the conflict. Additionally, **Nader**, 40 years old, married with 7 children (ages ranging from 2 to 11 years old, as of 2015), mentioned that he had a vegetable shop back home where his income was about 40'000 Syrian Lira per week before the war started (around $800 USD) (Nader, 2015).

Al-Shahma states that it is very difficult to live in the camp when only counting on the UNHCR vouchers. He says that anyone able to find a job in the camp or open a successful shop/business may be able to afford to upgrade their shelter unit and improve living conditions, however many still have no job opportunities and thus are living with very basic supplies (Al-Shahma).

3.4.3 The Social Fabric at Zaatari

All interviews with inhabitants of Zaatari camp in 2015/2016 focused mainly on three parts: 1) background and personal details, 2) personal opinions and evaluation of what they have and what they do in the camp, and 3) needs and ambitions.

In general, most refugees mentioned that despite Zaatari camp being close to urban areas, its inhabitants are not allowed to work in local cities/villages or go outside the camp without obtaining a permit from the community police office inside the camp. This permit allows them to go out of the camp for a specific number of hours or days, depending on the purpose.

Since they are not able to gain employment outside of the camp refugees have created alternative job opportunities to satisfy their needs, create social networks and find livelihoods within the camp. Many refugees mentioned that the social interaction in the camp is very good, the Syrian community is very social and they have no differences in culture or religions.

When asked about activities and leisure, most refugees said that there is no leisure at all; even the basic necessities which can provide leisure do not exist in the camp

Below are some stories collected from interviewees which describe some of the challenges and hardships that refugees have faced since arriving to Zaatari camp, as well as some improvements which refugees are thankful for.

Ali Al-Akra'a, 37 years old, arrived to the camp with his family on 23 August 2012 at night, one month after the camp opening.

> *"We slept the first night to wake up the next day and find ourselves in a hard situation and hard living conditions. The camp was very primitive with no services, not as advanced as it is today. It was a crisis for us compared to our previous life. It was a strong shock on me as a father, so imagine how it was on children and women." (Alakra'a, 2015)*

Abu Abdallah, a successful owner of a falafel shop, also expressed his frustrations because of the living conditions in the camp as of 2015.

> *"How should I entertain my wife and kids? There's nothing in the camp such as gardens or formal open spaces where I can take my family. We have nowhere to walk, sit or go in the camp. There are only these community and youth centers which organizations are running that have children's playgrounds, but nothing for us as a family, or me as an adult. Do you think I am happy living in a caravan? I cannot invest anything here and I feel it is more dignified for me to live outside the camp on my own in rural areas. Even if we have aid and support from organizations, we still have a big lack of basic necessities which is causing frustrations and deprivations for us and for our children."* (Abu-Abdallah, 2015)

Fadi Al-Shahma, who arrived to the camp with his family on 4th October 2012, stated in 2015:

> *"The area of the camp was very small, spaces and services were very limited. We stayed in a tent for over a year; living in a tent was bad because it cannot resist any natural conditions. For example, in winter we had snow, most of tents were on the ground and flooded with water, and during summer there are sand storms. It usually gets very dusty, hot and humid for many hours, while the shelter units can barely protect us" (Al-Shahma, 2015)*

During the recent video call with Al-Shahma, he mentioned that services have significantly improved in comparison with 2015, with almost everything available in the camp today. Districts 7 and 8 now have more services as well as schools. Moreover, as a comparison between the two interviews with Fadi (2015 and 2018) he stated that after 6 years living in the camp, the inhabitants have had to make an effort to adapt and have grown used to the living conditions, the available services and life

at Zaatari,; this is remarkable given that many demonstrations erupted in 2012 when the camp initially opened. Today the inhabitants rarely complain.

Figure 41: After conducting the interview with Abu Abdallah (right) and Ayham (left) in 2015 at the falafel shop.

3.4.4 Zaatari: Summary of Analysis and Fieldwork Results

The analysis of Zaatari and the results of fieldwork conducted at the camp clearly show that the refugee inhabitants have been negatively affected by the layout and design of the camp, even though it has gradually improved up to its the present state. The qualitative family interviews conducted in 2015/16, indicate that **70%** of the 250 involved interviewees were happy staying in the camp (until they could return home to Syria), **21%** were neutral and **9%** were not happy but could not leave since they had no other choice.

Figure 42: Zaatari during summer, fall and harsh winters. Photos by: Brian Tomaszewski (left), Mohamad Hamed-Reuters (center), Muse Union (right)

As of 2018, the main socio-cultural issues, spatial issues, economic issues, and camp advantages could be drawn as follows:

Physical-Spatial Issues

- Camp planning does not respond to the harsh desert environment in which the camp is located, the wide horizontal and flat layout of the camp means shelter units receive the full impact of harsh natural conditions; the camp has barely any shade as the height of shelter units is approximately 2.4–3 m.

- Shelter design is inadequate when it comes to the shelter typologies used in the camp (tents, caravans, prefabricated units etc.); the tents' fabrics and sandwich panels do not insulate the inner atmosphere/temperature of shelter units, rather they absorb and transport the heat and cold.
- The inhabitants still suffer from the limited space inside shelter units; *The shelter unit design does not consider key factors of the cultural background of the refugees, the factor of organic family growth and the need for privacy and personal space.*
- Even though the space between shelter units is small, the space between blocks and sectors is massive, which creates physical spatial gaps that impede the development and growth of the social fabric of the camp. This is due to the UNHCR standards and guidelines regarding ensuring wide firebreaks between blocks (30 m), necessary due to the highly flammable material of the shelter units but not conducive to the formation of connected integrated communities.
- The road and passageways between communities and shelter units are made from gravel and sand, thus they get muddy when it rains, which particularly affects children whenever they want to go or comeback from school, or if they want to play outside their shelter units.
- The camp still lacks trees, green spaces and recreational features and particularly public spaces for families and adults; the Mafraq Governorate where the camp is located has many agricultural and rural areas and trees could be planted in the camp. Zaatari Village next to the camp has many trees making given it greater protection and resilience in the event of sand storms. The planning section in the UNHCR Handbook 2007 (P.217) states that the 30 meter firebreaks between blocks "*would be ideal for growing vegetables or recreation*" which is not happening at Zaatari.

Socio-Cultural Issues

- According to UNHCR, the average lifespan of camps is 17 years. Zaatari was established back in 2012, its inhabitants suffer by being displaced, and living in 'temporary' shelters as the camp *conditions are very different from their previous ways of life, particularly in relation to issues of freedom of movement and personal and social dignity*.
- As mentioned in the physical-spatial issues, the lack of leisure facilities and activities in the camp for women, men, families and the elderly (children attend different programs at community centers) is a key failure and impedes social interaction and the development of an organic social fabric. .
- The stigma of being labeled a "refugee" and of having to live in a restrictive refugee camp like Zaatari is very hard for Syrian people who, despite the suffering and hardships, work hard to maintain their dignity and comfort.
- The camp inhabitants used to have issues regarding the public WASH facilities in the camp, which led them adapting their shelter units by creating private kitchens and bathrooms. This forced UNHCR to implement a sewage and drainage network in the entire camp.
- Refugees in the camp feel isolated and dependent on humanitarian organizations and at the mercy of donors, whereas they used to have a dignified and comfortable lifestyle back home. They are not involved in the management of the camp and have no leadership or

decision making power. The only involvement of refugees is through a few maintenance jobs or secondary positions with humanitarian NGOs.

Economic Issues

- Even though the market in the camp created by the refugee inhabitants provides thousands of job opportunities, the camp still lacks many opportunities, particularly for educated people who already have degrees and specific expertise and who are not permitted to work in Jordan.
- Some refugees are still working illegally in Jordanian urban areas, accepting lower salaries than Jordanians, creating tension between the two nations because of competition over the available job opportunities.
- The lack of job opportunities for women in the camp is a major issue since families often lack male members, resulting in increased child labor and consequent increased absence from formal education, while the educational systems in the camps are already inadequate (as of 2015).
- Camps are often dependent on the resources and interventions of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, however the food distribution systems and the voucher of 28$/month are insufficient to satisfy refugees' needs.
- Syrian shops in the camps have lower prices than the formal grocery stores in the camp, run by Jordanians, but refugees are restricted to buying from Jordanian stores in order to use the monthly vouchers.

Camp Advantages

Based on the comparative analysis of Zaatari camp in 2015 and 2018, the camp has improved significantly, leading to refugees in the camp feeling happier than before.

- Drinking and service water are both available 24/7 in the camp, covering inhabitants' needs.
- The camp offers 12 hours of clean energy to all shelter units in the camp, since the opening of the solar plant south of the camp. This makes it, along with Azraq camp, two of the few refugee camps in the world with such facilities.
- Today, the camp has better internet reception and phone signal, with many counting on these for their daily entertainment, communication and as their source of news and information.
- Since 2016, the camp has had infrastructure networks for private usage, drainage and sewage systems.
- In 2015/16, the camp still lacked transportation networks and refugees had to walk long distances to reach public use buildings such as schools, public health facilities and distribution centers, or between the entrance and the far districts of the camp; today, the camp has sufficient transportation systems at cheap rates (1-1.5 JOD/ride, around $2 USD)
- In regards to public use buildings, now all districts have services, particularly clinics and schools. This has increased the efficiency of original schools at Zaatari Camp (districts 3, 4 &

5). Moreover, according to Al-Shahma, today the educational systems and healthcare quality in the camp are much improved.

- Syrian refugees are able to put down concrete flooring in the camp today, which has finally been accepted by the Jordanian authorities.
- As with Syrian cities, Zaatari camp has thousands of bicycles, the main tool for the inhabitants to move around within the camp.

In general, Zaatari camp is a very unique case. The will and desire, demands and forms of adaptation of the refugee inhabitants have influenced and continue to influence the work of UNHCR and other NGOs in the camp and have shaped and transformed the rules and practices applied by the Jordanian Security Department.

Due to the isolated nature of the camp, 1km away from the main road, its impact on Zaatari village (3 km away) and other nearby urban areas has been low.

Moreover, the market of the camp has proven to be a very important element of the social fabric of the camp, allowing Syrians to work, generate income, improve living conditions, entertain themselves and socialize. These factors together help recreate a part of what Syrians had prior to conflict. Kleinschmidt's TED talk as well as a variety of news articles report that the camp generates millions of euros every month through its economic activity as well as through high demand from refugees for many products and appliances, food supplies, fruit and vegetables, etc., activity which is benefits the Jordanian market, suppliers and the wider economy.

Zaatari - Evaluative Summary: Zaatari refugee camp represents an excellent example of both the strengths and of the major shortcomings of the UNHCR model and approach to refugee camp design, planning and management.

Whilst we strongly criticize the UNHCR paradigm and approach throughout this thesis and have discussed many of the problems with the UNHCR model in analyzing Zaatari, it should nevertheless be stated again that it is important to have a set of minimum humanitarian standards which are applied in emergency refugee situations. In this sense UNHCR does a good job of providing emergency humanitarian relief in crisis situations. This was clearly the case with the 'spontaneous' development of Zaatari refugee camp which has provided shelter and protection to tens of thousands of Syrian refugees in urgent need.

Some flexibility at Zaatari has allowed for adaptations of camp structures and the camp management have also attempted to ameliorate and improve the design of the camp and the facilities over time. We conclude, however, that these developments have been necessary to address basic insufficiencies in the design and planning of the camp as highlighted in the analysis and are the result of the insufficiencies of the UNHCR model itself to address the real developmental needs of establishing a fully functioning, integrated settlement.

Organic development of the camp by refugee groups has been the main driver of transformations. This has occurred through the efforts of the refugees in advocating for changes and improvements and particularly in the way that refugees have subverted and ignored the rules of the camp where necessary: **positive changes have happened usually *in spite of the model rather than because of it***.

The key point is that beyond the initial emergency phase, as seen at Zaatari, the UNHCR model seems to becomes incapable of meeting the needs of refugees and ensuring their full spectrum of

human rights. The analysis of Zaatari has highlighted the contrast between how the informal development of the camp through refugee agency has improved conditions and how the rigid, charity and containment approach of UNCHR impacts negatively on the lives of the refugees within the camp as well as on the host country, restricting human development and creating cycles of dependency and frustration.

This failure is written into the UNHCR paradigm from the start since 'camps' like Zaatari are envisaged as 'temporary' interventions aimed at 'managing' a humanitarian 'problem' rather than as integrated sustainable settlements aimed at creating flourishing communities that ensure refugees' rights, promote human development and contribute to the wider society of the host country.

3.5 Azraq Refugee Camp, Jordan

Figure 43: Satellite image of Azraq Camp (2018) (Google)

Azraq Camp is located in the desert, 100 km east of Amman. The camp was opened on 30th April 2014 and began hosting refugees on 22nd May 2014 (Musana, 2015). The design and management of Azraq camp applies lessons learned from the experience of Zaatari. "We've studied what's been done in Zaatari and other refugee camps around the world and tried to plan carefully," says Former UNHCR head at Azraq Camp, Bernadette Castel (Knell, 2014).

As of June 2018, the camp had around 36,700 refugees; 59.6% are children including 278 unaccompanied minors, while 3 in 10 households are headed by women. In addition, there are 1,288 persons recorded as having disabilities (37.2% of which are children).

The camp has an almost 50:50 female to male ratio, with refugees coming from different areas in Syria including Aleppo, Homs, Daraa, Al-Raqqa, and others. The camp has 4 governmental and 27 humanitarian partners with 54 national UNHCR staff and 8 international staff, including 2 volunteers. The camp is 90 km from the Syrian border and 20km from the closest nearby urban area of Azraq village. In terms of climate, the camp is situated in the middle of the desert with frequent sand storms, very hot temperatures during summer days and cold nights in the winter (UNHCR, 2016)

3.5.1 The Spatial Conditions of Azraq

Azraq camp has a high level of security, controlled by a police station located in a strategic position. The camp's perimeter fence is topped with barbed wire and patrolled by the Jordanian military;

refugees are not permitted to leave freely without applying for a permit, as is the case at Zaatari Camp.

Whenever new refugees arrive, they are fully registered at the reception center, then receive basic household items including mattresses, blankets, buckets, waste bins, hygiene kits, gas stoves, kitchen sets and solar-powered lanterns. They also receive one week's worth of food rations. The opening of Azraq camp was an attempt to try to manage the crisis more effectively, with a growing awareness that the refugees may have to stay for years to come (Knell, 2014).

Camp Layout, Villages and Population

Unlike Zaatari camp, Azraq is highly decentralized with an area of 14.7 km^2. It is currently divided into seven districts or "villages" (V1-V7) that can each house 10,000 to 15,000 refugees, four of which are currently inhabited. Referring to the Azraq Fact Sheet (June 2018), the active population distribution by village is 7,249 in V2, 10,406 in V3, 9,568 in V5 and 9,476 in V6. V1 contains the administrative area where the base camp is located, and V3 and V7 are additional areas for future extension.

Figure 44: Administrative divisions of Azraq Camp. Source: (Data.UNHCR, 2015) (Openstreetmap, 2015). Map produced by author.

Public Use Buildings, Facilities and Infrastructure

Education: Around 9,840 children are enrolled in six schools in the camp that operate two shifts; girls in the morning and boys in the afternoon. In addition, there are numerous child friendly spaces providing learning and psycho-social support. Kindergarten facilities, playgrounds, community centres, daycare and mosques are also available. Additionally, 17 students from Azraq have been granted scholarships from the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative, to undertake Bachelor degrees at Jordanian universities in 2017/18.

Healthcare: Each village has a clinic, two comprehensive ones in V5 and V6, and two basic ones in V2 and V3, as well as a central hospital run by the Red Cross and Red Crescent, with an average of 7,600

consultations and 35 child deliveries each month. UNHCR and its partners provide psychological support to families and persons with disabilities. In addition, the camp has 27 trained refugee volunteers who act as first aid responders.



Figure 45: Location of public use buildings at Azraq. (Data.UNHCR, 2015)(Openstreetmap, 2015). Map produced by author.

Infrastructure: In comparison with Zaatari camp, Azraq generally has better spatial conditions, particularly in terms of the road network, water sources and sanitation. All main ring roads and streets between blocks are asphalted with proper street lighting and drainage networks. However, the areas between shelter units are made of sand, resulting in muddy passageways during winter, as seen at Zaatari.

The camp has two boreholes with a capacity of 120 m^3/h which ensures a good quantity and quality of water, as well as cost efficiency. As of April 2018, the average water supply per day was 1,600 m^3. Water is distributed through a water supply network of 302 manual tap stands. Each person receives around 44 JOD/day. In addition, there is an average of 743 m^3/day of sewage, which is transported to an external waste water treatment plant situated 75 km from the camp.

Azraq has a comprehensive plan to provide electricity to most shelters in the four inhabited villages. As of August 2018, the initial solar power plant and a new expansion plant next to the camp provide 3.5 MW solar power to all four villages, offering each shelter 2.2-2.4 kWh/day, enough power to operate lights, a refrigerator, a television, a fan and to charge cellphones.

Based on the interviews conducted in 2015/16, the inhabitants of Azraq were generally happy and satisfied with the provision of services in the camp. However numerous families pointed out difficulties related to quality and location of service buildings; in some cases, inhabitants have to walk for over an hour to access vital services, since the camp has no public transportation.

Moreover, many families complained about the location of the camp being isolated "in the middle of nowhere", far from existing urban areas while the camp has no public transportation connection. Refugees mentioned that they have to hire a private driver to take them and their families to the main cities if they are granted permission to go.

Inhabitants in the southern areas of V6 complained the most as they are furthest from the main entrance of the camp and the central supermarket, making it difficult from them to carry goods home, particularly when it is very hot or cold. The photo below shows that most refugees do not take formal asphalted roads, but walk on rocks and take the shortest passageways to get to their destination(s) more quickly (**Fig. 46**).

Figure 46: An inhabitant carrying goods on her head after leaving the central market (Sameh). Village 5 in the background. (Chamma)

Shelter Typologies and Communities

At Azraq Camp, there is one type of shelter unit, a "cabin" with a floor space of 24 m^2, able to house a maximum of 6 refugees; it has a high ceiling and sloping roof with a ventilation point. Each group of six cabins are supposed to share one public lavatory and shower. Each community module consists of 12 cabins and 4 WASH units (2 on each side). These camp modules are used throughout

the camp, forming blocks and then villages. The average block size is 60 cabins, surrounded by roads on all sides.

"We used feedback from the refugees at Zaatari Camp to help us design these cabins and they're also adapted to the weather conditions here," said Ms. Castel (Knell, 2014).

Figure 47: UNHCR grid layout of shelters at Azraq. Source: Openstreetmap 2015

Even where shelter units were designed and built based on the lessons learned from Zaatari, many refugee families at Azraq –but not all— still extended their shelters by adding additional areas beside the shelter unit or in the middle in between the 2 shelter units in cases where the family has 7 members or more (household of 2 shelter units). The ongoing transformation and adaptation includes adding new indoor kitchen areas, toilets, showers, storage areas and shaded terraces. These new private WASH facilities which people add have no formal sewage and drainage networks, resulting in similar problems to those experienced at Zaatari.

In order to build these additions, many refugee families dismantled vacant cabin units and mobilized materials from them in order to build extensions to their shelters, as well as using plastic sheets, zinc panels and blankets. As a result of this adaptation process, communities have become more private, allowing Syrian women not to have to cover up within and next to their shelter units (**Fig. 48**). For families that could not build private bathrooms, the new layout of communities has made it easier for them to privatize/give one WASH unit for every three shelter units, allowing women safer and more covered passages to showers and toilets.



Figure 48: Privatizing shelters and communities at Azraq Camp. (Chamma)

The photo below was taken in April 2015; it shows how the inhabitants define the boundaries of their communities by closing gaps between the cabins as well as between adjacent communities. It also shows how soil has been used to hold the bottom side of fabrics and plastic sheets so they are fixed against the high-speed winds and do not allow rainwater to pass underneath.

Figure 49: Shelter units at Azraq. (Chamma)

Referring to the recent UNHCR Factsheet (June 2018), all shelters in the camp have been upgraded with a kitchen extension and a canopy. 250 damaged shelters were also fixed in May 2018 in different areas of the camp. These improvements and adaptations indicate how the UNHCR standards and guidelines were not able to comply with refugees needs or with the type of shelter and WASH units which they would actually use—demonstrating the lack of refugees' involvement at the planning/design stage. Even though it took one year to plan Azraq, and having learned lessons from Zaatari camp, the forms of adaptation on the micro scale look very similar.

As at Zaatari and in spite of the supposed implementation of lessons learnt from the Zaatari experience, one of the common complaints from interviewees at Azraq in 2015/16 was that the cabins are very exposed to the natural conditions such as heat waves, sand storms, dust, cold winter days, high-speed wind and rats. Multiple families mentioned the inefficiency of walls (sandwich panels) to insulate them from the temperature outside, while rats get inside their cabins by eating the wall foam and/or climbing through ventilation openings (**Fig. 49**).

3.5.2 The Economic Situation at Azraq

During the interviews, the majority of refugees complained about the lack of job opportunities and the hard living conditions in the camp. Receiving only 20 JOD ($28 USD) as a monthly voucher per refugee is not enough to cover basic needs (as is the case at Zaatari). Refugees mentioned that prices in the central supermarket of the camp (Sameh Market) are very high and that it only accepts vouchers from the World Food Program.

In February 2018, UNHCR and the International Labour Organization (ILO), in coordination with the Government of Jordan and sponsored by the Dutch Government, inaugurated the first employment

office in Azraq camp (ACE). This initiative aims to facilitate access to formal work opportunities for refugees living in the camp, conditional upon applying for and obtaining a work permit. This allows refugees to leave the camp for one month at a time. ACE also provides counselling services, information on labor rights, training opportunities and job matching services. Referring to the Factsheet of UNHCR, by the end of May 2018, around 3,371 work permits had been granted at Azraq.

Another initiative implemented by UNHCR was the creation of three new market areas in the camp, consisting of 250 shops —50% owned by refugees and 50% by Jordanians. The markets provide the camp with food shops, restaurants, accessories, bikes, and other items. Moreover, UNHCR and its partners have set up an Incentive Based Volunteering (IBV) scheme, where refugees play an active role in the functioning of the camp and are able to earn some extra income.



Figure 50:The four market areas in the camp and the central grocery store (Sameh Market). (Chamma)

3.5.3 The Social Fabric at Azraq

During interviews at Azraq camp in 2015/16, most of the interviewed refugee families explained that social interaction in the camp is good; families are making friends and feeling happy with their neighbours. However, several of the interviewees did complain about the lack of livelihoods in the camp in general, mainly due to the exit and entry restrictions; the location of the camp in the middle of the desert, far from existing urban areas; and the lack of gathering and social activity spaces, gardens and recreational features, particularly for adults and elderly.

Mohamad Abu-Marwan, from Aleppo, lives with his 7 children and wife. He has no other relatives in the camp but does have many friends, although he explained that "despite the

controlled/limited water and electricity sources, the services in the camp are good but people feel that they can do nothing but stay inside their shelters." (Abu-Marwan, 2015)

Figure 51: Abu Marwan wanted to take a photo after showing us around their shelter unit (2015)

Hajar, from Edlib, married and with 5 children, arrived to the camp in August 2014. She explained that she used to work as a seamstress back in Syria and that this was a big part of her daily life but that she is not able to resume her profession in the camp. She did not have any other relatives in the camp but made some friends. She added that neither women nor men have anything to do but stay inside their cabins due to the harsh living conditions in general, "During winter, staying inside is ok as we can turn on heaters and use blankets, but during summer, we have to stay inside to avoid the sun but we cannot stand the heat; we feel we are being toasted inside our cabins" (Hajar, 2015)

Heba, another refugee mother who was Hajar's neighbour added, "We don't care about the services in the camp; what we need is livelihoods and job opportunities. The living conditions are very hard and people have debts already." (Heba, 2015)

Most of the interviewees shared the same general concerns about the lack of livelihoods in the camp and that they feel isolated "in the middle of nowhere." Some interviewees even referred to Azraq as "Guantanamo Prison" when comparing it to Zaatari that has a large market, job opportunities, room to adapt shelter units, and is closer to urban areas and the Syrian border. As of 2015/16, different interviewees mentioned that refugee families at Azraq are sick of the living conditions which have forced many to leave the camp and migrate to Zaatari or Jordanian cities/urban areas.

Based on the recent UNHCR Factsheet (June 2018), the camp today has numerous facilities and initiatives intended to empower the social life of refugee families and offer them activities. The camp has four community centers, each situated in a village as well as multipurpose sports-grounds for all age groups. These centers facilitate vocational training, community gatherings and mass information activities by different agencies as well as providing an environment for community learning, innovation and community initiatives and conversation. Moreover, the camp has different learning platforms such as:

1. The Ideas Box - an innovative portable multimedia center that provides customized technologies and facilitates access to information as well as cultural and educational resources.
2. UNHCR Community Learning Hub-InZone, a space for higher education that connects youth to quality learning initiatives by InZone (a center of the University of Geneva).
3. Hewlett-Packard Learning Studio, an interactive learning environment space that stimulates refugees' innovation.
4. A camp magazine *Heartbeat of the Camp*, a community-based initiative established by 12 refugees, 6 female and 6 male youth, and supported by UNHCR and CARE. The main aim of this initiative is to improve the social well-being of refugees and support youth development.

In addition to these initiatives there are also the three new established markets in the camp today, in addition to the existing one established in 2015.

In September 2018, phone calls were conducted in order to connect and talk to refugee inhabitants at Azraq, but it was not possible to reach any or conduct new interviews. The aim behind these calls was to confirm whether the markets are active and are run by Syrian family members, whether they have created similar social-economic activity as at Zaatari and if the changes at Azraq have improved livelihoods in the camp and strengthened the social relations and interactions in general.

Moreover, during a recent valuable remote interview with a UNHCR staff member in Jordan (25th Sept 2018), they said that the design of the camp was mainly based on the consideration of social relations between inhabitants, however,

> "*livelihoods is an area of concern [at Azraq]. The lifestyle is very different for Syrians because the type of housing is different from back in Syria as well as the daily activities and so on. The design followed the Sphere standards, but still has weaknesses when it comes to placing villages far from each other which makes it hard for beneficiaries to interact with each other,*" (Interviewee A1, 2018).

The interviews with the camp inhabitants and UNHCR staff have proven that the standards and guidelines did not respond to the real refugees' needs in Azraq and the lessons learned also did not involve refugees in the planning phase of the camp and design phase of shelter units. This has resulted in all of the forms of adaptations mentioned and in refugees feeling disempowered and frustrated and many leaving the camp.

3.5.4 Azraq Analysis Results

Based on the analysis of Azraq and the conducted fieldwork, the refugee inhabitants have been heavily affected by the layout of the camp, even though the camp does have many advantages and improvements today, as well as more services and better infrastructure than Zaatari. According to the qualitative interviews conducted in 2015/16, **28%** of the 70 interviewees were happy staying in the camp, **49%** were neutral and **23%** were not happy and might leave the camp. As of 2016, Azraq had similar issues to Zaatari today (2018). The main socio-cultural issues, spatial issues, economic issues, and camp advantages can be detailed as follows;

Physical-Spatial Issues

- The camp is very far from main urban areas (around 2 hours by car from the capital Amman), while there is no public transportation connection.
- Camp planning of Azraq did not to respond to the harsh desert environment in which the camp is located; the wide horizontal and flat layout of the camp means shelter units get the full impact of natural conditions; the camp has barely any shade as the height of shelter units is approximately 3.5-4 m. The camp also gets sand storms during summer..
- Shelter design of cabin units is inadequate, mainly since units are made out of sandwich panels (zinc sheets and foam), which do not insulate the inner atmosphere/temperature of shelter units, rather they absorb and transport the heat and cold. Moreover, many refugee families mentioned the high speed winds in the camp, especially during the night; they added that they feel the cabin walls are about to fall off sometimes.
- Refugee families have been affected by the presence of rats in the camp; this factor was not considered in the shelter design process.
- *The shelter unit design at Azraq does not consider key factors of the cultural background of the refugees, the factor of organic family growth and the need for privacy and personal space*, which has led to refugees adapting their shelters by adding extensions
- As at Zaatari, even though the space between shelter units is small, the space between blocks and sectors is massive, creating spatial barriers which impede the growth of the social fabric of the camp. This is due to the UNHCR standards and guidelines regarding the wide firebreaks between blocks (30 m).
- The roads and passageways between communities and cabin units are made of gravel and sand, thus they get muddy when it rains, particularly affecting children whenever they attend school, or if they want to play outside.
- The camp still lacks trees, green spaces and recreational features, particularly for families and adults; the Azraq Governorate where the camp is located has agricultural areas and trees can be planted. The closest agricultural area is around 20 km away from the camp (north-west).

Socio-Cultural Issues

- As with the inhabitants of Zaatari, refugees at Azraq suffer by being displaced and living in 'temporary' camps for many years as the camp *conditions are very different from their previous ways of life, particularly in relation to issues of freedom of movement and personal and social dignity*.
- The lack of leisure facilities and activities, for women, elderly, and men in the camp (children attend different programs at community centers), is a key failure of the camp.
- The stigma of being labeled a "refugee" and of having to live in an isolated refugee camp is very hard for the Syrian people at Azraq who, despite the suffering and hardships, attempt to maintain their dignity.

- Refugees in the camp feel isolated and dependent on humanitarian organizations and the mercy of donors, whereas they used to have a dignified lifestyle back home. They are not involved in the management of the camp have no leadership or decision making power. The only involvement of refugees is through a few maintenance jobs or secondary positions with humanitarian NGOs.

Economic Issues

- The camp lacks job opportunities, while it is not confirmed how many opportunities are available at the four markets. Based on the recent interview with Al-Shahma (at Zaatari), he said that "opening a shop in the camp needs money, and you have to open a successful business, otherwise, no one would buy from your shop". After four years of unemployment, most refugees at Azraq have exhausted their savings and have gone into debt as one of the interviewees mentioned.
- Some refugees are still working illegally in Jordanian urban areas, accepting lower salaries than what Jordanians ask for creating tension between the two nations as well as competition over available job opportunities.
- The camp is dependent on the resources and interventions of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, whilst the food distribution systems and the voucher of $28 USD/month are insufficient to meet refugees' needs.

Camp Advantages

Based on the comparative analysis of Azraq camp in 2015 and 2018, the camp has improved significantly;

- Drinking and service water are both available 24/7 in the camp, covering inhabitants' needs.
- As of August 2018, the camp offers clean energy to all shelter units following the establishment of the solar plant expansion. This makes it, together with Zaatari camp, one of the few camps in the world with such facilities.
- Since 2016, the camp has had infrastructure networks for public facilities and rain water management. The infrastructure for private usage is not confirmed.
- In 2015/16, the camp still lacked transportation networks in the camps and refugees had to walk long distances to reach public use buildings such as schools, public health facilities, distribution centers and between the entrance and the different village areas of the camp.
- In regards to public use buildings, the four villages have the necessary services such as clinics and schools.

Even though Azraq camp looks more permanent than Zaatari, and the structures might be better, the camp still lacks livelihood opportunities. During interviews, many refugees expressed their will and desire to leave the camp and move to Zaatari or urban areas, where they would have better living conditions, better opportunities and a brighter future.

Moreover, the demands and forms of adaptation of inhabitants at Azraq have influenced some of the work of UNHCR and other NGOs; i.e. the implementation of kitchens and canopies. However, these adaptations are still minor in comparison to all of the needs and demands of the inhabitants. And unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct new interviews in order to see if the living conditions have improved after opening three new markets and launching the different community initiatives.

During the interviews in 2016, some refugee families mentioned that there is a reason why the camp is located in this specific location, far from urban areas. When asked why, the interviewee said that the Jordanian Government's hidden agenda is to take over the camp when the Syrian conflict is done and transform it into a giant army base. Based on the information provided, some personal analysis has been conducted to find out that there is an air base 25km from the camp, just next to Azraq village. This raises concerns and provides a possible insight into the decentralized layout of the camp and cabin typology.

Azraq – Summary Evaluation: The key to understanding Azraq is to place it in the context of the development of Zaatari. Azraq was planned and designed to implement lessons learnt from Zaatari in order to provide a better experience for the refugees and for the camp management in terms of efficient use of resources and donor funds.

