Understanding the Political Integration Outcomes of Enfranchised and High Socioeconomic Status Immigrants in Host Societies

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ABSTRACT

While much of the contemporary research on immigrant integration focuses on promoting and expanding legal, economic, and social rights for immigrants, little scholarship exists on how those markers of inclusion lead to political integration. This dissertation examines why immigrants, who would otherwise be considered fully integrated into their host societies, participate in politics at different rates when they face similar institutional and sociological barriers. It examines three facets of political integration that are central to immigrant political power: preference for descriptive representation, adoption of the democratic value of civic duty, and participation in local elections. This dissertation extends our overall understanding of immigrant political behaviors at a time when immigration is ever increasing, and the issue of integration is at the forefront of policy debates. By studying the political behaviors and beliefs of long-term migrants, the findings of this dissertation offer a road map for integration policies concerning the current wave of immigrants. Finally, this dissertation makes a case for ensuring the electoral power of immigrants as it is the only one that matters for the representativeness and preservation of democratic governance.

RESUMEN

Si bien gran parte de la investigación contemporánea sobre la integración de los inmigrantes se centra en promover y ampliar los derechos legales, económicos y sociales para los inmigrantes, se ha prestado menos atención a cómo esos marcadores de inclusión conducen realmente a la integración política. Esta tesis doctoral examina por qué los inmigrantes, que de otra manera serían considerados completamente integrados en sus sociedades anfitrionas, participan en políticas electorales a tasas variadas cuando enfrentan barreras institucionales y sociológicas similares. Considera tres facetas de la integración política que son fundamentales para el poder político de los inmigrantes: la adopción del valor democrático del deber cívico, la participación en las elecciones locales y la preferencia por la representación descriptiva. Esta tesis amplia nuestra comprensión general de los comportamientos políticos de los

inmigrantes en un momento en que la inmigración está en aumento y el tema de la integración está a la vanguardia de los debates políticos. Al estudiar los comportamientos de los migrantes a largo plazo, los hallazgos de esta tesis ofrecen una hoja de ruta para las políticas de integración relacionadas con la ola actual de inmigrantes. Finalmente, esta tesis aboga por garantizar el poder electoral de los inmigrantes, ya que es el único que importa para la representatividad y la preservación de la gobernabilidad democrática.

PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to systematically investigate the theoretical perspective that political power derives from socioeconomic power—a fundamental tenet of both sociological theories of assimilation and political science theories of participation. Each chapter of this dissertation studies this assumption within the context of the acquisition of socio-racial status, the acquisition of nationality, and the acquisition of assets. This thesis analyses the roles played by political capital obtained from the origin country, social capital built within the communities, and institutional-political context of the host country. This dissertation finds that socioeconomic inclusion does not automatically lead to political inclusion but that much of this process can be facilitated by public policies.

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1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant events that concern scholars as it relates to democracies in Europe and North American, and indeed the rest of the world, is immigration. Immigration is arguably one of the major 21st-century challenges, both in terms of receiving and accepting immigrants, because governments are grappling with how to integrate people from a different culture into their society. Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed major world events—the enlargements of the European Union, the Syrian War, and the Great Recession to name a few—that resulted in an influx of immigration to and across OECD countries. As of 2018, the OECD estimates around 128 million people who were born in another country now live in its member states, account for over 10% of its population (OECD/EU 2018, 40). In the European Union alone, the number of immigrants increased by 32% over the last ten years. There are currently around 58 million EU residents who are foreign-born, with two-thirds of them from non-EU countries. In this context, the political outcomes of immigrants in their host societies have acquired new relevance and significance.

While the integration of immigrants is important across all domains, political integration has the most profound repercussions for the robustness of democracies because it is "the process of becoming a part of mainstream political debates, practices, and decision making…[and] incorporation is generally achieved when patterns of immigrant participation are comparable to those among the native born" (Bloemraad 2006, 6). That is, political equality provides immigrants with a voice and the power to advocate for their interests and to express their grievances. As democracy rests on the ideal of political inclusion and empowerment, the political integration of immigrant is necessary to bolster democratic legitimacy.

The task at hand for political scientists now is to expand our understanding of the determinants of immigrants' political integration and to provide evidence for policymakers to design and implement effective integration programs. This dissertation aims to contribute to this endeavor by examining the political outcomes of enfranchised and high socioeconomic status immigrants in their host societies. While it has become conventional wisdom that naturalization or

socioeconomic success, or both, promote political incorporation among immigrants (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015; Brubaker 2001), very little is known about the extent to which immigrants who have citizenship or social status integrate into their host country's political life. This dissertation, therefore, set out to understand the factors that facilitate or hinder the political integration of those immigrants. It uses data from Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Making Electoral Democracy Work, and Current Population Survey to analyze variables relating to immigrants' desires, interests, and abilities to politically integrate, as well as the role of public policies on integration outcomes. By investigating why political integration does not always occur in lockstep with legal and socioeconomic integration, this dissertation aims to broaden the public knowledge of this issue.

1.1 The concept and its measurement

Immigrant political integration refers to the general process through which foreign-born residents gain influence and representation in their host countries' political life. There is, unfortunately, no universally accepted checklist of political behaviors that immigrants must partake to be considered integrated. In the interest of clarity, this dissertation employs the concept presented by Martiniello (2006, 84) as its framework. The reason is that the definition separates the integration process into four distinct dimensions. They are as follows: political rights granted by the host country, sociological identification with the host society, internalization of host country's democratic norms and values, and political participation. This dissertation, however, only focused on the last three dimensions mentioned above.

Immigrants' political behavior and attitudes, unlike those of the general population, are analyzed across individuals more so than across countries or time. This approach may be due to several factors. For example, the experience of immigrating and settling in a country varies widely between individuals. An aggregate-level analysis is, therefore, not an apt approach to explaining why immigrants seem to be better integrated into one country than in another. Additionally, there are vast differences between countries in terms of their history of immigration, demographics of migrants, and public and political

attitudes toward immigrants. For these reasons, individual-level surveys are the primary means through which we study immigrants' political integration.

In terms of operationalization, the multidimensional nature of political integration means that no single comprehensive measurement of this concept exists. Thus, empirical studies use different operationalizations depending on their integration outcome of interest. In this dissertation, I use three variable measurements that correspond with each of Martiniello's dimensions of political integration. First, sociological identification is measured as the preference for co-minority or co-ethnic candidate. The logic here is that descriptive representation is important to immigrants when they do not or cannot identify as part of the host society. This preference for political candidates that reflect their socio-racial status means that immigrants do not believe that politicians who represent the majority can also serve them. Internalization of democratic norms is operationalized as the belief that voting is a duty and not a choice. Second, a sense of civic responsibility is widely accepted as one of the main principles and main engines of democratic governance. Although voting is costly, and the rewards are low, citizens who believe that it is a civic obligation to turnout are the ones who ensure government works them and people like them. Lastly, political participation is defined as turnout in local elections. Because the local government has a direct impact on citizens' welfare and local politics have a lower engagement rate, a vote in local elections can give immigrants a stronger political voice than at any other level. All analyses in this dissertation include aggregate-level data to account for the impact of contextual factors. This dissertation, thus, provides a holistic understanding of the conditions under which immigrants become incorporated into the host societies' polity.

1.2 The relevance of the topic

The political integration of immigrants is among the most pressing, and the most contentious, of matters on the policy agenda of OECD countries. As previously described, the sizeable and growing population of immigrants means that they have the increasing potential to influence the outcome of electoral contests and the direction of public policies for years to come. While the potential for

immigrant political impact is unlimited, the reality is that immigrants who have acquired host-country citizenship are participating at a lower level than native citizens in electoral politics—on average 74% of enfranchised immigrants voted in the most recent national elections, compared with the native-born rate of 79% (OECD/EU 2018, 126). This gap, which continues to persist after accounting for age and education, shows that nationality is a necessary but not sufficient condition to end the political marginalization of immigrants.

Moreover, the under-participation of immigrants means that they are not being represented demographically and that their interests are not being advocated for politically in the host countries' government. If the ultimate goal of integration—whether it be political, social, or economical—is for immigrants to become a part of the mainstream society and for their outcomes to be comparable to those of native-born (Bloemraad 2006), then clearly there is work left to do. In this aspect, the scholarly pursuit of understanding political participation can assist public policy makers in achieving the goal of immigrant political integration.

In addition to its impact on the public sphere, the study of immigrant political behavior and participation has theoretical implications for the field of political science. It forces us to explicitly reexamine our understanding of voting and political behavior since most studies rarely distinguish between foreign- and native-born citizens. While decades of research and volumes of studies have yielded considerable knowledge about individual-level differences and contextual factors that determine political engagement, we still know very little about immigrants' political decision-making process. This gap is significant for theories of political participation because immigrants' political experiences, in both the origin and the host country, differ significantly from those of the general population. Thus, we cannot merely assume that immigrants are motivated by the same variables as natives. In the absence of specific knowledge about immigrants' political behavior, our theoretical understanding of participation would be incomplete, and our models underspecified.

In summary, it has been shown that the topic of immigrant political integration has substantial benefits for the function of a democratic country and the study of democratic government. This dissertation,

therefore, seeks to contribute to advancing the political participation literature as it relates to the immigrant population. It does so by examining their political integration via the preference of co-minority/co-ethnic candidates, acceptance of democratic norms, and political participation in local elections.

1.3 What we know about immigrant political integration

Scholars have employed several theories, such as the resource model of political participation, social capital, and social identity theories, and political socialization theories, to address the variation in immigrant political engagement. In particular, research has emphasized factors such as host countries' integration policies, immigrants' experiences with formal and informal exclusionary treatments, and origin countries' political values and norms (Morales and Giugni 2011; Koopmans et al. 2005; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015; S. White et al. 2008). Many researchers hold the view that by easing access to naturalization and granting resources for immigrant communities to succeed, countries provide immigrants with both the means and motive to stake their political claims (Koopmans et al. 2005; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015). In essence, works based on the resource model argue immigrants' engagement with politics can be explained through the following answer about political participation in general: people do it because they can (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Host countries should, therefore, enact policies that enable and facilitate the political participation of their immigrant population. Despite this proposal, major differences in immigrant political engagement remain unexplained even upon accounting for host countries' integration policies.

To better understand the determinants of immigrant political integration, scholars are increasingly turning to social identity theory and social capital theory to analyze how the lived experiences of immigrants shape their political behavior. Researchers argue that racial/ethnic identity, formed by experiences of social exclusion and racial discrimination, increase immigrants' political participation by instilling in them a sense of collective cause (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo

2017; McClain et al. 2009). Scholars have also shown that access to social resources, either through social networks of co-ethnics or through community networks of neighbors, has positive effects for immigrants' political incorporation (Gidengil and Stolle 2009; Mireles 2017). The results of the literature thus far suggest that positive institutional and social encounters in the host country are particularly mobilizing for immigrants.

Another body of research seeks to explain immigrant political integration through the three political socialization hypotheses: resistance, transferability, and exposure. The theory of resistance argues that immigrants become accustomed to the origin country's political realities and are thus not able to change their political frame of reference. The transferability theory, on the other hand, suggests that immigrants who come from democratic contexts can quickly acclimate to host countries' norms because they can draw on previously acquired political skills. The exposure hypothesis posits that length of tenure affords immigrants, from both democratic and undemocratic countries, opportunities to observe host countries' political cultures, to internalize them, and to transform them into personal values that guide their political actions (S. White et al. 2008; B. Voicu and Comșa 2014). The academic literature on political socialization has thus far presented us with different expectations; and correspondingly, empirical tests of the relationship between the three theories and political participation have, to date, yielded mixed results.

This section has attempted to provide a summary of the literature relating to immigrant political integration. These studies support the notion that legal and social resources are important for the formation of immigrant political presence. Little attention has been paid to the political behavior of immigrants once they acquire those rights. As a result, it remains unclear as to why immigrants would go through the difficulties of obtaining citizenship, buying a home, or climbing the socio-economic ladder, but then proceed not to exercise their political power.

1.4 The limitations of the literature

As previously stated, the political integration of immigrants contains four dimensions: acquisition of legal rights, psychological identification with the host society, adoption of democratic norms, and finally political participation (Martiniello 2006, 84).The vast majority works currently only focus on the fourth dimension. Although this emphasis on political participation is understandable considering that political actions are the only means to acquiring political voice, it has led researchers to overlook important normative questions about the psychological drivers behind a citizen's continuous political participation. These include, but are not limited to, one's sense of civic obligation, of community attachment, and linked fate. The scant attention paid to these psychological motivations is cause for concern considering that mainstream political science research indicates a significant relationship between these perceptions and consistent political engagement (Blais 2000; Putnam 2000b; Dawson 1994). A comprehensive examination of how these notions of connectedness affect the political attitudes and behavior of immigrants is therefore largely overdue.

This dissertation aims to address the shortcomings mentioned above in three research articles, presented here as chapters. The chapters explore three aspects of political integration: (1) racial background of preferred candidate, (2) sense of civic duty towards host countries, and (3) voting in local elections. Each chapter analyzes the outcome of interest through a combination of the following theoretical perspectives: political socialization theories, social identity theory, social capital theory, the homevoter hypothesis, racial voting theory, and the politics of racial consciousness. The results of this dissertation contribute to this growing area immigrant integration research by demonstrating the specific conditions under which legal, economic, or social integration lead to positive political outcomes.

1.5 The structure and contributions of the dissertation

This dissertation has been organized in a manner that follows the political incorporation of immigrants at different milestones of their

social and economic integration in host countries. It investigates the incongruity of immigrants' political behavior and major predictors of electoral behaviors. The following pages outline each subsequent chapter.

In what way does being socioeconomically proximal to whites affect Asian Americans' candidate preference?

The first chapter titled "Same Same but Different: Comparing Asian Americans' and White Natives' Candidate Preference in US House of Representatives Elections" addresses the material consequences of racial stratification on immigrants' preference for co-ethnic or co-minority representation or both. This chapter focuses specifically on Asians Americans because they have been racially positioned vis-à-vis whites and Blacks in American society for the past half-century (Kim 1999). In the US racial hierarchy, Asians are considered to be socially and economically superior to Blacks and other minorities, but they are *not quite* equal to whites—this racial status is reflected in terms such as "honorary whites" or "model minorities." This chapter shows that researchers need to contextualize racial minorities' experiences in host countries to understand their political preferences and ultimately, behaviors.

This chapter compares Asians to whites because the paradox of Asian American under-representation in electoral politics is fundamentally about why Asians, who have surpassed whites in terms of socioeconomic resources (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson, and Stringfellow 2010), continue to be politically powerless. I shed light on this puzzle by investigating Asians' and whites' political preferences, specifically the racial backgrounds of their preferred candidates (RPC). This conceptual framework for this chapter draws on research studying how the interaction between a voter's racial attitudes and a candidate's race informs vote choice, as well as the literature analyzing the conditions under which racial identity and group consciousness have political consequences. The main argument here is that Asian voters' preferences for co-minority or co-ethnic are motivated by racial attitudes rather than a collective sense of racial injustice. I contend that Asian voters develop either positive or negative racial attitudes about other minorities and those perceptual biases then guide their vote choice.