This intention has unfortunately been subsumed by the decision to adhere strictly to the UNHCR charity and containment model which implements rigid, dehumanizing and disempowering structures on refugees and is the cause of many of the problems. The movement has been to make Azraq *more* closely aligned to the ideal UNHCR camp than Zaatari rather than to see the deficiencies in this model as the cause of the problems. In fact, many of the advantages of Zaatari in terms of organic informality, economic enterprise and refugee agency in transformation which have made life at Zaatari more bearable for refugees have been actively avoided at Azraq in the name of efficiency, structure and organization.

So whilst Azraq has better facilities and planning in accordance with the ideal UNHCR camp model, these 'improvements' and this closer alignment with the ideal are shown in reality (and reflected in our analysis) to worsen the experience of refugees. Under this model refugees are 'contained' and 'managed', placed in a dependent relationship to the camp and to humanitarian relief systems and deprived of livelihoods, democratic participation and a sense of community, integration, connection and belonging.

Again, it is important to state that in terms of initial emergency humanitarian relief, the UNHCR model has some good logistical and structural advantages. However, our analysis of the experience at Azraq again highlights the limitations of the UNHCR model and how it is unsuitable as a planning instrument, beyond the emergency phase, and incapable of promoting the creation of active, empowering communities which promote refugee rights and human development.

3.6 Kilis Oncupinar Camp, Southern Turkey

Figure 52: Provincial breakdown of Syrian refugees in Turkey as of 29th August 2018. Sources: UNHCR, DGMM

As mentioned in the figures presented in the introductory chapter, Turkey is home to the largest refugee population in the world. During a television interview via Euronews, Dr. Kerem Kinik, President of the Turkish Red Crescent, one of the leading humanitarian organizations in Turkey, explained that there are around 4 million refugees in Turkey including 3.5 million Syrians (**Fig. 52**); around 250,000 of these refugees are living in over 30 refugee camps, mostly located in southern Turkey. He added that Red Crescent regularly provides education scholarships to a total of 250,000 Syrian children across Turkey. Moreover, the Ministry of Health provides health services free of charge to the entire Syrian population in Turkey. By March 2018, more than 40 million health visits had been carried out under these services; nearly 1.5 million operations had been done and about 200,000 babies had been delivered at local hospitals (Euronews, 2018). One of the camps in southern Turkey is Kilis Oncupinar camp.

All of the *Research and Field-Work Methods* detailed at the start of this chapter were followed while working on Kilis camp, including travel to southern Turkey to visit the camp, undertake site assessments and conduct interviews. Unfortunately, when applying for a permit to enter the camp in advance, none of the responsible ministries/departments responded to emails or phone calls, even when Turkish friends called to ask about the process of getting a permit. I also visited the responsible ministries with a Turkish friend/interpreter to meet officials in order to obtain a permit however officials were very strict about three things which made this case-study challenging:

1. No new permits were issued to any foreigners including students and researchers, as the officials did not want visitors to talk to Syrian families and collect information. This policy was likely influenced by the publication of a recent article in the news that talked negatively about the living conditions of Syrians in the Turkish camps. Thus, the visit to the camp had to be cancelled.

2. Few of the officials that were contacted agreed to meet and none of them provided information about the camp or helped in the process of getting a permit.
3. The Turkish government has warned Syrian families across the country, inside the camps and in urban areas, not to provide any information to foreign parties or they would face deportation back to Syria.

This has also scared humanitarian workers and academics; a few agreed to be interviewed but asked for their names to be kept anonymous. The total number of conducted interviews related to Kilis camp was five; three in person in November 2016 and two remotely in August and September 2018.

- Interviewee K1: A staff member at the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency committee (AFAD)
- Interviewee K2: A staff member of the Turkish Red Crescent in southern Turkey.
- Interviewee K3: A university professor in Kilis.
- Interviewee K4: One of the Kilis camp's inhabitants (remote interview).
- Interviewee K5: Ahmad Ajouz who was the translator of Mac McLelland, a reporter and journalist with The New York Times, while visiting the camp for four days in 2014.

Even though the number of qualitative interviews was small in comparison to the ones conducted in Jordan and Lebanon, the outcomes were useful and the information gained was still very valuable and provided sufficient basis for analysis and comparison.

3.6.1 Overview

Interviewee K1 expressed that Turkey has been a main supporter to Syrian refugees who are seeking shelter and pointed out that Turkish citizens and government are very proud of the camps; they added that Syrian refugees are considered as brothers and sisters to Turkish citizens, thus the refugee camps were designed well to cover all Syrians' needs. They added, "*the Turkish refugee camps of Syrians are the best in the world.*" However, no permits were issued in order to check the reality of that claim (K1, 2016).

Interviewee K2 who was more collaborative, but also protective, provided information about the early stages of Kilis camp. K2 stated that during the initial establishment period of the camp, tents were provided as housing for the refugees. *However, since then, the conflict in Syria having persisted and its aftermath proving to be too dangerous for refugees to return to their home country, containers were brought into the camp, rendering a rather permanent living status to its facilities.* Tents were moved to the other side of the border and the container houses were then wheeled in to accommodate the entire camp. They added that each container is divided into two flats with 2 or 3 bedrooms, 1 kitchen and 1 bathroom.

> *"Kilis camp has a kindergarten, primary school, high school, handicraft work programme, social programs, the latter for which the graduating participants may receive money for their work in the future. There are some job opportunities for women in the camp, such as managing a laundromat and cash is in fact given to these female workers. Moreover, a monthly allowance of 100 Turkish lira per refugee is given to every new refugee family, as well as the possibility to earn more money if they obtain a job inside the camp." (K2, 2016)*

They added that the Turkish government, desiring the newcomers to feel welcomed and more comfortable, built schools and houses made of containers and built a mosque out of concrete in the camp. All the other facilities are made of concrete as well. Further, the government gave bicycles to the refugee children.

> *"The Turkish government allows the Syrian refugees to express their own culture, whereas other countries sometimes repress customs and norms of Syrians. A testimony from a reporter, belonging to another news agency, interviewing a resident, conveys that, despite having seen many refugee camps in different countries, the Kilis refugee settlement, is the most impressive one. In the words of the reporter: 'I saw many camps in different countries and if I had a choice as a refugee, I would stay in Turkey.'"* –K2, 2016

When asked about the settlement location of Syrian refugees before coming to the camp, K2 added that they were still in Kilis city but were lodged in schools, dormitories or were hosted by Turkish residents. The Turkish government then decided to create a refugee camp to accommodate the growing number of Syrians fleeing from their home country.

When asked if the Syrian refugees would leave the camp/country once the war is finished, K2 pointed out that the refugees would like to go back to Syria. *"Although they are quite appreciative of the Turkish people for their hospitality, they miss their home country,"* says K2.

After K2 added that all the areas that are peaceful now in Syria are currently rebuilding, more questions followed about the future of the camp once the Syrians can return home;

> *NC: Once the conflict has been resolved and once the Syrian refugees leave the camp, will the Turkish government keep the camp or demolish it?*
>
> *K2: The decision-making process is essentially undertaken solely by the Turkish government. It is unknown at this point what will become of the camp after the refugees leave, but it will probably not be destroyed. It might be reused for something else, but it will not be destroyed.*
>
> *NC: Would the people of Kilis be content with living in the camp, since the main housing structures, the container buildings, will remain intact?*
>
> *K2: Kilis city is already established and is composed of houses. If some existing housing is not suitable, the government might subsidize some of the container buildings to citizens, so perhaps they could keep them in the camp.*

K2 added that if Syrian refugee families had money, they would not necessarily live in the camp but would probably rent a house in Kilis city instead and maybe open a business if possible. He pointed out that the city has over 90,000 Turkish citizens and a further 100,000 Syrians (as of November 2016), which has put pressure on the infrastructure and public facilities as well as creating social issues and economic problems. He added that, "*years ago, when the first wave of Syrian refugees came to Kilis, they were shopping in Turkish stores. Nowadays, however, they are shopping amongst their own shops which they have created in the city. But in general, the Syrian refugees are contributing to the growth of the economy in Kilis.*" (K2, 2016)

3.6.2 The Spatial Conditions of Kilis Camp

Figure 53: Satellite image of Kilis Oncupinar Camp

According to K2, Kilis Oncupinar camp was the first refugee camp built in Turkey to accommodate the refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war. It is located at Oncupinar, next to Turkey's border with Syria in Kilis and is fully managed and operated by AFAD. It was opened in 2012 and it hosted 14,000 people in February 2014. According to the official numbers of UNHCR-Turkey and AFAD, as of July 2018, the camp hosted 10,577 refugees, contradicting the information provided by K4 (the inhabitant interviewee), who stated that the camp only has 4,000 inhabitants and that the number is dropping (as of Aug 2018).

The Camp Layout

Kilis is one of eleven container camps opened by AFAD; it is based on the grid model of the UNHCR standards and guidelines, with the aim of offering a higher quality of life and better standard of shelter to incoming refugees than traditional tent camps. It consists of 2,053 identical containers, linked with brick paths, several schools, kindergartens and playgrounds which serve the camp's pupils (CA/AL-Sharq, 2015).

During the interview with K4, the camp inhabitant, K4 referred to the camp layout as 'matchbox'; everything is very organized, aligned and repetitive, including the containers' communities and sectors. All distances in between these are equal, even the light posts. Streets and sidewalks are wide and the electric grid is underground. The camp services and public use buildings/facilities are spread equally all over the camp. From north to south, the camp starts with the main entrance, administration, logistics services, the hospital, clinic and kindergartens. Further in there is a grocery supermarket for the camp inhabitants, then the caravans' sections start from sections A to L, divided

by wide streets, after which there is the playground, another grocery store/market and two mosques in the camp (K4, 2018).

K4 expressed frustration with the camp layout and design; they said that even though all the basic services and necessities are available in the camp, they feel that it is very standardized and rigidly fixed with no opportunities to add, change or improve anything.

The type of structures, road networks and materials used combine to establish a more permanent type settlement than those at Zaatari and Azraq. This is important regarding the provision of services but has not been very favorable for inhabitants who have not been involved in the planning and development process. Refugees are unable to adapt their conditions and feel disempowered from the social, public spaces necessary for the creation of active and flourishing communities.

Public Use Buildings, Facilities and Infrastructure

Figure 54: Aerial view of Kilis Oncupinar Camp from North to South. Çevik, S. (2017)

When asked about public use buildings, K4 mentioned that the provision of services is good in the camp. Regarding the education system and children's activities, all grades are available, from kindergarten to high school (K4, 2018).

This was confirmed by a news article that was published in 2014 by The New York Times Magazine under the title *How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp,* where Kilis camp was the case-study. According to the author Mac McClelland who spent four days in the camp with a Syrian interpreter (Interviewee K5) the camp did not look like an inviting place to live from the outside because of the high gates which bar entry, walls topped with barbed wire, police officers and private security milling about, as well as ID card and fingerprint scanners, metal detectors and X-ray machines at the entry. (McClelland, 2014).

Figure 55: Barbed wired fencing at Kilis. Source: Tobias Hurzker for The New York Times. ANADOLU AGENCY. (2016)

From the inside Kilis does have advantages over other camps and McClelland talks about her experience of seeing services such as infrastructure networks, Turkish workers maintaining cleanliness of the streets, brand-new brick paths, street-washing trucks, power lines, streetlights, multiple playgrounds, fire hydrants and a maintenance team that can fix electric and plumbing problems. She compares the Kilis Oncupinar to other camps where many of the world's displaced live in bad conditions, striking for their wretchedness, where there are only tents, rotting garbage and raw sewage smells, hard living conditions and a lack of infrastructure. In her article, McClleland refers to the amenities and services provided at Kilis as 'luxuries'. Refugees, on the other hand, might think of these facilities as a way to ensure their basic human rights to a decent standard of living, as most people would.

Shelter Typologies

Figure 56: One of the streets at Kilis Camp. Source: Tobias Hurzker for The New York Times (McClelland, 2014)

Based on their interviews with refugee families, McClelland and K5 highlight the general shelter typology in the camp; all trailers/containers have the same size of 7-by-3 meters divided into three rooms. The front door is lockable, the bathroom is serviced by its own plumbing and hot-water tank; the kitchen is equipped with a refrigerator and a stove; there is a living room and a small color TV.

Figure 57: Inside one of the containers. Source: Tobias Hurzker for The New York Times (McClelland, 2014)

K4 (the refugee inhabitant) as well as McClleland and K5 mention the spatial challenges in the camp faced by the refugee families and the feeling of being crammed into their shelter units. One of the containers housed twelve people: a woman interviewee (in McClleland's article), 30, living with her husband, her husband's parents, her three children, her husband's three brothers, one of whom has a son, and a nephew, as well as 15 canaries in three cages, all together in a space of 230 square feet (21.3 m^2), equal to 1.7 m^2 per person, equivalent to one third of what UNHCR states in their standards (minimum of 3.2-4.5 m^2 per person).

K4 expresses the frustrations and concerns of their family and many families in the camp regarding the shelter space.

> *"There is no way to raise our children properly because of the very limited space inside shelters and outside between shelter units—they are extremely close to each other. Moreover, People are not allowed to get any home appliances such as ovens, washing machines, air conditioners etc. because these would consume electricity and water."* (K4, 2018)

The controlled and rigid living conditions imposed at the micro scale disempower and negatively affect the camp inhabitants who have the will and desire, but not the permission or support to improve them.

3.6.3 The Economic Situation in Kilis

Due to the lack of specific literature on Kilis camp, the remote interview with K4 was very valuable, particularly regarding the economic situation. K4 explained how the spatial conditions and camp location have affected the economic situation of inhabitants. Based on the information provided by K4, the economic issues could be listed as follows;

- The camp location is very far from urban areas and the province center, directly affecting the possibility of finding job opportunities, thus the majority of working members in the camp work in agriculture in nearby areas.

- There is no public transportation between Kilis city and the camp. Mobility is confined to independent taxi drivers and vans.
- If anything breaks down in the *caravans* (shelter units), inhabitants have to hire the camp technician team to fix it, part of the camp administrative unit. Refugees have to pay out of pocket for repairs.

They add that there was a souk at Kilis that provided life in the camp and offered some job opportunities, but *it was later shut down by the administration of the camp approximately two years ago (in 2016), resulting in many families leaving the camp and relocating to Turkish cities instead. Thus, it has been really hard to cover needs inside the camp as the only place to get stuff is at the Turkish camp grocery stores, which have a limited range of items available as well as high prices.*

Figure 58: Two of the grocery stores at Kilis. Source: Tobias Hurzker for The New York Times (McClelland, 2014)

When asked about the reason for the souk getting shut down, Interviewee K4 said,

> "*I am not sure what the exact reason was, but one of the possibilities was to open the government grocery stores in the camp and leave the inhabitants with no choice but to buy from them. This has happened in multiple camps in southern Turkey; they have closed the camps' souks and opened grocery stores.*"

Another question posed to camp inhabitants was where their source of income comes from, where people get money from in order to live and whether working in agriculture is enough; they answered that each person gets 100 Turkish Lira[13] (TL), given as a voucher that can only be used within the camp. Otherwise, all services in the camp such as water, electricity, healthcare and education are free. What people earn from agricultural work is little but covers most needs, however, the work is hard and tiring. "*Regarding elders and people with disabilities, they get the same services as other inhabitants. Sadly, no additional advantages are offered to them based on their situation.*"

Since 2016, the European Union (EU), partnered with the Turkish Red Crescent, has sent billions of euros to assist the Syrian refugees. Their initial payment of 3 billion euros (through this program alone) has been increased to include another 3 billion as of March 2018. This money is loaded on to cards, similar to debit cards, allows 120 TL per refugee each month, which covers up to 80% of their

[13] 100 TL was equivalent to $27USD but has dropped recently to $15.6 USD (August 2018).

food/necessities. It can be further topped up based on childrens' school attendance, or qualifying as a single mother, senior citizen, or someone with a disability (Summers, 2018). This program reaches 1 million Syrian refugees, so it is unclear how many refugee camp inhabitants are allowed to participate. Additionally, this monetary support from the EU comes with the expectation that Turkish officials block migration of Syrian refugees from Turkey into the EU, another indication of how funding is dependent on acceptance of donor conditions and of the containment approach to refugees (Baczynska, 2018; European Commission, 2019).

3.6.4 The Social Fabric in Kilis

For Interviewee K4, when asked about the social relations between family inhabitants and whether the lifestyle and living conditions are very different to those in the villages and cities back in Syria, they replied that there is no comparison between living at home in Syria with living in a refugee camp, whether staying in a caravan/container or a tent. "Life in this camp is like living in a giant prison while the difference is that here we have family members and relatives." K4 mentioned some of the things that are making their lives in the camp 'miserable';

- *The camp feels like a prison mainly because of the daily life routine— people feel so bored.*
- *The lack of proper dwelling space*
- *The lack of parks and gardens—recreational space*
- *The need for a permit in order to exit or enter the camp with a thorough security inspection every time.*
- *People are not allowed to adapt/transform their shelter units nor get appliances to improve their living conditions—Families feel they are controlled and limited by the camp layout and administration.*

K4 adds, *"with these daily frustrations continuing over time spent in the camp, the social relations between inhabitants deteriorated to the point that many people in the camp today do not talk to each other, even when they live next door or in the same community/street"* (K4, 2018).

They add, because of all of the living difficulties and challenges, the number of inhabitants has dropped *to around 4,000 today and the number keeps dropping as more families leave the camp every day; "I have no idea why they are making the living conditions hard like that in the camp."* (K4, Aug 2018).

Figure 59: The spatial, cultural and social dimensions at Kilis camp Weinthal, B. (2013)

The last part of McClelland's article supports K4's insights; after highlighting all of the amenities and spatial conditions, McClelland touches on the social aspects and life in the camp. She adds, "Besides the comforts, and the cleanliness and the impressive facilities of the Kilis camp (**Fig. 59**), there is one important thing to note: nobody likes living there."

McClelland ends her article with different statements by her interviewees, describing the hardship of living in Kilis camp, despite all the available services and desirable spatial conditions for a refugee camp.

- A section leader tells her "*It is hard for us. Inside, we are unhappy. In my heart it's temporary, not permanent*"—as a reflection about the life in the camp.
- A woman interviewee said that *keeping her spirit up was difficult*, "*we are visiting relatives, volunteering, trying to keep busy. But it is nothing like home*"
- Another statement was "*This camp has many services but we are not happy here*"

In 2016, interviewee K2, who is a Turkish citizen and a staff member at Red Crescent in southern Turkey, mentioned that a shift towards a focus on the social and psychological aspects of the lives of the refugees (ex. social centers for children and women/vocational schools for men) has occurred following the creation of the camp.

When asked about the mental health of refugees in the camp and if they have trauma issues, K2 answered,

"When the camp was first created, the Turkish government established a counselling support team for the refugees in Kilis and Gaziantep, composed of about 200 support workers. Moreover, there is a very effective integration program involving Syrian refugee peers. Upon the arrival of new refugees at the camp, they are paired with established refugee inhabitants so that they receive orientation and knowledge about how the camp functions. The use of such a method facilitates transitioning for newcomers, as they would tend to feel more at ease, better understood and supported. There is also a youth councillor team at Kilis camp set up to offer the youth and the children of refugee families a more comforting and pleasant

environment, as a distraction from the traumatic situation they were exposed to prior to immigrating to Turkey.[11]

Based on the answers of interviewee K4, all of the facts and programs above did not seem to help the refugee families as the fundamental factors of livelihood opportunities, community and active social participation are still missing. K4 explained the difficulties and challenges in the camp and how many refugee families have left already because of the living conditions and environment at Kilis.

Even though the Turkish government has invested in the camp, trying to establish public facilities and provide services, they do not seem to have responded to the needs and desires of the inhabitants for employment opportunities. The lack of livelihoods in the camp is compounded by the very standardized living conditions, which affect the social life and interactions, resulting in many families leaving the camp and moving to urban areas.

Interviewee K3, another Turkish citizen and professor at Kilis University, explains the impact of the large number of Syrian refugees in Kilis city, higher than the number of Turkish citizens. K3 says that the current refugee situation in Kilis has already created social issues between Turkish people and Syrians as well as between Turkish citizens themselves. K3 pointed out several issues which can be summarized as follows;

- *Since Syrian refugees arrived to Kilis city, and due to the high demand on housing, landlords have increased rent rates.*
- *As many Syrian families have cars, this has created parking issues in the city.*
- *Job competition; Syrians have been accepting lower salaries, thus many Turkish citizens have become unemployed and/or had to accept matching salaries to Syrians.*
- *Many Turkish men are now interested in and getting married to Syrian women; "Men betray their wives with Syrian women."*
- *Syrian shop owners do not pay tax, while Syrians shop amongst themselves.*
- *There is no formal data about Syrian refugees in Kilis City*
- *There is not much integration happening in Kilis, Syrian families are forming their own community within the Turkish one.*
- *There is the language barrier as Turkish and Arabic are different; only Syrian children are learning the language. Adults and elderly only speak Arabic, creating social barriers between the two nations.*
- *The law that applies to Turkish people does not necessarily apply to Syrians, creating friction and an unfair situation for Turkish citizens.* (K3, 2016)

When asked about the situation at Kilis camp, K3 was not very familiar with the living conditions inside the camp but said that it is small in general, "It is not good, not bad." K3 also shared two of their books/publications (Paksoy 2013; Paksoy et al 2014) in Turkish which explain in detail the impact of Syrians on the Turkish society in Kilis. The research materials of K3 provide very good evidence that the Turkish government's management policies of the camp(s) seem not only to adversely affect Syrians but also Turkish citizens as well, particularly over the long term.

3.6.5 Kilis Analysis Results

Based on the five conducted interviews and literature review, the issues at Kilis camp can be summarized as follows:

Physical-Spatial Issues

- The camp is far from urban areas and the provincial center, while there is no public transportation between Kilis city and the camp. Mobility is confined to independent taxi drivers and vans.
- The camp layout is very organized, standardized and repetitive, creating frustration for inhabitants, while there are no opportunities to add, change or improve anything.
- The type of structures, road networks and materials used, all present a more permanent settlement than Zaatari and Azraq, important regarding the provision of services. However inhabitants were not involved in the planning and cannot adapt shelters, even if some refugees at Kilis have added plastic sheets and fabrics in order to privatize some of the open spaces next to their shelter units (**Fig. 56, Fig. 63**).
- The camp does not look inviting from the outside or inside because of the high gates which bar entry, walls topped with barbed wire, police officers and private security milling about, as well as ID card and fingerprint scanners, metal detectors and X-ray machines at the entry. This confirms K4 feeling of being in a giant prison.
- Lack of proper dwelling space; the community planning and design of shelter units raise different spatial challenges which the refugee families face; feeling crammed into their shelter units. Some containers housed twelve people where the total area of shelter all together is 230 square feet (21.3m^2), equal to 1.7m^2 per person, equivalent to one third of what UNHCR states in their standards (minimum of 3.2-4.5m^2 per person).
- Shelter units are extremely close to each other and refugee families have frustrations and concerns over the limited spaces in the camp, particularly when it comes to raising children.
- Moreover, inhabitants are not allowed to get any home appliances such as ovens, washing machines, air conditioners etc. because these would consume electricity and water.
- The lack of parks and gardens—recreational space

Socio-Cultural Issues

- Elderly and people with disabilities in the camp get the same services as other inhabitants. No additional support is offered to them according to their situation.
- The camp feels like a prison mainly because of the daily life routine— people feel extremely bored.
- The need for a permit in order to exit or enter the camp, with a thorough security inspection each time.
- People are not allowed to adapt/transform their shelter units nor get appliances to improve their living conditions—Families feel they are controlled and limited by the camp layout and administration.

Economic Issues

- Refugees do not have job opportunities in the camp other than voluntary ones. And the camp location, far from urban areas, directly reduces possibilities for finding work. Thus, the majority of working members in the camp work in agriculture in nearby areas, requiring a lot of effort whilst offering little income.
- If anything breaks down in the *caravans* (shelter units), inhabitants have to hire the camp technician team to fix it, part of the camp administrative unit. Refugees have to pay from their own pockets.
- There was a souk at Kilis that provided social and economic life in the camp and offered some job opportunities but it was later shut down by the administration of the camp approximately two years ago (in 2016), resulting in many families leaving the camp and relocating to Turkish cities instead.
- The only place to buy necessities is the camp Turkish grocery stores, which have a limited range of items available as well as high prices. Each person gets 100 Turkish Lira (TL), given as a voucher that can only be used within the camp.

Camp Advantages

The majority of the camp advantages fall under the category of physical-spatial conditions

- The camp covers most of the basic services and necessities of refugees, including health services and secondary education.
- The roads and passageways between communities are all made of brick.
- One of the camp sectors has two-story shelter units which provide shade and occupy a smaller physical footprint.
- The camp has two playgrounds for children.
- The camp is just next to a main highway as well as the Turkish-Syrian border.

Kilis – Evaluative Summary: Analysis of Kilis presents many of the same issues as those experienced at Azraq. Once again it can be seen how the UNHCR guidelines are adept at ensuring coverage of basic needs but are completely lacking in the developmental approach and vision needed to empower refugees properly and promote and support active, flourishing, integrated community settlements.

The rigid, controlling structures imposed on refugees at Kilis are restrictive rather than beneficial and the references to the camp being like a prison further underline the consequences of the containment and charity approach implicit and key in the UNHCR model.

The lack of participation of refugees in decision making spaces, the attempt to prohibit economic interactions, the conception of housing as 'container units' rather than homes, the lack of support for creation of social organization and community structures are all negative factors in play at Kilis and mirror many aspects of the experience at Azraq and to a lesser extent at Zaatari. Given the

limitations of the conception of the UNHCR vision of what a refugee camp should be and do, this is to be expected. Our analysis of these first three camps reveals a pattern emerging from this approach and conveys the message that *the more strictly UNHCR standards are applied the more difficult and uncomfortable life can be for refugees.*

The limitations of the UNHCR model highlighted by our analysis of Kilis (and reflected in the analysis of Azraq and Zaatari) should not be seen as unexpected problems but rather consequences of the shortcomings of the UNHCR paradigm itself. All these problems and limitations point to the disinterest or lack of understanding of this approach in creating resilient and flourishing communities where refugees are happy and can exercise the full spectrum of their developmental needs and human rights.

3.7 Deir Zanoun Camp, Bekaa, Lebanon

Figure 60: Satellite image of Deir Zanoun Camp (Google Maps 2018)

Deir Zanoun is a compound of six small self-built encampments, located in Bekaa, eastern Lebanon. It was established in 2012 by Syrian families as a tent-style camp using whatever materials they were able to find, from wood and tarps to plastic sheets. There are many such informal refugee settlements in the area with a few humanitarian NGOs providing aid, including UNHCR, which usually provides tents and limited construction materials for families in new encampments, as well as limited health services and child support for school registration and transportation. UNHCR also supports registered families financially ($28 USD/per person every month), keeps track of the number of refugees in every camp and also applies rules related to newcomers in order to limit the growth of each camp (Abou Zeinab, 2018).

According to the UNHCR estimate from August 2018, around 5.6 million Syrians have fled their homes in search of safety in neighboring countries. Lebanon is currently hosting over 1 million Syrians, 976,000 of whom are registered with UNHCR, living in 222,412 households. The majority are located in Bekaa valley—351,972 people, followed by Beirut and north Lebanon with around 251,500 each (UNHCR Operational Portal, 2018).

The Lebanese government has been continuously prohibiting any new formal refugee settlements in Lebanon, since the influx of Palestinian refugees beginning in 1948, when 'temporary' camps were established and which still exist today as informal concrete camps. Instead of going with the policy of creating formal UNHCR containment camps (Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis under AFAD auspices) they have allowed refugees to create these informal settlements for themselves and coordinated with UNHCR to provide limited support systems.

The political decision of the Lebanese government has meant Syrian refugees choosing between residing in informal neighborhoods of the Lebanese urban areas (where their finances allow) or creating self-encampments in rural areas. This has led to the creation of hundreds of group self-encampments all over Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa valley, one of Lebanon's poorest agricultural regions, creating an environment for impoverished refugees to settle. Settlements of white tents with no clear organization dot the expansive fields of the valley (**Fig. 65**). Mainly because of its large agricultural area and the vast space for improvised camps to take shape, Bekaa Valley has become the main attraction point for informal settlements to house the influx of Syrian refugees. Since Lebanon does not recognize these settlements as official camps, they are often built with whatever their inhabitants can get their hands on, or anything that the humanitarian NGOs are able to provide.

Figure 61: Informal Syrian encampments in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon. Lamb, F. (2018)

Prior to a site visit, a personal phone interview was conducted in April 2018 with Salah Ghanem, a Humanitarian Aid Distributor at Irshad Charity-Lebanon. Ghanem has been working on providing aid to Syrians in the Bekaa region since they began arriving in 2011. During the phone interview he stated the following;

- Most of the camps in Bekaa look the same and are in bad condition.
- Most units/communities are not connected to the sewage or drainage systems.
- Tents must be changed or maintained at least once a year due to the harsh natural conditions.
- Many refugees are dependent on humanitarian aid and assistance (even though it is limited).
- Each Syrian refugee (irrespective of age) receives only $25-27 USD/month from UNHCR. For example, a family of 6 members receives around $160/month.

- Refugee families pay rent to the landlord(s) through sector leaders, and the rent varies based on the tent size and occupied area ($50-200 per month). Due to financial difficulties, some shelter units accommodate 2-3 families.
- He estimates that there are over 100 informal settlements of Syrian encampments in Bekaa, each with a camp leader who represents families and receives and distributes aid (Ghanem, 2018).

As this camp is just one of over 100 Syrian refugee encampments in Bekaa, it was extremely difficult to find information about it, with an absence of both academic articles and specific humanitarian reports. Most of the available information refers to the general situation of Syrian refugees in Bekaa. Therefore, the main source of information was first-hand materials collected through a site visit.

In July 2018, a group of four Lebanese architects were commissioned to visit Deir Zanoun in order to map the camp and conduct interviews (See Annex 5). The mapping team was divided into two groups; one group did the *spatial* mapping and *physical* assessments and the other group focused on conducting planned qualitative interviews in order to collect information regarding the *social* life in the camp as well as to assess the *economic* activities, available services and refugees' needs. The number of qualitative interviews conducted was 15 with around 55 interviewees involved. The collected information is presented and analyzed thoroughly in the following sections.

3.7.1 The Spatial Conditions of Deir Zanoun

Camp Layout, Sectors and Population

The spatial mapping team identified that Deir Zanoun is a compound of six small camps or sectors, forming one overall compound, split over the two sides of the road with a total population of around 1,500 refugees. The six sectors can be listed as follows;

- Jomaa sector: around 300 people, living in 64 structures.
- Jeled sector: around 180 people, living in 40 structures.
- Sabah sector: around 65 people, living in 30 structures.
- Abou Hussein sector: around 446 people, living in 73 structures.
- Abou Kamal sector: around 300 people, living in 29 structures
- The sixth sector was left unmapped due to site challenges and time limitations

Figure 62: Layout of Deir Zanoun camp. (Source: Abou Zeinab, 2018). Map produced by author.

This totals approximately 295 structures. In most cases, multiple families are living together in a single shelter unit, reinforcing the point made by Ghanem. The drawing above was developed on AutoCad based on information collected from Google Earth as well as through identifying structures, functions and zoning on site. The three sectors to the left side of the road are Jeled, Jomaa and Sabah, while the ones to the right are Abou Hussein and Abou Kamal, and the northern sector is the unmapped one.

Infrastructure and Public Facilities

Figure 63: Deir Zanoun Camp. (Abou Zeinab)

The compound of Deir Zanoun generally lacks basic services and any kind of public facility buildings, raising a range of different issues and hardening the living conditions in the camp. Most services and

facilities are missing due to the absence of support from humanitarian NGOs, the high number of encampments in Bekaa, and, most importantly, the limited amount of available funds due to the lack of support from the Lebanese government and UNHCR (Ghanem, 2018).

Water and electricity: One of the main needs of families is water. Each family receives only around 500 L of water/month from UNHCR. In order to cover their needs, they have to buy additional water from private providers each week. The situation is similar when it comes to the lack of public electricity, due to the 'temporary' nature of the camp and the insufficient public energy grid in the surrounding urban areas. Refugee families also have to buy electricity from local private providers, or illegally connect to the public grid, increasing overall demand and thus resulting in increases in shortages and maintenance expenses. These actions also put refugees in danger due to the informal nature of their connections to the grid and the associated risks. Moreover, the locals can react negatively to this and force refugees to take their electrical wires down.