The empirical analysis of this chapter uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study and hand-coded data on the racial background of candidates, along with aggregate information about each congressional district. I begin with the descriptive statistics of Asians' and whites' RPC to determine if their political preferences differ or resemble. The results reveal vast differences in both groups' RPC, indicating that proximity on the racial hierarchy does not translate to proximity in political interests. I then delve into the three main factors that lead Asian and white voters to vary in their candidate preference: racial attitudes, racial consciousness, and election context. The most striking result to emerge from the analysis is that Asian voters, unlike whites, are more influenced by the electoral environment than by personal beliefs. While the result is unexpected, it reveals a previously overlooked motivation behind Asian Americans' political decisions. This chapter contributes to the field of ethnic politics by going beyond the traditional paradigm of studying Asian Americans in relations with other minorities. Although this study focuses on race relations in the US, the political ramifications of racial stratification may well have a bearing on European society as its immigrant population continues to grow in size and diversity.

What facilitates the adoption of host countries' political values?

The second chapter titled “Adapting Behaviors, but Not Adopting Beliefs: Determinants of Naturalized Citizens’ Civic Duty” is dedicated to the fundamental question of electoral behavior: why do some people vote, and others do not? This chapter specifically addresses the uneven voter participation among naturalized citizens by examining their sense of civic duty towards host countries. Civic duty is the democratic ideal that voting is an obligation and not a choice. As such, it drives turnout when the benefits do not outweigh the costs, when one is socioeconomically disadvantaged when political parties' mobilization efforts fail to reach citizens, and when an individual has a multitude of other reasons to not vote (Blais 2000; Blais and Achen 2017). Given that immigrant integration scholars has long herald naturalization as a resource that catalyzes and sustains political engagement among immigrants (See Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015; Just and J. Anderson 2012; Street 2017), understanding civic duty is key to understanding why

some immigrants abstain even though they self-select into the arduous process of acquiring citizenship.

This aim of this chapter is to ascertain the conditions under which social integration via citizenship leads to political integration via the acceptance of host countries' democratic values. This chapter makes a major contribution to research on civic duty by drawing on political socialization theory (PST) and social identity theory (SIT) to explain why some foreign-born nationals develop a sense of civic obligation towards host countries and others do not. The central position of this chapter is that civic duty is not shaped only by pre-migration experiences, but also by immigrants' encounters with the policies and politics of host countries. Host countries can promote a sense of inclusion among its foreign-born nationals by championing their development and growth within its society. This perception of in-group membership is the mechanism through which public policies can foster the belief that voting is an obligation because it maintains the country's democratic system.

I tested this argument with data collected in the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project from the period of 2010 to 2015 in Switzerland, France, Spain, Germany, and Canada. Using the MEDW data is important because the wording of the civic duty question was based on Achen and Blais' (2017) idea that the social desirability bias can be avoided by depicting both views of voting (duty or not) as equals. I also appended data about the origin country's political regime from the Polity IV Project and host countries' policies and politics from the Migration Integration Policy Index and the Comparative Manifestos Project.

Finally, this chapter provides the first extensive examination of which independent variables influence a sense of civic obligation towards a country that is not of one's origin. It is clear that civic duty, an often-overlooked normative aspect of immigrant political integration, has real consequences for the turnout of a group of citizens that most need to maintain a consistent voice in government. The findings confirm the hypothesis host countries' political-institutional context is central to naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. Host countries thus not only provides a stage for the electoral participation of immigrants but can also be an agent in their success.

Does homeownership motivate turnout in local elections?

The chapter titled “A House is Not a Home: Homeownership and Voter Participation in Local Elections among Naturalized Citizens" evaluates the extent to which the economic integration of naturalized citizens facilitates their political integration. This chapter focuses on an academically contentious but politically popular public policy principle in the United States (US): homeownership leads to better citizenship. Homeownership is fundamental to the American ethos; the American public views it as a symbolic equivalent of citizenship—a status of not only economical but also social success (Perin 1977). The American government regards it is a useful public policy tool for promoting civic engagement since a home economically and emotionally roots citizens in their communities. Despite the importance of homeownership, there remains a paucity of studies investigating the mechanisms through which owning a home would increase the turnout of naturalized citizens in their communities' elections.

This chapter contends that there are two facets of homeownership that could motivate participation in local elections: active social capital building and passive political awareness. The hypothesis of active social capital building is based on DiPasquale and Glaeser’s (1999) study showing that homeowners invest in cultivating relationships because they immediately benefit from being within a neighborhood network, irrespective of their tenure in the community. These neighborly relationships can mobilize homeowners to electorally participate by providing them with political knowledge and by calling them to act for specific collective causes. Stemming from the logic of Fischel's (2001) homevoter hypothesis, the passive political awareness hypothesis argues that homeowners understand that local elections have consequences for their well-being and this knowledge is enough to motivate them to participate. In addition to these two variables, the chapter also considers the impact of political socialization at the individual level and of the supply of immigrant representation at the contextual level.

These arguments are tested and partially confirmed in an analysis of naturalized citizens in California using data from the Current Population Survey Civic Engagement Supplement. The findings contribute to our understanding of the pathways through which

homeownership affect election turnout at the local level. This chapter highlights the flaw in the assumption that a house of one's own is automatically a home and that people will politically invest in maintaining that house and their community. This chapter shows that economic integration only leads to political integration when it is in tandem with social integration.

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2 SAME SAME BUT DIFFERENT: COMPARING THE CANDIDATE PREFERENCE OF ASIAN AMERICANS AND WHITE NATIVES IN US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS

Abstract

This paper considers the racial characteristics of Asian naturalized citizens' and white native citizens' candidate preference in U.S. House elections. This article particularly investigates the conditions under which racial heritage becomes salient in the political decision-making process of voters with an immigrant background, i.e., those born outside the US and their US-born children. It uses data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES), Federal Election Commission and American Community Survey to examine whether the effects of racial attitudes, racial awareness, and electoral environment differ across racial groups. Evidence from the analysis suggests that a racial heritage is not a positive or significant determinant of Asian voters preferring a co-(pan)ethnic or a co-minority candidate over a white candidate. Instead, racial heritage matters for the impact of racial attitudes—it does not matter for the effects of racial consciousness or electoral environment. Furthermore, the results show that the differential impact of racial attitudes is only significant when the candidate choice is between an Asian and a white candidate.

2.1 Introduction

In November 2014, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) filed a lawsuit against Harvard University alleging that Asian Americans, like white Americans, are held to a higher standard than applicants from other racial/ethnic groups (SFFA v. Harvard, No. 14 Civ. 14176).[1] While the validity of SFFA's discrimination claims remains to be decided by the Court, the case highlights the unique position of Asians in American society—they are not as socially privileged as whites but not as disadvantaged as Blacks and Latinos (Kim 1999). Given the prevalence of racial stratification in American society (Bonilla-Silva 2004), this study focuses on Asian Americans because their high racial status in American society provides a suitable case to study how and when socioeconomic integration facilitates the second dimension of Martiniello's (2006) definition of political integration: identification with the host society.

This current study focuses on the racial background of immigrant voters' preferred candidates (referred hereafter as the race of preferred candidate or RPC). *This article particularly investigates the conditions under which racial heritage becomes salient in the political decision-making process of voters with an immigrant background, i.e., those born outside the US and their US-born children.* Although the concept of identification has been traditionally examined through the lenses of psychology, recent studies on descriptive representation have shown that identification can be manifested through candidate preference.[2] That is, immigrants who identify primarily as a host country's national rather than with

[1] In this paper, I use Asian Americans as a pan-ethnic term with the understanding that at least 19 ethnicities constitute the Asian collective in the US. Refer to http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/ for more information.

[2] Immigrant integration research has traditionally defined identification as either immigrant believing that they are first and foremost a national of the host country (de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014; Nesdale and Mak 2000) or their sense of belongingness in the host society (Amit and Bar-Lev 2015; Wallace 2014).

their ethnic or pan-ethnic group are less likely to prefer a co-(pan)ethnic or co-minority candidate (Schildkraut 2013). By examining the RPC of immigrant voters rather than their psychological identification, we can ascertain the political consequences of when identification with the host society is (not) realized.

Because the primary aim of the dissertation is to explore the political integration of enfranchised and high SES immigrants, this paper has opted to compare Asian Americans and whites Americans in elections where a minority is running against a white candidate. Asians are compared to whites because Asian Americans continue to lag behind whites in political representation even though Asians are now equal or superior to whites in terms of socioeconomic power (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson, and Stringfellow 2010; Ryan and Bauman 2016). Another significant aspect of comparing Asians to whites is that we can assess the extent to which the model minority narrative affects Asian Americans' political preferences. If Asian Americans have internalized the discourse that they are socially proximal to whites, then they should theoretically align their social and political interests with those of white voters. Hence, being Asian should not be a primary determinant of candidate preference for Asian voters, even in elections where a co-(pan)ethnic or co-minority is running against a white candidate. By studying the political behaviors of Asians in tandem with whites, this paper contributes to the field of ethnic politics by extending its general scope beyond the traditional examination of Asian Americans and their relations to other minorities. It also goes beyond the current focus on how whites view minority candidates or how minority groups perceive co-(pan)ethnic candidates (see, for example, Visalvanich 2017b; Adida, Davenport and McClendon 2016; Schildkraut 2013).

This article begins by drawing on three distinct strands of research to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the RPC of immigrant voters. I then build upon the literature to ascertain which of the following three factors is the primary determinant of an individual's RPC: racial attitudes, racial consciousness, or election context. The first body of literature examines how a candidate's race functions as an information heuristic for voters. Referred to as racial

voting, voters use candidates' racial heritage, just as they would partisan affiliation or incumbency, to understand what candidates represent and to choose their preferred candidate. The second tradition analyzes when and for whom do racial identity and group consciousness have political consequences. Awareness of racial injustice and opportunity disparity in the US may be particularly crucial for Asian voters. This group has been told that no racial barriers exist for them in the US system, yet who tend to face more race-based obstacles in their lives than whites. The third strand of research argues for the importance of election-level variables in the candidate preference of voters. Studies on election context have demonstrated that the degree to which candidates differ in their ideologies and to which elections are contested can be influential factors in the calculus of vote choice.

To analyze the factors that determine the RPC of Asian and white voters in House of Representatives elections in the US, I combined the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES) with candidates' Campaign Finance Score (CFscores) from data compiled by Bonica (2013). [3] I also added hand-coded data on candidates' racial background, information on campaign spending from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the district-level information from the American Community Survey. The US provides an excellent setting for studying the impact of racial beliefs and electoral environment on candidate preference because it has a sizeable population of Asian voters and non-white political candidates. As the issues of immigration and the political integration of immigrants gain more prominence across democracies in Europe and North America,

[3] House of Representatives (also referred to as the House) is one of the two bodies of the U.S. federal government's legislative branch. The other is the Senate, and together they are collectively known as Congress. The total number of voting members in the House is fixed at 435, proportionally representative of the 50 states' population. Each congress member is elected to a two-year term serving the constituents of a specific congressional district. Unlike Senators (two per state) who represent the whole state, House members usually represent a smaller population and therefore are considered to be more responsive to their constituents' needs and opinions. Refer to https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained for more information.

the diversity in both the demand (voters) and supply (candidates) in American politics can provide a survey of the political landscape of new receiving countries in the not too distant future. Finally, I use multinomial logistic regression models with standard errors clustered by state-congressional districts to examine the probability of voters preferring an Asian or a Black/Latino candidate over a white candidate.

Below I present evidence suggesting that a voter's racial heritage matters in elections where the race of the candidates differ. In the case of Asian Americans, racial heritage is not a positive or significant determinant of preferring a co-(pan)ethnic or a co-minority candidate over a white candidate. Instead, racial heritage matters for the impact of racial attitudes—it does not matter for the effects of racial consciousness or electoral environment. Furthermore, the results show that the differential impact of racial attitudes is only significant when the candidate choice is between an Asian and a white candidate. The findings of this paper provide two important implications for our understanding of race and politics in the US: Asian Americans' political identity and interests have not converged with those of whites and their behaviors to do not conform to current models of racial voting.

2.2 Historical and Social Context

Asians were seen as a group of foreign and insidious people for much of the 19th and 20th century (Chou and Feagin 2015). Their public image, however, shifted in the 1950s and 1960s due to civil rights movement and geopolitical interests abroad. Whites recast Asian Americans as the model minority—"a racial group distinct from the white majority but lauded as well assimilated, upwardly mobile, politically nonthreatening and *definitely not-black*" Wu (2013, 215). Whites argued that minorities are not systematically oppressed if one group could find socioeconomic success within the American system. Henceforth, Asians are considered to be socioeconomically closer to whites than to their Latino and Black counterparts in the contemporary US racial hierarchy. Asians are thus often depicted as a model minority or referred to as honorary whites. This construction

of Asians' racial status means that they are not perceived to have the same racial struggles as other minorities (Kim 1999), but also means that they are not privy to the same privileges as the majority. According to Wu (2013), it is essential to note that Asian Americans were complicit in this stereotype because the narrative provided them access to social and political spaces that were previously legally denied to them. Naturally, the myth that it is the faults of Blacks and Latinos that they "failed" in American society has been debunked. Yet, the SFFA v. Harvard case demonstrates that the model minority narrative continues to persist for Asian Americans.

While Asian Americans have made considerable social and economic strides in the past century, they remain politically underrepresented in American society. Indeed, the 116th House of Representatives (2019-2021), lauded as one of the most diverse in US history, has 17 Asian Pacific American members out of 435 seats (Bialik 2019). To put that number into perspective, Asian Americans account for 5.8% of the US population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2018d) but only has 3.0% of representation in Congress.[4] Whites, on the other hand, accounts for 76.6% of the total population and 73% of House members. The current state of Asian political representation is even more peculiar given that previous literature has found that race has a negative effect on white voters' evaluations of Latino and Black candidates while it significantly benefits Asian candidates (Visalvanich 2017a; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). This begs the question of why is it that Asians are politically underrepresented when their racial and socioeconomic status in American society should afford them at least representation equal to their share of the population?

[4] This number is not to say that other minorities enjoy equal representation in the House. While Blacks' and Native Americans' share of House Representatives is now equal to their population size, —12% and 1% respectively—the Latino population (18%) is twice as high as its share of the House (9%) (Bialik 2019).

2.3 Theoretical Arguments

The study of how race, particularly racial attitudes, affect candidate preference is a relatively new body of work in political behavior. The thrust of the early literature focused on Black candidates and how they fare in the eyes of white voters when compared to white candidates (Sigelman et al. 1995; Terkildsen 1993). Those studies not only found that white voters overwhelmingly prefer white candidates, but also that racial bias and stereotypes against blacks cause white voters to evaluate Black candidates' qualification and ideological standing negatively. Subsequent literature on race and candidate evaluation shifted its concerns to the consequences of racial-political stereotypes.

Whereas previous studies examine race through the Black-white cleavage, this latter strand of research centered on understanding how racial stereotypes held by whites afflict non-Black minorities. Kim (1999) argued that Asians Americans are located between Blacks and whites on the racial spectrum and that this position has both benefited and hindered them. On the one hand, whites valorize Asians for characteristics that Blacks "lack," thus deeming Asians to be closer to them in terms of civic and social superiority. On the other hand, whites ostracize Asians for their racial-cultural foreignness and refuse to accept Asians as equal members of their civil and political society. Bobo (2001) later conducted a comprehensive analysis of race relations in the US and confirmed the existence of a racial hierarchy in the prejudices of whites. He concluded that "For Blacks and Hispanics—and, to a lesser extent, Asians—modern racial bias and discrimination are central factors in the problem of minority disadvantage" (Bobo 2001, 283). More recently, Visalvanich's (2017b) analysis of whites' assessment of minority candidates lends further support for the hierarchical nature of whites' racial attitudes. Proceeding from the idea that race influence voters' candidate preference by activating certain racial stereotypes held by the voter, the author found that racial biases negatively impact the candidacies and assessments of Latino and Black candidates while they positively benefit Asian candidates. Findings from these studies suggest although overtly racial responses may no longer be accepted, the

reality is that stereotypes derived from white voters' perceptual bias of minorities affect Latino and Black candidates disproportionately.

Having discussed the impact of racial attitudes on candidate preference, I will now move on to the literature on the political consequences of racial identity and group consciousness. Research on this topic has emerged from the interest to understand how over two centuries of systemic racial oppression (i.e., slavery and Jim Crow laws) affect the political attitudes and behaviors of Blacks in the US. Racial identity refers to a psychological sense of belonging to a certain racial group. This perception is based on a perceived notion of shared interests while group consciousness is racial identification "*politicized* by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (McClain et al. 2009, 476). Stemming from the scholarship on Black racial consciousness, other theorists have tried to determine whether racial identity also activate group consciousness among nonblack minorities.

Scholars have offered alternative explanations for how experiences as a racial minority affect Latinos and Asian Americans. Some scholars theorize that group consciousness is formed in the same way for nonblack minorities as it does for blacks (Wallace 2014; Schildkraut 2013). That means direct and indirect encounters with discrimination active individuals' sense of linked fate with co-(pan)ethnics and co-minorities. This perception of shared struggles then becomes a central component of inter- and intra-group political solidarity, for people are more likely to support candidates that they believe can identify with their experiences (Adida, Davenport, and McClendon 2016). According to this conceptualization, an awareness of the racial injustice experienced by not only oneself but also by others, drives individuals to behave in a way that can balance the political power between whites and minorities.

Another group of scholars argues that the findings from Black research cannot be extrapolated to other minority groups because members from those groups may not perceive themselves to be in the same subordinate racial position as Blacks (McClain et al. 2009; Junn

2007). Indeed, research on Asian Americans reveals that racial identity and group consciousness are not highly correlated (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005; Junn and Masuoka 2008). Junn and Masuoka (2008) contended that Asian racial consciousness is a latent variable in Asian Americans' political decisions—it requires priming to have an effect. They argued that linked fate does not have the same impact on Asian political behaviors as it does for Blacks because of ethnic, historical, and social reasons. The term Asian American is a pan-ethnic label that encompasses groups who have a long history in the US (Chinese and Japanese Americans) and newly immigrated groups from the rest of Asia (Indian, Pakistani, Korea, Vietnamese, Filipino, Thai, etc.). Because the majority of Asian Americans today immigrated to the US after the 1960s, when the model minority trope has already been established in the American racial narrative, they do not share a long history of institutional discrimination. Lastly, the model minority status provides Asians with enough socioeconomic opportunities that they have few motives for forming a racial consciousness that can be used to better their social standing through political means.

Although heterogeneity at the individual level is vital in understanding vote choice, it tells only a partial story of how voters decide which candidate they prefer in an election. Researchers on this topic have pointed to the role that election context plays in shaping candidate evaluation and determining candidate preference (Buttice and Stone 2012; Loepp 2018; Ensley 2007; Shor and Rogowski 2018). Here, electoral context or electoral environment refers to not only candidates' particular attributes (e.g., race, gender, partisanship), but also the differences between competing candidates. Unlike earlier models of candidate evaluation—with their focus on traits, such as competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy (Kinder et al. 1980; Funk 1999)—the recent scholarship shows that voter's choice is influenced by the relative ideological positions of the candidates and by the competitiveness of the election (Ensley 2007; Shor and Rogowski 2018).

The argument put forth by contemporary scholars is deceptively simple: who you choose depends on who *else* is available. In short, the attractiveness of a candidate depends on how the candidate

compares to his or her competition. Through his analysis of data from the American Senate Election Studies 1988 to 1992, Ensley (2007) concluded that the impact of ideology on vote choice increases as the ideological divergence between candidates increases. For example, a moderate Democratic candidate is much more preferable to a "middle-of-the-road" or left-leaning voter if the other choice is a conservative Republican than if the other candidate is a moderate Republican. Loepp (2018) referred to the impact that candidates have on voters' perceptions of other candidates as the reference dependence effect. Results from Loeep's original survey experiment confirms Ensley's findings and underscores the fact that candidate evaluations and choices are not made in a vacuum—they depend on the electoral environment as much as they do on the peculiarities of candidates and of voters.

Findings on the competitiveness of the race are more nuanced than on the ideological divergence between candidates. On the one hand, Ensley (2007) concluded that high-stakes campaigns are not more likely to prime voters' attention for candidates' ideological differences and do not make the issue more salient to the vote. Shor and Rogowski (2018), however, found that ideological voting is most potent in competitive elections. This difference between the two findings could be a result of different measurements of competition. Ensley used data on poll results collected from newspapers around one month before the election while Shor and Rogowski used information from Cook Political Report on whether the election is a "toss-up" and from the FEC on campaign spending by candidates.

Hypothesis

In contrast to the abundance of research on racial bias and candidate evaluation among white voters, the question of how racial attitudes shape the candidate preference of minority voters remains underexamined in the political science field. I thus borrow from the sociological literature on intergroup attitudes to theorize how the stereotypes that minority groups hold about each other might affect their evaluation of minority candidates. Contrary to the popular belief that nonwhite groups in the US should empower each other because they share the experience of racialization and discrimination,

research on intergroup relations indicates that minorities' racial attitudes depend on their group's position in the racial hierarchy (Wodtke 2012; O'brien 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2004). In regards to Asian Americans, Wodtke's (2012) findings show that Asians are more likely to report negative stereotypes about other minority groups than Blacks and Latinos and that education—a variable that often mitigates negative racial attitudes in different groups—has no consistent effects on Asians.

I extend the research on intergroup relations to argue that racial attitudes, operationalized as support for or opposition to public policies that benefit other nonwhite groups, will induce Asians to view other minorities as either member of the ingroup or the outgroup. This ingroup/outgroup distinction between themselves and other minority groups can lead Asian voters to believe that their socio-political interests differ from those of Blacks and Latinos, and thus Black and Latino political candidates cannot and do not represent Asian communities. I, therefore, expect that Asian voters, like white voters, are less likely to support non-Asian minority candidates over white candidates. However, I posit that negative racial attitudes about Blacks or Latinos do not automatically translate to support for Asian candidates in contests against whites. Because the model-minority stereotyping corresponds with valence qualities, such as competence, integrity, and diligence (Visalvanich 2017a), voters may evaluate Asian candidates based on those criteria rather than on race. I thus postulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: Asian respondents are less likely than white to prefer Black/Latino candidate.

Hypothesis 1b: Positive racial attitudes towards non-Asian minorities are positively correlated with voters' preference for a Black/Latino candidate over a white one. However, racial attitudes have a null effect on voters' preference for an Asian candidate over a white candidate.

Hypothesis 1c: The relationship between racial attitudes and RPC is different based on the race of the respondent.

Building on previous group consciousness research, I do not expect racial consciousness to influence the RPC of white and Asian voters in the same manner. A racially conscious white voter may prefer a minority candidate over a white one because he or she believes that the candidate would implement public policies that could balance the socio-racial power in his or her community. On the other hand, a racially conscious Asian voter may recognize that an opportunity gap continues to exist between Asians and whites despite the model minority narrative. However, Asian racial identity, unlike Black racial identity, and group consciousnesses are not inextricably linked. The reason is that American political and social institutions have not treated and discriminated Asians—to the extent that they did with Blacks—as a group rather than as individuals. Asian Americans, in particular, those that migrated World War II, may not have a sense of collective racial injustice that instills in them the belief that their wellbeing is connected to the group—referred to in the literature as a sense of linked fate by Dawson on Black consciousness (Dawson 1994). Consequently, Asians' political decisions, even the ones who are racially conscious, may not be primarily motivated by the desire to further the group's social standing in American society. This yields the following prediction:

Hypothesis 2a: Voters who are more racially conscious are more likely to prefer a minority candidate over a white candidate.

Hypothesis 2b: Racial consciousness has stronger effect for white voters and a weaker one for Asian voters.

Lastly, a substantial body of literature has examined the effects of the electoral environment on ideological voting, but few studies have analyzed how election-level variables impact racial voting (for a notable exception, see Boudreau, Elmendorf, and Mackenzie 2019). Because both ideological and racial voting depends on heuristic cues, I borrow from the research on ideological voting to form my expectations for how the ideological positions of candidates and the competitiveness of elections shape the RPC of voters (Shor and Rogowski 2018; Ensley 2007; Loepp 2018). First, I expect that race becomes a more salient criterion for candidate preference as the ideological divergence between candidates decreases. The reason is

that candidates in these contests are required to find ways to distinguish themselves and to argue why they would best represent the voters when they can no longer campaign on their ideological position. In this context, racial characteristic then becomes the main selling point for candidates and the primary heuristic cue for voters. Second, I hypothesize that race becomes less important in the candidate preference of voters as the election become more competitive. This expectation is based on research that showed ideological and partisan differences become defining issues for candidates in tightly-contested races (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2007; Shor and Rogowski 2018). I thus do not expect race to be a significant influence in competitive elections since voters will be presented with partisan choices and will select according to their party identity. Based on the arguments outlined above, I can specify the following empirical expectations:

Hypothesis 3a: Voters are less likely to prefer a minority candidate over a white candidate as ideological divergence increases, the election becomes more competitive, or both.

Hypothesis 3b: Ideological divergence and electoral competitive have the same effect for Asian and white voters since both will trigger issue-based responses.

2.4 Data and Methods

Data

For this study, I use the 2016 CCES survey by Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2017). The 2016 CCES is part of an on-going endeavor to study how Americans view their representatives, hold them accountable, vote and how these behaviors vary across the US within the context of congressional elections. The CCES uses YouGov's matched random sample methodology that yields a nationally

representative survey with an original sample size of 64,600 adults.[5] Interviews for the 2016 election, held on November 8, were conducted over the Internet by YouGov in two waves. The pre-election wave was available from September 28 to November 7, and the post-election wave was available from November 9 to December 14. This paper only uses the pre-election survey since all the variables of interests are obtained from the pre-election questions.

The 2016 CCES provides a novel way to study race in politics since it asks respondents to identify the race of the candidates in their congressional districts. While the dependent variable is the candidates' race derived from hand-coded data, the CCES question allows me to account for respondents' perceptions of candidates' racial and ethnic backgrounds in their candidate preference. Additionally, the diverse political geographies in the CCES enables me to study the RPC of voters across various Congressional contests with different racial combinations of candidates. Finally, 2016 was a notable election year because race was central to the main issues of the presidential election (US-Mexico wall, the Muslim ban, and the Black Lives Matter movement).

To examine and compare Asian and white voters, I omitted respondents of other races from the sample. This paper does not include other minorities in the analysis because its primary purpose is to explore why Asian Americans, who—unlike Blacks or Latinos—are socioeconomic equals with whites, have not achieved the level of political representation proportional to their share of the population. Regarding white voters, I only considered non-Hispanics whites and native citizens (second and third generation). [6] I also

[5] The sample composition is as follows: 46,289 are White, 7,926 are Black, 5,238 are Asian, 522 are Native American, 1,452 are Mixed, 135 are Middle Eastern, and 760 are other.

[6] The US Census Bureau considers race and ethnicity to be two distinct concepts. By eliminating White Hispanic, I am not including any white respondents whose ethnicity is of Hispanic origin. For more information on how the US Census Bureau defines race, please refer to the following website: https://www.census.gov/mso/www/training/pdf/race-ethnicity-onepager.pdf

omitted non-citizen Asian respondents. I excluded Congressional races that did not have at least two contenders and that were not an Asian-white or Black/Latino-white racial matchup. Although the political reality is that most voters can often only choose between two white candidates, this paper is interested in how Asian voters behave compared to white voters when a minority runs against a white candidate. Following the cleaning of the data, a total of 6461 (92.86%) white respondents and 497 (7.14%) Asian respondents remained for analysis in 94 districts across 33 states (see Appendix 2-A for list of states and districts).[7]

In addition to the CCES, I incorporate data from other sources into my analysis. First, I use CFscores created by Bonica (2013) to measure the ideology of candidates. CFscores use contribution data from campaign finance records to place candidates onto a liberal-conservation spectrum ranging from -5 (most liberal) to +5 (most conservative). I compare the CFscores of the competing candidates to determine the degree of ideological divergence between them. I also use data on campaign spending by candidates from the FEC, the electoral margin of victory for each contest from Ballotpedia, and demographic and economic statistics about each congressional district from the 2016 American Community Survey 1-year estimates.

Finally, the analysis also includes original hand-coded data on candidate race. Because collecting this data is extremely challenging, and because of the US's system of plurality voting, I only coded the race characteristics of the two primary candidates in each election. The process of collecting data on the race of the candidates required several steps. For incumbents, I searched for their membership in either the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, the Congressional Black Caucus, or the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. For non-incumbents or candidates that do not have membership in one of the caucuses, I visited their campaign websites or Ballotpedia

[7] According to the 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, whites constitute 72.62% and Asians 5.43% of the US's population.

profiles. Those sources often contain pictures or statements that allow me to gather enough information to identify candidates' racial/ethnic backgrounds. All in all, I coded the race of 188 candidates from the 94 districts considered in this analysis.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the race of respondents' preferred candidate in US House elections. Granted that vote choice is what matters in electoral representation, I argue candidate preference provides us with the best gauge of voters' candidate support for two reasons. The first is that the plurality system used for congressional elections may lead to a divergence of preference and choice, especially among undecided voters. Because the winner of the election is the candidate who receives the most votes, voters may cast their ballots for the candidate that has a winning chance rather than one that they prefer. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the key difference between respondents' answers to which House candidate they prefer and which they voted for is the non-response rate (coded as "Respondent missing") in the latter question (see Appendix 2-B for the questions broken down by race). While it is possible to include respondents in the "I'm not sure" category in the candidate preference model because those individuals can still make a choice, I would have to omit the non-response respondents from the vote choice model. Thus, the second reason for using candidate preference over vote choice is that preference allows us to avoid biased estimates due to the exclusion of observations that are probably not missing completely at random.