Healthcare: Refugee families in the camp suffer whenever health issues arise since the camp lacks any kind of healthcare services. Most of the families interviewed mentioned this issue as a fundamental one which needs an urgent solution. The findings in terms of health can be summarized as follows:

- UNHCR provides vaccines to children every 3 months
- Hygiene levels in all sectors are very low
- There are no nearby local healthcare centers.
- Families cannot afford to take their children to local hospitals
- There is no medical attention/care in general

One of the interviewees mentioned that Deir Zanoun has a couple of members who used to be doctors and nurses in Syria but cannot resume their professions or work in the camp due to it lacking the necessary structures, facilities and equipment. In addition, the camp is home to many people with special needs/disabilities, however humanitarian NGOs including UNHCR are either not aware of their situation or are not taking their conditions into consideration in their approaches.

Education: Refugee families stated that another fundamental problem is the lack of education in the camp. The inhabitants mentioned that all six sectors lack any kind of educational facilities/services. There used to be a central school made of tents for children's activities but it was later closed due to financial difficulties.

Families receive aid from UNHCR to send up to 3 children to a nearby local school called Al-Rawda, however, families in the camp have an average of 6 children per household, limiting the chance of many children to go to school and receive education. The quality of education services at Al-Rawda school has also been affected, as the number of pupils exceeds its capacity. Other local schools are in a similar situation. Some families mentioned that local schools are no longer accepting their children, thus they have to find alternatives for their education (Abou Zeinab, 2018). UNHCR is limiting the number of inhabitants in the camp as well as controlling the educational activities and is taking responsibility for registering up to three children from each family in nearby schools and for the daily transportation of children. This is better than nothing but is still resulting in a situation where many refugee children are being denied their right to primary and secondary education.

Recreation: The camp lacks all kind of recreational facilities and built public spaces where refugees can do outdoor activities, however the lack of perimeter fencing and control of refugees means they

do enjoy a freedom of movement which contrasts with that of the regimes at Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis. Based on the interviews, most families at Deir Zanoun would like to have recreational features in the camp and a community center where they could do activities and feel involved as well as a gathering space, for children and religious activities.

Shelter Typologies and Camp Communities

The shelters forming the six sectors are mostly made of plastic sheeting, zinc sheets and tents, constructed by refugees on land owned by local Lebanese farmers. They have to pay rent in order to use the land and keep their tents there, with the rent varying based on the tent/shelter size.

Families reported that weather conditions are tough, especially in winter since the tents lack proper insulation or heating systems, forcing families to rely on blankets, or purchasing fuel for fires which can pose dangers in a crowded informal encampment. Generally, refugee families in the camp suffer during the very cold winter months, there can be extreme flooding, which causes extensive damage and temporary relocation. When it comes to the hot weather conditions there is a general absence of shade although families adapt their shelters to mitigate the worst effects and most families have bought electric fans to improve ventilation.

Figure 64: In between shelter units. (Abou Zeinab)

It was identified that around 50% of the units in all 6 sectors are in fair shape. The remaining 50% are in very poor condition in terms of structural stability and quality of materials and the tenant refugee families have no money to renovate and improve their units.

When the camp first opened, UNHCR provided half of the building materials with the refugees responsible for finding the rest. Due to the proximity to job opportunities, two out of six sectors in the camp (Jomaa and Jeled) look more organized today, having more appropriate shelter units and better quality of passageways and services, and consequently better and more dignified living conditions.

In Deir Zanoun, refugees are allowed to bring additional materials in to extend their existing tents in order to accommodate new family members, however they are not allowed to build new shelters, as enforced by UNHCR. Some families have better quality and bigger tents, some have private bathrooms, however in most cases, multiple families share one tent and use a shared public bathroom.

Even where public and private washrooms are provided in the camp, Deir Zanoun lacks sewage and drainage networks as well as a water network, thus families had to buy plastic tanks and place them next to their shelter units.

UNHCR has provided tents and some construction materials and they do encourage refugee families to find job opportunities and work locally in order to improve their living conditions and upgrade their shelter units.

3.7.2 The Economic Situation

Figure 65: The women of Jomaa and Jeled working in agriculture. (Abu Zeinab)

As mentioned in the previous section, the sectors of Jomaa and Jeled are doing better than other sectors as the inhabitants are able to work and have an additional source of income above the $27 USD which every refugee receives from UNHCR each month. Most women in these two sectors, including mothers, work in agriculture (**Fig. 65**), while men work in construction in local urban areas. The women also buy some of the harvest and sell it as street vendors on the main road every couple of weeks. Usually buyers are passers-by, camp inhabitants from Deir Zanoun or families from other Syrian encampments. These small income-generating activities for the men and women of Jomaa and Jeled are helping them to improve the situation of their families.

The sector leaders of Jomaa and Jeled are working together with the inhabitants to improve living conditions. The advantage of these two sectors is that they are located just next to agricultural lands which offer job opportunities to the inhabitants allowing women to work very close to their shelter units. The men interviewed mostly mentioned working in construction outside of the camp since they do not need a permit for this type of work and are easily accepted. In Jomaa and Jeled, all men and women work, while in the other mapped sectors, only some men work and none of the women are working.

All sector leaders are renting out land from Lebanese landlords/farmers and collect the rent from the inhabitants monthly. Some sector leaders, such as in Abou Hussein, charge higher rents than the ones in the other sectors. In Abou Hussein the average rent is 90K LBP/month ($60 USD); Abou

Kamal and Sabah have an average rent of 60K LBP/month ($40 USD); and in Jomaa and Jeled, the average rent is 70K LBP/shelter unit ($47 USD).

Few people in Abou Hussein and Abou Kamal have jobs as their location does not offer the same advantages as other sectors and the sector leaders are applying restrictions, mostly on women, by forbidding them to work because of cultural and traditional beliefs.

In Jomaa and Jeled people have established a few shops and street kiosks in order to sell shoes, clothes, grocery, vegetables etc. It is noticeable that there is a high level of solidarity and collaboration between families in these two sectors as well as with sector leaders.

Generally, most of the camp inhabitants hope to have job opportunities in order to be active and to be able to cover their needs, even if through working as cheap labor. However, due to bad leadership by the sector leader in Abou Hussein, residents are prohibited from working while the sector's leader receives most of the aid and support from humanitarian NGOs. This is creating a tough challenge for this sector's people; most of the inhabitants of the sector have needs that are not covered, even when it comes to food and water. The leader of Abou Hussein owns three out of six shops in the whole compound, while the other three are located in Jeled.

In general, it was noticeable how the people of Jomaa and Jeled are working together, generating income, improving their living conditions and able to finance sending all their children to local schools to receive education, even in families with many children. The families of Jomaa and Jeled have expressed that they need nothing as they work in the nearby agriculture and urban areas. They are getting paid, they can open shops and they generally have a better quality of tents with concrete flooring and are able to improve their quality of life. Furthermore, based on site assessments, the tents in these two sectors seemed well organized inside and outside in comparison to the other sectors.

3.7.3 The Social Fabric of the Camp

Deir Zanoun is currently home to around 1,500 people, most of whom are children and women. UNHCR-Lebanon has a record of all refugee families and the camp cannot accept more arrivals until an existing refugee family leaves based on UNHCR's recommendations (Abou-Zeinab, 2018).

Moreover, even though there is social interaction between the 6 sectors, there is tension between Jomaa and Jeled sectors, and Abou Hussein and Abou Kamal sectors as the inhabitants of the last two think that Jomaa and Jeled receive more humanitarian aid. Additionally, the two sectors Abou Hussein and Abou Kamal have tension between them, mainly because of a conflict between the sector leaders.

Refugees in the camp are generally happy because they have freedom of movement, are able to look for jobs and to do activities outside of the camp. However, there is a noticeable gap between the Jomaa and Jeled sectors and the other sectors of the camps. In the sector of Sabah, the leader is trying to improve the living conditions of the people but he is not receiving any aid. In Abou Kamal, refugees were able to build gathering tents for activities and to teach religion, but these were removed due to a conflict with the neighboring sector leader of Abou Hussein. Below are some of the statements recorded during interviews:

> **Yaze**, a 35-year-old female with 7 children, said that she is tired because of the tough living conditions in the camp and that her only hope is to teach her children.

Hala, a 37-year-old female with 5 children who lives in Jeled, expressed that she is happy living in the camp, mainly because she is able to work and thus feeling productive and in control of her life. Hala said that together with her working husband they are able to send their children to school and improve their tent unit. They mentioned that they are satisfied with the incomes they are receiving which allowed them to cover most of their needs including sending their children to school.

Tayssir, a father with a wife and 11 children said, *"We have tried to go back to Syria but we could not cross the borders. I was denied together with my family members. We are refugees here in Lebanon with no rights. That is why we prefer to go back, even if that would be risky for our lives because of war and hunger. I prefer to live with my full dignity in Syria than living here with no rights."*

Afifi, a mother in her 20's is living together with husband and 3 children. They have recently arrived in the camp. They were renting an apartment in one of the nearby urban areas but they could not afford to pay the rent any longer, forcing them to move to the camp. Afifi said that she is very worried about her children's education and future. She mentioned that they are still young and there are rarely any organizations that check on the families' situation in the camp. The UN staff show up every three months to provide minor aid; "We cannot go back to Syria and we have no idea how to proceed with our lives in such tough conditions."

Abou Kamal, one of the camp leaders, said, *"We are left alone, forgotten and neglected. We do not receive aid or services. One of the other camp leaders is receiving most of the humanitarian aid and money, but we are not receiving anything. We are not allowed to create any activities in the camp and we do not have any recreational features, thus we are doing nothing but waiting. The camp has doctors and engineers with degrees, and they are like me, not working. Isn't that a pity? They are losing their skills and their degrees have no value now, which is doubling their suffering as they are displaced in the first place."*

3.7.4 Deir Zanoun Analysis Results

Based on the answers of the **95** interviewees involved during the qualitative interviews, on the site assessments and on the analysis of collected information comparing the populations of the five different sectors, it can be concluded that:

- Due to the tough living conditions in the camp and lack of services, **50 %** of interviewees feel neutral about Deir Zanoun camp and do not mind staying there until they can return home, however they need basic services such as water, healthcare and education to be covered.
- **20 %** of interviewees are generally satisfied. They do not need anything more than a safe shelter to live in. Most of these are the working families in Jomaa and Jeled sectors.
- **30%** would prefer to go back to their hometowns in Syria, as they cannot live without work, education for their children or basic services. They wish to return even if the conditions in Syria are dangerous and there is a lack of services—they would at least feel more dignified and comfortable being in their home country. Most of these families live in Abou Kamal and Sabah sectors.

Refugees added that it is restricted by the Lebanese authorities for many families to go back as there is a fee which they have to pay in order to cross the border, as well as due to the dangers of the ongoing conflict.

Physical-Spatial Issues

- The camp was established spontaneously by refugee families with very basic and limited resources.
- The camp is missing all kinds of service facilities, infrastructure networks and proper roads and passageways, while the main refugees' needs are healthcare and education for their children.
- Shelter units are very basic; they are mostly made out of a combination of tents, plastic sheets, wooden pallets and elements and zinc sheets. Shelters need to be maintained at least once a year.
- Refugees suffer the harsh living conditions in Bekaa Valley as winters are cold while it snows there a couple of times every year.

Figure 66: A Syrian woman hangs her laundry outside her snow-covered tent at a refugee encampment in Bekaa valley, east Lebanon, Jan. 8, 2015. Photo source: Weinberg - abc News

Socio-Cultural Issues/Facts

- Most of the inhabitants of Deir Zanoun are generally happy living in the camp but they wish there were recreational facilities or activities for them to do.
- Refugee families in two out of six sectors (Jomaa and Jeled) in the camp have shown solidarity and mutual support, while the other sectors seem to have social tensions and conflicts between inhabitants, not helping with living conditions. This seems to be due in large part to the abuse of power and bad leadership of the sector leaders.
- No tensions/social issues were recorded between the camp and local context; the camp inhabitants in general do not feel integrated in the context of the camp, but interact with locals when selling vegetables or buying goods from the Lebanese stores.

Economic Issues

- Most of the camp inhabitants do not have jobs and are dependent on humanitarian aid and assistance. The $25-27 USD barely covers any of the refugees' needs. It was noticeable however that refugees in Lebanon receive cash instead of vouchers, which gives them a better chance to use the money as needed.
- The refugee women and men of Jomaa and Jeled seem to benefit from the agriculture and construction sectors in this region, which in return is helping them generate income and improve living conditions.
- The camp has six shops in total and numerous vending shacks. Some of these are located on the main roads, allowing interaction between the camp inhabitants and locals.

Camp Advantages

- Refugees have freedom of movement and leadership of their lives due to the uncontrolled conditions in the camp
- The camp location is ideal for Syrians, close to urban areas and the Syrian border as well as being located in between agricultural lands and industrial zones, making it possible to find job opportunities.
- It is mandatory for Syrians to get a work permit in Lebanon, but rarely do refugees get permits. The Lebanese authorities do not apply restrictions due to the very high number of refugees (over 1 million).
- The rents in the camp are affordable in general, in comparison with the rates of urban areas.
- Even though the camp is informal, most refugees like living in the camp (especially if missing vital services could be added), partly **because they were the ones who built it, based on their needs and perception of space.** Families can also maintain or upgrade shelter units whenever possible. In general, Syrian refugees are making use of everything they can get their hands on in order to improve the conditions of their shelter units; soil, stones, rocks, zinc sheets, plastic sheets, fabrics, wooden pallets and elements, steel pipes, plastic buckets etc.

Deir Zanoun - Evaluative Summary: Deir Zanoun presents a good comparative case which contrasts with and thereby illuminates some of the problems as well as some of the advantages of the UNHCR camp model and approach.

The informal nature of Deir Zanoun means that many of the basic services which are catered for at Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis are missing. This creates difficult basic living conditions for the inhabitants and a number of fundamental development issues. Yet in terms of their lives the inhabitants are generally more satisfied than those in the formal UNHCR camps in Jordan and Turkey. This is revealing since although key factors like education, health, support infrastructure, etc. are lacking or only partially catered for at Deir Zanoun, freedom of movement, ability to pursue livelihoods, freedom to create, adapt and improve their shelters and a sense of community and identity help to offset the impact of these problems. The refugees have greater agency over their lives, a greater

sense of empowerment and more freedom and dignity, despite having less support and more difficult conditions.

One of the key issues at Deir Zanoun is the functioning of the sectors on an organizational level. In the absence of a controlling authority external to the settlement (apart from the periodic oversight of UNHCR) the sector leader occupies a key role. In sectors where the leader is performing the role well the inhabitants have been able to cooperate effectively and actively improve their conditions. Where sector leaders are not acting in the interests of the inhabitants social tensions arise and basic problems are compounded.

As countless experiences in urban planning, development and refugee camp design and management (see Chapter 02) have demonstrated, the socio-political organization of a community or settlement is absolutely key to ensuring participation, empowerment, solidarity and agency of inhabitants. This is an element that UNHCR does not consider in the containment and charity approach it uses in management of its formal camps, excluding refugees from development decisions and imposing rules and systems upon them. In Deir Zanoun and in UNHCR treatment of informal settlements more generally, there also seems to be a lack of understanding of the vital need to support participative, democratic community organization and distribution of resources.

This lack of consideration for this key developmental element is a major contributing factor to the unhappiness of refugees in camps run according to UNHCR guidelines. The key in creating flourishing, harmonious communities is to ensure basic needs are covered but also to include inhabitants in the decision-making processes regarding coverage of these needs and development of their communities.

3.7.5 Summary of Analysis Results

This section summarizes the analysis of the previous sections of this chapter in order to clearly set out the key features of each camp, their main advantages (in green) and disadvantages (in red) and key lessons learnt from the analysis of each camp. This provides the basis for the comparative analysis presented in chapter 04.

Case-Study /Comparison Categories	Zaatari Camp 	Azraq Camp 	Kilis Camp 	Deir Zanoun Encamp. 
Description of camp layout	A formal refugee camp, established by UNHCR based on their guidelines in Northern Jordan; it started as emergency spontaneous camp whilst the second	A formal refugee camp, established by UNHCR based on their guidelines in central-eastern Jordan; pre-planned over one year	A formal refugee camp, established by AFAD based on the UNHCR guidelines in southern Turkey; the camp was pre-planned.	An informal refugee camp, established by Syrian refugee families as self-encampment in Eastern

	phase of it was pre-planned			
Density	78,000	53,000	4,000	1,500
Freedom of movement	Refugees have to apply for temporary permits in order to leave the camp; numerous security points around the camp	Refugee have to apply for temporary permits in order to leave the camp while the camp is fenced and patrolled by Jordanian national security units	Refugee have to apply for temporary permits in order to leave the camp; the camp is fenced and very secured while entering the camp requires multiple security checks	The camp is open and refugees are free to leave the camp and return whenever; no security measures
Context and Location	In a dry context, close to the Syrian border; 3km away from Zaatari village and 10km from Mafraq city; the closet border point is 20km away; connected to public transportation; agricultural lands do exist close to the camp	In a dry context, far from the main urban areas and Syrian border; established in an isolated location that is not connected to public transportation	In a temperate context, just next to the Turkish/Syrian border; far from the main urban areas; location is not connected to public transportation; surrounded by agricultural land on all sides	In a temperate context, close to the Syrian border, close to urban areas and surrounded by local housing units/farms; well connected to public transportation; the camp is surrounded by agricultural land
Key features & Shelter Typologies	The camp initially had three types of shelter units, tents, caravans and prefabricated units, which were mobilized and mixed by refugees. The principal key feature at Zaatari is the 3,000 shops market.	The only shelter typology at Azraq is the T-shelter (cabin). The principal key feature at Azraq is the high quality road network	Shelters at Kilis camp consist of prefabricated units and containers. One of the sectors has a typology of two-story units. The paved roads and pedestrian pathways as well as the services are all key features	Shelter units are all self-built using tents, plastic and metal sheets and wooden elements. The main key feature at Deir Zanoun is the central location of the camp on a main road
Physical-Spatial issues	Lack of proper infrastructure, quality of roads, low quality of pedestrian passages mainly during winter, lack of recreational features, green spaces and proper public space, shelter units are not prepared for the harsh living conditions	Lack of proper infrastructure for shelter units, low quality of pedestrian passages, lack of transportation network, the extensive physical area of the camp, lack of recreational features, green spaces and proper public space, shelter units are not	The very limited space inside shelter units and lack of space around units	The camp lacks all kind of primary and basic services, no road network inside the camp, no formal pathways, lack of water and electricity etc. The self-built shelter units are not prepared for the harsh living conditions

		prepared for the harsh living conditions		
Forms of adaptation	Refugees have mobilized units and added additional ones based on their needs, they have built private bathrooms and kitchen as well as shops, they have added concrete flooring in their shelter units	Refugees are privatizing shelter units and converting the public WASH units into private ones.	Refugees are privatizing shelter units	As Deir Zanoun is self-built there are no forms of adaptation, but rather continual upgrades
Sociocultural issues	Frustrations with life, lack of cultural events and associations as well as control of movements	People feel bored, frustrations with life, lack of cultural events and associations as well as control of movements	People feel bored, and the limited spaces between and surrounding units has created social friction in the camp—neighbours do not talk to each other in some areas; there is also a language barrier between refugees and the Turkish people	As some sectors have been doing better economically than the other one, this has led to social friction. Moreover, the sector leaders were not all supportive to one another
Economic situation	Each refugee receives around $28USD per month. Refugees started opening shops at Zaatari since the establishment of the camp. Today the market generates around 10 mil euros (8 mil JOD) a month. The market is offering thousands of job opportunities and creating a large social economy in the camp	Each refugee receives around $28USD per month. The camp now has four markets	Each refugee receives around $28USD per month. Refugees are able to work in agriculture next to the camp, but the work is hard and the income is low	Each refugee receives around $28USD per month. Refugee men in the camp are working in construction in nearby towns while women in two sectors work in agriculture, just next to their sectors
Key needs of refugees	Better and more resilient shelter units, the camp to be closer to urban areas, have job opportunities, better education,	Better and more resilient shelter units, the camp to be closer to urban areas, have job opportunities, better education,	The camp to be closer to urban areas, have job opportunities, better education, freedom of movement,	Better and more resilient shelter units and all basic services

	freedom of movement	freedom of movement	recreational features etc.	
Camp layout advantages	Having a central market	High quality road network	Higher quality of shelter units, services and roads/pathways	Having the freedom of movement and being able to work
Lessons learned & notes	The emergency and post emergency phases should be separate or in two different areas, otherwise, the camp will become informal and chaotic at the macro and micro scales	The camp should have been built closer to urban areas, which would help refugees integrate, find jobs and allow the reuse of the camp in case of refugees' repatriation	The camp should have been built closer to urban areas, which would help refugees integrate, find jobs and allow the reuse of the camp in case of refugees' repatriation.	Putting the camp on a main road, next to agricultural areas, industrials zones and nearby towns are all advantages

The next chapter presents a comparative analysis between case-studies based on four categories; political, spatial/physical, social and economic. It also **highlights the real needs of refugee inhabitants and the impact of each of the camp layouts on the well-being of refugees.** The comparative analysis also covers the aspect of formality vs informality and the impact on the living conditions and quality of life of refugees, considering whether self-settled camps offer refugees a better sense of belonging, a higher quality of life and/or less suffering.

In addition, the analysis looks at how physical-spatial adaptations impact social life and help in creation of job opportunities, thereby improving the economic situation by providing alternative sources of income.

Chapter 04

Comparative Analysis: Discussion and Recommendations

Figure 67: Aerial views of the four camps. Google Maps (2019)

The four Syrian refugee camps under comparison in this thesis and examined in detail in chapter 03 (Zaatari, Azraq, Kilis and Deir Zanoun) are complex spaces, accommodating tens of thousands of desperate refugee families who have no choice but to fight each day as best they can for better living conditions and a brighter future.

The systems of isolation and containment imposed upon refugees by host governments; the aid strategies and dependency approaches of UNHCR and of humanitarian NGOs; the concept of and creation of 'temporary' camps; and the impact of the environmental context on temporary housing structures not designed for such conditions: all these factors play a major role in defining the conditions of the camps, causing problems and making life difficult for the refugees inhabitants. These deficiencies lead to the transformation of these refugee camps over time, both through the improvements the camp management make in response as well as through the organic agency of refugee groups who do what they can, including subverting the established systems where possible, in order to meet their real needs and aspirations.

Every refugee habitat presents its own challenges and every refugee group works within the conditions imposed upon them in order to create as dignified a life as possible for themselves in very bleak situations and places. As observed while mapping the four case studies in chapter 03, it is noticeable how the Syrian refugees have mastered the art of upgrading their settlements despite the numerous and varied challenges, restrictions and limitations which they have faced.

This chapter presents a comparison and discussion of the results and findings of the analysis of the four camps, highlighting the negative and positive aspects of each case based on six terms of comparison;

I. Freedom of movement and location of camps

II. Formality and informality of camps

III. The right to work and generate income

IV. Spatial adaptations and improvement of living conditions; level of permanence, quality of living conditions and provision and absence of services

V. Recreational facilities, green spaces and public spaces

VI. Dependency and independency systems in the camps

These terms of comparison reflect the objectives of analysis selected and detailed in chapter 03 and show the most important aspects of camps for refugees, in accordance with the information obtained from on-site interviews and assessments.

Overall, the comparative analysis in this chapter provides a discussion of the strong evidential basis - established by the results of analysis set out in chapter 03 - which highlights the need to move towards a more sustainable, integrated model and approach to refugee settlements in order to achieve better outcomes for refugees and host communities, as argued in the hypothesis of this thesis. The analysis in this chapter achieves this through detailing and explaining the limitations of the current UNHCR model in relation to the four case-study camps analyzed. These considerations inform and shape the subsequent development of the ISS proposal presented in Chapter 05.

The comparison provides evaluation of the models of response of the three neighboring host countries to the large influxes of Syrian refugees, particularly in relation to how the UNHCR guidelines have been applied in each case; clarifies understanding of which aspects of the approaches taken by the three countries work best (if any) for refugees and hosting communities; deepens understanding of the similarities between the different refugee camp types and the lessons learned from each case; highlights the real needs and views of Syrian refugee inhabitants in each camp; covers the aspect of formality vs informality on the living conditions and quality of life of refugees; and further highlights the problems and shortcomings of the current international humanitarian approach towards refugees and refugee camp planning.

4.1 Freedom of Movement and Location of Camps: Isolation vs Integration

As seen throughout the analysis of the four camps, the issue of freedom of movement in and out of the camps, as well as within the host country, is a very important defining factor for the happiness and satisfaction of the Syrian refugees. It is key to a feeling of integration, belonging and social agency. The Syrian refugees came from cities and villages—urban areas where they had freedom of movement and leadership of their lives. In three out of four camps, the lack of freedom of movement has been a key limiting factor on the wellbeing of refugees with the vast majority expressing their frustration at the security measures applied inside and surrounding the camps and at the need to apply for permits in order to leave the camps.

Zaatari and **Azraq** camps are both run by UNHCR and are both secured from all sides by the Jordanian army and national defense agents, although Zaatari has less security measures than Azraq. The latter has motorized units that patrol the front of the camp, close to the entrances. Three interviewees at Zaatari and two at Azraq mentioned that the camps have barbed wire fences,

however these were only observed around the base camp at Zaatari and at the reception area and base camp at Azraq. As of 2016, it was confirmed in Jordan that refugee members caught outside of camps without permits would be deported back to Syria.

Kilis camp in Turkey, run by AFAD (Turkish authorities) has the highest security level amongst the four case studies and does looks uninviting from the inside and outside, due to high gates which bar entry, walls topped with barbed wire, police officers and private security milling about, as well as ID card and fingerprint scanners, metal detectors and X-ray machines at the entry. As explained in the last two chapters, the main interviewee in this case expressed the inhabitants' feeling of being contained in a 'giant prison' because of the limited shelter space, the numerous security measures, the need to apply for permits to get out of the camp, its location just on the Turkish/Syrian border and the strict management policy of AFAD.

Deir Zanoun in Lebanon seems to be the best of the four camps when it comes to freedom of movement. Even though the camp is self-built and lacks humanitarian aid and many primary services, the inhabitants expressed their happiness regarding being able to leave the camp and return whenever needed without any restrictions or limitations applied. The inhabitants of Deir Zanoun are generally happier than the inhabitants of the other three camps as there are no authorities or organizations administrating the camp, but rather sector leaders from the camp itself.



Figure 68: Geographical context of the four camps. Google Maps (2019)

Another critical factor for refugee camp inhabitants is the camp location. Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis were all established far from urban areas; Zaatari camp is located 3 km from Zaatari village and 14 km from Mafraq city, while the camp itself is 1km from a main road; Azraq camp is located 26 km away from Azraq village and 82 km from Amman city, the capital of Jordan; Kilis camp is 8.5 km from Kilis city; whilst Deir Zanoun was established by Syrian refugee families within the perimeter of the town of Deir Zanoun and 3.6 km from Bar Elias, the second largest town in Bekaa, Lebanon. Deir Zanoun was established on both sides of a main road, helping with recognition and integration of the camp as part of the urban fabric.

As the analysis of the four camps has shown, 95% of all refugee families interviewed prefer to be close to or part of the existing urban areas of the local hosting community for the following reasons:

- To eliminate the feeling of being contained in isolated camps in *the middle of nowhere*
- To be socially active, to interact with and be part of the wider community/society
- To be closer to public spaces, services and facilities such as souks, hospitals, schools, healthcare centers, universities, recreational facilities, parks, gardens etc.
- To have the chance of finding work opportunities
- To be well connected to public transportation
- To be close to agricultural areas and/or factories
- And most importantly, to live in similar urban settings to those in which they lived in Syria

These factors are mostly lacking in the four camps under analysis (with the exception of Deir Zanoun), catalyzing the transformation and adaptation processes which refugee inhabitants have undertaken from the outset in the camps in order to attempt to mitigate against these deficiencies.

The location of Deir Zanoun, on either side of the main road, and the freedom of movement enjoyed by the refugees there contrasts with the other analyzed case studies and lends support to the recommendation of James Kennedy (2004) on the importance of laying camps/settlements along a main road, given that the accessibility of a camp to adjacent communities and services can have a large impact on the refugees residing there (**Fig. 22; Fig. 67**). Kennedy explains that for a normal town the main road is its lifeblood and its connection to the rest of the world. In regards to establishing a refugee settlement, he suggests that it is an advantage to place the settlement along a main road as this ensures economic connections, a chance to sell products and to purchase goods from other places, as well as facilitating access to information and to meeting other people. This feature of Deir Zanoun helps in some part to mitigate the impact of the lack of basic facilities, services and decent housing in the camp.

Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis are all isolated camps, a result of the policies of the governments of Jordan and Turkey which chose not to follow an integrated developmental approach but instead decided to establish 'temporary' 'containment' camps away from existing urban areas under the guidelines of the UNHCR model. The types of camps and the negative conditions experienced by the refugees in the camps are a consequence of the political choices of those governments adopting a 'crisis management' approach, as well as the way in which the UNHCR guidelines shape the discourse regarding 'management' of the refugee population. A developmental approach that properly supports refugees instead of containing and controlling them would lead to an improvement in these conditions and in development outcomes, both for host countries and for the refugees.

Deir Zanoun's inhabitants by contrast are able to move freely, interact with the local community, find job opportunities and obtain necessary supplies and services, resulting in a higher degree of agency, quality of life, social integration, employment opportunities and living conditions, despite the lack of basic services in the camp. In the case of Deir Zanoun the decision of the Lebanese government not to establish formal UNHCR camps and the consequent lack of direct continual involvement of UNHCR is actually a positive aspect in the area of freedom of movement contributing to the further positive related consequences, already outlined in this analysis.

It is worth keeping in mind that the location of a camp not only helps (or hinders) its inhabitants to integrate and to find work and education opportunities and services, but also enables the possible

reuse of the camp's structures by the host communities in the future, following eventual repatriation of refugees. Even ignoring the many other issues with these camps, the locations of Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis, sited far from urban areas, make it very difficult for these camps to be reused by local people and host governments in future.

4.2 Formality vs Informality of Camps

Even though three out of the four camps were planned by humanitarian organizations and/or host governments (UNHCR and AFAD), all of the camps still fail to meet many of the real needs of refugees. This can be attributed to the formulaic and generally inflexible UNHCR model of camp planning which dominates the field, uses temporary 'container unit' housing unsuited to environmental conditions and social needs and imposes restrictions which prevent social and economic integration and participation of refugees.

Based on analysis and site observation, the most formal of the camps in terms of organization and planning is Kilis followed by Azraq, whilst Zaatari and Deir Zanoun are both informal, even though the post-emergency phases of Zaatari were pre-planned by UNHCR. Deir Zanoun is the most informal camp of all as it was self-built spontaneously by Syrian families. The terms 'formal' and 'informal' do not only refer to how each camp looks but also reflect the different spatial and organizational aspects such as the planning of the camp, the provision/absence of services, the type of camp administration and management, housing quality and the general living conditions.

Kilis is the most formal and organized camp of the four cases and at the same time, the least attractive to refugee groups, based on opinions expressed during interviews as well as on the evidence of the sharp decrease in inhabitants there over time. This is again due in large part to the strict application of the UNHCR guidelines which define the reality of the camp and conditions for refugees and result in factors such as the camp location far from urban areas, strict administration systems, limitations on freedom of movement, lack of job opportunities, crammed housing spaces, lack of space between units, lack of recreational facilities and particularly the difficult economic situation. This has resulted in thousands of refugees leaving the camp in the last two years, moving to Turkish urban areas. Based on the interview with K4, the inhabitants of Kilis have been extremely *frustrated and bored of the organized, standardized and repetitive layout of the camp, while there are no opportunities to add, change or improve anything.*

The situation is not too dissimilar at Azraq; the camp is very controlled and the shelter typology of fixed cabin units restricts change and presents a number of challenges and frustrations to the inhabitants. Refugees at Azraq cannot move their shelter units, forcing them to build extensions around them in order to ensure privacy, meet their needs and create additional space. The main source of materials for families has been from dismantling vacant shelter units at night and moving scraps of zinc sheets and sandwich panels around the camp.

The UNHCR guidelines and standards (applied methodically at Azraq and Kilis) limit options for refugees to adapt their living spaces. By imposing standardized and controlled living conditions on the inhabitants, these camps do not provide well-being or a feeling of belonging and home for refugees, nor do they accommodate their cultural views and social values. For example, the shared WASH centers and units at Zaatari and Azraq were very unpopular because they went against the values of Syrian families; women did not feel comfortable using public toilets or having showers outside their shelter units, resulting in the building of additional walls to isolate units for individual

use by some of the inhabitants (at Azraq), or in humanitarian NGOs demolishing and removing them (at Zaatari). Another example is the very limited space between units at Kilis which contradicts the privacy values of Syrians.