[Figure 2-1 about here]

I used a two-step process to create the RPC variable. First, I determined the candidate preference using the question "Which candidate for the House of Representatives do you prefer?" for the 2016 midterm election. Respondents could choose one candidate from a list of individuals running in their congressional district (House Candidate 1 to House Candidate 3), "other," "I'm not sure," or "no one." I recoded the house candidate preference variable into a categorical variable—1 for the first leading candidate, 2 for the

second leading candidate and 3 for all other options. The third category, named "alternative options," includes "other," "I'm not sure," and "no one" responses.[8] The first and the second primary candidates are usually ones from either the Democratic or Republican party. However, 2.50% of the sample saw a Democratic ran against another Democratic candidate, and 3.35% had to choose between a Democratic and a third-party candidate (see Appendix 2-A for racial and party matchups). I then used data collected on candidates' racial backgrounds to create the final RPC variable.

RPC is a categorical where 1 indicates "white," 2 "Asian," 3 "Black/Latino" and 4 "Alternative option." The "alternative option" category does not denote that the preferred candidate is of a different racial group. It means the respondent's preferred candidate is neither candidate 1 or candidate 2, and thus I do not have information on that candidate's racial background. Table 1 provides the distribution of the dependent variable by the race of voters. Contrary to the expectation that the high socioeconomic status of Asian Americans (in line with the model minority narrative) would cause them to share the same political interests as whites, we can observe a vast difference in both groups' RPC. It can be seen that the majority of white voters (39.8%) prefer a white candidate while the majority of Asian voters (45%) prefer neither of the establishment candidates—albeit Asian voters do prefer an Asian candidate over a white or Black/Latino candidate. This finding is revealing in several ways. First, it provides the initial evidence that Asian Americans remain on the fringes of American political life, despite being well integrated in socioeconomic terms. That is, their overwhelming preference for an alternative option indicates that Asians do not believe that a Republican or a Democratic candidate can adequately represent them. Second, the dissimilarity between the candidate preference of Asians and white voters denotes that Asian Americans broadly do not identify with mainstream white-American society and possibly do not align their

[8] 0.03% of respondents preferred a third House candidate, 0.76% respondent said "other," 22.94% of respondents answered "I'm not sure," and 6.81% of respondents preferred no one.

political interests with those of whites. In the section that follows, I will attempt to account for the factors that explain the difference between the RPC of Asian and white voters.

[Table 2-1 about here]

Independent Variables

The independent variables of interest measure whether racial attitudes, racial consciousness, or electoral environment have a more consequential influence on the RPC of Asian and white voters. I grouped the variables into two classifications: respondent characteristics and election context. The variables capturing respondent characteristics examine whether respondents who have a more positive racial attitude and who are more aware of racial injustice are more likely to prefer a minority candidate over a white one. The variables at the election level assess how ideological divergence between candidates and competitiveness of the election influence voters.

Regarding respondent characteristics, I used questions pertaining to beliefs on immigration and criminal justice policies to measure racial attitudes and to perceptions of white privilege and racial problems to measure racial consciousness. I created two indices based on questions regarding respondents' support or opposition to certain immigration and criminal justice policy proposals to determine whether respondents have positive or negative racial attitudes.[9] The indices serve as a proxy for how respondents perceive Blacks and

[9] Regarding immigration issues, respondents were asked: "what do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?" They could then select all policy proposals that they think should be applied. I chose the following four questions to capture respondents' views on policies that are linked to migration from Latin America: 1) identify and deport illegal immigrants; 2) grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school; 3) grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes; and 4) increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border.

Latinos since those immigration and criminal justice issues were centered around race during the 2016 election (migration flow from Latin America and Black Lives Matter movement).[10] Both indices range on a scale of 0 to 4, corresponding to the four questions that respondents were asked on each of the topics. Respondents received a point for each response that would benefit Latinos or Blacks. For example, I gave one point to respondents who oppose increasing the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border and one point to those who support granting legal status to people to were brought to the US illegally as children. The higher the respondent scored on the immigration policy index, the more positive their attitudes are towards Latinos and likewise for Blacks on the criminal justice policy index. The empirical expectation is that those with more positive attitudes are more likely to prefer a minority candidate over a white candidate.

Racial consciousness is measured using two questions regarding respondents' perceptions of white privilege and of racial problems. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 1 "strongly agree" to 5 "strongly disagree" whether "White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin." They were also asked to rate on the same scale whether "Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations." I reversed the order of the scale for ease of interpretation in the statistical output. I used these two questions to capture respondents', particularly Asian voters', views of their racial status in American society. The expectation is that individuals who agree more with those statements are more likely to be conscious of the racial hierarchy in the US. Their candidate preference is, therefore, more likely to be affected by racial attitudes. However, this

[10] Regarding policies on crimes, respondents were asked "do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?" I selected the following four questions to encapsulate respondents' judgment of the criminal justice system: 1) eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders; 2) require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of their activities while on duty; 3) increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services; and 4) increase prison sentences for felons who have already committed two or more serious or violent crimes.

presents us with two scenarios for the impact of racial awareness. It could be that a recognition of the racial hierarchy reinforces negative racial stereotypes, or that awareness could motivate individuals to choose their candidates based on merits and not on race. As previously argued, I expect the latter scenario to be the case for white voters but not for Asian voters.

The second class of independent variables examines the role of the electoral environment on the RPC of voters. The first variable is the ideological divergence between the competing candidates. As previously mentioned, I used Bonica's (2013) CFscores to ascertain each candidate's actual political ideology. A negative value on the CFscores scale indicates that the candidate leans left (liberal) while a positive value tells us that the candidate leans right (conservative). Unfortunately, the CFscores were only available for the main candidates of each race; therefore, I gave a value of 0 to candidates who are neither candidate 1 nor candidate 2. The zero indicates a neutral position; only two candidates out of 48,498 from the period of 1980-2018 received a CFscores of 0 (Bonica 2013).[11] I calculated the absolute value of the difference between candidate 1's and candidate 2's CFscores. I expect that divergence will have a negative effect on the likelihood that a voter prefers a minority candidate over a white one.

The other factor in the electoral environment is the level of competitiveness between the candidates. I used two variables to measure this component: Ballotpedia's margin of victory and campaign spending from the FEC. Ballotpedia is a nonpartisan and nonprofit organization that curates a digital encyclopedia of American politics and elections. It calculates the margin of victory as the difference between the percentage of votes that the winner and the second-place finisher received (Ballotpedia 2017). Margin of victory is a continuous variable where a lower difference between the candidates indicates higher electoral competitiveness. I also use the

[11] Although the CCES asked respondents to rate each candidate's political ideology, I chose not to use that question since many factors could bias respondents' assessment of a candidate.

FEC data to calculate the total spending of each candidate and the difference between the two campaigns. The lower the difference between the two campaigns, the closer the contest. Spending parity indicates that both candidates had the equivalent amount of financial and political support. I used the logged version of spending parity because the variance in spending election with well-known candidates to another in a small district is substantial. Similar to ideological divergence, I expect that electoral competitiveness will have a negative effect on the likelihood that a voter prefers a minority candidate over a white one. That is because I also expect that issues will be more important than race in a tightly-contested election. Statistically, we should see that respondents are more likely to support minority candidates as both margin of victory and spending parity increase (indicating lower competitiveness).

Controls

In addition to racial attitude and racial awareness, I account for other individual idiosyncrasies that could affect the RPC of voters, such as party identification, awareness of candidates' racial backgrounds, political interest, socioeconomic status, age, age squared and gender. This analysis also controls for contextual variables concerning district-level idiosyncrasies that could affect the RPC of voters. The variables include whether the district is a majority-minority district, party match-up in the election, whether there was an incumbent in the contest, the proportion of white and Asian living in the district and the average household income of each district.[12] Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables before imputation (see Appendix 2-C for variable construction).

[12] A congressional district is considered a majority-minority district when the majority of its total population is comprised of a racial minority group or groups. 48 out of 94 districts in the sample are majority-minority districts, and only 4 districts have an Asian majority. I coded the majority-minority district based on the listed provided in the following website: https://ballotpedia.org/Majority-minority_districts#cite_note-2017data-5.

[Table 2-2 about here]

Methods

This study ascertains whether respondent characteristics or election context influence the RPC of voters and whether their effects differ across racial groups. To answer these two questions, I first addressed issues concerning the limitations of the data, missingness, and clustered responses. I then estimated multinomial logistic models using a variable distinguish the race of the respondent. This first set of models allow me to determine whether a voter's race is pertinent to his or her RPC after accounting for all my independent variables. Finally, I interacted the main independent variables and racial heritage to determine whether the effects racial attitudes, racial consciousness, and election context change depending on respondent race.

The first methodological concern is that there are congressional districts' unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the supply of Asian (or minority) candidates and with respondents' racial attitudes and consciousness. There are a few reasons to expect such endogeneity exists. First, Asian candidates are more likely to run in districts with a larger Asian population since they already have a political base. Thus, the effects of respondent characteristics and electoral environment on RPC may simply be the results of respondents living in congressional districts that have a friendlier political climate for Asians or other minority to run for office. Otherwise stated, the area where the respondents live determine the race of their preferred candidates since it determines the availability of candidates. Second, the level of animosity that stemmed from a historical racial conflict could affect voters' preference for candidates from an outgroup. For example, the 1992 Los Angeles riots that resulted in the destruction of Korean-owned businesses in majority-Black neighborhoods may have a lasting impact on the racial relationship between Asians and Blacks in the area. Those variables are difficult to observe and can only be captured by the error term. Using the error term alone, however, would result in an omitted variable bias. To solve the endogeneity problem, I account for the

effects of district-specific racial unobservables by using the locations of Donald Trump political rallies as a natural experiment.

Donald Trump's divisive 2016 political campaign provides a unique opportunity to study how race-based considerations affect candidate preference in what amounts to a natural experiment. I contend that a Trump rally would heighten voters' existing racial attitudes and consciousness due to the racialized rhetoric of his 2016 campaign.[13] It is worthy to note that while Trump often disparaged blacks, Latinos, and Muslims, he surprisingly did not target Asian Americans (Simon 2018).[14] By omitting Asian Americans from his racialized account of the US, Trump inadvertently reinforced the model minority narrative and thus presented us with an opportunity to examine whether Asians and whites can be influenced by the same racial provocations. One should not, of course, disregard the fact that Asians' and whites' experiences with racial discrimination are not the same; thus, they may interpret Trump's comments on race and ethnicity through different frames of references.

In addition to Trump's rhetoric, we are also afforded with an as-if random assignment of respondents who live in congressional districts where Trump personally held a campaign (the treatment) and ones where he didn't (the control).[15] While the locations of presidential candidates' political rallies are not random, they are not chosen based

[13] To say that Trump spoke negatively about blacks and Latinos is an understatement. In one rally, Trump tried to persuade blacks to vote for him by asking, "What do you have to lose by trying something new, like Trump? You're living in your poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58% of your youth is unemployed, what the hell do you have to lose?" (Fausset, Blinder, and Eligon 2016). In a presidential debate, part of Trump's answer on his immigration plan includes the following statement: "We have some bad hombres here and we're going to get them out" (Rhodan 2016).

[14] Trump did accuse China of having unfair trade practices that damaged the US's economy (*BBC News* 2016). However, this comment referred to the nature of China's government and not a negative stereotype of Chinese or Asian people.

[15] See, though, Craig et al. (2017) and Dunning (2008) for a discussion of caveats in natural experiments, in particular when the exposure to the treatment may be unclear.

on the political endorsement power of the presidential candidates—this is especially true during elections where there is not an incumbent presidential candidate. The reason is that new candidates do not yet have the presidential clout or the political base to endorse a congress member. Furthermore, the treatment is completely exogenous since respondents could not self-select into a district where Trump held a rally during the 2016 election. Finally, Table 3 provides evidence that congressional districts where Trump held a rally and ones where he didn't are similar in observables. It reports the key variables' means for the treated and control districts based on the weighted sample.[16] The means reported for the survey responses (in the upper part of the table) are the same across both groups, except race (% white), family income, and age being significantly different. The lower part of the table also shows that are minor differences at the district level based on administrative data. The Trump natural experiment is included in the models as a binary variable: 1 for "treatment" and 0 for "control" (see Appendix 2-D for a map of the Trump rally treatment).

[Table 2-3 about here]

The second issue to be addressed is missing data. Six different independent variables have different amount of missing data value: white advantage (13.55%), racial problem (13.64%), criminal justice policy index (0.23%), family income (10.02%), political interest 1.84%) and party identification (0.04%).[17] I used multiple imputation (using chained equations) method to treat this concern (Allison 2001, 81).[18] Multiple imputation employs information collected from other

[16] The CCES sample is first weighted to adjust for age, gender, education, race, voter registration, ideology, baseline party ID, born again status, political interest, plus their interactions. The resultants weights were then post-stratified by age, gender, education, race, voter registration, states, and statewide political races. This study uses "commonweight_vv" since the variables are from the pre-election wave of the study, as per the CCES's recommendation.

[17] 1649 out of 6958 respondents or 24% of the sample are missing at least one of those variables.

[18] As a robustness test, I also ran the analysis using the most common way of dealing with missing data: listwise deletion. There are negligible differences

variables of interests in the dataset to predict values for missing cases. These predicted values are as close as possible to what would be the respondent's answer to the question. Each completed dataset is analyzed separately, and the results are then combined to calculate the variation in parameter estimates. In accordance with the recommendation by White, Royston and Wood (2011), I added 24 imputations, the number equivalent to the percentage of cases with missing values, to the original dataset.[19] I first imputed the unweighted data by respondent race and then included the CCES pre-election weight in the final analysis.

Lastly, I used multinomial logistic regression models with standard errors clustered at the state-district level to account for the interdependence in the data structure. [20] While the structure of the data is clearly hierarchical, I opted to not use multilevel modeling because this paper is primarily interested in the effects of individual-level predictors rather than variance at the second-level structure (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Additionally, not every district in the sample has a sufficient number of Asian respondents—eight congressional districts have zero Asian respondents, and 17 have only one. I first begin my analysis by defining a linear model of key independent variables (Equation 1). The dependent variable is RPC, where b = 1 (white: reference category), m = 2 (Asian), m = 3 (Black / Latino) and m = 4 (alternative option). All models include the "commonweight_vv" variable recommended by the CCES for studies using questions from the pre-election wave of the survey.

between the results. As listwise deletion may introduce bias if the data are not missing completely at random, I opted to use multiple imputation.