At Zaatari, another pre-planned camp, the UNHCR guidelines were used in both the emergency and post-emergency phases but were insufficient in responding to the situation of Syrian refugees in the post-emergency phase, as refugees transformed the camp and mobilized shelter units based on their needs, leading to the informality of communities. The statements of Jertila and Etyemezian highlight that the inhabitants of Zaatari were not involved in the planning process of the post-emergency phase. Yet tens of thousands of refugees nevertheless moved their shelter units to better match their spatial needs. The mobilizing process of shelters happened over a wide range at the micro scale, thereby transforming the macro look of the entire camp.

Regarding Deir Zanoun, as shown in the analysis results, even though the camp is informal and unorganized, most refugees enjoy living there (despite it lacking vital services), partly **because they were the ones who built it, based on their needs and perception of space. They therefore feel more of a sense of ownership, community and belonging.** Families can also maintain or upgrade shelter units whenever they are able to do so. The Syrian refugees at Deir Zanoun make use of everything they can get their hands on in order to improve the conditions of their shelter units; soil, stones, rocks, zinc sheets, plastic sheets, fabrics, wooden pallets, steel pipes, plastic buckets and so on. The informal elements that have been allowed to develop in Zaatari are also key to making that camp more liveable and attractive to refugees. The conclusion is that in refugee camps, allowing flexibility and participation, meaning refugees building and adapting their living spaces and environments in the way they think is right at any stage of the settlement, can foster greater happiness and well-being, particularly where provision of housing and facilities is sub-standard and does not meet their needs. The key is to get the balance between ensuring coverage of fundamental services and basic standards for all whilst ensuring freedom of movement, economic enterprise and active participation of refugees in decisions affecting their lives.

In conclusion, and based on the analysis of the four case studies, a degree of "informality" in refugee settlements and flexibility in regulation of living conditions in refugee camps can allow refugees to exercise decision-making freedom, which can be an advantage since it can give them the choice and freedom to mobilize, upgrade and transform shelter units based on their vision and perception of space and build what they can call a *home*, even if it is a temporary one. The situation can depend on numbers of refugees and context; if there are a lot of refugees arriving in one place, even planned camps might be transformed and adapted as happened at Zaatari. Tents are not appropriate or adequate beyond being a temporary humanitarian measure in the emergency phase of a refugee movement. But temporary shelter units and their transformation by refugees raises other issues and is not an ideal solution either.

Another important lesson learned from the analysis of Zaatari camp is that there should be a clear difference between the emergency phase camps and the post-emergency settlements. The two should be built in different locations if possible in order to avoid the chaotic growth of emergency and post-emergency camps. Due to the urgent nature of responding to large influxes of refugees, emergency tent camps can be necessary but should not be upgraded in the same location to become post-temporary camps if possible. UNHCR has faced a very tough challenge in upgrading Zaatari (i.e. implementing infrastructure networks) particularly in the original sectors where the camp started. These challenges have doubled following the transitional shelter phases of Zaatari and the processes of transformation it has undergone over time due to the adaptation actions of different stakeholders, particularly the refugees themselves.

One important issue relating to formality versus informality is in the question of possible reuse of settlements following eventual repatriation of refugees. This consideration should inform the planning aspect of the camp and should be a perspective which is incorporated into the vision and helps to shape the design, construction, management and development of the settlement.

4.3 The Right to Work and Generate Income

Based on the analysis of the four case studies, and with particular reference to Kilis, we determine that even though it is essential that camps be prepared with proper infrastructure, basic services and facilities, this is not enough on its own to ensure good living conditions and quality of life for refugees. Apart from considerations related to the type, suitability and quality of the infrastructure, our analysis has shown that the most valuable element for refugee inhabitants is access to job opportunities (i.e. in markets, shops, factories, agriculture, businesses, etc). Being able to work allows refugees to become active and productive again. Working and receiving an income allows them to improve their living conditions and empowers them to pursue their goals, resulting in happier and more cohesive families and communities with a better quality of life.

As mentioned in the previous section, the most formal camp, Kilis, has modern infrastructure, services and amenities but does not have a market like Zaatari (except for a few grocery stores, run by Turkish people) and does not offer any job opportunities or strong foundations for a stable community. That is the main reason so many refugees have left and are leaving the camp for Kilis city and other parts of Turkey; the number of inhabitants has dropped from 14,000 (2016) to 4,000 (2018). Zaatari has less permanent structures and tougher living conditions but refugees there have been able to establish a market that has has offered thousands of job opportunities and created economic movement and social interaction in the camp, helping inhabitants to upgrade their shelters, improve their lives and pursue their goals. This has attracted new refugees as well as created an economic trade partnership with the local Jordanian market.

Azraq camp presents a similar situation to Kilis when it comes to job opportunities; as of 2016, the camp had only one market with around 50 shops, mostly run by Jordanians. During interviews in 2016, almost 100% of refugees complained about the lack of job opportunities and the hard living conditions in the camp. Receiving only 20 JOD ($28 USD) as a monthly voucher per refugee is not enough to cover basic needs (as is the case at Zaatari and Kilis). Refugees mentioned that prices in the central supermarket of the camp (Sameh Market) are very high and it only accepts vouchers from the World Food Program. Families at Azraq compared their camp disfavorably to Zaatari, mentioning their desire to have a similar market, owned and run by Syrians, not only to provide job opportunities in the camp, but livelihoods as well. As of 2018, the UNHCR Factsheet (Aug 2018) confirms the opening of 3 new markets at Azraq, giving a total of four markets along with the central grocery store (Sameh Market). Although there are four markets at Azraq today, it is not confirmed whether opportunities are being offered to Syrian family members.

Regarding Deir Zanoun, the camp is substantially smaller than the other three but has six shops and many vendors' shacks. Some of these are located on the main road, allowing interaction between the camp inhabitants and locals. The refugees also enjoy freedom of movement and can therefore purchase supplies in local markets without restrictions. Refugees from the Jomaa and Jeled sectors of Deir Zanoun are working in local agriculture and construction enterprises, helping the refugees to generate income and improve living conditions. The advantage of these two camp sectors is that they are located just next to agricultural lands which offer job opportunities to the inhabitants, allowing women to work very close to their shelter units. It was noticeable that refugees in Lebanon

receive cash payments for work (instead of aid vouchers given to the refugees in the other camps which are insufficient and can only be used within the camps), giving the refugees from Deir Zanoun the freedom to spend the money as needed and where they choose.

It is important to note that Syrian refugees in Jordan and Turkey were either not allowed to work or required a permit, whilst in Lebanon, although it is technically mandatory for Syrians to obtain a work permit, it is rarely enforced so many do not bother. The Lebanese authorities do not apply restrictions due to the very high number of refugees (over 1 million). As an example, the men interviewed at Deir Zanoun mostly mentioned working in construction outside the camp since they do not need a permit for this type of work and are easily accepted.

In general, almost all interviewees in the four camps (except children, the elderly and members with disabilities) expressed their desire and will to work and resume their professions, particularly those who have degrees and specialized education. The case studies have shown that refugees who are allowed to work enjoy better outcomes, being more integrated into the host community, having a source of income and feeling freer, more empowered and happier with their conditions, even where they have fewer amenities than those in other camps.

The interviews and analysis conducted show that the Syrian refugees have a strong desire to be active and productive. The refugees want to earn incomes and be integrated as part of the host communities. The freedom to work in the host country can play a big role in shaping the lives of refugees during their stay in a host country and the restrictions placed on refugees in formal camps prevent them from earning an income, disempower them, place them in a position of dependency and prevent fuller integration with the host population. Since the majority of Syrian refugees in each of the three host countries live within urban areas, not within camps, and since many refugees living in camps plan to move to available housing in urban areas once they can afford to, we can deduce that generating income allows refugees to become self-sufficient and even able to repatriate faster. Even where refugees are mainly restricted to camps, income from work opportunities allows them to make improvements to their shelter units and leads to better maintenance and longevity of camp infrastructure.

4.4 Spatial Adaptations and Improving Living Conditions

As stated in the previous sections, although presenting differences in terms of type of settlement, organization and management, Deir Zanoun and Zaatari are both considered as informal. At both camps refugees are leading a continuous process of adaptation of housing and infrastructure based on their needs. Interviews and analysis results show that the inhabitants of these two camps are generally happier than refugees at Azraq and Kilis, even though more services are available at the latter two.

At Zaatari, **70%** of the 250 interviewees were happy staying in the camp (until they could return home to Syria), **21%** were neutral (neither fully satisfied nor displeased enough to want to leave), and **9%** were not happy but could not leave since they had no other choice.

At Azraq, **28%** of the 70 interviewees were happy staying in the camp, **49%** were neutral and **23%** were not happy and might leave the camp; a major cause of dissatisfaction was the inability to make adaptations (due to supplies and cost).

At Deir Zanoun, **35%** of interviewees were generally satisfied with staying in the camp, **35%** of interviewees feel neutral and **30%** would prefer to go back to their hometowns in Syria. In Deir Zanoun, the two major factors that made inhabitants satisfied were the better freedom of movement/refugee agency and the ability to adapt and improve their shelters, superseding the glaring lack of basic infrastructure.



Figure 69: Inhabitants' satisfaction living in camps. (Chamma)

Whilst at Kilis, there were no defined percentages due to the limited number of conducted interviews, the answers of K4 and demographic facts at the camp suggest that refugees are not satisfied or happy at all and are leaving the camp in the thousands.

Through analysis of Zaatari camp, site observations and interviews, the following forms of adaptation were documented:

- Upgrading of shelter units by buying and mobilizing used shelter units from families who leave the camp, adding extensions to create extra space, kitchens and bathrooms.
- Adding of plastic sheets, zinc panels and fabric around units to adapt to different conditions in summer and winter.
- Painting and drawing of graffiti on the exterior envelopes of units, or totally changing the identity of prefabricated/container units by adding inclined roofs, new external panels and fabrics.
- Creating private gardens and green areas next to shelter units; a few refugee families have been planting vegetables and filtering all the organic waste as an individual initiative.
- Creating concrete flooring, adding 30 cm of sand/gravel surrounding the perimeter of units to eliminate leakage and reduce the transport of heat and cold, and/or lifting shelter units completely.

- Based on information collected on site, different families in the camp have initiated the establishment of fountains in different sectors to help revive the experience of the ventilated courtyard feeling which many families used to have back in Syria.
- Creating a massive market in the camp, made of thousands of shops and vendors' shacks in all sectors. The market acts as the heart of the camp and a source of livelihoods, providing an economic base, trading activities and social interaction—the market is considered by many women and men as the social space in the camp due to the lack of proper public spaces.
- Importing, building and using bicycles in the camp which has become the main form of transportation within the camp.

The observed and documented forms of adaptation at Azraq camp have been minor in comparison:

- Enclosing of refugee communities (12 shelters and 4 WASH units) to give more privacy; even where shelter units were designed and built based on the lessons learned from Zaatari, many refugee families at Azraq still extended their shelters by adding additional areas beside the shelter unit or in the middle in between two shelter units. The ongoing transformation and adaptation included adding new indoor kitchen areas, toilets, showers, storage areas and shaded terraces.
- Adding 30cm of sand/gravel surrounding the perimeter of units to eliminate leakage, reduce the transfer of heat and cold from outside as well as to stop rats from sneaking inside the shelter walls (sandwich panels)

Kilis camp is similar to Azraq, due to the very strict controls in the camp; the only form of adaptation is the following;

- Enclosure of most refugee communities and shelter units for privacy by adding plastic sheets and fabric around units, on the roof or to cover windows/doors. The main factors behind this form of adaptation are cultural as well as to have better cover from the natural conditions such as sun/heat, high winds, dust and rain.

In the case of Deir Zanoun, the term 'forms of adaptation' cannot strictly be used in the same sense as in the analysis of the other three camps since all existing structures in the camp were built by refugee families, based on their own perceptions of space. Deir Zanoun is in a continual process of improvement and transformation by the inhabitants, particularly in terms of the shelter units, due to the lack of restrictions and to compensate for the lack of humanitarian aid and government support.

The following points are important policies and adaptations which humanitarian NGOs, foreign governments and/or host governments have implemented at Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis, creating more positive impacts for inhabitants and improving living conditions;

- Shared factors:
  - Provision of public services and facilities such as schools, hospitals, clinics, community centers, playgrounds for children, etc.
  - Implementing infrastructure networks including service water and energy grids in the camps, (even if late at Zaatari and Azraq)
  - The high quality roads at Azraq and Kilis camps, better than those at Zaatari
  - The solar energy plants at Azraq and Zaatari

- At Kilis:
    - The brick pedestrian pathways
    - The two-level shelter units (made out of containers) at Kilis which provide shade and have more resilience to natural conditions as well as saving space, services, infrastructure cost, etc.
- At Zaatari:
    - Allowing inhabitants at Zaatari to implement concrete flooring under their shelter units
    - Providing the public transportation network in Zaatari camp
    - Allowing inhabitants at Zaatari to import all kind of products, appliances and vegetables, etc. to the camp including construction materials, helping refugees to improve their living conditions
- At Azraq:
    - Giving inhabitants the chance to apply for work permits and work outside of the camp, even though that was not very helpful due to the isolated location of the camp
    - The camp today has numerous community facilities and initiatives such as the Ideas Box, the Community Learning spaces and a camp magazine, all designed to improve the social life of refugee families and offer them activities.

These positive features of the case-study camps are elements which can be implemented in refugee settlements, in addition to the provision of other services and infrastructure to cover the basic needs of refugee inhabitants. The types of features and their use will depend on the type of settlement, the phase of response and the long-term vision for the settlement.

The findings also show how refugee families have been continuously transforming the camps, trying to replicate as much as possible the services and structures that they had back home and which are usually found in permanent urban settlements and neighbourhoods. Once the emergency phase ends and refugees become settled in camps, despite the restrictions placed upon them by the UNHCR model and the lack of a developmental vision, refugees still work to improve living conditions and quality of life for themselves. Replicating structures from their towns and villages and attempting to create a sense of community even where the structures and systems of the camp impede and actively prohibit this feeling of home and community.

4.5 Recreational Facilities and Green Spaces

As shown in the analysis of case-studies, recreational features and spaces are always requested by inhabitants, in order to provide leisure options and places where they can recover from the traumatic memories of conflict and displacement and of physical injuries as well as to allow them to heal and develop social relationships.

While conducting site visits to Zaatari and Azraq, many interviewees (particularly parents) mentioned that even though there are numerous community centers in the camps for children, they still lack the proper public spaces for families, adults and the elderly. A particularly eloquent

expression of the frustration of many families at Zaatari and Azraq at the lack of these spaces came from Abu-Abdallah, a male interviewee at Zaatari who mentioned that he feels that there is nowhere in the camp where he can take his family and enjoy 'family time'.

> *"How should I entertain my wife and kids? There's nothing in the camp such as gardens or formal open spaces where I can take my family. We have nowhere to walk, sit or go in the camp. There are only these community and youth centers which organizations are running that have children's playgrounds, but nothing for us as a family, or me as an adult.*
>
> *Do you think I am happy living in a caravan? I cannot invest anything here and I feel it is more dignified for me to live outside the camp on my own in rural areas. Even if we have aid and support from organizations, we still have a big lack of basic necessities which is causing frustrations and deprivations for us and for our children."*(Abu-Abdallah, 2015)

The situation at Kilis is not very different from Zaatari and Azraq. K4 explained how families feel so bored at the camp because there in nothing to do and no recreational features. Kilis in general is still nevertheless slightly better than the other camps since it has proper pedestrian pathways and gathering spaces for friends/relatives, as well as play spaces for children.

Figure 70: Children gathering on one of the pedestrian pathway at Kilis. (McClelland, 2014)

Due to the lack of basic services and facilities at Deir Zanoun, many families expressed the lack of necessities such as healthcare, education, water, electricity etc. as more immediate priorities than recreational features. The freedom of movement for the inhabitants of Deir Zanoun also alleviates the need for recreational space within the camp since they are not confined to the settlement, a major problem at the formulaic, grid-style UN camps.

As explained in the analysis section of Pre-Conflict Syria, the cultural identity of Syrians is rooted in family and friends gathering in public squares based in the centres of towns and neighborhoods. People socialize while heading to the market or agricultural lands together, or arranging activities for their children. Cultural ceremonies relied on the beautiful public spaces including parks and gardens they incorporated into their towns and cities. All of these factors seem to be missing from all four camps.

4.6 Dependency vs Independence: Funding and Spending Strategies

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kilian Kleinschmidt, former UNHCR manager of Zaatari, states in his TED Talk that the Syrian refugee crisis has been the most funded humanitarian response in history. He also explained that UNHCR together with the host government of Jordan were shocked by the reaction of Syrian refugees during the emergency phase of Zaatari: "we were building a camp, they were building a city," prompting him to advise that humanitarian NGOs and host governments should study the case of Zaatari and learn from it. Yet the UN Agencies and partners still appeal for billions of dollars every year to provide basic aid and *temporary solutions* to 'manage' the refugee 'crisis'.

At the end of 2017, the 2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) of UN Agencies and NGO partners (270 partners) developed a USD $4.4 billion plan, designed to support over five million refugees from Syrian and the vulnerable communities hosting them in neighboring countries, across the Arab region (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt) (Reliefweb-3RP, 2017).

For 2019, 3RP partners have laid out a USD$5.5 billion comprehensive plan in each of the five countries to build on progress in supporting national efforts. The 3RP 2019 report states the following:

"3RP partners have made a significant and concrete impact and they continue to be at the cutting edge of programme and policy innovation – from biometric registration and common cash systems, to livelihoods and resilience-strengthening approaches, to social cohesion and tension reduction interventions... 3RP partners have set a strong example globally in achieving results and synergies around the humanitarian-development nexus...

While refugees from Syria will continue to require protection and assistance in host countries in 2019, ***the protracted nature of the crisis means that more durable solutions are urgently needed so they can look to the future with hope and dignity.***" (3RP-Syria, 2018)

Despite the concerted efforts of the 270 partners in the five countries mentioned, particularly in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, it seems from our analysis that the importance of a long-term sustainable approach when establishing refugee camps/settlements is a lesson that has still not yet been learned and integrated by refugee camp/settlement planners and managers. It remains to be seen whether the 3RP approach will represent a change of vision in this regard.

Humanitarian NGOs and host governments still tend to think of refugee crises caused by conflicts as temporary, where refugees have to be dependent on humanitarian aid, support and handouts. As our analysis of the four case studies shows, the decisions and strategies of humanitarian NGOs, UN agencies and host governments have resulted in a range of negative issues related to funding and creation of dependency, including insufficient monthly living allowances for refugees, very limited employment opportunities and restrictive conditions, lack of spatial and temporal camp planning and unbalanced distribution of funds by humanitarian organizations. Camps (particularly Kilis and Azraq) are dependent on the resources and interventions of humanitarian organizations and NGOs and refugees are expected to be dependent on the insufficient humanitarian assistance provided, food distribution systems and the voucher of 25-28$/month are insufficient to satisfy basic needs, leaving refugees unable to afford education, health care, transportation etc. and unable to improve their living conditions or prepare for eventual repatriation.

Refugees at Zaatari and Deir Zanoun also receive vouchers/cash, but the difference is that they are able to work and generate additional income. Being unable to work in host countries creates dependency issues for refugees. Refugees —in most cases— do not have the legal right to work or access the labor market, contradicting the UN Declaration of Human Rights—Article 23 "the right to work"; this puts them directly into dependency and often desperate economic situations. As a consequence many of refugees end up leaving the camp, as seen in Kilis, and try to offer cheap labor, working illegally in nearby urban areas in order to cover some of their needs. This practice often creates competition between refugees and locals, leading to overall decreased wages and eventual social conflict that results in the 'unwelcoming attitude' towards refugees. This was highlighted by Interviewee K3, a Turkish citizen and professor at Kilis University; K3, explained the impact of the large number of Syrian refugees in Kilis city, where the Syrian refugee population has become larger than the number of Turkish citizens, due to the inhumane dependency systems in operation at the camps which have forced refugees to move to urban areas. In areas where the refugees are not allowed to work, they are unable to improve living conditions or generally leave the camps.

Our analysis has also shown how lack of planning for a long-term vision can also lead to inefficient use of funds. The transitional temporary phases in the case-study camps have resulted in the need for extra spending in addition to causing frustrations for refugees that have led them to the continuous adaptation process, resulting in the informal elements of the camps. All phases of the camps have been developed in the same location, making it very difficult and costly for UNHCR and its partners to upgrade them, i.e. implementing new infrastructure. In a recent interview with an anonymous UNHCR member (January 2019), they stated that different initiatives have been taken at a very late stage at Zaatari and Azraq, costing double or more of the original cost or resulting in the failure of the project. They state that the current scattered typologies of shelter units at Zaatari have made it extremely difficult and costly to implement the sewage and drainage networks for each unit.

The decisions taken in terms of how to host refugees have also severely stretched the economies of the host governments, for example, in a recent official infographic on Twitter, the Jordanian Foreign Ministry said that hosting Syrian refugees has cost more than $10.3 billion by 2017 (JFM, 2017). That figure included expenses in different sectors such as health, education, employment, subsidized food and other public services (TheNewArab, 2017). Due to the late and unwise decisions and the systems of dependency, humanitarian NGOs and host governments have exhausted donor funds on temporary solutions instead of formulating and implementing sustainable, integrated solutions. As reported in the interviews, most of these decisions and late initiatives have disappointed both refugees and host communities. Better planning could have used donor funds more wisely to create dignified living spaces and better services for the refugees.

Unbalanced distribution of funding also has a direct impact on refugees and depletes funds quickly. The monthly funding for each refugee is the same regardless of other factors including living costs and conditions. Refugees with disabilities or special needs are treated the same as other members in the camps, which can be extremely costly for families. Another reason for the quick depletion of donor funds is the high number of humanitarian workers (international and national—270 partners) and their inflated salaries to manage the Syrian refugee crisis since 2011; as an example, the salaries at United Nations range from an average of $47.8k USD to around $140K (Payscale, 2018), and the salary statistics for Humanitarian Aid Program Directors in the low salary range earned between $52K and $165K, while those in the high salary range earned between $82.4K and around $284k per year (IR-EDU, 2018). It is important to mention that most humanitarian workers do not pay tax and

in some asylum countries have better health insurance coverage than the local populations (i.e. Lebanon).

Fairer and more efficient distribution of funding as well as economic integration and formal employment opportunities for refugees would would benefit the whole population of a host country and could allow refugees to be more independent, less of a drain on resources and perhaps even contribute to the local and national economy. A change in perspective with regards to planning and use of donor funds could greatly impact the day to day lives of refugees. If they are better able to support themselves they could improve their conditions more quickly, move from the camps to more appropriate areas, or afford to repatriate once the conflict ends.

4.7 Humanitarian Experts Feedback: Weaknesses of the Current UNHCR Approach to Refugee Camps

Following presentation and discussion of the conclusions of this chapter, in chapter 05 we advance an alternative developmental vision of response to refugee situations which aims to address the weaknesses and limitations of the current approach to refugee camps highlighted by our analysis of the four case study camps. As part of the development of this proposal an initial draft was sent to three humanitarian experts from UNHCR and UNICEF in January 2019. In addition to providing recommendations and feedback on the advantages, potential issues, limitations and challenges of the proposal, the experts also made a number of points regarding the weaknesses of the current UNHCR/host government approach to refugee camps.

The considerations raised by the humanitarian experts regarding the current approach are included here in order to complement and support the findings of the case-study analysis we presented in chapter 03 and have discussed in this chapter. The following key points present the feedback of the humanitarian experts on the key spatial, social, economic and political weaknesses of the current approach of 'temporary' camps, planned, designed, managed and developed on the current UNHCR model.

Spatial

The experts stated that the temporary 'container units' of UNHCR camps require frequent maintenance. A key problem in current refugee camps is that they are not at all suited for variable weather conditions. UNHCR spends a lot of money to equip the existing semi-permanent shelter units (tents, caravans) to the environmental conditions at different times of year due to the inadequacy of the original shelters. This money would be better utilized if tents were replaced directly with appropriate housing after the emergency phase instead of the current use of intermediate 'container units'. In other words, running costs would be much less.

The UN Agencies have the basic construction and development teams but there is an absence of external expertise employed in designing, building and developing camps (i.e. architects, urban planners, economists etc.) due to old school humanitarian recruiting procedures. They should make use of expertise coming from the private sector mixed with expertise in the humanitarian field. The mix of the two would produce much better results.

One of the three humanitarian experts explained that while the roads constructed at Azraq camp are of the highest quality, costing millions of dollars, shelters are made of steel sheeting which in a desert area like Azraq become very hot in summer making them unbearable to stay in. They added

that NGOs started to get involved to improve the thermal insulation of the shelter units but such solutions have a big financial impact on the UN Agencies and NGOs.

The original provision of low quality 'container units' means that improvements are necessary and costly. Introducing/implementing concrete flooring and shelter extensions (i.e. kitchen, toilets, shaded area, etc.) at Zaatari and Azraq as well as waterproofing for shelter units have a financial impact. All of this process has been time consuming and requires a lot of human resources and labor every year/season, as well as management costs.

Infrastructure has been introduced gradually and at a late stage at Zaatari and Azraq. The long distances between the camps and nearby urban centres means it would be difficult for this infrastructure to be reused by local populations and very expensive if not impossible to be moved to domestic urban areas. This constitutes a huge waste of money in terms of sustainability of investments if the camps are not reused following the eventual repatriation of Syrian refugees.

Social

The current approach of placing refugees in temporary camps means that having been uprooted from their homes and land, families are placed into a context of misery and total dependency on external assistance. This has a negative impact on the psychology of the family members who have already faced the trauma of conflict, displacement and seeking asylum, with children and single mothers particularly vulnerable.

The impact of the current approach on children is severe. The low quality of life, the lack of access to good quality education and higher education, as well as the lack of recreational spaces/features has a negative impact on their mental health and futures. Temporary camps limit the social interaction of children and impede social cohesion of children within their own community, in addition to integration with the host communities.

Before leaving home, refugees had privacy, but when stranded in refugee camps this becomes an issue for all members of the family, particularly affecting women.

The Syrian refugee camps were located in remote areas which made it very hard to interact with local communities. The experts highlighted that Syrian refugees living in urban areas are happier and have better living conditions. The situation in the Jordanian urban setting is very different because refugee families have access to proper housing, schools, job opportunities, commercial areas etc.

Economic

The negative impacts of temporary camps on refugees are huge since the camps are not developed to help provide livelihoods, dignified living conditions, economic activity or social interaction. UN agencies follow "by-the-book" implementation methodology that limits innovation in emergency response implementation and planning and a 'humanitarian' containment and charity model which excludes any consideration of an integrated developmental approach.

The experts did not raise further specific points in relation to economic considerations, other than to note how the conditions imposed at the camps restrict refugees to positions of dependency and require continuous funding which is inefficient and costly. Many of the points included in the other sections regarding the cost inefficiencies of inadequately planned infrastructure development and funding requirements are related to economic issues and funding.

Political

The current containment and charity approach requires a steady-state flow of funds that tends to increase along the lifespan of the crisis. It is an aid-dependent approach that does not aim to create integrated and sustainable flourishing communities. According to one of the field experts, the current approach costs the Jordanian government around $3,500 USD/refugee annually. As of January 2019, the total number of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan is 671,551 (UNHCR Estimate). This means the government pays around $2.22 billion USD/year for Syrian refugees alone. According to the same expert, the maintenance cost of the temporary camps is high, for Zaatari around $4 million USD a year; and Azraq around $2.6 million USD a year.

4.8 Conclusions

A good proverb here reflecting the current dependency approach of host governments and international NGOs in response to large influxes of asylum seekers is "give a man a fish and he eats for a day, teach a man to fish and he eats for a life." Ruta supports this idea when she explains that the purely technical way of looking at refugee camps as places of control (the current UNHCR containment and charity approach) turns people into passive recipients of aid and prevents them from being able to live independently (Ruta, 2012).

As this chapter has set out, the current UNHCR model of refugee camps does not adequately address the needs and full spectrum of rights of refugees. These considerations, and the final remarks in this conclusion which expand on some of these aspects, establish the necessity for a better, more holistic approach to planning, design, management and development of refugee settlements. The approach should incorporate the relative success of the UNHCR model in meeting the needs of refugees in the initial emergency response phase but should build on this platform to include a post-emergency response phase which integrates refugees into the host society and economy and produces flourishing refugee communities. As our hypothesis argues, if this were done then these settlements would be more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and would have a positive impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities.

4.8.1 Rationale for Stakeholders - A Shelter is Not Enough

Our analysis of the four case-study camps has shown that, beyond the emergency relief phase, simply providing basic shelters and services and then containing refugees within restrictive camps for years is not a desirable or cost-effective response to refugee situations. Thinking of the main stakeholders in a refugee situation, *refugees*, *host governments*, *host communities*, *humanitarian NGOs*, *the international community and donors*, can help us to understand how and why decisions are made in terms of refugee hosting and help us to improve responses. It is crucial that decision makers ask the question "who wants what and why?" and then anticipate the potential consequences of their decisions, involving experts and studying similar cases so that better solutions can be provided for refugee hosting in order to improve outcomes for all stakeholders.

So what do each of these stakeholders want and why?

Refugees, once they have found safety in asylum countries and until they are able to return to their home countries, want to contribute to and invest in their host countries, live a stable life and have good living conditions, similar to what they had prior to the conflict back home. A life where they have freedom of movement, dignified housing as well as a secure future which includes employment opportunities, services such as education and healthcare as well as social inclusion and integration.

Host governments in developing countries want to offer 'temporary' refuge to asylum seekers fleeing from neighbouring countries and to provide interventions in collaboration with UNHCR which will attract international aid and support for distinct but interconnected policy areas (political, spatial, social, economic).

Developing host country governments generally do not currently consider provision of long-term solutions and settlements since refugee groups are envisaged as a potential threat and burden that could cause social and economic disturbances, as seen in the analysis of refugee situations in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. Thus the prevailing predominance of 'temporary' emergency response camps on a containment and charity approach with a short-term perspective that benefits neither refugees nor the host communities. This approach actually leads to social and economic disturbances for refugees and host communities in the short term and an unproductive investment for host governments and donors in the long-term. Hence the need for a paradigm shift in thinking towards a developmental model which would be beneficial for both host governments and refugees. The key lies in convincing host governments that the investment of their time, resources and energy in developing integrated, sustainable settlements would be useful, productive and give them a good return-on-investment and better development outcomes for host populations as well as for the refugees themselves.

Host communities generally want to assist their uprooted refugee neighbours and show solidarity, provided that this does not cause social and economic disturbances or impact negatively on local services (i.e. education, healthcare, infrastructure etc.), housing availability and rent rates, existing job opportunities and dynamism of commercial areas and societies. This is a major worry for host populations and the containment camp approach is partly designed to respond to this and ensure these disturbances are avoided. Yet our analysis has highlighted that this approach can be counterproductive and lead to the very issues it attempts to avoid. Formal, organized and supported integration of refugees within host communities requires consultation and planning but if done well could be more beneficial than the current approach and host communities might actually see international aid and support as an opportunity that could improve cities and overall living conditions.

Humanitarian NGOs, the international community and donors want refugees to find asylum and feel safe until the conflict is over, which, as seen in the different examples presented in this thesis, can take years or decades. For example, the Palestinian settlements in Beirut, Lebanon, were established in 1948 and today are still considered as 'temporary camps'.

These stakeholders are also driven by the short-term response paradigm and influenced and led by the political will of host-governments in developing countries, resulting in refugees living in squalid shelter units in isolated temporary refugee camps for years (i.e. temporary infrastructure, temporary schools etc.). These factors only serve to exacerbate the suffering of refugees excluded from the society of the host country and with negative effects on mental health and well-being and on the future of refugee children who compose over 50% of refugee populations worldwide.

Understanding these key concerns for each stakeholder group helps to highlight the shortcomings of the current approach and provide additional support for the rationale behind the proposal presented in chapter 05, foregrounding why and how such an approach could be beneficial for all stakeholders in refugee hosting situations. The proposal presented in chapter 05 attempts to provide a model of planning, design, management and development of refugees settlements which would be able to respond positively to the demands and desires of each stakeholder group and provide better development outcomes for all.