[19] According to Alison (2001), a serious downside of multiple imputation is that it produces different results every time you run the data. I accounted for this by specifying a random-number seed in Stata for reproducibility.

[20] To test the robustness of the findings, I also estimated multilevel multinomial models; the main outcomes did not differ.

$$x\beta_{m|b_i} = \ln\left(\frac{\Pr(RPC_i = m \mid x)}{\Pr(RPC_i = b \mid x)}\right)$$
$$= \alpha_{m0} + \beta_{m1}(Respondent\ Race) + \beta_{m2}(Immigration\ Policy\ Index)$$
$$+ \beta_{m3}(Crime\ Policy\ Index) + \beta_{m4}(White\ Advantage)$$
$$+ \beta_{m5}(Racial\ Problems) + \beta_{m6}(Ideological\ Divergence)$$
$$+ \beta_{m7}(Margin\ of\ Victory) + \beta_{m8}(Campaign\ Spending\ Parity)$$
$$+ \beta_{m9}(Individual\ Idiosyncrasies) + \beta_{m10}(District\ Idiosyncrasies) + \varepsilon$$

I then use the multinomial logit link to generate the probability equation (Equation 2) for the for RPC:

$$P(Y_i = m \mid x) = \frac{\exp\,(x\beta_{m|1_i})}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^{4} \exp\,(x\beta_{j|1_i})}$$

2.5 Results

To determine the role of a respondent's race relative to variables concerning racial attitudes, racial consciousness, and election context, I estimated three multinomial logit models of the race of voters' preferred candidates. The first model examines the individual-level variables relating to racial attitudes and consciousness. The second concerns the effects of the electoral environment. The third model combines individual and contextual-level variables to provide a full understanding of RPC. The results of the analyses are shown in Table 4. The base outcome for all three models is a preference for the white candidate.

[Table 2-4 about here]

Beginning with model 1, we see first that the racial heritage variable is statistically significant, with the expected relationships, across all RPC outcomes. Asian respondents are more likely to prefer an Asian ($p<0.05$) or an alternative option ($p<0.10$) over a white one but are less likely to favor a Black/Latino candidate ($p<0.05$) over a white candidate. This result provides support Hypothesis 1a and indicates that the political behaviors of Asian voters do not mirror those of

whites. Although this finding is not groundbreaking, to say the least, it informs us that Asian Americans do not always share the same political interests as whites. This result stands in direct contrast to the model minority narrative that tells Asian Americans that what benefits whites also benefits them.

Model 1 also considers the effects of racial attitudes and consciousness on the RPC of voters. We see that all four variables capturing those two concepts are statistically significant; however, not always in the expected direction and not across all categories of the dependent variable. Regarding racial attitudes, immigration policy index has a negative and significant effect ($p<0.05$) on voters preferring an alternative option over a white candidate and criminal justice policy index has a positive and significant effect ($p<0.10$) on voters favoring a Black/Latino candidate. These results mean that voters who are in favor of immigration policies that help Latinos are less likely to explore alternative options to Republican or the Democratic candidates, while voters who support criminal justice policies that benefit blacks are more likely to choose a Black/Latino candidate over a white one. Additionally, no significant relationship was found between racial attitudes and preference for an Asian candidate. This result conforms to Hypothesis 1b expectation that positive racial attitudes would have a null effect on voters' preference for an Asian candidate.

On the other hand, the variables that measure racial consciousness support the hypothesis that voters who are more aware of racial injustice are more likely to choose a minority candidate over a white one (Hypothesis 2a). We see that voters who strongly agree that white people have certain advantages because of their skin color are more likely to choose an Asian candidate ($p<0.05$) or a Black/Latino candidate ($p<0.01$) over a white one. We also see that voters who strongly agree that racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations are less likely to prefer an Asian or a Black/Latino candidate as well as less likely to prefer an alternative option. This result means that respondents may not prefer a non-white candidate in biracial elections if they do not believe that systemic racial injustice exists in the US. The negative relationship between racial consciousness and RPC, however, is not statistically significant for

Asian and Black/Latino candidates but is significant for the alternative option ($p<0.01$). On the whole, the findings on racial consciousness in model 1 lend support to Hypothesis 2a.

In Model 2, I test the hypothesis that election context matters to the RPC of voters. In contrast to earlier findings, this Model does not detect any evidence that ideological divergence and electoral competitiveness matters to the candidate preference of voters. What is curious about this result is that the statistical relationship between each of the main variables and the dependent variable is not as expected. Not only does the positive relationship between ideological divergence and preference for a minority candidate contradict Hypothesis 3a, but the two variables measuring electoral competitiveness (margin of victory and campaign spending parity) have different effects. Contrary to the expectation is that margin of victory and campaign spending parity will have positive effects (indicating lower competitiveness), margin of victory has a negative impact when the choice is between an Asian and a white candidate and a positive effect when the option is between a Black/Latino and a white candidate. The effect is inverse for the variable campaign spending parity. While Hypothesis 3a is not supported by Model 2 results, it is worth noting that Asian respondents are still more likely to prefer an Asian candidate ($p<0.05$) or an alternative option ($p<0.01$) than a white candidate. Asians' preference for an alternative option change from being significant at the 0.1 level in Model 1 to 0.01 level in Model 2. This finding implies that the main parties' political candidates and their campaigns are failing to engage Asian voters.

Model 3 reports the results of how both individual and contextual-level variables affect the RPC of voters. Concerning racial heritage, I find that Asian respondents' preference for an Asian candidate, compared to the results from Model 1, is no longer statistically significant. This difference could be due to the change in the significance of racial attitudes and racial consciousness. Compared to Model 1, Asian respondents' negative preference for Black/Latino candidates remains significant at the 0.10 level, and their positive preference for an alternative option is also significant at the 0.10 level. It is worth noting that the coefficient for Asians' preference for

Black/Latino candidate is positive in Model 2 (although not significant). The reason for this lack of robustness is not clear but it could be associated with the positive and significant coefficients of criminal justice policy index and white advantage variables in Model 3. These results, which show that Asians are significantly less likely than whites to prefer a Black/Latino candidate, supports the works of other studies on intergroup relations among minorities in the US. Because Asian Americans are more likely to hold negative stereotypes about other minorities, they are also more likely to view non-Asians as members of the outgroup and subsequently less likely to support those individuals (Wodtke 2012).

Regarding the racial attitude and racial consciousness variables in Model 3, we see that a positive immigration policy index and an awareness of white privilege are no longer statistically significant to voters' preference for an Asian candidate (compared with Model 1). On the other hand, criminal justice policy index and white advantage remain statistically significant to respondents' preference for a Black/Latino candidate, at the 0.05 level and 0.01 level respectively. Lastly, I also find that candidate ideological divergence has a statistically significant ($p<0.10$) effect on voters' preference for an Asian candidate. I speculate that voters begin to evaluate candidates according to their valence qualities as the electoral contest become issue-based rather than race-based. This result reflects Visalvanich's (2017a) finding that Asian candidates benefit from positive stereotypes associated with Asian Americans.

Turning now to the results of the Trump rally natural experiment, we can observe that the Trump rally variable has a negative and insignificant effect on the RPC of voters. Model 3 in Table 4 shows that respondents who live in a congressional district where Donald Trump held a political rally during the 2016 presidential race are less likely to prefer a minority candidate over a white one. These findings are consistent with the expectation that the "treatment" of a Trump rally can prompt respondents' racial attitudes and consciousness but does not directly affect their candidate preference as it relates to racial characteristics. Because the locations of the rallies were not selected based on congressional districts, the as-if random assignment of respondents allows us to account for district-specific unobservables

that could affect their views on race. The negative and insignificant effect of the Trump rally in Model 3 is also evident in Model 2 (interaction model) in Table 5.

Taken together, the analysis in Table 4 presents evidence that racial heritage continues to inform minority voters' political behaviors, even if their group is considered socially proximal to whites. However, the effects of the explanatory variables in Table 4 are explicitly assumed to be the same for Asian and white voters. Since one of this paper's expectations is that the effects of the predictors are different for Asians and whites, it makes sense to estimate a model that includes interaction terms. Interactions between respondents' race and racial attitudes, racial consciousness, and electoral environment enable us to compare their coefficients and draw conclusions about their differences across racial groups. Table 5 presents the full model (Model 3 from Table 4) and the interaction model.

[Table 2-5 about here]

The results from Table 5 provides partial support for the prediction that racial heritage moderates the strength of the main predictors for RPC. Before analyzing the interaction terms, it should be noted that the main effects of racial attitudes, racial consciousness, and election context in the Model 2 (interactions) do not differ from the ones observed in Model 1 (full model). The relationship between racial heritage and RPC, on the other hand, went from negative and significant ($p<0.10$) to positive and not significant for the Black/Latino option; it went from significant ($p<0.10$) to not significant for the alternative option. This finding tells us that the RPC of Asian respondents is not solely influenced by their racial heritage.

With regards to the interaction terms, we can observe that the effects of the predictors differ for Asian and whites in only certain conditions. First, we find confirmation for Hypothesis 1c that the impact of racial attitudes on RPC depends on the race of the respondent. It is evident that a higher rating on the immigration policy index and the criminal justice policy index affect Asian and white

respondents differently. However, this difference in the effect of immigration policy index is only significant when the option is between an Asian candidate or a white candidate. The variance in the impact of criminal justice policy index is only substantial when considering the Asian and the alternative option over the white candidate. Second, the results of the two racial consciousness variables (white advantage and racial problems in the US) provide no evidence that their effect differs across racial groups. This finding fails to provide support for Hypothesis 2b. In the case of electoral context, the non-significant correlations between racial heritage and candidate ideological divergence, election margin of victory, and campaign spending parity sustain the expectation that electoral context has the same effect across racial groups (Hypothesis 3b). One exception to this observation is the racial heritage and margin of victory interaction, which is negative and significant ($p<0.10$) for the alternative option.

Although the coefficients in Model 2 support Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 3b, I recognize that an interaction term is difficult to interpret directly and that its substantive import is best assessed visually (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities for the four interaction terms that are significant in Model 2. Beginning with the effect of immigration policy index on the probability of preferring an Asian candidate over a white one, it is clear that Asians are substantially less likely to prefer a white candidate as their support for pro-immigration policies increase. Turning now to the impact of the criminal justice policy index, the figures in the top left and bottom right quadrants of Figure 2 show that Asians are more likely to prefer a white candidate over an alternative option or an Asian candidate as their support for Black-friendly criminal justice policies increase. The figure in the bottom left quadrant shows the difference between Asians' and whites' consideration for an alternative option over a white candidate as the election margin of victory increases (indicating lower electoral competitiveness). While the probability of preferring a white candidate does not change for white respondents, we can observe that it increases substantially for Asian voters.

[Figure 2-2 about here]

The big picture that emerges from both Table 4 and Table 5 is that Asian Americans do not share the same political motivations and preferences as whites. In general, voters who hold positive racial attitudes and a sense of racial consciousness are more inclined towards Black/Latino candidates. However, Model 2 in Table 5 provides evidence that the impact of racial attitudes is significantly different for Asian voters when the candidate choice is between an Asian or a white person. This finding is not observed for racial consciousness. The effects of ideological divergence and election competitiveness, as expected, do not differ across racial groups.

2.6 Conclusion

This study assessed the preferences for minority candidates among Asian and white respondents in the context of biracial US House of Representatives elections. Although numerous studies have estimated the extent to which racial heritage, both that of the voters and the candidates, determines the political behaviors of minority voters, the research thus far has only attempted to study minority groups in relations to each other (i.e., comparing Asian Americans to Blacks and Latinos). I argued that being a minority does not have the same effect on Asians' political decisions as it does on other minorities because of their social proximity to whites in the US racial hierarchy. Thus, I posited that Asian voters' political preferences and decisions could be better understood in connection with those of white voters.

In contrast to the presumption in immigrant integration research that shared political interests motivate minority voters to support minority candidates, I argued that Asian Americans—because of their unique position on the racial hierarchy—may not behave according to this assumption. I contended that co-minority or co-(pan)ethnic preference is dependent on Asian respondents' racial attitudes towards other minority groups and awareness of the systemic racial injustice in American society. Indeed, findings from the full-sample analysis (Model 3 in Table 4) showed that Asian voters are significantly less likely than white voters to prefer a Black/Latino candidate over a white one. Additionally, the interaction terms in

Model 2 in Table 5 showed that racial attitudes and racial consciousness are not significant in predicting Asian respondents' preference for a Black/Latino candidate. Their preference for Asian candidates, on the other hand, is significantly positive when they support pro-immigration policies but is significantly negative when they support pro-Black criminal justice policies. Overall, these results are consistent with research on intergroup relations that finds minorities' support for each other depending on their group's racial status (Wodtke 2012; O'brien 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2004). Unfortunately, this finding means that the proliferation of the model minority narrative in American society has been consequential for how race affects the political calculus of Asian Americans. In other words, being Asian matters to Asian voters but not in a manner that empowers theirs and other minorities' political power and representation.

The results of this study also shed light on a previously overlooked aspect of Asian Americans' candidate preference. More specifically, the full-sample analysis (Model 3 in Table 4) provided evidence that Asian Americans are more likely than whites to prefer an alternative option. This preference for an option outside of the Republican or the Democratic candidate has been an unexplored part of the literature, principally because previous studies either examined candidate preference within the context of one election or party-based voting. While this result was not expected and the reasons behind it remain unclear, a possible explanation for this might be that Asians are not considered to be the base voters of either political party. In other words, it is well established that the Democratic Party champions the interests of Blacks and Latinos while the Republican Party embodies those of white conservatives. Yet, neither party has claimed to represent the political interests of Asian Americans. More importantly, this preference for an alternative political option implies that Asian Americans, despite their high socioeconomic status, do not identify with the mainstream parties.

To conclude, this study attempted to answer a fundamental question in the study of race in political research: do racial differences make a difference? The short answer to that question is yes. The long answer, however, requires both academics and policymakers to seriously

consider each racial group's trajectory in the host country's history and its current status in the host society. It is clear from the analysis that racial heritage matters to minority voters' political calculus, even the ones who are told and are considered by whites to be an honorary member of their group. But, and to echo Lee's (2007) cautions, we must not make a priori assumption that minority voters are unified in their political interests and desired outcomes. The conclusions drawn from this study, while about the US, certainly have important implications for the future of Europe. As immigrants from across the world settle into European countries and make them more heterogeneous, intergroup relations and racial stratification will become more prevalent in European societies. It is thus crucial that European policymakers recognize the unique motivations behind each minority group's behaviors to design effective integration policies.

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Table 2-1. Dependent variable: race of preferred candidates by race of voters.

	White		Asian	
Race of Preferred Candidate	N	%	N	%
White Candidate	2572	39.8%	133	18%
Asian Candidate	402	6.2%	75	20%
Black/Latino Candidate	1584	24.5%	67	17%
Alternative Option	1903	29.5%	222	45%
Total	6461		497	

Source: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Cooperative Congressional Elections Study.