4.8.2 Summary Considerations

Prior to conflict, Syrian refugees were 'normal people', living independently as workers, teachers, students, builders, bakers, farmers, etc., people of all age groups from a unique society and a complex community fabric. They enjoyed their leisure time, traveled and created good memories, studied, pursued their goals and ambitions, enjoyed open spaces such as gardens, beaches and mountains and enjoyed busy lives full of meaningful relationships. Limiting them inside a camp area with 45m² space, or less, for years and years is surely not fair. Refugees in the camps feel isolated, dependent on humanitarian organizations and at the mercy of donors, in contrast to the dignified lives they had back home. They are not involved in the planning or management of the camps and have no leadership or decision-making power. The only involvement of refugees is through a few maintenance and voluntary jobs or secondary positions with humanitarian NGOs.

As highlighted in chapter 02, Kennedy J. (2005) argues that the current standard refugee camp planning processes contribute to and exacerbate the suffering of refugees whilst failing to benefit host countries, as seen in the cases of Kilis and Azraq. In contrast, in the case of Zaatari, where inhabitants refused the standardized living conditions, Al Husban and Adams (2016) found refugees offering new skill sets and new business start-ups at the camp, which now hosts more than 3,000 different shops, shacks and businesses with positive economic effects. The refugee-based economy at Zaatari generates an estimated 10 million euros (around 8.04 mil Jordanian Dinar) in revenue per month, a significant number in comparison to Jordanian government expenditure on all Syrian refugees in Jordan between 2012 and 2017 (10.8 billion JOD). Additionally, they have found Syrians filling jobs that local Jordanians do not want in the city of Mafraq, such as lower-paid jobs or jobs looked down on by the locals. This employment provides the refugees with a sense of dignity by providing support and income for their families whilst also supporting and boosting the local economy. In fact, in many cases, local communities perceived refugees as better at doing business than Jordanians themselves (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016). Clearly, refugee contributions to the local work force and trade can be a huge benefit.

As Al-Husban and Adams argue, future plans for refugee settlements should **consider sustainability by incorporating the local host communities. Plans should include how to support local food production, commerce, and development as well as meeting the needs of the settlement and promoting self-reliance by contributing to the local host community** (Al-Husban & Adams, 2016). This developmental model would ensure longevity of the community by improving physical and social infrastructure, economic activity, community development and environmental sustainability, which are often undermined by short-term and quick-fix responses (Zetter, 1995). The case study analysis has shown that where there is refugee integration with the local community, as seen in Zaatari and Deir Zanoun with their contribution to the workforce, there is a noticeable boost in local agriculture, business and economic activity as well as better outcomes for refugees. In both of these cases this integration of the refugee population has been done on a largely informal basis. If this were done with economic and developmental planning the results could be even more positive.

Crisp and Jacobsen summarize that refugee policy in the Global South has been largely driven by the demands of donors and humanitarian organizations in the north. They note that where host governments have maintained control of refugee policy, it has benefited both refugee and local populations, although we would add that for this to be effective the refugees must be able to interact with the host community, as evidenced by the case study analysis of Kilis (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). They also conclude (since 1998) that greater efforts must be made to prepare for future refugee influxes, particularly in those regions which are most affected by armed conflict and large-

scale population displacements; further efforts to ensure the physical, material and psychological security of refugees in camps should be a priority to host governments, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). In a supporting argument, Zetter says that **refugee assistance can only truly be called developmental if it contributes to building capacity of the host country**, as in most cases host country institutions need to be strengthened to cope with the unique pressures of refugee influxes (Zetter, 1995 p. 92).

We conclude from the analysis presented in this chapter that the current UNHCR led approach of 'temporary' emergency relief camps is necessary and effective as a first phase response but also clearly insufficient in terms of providing desired development outcomes for refugees and host governments in the medium and long term. The containment and charity approach that UNHCR, host governments and humanitarian NGOs currently follow in designing and managing refugee camps creates systems and cycles of dependency and prevents refugees from contributing to the host society and exercising leadership over their lives. A different approach is needed.

As set out in the introductory chapter, refugee camps are often built in response to populations fleeing conflict and in these cases tend to be protracted, long-term settlements, however 'temporary' they are initially conceived to be. Zaatari, Azraq, Kilis and Deir Zanoun have already been in operation for around 5-7 years whilst other 'temporary' camps have existed for over 25 years. Daadab in Kenya for example, the largest camp in the world, established in 1992 and currently hosting around 0.5 million refugees; or Borj El-Barajne, established in 1948 and hosting 40,000 Palestinian and Syrian refugees in less than 1 km^2 of space, an informal concrete settlement originally established as a temporary tent camp.

Analysis of the four camps in this thesis contributes to establishment of the wider conclusion that refugee camp planners, humanitarian NGOs and hosting governments should keep in mind the long-term perspective of current and future refugee camps, both at the planning and design stage and in terms of management and development of existing camps. Part of the key to this is through understanding that refugee settlements are inhabited by organic communities of people. Settlements are transformed and upgraded over time, often by the camp authorities, but particularly, where conditions and systems are inadequate at meeting their needs, by the refugees themselves.

Refugee camps which undergo processes of change and transformation can often develop to become comparable to cities in terms of geographical size, number of inhabitants, economic situation, shelter typologies, infrastructure and other services/sectors. In this thesis we therefore advocate considering refugee habitation and settlements as a form of urbanization. Settlements should be established directly after or during the emergency phase so that funds are not wasted on multiple temporary solutions. They should be established close to or within existing urban areas to allow refugees to integrate with the host communities. When the conflict ends and refugees can be repatriated, the strategic location of the settlements means that they would then be able to be reused by the local and regional authorities and host governments for the local population, thereby ensuring the value of the investment and creating long-term benefits for the host country.

Chapter 05

A Developmental Proposal: A Roadmap to Integrated Sustainable Settlements

5.1 Introduction and Rationale

The hypothesis of this thesis argues that if refugee camps were designed and planned from the outset as long-term, integrated sustainable settlements, close to or within existing urban areas, with proper infrastructure, public use buildings, employment opportunities and other services, they would be more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and would have a positive impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities.

The previous chapters of this thesis have established the need for a different approach to the current model since it has been shown that the UNHCR guidelines, although well intentioned, have severe limitations and are implemented in ways which create refugee settlements that are socially, economically and environmentally *unsustainable* and which generally have a *negative* impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities. Having thus shown that a different approach to refugee settlements is desirable, the proposal advanced in this chapter is intended to show that another way is also possible. This chapter outlines an alternative vision of response through a proposal for *Integrated Sustainable Settlements (ISS)*.

The ISS proposal sets out an approach that aims to create settlements which would offer refugees a better way of life and living conditions as well as being more cost-effective and better value-for-money for donors and host governments, better integrated into the local community and region and more successful at creating positive development outcomes for all stakeholders. Rather than leaving refugees languishing in 'temporary' camps, ***this proposal envisages the creation of refugee settlements which are developed within and integrated into existing urban areas of villages, towns and cities of the host country. These ISS communities would be established through the joint formulation of an ISS Development Plan, designed to respond to the particular features of each refugee situation and host country context, involving all of the relevant stakeholders in each case and integrated within a wider urban or regional development strategy. Formulation and implementation of these plans would be managed by specialist ISS Coordinating Teams and would create integrated communities of permanent social housing, facilities and infrastructure which could be reused by the host government for the benefit of the local population following repatriation of refugees. ISS settlements would provide a better solution for refugees whilst they are hosted in the asylum country and for host countries, both during hosting of refugees and following their eventual repatriation.***

The proposal is shaped by all components of the thesis, integrating key factors, parameters and considerations highlighted in the comparative analysis of the four case-studies in chapters 03 and 04 as well as good practice, successful aspects of alternative models and lessons learned from the literature review of academic and professional publications and technical manuals outlined in chapters 01 and 02. The proposal incorporates useful elements of the UNHCR model, particularly for the emergency response phase, however the focus is on developing integrated refugee settlements which directly address the limitations of the current UNHCR approach.

Design, implementation and cost factors of the proposed ISS model are considered through the presentation of feedback from humanitarian experts (UNHCR and UNICEF), discussing recommendations, possible limitations and advantages of ISS in order to assess the viability of the proposal in comparison with the current model. Personal experience and insights gained since 2014 while visiting and working at numerous refugee camps, listening to and interacting with refugee groups, collecting first hand materials and conducting site observations and assessments have also contributed to shaping the ISS proposal with the aim of addressing the questions and objectives of this thesis.

The ISS proposal represents a broad outline approach which would need to be adapted to meet the needs and particularities of each specific refugee situation and host country context. The proposal is not advanced as providing a definitive solution to the problems our thesis has discussed but is rather intended to show how the adoption of a more developmental approach to refugee situations is possible. It provides a possible model of response to our hypothesis and is intended as a starting point and catalyst for further discussion, research and development of better ways of responding to refugee situations.

5.2 Structure of ISS Proposal

The ISS proposal is laid out in the same way as the structure of our analysis of case studies, divided into three main (complementary) spheres of planning and intervention: spatial, social and economic. Integrated planning and development of each of these areas is fundamental for the successful establishment and functioning of any new settlement and the actions and considerations outlined in each section describe the content and methodology of this approach. Flexibility is built into the proposal so that it can be suitably adapted to meet the specific requirements of each refugee situation and host country context. The proposal is still at the development stage and requires further review, streamlining and improvement before it could be adopted as policy and implemented by host governments and humanitarian agencies.

Political considerations related to host government policy decisions would also be fundamental in determining possibilities for successful implementation of the ISS proposal in each particular context as well as in determining the practicalities of the application of methodology and actions proposed in each of the three areas (spatial, social and economic). Political considerations related to the three areas are therefore discussed in each section as well as more generally in a specific political considerations section.

Development of the ISS Proposal: Humanitarian Expert Feedback

Based on the analysis results and lessons learnt from the four case studies, an initial draft proposal for ISS was developed and sent to three humanitarian experts from UNHCR and UNICEF in January 2019. The experts explained the weaknesses of the current approach of host governments and humanitarian NGOs, included at the end of chapter 04, provided recommendations for development of the ISS proposal and the advantages of it from their perspective and raised a number of potential issues, challenges and limitations which the ISS proposal would face. Their feedback was received as responses to a questionnaire of 13 questions (Annex 8) and is grouped and included after the presentation of each thematic section (spatial, social, economic and political) of the ISS proposal. It gives added value and support to the findings and proposal of the thesis through honest, professional and valuable advice and expertise in assessing the feasibility and viability of ISS.

The feedback was used to shape the development of the final ISS proposal, presented here, in order to ensure it addresses the challenges identified and presents a viable, realistic and attractive alternative to the current paradigm. Some of the limitations and challenges raised by the experts still apply to the final ISS proposal, however none of them are insurmountable. One of the strengths of the proposal is that it can, and should, be adapted according to the particular needs of each context and situation. It is also worth stating again that the proposal presented here is aimed as a starting point for discussion, a roadmap which points towards the possibility and desirability of a change in vision. The practicalities and requirements of the proposal would need to be defined more clearly in further research, investigation and policy development.

5.3 Integrated Sustainable Settlements

5.3.1 ISS - Spatial: Coordinated Planning and Development

Analysis of the different phases of the development of the four case-study camps (presented in chapters 03 and 04) and evaluation of some of the historical experiences of refugee settlements discussed in chapter 02 of this thesis underlined the key influence of the concept of 'temporality' in relation to how camps and settlements are envisaged, planned, managed and developed. What should really be 'temporary' is the emergency relief phase of a refugee camp. The initial protection, shelter and basic services which the current UNHCR approach provides is a good standard of first response to an influx of refugees in need of this support. However this phase should only last for a limited time period in order to avoid creation of dependency cycles and the associated issues which our analysis has highlighted.

Timeframe: Phases of Response - Development of Settlements

In order to avoid both the restrictive containment and charity approach of current UNHCR camps as well as the lack of basic services and infrastructure in informal refugee settlements, the ISS proposal contemplates a planned, sequenced approach of distinct but overlapping phases. Each phase encompasses a specific time-period, with flexibility possible in order to respond to the specifics of each particular refugee situation and host country context.

Phase 1: Emergency Relief Camps (3-6 months)

Phase 1 consists of the creation of emergency relief camps, designed to provide a vital first response to refugee situations, ensuring shelter and basic services to refugees for a limited time period. These emergency relief camps (based on an adapted version of the UNHCR guidelines) accommodate the initial refugee arrivals and act as transit or processing centres before refugees are transferred to phase 2 ISS communities. Whilst hosted in phase 1 camps, once their immediate basic needs are met, refugees also undergo a Needs Assessment Consultation as part of the ongoing process of planning and development of the phase 2 settlements to which they will be transferred.

Phase 2: ISS Communities (6 months onwards)

Phase 2 consists of the process of creation of ISS communities, within or adjacent to existing urban areas of the host country, i.e. within or adjacent to existing villages, towns and cities. Phase 2 planning and development is initiated as soon as refugees begin to be hosted in phase 1 camps. Community infrastructure and housing is developed, with participation of refugees in the development and construction process where appropriate (see 'Economic' section below for details). Once the ISS communities have been developed to a sufficient degree to become functioning settlements (after 6 months to a year), refugees are transferred to the new location(s) and supported to settle into their new housing, to access relevant services and to develop their communities. Phase 2 continues once the refugees have been transferred to the settlements since there is still an ongoing process of development of social organization, social networks and community integration and of economic integration and development of employment opportunities, enterprises and economic initiatives. Support is provided for refugee agency and involvement in these processes. Integration with the local communities, urban centres and wider region also happens during this stage.

Phase 2 settlements would be intended to be fully functioning and flourishing communities, fully integrated into the existing social, economic and urban fabric of the host region after about 3 years of development. At this stage, settlements would be ready to be reused by the host government and

local population once the refugees are able to be repatriated. Depending on fluctuations in levels of demand for housing for the refugee population, the local population could also move to these settlements and live alongside refugees at this stage since the settlements would be designed to dissolve into the wider urban and regional socio-economic development context and become an essential part of the urban fabric.

The illustration below (**Fig. 71**) shows the emergency and post-emergency phases as a timeline/roadmap, from the moment the influx starts until refugees are settled in urban areas.



Figure 71: The road map to Integrated Sustainable Settlements. (Chamma)

Stakeholders and Planning Processes:

ISS Coordinating Teams and Phase 2 Development Plans

In order to ensure coherent planning and development of phase 2 settlements and successful implementation of the ISS proposal, the establishment of an ISS Coordinating Team responsible for the development of each new settlement would be a key element in the process. The Coordinating Team would be recruited by and jointly funded by UNHCR (using international donor funds) and the host country government. They would report to the host government (with UNHCR oversight) and would have a remit to manage the planning and development process of the phase 2 settlement, centered around the formulation and implementation of a Phase 2 ISS Development Plan.

Each Coordinating Team would be led by a Coordinating Team Director and composed of specialized departmental teams of staff responsible for development of the different key areas for each phase 2 settlement, including Spatial Development (Housing and Infrastructure), Social Development and Economic Development. These teams would liaise with the appropriate host country stakeholders and host government agencies relevant to their area of responsibility as well as collaborating on transversal aspects of phase 2 development. These would be specialized technical positions to be filled by experienced development professionals which would need recruitment and training processes, to be led by UNHCR in coordination with the host government in each case. Ideally these team members should include mainly staff from the host country, with additional staff from the refugee country of origin where possible and international staff with specific expertise where necessary. The size of the Coordinating Team would be related to the size of the settlement to be built and the number of refugees who would inhabit it.

The Coordinating Team would be responsible for bringing together and managing all of the relevant stakeholders in the formulation of the Phase 2 ISS Development Plan for establishment of the settlement and for ensuring that this Development Plan is implemented efficiently and effectively. The Coordinating Team would play a key role throughout the development of the phase 2 settlement and would be responsible for ensuring that the investment of funds met the objective of providing a socially, economically and environmentally sustainable settlement with positive impacts for refugees and for the hosting communities.

Key Performance Indicators for a phase 2 settlement would be defined globally for ISS developments (related to education, health, employment and other key areas) with additional specific measures of these intended development outcomes defined as part of each specific Development Plan, tailored to meet the particular requirements of each host country context and the specific development aims of each host country government. In summary, phase 2 settlements should provide refugees with decent housing, infrastructure and facilities, social interaction and integration and economic and employment opportunities and should be able to be inherited and reused by the host country government and population, both during hosting of refugees (where appropriate) and following eventual repatriation of refugees.

The process of formulation of a viable and effective Phase 2 Development Plan by the ISS Coordinating Team is vital and should begin as early as possible following commencement of phase 1 emergency relief settlements. The consultation process for the development of this plan should involve the host country authorities, UNHCR staff, project managers, architects, urban planners and engineers, business development agencies and economic agents as well as the social housing, development planning and economic departments of regional and national government in addition to local community and refugee community representatives. This joint planning approach would lead to the formulation of an agreed ISS Phase 2 Development Plan that can then be implemented,

monitored, evaluated and developed collaboratively by all of the relevant stakeholders over the duration of the project, led by the ISS Coordinating Team and centered around supporting the agency and participation of the refugees in this development process.



Figure 72: Structure of ISS Coordinating Teams and interaction with stakeholders. (The specific composition of each Coordinating Team might vary from case to case but would include this general structure and coordinate with these types of agencies and stakeholders). (Chamma)

Location of Settlements

Phase 1: emergency relief camps should be established close to the international border between the host country and the country of origin in order to provide shelter, protection and basic services to refugees as quickly as possible, as per the UNHCR guidelines. Ideally the location of these phase 1 emergency relief camps would be chosen with reference to a plan for the subsequent development of phase 2 ISS communities in existing urban areas, i.e. with reference to a Phase 2 ISS Development

Plan and/or a wider regional development plan. This does not necessarily mean that phase 1 camps need to be located close to planned locations for phase 2 settlements, however logistical aspects should ideally be considered at the planning stage.

Advance planning of phase 1 camps may not always be possible given the emergency nature of refugee movements. The efficient establishment of these camps would often be the priority, with subsequent planning of phase 2 settlements initiated once the first camps are established and functioning. Nevertheless, advance planning of the two phases in preparation for possible refugee situations could help countries to prepare for and deal with potential refugee situations and increase their resilience and ability to respond to sudden emergency migrations. This type of risk assessment and mitigation planning could be incorporated into the standard development planning processes of national governments.

Political considerations would also play a key factor in influencing the decisions of host governments regarding where to locate refugee settlements, both for the emergency relief phase 1 camps and particularly in terms of phase 2 settlements. If the host country made a decision not to host refugees within existing urban areas (as is envisaged and recommended by the ISS proposal), phase 2 ISS communities could be developed at the same location as, or adjacent to, the phase 1 camps, with land allocated accordingly. Where host governments decide to have phase 1 and 2 at the same location, the choice of this location should take into account the longer-term phase 2 perspective. The location of the camps will be fundamental in determining possibilities for social integration with the host communities and for economic integration of refugees. Employment opportunities and the development of economic initiatives would ideally need to be considered in order to create the *integrated* and *sustainable* settlements envisaged by ISS. Otherwise host country governments, through this type of political decision, may inadvertently (or purposefully) perpetuate the current containment and charity model of response to refugee situations.

Phase 2: location of settlements should be agreed as part of the Phase 2 ISS Development Plan. This plan should ideally be formulated with reference to a wider local and/or regional development plan involving specific villages, towns and cities. Allocation of land by the regional and local authorities for development of settlements within existing urban areas would require consultation with and agreement from the local communities. Engagement with and involvement of the neighboring host communities should commence at the start of the planning process since smooth integration of the new settlements within existing urban contexts would be fundamental for the success of ISS. This would also depend on ensuring adequate support for development of infrastructure and public services, factors which should be contemplated when deciding on locations for development of settlements. These decisions should be formulated as part of the Phase 2 Development Plan in order to ensure that the new settlements have a beneficial effect on the local economy, social fabric and existing local population.

The layout and design of phase 2 settlements should minimize the impact of housing, public facilities and large structures on the environment and surrounding contexts, including in villages, towns and cities. An understanding of the specific ecological and urban context in each case, as well as the proximity of agricultural, commercial and industrial areas to provide employment opportunities is vital to ensuring the integration of the ISS development within the local surroundings.

Housing, Infrastructure and Facilities

Phase 1: the UNHCR and Sphere Handbooks represent good sources of knowledge and logistics expertise to cover the needs and requirements of phase 1 emergency relief camps. The ISS proposal recommends using an adapted version of the UNHCR approach, with flexibility to respond to the specifics of each case and with a phase 2 ISS vision incorporated into the planning and management processes of the phase 1 camps. Development of phase 1 camps would still be covered under UNHCR auspices with host government involvement increasing in terms of planning and implementation for the second phase, in conjunction with UNHCR and other agencies where appropriate through the creation of ISS Coordinating Teams and the formulation of Phase 2 Development Plans.



Figure 73: ISS Roadmap Phase 1: Emergency camps. (Chamma)

The upgraded UNHCR guidelines would ensure provision of key structures and services for the initial phase 1 emergency relief stage. Where the decision is made to locate phase 2 settlements within existing urban areas of the host country, phase 1 infrastructure would be temporary (used for the lifespan of the camp) and would be developed accordingly. Where the decision is made to locate phase 2 settlements at the same location as phase 1 settlements, infrastructure could be developed to be permanent from the start so that it is reusable by the host country following repatriation of refugees (provided the location is accessible for the host population). This requires that a decision regarding the location of the phase 2 settlement is made as early as possible in the process since this will determine the type and permanency of infrastructure in the phase 1 camps.

The ISS proposal, based on a developed version of UNHCR guidelines, envisages construction of the following infrastructure and facilities for temporary phase 1 camps:

- Temporary shelter units (i.e. tents or caravans)
- Prefabricated latrines and showers (1 unit for every 3 shelter units)
- Basic infrastructure and road networks
- Primary services such as healthcare centers, schools and community centers social support facilities and religious buildings

- Basic public spaces and recreational facilities (i.e. cafe, gathering and activity spaces etc.)
- A base camp that functions as the camp administration and includes a screening center, warehouse and related buildings
- A small market to accommodate economic activities and social interaction

As presented in chapter 02 (section 2.1.4), the guidelines in the UNHCR and Sphere handbooks are more general and limited to the following elements;

- ***Camp module = 4 Sectors = 16 Blocks = 256 Communities = 4096 Families = 20,000 people 20,000 people x 45 m²/refugee = 900,000 m² = 9 Hectares (a site measuring 750 m x 1200 m).***
- ***1 latrine per family (6-10 persons)***
- ***1 water and 2 refuse drums per community (80-100 persons)***
- ***1 school per sector (5,000 persons)***
- ***1 health centre per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***4 distribution points of food per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 market per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 feeding centre per site (20,000 persons)***
- ***1 referral hospital per 10 sites (200,000 persons),*** (UNHCR H. , 2007, p. 215)

Phase 2: Phase 2 ISS communities would be created over an initial three year period, in accordance with the approved Development Plan in order to allow infrastructure, services and facilities to be provided and developed, to organize and engage the refugee communities and other stakeholders and to develop the socio-cultural and economic organization of the communities through a gradual, evolving, managed developmental process.



Figure 74: ISS Roadmap Phase 2: Post-Emergency Settlements. (Chamma)

Development and construction of housing and infrastructure would be jointly financed using a mix of donor funds and host government investment. Once completed, housing and infrastructure would be fully owned by the host government, thereby ensuring the value of the investment, both for the host government (which would be making an investment in its own social housing stock and social infrastructure) and for the donor community (which would be investing in housing and infrastructure for refugees during their time in the host country as well as in the longer-term development of the host country following repatriation of refugees).

Since the final end users of the phase 2 settlements following repatriation of refugees will be the host country population, their social and cultural needs should shape the design and planning of housing and infrastructure to ensure integration within the existing urban context and to ensure possibilities for effective reuse. However the urban contexts of the home countries of refugees could also be taken into account in order to adapt designs to match perceptions of private and public space, cultural background, traditions and social customs as well as providing space for economic activities and enterprise.

Figure 75: ISS Roadmap Phase 2: Integrated Sustainable Settlements. (Chamma)

Appropriate technology should be used in the development of each settlement so that the housing and infrastructure used in ISS developments represents best practice in terms of energy efficiency, sustainability and value-for-money for the host government.

The following infrastructure and facilities should be provided in **phase 2** settlements:

- Mixed-level clusters of social housing units/communal residential buildings, concrete and/or steel structures (or other appropriate local building materials), up to 4-5 stories including different unit sizes (i.e. 1 bedroom, 2 bedrooms, 3 bedrooms, etc.) with living room(s), kitchen and bathroom(s). Buildings should be designed to match the cultural traditions of the host population but also of the refugee population where possible.
- Fully built road networks connected to the existing ones of the local urban areas.
- Public facilities and services, dependent on demographics and needs. These would include facilities such as hospitals, healthcare centers, community centers, schools, social support facilities and religious buildings, as well as access to a university. Many of these services and facilities would not necessarily need to be built within the ISS communities themselves if they were already available in the local context, however, if existing local facilities and services were to be used by refugees this would require planning and allocation of funding

to support this integration and expansion of services in order to ensure absorption and response capacity and benefits to the existing institutions. The option of expanding existing services would often be preferable in terms of connecting refugees with the local communities however this would need to be assessed on a case by case basis and in terms of service provision and access to services for different localities and population groups.

- Paved pathways for pedestrians with street furniture.
- Public spaces, gardens and parks, recreational facilities and activity spaces. Incorporation of nature and green spaces within the communities. Community vegetable gardens could also be considered where appropriate.
- ISS Coordinating Team offices, located within the settlement and linked to nearby municipal and governmental offices, local and regional development agencies and planning authorities where appropriate.
- Market spaces, workshops, business, commercial and retails units for the development of shops, restaurants, cafes and community enterprises.
- Connection of housing and infrastructure to the water supply. Rainwater harvesting systems could be implemented on buildings where appropriate.
- Connection to sewage systems and waste disposal systems. Recycling and biomass energy generation could be considered where appropriate.
- Connection to the electricity supply. Solar panelled roofs or other localized renewable energy facilities could be considered where appropriate.

After 3 years, the initial development of Phase 2 ISS communities should be completed, with all buildings and infrastructure installed, functioning social structures integrated with the local communities, a flourishing social fabric and developed economic integration. At this stage the settlements would continue to be developed by the refugee inhabitants until repatriation as well as by the local communities through individual actions and joint initiatives and by the local and regional authorities. ISS Coordinating Teams would still be on hand to support the refugee communities however at this stage the social networks, organizations and decision making spaces would have been sufficiently developed and the inhabitants sufficiently integrated into host country social structures to mean that the settlements would be largely self-managed and self-sustaining, meaning a gradual decrease in donor and host government finance over the duration of the development, leading to contribution of the ISS communities back into the social and economic mix of the host country through ongoing development of enterprise, employment and fiscal contributions, social services, development of social capital and cultural activity. The aim after three years is to have settlements which are integrated into the local economy and with the urban centres of the local host region and which are able to be transferred to local authorities and host governments for reuse once the refugees are repatriated.

5.3.2 Humanitarian Experts Feedback: Spatial Considerations

The draft ISS proposal originally consisted of three transitional phases of response to the influx of refugees, presented as three distinct types of settlements (emergency camps, post-emergency settlements and ISS), to be established in separate (but closely grouped) locations based on a

planned timeline of response. The experts explained that it might be more realistic and practical to use only two phases and move straight from the emergency relief camp phase to the Integrated Sustainable Settlements, particularly in terms of financial challenges. Moreover, they added that in some cases host governments would limit the refugee response to one plot of land and have all the transitional phases in one space, a factor that would be a decision for the host government and which is considered in terms of spatial planning in ISS, which can be adapted to address this particular challenge. Comments in brackets **(bold text)** provide responses to the feedback received and show how it has shaped the final ISS proposal.

They suggested that it can be difficult for host governments to allocate land for refugees and therefore it would be best to have a plan in place so that the emergency phase could be transformed into a more sustainable solution in the same location if/where necessary. Given limitations on land availability, it might be best to use the same plot allocated for a settlement/camp for both phases i.e. it starts as an emergency camp but with the longer-term vision of creation of an ISS community at, or adjacent to, the same location. They emphasized that shelters do not come alone but include WASH services, education and health facilities, etc. and that it is therefore important from day one (and ideally even before the first arrivals of refugees) to ensure planning for how the emergency phase can be transformed into ISS at the same location if necessary. **(The ISS proposal allows for this option but recommends the option of integrating phase 2 settlements within existing urban areas for the reasons outlined in the presentation of the proposal. Where this is not possible then this alternative option can be developed).**

While the implementation of emergency shelter is vital in order to respond to surges of refugees seeking asylum, proper planning and implementation of longer-term solutions should nevertheless be commenced simultaneous to this emergency relief phase **(As envisaged in the ISS proposal).** The importance of the ISS proposal is in having a clear roadmap of moving, in the shortest possible time, from the emergency relief phase to the ISS phase. It is very important for [current] planners dealing with emergencies and human movements to plan for an immediate emergency response but at the same time have plans in place to move, in the shortest possible time, to more durable solutions. This proposal has addressed this very critical issue.

The proposal creates better and more dignified living conditions than the Jordanian, Turkish or Lebanese refugee camp context. Better housing requires moving refugees from emergency shelters to quality accommodation in integrated, sustainable settlements. It is a very rich and useful proposal; the major impact of this study will be to lay the foundation for more strategic thinking at the early stages of sudden on-set of emergencies and to include a long-term vision from the start which shapes planning, design, management and development of settlements within the developmental context of the host country and region.

5.3.3 ISS - Social: Empowering Interaction and Partnership

Rather than seeing refugees as groups to be isolated and segregated from the host society (as they currently are in refugee camps under the current approach, as our analysis of the case study camps in chapters 3 and 4 has shown), instead governments should see the hosting of refugees as a beneficial social development opportunity (as well as a moral and legal obligation). Even when camps are established to accommodate large influxes of refugees during the emergency phase, it is in the interest of host governments to have a developmental vision and strategy, to show the

political will to empower refugees to be socially active and economically productive and to ensure that they are integrated into the host society.

Developing a Social Partnership

The key to developing the flourishing communities envisaged in the ISS proposal lies in empowering refugee agency and supporting refugees to become active social citizens and members of the community of the host country during their period of asylum, engaged in developing the phase 2 settlements and contributing to the economic and social life of the host region. This might initially seem difficult given the recent trauma most refugees will have suffered and their unfamiliarity with the host country context as well as the potential difficulties of acceptance of refugees by the host population within existing urban areas. Directly addressing these considerations is central to the ISS approach which conceives the development of phase 2 settlements as an interactive partnership, led by the ISS Coordinating Teams and involving the active participation of a range of stakeholders, including the refugees who are at the center of the process and are provided with active ongoing support by the Coordinating Team and other stakeholders to inhabit the settlements, develop their communities and integrate within the host country society.

In contrast to the current containment and charity approach of refugee camps which segregate and isolate refugees, under the ISS approach refugees are supported to integrate with the host population and the development of phase 2 settlements is envisaged as a partnership between the various stakeholders. The success of this interaction and partnership requires planning, management and ongoing support, hence the crucial role of the ISS Coordinating Teams.

Specialized and dedicated ISS Coordinating Teams would manage the planning and development of each ISS phase 2 settlement, organizing meetings and delegating key tasks to the appropriate entities and agents. They would be responsible for ensuring collaboration between stakeholder groups and for overseeing the development of social capital, cooperation, active participation and positive group identities, both within the refugee population and between the refugees and the population of the host region. The Coordinating Team would be jointly employed by and report to UNHCR and the appropriate organs of the host country government and regional authorities and would be responsible for ensuring delivery of the key elements of the social development process with the key stakeholders during the different phases.

Initial Integration of Refugees - Phase 1 Camps

For phase 1 emergency relief camps the key social objective is to provide shelter, security and basic services for the refugees, allowing them to feel safe and protected following forced migration from their home countries and helping them to deal with the initial trauma of conflict and displacement. This would involve provision of health services, family and psychological support. Special care services for members with war injuries, special needs and disabilities would be provided.

Families would go through screening procedures and receive a Needs Assessment Consultation in order to compile information on their education, employment and social and cultural needs and aspirations, information which would be pooled to feed into the Phase 2 Development Plan which would begin to be developed by the ISS Coordinating Team, working with the other key stakeholders in the development process.

Since work on phase 2 ISS communities commences whilst refugees are still housed in phase 1 camps, many of the considerations outlined overlap between the different phases. This overlap is a key part of the ISS proposal. Rather than feeling stranded indefinitely in 'temporary' camps, as is currently the case, with all of the consequent restrictions and limitations that brings, instead the refugees or asylum seekers would be involved from the start in a consultation process for phase 2 development. There is thus a process of empowerment and social agency built into the ISS proposal from the start, increasing as the refugees become settled and gradually more involved in the development process and are transferred to the phase 2 settlements where they are then be able to fully participate in the social and economic life of the wider host community.

Developing Refugee Agency

Once the refugees are accommodated and settled in the phase 1 camp, the ISS Coordinating Team would create participative assemblies to communicate the process for the ongoing formulation of the Phase 2 Development Plan. This would give refugees a clear plan for their stay in the host country, broken down into the remaining time they would spend in the phase 1 camp, the process of participation in the development of the phase 2 settlement, the rights and obligations they would have in the phase 2 settlements as part of the conditions of the asylum agreement and the expected date for their transfer to begin living in the phase 2 settlement. In contrast to the current situation in refugee camps (as highlighted in chapters 03 and 04) where refugees languish indefinitely, restricted by passive, disempowering, isolating structures and restrictions, this chronological clarity at phase 1 of ISS would provide a clear timeline and action plan and a positive vision of their future in the host country for refugees, thereby encouraging their participation and involvement in the development of the phase 2 ISS communities.

At this stage the Social Department of the ISS Coordinating Team should help to develop community discussion groups and participatory workshops to engage the refugee population and prepare them to participate in the work to establish and develop the phase 2 settlements. This preparation would include organization of training to allow them to assist with development of housing and infrastructure where appropriate as well as preparation for transfer to the settlements once the housing and infrastructure have been developed to the necessary level. This preparation could include language courses and host country initiation where appropriate as well as skills training, preparation for participation in economic initiatives and employment opportunities, support for bureaucratic and logistical processes and enrolment in education and health provision. Initial development of social organizations and initiatives could also commence at this stage.

The ISS Coordinating Team would need to ensure participative democratic structures and representation of refugees and should support them to create democratic decision making spaces where community leaders from different sectors of the refugee population can be identified and nominated as representatives to play key roles in attending planning meetings and liaising with the other stakeholders in the development of phase 2 ISS communities. The Coordinating Teams will support community organization at the associative level to help with the creation of social networks and organizations for the development of social and cultural activities and events. This level of social development can play a key role in social integration strategies, creation of positive group identities and creation of a sense of belonging.

Engaging the Host Communities

Once the site for development of the phase 2 settlement is selected (and even during the selection process itself) the ISS Coordinating Team would also, in parallel, need to engage the host communities to ensure their support for development of the settlement. This would necessitate consultation, meetings and interaction with host community representatives and in particular requires that the host communities be convinced of the benefits of supporting the development of a settlement for refugees in proximity to their own communities. It should be emphasized that the benefits of these settlements to them, in addition to the humanitarian/moral considerations of supporting refugees, would include social benefits (in terms of enhanced cultural interactions, development of social capital, investment of donor funds in local services) and economic benefits (contribution to development of joint economic initiatives, enhanced economic interactions and activity).

In many cases the new settlements might be superior to existing host population communities in terms of quality of housing and infrastructure, a possible source of conflict which would need to be addressed. In order to avoid resentment in this sense it should be made clear to the existing local communities that the long-term users of the housing and infrastructure of the these settlements would also be the host population once refugees are able to be repatriated and their development should therefore be seen as an investment in the host country for the benefit of future generations as well as for the refugees during their period of asylum.

ISS Coordinating Teams could also support the organization of social events and initiatives at all phases of development of the settlements, bringing the host communities and the refugee population together, particularly in terms of integrating different sectors of each group, e.g. through organization of events for youth groups, women's groups, the elderly, sports and cultural events, etc.

Inhabiting the Integrated Sustainable Settlements

Refugees would be transferred to begin living in the phase 2 settlements once housing and basic infrastructure are completed and basic services are ensured. Enrolment of refugees in social services such as health and education would be done whilst refugees are in the phase 1 camps so that they can access these services immediately upon transfer to the new settlements. The Coordinating Teams would again play a key role in facilitating the transfer of the refugee population, helping them to settle into their new housing and supporting them to access services. The Coordinating Team would be based in specially created offices within the phase 2 settlement so that they can accompany the refugees in this process. Rather than being there to 'control' the refugee population (as camp managers tend to be charged with in current refugee camps) the Coordinating Teams are there to support the refugees to integrate into their communities and with the host population and to development the phase 2 settlements.

Once living in the phase 2 settlements the refugees should enjoy freedom of movement within the host country and freedom to visit their home country where possible. The local community should also be allowed to interact with the new settlements, have the chance to work there and/or start businesses and use services and facilities. This process would need to be managed by the Coordinating Teams in order to ensure harmonious integration and the smooth development of economic and social activity. Once refugee housing demand is covered, the local population should also be able to begin renting residential spaces and live in the settlements if desired. This would also

help to encourage and facilitate social interaction, integration and strengthening of bonds between the refugee population and the local population.

Finally the Coordination Teams should continue to work with the social organizations which they help the refugees to develop and with other stakeholders in order to continue to develop social cohesion, the social fabric of the settlements, their integration with the surrounding host communities and their contribution to the social development of the host society.

5.3.4 Humanitarian Experts Feedback: Social Considerations

The humanitarian experts underscored the fact that with over 50% of refugees being children, refugee camps should not be considered at all beyond the initial emergency relief phase. Integration of families with children within the host communities would provide the best option for those children to resume their normal lives. **(Supporting the ISS approach).**

Tenants of [refugee] settlements should have responsibility for housekeeping and care of their communities, with support and awareness campaigns where needed. Providing simple and basic tools to families would reduce annual maintenance and management costs.

There should always be a dedicated project management team that advocates to and coordinates with the host governments for the implementation of these sustainable solutions **(the ISS Coordinating Teams)**. Projecting the vision of local communities benefiting from these integrated, sustainable settlements would also increase acceptance of this approach from the host society. There should ideally be involvement of the people who will be living in the settlements during the design phase.

Selection of sites should be done strategically as part of a wider plan and vision in order to facilitate future integration of ISS communities with the existing local communities and within the social fabric of the region. The proposal would give the flexibility to build housing units in areas where it is possible to interact with the local community; long-term housing units can be built close to or within local urban areas where the acceptance/interaction with the local community is feasible (transportation, social interaction, workspace, livelihoods etc.). The long-term settlements/housing units would have a positive impact on refugee livelihoods and daily activities and help them to live and develop communities in healthier environments.

The experts also noted, specifically in relation to the Syrian refugee context, that in terms of integration into the social fabric, Syrians, like other Middle Eastern societies, have very strong social and family values, which are of the utmost importance to them. They added that Syrian and Jordanian communities have very similar backgrounds, thus, differences in cultural and social aspects were complementary and easily assimilated in that country.

5.3.5 ISS - Economic: Productivity and Self-Sufficiency

In contrast to the current containment and charity approach which restricts refugees to camps, prevents them from gaining formal employment, disempowers them and places them in a long-term position of dependency, the ISS proposal considers refugees as skilled and qualified professionals and active citizens with the right to pursue livelihoods, earn an income and contribute to the economic life of the host country whilst being hosted. The ISS approach proposes that host governments should see the hosting of refugees (in addition to being a moral and legal obligation) as

an economic opportunity. The ISS approach provides support to host governments to allow refugees to work, helping them to find employment and ensuring labor rights and good employment conditions so that they can realize their potential and contribute to the development of the local economy whilst receiving asylum.

Economic Development Planning for Sustainable Settlements

In order to provide refugees with employment and economic opportunities so that they can earn a living and contribute to the economic development of the host country, rather than being a drain on resources, the ISS approach aims to support host governments to create productive settlements which are integrated into and contribute to the local economy. With this objective the second phase of the settlements are mixed use and with incentives to provide sufficient employment opportunities and income-generating initiatives to support the refugee population. International donor funds are invested alongside host government funding to support the development of economic initiatives which empower and provide opportunities both for refugees and for the host country population, rather than funds being constantly consumed as 'aid' (as with the current model of refugees camps where refugees are placed in a long-term position of dependency). This developmental approach of ISS requires strategic planning on the part of host governments, supported by ISS Coordinating Teams, particularly in terms of the choice of location. This factor needs to be considered in terms of proximity of the planned settlements to industry, agriculture or specific economic sectors, whether pre-existing or to be developed.

The economic situation and potential of the neighboring host communities also needs to be considered: planned economic initiatives to be developed should include opportunities for the host population alongside the refugee population in order to create solidarity and harmony between the different groups and ensure that the host population also sees the benefits of hosting refugees. Accordingly ISS Development Plans need to take account of and link to national and regional development plans where these exist. Payment of taxes by refugees through formal employment would also feed back into the resources of the host country and the regulation of formal employment for refugees would ensure that social dumping and undercutting of wages do not occur.

The role of the Coordinating Team is crucial in working with the host government authorities and relevant economic stakeholders in planning and managing these aspects of the ISS approach. The success of the economic development of the phase 2 settlements and the creation of employment for the refugee population requires detailed planning and continuous focused support from the Coordinating Teams, particularly the Economic Department of the Coordinating Team in this case, liaising with the relevant economic stakeholders including regional planning and business development agencies, local companies, economic planning agencies, industrial and agricultural sectors, chambers of commerce, social services and host community organizations.

Host governments and stakeholders can decide on the type of industries and agriculture opportunities for every new phase 2 settlement based on the skills and aspirations of refugees as well as the economic needs of the host country. ISS communities could be tailored towards and integrated with particular economic sectors i.e. agricultural settlements, settlements with factories and industrial facilities, handcraft settlements, or mixed economic initiatives. Development of economic initiatives in these settlements could be designed to meet local needs as well as contributing to trade with other cities and regions of the host country as well as for export.

Strategic preference and support should be provided for development of joint refugee-host population enterprises, particularly favoring cooperatives and a solidarity economy approach in

order to prioritize creation of sustainable employment and shared income streams which benefit the community and region in general.

Phase 1: Humanitarian Relief to Economic Planning and Preparation

The stay of families in the emergency camps is short (3-6 months) and therefore little economic activity is envisaged at this stage. The following facilities and initiatives related to economic activity can be considered for inclusion in phase 1 camps:

- A small public market with cafés, kiosks and grocery stores, possibility for these initiatives to be jointly run by refugees and members of the local community.
- Involvement of refugees in the establishment and maintenance of shelter units, latrines, camp facilities etc. on a voluntary participation basis with cash payments in exchange for this work.
- Involvement of the local community through employment opportunities in the camp, helping to facilitate integration and solidarity between the refugees and the host population.
- Employment for refugees (alongside members of the neighboring host communities) in development of housing and infrastructure of the phase 2 settlements. Refugees and members of the local communities would be trained and employed together in the construction process of housing and infrastructure, helping to fuel local economic development, enterprise and employment, representing an investment of donor funds in reusable integrated infrastructure rather than temporary, sub-standard container units.

Phase 2: Initiation and Development of Economic Initiatives

During the phase 1 stage the Economic Department of the Coordinating Team would process the information collected and pooled from the Needs Assessment Consultations undertaken with refugee families following their arrival to the phase 1 camps, particularly in this case regarding their skills, education, qualifications and professional experience. This information would be used to develop an appropriate economic strategy for the phase 2 settlement and to help to define the choice of location, particularly in terms of proximity to existing industrial, agricultural and economic sectors where refugees could be employed and in terms of plans for development of economic initiatives that would benefit the local region and economic situation and create employment both for refugees and the host population.

Planning and preparation for refugee participation in employment and economic initiatives at phase 2 begins during phase 1, managed by the Economic Department of the Coordinating Team along with the relevant host government authorities and with refugees at the center of the planning process. This advance planning is vital to ensure that refugees can commence economic activities and employment upon transfer to the phase 2 settlements. This preparation will vary in each specific case however will include elements such as enrolment in employment and training programmes, contracting of employees, development of business plans, registration of cooperatives and businesses, purchase of stock, fitting out of retail and commercial units, integration of staff teams and so on.

Training of refugees to prepare them for economic initiatives to be developed in phase 2 would begin during phase 1 and continue into phase 2 where necessary. Workshops and training would be conducted both within the phase 1 camps and at appropriate locations outside the camps, including

in the developing phase 2 settlements, in some cases alongside members of the host population. Support would also be provided during the phase 1 stage for refugees to begin developing plans for their own economic initiatives, particularly cooperatives and solidarity economy enterprises. These plans would then be initiated from the start of phase 2 and support provided for further development of the initiatives as required.

Phase 2 settlements should have sustainable systems balanced between the production and consumption patterns of inhabitants and integrated into a wider development plan. Economic activities should be directed towards meeting community and local needs. As such, in addition to incorporation of refugees into employment within existing enterprises and within economic initiatives developed as part of the phase 2 economic planning, phase 2 settlements would also include market spaces, shopping centers and space for shops and retail units at ground level of buildings in selected areas/neighborhoods. These spaces would accommodate economic activities, small businesses and social organizations and events and could be used by both refugees and the local population. Members of the refugee population with professional qualifications and skills such as doctors, engineers, teachers etc. could also play an important role in serving their communities by working at the new settlements and helping to supervise and train other members at schools, clinics, hospitals and other facilities.

All of this work is intended to allow refugees to resume their normal lives and livelihoods as far as possible whilst receiving asylum in the host country, contribute to the local economy and integrate with the host population who would also benefit directly and indirectly from this approach. The aim is that after three years of the development of phase 2 settlements, the refugees have employment, businesses are in operation providing services to the community, income is being generated and the communities are self-sustaining. This requires a lot of coordination, work and commitment, particularly from the Economic Department of the ISS Coordinating Teams and from the host government however if undertaken efficiently and effectively this approach would provide much better value-for-money in terms of investment of donor funds and much better development outcomes for refugees and host communities.

5.3.6 Humanitarian Experts Feedback: Economic Considerations

Feedback from the experts in terms of economic considerations was mainly focused on the specific issues related to Syrian refugees. Although this feedback was context specific, the points raised could be applied generally to refugee situations in different countries and to the ISS proposal in general. The experts suggested that the Syrian workforce should be supported to fill gaps in the local economy rather than competing with locals. A close eye should be kept on the situation so as not to disturb the local economies and avoid friction and potential conflict between refugees and host communities. **(Rather there needs to be an integrated economic plan developed for the ISS communities, tailored towards matching skills and expertise with the local labor market, economic opportunities and development objectives in the region).**

They noted that amongst the Syrian refugee population there is a high number of people with advanced technical and professional qualifications and experience such as engineers, doctors, teachers etc., most of whom have been excluded from the job market according to the current restrictions in operations in the Syrian refugee camps. Better utilization of the skills and expertise of refugees should be considered and combined with employment opportunities, support for enterprise and insertion of refugees into the local and regional economy.

When asked about Syrian refugees in Jordan, the humanitarian experts stated that Syrian refugees are highly skilled people and very good businessmen and women. Given the opportunity, they will aim to be totally self-sufficient. At Zaatari, where Syrians have had a higher degree of freedom in the camp, they have created a huge market comparable to the local market in Mafraq City (Jordan), in size, skills and economic activity.

The experts also noted that contractors in Jordan prefer to hire Syrian workers as they are skilled, professional and require lower wages. The Syrians have moved from fully-fledged, advanced communities in Syria where they have been educated, trained and gathered experience and expertise in a wide range of areas. Syrian refugees have shown to be a skilled workforce with proficient levels in their fields of knowledge, sometimes exceeding the knowledge of local laborers. Such knowledge worried the local laborers and decreased the acceptance of Syrian refugees within the local communities. **(Hence need for management of issues such as this in ISS proposal).**

5.3.7 ISS - Political: Human Beings, not 'Numbers'

In every refugee situation and context there are different limitations and challenges on host governments but the political scenario of abandoning and rejecting asylum seekers, on either side of the border or treating them as a 'problem' to be 'contained and managed' should not be options.

The employment of concepts such as 'sustainability' and 'integration' in terms of refugee settlements is politically charged, giving an idea of 'permanence' in relation to the settlements which might repel host governments from adopting the ISS approach. The important distinction here, which would need to be clearly communicated to and understood and accepted by host governments, is that the development of housing and infrastructure in this strategy *would* actually be 'permanent', it is the hosting of refugees which would not be. In this model the settlements would be 'permanent' in the sense that they would be built to last. They should be considered as sustainable settlements, integrated into the local, regional and host country developmental context, able to be reused by the host government following repatriation of the refugees. This end-use state of the developments is one of the key benefits which host governments would receive. Donors would also see the long-term sustainability of their investment.

For the ISS model to be accepted and implemented at a policy level there are a number of important political factors which need to be considered and addressed. Perhaps most fundamentally there needs to be a real shift and change in the way governments consider and conceive refugee movements, a shift to a more sustainable perspective in which settlements hosting refugee groups are built as functional communities integrated in specific contexts and locations to support economic development, agricultural production, and/or specific industries. Making this shift presents a tough challenge for host governments, particularly given the hosting burden placed on developing countries, struggling economically in the first place. In order for this to become reality and for this change to occur there has to be the political will to see refugees as an opportunity and an aim to integrate them into a holistic development plan that benefits both the refugees and the host regions.

This requires economic, social and spatial planning by the different local departments, government ministries and communities of the host countries and would necessitate a huge amount of work. Three things would therefore be necessary for this change to occur:

1. Firstly, adoption of an approach like ISS at a policy level by the international agencies, particularly UNHCR in order to support host governments in the planning, construction, development and management of these settlements.
2. Secondly support for this approach from the international donor community who can have a big influence on shaping host country policies through carefully defining funding requirements.
3. Thirdly, for the first two of these to occur and for ISS to be viable in general, it would need to be shown that it is possible to create such settlements in practice, that they are cost-effective in terms of value-for-money and are capable of delivering the better development outcomes which this proposal forecasts.

All of this requires practical evidence and further highlights the need for testing of the ISS approach through trial projects with implementation of full evaluation and project monitoring systems to assess performance in terms of achievement of objectives and development outcomes, measured against comparable baseline studies from the current camps model. Full cost assessments would also be needed to developed in order to give a clearer indication of the relative funding costs of the ISS approach as compared to the current model. This would need to incorporate different cost and return-on-investment measurements related to short-term, medium-term and long-term benefits. This information could also then be used to generate agreements in terms of funding models and percentage funding contributions from the different agents of the international donor community, UNHCR, host governments and NGOs.

All of this information would be necessary politically in order to realistically assess the viability of the proposal and to convince host governments, UNHCR and the donor community to adopt this model of response. These key stakeholders would need more than just the intellectual, moral and rhetorical justification for adopting such an approach: they would need to see that it works in practice, is feasible in terms of delivery, achieves the intended development outcomes and provides value-for-money in terms of investment of resources and funding.

Advocacy for response to influxes of refugees has to consider the question of sustainability, especially in the context of the economy, so that interventions and settlements are beneficial to the host government and local regions rather than a drag on resources and a cause of unrest. If the efficacy of the ISS proposal can be shown in practice, as well as in theory, then potential political obstacles to adoption of this approach as a best practice methodology and choice of response on a wide scale can be overcome.

5.3.8 Humanitarian Experts Feedback: Political Considerations

Perhaps the most valuable feedback from the humanitarian experts in terms of shaping the ISS proposal was in regards to political considerations. They suggested that we need to be careful with terminology as some host countries might not want to hear the word “permanent”. Refugees, to them, are hosted temporarily. Nowhere in the world (at present) does a refugee settlement/camp start off as ‘permanent’; all start as temporary interventions to save lives and provide protection to the refugees from the elements as soon as is possible. **(Hence the need to frame ISS communities as long-term investments for the host country, providing a home for the refugees whilst they are in need of asylum and allowing them to contribute to the host country whilst there but also intended to be reused by the local population once repatriation has occurred – in that sense they**

would actually be permanent, it is the end-users that would change over time, as with any normal community or settlement. This consideration is incorporated into the ISS proposal).

The experts pointed out in relation to the previous point that the government in Jordan for example was against implementing any long-term shelters made out of permanent construction materials such as concrete. These materials were also not permitted to enter any of the camps unless preapproved and for very limited use. **(Again due to the conceptions of containment and impermanence which currently dominate thinking in terms of camp construction and development).**

They also pointed out that host communities might refuse the idea of considering creation of established sustainable communities for refugees, even if to eventually be reused by the host country, considering it as a threat to the country's demographics. **(This shows the need for buy-in from host government and host country population – this will depend on political vision and leanings of host government as well as a convincing case made for this approach at international level, ideally through support from UNHCR for ISS).**

In logistical and realpolitik terms, the experts pointed out that change is not easy within large multilateral organizations (UN Agencies) and implementing, benchmarking and scaling up this approach would require a lot of work and endorsement at the highest levels. Nevertheless they suggested that the proposal reflects the reality more than the current UNHCR approach of crisis response since historical data shows that the average camp lifespan, post-crisis, is more than 15 years. If responses were looked at from a developmental approach from the beginning, funds could be invested more productively and be utilized more effectively to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people affected by the crisis.

In that respect they suggested that donors would wish to know (the earlier the better) when the emergency phase is over as this phase consumes lots of funding. A plan that clearly states when the emergency phase is expected to start and end and when a more sustainable solution is to be put in place would be greatly welcomed by donors. They affirmed that the draft proposal is feasible in terms of availability of funding and could provide better value-for-money in terms of investment of donor funds. But it has to take into consideration the urgency of response; this factor could cause the response to be led by the emergency 'crisis management' imperative (following the stream) rather than leading to well-planned integrated, sustainable settlements**. (This will depend on engagement with this approach from UNHCR/host governments and ensuring the emergency relief camp phase is both well resourced and organized but also understood to be a temporary phase leading to ISS)**.

They suggested that the ISS approach would require a considerably larger initial investment of funds to be made available but would lead to a more sustainable intervention that requires less funds over the lifespan of the crisis. According to one of the interviewed experts, while funds were available at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the necessary time to implement infrastructure and long-term shelter projects was not. The shelters (tents, prefabricated building, caravans) that were implemented at that time are to be considered as an emergency, early recovery solution. Throughout the past 7 years, there was an intention to implement longer term shelter solutions, but over the years the funds from donors started to dry out, limiting such responses. They suggested that the donor community might not want to risk the initial high investment needed for ISS communities, taking into account the ambiguity of each crisis and its duration. **(Acceptance would depend on both the intellectual arguments and conceptual paradigmatic changes we are advocating in the proposal as well as on demonstrating that the approach works in practice and**

provides value-for-money, cost efficacy and better developmental outcomes for refugees and host governments. That is all possible but needs a lot of further practical evidential support in addition to the intellectual justification of the concept).

According to one of the UNHCR experts, the capital investment would be larger if two types of settlements (emergency camps and long-term settlements) were to be created separately; but would save a lot more money in the long-term if these settlements provided permanent housing units.

5.3.9 ISS Proposal: Summary Comparison

	INDICATORS	CURRENT APPROACH	ISS APPROACH
POLITICAL	Freedom of movement		●
	Applying for permits	●	
	Full human rights		●
	Isolated and contained	●	
	Refugees seen as a problem/burden	●	
	Vision and roadmap	temporary/short-term solutions	long-term/developmental
SPATIAL	Dignified living space/ Durable shelter		●
	Proper public services and infrastructure		●
	Full impact of natural conditions	●	
	Proper road/pedestrian network, transportation		●
	Environmental impact	●	
	Access to recreational features and public space		●
SOCIAL	Interaction with local communities		●
	Involvment, participation decision making		●
	Access to healthcare	●	●
	Access to high quality education		●
	Social and cultural integration		●
	Sense of belonging	●	●
ECONOMIC	Large initial investment from donors		●
	Working opportunities	●	●
	Dependency, aid handouts and charity	●	
	Illegal labor, competition and economic impact	●	
	Supporting sectors of the local economy		●
	Sustainable consumption and production		●
LONG-TERM BENEFITS	Reusable housing units/settlements		●
	Stronger economy and production		●
	Additional job opportunities and markets		●
	Empowerment of host governments/communities		●
	Stregthening exisitng public facilities/infrastructure		●
	Additional green and public space		●

Figure 76: Summary Comparison: ISS vs Current Approach. (Chamma)

5.4 Integrated Sustainable Settlements: Additional Considerations and Analysis of Proposal

5.4.1 ISS Communities and Refugee Repatriation

During a conference in March 2019 in Brussels, Belgium, foreign ministers pledged as much as $7bn to help Syrian refugees inside the country and on its borders as European officials consider the possibility of a large-scale returns later this year if the political situation changes. It is expected that the numbers returning to Syria are likely to exceed those leaving for the first time since the start of the conflict (Wintour, 2019).

A key feature of the ISS proposal is that when refugees are able to return to their home country and are repatriated, instead of closing and removing the settlements (as currently happens with refugee camps), instead host governments would use them to provide decent housing and accommodation for people from the local community and region, thereby ensuring the value of the investment for the host country and donors. In this scenario, host countries would be able to use donated funds to host refugees properly in formal urbanized settlements, which in the long term would also help to provide solutions to important social and economic problems domestically.

An additional related point to consider in terms of repatriation of refugees and reuse of facilities is the possible difficulty of persuading refugees to leave ISS communities once they have become settled, secured jobs, established businesses and integrated into the local society of the host country. One response would be that refugees will generally want to return to their home country as soon as possible, as evidenced by the feedback from the vast majority of refugees interviewed during the empirical investigation undertaken for this thesis. Around 85% of the 420 participants expressed the aim and wish to return home when the conflict ends in Syria. (The remaining 15% showed interest in staying in the host countries as immigrants, due to having nothing to return to after the years of war and destruction). It should nevertheless be remembered that these refugees were responding from within camps run on the current UNHCR model and not from ISS communities. However experience suggests that generally refugees will want to return to their home country when conditions there allow. Another response would be for refugees to be granted residency in ISS communities on a contractual basis, setting out rights and freedom but also obligations and responsibilities including a supported repatriation home when that becomes possible.



Figure 77: Percentage of interviewees in case-study camps who wish to return home. (Chamma)

5.4.2 Feasibility of Reusable Settlements

In terms of the feasibility of reuse of these settlements following repatriation of refugees, Cassidy Johnson argues that housing for the displaced should have a 'second life' since housing units (provided they are of good quality) are often still in good condition after accommodating affected families (Johnson, 2006). In a related book, "Rebuilding after Disasters: From emergency to sustainability", Johnson Lizarralde and Davidson highlight that in order to maximise efficiency, the second life of temporary housing must be planned from the outset of the programme and suggest that it is worthwhile to think about a secondary function for it (Lizarralde et al, 2010), in line with the ISS approach.

Another in-depth review by Seike et al examines how housing units were dismantled and reused in Japan after being constructed in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. The authors highlight different issues during the reconstruction planning stage such as changes in the floor plans and specifications for foundations (Seike et al, 2017). This experience supports the proposal for the second phase of ISS in terms of the importance of establishing settlements close to existing urban areas given that it removes the need to relocate them in future in order to be reused.

5.5 Chapter 05 Conclusions

As we have seen through the literature review, analysis of case studies (Zaatari, Azraq, Kilis and Deir Zanoun) and feedback received from humanitarian experts on the ISS proposal, durable and more permanent reusable settlements could have been a more effective solution in response to the current refugee crisis in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon and could represent a better model and approach in refugee situations which arise in other developing and developed countries in the future.

In the case of the responses of the three countries examined in this thesis, if considered from the outset, ISS settlements in the post-emergency phase would have presented numerous challenges to host governments, donors and humanitarian NGOs, particularly during the first few years of response. Yet, in the long term, this approach would have created a more sustainable and human scenario that would have offered refugees dignified living conditions, allowed them to resume their normal lives as much as possible and guaranteed them a brighter future. At the same time, they would have guaranteed host governments and local communities short and long-term benefits; economically, socially, and spatially, particularly in terms of being able to reuse the settlements following repatriation of refugees.

Integrated Sustainable Settlements are designed as places where families fleeing conflicts (refugees) do not suffer, where they have freedom, agency and a sense of community and belonging and where they are not a burden on host countries, local populations, the United Nations or humanitarian organizations. Integrated Sustainable Settlements would ensure refugees the same rights as local populations and all human beings, to live with freedom and dignity, to pursue a livelihood and to enjoy a good quality of life. Like they had prior to the conflict, living in formal cities and villages, working, studying, enjoying life and looking forward to their futures.

We conclude that the ISS proposal, with its two distinct but interconnected phases, emergency camps which then move to integrated sustainable settlements, is an example of how a clear roadmap from the outset would help host countries to improve the way they accommodate refugees, implementing suitable solutions that adapt to their specific economic and social situations, allowing them to choose what works best for their communities as well as for the refugees.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS | THE NEED FOR A SHIFT IN VISION

This thesis advocates a change in thinking, a movement away from the containment and charity approach of 'temporary' refugee camps based on the grid model of UNHCR and Sphere to a developmental and vision and approach such as the ISS model which considers, engages and benefits all stakeholders in refugee movements, providing sustainable development opportunities for host countries and ensuring better living conditions, human rights and quality of life for refugees.

In order to achieve this, this doctoral thesis presented five chapters, beginning with a literature review assessing the current situation of refugee camps and host government policies and ending with suggestions and recommendations for a new vision of response to refugee crises. The five chapters of the thesis presented and concluded the following:

In **Chapter 01**, we highlighted and discussed articles, books and field-reports in order to illustrate and place the current global refugee situation and its causes and effects in context, particularly since the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011. This chapter discussed how refugees are considered an "issue", how the "refugee crisis" affects different contexts, countries, societies and economies and expanded on the current approach to response and its effects.

It was concluded that hosting governments, particularly in developing countries, could consider refugees, in addition to vulnerable human beings in need of asylum, as an additional work-force with varied skills and professions that could boost specific sectors of the economy. Today, hosting governments could see every refugee as a skilled worker and refugee groups as skilled workforces able to contribute to positive changes to the situations of host countries. Host governments could actually think of refugees as an opportunity and help them to find the right places and conditions where they can work, perform at their best and realize their potential until they are able to be safely repatriated.

In **Chapter 02**, we presented and reviewed the literature on responses to refugee crises and mass influxes of refugees, specifically focusing on refugees living in camps and the different models of response. We highlighted and analyzed the different forms, models and standards of refugee camps which have been designed and adopted since 1977, making a critical review of the literature in order to deepen understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different models response and camp designs. This literature review provided a theoretical and historical background to the development of the contemporary UNHCR guidelines and approach, to the analysis of the case study refugee camps analyzed in chapters 03 and 04, as well as to the ISS proposal presented in chapter 05 of this thesis.

It was concluded that humanitarian organizations, refugee settlement planners and host governments still tend to think of refugee camps as temporary emergency settlements, even with regards to refugee situations caused by conflicts which can often last for years or even decades. They fail to consider the transitional phases of a settlement and the process of transformation it undergoes over time due to the actions of different stakeholders, particularly the refugees themselves. In fact, the process of transformation of a refugee settlement often begins from the moment refugees start to occupy it. It was also concluded that emergency camps should be implemented where needed but should be designed with the understanding that they may need to become long-term refugee settlements in the post-emergency phase and should therefore be created with this perspective in mind (possibilities for transformation of emergency camps into flourishing communities integrated into the local society and economy). There is thus a need for holistic planning models which can be carefully tailored to meet the specific needs of each refugee situation and host country context.

Another lesson learned in this chapter was that before planning and opening a refugee camp, it is important to understand the background and culture of the refugees and their previous lives in their country of origin. Not only is it vital 1) to consider the level of urbanization of the home settlements of refugees and their culture but also 2) to consider the geographical context and natural conditions of the location of the camp as fundamental parameters in the camp design, as well as 3) the needs and expectations of refugees.

In **Chapter 03**, we presented and analyzed four Syrian refugee camps located in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon as the case-studies of this thesis. Information was gained and compiled from site assessments, field evaluations, official data, literature, reports etc. and from hundreds of qualitative interviews conducted with refugees and a range of technical staff, management, support staff and local stakeholders in each case. This empirical analysis provided the evidential basis of the thesis.

The main criterion behind the selection of the four camps was to be able to analyze and compare how each government from three distinct developing countries reacted to the influxes of Syrian refugees received since 2012, the different types of settlements they provided and the forms of adaptation which refugees made in each camp in order to improve their living conditions. This analysis allowed us to assess how the current refugee camp planning and management paradigm is implemented and shapes the experience of refugees and host countries. It also provided the platform for development of our proposal for ISS to improve current thinking and outcomes for refugees and host countries.