Note: The data is unweighted.

Table 2-2. Descriptive statistics by race of respondents before imputation.

	White Respondents		Asian Respondents	
	Range	Mean (SD)	Range	Mean (SD)
Respondent Characteristics				
Racial Attitudes				
Immigration Policy Index	0 - 4	2 (1.5)	0 - 4	2.4 (1.3)
Criminal Justice Policy Index	0 - 4	2.1 (1)	0 - 4	2.1 (0.94)
Racial Consciousness				
White Advantage	1 - 5	3.2 (1.5)	1 - 5	4 (1.1)
No Racial Problems in US	1 - 5	2.3 (1.2)	1 - 5	2.2 (1.2)
Election Context				
Ideological Divergence	0.05 - 3	1.6 (0.7)	0.05 - 3	1.5 (0.69)
Competitiveness				
Margin of Victory	0.013 - 1	0.35 (0.21)	0.013 - 1	0.41 (0.23)
Spending Parity (Log)	11 - 15	14 (0.62)	11 - 15	14 (0.5)
Individual Idiosyncrasies				
Party Identification				
Democrat	2138	33.11%	210	42.25%
Republican	1824	28.24%	83	16.70%
Other	2496	38.65%	204	41.05%
Candidates' Race Awareness	0 - 2	1 (0.78)	0 - 2	0.86 (0.81)

Political Interest	1 - 4	3.3 (0.91)	1 - 4	2.8 (0.93)
Family Income	0 - 2	1.1 (0.85)	0 - 2	1.3 (0.8)
Education	1 - 6	3.7 (1.5)	1 - 6	4.4 (1.4)
Age	18 - 95	50 (17)	18 - 84	39 (14)
Age Square	324 - 9025	2768 (1676)	324 - 7056	1737 (1287)
Female	0 / 1	52.21%	0 / 1	48.49%
District Idiosyncrasies				
Majority - Minority District	0 / 1	34.28%	0 / 1	62.17%
Party Match-Up				
Dem v. Rep	6090	94.26%	461	92.76%
Dem v. Dem	148	2.29%	26	5.23%
Dem v. Alt.	223	3.45%	10	2.01%
Incumbent Candidate	0/1	85.36%	0/1	88.93%
Proportion of White	15 - 94	68 (17)	15 - 94	56 (17)
Proportion of Asian	0.9 - 39	6 (6.1)	1.1 - 39	15 (12)
Average District Household Income (Log)	11 - 12	11 (0.24)	11 - 12	11 (0.27)
Observations	6461	92.86%	497	7.14%

Table 2-3. Mean comparison tests for Trump-rally congressional districts (TR) and no-rally congressional districts (NR).

Variable	Obs	TR Mean	NR Mean	Diff.	t-Stat	p-V[a]
Survey Responses						
Race (% white)	6958	0.95	0.93	0.02	3.12	**0.002**
Immigration Policy Index	6958	1.94	1.94	0.00	-0.09	0.926
Criminal Justice Policy Index	6942	2.05	2.06	-0.01	-0.29	0.775
White Advantage	6015	3.09	3.10	-0.01	-0.21	0.832
No Racial Problems in US	6009	2.35	2.34	0.01	0.17	0.861
Party Identification (% Republican)	6958	0.32	0.32	0.00	-0.06	0.954
Candidates' Race Awareness	6958	1.02	1.01	0.01	0.38	0.705
Political Interest	6830	3.33	3.31	0.02	0.62	0.535
Family Income	6958	1.54	1.60	-0.06	-2.33	**0.020**
Education	6958	3.37	3.37	0.00	0.06	0.954
Age	6958	47.57	48.80	-1.23	-2.09	**0.036**
Gender (% Female)	6958	0.51	0.51	0.00	0.04	0.968
Appended Data						

Ideological Divergence	1.66	1.62	0.04
Margin of Victory	0.34	0.35	-0.02
Spending Parity (Log)	13.55	13.83	-0.28
Majority-Minority District (%)	0.31	0.40	-0.08
Proportion of White	65.58	68.14	-2.56
Proportion of Asian	4.89	7.49	-2.60
Average District Household Income (Log)[b]	11.21	11.31	-0.10
Electorate Profiles			
18 - 29 years (%)	0.23	0.22	0.01
30 - 44 years (%)	0.25	0.24	0.01
45 - 64 years (%)	0.34	0.34	0.00
65 and over years (%)	0.18	0.20	-0.01
Male (%)	0.52	0.52	0.01
Female (%)	0.35	0.34	0.00
Bachelor's or Higher (%)[b]	0.23	0.22	0.01

Note: Data is weighted using the CCES recommended "commonweight_vv" for studies using data from the pre-election wave of the survey. a Two-tailed test. b Not comparable to survey data due to classification differences. Electorate profiles are based on data from the 2015 ACS 1-year estimates on each congressional district's electorate for the 114th Congress.

Table 2-4. Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Race of Preferred Candidate.

Model No.	1			2			3		
Dependent Variable	Asian	Black / Latino	Alt.	Asian	Black / Latino	Alt.	Asian	Black / Latino	Alt.
Reference Category: White									
Respondent Characteristics									
Asian	0.82**	-0.51**	0.33*	0.71**	0.11	0.78***	0.48	-0.31*	0.31*
	(0.39)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Racial Attitudes									
Immigration Policy Index	0.10	0.07	-0.09**				0.10	0.06	-0.09**
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Criminal Justice Policy Index	0.01	0.11*	-0.04				-0.06	0.14**	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)				(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Racial Consciousness									
White Advantage	0.19**	0.16***	0.07				0.13	0.19***	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Racial Problems in US	-0.07	-0.04	-0.16***				-0.09	-0.04	-0.14***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)				(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Election Context									
Ideological Divergence				0.70	0.22	0.03	0.79*	0.29	-0.01
				(0.46)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.08)
Margin of Victory				-2.03	0.27	0.07	-2.25	0.07	0.05
				(1.57)	(0.62)	(0.31)	(1.61)	(0.62)	(0.35)
Spending Parity (Log)				0.33	-0.01	0.02	0.30	-0.03	0.06
				(0.38)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.39)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Individual Idiosyncrasies									
Party Identification									
Republican	-0.72	-1.05***	-0.60***				-0.78	-1.11***	-0.56**
	(0.53)	(0.37)	(0.22)				(0.53)	(0.38)	(0.23)
Independent	-0.22	-0.74***	0.66***				-0.17	-0.81***	0.72***
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.16)				(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)
Race Awareness	-0.14	0.13*	-0.45***				-0.01	0.10	-0.44***
	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.06)				(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Political Interest	-0.02	-0.14***	-0.60***				-0.03	-0.14***	-0.61***
	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.05)				(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Family Income	0.07	-0.11*	-0.06				-0.02	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)				(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Education	-0.01	-0.01	-0.10***				-0.06	-0.01	-0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)				(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.00				0.00	0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age Squared	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00				-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.10	-0.35***	0.31***				0.06	-0.33***	0.33***
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)				(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
District Idiosyncrasies									
Majority-Minority District				-1.42	0.17	0.17	-1.26	0.27	0.26*
				(1.11)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(1.03)	(0.25)	(0.15)
Party Match-up									
Dem-Dem				2.06**	-1.39	0.52*	1.86*	-1.73	0.48
				(0.93)	(1.17)	(0.29)	(0.97)	(1.30)	(0.38)
Dem-Others				-12.39***	1.16***	1.04***	-12.24***	1.20***	1.17***
				(1.06)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(1.06)	(0.33)	(0.26)
Incumbent				0.02	-0.06	-0.37***	-0.02	-0.14	-0.41***

				(0.67)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.67)	(0.24)	(0.13)
Proportion of White				-0.01	-0.02**	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.01
				(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Proportion of Asian				0.09	-0.06***	-0.02**	0.09	-0.07***	-0.02*
				(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Average District Household Income (Log)				1.07	0.22	0.12	0.96	0.05	0.28
				(1.78)	(0.43)	(0.25)	(1.83)	(0.44)	(0.33)
Natural Experiment									
Trump Rally	-0.24	0.16	-0.08	0.01	-0.01	-0.08	-0.01	-0.03	-0.10
	(0.56)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.69)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.69)	(0.19)	(0.10)
Constant	-2.29**	-0.33	3.12***	-19.29	-1.97	-1.26	-17.57	0.39	-0.11
	(1.02)	(0.54)	(0.47)	(17.72)	(5.44)	(2.80)	(18.18)	(5.40)	(3.61)
Observations		6958			6958		6958		
Pseudo R_2		0.125			0.060		0.181		
Log Likelihood		-7645.43			-8206.29		-7155.25		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by State-Congressional District. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. Reference category for party identification is Democratic. Reference category for party match-up is Democratic versus Republican.

Table 2-5. Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Race of Preferred Candidate with Interaction Terms.

	Model 1			Model 2		
Reference Category: White	Asian	Black / Latino	Alt.	Asian	Black / Latino	Alt.
Respondent Characteristics						
Asian	0.48	-0.31*	0.31*	10.93	8.06	3.48
	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(6.94)	(6.30)	(5.18)
Racial Attitudes						
Immigration Policy Index	0.10	0.06	-0.09**	0.06	0.05	-0.09**
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Crime Justice Policy Index	-0.06	0.14**	-0.03	0.01	0.15**	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Racial Consciousness						
White Advantage	0.13	0.19***	0.07	0.12	0.19***	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Racial Problems in US	-0.09	-0.04	-0.14***	-0.10	-0.05	-0.13**
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Election Context						
Ideological Divergence	0.79*	0.29	-0.01	0.75*	0.28	-0.03
	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.43)	(0.19)	(0.08)
Margin of Victory	-2.25	0.07	0.05	-2.11	0.02	0.18

	(1.61)	(0.62)	(0.35)	(1.55)	(0.60)	(0.37)
Spending Parity (Log)	0.30	-0.03	0.06	0.36	-0.02	0.05
	(0.39)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Interactions						
Asian # Immigration Policy Index				0.49***	0.12	0.12
				(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Asian # Crime Policy Index				-0.68***	-0.11	-0.31**
				(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Asian # White Advantage				0.02	-0.02	-0.07
				(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.15)
Asian # Racial Problems in US				-0.07	0.20	-0.19
				(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Asian # Ideological Divergence				0.71	0.48	0.29
				(0.51)	(0.45)	(0.19)
Asian # Margin of Victory				-1.20	1.47	-1.26*
				(1.33)	(1.36)	(0.67)
Asian # Spending Parity (Log)				-0.80	-0.75	-0.14
				(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.39)
Individual Idiosyncrasies						
Party Identification						
Republican	-0.78	-1.11***	-0.56**	-0.77	-1.11***	-0.56**
	(0.53)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.23)
Independent	-0.17	-0.81***	0.72***	-0.17	-0.81***	0.72***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.17)

Race Awareness	-0.01	0.10	-0.44***	-0.00	0.10	-0.43***
	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Political Interest	-0.03	-0.14***	-0.61***	-0.03	-0.14***	-0.61***
	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Family Income	-0.02	-0.07	-0.08	-0.01	-0.06	-0.09
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	-0.06	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.06	-0.00	-0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age Squared	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.06	-0.33***	0.33***	0.06	-0.33***	0.33***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
District Idiosyncrasies						
Majority-Minority District	-1.26	0.27	0.26*	-1.27	0.26	0.25*
	(1.03)	(0.25)	(0.15)	(1.03)	(0.25)	(0.15)
Party Match-up						
Dem-Dem	1.86*	-1.73	0.48	1.86*	-1.69	0.46
	(0.97)	(1.30)	(0.38)	(1.00)	(1.32)	(0.38)
Dem-Others	-12.24***	1.20***	1.17***	-12.68***	1.20***	1.14***

	(1.06)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(1.05)	(0.32)	(0.26)
Incumbent	-0.02	-0.14	-0.41***	-0.02	-0.13	-0.42***
	(0.67)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.68)	(0.24)	(0.14)
Proportion of White	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02*	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Proportion of Asian	0.09	-0.07***	-0.02*	0.09	-0.07***	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Average District Household Income (Log)	0.96	0.05	0.28	0.99	0.04	0.28
	(1.83)	(0.44)	(0.33)	(1.83)	(0.44)	(0.33)
Natural Experiment						
Trump Rally	-0.01	-0.03	-0.10	0.00	-0.03	-0.11
	(0.69)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.69)	(0.20)	(0.10)
Constant	-17.57	0.39	-0.11	-18.68	0.32	-0.09
	(18.18)	(5.40)	(3.61)	(18.30)	(5.45)	(3.65)
Observations		6958			6958	
Pseudo R_2		0.181			0.184	
Log Likelihood		-7155.25			-7131.00	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by State-Congressional District. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The Model 1 is Model 3 from Table 4. Reference category for party identification is Democratic. Reference category for party match-up is Democratic versus Republican.

Figure 2-1. Comparison of responses in candidate preference and vote choice questions.



Source: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Cooperative Congressional Elections Study.

Note: The data is unweighted.

Figure 2-2. Predicted probabilities of immigration policy index, criminal justice policy index, and margin of victory by respondent race.



Note: Predicted probabilities calculated with actual values of the covariates, not their means. Dotted lines mark 95% confidence intervals. Visuals of the significant interaction terms from Model 2 in Table 5.

3 ADAPTING BEHAVIORS, BUT NOT ADOPTING BELIEFS: DETERMINANTS OF NATURALIZED CITIZENS' CIVIC DUTY

Abstract

As naturalized citizens constitute a growing portion of the electorate in developed democracies, the political integration of these enfranchised immigrants has become a pressing issue for policymakers. While immigrant integration research has investigated foreign-born voting behavior extensively, little is known about the acceptance of the host country's democratic norms by immigrants. This article attempts to fill that gap by focusing on the sources of civic duty in explaining why turnout among naturalized citizens varies across democratic contexts. Using data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work, the Migrant Integration Policy Index, and Comparative Manifestos projects, the study investigates whether pre-migration experience continues to affect naturalized citizens' political values in a different environment, or that a host country's institutional-political contexts can facilitate immigrant adaption and adoption of the new society's political norms. The main findings suggest that naturalized citizens are more likely to feel obliged to participate in their host country's electoral politics when it facilitates those citizens' sense of attachment to the country and belief in its democratic institutions through inclusive policies aimed at providing social and political pathways for immigrant integration.

3.1 Introduction

Between 2000 and 2015, 25 million immigrants—persons living in a country other than the one in which they were born—underwent the legal process of naturalization to acquire citizenship of an OECD country (OECD 2015). Citizenship provides these foreign-born nationals the same legal protection and political rights as native citizens to electorally participate in their host society. In theory, naturalized citizens should vote because it is a pathway through which they can protect and promote their political, economic, and cultural interests.[21] However, research on the political integration of immigrants shows two main phenomena: (1) Within the country, the turnout rate of naturalized citizens remains consistently lower than that of native-born—hereafter referred to as the nativity turnout gap (DeSipio 2011). (2) Across countries, the turnout rate of naturalized citizens varies widely by both the origin country and the host country (B. Voicu and Comşa 2014; Bueker 2005; Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007).

This paper examines the second phenomenon, the variation in turnout rates of naturalized citizens across countries. Figure 1 displays the self-declared voter participation of naturalized citizens in the most recent elections from the Making Electoral Democracy Work dataset. It is evident that naturalized citizens participate in electoral politics at a higher rate in some country than in others. This paper attempts to understand this variation in naturalized citizens' electoral participation by examining the third dimension of Martiniello's (2006) definition of political integration: adoption of democratic norms and values by immigrants. Surprisingly, previous research has not examined the impact of civic duty on naturalized citizens'

[21] This paper focuses on respondents who have citizenship in the host country but were not born in the host country and whose mothers are not native-born. Country of birth is determined by the question: "Were you born in <country>?" Mothers' native-born status is determined by the question "Was your mother born in <country>?" This question is not available for the father. Citizenship status is determined by the question "Are you a <country> citizen?"

decision to vote considering that it has long been documented as one of the key pieces in the perennial puzzle of voter turnout (Blais and Achen 2017).

[Figure 3-1 about here]

This article mainly explores the development of a sense of civic duty and inquire into why some naturalized citizens espouse this democratic norm while others do not. I posit that the nativity turnout gap cannot be explained without understanding the source of civic duty among naturalized citizens because "…For many people voting is not only a right, but it is also a duty. And the belief that in a democracy every citizen should feel obliged to vote induces many people to vote in almost all elections" (Blais 2000, 113). Civic duty, therefore, is an enduring motivator of political participation. Put differently, individuals who turn out because they feel it is their obligation, compared to those who vote because of their resources or because of elite mobilization, will continue to do so no matter the personal circumstances of their lives or the political events of the country.

This paper draws on political socialization theory (PST) and social identity theory (SIT) to explain the variances in naturalized citizens' sense of duty across countries. I particularly focus on establishing which of the competing theories—resistance, transferability, exposure, or host country's institutions—best explain the conditions under which naturalized citizens assimilate into their host countries via the adoption of civic duty. I posit that the host country can be a key agent in shaping naturalized citizens' commitment to vote. Through immigrant-friendly policies and political discourse at the national level, the host country can provide an inclusive environment for immigrants to become full members of its society (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). As immigrants have more positive political and social experiences in the host country, they are also more likely to develop a sense of attachment to that country and a belief in its democratic institutions—two sentiments that are crucial to the sense of duty to vote (Blais 2000). I test these arguments with the help of data collected in the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project from the period of 2010 to 2015. The MEDW data enables

the research to go beyond the most heavily studied case of the nativity turnout gap, the United States—a unique case due to its history of immigration.

3.2 Theoretical Arguments

Civic Duty and Turnout

The sense of civic duty came to prominence in the study of electoral behavior because voting is a decision that appears to adhere to and defy logic simultaneously. This simple act of casting a ballot has inspired volumes of studies and approximately six major theories as to why some people (do not) vote. Rational choice theorists traced the decision-making process of voters and argued that people vote when it benefits them and abstains when the stakes are low (Downs 1957). Resource scholars examined voters' socioeconomic characteristics and showed that time, money, and education matter to turnout (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Institutionalists focused on the impact of contextual factors such as electoral law and nationalization of parties and party system (Jackman 1987). The psychological and socialization perspectives delved into how political attitudes matter for turnout and the social origin of those attitudes (Almond and Verba 1963). And mobilization models of electoral participation emphasized the intentional efforts by political elites to gather support and provide incentives for voters to turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). While these theories could explain much of the decision to vote, scholars were still perplexed as to why some citizens are habitual voters and why they vote despite the low probability that their participation would make a difference in the election outcome.

The answer seems to lie in the sense of civic duty. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) introduced this concept in their seminal work on the decision-making process of voting. They expanded the rational choice model by Downs (1957) to include the normative variable of duty—a variable whose benefits are so substantial that its omission would impair the adequacy of the traditional cost-benefit analysis of voting. According to Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 28), duty accounts

satisfactions ranging from the compliance with the democratic obligation to vote to the affirmation of one's political efficacy. Blais (2000, 93) later argued that duty, which he defined as "the belief that not voting in a democracy is wrong," is the overriding reason why people vote. Subsequent literature has widely accepted the conceptualization that civic duty is an intrinsic motivation which stems from the belief that citizens have a moral obligation to vote; as well as recognized that some people go to the polls because they believe that abstaining is ethically wrong (Dowding 2005; Usher 2011; Blais and Achen 2017).

Where does the commitment to vote arise from in one's life? Blais (2000) identified two attitudes that are the foundation for the belief in civic duty: a sense of attachment to the community and personal support for the democratic system. The underlying logic is that some believe that living in an electorally democratic society is a privilege; hence, citizens "owe" it to the community and to democracy to vote. Recent studies have further demonstrated the link between these two attitudes and civic duty. The first set of arguments by Galais and Blais (2016) rests on theories of political support, which assert that individuals tend to view a political system as legitimate when it conforms to their sense of right or wrong. As this attitude lies in the same moral domain as the sense of duty (Graham et al. 2011), some citizens feel obligated to vote because they want to preserve the democratic system and its ideals. Focusing on the social sources of civic duty, Hur (2016) confirmed that the commitment to vote is partly dependent on the linkage between the community and the individual's identity. In other words, citizens feel a sense of duty towards the welfare of the state when they see it as integral to their political identities.

Additional arguments for proposing a link between support for democratic ideals, attachment to the political community, and civic duty are grounded in studies on citizenship norms. Defined by Dalton (2008, 78) as "a shared set of expectations about the citizen's role in politics", these norms tell citizens not only the responsibilities they are obligated to fulfill but also the values of the political system. In democratic societies, electoral participation is an essential component of citizenship. Therefore, attitudes that are consistent

with the democratic credo and encourage voting are reinforced through both the education and political system (Campbell 2006). In theory, we can expect that foreign-born nationals would adopt the host country's social norms since immigrants that self-selected into the naturalization process are usually more motivated to integrate into the host society, more educated, and better informed (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015). If, however, foreign-born nationals are not adopting the democratic norm of voting as a moral obligation, what would be the reasons for this differentiated sense of duty? In the absence of any research specifically addressing the civic duty among naturalized citizens, I borrow from existing literature on the political resocialization of immigrants and on social identity theory to understand their attitudes toward voting.

Political Socialization and Social Identity Theories

While the current literature on civic duty provides us with extensive knowledge on the importance of this belief in voter turnout, it has thus far treated citizens as one homogenous group. This gap consequently misses how individuals with experiences from other cultural and political contexts, in this case, naturalized citizens, develop their sense of civic duty in the new society. In the absence of research on this topic, I draw upon scholarship on political (re)socialization and social identity theory to understand how migrant-specific experiences determine an immigrant's adoption of the host country's political norms.

The first pillar of my theoretical framework pertains to the literature on the political (re)socialization of immigrants. Scholars of political attitudes have offered three competing theories to explain how pre-migration beliefs and behaviors, shaped by the origin country's political culture, translate to the new society: resistance, exposure, and transferability. When examining the impact of pre-migration experiences, the theory of resistance is the least optimistic about the adaptability of immigrants to a new political context. It argues that immigrants are habituated to the political culture of the country of origin and are not able to adapt quickly to a new context. This hypothesis reflects the traditional belief that individuals internalize the political orientations they developed during the early stages of

their lives and use these values as a filter for subsequent experiences (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Sears and Funk 1999). The transferability hypothesis suggests that immigrants can draw on political skills gained in the source country and adapt them to the host's environment (Black 1987; Wals 2011). Studies under this theory have emphasized the effect of origin countries, specifically that immigrants with previous experience in a democratic system are more able to integrate politically than those without (Bueker 2005).

In contrast to the resistance and transferability theories, the exposure perspective posits that migrants adapt as they acquire more experiences with the host country's cultures of participation. At the individual level, the underpinning of this theory is that immigrants can undergo a learning process that reframes their political predispositions to mirror the prevailing attitudes and behaviors in the host society (Wong 2000; Stephen White et al. 2008; B. Voicu and Comşa 2014). In other words, the host country's cultures of political participation are manifested through specific behaviors. The immigrants then observe these behaviors, internalize them, and transform them into personal values that influence their attitudes and behaviors. In sum, the process of political (re)socialization provide immigrants with a set of protocols that guide their political actions in the host country. Much of this research, however, focuses on individual-level factors and neglects to theorize how the host country's socio-political context might matter in the integration of its immigrants.

The second body of literature, which derives from acculturation research, borrows from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) to explore how experiences in the host country can affect immigrants' willingness to adopt the new culture. Arguments derived from SIT are based on the premise that individuals are motivated by the desire to maintain positive self-esteem, and therefore are only willing to identify with a group if they perceive that it will accept them (Padilla and Perez 2003; Bourhis et al. 1997). Rationally, individuals from the outgroup (i.e., immigrants) are not willing to invest efforts into adopting the norms of the ingroup (i.e., host society) if they believe that rejection is inevitable. In the case of immigrants, scholars have shown that the host country's integration

policies have both direct and indirect consequences for immigrants' sense of acceptance in the host society (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; Laurentsyeva and Venturini 2017; Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Crul and Schneider 2010). Directly, strong integration policies lower the legal boundary between immigrants and natives by providing them with easy access to equal citizenship rights and protection against discrimination. Indirectly, they reduce the social barrier by signaling to immigrants that the host country wants them to become full members of its society. Simply stated, immigrants are more likely to adapt and adopt the host society's norms and behaviors when assimilation is an achievable reality.

Hypotheses

In the following section, I first associate the variables employed in this study with each of the political socialization theory to determine which model best explains civic duty among naturalized citizens. I then argue that immigrant integration, via the adoption of the host country's normative values, does not only depend on an individual's political socialization experiences. The host country's tone on immigration, manifested through the government's policies and the political parties' rhetoric, can impact immigrants' perception of their belongingness in the host country. This perception, in turn, informs their belief on whether or not they "owe" it to the country to vote.

Starting with the resistance model, we can expect that immigrants who migrate later in life adopt the host country's normative values less quickly because of their experience in the origin country colors their perception of politics. In other words, older immigrants will have had time to internalize the origin country's prevailing social attitudes towards politics and to crystallize their own beliefs on the role of citizens in government. I hypothesize that the impact of one's years in the origin country differs based on whether the person in question immigrated from a non-democratic or democratic country. For example, older immigrants from a non-democratic country have had more exposure to a political system that suppresses not only citizen participation but also conditions citizens to believe that involvement in politics means considerable personal risk. These immigrants may also have received a civic education that does not

align with the democratic values of the host country. These experiences cumulate as the individual becomes older and solidify into a set of political beliefs. These beliefs are the filters through which individuals evaluate the world and can become barriers to the adoption of the host society's normative values when individuals migrate. On the other hand, older immigrants socialized under a democratic regime may find it easier to adopt the host country's political values because they corroborate with the immigrant's world view. Below is my expectation for the resistance model:

Hypothesis 1, resistance: For naturalized citizens from non-democratic countries, being older at the time of migration decreases the likelihood of expressing a sense of duty to vote. However, the effect of age at migration is weaker for those from democratic countries.

The transferability model can be tested with an individual's democratic experience in their origin country. In theory, migrants from democratic regimes adopt the host country's normative values more easily because their socialization experience in the origin country provides them with both the soft and the hard skills to assimilate to a new political context. These immigrants are more likely to migrate with the political values knowledge, and interests that enable them to assimilate and even to participate in the host country. They are also more likely to have undergone, or at the very least observed, the process of electoral participation (i.e., registration, campaigning, and voting). These experiences provide individuals with a set of foundational political skills that they can transfer from one democratic context to another. Immigrants from non-democratic regimes, in contrast, face a steep political learning curve that may deter their adoption of the host country's democratic values. My expectation for the transferability hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2, transferability: Naturalized citizens who originated from countries that are democratically similar to the host country are more likely to express a sense of duty to vote.

Regarding the exposure model, I argue the turnout rate of the respondent’s regional community in previous elections can be used

to test the impact of political exposure on immigrants' normative values. As a community's turnout rate can be seen as a proxy for its culture of political participation, a higher percentage means that there exists a strong civic culture in the community and that its citizens are more active in government. Immigrants from both democratic and non-democratic countries who observe these aspects about their new society's political culture might be more motivated to engage in politics than their counterparts who reside in communities with a weak civic culture. These initial acts of participation, which may begin as a form of social assimilation, can transform into political values that guide immigrant's behaviors. I, therefore, hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3, exposure: Naturalized citizens are more likely to express a sense of duty to vote when they observe a strong culture of political participation in elections in their communities.

In addition to individual variables, host country's contextual factors also matter explaining why immigrants' sense of civic duty varies. At the national level, governments can implement citizenship and integration laws that can either provide pathways or set up barriers for immigrant integration (Alba and Foner 2014). Returning to the premise that support for the political community is one of the essential elements of civic duty, it can be contended that citizens care more about their government when they believe that it champions their interests. The role of government in cultivating this support, and by extension, civic duty, is even more crucial among immigrants because they are often considered and treated as outsiders. Accordingly, I will test the hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4a, the host country's effects: Naturalized citizens who live in a country with strong integration policies and inclusive political environment are more likely to express a sense of duty to vote.

Hypothesis 4b, the host country's effects: The inclusive nature of the host country's policies and politics can foster or impede immigrants' sense of attachment to the country and belief in its democratic institutions.

Finally, I consider the effects of interactions between different sources of political socialization on a naturalized citizen's sense of civic duty. The first interaction is between age at migration and the origin country's democratic characteristic. As previously mentioned, I expect that the impact of age at migration is conditional on the country of origin. For example, later age of migration may be more detrimental to individuals who come from non-democratic countries than those from democratic regimes. Additionally, the interaction also helps to disentangle the effects of the two variables since high resistance due to later migration could also capture more prolonged exposure to undemocratic regimes. The second interaction is between the host country's immigrant integration policies and its political rhetoric about immigrants. I expect that the positive effect of integration policies will change depending on the pro- or anti-immigrant rhetoric of political parties at the national level. Because immigrants are more exposed to political sentiments (either through the news or in person), their evaluations of the inclusive nature of the host country's institutions will be tempered by what they hear. As political beliefs are shaped by the political socialization process, studying the interactions between the three different dimensions of a foreign national's life—individual's migration experiences, origin country's socio-political culture, and host country's institutional friendliness—facilitates a better understanding of the mechanisms that mediate those variables and foreign-born nationals' sense of civic duty. The next section presents the data and the statistical method that I used to evaluate these hypotheses.