This chapter aimed to clearly set out the key features of each camp, their main advantages and disadvantages and key lessons learnt from the analysis of each camp, which were summarized in a chart at the end of chapter 03. This also provided the basis for the comparative analysis presented in chapter 04.

1. Zaatari refugee camp represents an excellent example of both the strengths and of the major shortcomings of the UNHCR model and approach to refugee camp design, planning and management. The will and desire, demands and forms of adaptation of the refugee inhabitants have influenced and continue to influence the work of UNHCR and other NGOs in the camp and have shaped and transformed the rules and practices applied by the Jordanian Security Department. The market of the camp has proven to be a very important element of the social fabric of the camp, allowing Syrians to work, generate income, improve living conditions, entertain themselves and socialize. These factors together help recreate a part of what Syrians had prior to conflict. Some flexibility at Zaatari has allowed for adaptations of camp structures and the camp management have also attempted to ameliorate and improve the design of the camp and the facilities over time. We conclude, however, that these developments have been necessary to address basic insufficiencies in the original design and planning of the camp, as highlighted in the analysis, and result from the insufficiencies of the UNHCR model itself to address the real developmental needs of establishing a fully functioning, integrated settlement.
2. Azraq camp looks more permanent than Zaatari but although infrastructure might be better, the camp lacks livelihood opportunities. During interviews, many refugees expressed their will and desire to leave the camp and move to Zaatari or urban areas, where they would have better living conditions, opportunities for employment and a brighter future. Moreover, the demands and forms of adaptation of inhabitants at Azraq have influenced some of the work of UNHCR and other NGOs; i.e. the implementation of kitchens and canopies. However, these adaptations are still minor in comparison to all of the needs and demands of the inhabitants. And unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct new

interviews in order to see if the living conditions have improved after the opening of three new markets and the launch of different community initiatives. The key to understanding Azraq is to place it in the context of the development of Zaatari. Azraq was planned and designed to implement lessons learnt from Zaatari in order to provide a better experience for the refugees and for the camp management in terms of efficient use of resources and donor funds. This intention has unfortunately been subsumed by the decision to adhere strictly to the UNHCR charity and containment model which implements rigid, dehumanizing and disempowering structures on refugees and is the cause of many of the problems.

3. Analysis of Kilis presented many of the same issues as those experienced by refugees at Azraq. Once again it can be seen how the UNHCR guidelines are adept at ensuring coverage of basic needs but are completely lacking in the developmental approach and vision needed to empower refugees properly and promote and support active, flourishing, integrated community settlements. The lack of participation of refugees in decision making, the attempt to prohibit economic interactions, the conception of housing as 'container units' rather than homes, the lack of support for creation of social organization and community structures are all negative factors in play at Kilis and mirror many aspects of the experience at Azraq and to a lesser extent at Zaatari. Given the limitations of the conception of the UNHCR vision of what a refugee camp should be and do, this is to be expected. Our analysis of these first three camps reveals a pattern emerging from this approach and conveys the message that *the more strictly UNHCR standards are applied the more difficult and uncomfortable life can be for refugees*.

4. Deir Zanoun presented a good comparative case which contrasts with and thereby illuminates some of the problems as well as some of the advantages of the UNHCR camp model and approach. The informal nature of Deir Zanoun means that many of the basic services which are catered for at Zaatari, Azraq and Kilis are missing. This creates difficult basic living conditions for the inhabitants and a number of fundamental development issues. Yet in terms of their lives the inhabitants are generally more satisfied than those in the formal UNHCR camps in Jordan and Turkey. This is revealing since although key factors like education, health, support infrastructure, etc. are lacking or only partially catered for at Deir Zanoun, freedom of movement, ability to pursue livelihoods, freedom to create, adapt and improve their shelters and a sense of community and identity help to offset part of the impact of these problems. The refugees have greater agency over their lives, a greater sense of empowerment and more freedom and dignity, despite having less support and more difficult conditions.

In **Chapter 04**, we provided synthesis and comparative analysis of the four case-studies. This chapter made a thematic comparison of the four case-study camps from six key terms of reference:

- Freedom of movement and location of camps
- Formality and informality of camps
- The right to work and generate income
- Spatial adaptations and improvement of living conditions; level of permanence, quality of living conditions and services
- Recreational facilities and green/public spaces
- Dependency and independency systems in the camps

This chapter highlighted the real needs of refugee inhabitants and the impact of each of the camp layouts on the well-being of refugees. The comparative analysis also covered the aspect of formality vs informality and the impact on the living conditions and quality of life of refugees. In addition, the analysis looked at how physical-spatial adaptations impact social life and help in creation of job opportunities.

The current UNHCR model of refugee camps does not adequately address the needs and full spectrum of rights of refugees. These considerations establish the necessity for a better, more holistic approach to planning, design, management and development of refugee settlements. The approach should incorporate the relative success of the UNHCR model in meeting the needs of refugees in the initial emergency response phase but should build on this platform to include a post-emergency response phase which integrates refugees into the host society and economy.

Analysis of the four camps in this thesis contributed to establishment of the wider conclusion that refugee camp planners, humanitarian NGOs and hosting governments should keep in mind the long-term perspective of current and future refugee camps, both at the planning and design stage and in terms of management and development of existing camps.

Refugee camps which undergo processes of change and transformation can often develop to become comparable to cities in terms of geographical size, number of inhabitants, economic situation, shelter typologies, infrastructure and other services/sectors. In this thesis we therefore advocate considering refugee habitation and settlements as a form of urbanization. Settlements should be established directly after or during the emergency phase so that funds are not wasted on multiple temporary solutions. They should be established close to or within existing urban areas to allow refugees to integrate with the host communities. When the conflict ends and refugees can be repatriated, the strategic location of the settlements means that they would then be able to be reused by the local and regional authorities and host governments for the local populations, thereby ensuring the value of the investment and creating long-term benefits for the host country.

In **Chapter 05**, we defined a developmental proposal for a new vision of urbanized *Integrated Sustainable Settlements* (ISS) that would offer refugees a decent way of life and good living conditions, whilst at the same time offering host countries both immediate and long-term benefits. These types of settlements can be seen as intermediate solutions between designing an emergency camp and a full town or city neighborhood. This chapter also presented and incorporates recent feedback from three humanitarian experts on all phases of the ISS proposal and discusses the viability and limitations of the proposal as well as delineating a possible roadmap towards the implementation of such an approach.

Discussion

Mass migration by asylum seekers and refugee migrants is still invariably seen as a short-term "problem" that consumes resources and generally has a negative impact on hosting communities. Instead, host governments could see every refugee as a skilled worker (and potential future citizen) and refugee groups as skilled work forces that can boost economies and create positive change for host countries. Host governments could actually think of refugees as an opportunity, ensuring labor rights and helping them to find good employment and the right places and conditions where they can perform at their best and realize their potential until they are able to be safely repatriated.

According to UNHCR, the current average lifespan of a conflict is 17 years; refugees fleeing conflicts therefore tend to stay for years or decades in the host country, whilst in some cases, when the

conflict lasts longer, the asylum country becomes the new home for these families. Following the initial emergency phase, refugees must receive equal consideration and treatment as that of host populations, meaning full rights and freedoms, not being considered as second or third-class citizens, as is currently happening with Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. As the analysis of the four camps (Zaatari, Azraq, Kilis and Deir Zanoun) has shown, most refugees are skilled people with business experience, professions, education and often spectacular qualifications and talents. They have a long history, a rich culture and, mostly, have come from a life with dignity, full rights and freedoms, where they felt a sense of belonging and empowerment. Refugees should not be treated as numbers, threats or sources of social disruption but as skilled human beings with unique stories, backgrounds and potential.

This thesis aims to contribute to a change of approach and vision in the way refugee camps are conceived and understood, leading to practical changes in the way they are planned, designed, managed and developed in order to create better outcomes for refugees and host populations. This implies a change in the mindset and thinking of humanitarian agencies and host governments which in turn implies a change in the standard approach to refugee situations, shaped and defined by the current UNHCR guidelines.

The guidelines provide a good model of vital humanitarian response in emergency situations but are limited in their scope by a temporary vision which does not conceive of refugee settlements as long-term communities of people which can and should be integrated into the local development context of the host country. Rather camps are seen as responses to humanitarian emergencies which then provide the necessary basic infrastructure and shelter units for control and containment of a dependent population which is isolated from the host population.

These considerations lead us to draw the conclusion that the model and approach presented in the ISS proposal would be beneficial in response to refugee situations and would lead to more socially, economically and environmentally sustainable settlements which would have a positive impact, both for refugees and for hosting communities. The ISS proposal incorporates the successful elements of the current UNHCR approach for the emergency relief phase but crucially includes a built-in vision and aim of creating flourishing refugee communities, integrated into the social and economic fabric of the host region, together with a potential roadmap of how to achieve this.

Today it is possible to change the way of thinking about refugee camp planning and the standardized conditions of refugee camps in order to ensure better living conditions and futures for refugees. After hundreds of wars and refugee camps and since the timespan of conflicts is unpredictable (17 years on average), now is the right time to attempt to influence decision makers in UNHCR/UN agencies and the largest refugee-hosting countries. There is a clear need to build political will towards the adoption of more sustainable and integrated strategies of response, both nationally and internationally, so that temporary camps are only used in the emergency relief phase and designed to meet basic shelter needs until refugees can be provided with more sustainable solutions.

The alternative to 'temporary' camps should be strategic support and coordinated planning, a developmental socioeconomic approach that prioritizes urban integration through affordable reusable housing, empowerment of local communities and which sees hosting of refugees as an opportunity as well as an obligation. Connecting refugees with job opportunities in different areas including agriculture and industries would fill gaps in economic sectors, resulting in better economic outcomes for both refugee groups and host governments. Offering refugees support to integrate socially, develop bonds with the local population and pursue livelihoods could result in win-win situations. When decision makers consider long-term, sustainable solutions instead of temporary

ones, less money overall would be spent and would represent a long-term investment in the infrastructure, housing supply, services and social and economic fabric of the host country.

In this scenario, the international community, UN agencies, national and international humanitarian NGOs and donors would focus on increasing capacity of facilities, services and infrastructure in the host country, not only through empowering governments with funds but through a coordinated development plan which addresses the real development needs of refugees and host communities. Having this perspective in mind might provide a real shift and change in the way governments consider refugee movements and perhaps lead to a more sustainable perspective (such as ISS) where reusable settlements can be built in specific contexts and locations to support local agricultural production, industries and economic sectors.

The arguments advanced in this thesis are intended to contribute to both conceptual and to practical change at a global policy level, however the potential impact of the thesis is limited and is therefore intended as a contribution to a process of change towards this developmental approach and vision of refugee settlements.

As explained previously, acceptance of the change of approach and vision which we advocate would depend upon demonstrating that the approach works in practice and provides value-for-money, cost efficacy and better developmental outcomes for refugees and host governments. That requires practical evidential support through implementation of trial projects with full evaluation and project monitoring systems in order to assess viability and to convince host governments, UN agencies and the donor community to adopt this model of response.

In other words, host governments would need more than just the intellectual justification for adopting this approach: they would need to see that it works, which could be the next steps in developing this research further. If the efficacy of the ISS proposal can be shown in practice, as well as in theory, then potential obstacles to adoption of this approach as a best practice methodology and choice of response on a wide scale can be overcome.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Field-Trip to Jordan, Site-Assessments: Zaatari and Azraq (2015)

Interview Details: UNHCR, Zaatari and Azraq Camp Management, Staff and External Organizations

- **Ayman Arabeyat**
  Director of Jordanian Government Media & Press Office
  Jordanian Government
  City of Amman_Arabic
  April 06, 2015; 15:12 (Transcribed)

- **Diana El-Fawair**
  Civil Engineer/ Infrastructure Supervising and Monitoring
  UNHCR UNIT, WASH Department
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 06, 2015; 22:16 (Recorded)

- **Mohamed Jertila**
  Former Associate Site Planner
  UNHCR UNIT, Planning and Design Department
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 06, 2015; 63:04 (Recorded)

- **Gavin David White**
  External Relations Officer
  UNHCR UNIT, External Relations department
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 06, 2015; 27:03 (Recorded)

- **Hovig Etyemezian**
  Senior Field Coordinator
  UNHCR UNIT, Camp Manager
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 07, 2015; 59:31 (Recorded)

- **Samer Makaleh**
  Health Coordinator
  JORDAN HEALTH AND SOCIETY (JHAS)
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 08, 2015; 13:30 (Recorded)

- **Mahmoud Alazzeh**
  Field Officer
  Save The Children
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 08, 2015; 06:31 (Transcribed)

- **Ali Al-Akra'a**
  Teacher of Arabic Literature
  Bahranian Primary School
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_English
  April 08, 2015; 73:12 (Recorded)

- **Collective Interview: Al Zaatari Youth Commission + International Relief and Development (IRD)**
  A group of 30 Syrian refugee members of the Youth Commission & 3 administrative members of IRD
  IRD Community Center
  Al Zaatari Refugee Camp, City of Al Mafraq_Arabic
  April 08, 2015; 61:15 (Recorded)

- **Mohamed Abed-Al**
  Senior Shelter and Settlement officer
  UNHCR Head Office UNIT, Planning and Design department
  City of Al Amman_English
  April 09, 2015; 44:11 (Recorded)

- **Musana A.**
  Guard and Guide: National Security Agent
  Jordanian Security Force of Al Azraq Refugee Camp
  Al Azraq Refugee Camp, near the City of Al Azraq_Arabic
  April 10, 2015; 114:23 (Transcribed)

Interview Questions – Summary (Various)

Jordanian Government representative

Meeting with Ayman Arabeyat
Director of Jordanian Media & Press Office presenting the Jordanian Government

- Question: how involved is the Jordanian government in Al Zaatari refugee camp?

Administrative Staff, UNHCR

Different sets of questions posed according to the department:

General:

- Name, background and duration in your role to date
- What type of problems do you face in the camp, particularly in your sector/ department

Context:

- What do you think about the camp location in terms of:

- Proximity to the Syrian borders?
- Surrounding villages/ cities?

- Natural context and conditions and how they vary during different times and seasons (day/night - summer/ winter)?

- Is there an environmental impact from the camp?

Planning:

- How was the camp planned and where?

- Are new refugees still heading to the camp? How many per month approximately?

- How do you plan for and contain the growth? According to which rules and standards?

- Who's the policy maker (or: Who are the policy makers) in terms of planning and with regards to management of the camp in general?

- What do you think about the size and location of service buildings? I can see new ones surrounding the camp to the south.

- How was the location of different facilities (commercial, leisure etc.) planned?

- Are there any sets of standards used to plan facilities?

- Do you coordinate with other organizations during the planning process and why?

- How involved are refugees in the planning process and growth of the camp?

- What is causing the transformation of the camp?

Services:

- Is there any inefficiency or lack of services in the department you are working with?

- What do you offer refugees per day/ month and do they all receive help?

WASH:

- What is the main source of water and how do you get it?

- Is it clean and is it enough?

- What do you offer for refugees in terms of water, shelter, facilities and how does the distribution happen?

- Where do sewage and drainage go?

- What about rain water collection?

- What happens when it rains and more generally between different seasons?

- Are there infrastructure networks such as energy, water supply, sewage, drainage etc.? Were they planned before the camp was opened?
- How many latrines are there per community and do you have a specific design which is used?
- What is the volume of the water source which the camp relies on?
- Is there any contamination of underground water? Do you expect any contamination in the future?
- Do you provide hot water? When and why?

Efficiency:

- Is there agricultural land for cultivation of crops for food?
- Is there any agricultural or industrial production in the camp?

Health Coordinator, JHAS

The interview covered points related to:

- Name, background and duration in the role to date
- The preparation and level of services offered at JHAS clinic
- The type of problems and difficulties faced in the health sector in providing services for refugees
- The design and location of the building in relation to different considerations
- The effect of natural conditions over the different seasons of the year

Field Officer, Save The Children

The interview covered points related to:

- Name, background and duration in your role to date
- The number and location of children and family centers
- The type of programs, activities and facilities Save the Children provide
- The effects of the conflict on children
- The main goals and aims of the organization's interventions

Primary School Teacher, Zaatari

The interview covered points related to:

- Name, background and duration in your role to date
- Date that buildings were constructed

- The educational systems available
- The type of problems and difficulties faced in the school system implemented in the refugee camp
- The number of students per year and attendance levels of students
- The design and location of buildings in relation to different considerations
- The amount of space in classrooms and the number of students in each class
- The type of activities and facilities they provide
- The effect of natural conditions during the different seasons of the year

Al Zaatari Youth Commission

The interview covered points related to:

- The number of members in the organization and their general background
- When and why this group was created, including their goals
- The types of activities they do and how they organize them
- Getting people involved and enabling their participation
- The main goals and aims of the organization

Interview Details: Refugees at Zaatari and Azraq

Interviews at Al Zaatari refugee camp

Visiting the souk in Al Zaatari | Shoe Shop (RECORDED) April 07, 2015

- Interview with Nader | 40 years old - Married with 7 children

Visiting IRD Community center | International Relief and Development (ALL RECORDED) April 09, 2015

- Interview with Emtinan | Al Zaatari youth organization - 19 years old - Single
- Interview with Fadi | Al Zaatari youth organization - 25 years old - Married
- Interview with Muhanad | 11 years old
- Interview with Hamoudi | 5 years old
- Interview with Karima | 9 years old
- Interview with Aya | 10 years old
- Kids short session | Drawing their homes | Group photo at the end (below left)

Visiting the souk in Al Zaatari | A falafel restaurant (ALL RECORDED) April 09, 2015

- Interview with Ayham | A mechanical engineer (refugee) - 30 years old - Single
- Interview with Abu Abdallah | (Restaurant owner in the souk) - 45 years old - Married

Invitation to a free falafel sandwich - photo on completion of visit Interviews at Al Zaatari refugee camp (below right)

Visiting Sameh Mall, the central grocery store at Al Azraq | Public Collective Interview (ALL RECORDED) April 10, 2015

- Ghazi (Father) | 35 years old - 2 children
- Majida (Mother) | Around 35 years old - 5 children
- Walid (Majida's son) | 14 years old
- Abdulmajid (Father) | Around 40 years old - 4 children
- Fassel (Mother) | Around 60 years old

Visiting districts at Al Azraq | Interviews with families inside/outside shelters (ALL RECORDED) April 10, 2015

- Abu Marwan's family | Mother 40, Father 50 years old and 7 children (2 units shelter) - photo on completion of interview
- Two single mothers | each has 3 children
- Abdul Hamid's family | Mother 45, Father 69, two young children (1 unit shelter)

Interview Questions - Refugees

Some of the more specific points that guided my interviews with refugees can be categorized into three main parts:

1. **Background and personal details:**

Personal story: Arrival date and journey details

Hometown:

Age:

Gender:

Marital status:

Occupation:

Current Work Status:

If they live with family members:

If they have relatives in the same community or in the camp but in different area(s)

2. **Personal opinion and evaluation of:**

Shelter / Services

Food / Basic needs

Work opportunities in the camp

Educational systems / schools

Cultural religious practices

Social interaction and relations

Leisure and public facilities

The camp in general

3. **Needs and ambitions:**

What is missing?

Aims and future plans

Chronology and reports of visits to Al Zaatari and Al Azraq refugee camps, Jordan, 5th to the 12th April, 2015

Sunday 5th April

Arrived Amman, Jordan at 19:30.

Monday 6th April

Meeting with Ayman Arabeyat Director of Jordanian Media & Press Office, representing the Jordanian Government

- Question: how involved is the Jordanian government in Al Zaatari refugee camp?

Mr. Arabeyat mentioned that there are around 2.2 million refugees in Jordan, from different countries including Syria and Iraq as well as others. The total refugee population constitutes about 33% of Jordan's overall population. According to UNHCR online data, there are about 627,287 individual Syrian refugees located in Jordan.

Mr. Arabeyat explained that the Syrian refugees are a burden on the Jordanian Government, economy and society, particularly because of the huge number of refugees compared to the total Jordanian population of about 6.5 million. He gave an example to illustrate the size/magnitude of the problem by saying: "it is like moving all of Canada's citizens to the US.. all of them"

He also pointed out that the government is only responsible for the protection of the camp and that they have no responsibility over what happens inside the camp nor over meeting the needs of refugees. The Jordanian government got involved at the beginning of the conflict by ensuring the basic needs of the refugees were met when the first waves arrived to Jordan and until humanitarian organizations arrived to take responsibility. Finally, regarding camp location, access to water was the main parameter and primary consideration, as is usually the case for any new settlement. The Jordanian government provided the site at Al Zaatari village since it has a good underground water supply, thereby avoiding the need to make highly expensive transfers of water from elsewhere.

Visit to 'Base Camp' at Zaatari, Mafraq, Jordan | Interviews with technical UNHCR staff

- WASH Department | Diana El Fawair - Civil Engineer/ Infrastructure Supervision and Monitoring (Zaatari)
- Planning and Design Department | Mohamed Jertila – Former Associate Site Planner
- External Relations | Gavin David White - External Relations Officer

The three interviews were entirely recorded after receiving permission. I received a lot of good information from their answers.

Tuesday 7th April

General site observation – Zaatari

Today I was introduced to Fadi by International Relief and Development (IRD), a nice Syrian guy who is 25 years old, lives in the camp with his family and got married eight months ago. He is currently living alone with his wife, close to relatives and to his brother who is also married and has 3 children. Their shelters are all in close proximity. Fadi is an educated person who arrived to the camp about three years ago. He has worked as a volunteer with different organizations in the camp. He is one of the founder members of Al Zaatari Youth group, a camp community organization formed of 30 members, 10 female and 20 male. The organization focuses on creating activities in the camp, particularly for children, working on plays, performances, youth activities and songs to deliver specific messages to the camp community and to spread awareness of different issues.

The movement has found a lot of support and empowerment from different organizations, particularly International Relief and Development (IRD) who facilitate and follow their work/meetings, aims and activities. Their activities reach not only the camp community but even nearby cities including Amman, the capital of Jordan. Tomorrow (8th April) the Youth Group are having a meeting which I am invited to attend to hear about their plans and future actions.

As one of the camp's first refugees, Fadi knows a lot of people and has many friends with a wide range of ages, occupations and backgrounds. This allowed us to meet and talk to many refugees/ street vendors/ shop owners/ children/ youth and others, whilst walking around the camp through the course of the day. It is interesting to note that the oldest two streets, vertical (entrance axis) and horizontal (middle axis) are the most active ones, serving as souks with all commercial activity generated and created by the camp inhabitants themselves. These two axes play the role of the heart of the camp. UNHCR provides refugees with a 20 Jordanian dinar (JRD) voucher each month (about 28 US dollars) to buy food and basic needs from the official market in the camp. Many refugees complained that it is not even really enough to cover 10 days, perhaps a maximum of two weeks. That's why many of them started businesses to survive and to do some of what they used to do in Syria before the war. In the camp there are all kinds of shops which would be found in a typical Syrian city, from a baker to a barber shop, a perfume shop, clothes shop and many others.

The longest interview conversation today was with two shoe shop owners who have been friends for decades, coming from the same area in Dara'a, Syria. They explained a lot about the living conditions in the camp and how hard is it to find a dignified space and work opportunities. They were used to living a very good life in Syria before the conflict.

One of them "Nader", 40 years old, married with 7 children (with ages ranging from 2 to 11 years old), mentioned that he had a vegetable shop back home where his income was about 40'000 Syrian Lira per week before the war started (around $800 USD). He told me that he used to live a fancy life whereas now he's sleeping with his wife and children in one small 3x4sqm container with no electricity for the last 4 months. There is no infrastructure for sewage and drainage and the shelter is poorly adapted to the natural conditions, being cold in winter and leaking water when it rains and being extremely hot in summer. The men didn't allow us to record the interview, fearing that camp's security might hear about their commercial activity and details since it's totally prohibited to undertake commercial activity within the camp.

The last point on this first walk was Fadi's place where he invited us to have lunch, to meet his nieces and his wife who prepared the food and gave us very nice home-made sweets. In

spite of the hard living conditions and the lack of working opportunities in the camp, we were lucky today to be invited to have lunch with a very kind refugee family inside their super clean shelter.

After that, Fadi took us to a turf soccer field where the youth group is organizing a soccer tournament at a community center built by IRD that includes the field, a children's playground and other activity blocks. The covering canopy above the playground was the highest in the entire camp, at a height of about 6 meters. In the rest of the camp the roves are about 2.4 – 3 metres high except in some service buildings where the height is around 4-6 meters high. It wasn't possible to enter or to photograph anything because a special permit is needed that I wasn't able to get. From the soccer field, we headed back to base camp, the organizational centre for humanitarian organizations working in the camp and the starting point of our visit. Here I conducted an interview with the camp manager and before heading back to Amman.

Base Camp | Humanitarian organizations' offices
Interview with Zaatari Camp Manager, UNHCR, Mafraq, Jordan (RECORDED)

The camp manager Hovig Etyemezian is a Senior Field Coordinator who started working with UNHCR in 2006. He has worked in several countries including Iraq, Libya, and Mauritania. He has been Head Manager of Al Zaatari refugee camp for 6 months to date. He shared lots of information and knowledge with me, based on managing Zaatari and on previous experiences. The interview was more like a discussion, covering many points related to:

- Camp planning, infrastructure and guidelines
- The phases of the master-plan for the camp
- Staff/employees, shelter design and donors
- Refugees' living conditions and demands
- The challenges which exist in emergencies and post-emergency situations.

Opening questions:

- Name, background and duration in your role to date
- What types of problems and challenges do you face in the camp?

Wednesday 8th April

This morning, after coordinating with administrative members from UNHCR and Unicef, we were facilitated access to two service buildings at Zaatari, a health care center (clinic) and a primary school.

Visit to JHAS clinic | JORDAN HEALTH AND SOCIETY
Interview with Samer Makaleh | Health Coordinator (RECORDED)

Save The Children | Base Camp Unit
Interview with Mahmoud Alazzeh | Field Officer (NOTED)

Visit to The Bahranian Primary School
Interview with Ali Al Akra'a | One of the Zaatari refugees who is a teacher (RECORDED)

Meeting with Al Zaatari Youth Organization + IRD
Collective interview with all 30 members (RECORDED)

Thursday 9th April

We started the day in one of the camp community centers (created by IRD) to observe and talk to "Emtinan" a young Syrian teacher who is 19 years old, one of the 10 female members of Al Zaatari Youth Organization. She arrived to the camp after fleeing her hometown with her family, passing through a couple of neighboring villages before reaching Jordan and remaining at Al Zaatari ever since.

The shock and trauma of the war had a big impact on her and she spent four continuous months in her tent without going out. Emtinan explained to us how hard it was to survive with her elder parents and sister before starting the job as an employee with IRD to earn a little money. Like many of the youth of the camp, Emtinan wanted to do something for her parents and society, to help people meet their needs, with a particular desire to help children. Because of the lack of activities for everyone in the camp, the youth group runs a couple of activities that create leisure opportunities and provide happiness, mainly for children.

Visit to UNHCR Head Office | Amman, Jordan
Interview with Mohamed Abed-Al | Senior Shelter and Settlement Officer (RECORDED)

Mohamed is a Palestinian civil engineer. He started working with UNHCR seven months ago after working for years in Lebanon with UNRWA as Chief of Infrastructure and Camp Improvement while re-building Naher Al Bared, one of the permanent Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. He has been working on refugee camps for almost 20 years and this experience meant that the context of Al Zaatari refugee camp was very familiar to him. Mohamed explained the difficulties and challenges they are having at the moment and also the background of the refugees and how politics places restrictions on refugee camps. The talk with Mohamed was the most important one for the investigation given his extensive knowledge and experience. He was able to respond to a lot of my doubts, questions and concerns.

Thursday 10th April - Azraq

After getting the new permit we headed to Al Azraq refugee camp, located about 100km from Amman. The closest city/village to the camp is Al Azraq, about 35km away. There is no public transportation to this area. None of the refugees have cars and only a few have bicycles.

We met Musana at the gates of the camp who joined our visit as a civil guard and guide. He is one of the team of national security agents working on control and security of the camp. We went first to the central market "Sameh Mall", the only one in the camp, serving over 17,000 people. The food supply comes from the closest two villages, Al Azraq and Zarqa'a according to Musana.

After that we went to couple of districts to meet refugee families inside and outside their shelters. And lastly, we met children at different points in the camp, near shelters and

community centers. There were a huge number of children and young people playing on the belt road (surrounding road) using stones and drawing on asphalt, with others playing soccer outside of the built area. Musana told us that there are 19 humanitarian organizations in the camp. The camp opened on 30/04/2014 and started hosting refugees on 22/5/2014. It has 12 districts but only 4 of them are completely full. Every district has its own playground and service points such as public kitchens, bathrooms and water tanks that are filled daily to serve refugees' needs. The camp has 1 school that can receive a maximum of 20,000 children. The school has 2 sessions, as with schools in Al Zaatari camp, the morning session for girls and the afternoon session for boys. The camp also has 1 Italian-run hospital that provides primary medicines.

The majority of refugees we met complained about the hard living conditions. Receiving only about $25 USD monthly voucher per refugee is not enough to cover very basic needs. Refugees mentioned that prices in the market are very high. They pointed out other things such as number, quality and location of service buildings. Some of them have to walk for over an hour to reach these services. Some refugees were thankful however others weren't satisfied, even though the shelter quality/space and infrastructure are much better than the ones in Al Zaatari. The common complaints of all refugees were the lack of electricity, facilities and work opportunities.

Visi to Sameh Mall | Public Collective Interview (ALL RECORDED)

- Ghazi (Father) | 35 years old - 2 children
- Majida (Mother) | Around 35 years old - 5 children
- Walid (Majida's son) | 14 years old
- Abdulmajid (Father) | Around 40 years old - 4 children
- Fassel (Mother) | Around 60 years old

Visit to housing districts | Interviews with families inside/outside shelters (ALL RECORDED)

- Abu Marwan's family | Mother 40, Father 50 years old and 7 children (2 units shelter)

- Two single mothers | each has 3 children

- Abdul Hamid's family | Mother 45, Father 69 and two young children (1 unit shelter)

Sunday 12th April

Returned to Barcelona, Spain at 09:30.

Annex 2: Professional Internship with UNHCR-Jordan: Refugee Camp Planning and Shelter Designs (2015/2016)

Figure 78: At Zaatari Camp (2016)

The internship with UNHCR-Jordan covered a period of six months, from September 2015 to February 2016. During this time I had the chance to study and work on 4 camps (including 2 of the case studies of this PhD thesis): Zaatari and Azraq, and Hadalat and Rukban, the latter both informal refugee camps. Work included the following tasks:

- Analyzing the situation at Zaatari and Azraq and working on planning suggestions including proposals for shelter upgrading.
- The design of a Community Park at Zaatari.
- Analyzing the situation of Syrian refugees at Hadalat and Rukban and working on different proposals of emergency camp designs.

Work on these tasks was supported with interviews with refugee families, discussions with UNHCR colleagues and camp managers and meetings with humanitarian workers from other organizations and NGOs.

The internship offered me the opportunity to gain additional in-depth, first-hand experience of the two case-studies in Jordan (Zaatari and Azraq), to be in the right context and to meet the right people including representatives of the Jordanian government, camp managers and staff, humanitarian organizations and the refugees themselves, all of which fed into and helped to shape this PhD thesis.

Annex 3: Site Visits to Gaziantep and Kilis | Southern Turkey (Nov 2016)

The trip to Southern Turkey was primarily in order to visit Kilis refugee camp. Unfortunately I was unable to get permission to enter the camp due to strict permit restrictions imposed by the Turkish authorities. I was still able to visit the nearby urban areas however where I interviewed Syrian refugees, local humanitarian workers and academics. The first day included the following interviews in Gaziantep;

- I met **Murruvvet, a local Turkish engineer** who accompanied me around Gaziantep and Kilis, up to the Turkish-Syrian border.
- Interviewee K1: A staff member at the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency committee (AFAD)
- Interviewee K2: A staff member of the Turkish Red Crescent in southern Turkey.
- Interviewee K3: A university professor in Kilis.
- Interviewee K4: One of the Kilis camp's inhabitants (remote interview).

On Nov 14th, I visited the city of Kilis, located 6km from the Turkish-Syrian border and 70km north of Aleppo. This was primarily in order to meet and interview a humanitarian worker with The Turkish Red Crescent (IFRC). K2 explained the overall situation regarding Syrian refugees in Southern Turkey and talked about the living conditions of Syrians at Kilis and Nizip camps, as well as the status of urban refugees living in Kilis city. This interview was very valuable and K2 answered all of my interview questions and provided a lot of information. He also suggested that I meet K3, a professor Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences.

Meeting K3 was also very valuable. He has written two books on the social and economic issues caused by the influx of Syrian refugees into the Turkish market and society. The latest book was issued in 2015 and details the interactions and tensions between Syrians and the Turkish hosting community.

K3 says that quality of life at Kilis and Nizip camps is not very good whilst K2 says exactly the opposite.

Interview with K2 (Kilis, Turkey)

It is currently forbidden to enter Red Crescent (RC) camps due to restrictions applied by the Turkish government.

As a humanitarian worker with RC in Kilis, what type of projects are you elaborating/ implementing with Syrian refugees (in camps or other areas)?

A shift towards a focus on the social and psychological aspects of the lives of the refugees (ex.: social centers for children and women / vocational schools for men) has occurred following the creation of the camp.

As an example, 60% of refugees are making shoes, leading to the opening of multiple shoe production enterprises and thus to the creation of jobs for male refugees. (This statement contradicts with what the camp inhabitant said during the interview)

How many years have RC been working on the camp?

They have been working on the camp for approximately 5 years.

How would you evaluate the quality of life of Syrian refugees in the camp?

Turkish citizens are very proud of the camps according to media articles and the refugees are treated very well.

What was your agency's involvement in the design of the containers? Could you please elaborate on the utilization of the space, since the camp proves to be inaccessible to visitors?

Each container is divided into two flats with 2 or 3 rooms, 1 kitchen and 1 bathroom. Approximate measurements are 80m by 80m.

Were tents removed and container units assembled throughout the entire camp?

The tents were moved to the other side of the border and the container houses were then wheeled in to accommodate the entire camp.

Kilis camp has a kindergarten, primary school, high school and handcraft workshop as part of social programs for which graduating participants may receive money for their work in the future.

There are some job opportunities for women in the camp, such as managing a laundromat and cash is given to these female workers.

Moreover, a monthly allowance of 100 Turkish liras per refugee is given to every refugee family, as well as the possibility to earn more money if they obtain a job inside the camp.

How many refugees are there in the camp?

It is not possible to give an exact number since the demographic is in a constant state of flux. Estimate-14,000.

The Turkish government, desiring the newcomers to feel welcomed and more comfortable, built schools and houses made of containers and built a mosque out of concrete. All the other buildings are made of concrete as well.

Furthermore, the Turkish government gave bicycles to the refugee children.

In the initial phase of the creation of the refugee camp the containers were only in one area of the camp.

The Turkish government allows the Syrian refugees to express their own culture, whereas other countries sometimes repress customs and norms of Syrians. A testimony from a reporter, belonging to a news agency, interviewing a resident conveys that, having seen many refugee camps in different countries, the Kilis refugee settlement, is the most impressive. In the words of the reporter: "I saw many camps in different countries and if I had a choice as a refugee, I would stay in Turkey".

How long will the settlement remain active, since the installation of container houses implies specific timespan expectations?
During the initial establishment period of the settlement tents were provided as housing for the refugees. However, since then, the conflict in Syria having persisted and its aftermath proving to be too dangerous for refugees to return to their home country, containers were brought into the camp, rendering a rather permanent living status to its facilities.

Where were the refugees located before coming to the camp? Were they in Turkey or in Syria?
They were still in Kilis but were lodged in schools, dormitories or were hosted by Turkish residents. The Turkish government then decided to create a refugee camp to accommodate the growing number of Syrians fleeing from their home country.
Compared to other countries which have welcomed refugees, such as Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey led by example by offering a food voucher system to refugees. This measure was initiated by the Red Crescent.

Will the Syrian refugees leave the camp once the war is finished?
The refugees would like to go back to Syria. Although they are quite appreciative of the Turkish people for their hospitality, they miss their home country.
The news agencies publish their material in 11 different languages (English, Turkish, Arabic, etc.). The camps are also able to follow the news on television.

What are the home villages or towns of the refugees in the camp? Are their home towns destroyed (how will they return if they've been destroyed)?
The war is regional: some places are destroyed but some have buildings that are intact still.
They are many groups that are fighting with each other.
Refugees from villages in conflict need to have a stable environment and remain in the camp until the crisis is alleviated, so that they may rebuild their lives.
All the areas that are peaceful now (in Syria) are currently rebuilding.

Once the conflict has been resolved and once the Syrian refugees leave the camp, will the Turkish government keep the camp or demolish it?
The decision-making process is essentially undertaken solely by the Turkish government. It is unknown at this point what will become of the camp after the refugees leave, but it will probably not be destroyed. It might be reused for something else, but it will not be destroyed.

Would the people of Kilis be content with living in the camp, since the main housing structures, the container buildings, will remain intact?
Kilis city is already established and is composed of houses. If some existing housing is not suitable, the government might subsidize some of the container buildings to citizens, so perhaps they could keep them in the camp.

Are there many Syrian refugees in the Kilis city area?
In the city of Kilis, there are a little over 90,000 Turkish citizens and about 100,000 Syrians.
When the camp was first built, an aid system, similar to the one executed in Djemaran was implemented. The Turkish citizens were questioning why they did not receive any aid or help from their own government

Is there good interaction between the Turkish citizens and the Syrian refugees in Kilis? (Are the refugees able to integrate in the community?)
There is interaction between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugee families who live outside of the camp. These families are growing, trying to create a life for themselves.

Are the Syrian refugees in urban areas getting money as well?
Not all Syrian refugees who reside in urban areas receive money from the Turkish government, because many of them have jobs. However, the situation and needs of each refugee or refugee family are assessed and they will receive an allowance if necessary.
A card linked to a bank account, similar to the one used in the Jordanian camps, is given to each refugee family.

Is it easy to get jobs in the camp? Are there job opportunities in the camp?
The economic situation in the camp is quite precarious and it is thus difficult to maintain a business or open a shop as a refugee.
If Syrian refugee families have money, they would rent a house in Kilis and not necessarily live in the camp.
Turkish citizens are the shop owners inside the camp. The market is mainly run by Turkish shop owners. Citizens own everything: smoke shops, markets, etc.
In the beginning, the refugees were solely allowed to use the bank card that is given to them in the camp, but now they can also use it in the city [whenever they have a permission to leave the camp].
At Zaatari camp, after the third month of existence of this settlement, Syrian refugees started to open their own shops. Today the camp has 3000 shops and the revenue created by this market totals 2 to 3 million euros per month. (Nasr)
K2 is not aware of what is happening in other countries but in Turkey, if the refugees have money, they can open some kind of shop or stand inside the camp grounds.
Another camp was just built in Chimaera and is of very high quality. It counts about 15,000 people and is very well furnished economically since there are many shops.

Some people from the camp are working outside of its grounds. Do they need permission to go outside of the camp?
They are permitted to go outside camp grounds, but there is a security system put in place at the entrance of the camp, in the means of a card (identity card?) that is verified at every entrance and exit point of the camp. The Turkish government can thus control who comes in and out of the settlement. Should Syrian refugees need to stay outside of the camp for a couple or a few days, they need to inform the camp administration. Other than the security system at the entrance of the camp, there are no other security measures enforced.

What are the impressions of the living conditions in Kilis camp compared to other refugee camps?
The first camp was built in Kilis because the city is near the Syrian border. The project managers that assisted in building the camp did not have a lot of experience. However, that experience will grow with the creation of more refugee camps. Builders and designers will therefore be able, in due time, to anticipate the needs and efficient functionality of a settlement, which will in turn improve the overall living conditions of its inhabitants and productivity of the newly formed community.

Is the economy of Kilis growing because of the settlement of Syrian refugees?
Years ago, when the first wave of Syrian refugees came to Kilis, they were shopping in Turkish stores. Nowadays, however, they are shopping amongst their own shops which they have created in the city
In general, the Syrian refugees are contributing to the growth of the economy in Kilis.

Some refugees are working on farms and offer a manual labor work force. Would they then not have an important economic value?
In the city, they are employing their acquired labor skills to contribute to the job market. Women and children stay in the camp and only the men will exit its premises for work purposes.

Are the goods in Kilis camp market coming from the city centre?
The owner of the shop can buy products from Kilis

Are the refugees in the camp affected by mental health and/or trauma issues?
When the camp was first created the Turkish government established a counselling support team for the refugees in Kilis and Gaziantep, composed of about 200 support workers.
There is a very effective integration program involving Syrian refugee peers. Upon the arrival of new refugees at the camp, they are paired with current Kilis refugees so that they may receive orientation and knowledge about the functioning of the camp. The use of such a method facilitates transitioning for the newcomers, as they would tend to feel more at ease, better understood and supported.
There is also a youth counseling team at Kilis camp, established to offer the youth and the children of refugee families a more comforting and pleasant environment, in order to support them dealing the traumatic situation they were exposed to prior to immigrating to Turkey.

Annex 4: Periodic Phone Calls and Video Interviews with Two Inhabitants of Zaatari (through 2017/18)

- Interviews with Fadi | Al Zaatari youth organization - 28 years old – Married
- Interviews with Abu Amer | Around 40 years old –Married

Annex 5: Field work in Lebanon (2018)

Phone Interview with Salah Ghanem – Irshad

Prior to a site visit, a personal phone interview was conducted on 12th April, 2018 with Ghanem, a Humanitarian Project Manager at Irshad, a Lebanese NGO. Salah has been working on providing aid to Syrian in the Bekaa region since the influx of refugees began back in 2011. During the phone interview he stated the following;

- Most of the camps in Bekaa look the same.
- Most units/communities are not connected to the sewage or drainage systems.
- Tents must be changed or maintained at least once a year.
- Many refugees are dependent on humanitarian aid
- Each Syrian refugee (irrespective of age) receives $25-27 USD/month from UNHCR. For example, a family of 6 members receives $150/month.
- Refugee families pay rent to the landlord(s) and the rent varies based on the tent size and occupied area ($50-200). Thus, some tents/shelter units accommodate 2 or 3 families.
- He estimates that there are over 100 informal settlements of Syrian refugee settlements in Bekaa.

Deir Zanoun – Mapping Materials

Refugee Families Interview Questions (English)

Background and personal details

Name/Nickname:

Personal story: Arrival date and journey details

Hometown:

Age:

Gender:

Marital status:

Working? Occupation: Initial profession:

If they live with family members:

If they have relatives in the same community(?)/ or in the camp but in different area(s)

Personal opinion and evaluation of:

Shelter / Services

Food / Basic needs

Work opportunities in the camp

Educational systems / schools

Healthcare systems/ clinics

Cultural religious practices

Social interaction and relations

Leisure and public facilities

The camp in general

Needs and ambitions:

Are you generally satisfied/happy with the living conditions?

What is missing?

Aims and future plans

(Arabic below)

أسئلة العائلات المقيمة في المخيم

١. المعلومات العامة:

الاسم او اللقب:

تاريخ الوصول الى المخيم:

تفاصيل الرحلة:

مسقط الرأس:

العمر:

الوضع العائلي:

هل هناك عمل؟

المهنة أولية:

إذا كانوا يعيشون مع أفراد الأسرة:

إذا كان لديهم أقارب في نفس المخيم او في منطقة مختلفة في تركيا؟

٢. الرأي الشخصي في الوضع المعيشي في المخيم:

المسكن:

الغذاء والاحتياجات الأساسية:

فرص العمل في المخيم:

النظام التعليمي / المدارس:

الرعاية الصحية:

هل هناك مستشفايات ومستوصفات لخدمة الجميع؟

التفاعل الاجتماعي بين الناس:

الترفيه في المخيم:

الحياة في المخيم بشكل عام:

٣. الاحتياجات والطموحات:

هل انتم راضيين عن الوضع المعيشي؟

ما المفقود في المخيم؟

الأهداف والخطط المستقبلية:

Deir Zanoun Mapping Sheet

Category	Details			Additional Comments
Shelter Typologies	Tents			
	Plastic Sheets			
	Wooden Panels			
	Concrete			
	Mixed			
	Containers			
	Other			
Public Use Buildings	Schools			
	Health Centers			
	Community Centers			
	Administration			
	Religious Buildings			
	Warehouse			
Available Services	Drinking Water			
	Service Water			
	Garbage Collection			
	Electricity			
	Gasoline			
Infrastructure	Sewage			
	Drainage			
	Lighting			
WASH	Latrines			
	Showers			
	Laundry Areas			
Road Network	Asphalted Roads			
	Paved Passages			
	Mud/Sand/Gravel			
Vegetation	Green Areas			
	Trees			
	Agriculture Lands			
Recreational Areas	Playgrounds			
	Sports Facilities			
	Plazas/Squares			
Spatial Planning	Shelter Areas			
	Communities			
	Camp Layout/Outline			
Commercial	Market Place			
	Individual Shops			
	Street Vendors			

Annex 6: Interview with UNHCR Staff, Azraq Refugee Camp – 25th September 2018 (Anonymous)

Before answering the questions, the interview stated the following; "Just to state the answers below are my personal opinions and shouldn't be considered or used as a UNHCR point of view—"

1- What do you think of Azraq camp from a planning and design point of view?

The design followed the sphere standards but has some weaknesses when it comes to distribution of the villages. They are far away from each other which makes it hard for beneficiaries to interact with one another

2- Do you think that the camp design strengthens the social relations between family inhabitants or does it have a negative impact on them? Do you feel that the lifestyle and living conditions are very different to those in the villages and cities back in Syria?

The design of the camp was built on the consideration of social relations of people of concern, and the distribution of the shelter units was designed to put families and extended families close to each other, however, livelihoods is an area of concern. The lifestyle is different because the type of housing is different from back in Syria and also the daily activities and so on.

3- Are there available job opportunities in the camp? And/or what is the main source of income for families? Are they being able to live a dignified life?

Yes there are, the main source of income is cash for work, to a certain extent yes.

4- What do you think of the 'cabin' shelter and how do you think it could be better?

The design could be improved and so could the material used to build it, but it was built like this due to funding limitations I presume. We are working on insulation to improve the weatherproofing and also including small kitchen units and toilets where possible.

5- Different UNHCR staff have claimed that Azraq is one of the best refugee camps in the world. Do you agree with that?

From my perspective there is no black or white answer to this question. There are always pros and cons to all cases, but I can say that it is one of leading camps in terms of the infrastructures such as good quality asphalted roads, solar power is already installed in some villages and being extended. But the insulation of the shelters could be improved and also the type of facilities associated with the shelter units (kitchens, toilets)

Annex 7: Virtual Interview with a Refugee in Kilis Camp

Spatial - What do you think of the camp from an architectural and design point of view?

The camp is like a matchbox. Everything is very organized, aligned and repetitive, including the caravans' communities and sectors. All distances in between these are all equal, even the lampposts. Streets and sidewalks are wide and the electric grid is underground. The camp services and public

use buildings/facilities are spread equally all over the camp. From north to south, the camp starts with the main entrance, administration, logistics services, then the hospital, clinic, kindergartens, then a little deeper there is a grocery market for the camp inhabitants, then the caravans' sectors start from A to L, divided by wide streets, after that there is the playground, another grocery store/market and two mosques.

Social - Do you think that the camp design strengthens the social relations between family inhabitants or does it have a negative impact on them? Do you feel that the lifestyle and living conditions are very different to those in the villages and cities back in Syria? In urban sociology, the very repetitive/very organized spatial design might negatively impact inhabitants/users because of the visual repetition and the daily life routine. What do you think?

There is no comparison between living at home back in Syria or generally in Syria with living in a refugee camp, whether staying in a caravan or a tent. Life in this camp is like living in a giant prison while the difference is that here we have family members and relatives. Some of the things that are making our lives miserable;

- The camp feels like a prison mainly because of the daily life routine— people feel so bored of each other.
- There is no way to raise our children properly because of the very limited space inside shelters and outside between shelter units—they are extremely close to each other.
- The lack of parks and gardens—recreational space.
- The need for a permit to get out and into the camp, every time there is a thorough security inspection.
- People are not allowed to get any home appliances such as ovens, washing machines, air conditioners etc. because these would consume electricity and water.

Because of all of these factors and with time, the social relations between people got really torn apart until many people in the camp today do not talk to each other, even when they live next door or in the same community/street.

Spatial/Economic - What about the pros of this camp's design? Do you think there are positive aspects? Or mostly negative ones? What about the available activities, quality of living space and work opportunities?

The provision of public use buildings/services is good. Regarding the education system and children's activities, all grades are available in the camp, from kindergarten to high school. But there are more cons than pros, for example;

- The camp location is very far from urban areas and the province centre which affects the possibility of finding job opportunities, thus the majority of working members work in agriculture in nearby areas to the camp.
- There is no public transportation between Kilis city and the camp. Mobility is confined to independent taxi drivers and vans.

- If anything breaks down in the caravans (shelter units), we have to hire the camp technicians team to fix it which is part of the camp administrative unit. We have to pay them from our own pockets.

Economic - Is the shelter free? Are the wages in the camp and the nearby agricultural areas enough to cover living expenses? Are there shops or is there a market (souk) in the camp, run by the camp inhabitants and offering job opportunities? —As I remember, the commercial souks back in Syria were very lively, full of social interaction, activity and motion. People were working hard as well as being passionate about doing business and commercial activities. Souks were a critical part of Syrian cities' daily routine and people.

In Kilis, the administration shut down the camp souk approximately two years ago (in 2016) which has resulted in many families leaving the camp and relocating to Turkish cities instead. Thus, it has been really hard to cover our needs inside the camp as the only place to get stuff is the camp grocery stores, which have a limited range of items available as well as high prices.

Economic - Why was the souk shut down?

I am not sure what the exact reason was, but one of the possibilities was to open the government grocery stores in the camp and leave the inhabitants with no choice but to buy from them. This has happened in multiple camps; they have closed the camps' souks and opened grocery stores.

Economic/Social - I see. What is the source of income for the inhabitants, or where do people get money from in order to live? Is working in agriculture enough? And what is the percentage of people who do this work? And what is the situation of elderly people?

Each person gets 100 Turkish Lira* (TL), given as a voucher that can only be used within the camp. Otherwise, all services in the camp are free such as water, electricity, healthcare and education. What people earn from agricultural work covers most needs, but the work is hard and tiring. Regarding elders and people with disabilities, they get the same services as other inhabitants. Sadly, there are no additional advantages for them based on their situation.

*100 TL was equivalent to $27USD but has dropped recently to $15.6 USD (August 2018).

Social - That is really sad.

Because of all of the living difficulties and challenges, the number of inhabitants has dropped from around 30,000 people in 2014 to around 4,000 today and the number keeps dropping as more families leave the camp every day. I have no idea why they are making the living conditions hard like that.

I see.

Do you think if the camp design were better and job opportunities were available as well as recreational features, souks and gardens, people would remain in the camp?

No answer

What do you think is missing in the camp design wise? How is it possible to make it better? Or how should the design be from your point of view?

- No answer after that; the interviewee stopped responding to questions.

Annex 8: Questionnaire to Humanitarian Experts from UNHCR and Unicef (2018) - feedback on ISS proposal

The ISS proposal and questions presented below were discussed with two UNHCR workers **(A. & B.)** and one former UNHCR and Unicef worker **(C.)**, in order to get practical feedback from experts in the field, to see how feasible the proposal is and to learn about the challenges and limitations of its different phases. The three persons were:

A. UNHCR worker (anonymous)

B. **Mohamed Abdel-al**, Senior Technical Coordinator at UNHCR-Uganda and Former Senior Technical Officer at UNHCR-Jordan who used to coordinate and supervise most projects at Zaatari and Azraq camps. (Abdel-al also used to be my supervisor at UNHCR in 2015)

C. **Ahmad Afaneh**, Former Shelter Associate at UNHCR-Jordan and Former WASH Officer at Unicef-Jordan, who also used to be involved in the implementation of different projects for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

The proposal details and graphics were sent separately to the three people as well as a questionnaire that included 13 questions. Their responses were as follows:

1. **What do you think of the proposal? Do you see any advantages/positive aspects? If yes, what are they?**

   A. It is a very rich and useful proposal; the major impact of this study will be to lay the foundation for more strategic thinking at the early stages of sudden on-set emergencies and to include long-term vision.

Advantages: it creates better and more dignified living conditions, which don't exist in the Jordanian context, unfortunately. Better shelter conditions—moving from shelter to housing conditions which work better in all seasons not only in 1 or 2 seasons.

The main current problem in the camps is that they are not at all suited for cold weather. In winter, UNHCR is spending a lot of money to winterize the existing shelter units (tents, caravans), this money would better utilized if we moved to housing units after the emergency phase. In other words, running cost would be much less.

The capital investment would be larger if we do two types of settlements (emergency camps and long-term settlements); But we would save way more money in the long-term if these settlements are made permanent as housing units.

The proposal would give the flexibility to build the housing units in domestic areas where it is possible to interact with the local community; long-term housing units can be built in local urban

areas where the acceptance/interaction with the local community is feasible (transportation, social interaction, workspace, livelihood etc.)

B. I do like the concept of moving from emergency to post emergency. **It is very important for planners dealing with emergencies and human movements to plan for an immediate emergency response but at the same time have plans in place to move, in the shortest possible time, to more durable solutions.** This proposal has addressed this very critical issue. There are certainly different options to deal with this issue but focusing on this proposal, I would say the 6-8 weeks emergency response duration is not realistic in practical terms. **It needs to be in the range of 6 months, and if so, it would be best to move from emergency to "durable" solutions directly without having to go through the intermediate phase.**

C. I believe the proposal reflects the reality more than the current UNHCR adopted approach of crisis response since historical data shows that the average camp lifespan post crisis is more than 15 years. **If responses were looked at from a developmental approach from the beginning, lots of funds would have been saved and redirected towards the needs of the most vulnerable people affected by the crisis.**

2. **Is it feasible if considered at an early stage of response when funds are available?**

A. Yes, with better planning at the early stages, it could be feasible.

B. I'm not quite sure I understand the question.

C. Yes, it is feasible considering the availability of funds. But the urgency of response has to be considered; most of the time that might cause the response to be led by the emergency (following the stream) rather than it being well planned.

3. **Would it need the same amount of funding as the current model of response? Less? Or more? and why?**

A. I personally believe that it will require more funding because the two types of setting will be built at the same time, the emergency one and the long term.

B. I think donors would wish to know (and the earlier the better) when the emergency phase would be over since this consumes lots of their funds. Therefore, a plan that is clearly stating when the emergency starts and ends and when a more sustainable solution is put in place will for sure be very welcomed by donors.

C. This approach would require a considerably larger initial injection of funds to be made available but would lead towards a sustainable situation that decreases and requires less funds along the lifespan of the crisis.

The current approach requires less initial availability of funds but requires a steady-state funds requirements that tends to increase along the lifespan of the crisis.

4. **How much does every refugee cost UNHCR or host government? Food, accommodation (shelter), income, facilities, etc.?**

   A. Unfortunately, I do not have such information; this is a crosscutting issue between several parties.

   B. I really don't know but for sure this depends on the location. For example, in Zaatari camp in Jordan accommodation quickly moved from tents to prefabs. In some African countries, refugees are provided with few wooden poles and plastic sheeting to build their own shelters…

   C. In Jordan, every refugee costs the host government around $3,500 USD annually.

5. **What is the maintenance cost of the temporary camps?**

   A. Unfortunately, I do not have such information

   B. Again, what camps are we talking about? Different camps have different structures and consequently different maintenance costs. If specific for Jordan, please contact colleagues in the operation.

   C. Zaatari: around $4 million USDs a year; Azraq: around $2.6 million USDs a year.

6. **Do you agree that the emergency camps and post-emergency settlements should be built separately? Or perhaps in different areas?**

   A. Yes, while the emergency camp(s) should be built in a close enough but safe area to the entry point of the host country to minimize the travel distance on the refugees, the post-emergency settlement should be in an area that allows interactions with local communities and close to existing services (water, wastewater, road network, etc.).

   B. No. I think it is hard for host governments to allocate lands for refugees and therefore it would be best to have a plan in place where in the same location the emergency can be transformed into a more sustainable solution. In addition, we need to be careful about terminologies as some host countries would not agree with one name or the other (camp, settlement, etc.)

   C. I do agree that emergency camps should be set-up in a temporary transitional location until a proper plan is endorsed for the post-emergency settlement.

7. **Do you think the UN Agencies and partners are counting on the right expertise while designing and building camps (i.e. architects, urban planners, economists etc.) which will help providing livelihoods, dignified living conditions, an economic cycle as well as social interaction?**

   A. They have the basic construction and development team, but there's a lack of experts due to old school humanitarian recruiting procedures (Human Resources procedures) – very strict titles especially for secondary units (i.e. UNHCR Technical shelter unit). In secondary units, titles are very rigid and implemented in the system as one or two, i.e. shelter officer and site

planner which does not attract the right expertise such as architects, urban planners and developers. The negative impact is massive as camps are not developed based on these 4 categories (livelihood, dignified living conditions etc.).

B. Not entirely. UN agencies should make use of expertise coming from the private sector mixed with expertise in the humanitarian field. The mix of the two can then produce much better results.

C. UN agencies do have the right expertise but are limited to "by-the-book" implementation methodology that limits the innovation in emergency response implementation and planning.

8. **Do you agree that the most severely impacted group in the Syrian refugee crisis, are children? If yes, what is the impact of living in such temporary camps on their childhood, mental health and future?**

   A. I am not sure if they are the most impacted as I don't have the right figures, but yes, children have been impacted in a severe way. The impact of living in such temporary camps, the lack of access to good quality education and higher education as well as lack of recreational spaces/features will definitely have a psychological impact on them in the future.

   B. Yes children and women. When back home they had some sort of privacy, but when lost in a refugee situation it is an issue for all members of the family. Children's education, recreational, etc. activities are certainly impacted. When an entire family is totally uprooted from their place of living into a place they never imagined existed in terms of misery and total dependency on external assistance, it has real impact on the psychology of the family members and given that children are the most vulnerable, they are the most affected.

   C. Indeed, the most impacted are the children. Temporary camps limit the social interaction of the children and discourage the social cohesion of those children within their own community, in addition to within the host communities.

9. **When over 50% of inhabitants are children, do you agree that permanent settlements should always be considered a primary option in order for them to resume their normal lives and have a healthy living environment?**

   A. Absolutely, yes; long-term settlements/housing units will reflect on their livelihood and daily activities and help the children develop in healthier environments

   B. Host countries would not want to hear the word "permanent". Refugees to them are hosted temporarily. Nowhere in the world does a settlement/camp start off as 'permanent"; all start as very temporary to save lives and provide protection to the refugees from the elements as soon as is possible. Therefore, the importance of this proposal is to have a clear roadmap of moving, in the shortest possible time, from the emergency phase to a more durable solution. **The proposal may consider setting up more durable structures mainly for education and health support at emergency stage provided that the materials and design allow for absolutely quick delivery. In this instance, children can join "decent" schools almost immediately and receive "decent" health services the first days of their arrival.**

C. With over than 50% being children, I would not consider a refugee camp at all. In my own opinion, I believe that integration of those families within the host communities would provide the best option for those children to resume their normal lives.

10. **Do the temporary shelter units of UNHCR at Zaatari and Azraq need annual maintenance? Is this process expensive? And roughly what percent does a shelter require annually for maintenance in comparison with the initial price?**

A. Yes, they need annual maintenance, mostly during winter, but sometimes in other seasons, UNHCR and their partners implement on-demand maintenance through quick-fix teams. The process is very expensive as it includes maintenance and improvement since shelters were not insulated properly which requires implementing an insulation layer to all shelter units, which has a huge financial impact + introducing concrete flooring shelter extension (kitchen, toilets, shaded area, etc.) in both camps. + Water proofing.

All of this is time consuming and requires a lot of human resources/labor work every year/season, as well as management.

Around 20% annual maintenance of the initial price, but even the UN Agencies and partners do not have accurate numbers.

B. Sure. Every structure would need maintenance. On the annual cost, I would recommend consulting with colleagues in the Jordan operation. Having said that, the tenants have responsibility for the housekeeping and therefore the need for awareness campaigns. Providing simple and basic tools to the families would reduce the annual maintenance cost. Under no circumstances, the maintenance should exceed 3-5% of the initial cost

C. Yes they do, 35%.

11. **Based on your experience working with/for Syrian families, what do you think of them as a society, work force, educated people and skilled members?**

A. Based on my experience, contactors in Jordan prefer to hire Syrian workers as they are skilled, professional and require lower wages. The Syrians have moved from a fully-fledged and advanced community back in Syria where they have been educated, trained, gathered the right skill-sets. Also, in camps there is a high number of engineers, doctors, teachers etc. that in some cases had access to the job market, whilst others didn't and that needs to be taken into consideration for better utilization of skills in the future.

Last but not least, **Syrians have created a huge market at Zaatari which is comparable to the local market in Mafraq city, in size, skills and economic base.**

I think the situation in the Jordanian urban setting is very different because they have access to proper housing units, proper schools, job market, commercial areas etc. The methodology of dealing with/helping refugees in urban areas is different than the ones used in the camps; the way to reach refugees in urban settings is different.

I personally believe that refugees living in urban areas are happier and have better living conditions.

B. Syrian refugees are highly skilled people and very good businessmen. Given the opportunity they will, in the very shortest possible time, be totally self-sustained but again a close eye should be kept on things so as not to interrupt the local economies and therefore **the Syrian workforce should be directed to fill in gaps in the local hosting markets rather than competing with them.** The latter will not only disrupt the economic cycle but will certainly lead to friction and potential distinct communities; refugees and host communities. On the social fabric, Syrians, as with middle eastern societies in general, have very strong social and family values, which to them are of utmost importance

C. **Syrian refugees have shown to be a skilled workforce with proficient levels in their fields of knowledge, which sometimes exceed the skills/knowledge of local laborers.** Such knowledge worried the local laborers and decreased the acceptance of Syrian refugees within the local communities.

Syrian and Jordanian communities have very similar backgrounds, thus, differences in cultural and social aspects were not noticed.

12. **From your perspective as a UNCHR worker, could you please list all the challenges and limitations which every phase of this proposal would face?**

A. Funding: while funds were available at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the necessary time to implement infrastructure and long term shelter projects was not. The shelters (tents, prefabricated building-caravans) that were implemented at that time are to be considered as emergency and early recovery solutions. Throughout the past 7 years, there was an intention to implement longer term shelter solution, but as the years went by the funds started to dry out which limited such responses.

Host government concerns: the government in Jordan was against implementing any long term shelters made out of permanent construction materials such as concrete. These materials were also not permitted to enter any the camps unless preapproved for very limited use.

Imbalances between the infrastructure and the shelter quality: while the roads which have been constructed at Azraq camp rise to the highest quality level- costing millions of dollars- the shelters were made of steel sheeting which in an area like Azraq means shelter become very hot in summer making them unbearable to stay in. NGOs started to get involved to improve the thermal insulation of the shelter units but such solutions result in a big financial impact on the UN Agencies and NGOs.

Integration with the local communities: the camps were located in remote areas which made it very hard to interact with local communities. Infrastructure has been introduced in both camps which now also makes it very expensive to move them to domestic urban areas.

B. (Answered below in 13)

C. The donor community would not risk the initial high investment, bearing in mind the ambiguity of each crisis and its duration.

Change is not easy within the organization and would require a lot of work and endorsement at the highest levels.

Host communities would sometimes refuse the idea of having a permanent residence for refugees, even if sustainable; they would consider it as a threat to the country's demographics.

13. **What are your recommendations?**

A. While the implementation of emergency shelter is a must for big surges of refugees due to the lack of time for building more permanent structures that would respond to such crises, there should be proper planning and implementation of longer term solutions going on simultaneously while the funds are available

The presence of a dedicated project management team that, in close collaboration with the coordination teams, would advocate to the host governments for longer term solutions such as permanent shelter and projecting the vision of local communities benefiting from such permanent structures in these camps that would eventually turn into villages, towns or even small cities.

There should be more involvement of the people who will be living in the camps during the design phase of the shelter prototypes.

Selection of location of camps should allow for future integration with the local communities.

B. This would be the reply for both questions above (12 & 13): The challenge is that it would be difficult to acquire the desired plots of land for the implementation of this plan. In addition, it would be more practical as mentioned earlier to have two phases instead of three: emergency and post emergency (durable). Besides, and given limitations on land availability, the plan would best use the same plot allocated for a settlement/camp for both phases i.e. it starts as an emergency but has the tendency to move from emergency to durable solutions in the same location. Let us keep in mind that shelters don't come alone. They come with WASH services, education & health facilities, etc. and therefore the importance of planning from day one how the emergency phase can be transformed into durable in the same location.

C. (No answer)

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