3.3 Data and Methods

Data

In considering why civic duty differentiates among naturalized citizens, my analytical strategy is to examine naturalized nationals' political and social experiences in both the origin and host country. I analyze data from Internet panel surveys carried out within the MEDW project's framework (http://www.chairelectoral.com/medw.html). Although the surveys were conducted in two waves, pre- and post-election, I use the data

as cross-sectional since they are, on average, only one month apart. Harris International conducted the surveys using their panel of respondents during national, regional, and when possible European election campaigns in Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. The surveys were carried out in at least two regions of each country to ensure variation in the electoral and political context.

The sample for each survey was pulled based on those respondents 18 years or older, the language set to the national and regional languages, the area set to the region, education levels, gender, and citizenship of the country. I opted not to use supra-national elections and only retained the regional and national surveys because Canada and Switzerland do not have European-level elections (see Appendix 3-E for a list of surveys). I combined all the surveys to create a pooled dataset with a sample of 1,983 naturalized citizens who were born abroad and whose mothers were also born abroad. I used multiple imputation (using chained equations) method to treat this concern (Allison 2001, 81). Multiple imputation employs information collected from other variables of interests in the dataset to predict values for missing cases. These predicted values are as close as possible to what would be the respondent's answer to the question. Each completed dataset is analyzed separately, and the results are then combined to calculate the variation in parameter estimates. In accordance with the recommendation by White, Royston and Wood (2011), I added 40 imputations, the number equivalent to the percentage of cases with missing values, to the original dataset.[22] I imputed data for one categorical and four continuous variables: acquirement of postsecondary education, sense of national attachment, length of residence in the host country, origin country's Polity IV score, and respondent's age at immigration. The results reported from the models are robust to estimations that used an alternative missing data specification in which missing data is eliminated

[22] According to Alison (2001), a major downside of multiple imputation is that it produces different results every time you run the data. I accounted for this by specifying a random-number seed in Stata for reproducibility.

The MEDW data is useful in studying the sense of civic duty among foreign-born nationals for four reasons. First, the MEDW project asks respondents directly whether they view voting as a duty or as a choice. As surveys typically infer civic duty from a barrage of questions about political and social values, this enables us to measure our dependent variable precisely. Second, the survey question provides respondents with a positive justification for the non-duty option—this is key to avoiding the social desirability bias associated with a behavioral norm (Blais and Achen 2017). Third, the study includes immigrant cases and questions about respondents' country of birth, which provides the opportunity to study the impact of the origin country. Lastly, the ex-post harmonization of data is not an issue, and the data are entirely comparable because the variables have been measured exactly in the same way in the five countries and the methodological design of all surveys is similar (Granda, Wolf, and Hadorn 2010).

Measures

The dependent variable is civic duty at the national level. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they primarily perceive voting as a duty or as a personal choice. Respondents could choose from "don't know," "choice," or "duty." I combined the "don't know" and "choice" respondents to create one group because this analysis is mainly concerned with understanding why voting is a duty for some and not for others. I then coded "duty" as 1 and "choice / don't know" as 0. It is important to note that the wording of the question was based on Achen and Blais' (2017) idea that both the "duty" and "non-duty" views of voting should be positively stated. This conception of civic duty corresponds to the widely shared belief that freedom and choice are the foundations of a democratic society; hence, citizens should not be forced to vote. As Figure 2 demonstrates, naturalized citizens' sense of duty varies widely between host countries.

[Figure 3-2 about here]

The independent variables are categorized into three categories according to the three political resocialization hypotheses. The variable testing the resistance theory examines whether or not

migrating later in life affects individuals' ability to adopt the host country's norms. The transferability theory variables capture the origin country's political culture and look at how socialization during the pre-migration period can influence a naturalized citizen's sense of civic duty. Finally, I tested the exposure hypothesis with a measure of the host country's culture of political participation.

The variable that tests the resistance theory is the age at which an individual migrated to the host country. This theory is operationalized using the variable "years in the host country" subtracted from the variable "age" to calculate the respondent's age at immigration. The expectation is respondents who migrated later in life are less likely to adopt the belief that voting is a duty in the host country.

The transferability theory is tested using the origin country's Polity IV score from the Polity IV data (Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers 2016). The score, ranging on a scale from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic), measures the political distance between the origin and the host country. All of the five host countries in the dataset have a Polity IV score of 10 during the survey period. If the respondent comes from a country that did not go through a regime change, then the variable is computed as the mean of the Polity IV scores from each year that the respondent spent in his or her origin country. If the respondent originates from a country that experienced a transition (for example, countries from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), then the variable is computed as a mean score of two socialization periods—one before and one after the transition. The Polity IV score from before the transition is calculated as the mean each year from birth to the year of transition. The Polity IV score from after the transition is calculated as the mean of each year from the year of transition to the year of immigration. This variable is intended to capture the respondent's experience with democratic values that are similar to that of the host country's norms. It is believed that respondents who were socialized under a political regime with a Polity IV score closer to 10 are more likely to adopt the host country's values.

To examine the extent to which the exposure theory can explain naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty, I used the official turnout in the election in which the respondents were surveyed. I opted for the official participation of each election rather than national turnout because only one general election took place in each country during the survey period. Therefore, the national turnout would have caused the problem of multicollinearity. The use of each election's official turnout provides variation in terms of the political context within the country, as well as captures the culture of participation in the respondent's immediate surrounding.

I employed two variables to measure the inclusiveness of the host country's political-institutional context. The first uses data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2016) to measure the overall tone of political parties' attitudes on immigration in national elections held between 2010 and 2015. Following the method of Alonso and da Fonseca (2012), I constructed each party's position on immigration based on five categories: multiculturalism: negative, multiculturalism: positive, underprivileged minority groups, national way of life: positive, and law and order: positive.[23] Each party's score is computed by subtracting the percentage of negative references from the positive ones, then dividing the result by the sum of all references. The score indicates the party's stance on immigration in the national election, with higher values indicating more liberal positions. The final score is the mean of all the parties' scores, weighted by the percentage of the vote each party received.

The second indicator uses data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). MIPEX measures national governments'

[23] In the CMP codebook, Volkens et al. (2016) define multiculturalism: positive as "favorable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies." Multiculturalism: negative is defined as "the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration." The category "underprivileged minority groups" is defined as "very general favorable references to underprivileged minorities." "National way of life: positive" is defined as "favorable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals." "Law and order: positive" is defined as "favorable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime."

performances in promoting migrants' assimilation in policy areas such as labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination (Huddleston, Thomas; Bilgili, Özge; Joki, Anne-Linde and Vankova 2015). The MIPEX score is calculated from 167 policy indicators on migrant integration. Policy indicators are questions that relate to a specific policy component in one of the eight policy areas. Three options are available for each question, with a maximum of 3 points when policies provide the optimal standards of equal treatment for migrants as they do for natives. The score for each of the eight policy areas is the average of 4 scores which examine four different dimensions of the same policy. The eight policy scores are averaged together to make the overall scores for each country. The initial 1-2-3 scale is then converted into a 0-50-100 scale, where 100 is the highest score. The variable is computed as the host country's MIPEX overall scores from the year before the respondent's survey year—a high score indicates more favorable policies.

I include several demographic and attitudinal controls. I control for each respondent's age (in years), the square of age, female (0 male, one female), education level (0 without post-secondary education, one yes).[24] I also control for the length of residence (in years) in the host country, which accounts for variation in exposure to the host country's contexts. I use the natural of years in the host country because previous research has shown that changes from social learning occur mainly in the earlier period and decreases with additional time (Baltes, Staudinger, and Lindenberger 1999). Also included are two variables that mediate the sense of civic duty—support for the democratic system and support for the political community. Since the data does not have a variable that directly measures support for the democratic system, I created a political participation index to serve as a proxy. The logic is that individuals

[24] Education was initially measured according to the host country's education system. This measurement subsequently resulted in Spain having only six categories while Canada has 10. I used the dichotomization of education as a way to ensure consistency across the countries.

who strongly believe in the democratic system are more likely to participate in political activities other than voting. Support for the political community is measured through a question regarding one's attachment to the nation (see Appendix 3-F for variables' question wording and coding). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables considered in the analysis.

[Table 3-1 about here]

Methods

Even though the structure of the data is hierarchal, I have decided not to run a multilevel model since my data does not fulfill the recommended sample size or the sample structure for a robust multilevel analysis.[25] Instead, the estimation is by binary logistic regression because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. As a robustness check, I repeated all the specifications excluding the "don't know" since it could encompass many things. I noticed no substantial change in my findings (see Appendix 3-G. for the reported outputs).

All standard errors are clustered by origin and host country to account for the interdependence among respondents who originated from the same origin country and are living in the same host country. All specifications were weighted by age, gender, and education to ensure that the data reflect the actual proportions found in the country's population. I also include an additional country weight to account for the asymmetric distribution of cases across countries. The full model specification is as follows:

[25] My data consists of only five host-country groups, whereas the literature suggests at least 20 groups and 30 observations per group (Heck and Thomas 2000), or 30 groups and 30 observations per group (Hox 2002), or 50 groups and 30 observations per group (Maas and Hox 2004).

$$duty\ to\ vote_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Age\ at\ Migration + \beta_2\ Origin\ Country's\ Polity\ IV + \beta_3 Official\ Turnout + \beta_4 CMP\ Systemic\ Immigration\ Position + \beta_5 MIPEX + \beta_6 Controls + \varepsilon$$

3.4 Results

I start by comparing the voting intention and behavior of naturalized citizens by their sense of civic duty. Figure 3 displays the voting intention and voting behavior of naturalized citizens in their host country. The standard errors in Figure 3 are clustered by each respondent's origin and host country. I also use population and country weights to account for the population proportion in the host country and the distribution of cases across host countries.

[Figure 3-3 about here]

The voting intention graph on the top of Figure 3 demonstrates that respondents who answered "voting is a duty" are less likely to say that they are "unlikely to vote" or "certain to note vote" in the upcoming election. This result indicates that naturalized citizens who have a strong sense of civic duty are more certain that they will participate in an election: the difference between those who declared voting is a duty and voting is a choice is significant at $p<0.01$ (all results are reported from two-tailed tests). The voting behavior chart on the bottom of Figure 3 shows that respondents who believe voting is a duty are less likely not electorally to participate in an election. Those respondents are also more consistent voters since they are not as likely as non-duty respondents to "usually vote but did not" in an upcoming election. For both outcomes considered in Figure 3, naturalized citizens who believe voting is a duty are more likely to intend to vote ($p<0.01$) and more likely to vote in the election ($p<0.01$). I now focus the analysis on the drivers of civic duty among naturalized citizens and report results from logistic models that rely on cross-individual and cross-national variation.

I have estimated five models testing the three political socialization theories and the impact of the inclusive nature of the political-institutional context on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. The first model considers only variables pertaining to the resistance theory; the second considers only variables concerning the transferability theory; the third contains variables relating to the exposure theory; the fourth tests the effect of the host country's immigrant integration policies and political stance towards immigration; and the fifth model is a full model in which all variables are included. The outcome across all models is sense of civic duty in the host country's national election. Table 2 presents the findings from the analysis.

[Table 3-2 about here]

In the first model, I tested the resistance theory using the variable "age at migration." The crux of this theory is that the political outlooks and values that guide individuals through adulthood are mainly developed in the early stages of life. As such, while individuals inevitably accumulate new knowledge and experiences as they move through life, additional information is often filtered through the prisms of existing worldviews. For immigrants, we might expect that individuals who have had more prolonged exposure to their origin country's political regime are more likely to reject new environmental messages that are inconsistent with their previous dispositions. Hence, I predicted that respondents who migrated later in life are more likely to resist adopting the host country's political norms and therefore less likely to declare a sense of civic duty in the host country. The findings from Model 1, however, do not provide support for the hypothesis that age has a negative effect on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty towards the host country.

The second model tests the transferability of democratic skills acquired in the origin country through the variable "Polity IV." This theory contends that immigrant political adaption is driven by immigrants' political resources acquired in the country of origin. The assertation is that immigrants who come from democratic regimes have experiences with being engaged and participating in politics; those individuals are then able to draw on and use those skills in a

new political environment. The empirical implication of this theory is that socializing under democratic regimes would have a positive effect on naturalized citizens' civic duty in the host country. Contrary to this expectation, the results from Model 2 show that the origin country's political regime does not have a significant effect in predicting the individual's sense of civic duty in the host country. The transferability theory is consequently rejected.

Regarding the exposure theory, Model 3 tests the impact of the host society's cultures of electoral participation on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. The perspective of exposure focuses on the political experiences and observations that immigrants have had in their country of residence. The theoretical expectation is that immigrants model their political behaviors after the ones that they observe in the general population. Over time, those behaviors can transform into principles that guide immigrants' political decision-making process. One empirical implication of the exposure hypothesis is that naturalized citizens who live in places with a strong culture of voter participation (measured as a high turnout rate) are more likely to believe in the obligation to vote. However, there is no evidence from Model 3 or Model 5 showing that the turnout rate of the host society (whether in local, regional, or national election) has any additional effect on naturalized citizens' civic duty.

Model 4 presents interesting findings regarding the effect of the host country's political-institutional context (CMP and MIPEX) on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. Both of these variables capture the host country's inclusiveness towards its immigrant population. The expectation is that an inclusive political-institutional context would have a positive effect on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. The results show two contradictory findings. On the one hand, the host country's systemic position on immigration (CMP) has a negative and significant effect on civic duty ($p<.01$ in both Model 4 and 5). This finding was unexpected and suggests that the more positive the host country's position is on immigration, the less likely it is for naturalized citizens to believe that voting is a duty. This rather intriguing result might be explained by the fact that immigrants may develop a sense of apathy towards politics if political parties do not pose a threat to their socioeconomic or legal rights in the country.

Indeed, recent research on Latinos in the US shows that xenophobic rhetoric has a mobilizing effect because it calls into question the worth of migrants and minorities; and this affront to their worth subsequently raises the saliency of minorities' ethnic identity as a way to protect and defend their place in the host country (Pérez 2015). On the other hand, MIPEX has a positive and significant effect on civic duty among naturalized citizens ($p<.01$) and remains so when considering other variables in Model 5. This finding goes against previous research in showing that MIPEX is not significant in the political re-socialization of immigrants (B. Voicu and Comşa 2014). The effects of CMP and MIPEX are shown graphically in Figure 4.

[Figure 3-4 about here]

Having discussed the main effects of the variables of interest, I will now move on to examine the interactions between those variables. I have estimated four models testing the moderating effect of each interaction naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. Table 3 presents the results. As Model 1 is the full model specification (Model 5) from Table 2, I will begin the discussion with Model 2 and Model 3 as it tests Hypothesis 4b: the inclusive nature of the host country's policies and politics can foster or impede immigrants' sense of attachment to the country and belief in its democratic institutions. Model 2 tests this hypothesis by interacting MIPEX and CMP with the variable attachment to the host nation, and in Model 3, I did the same but with the variable satisfaction with democracy. The results from both models reveal that MIPEX is not significant in moderating the effects of sense of attachment and satisfaction with democracy on the belief that voting is a duty. On the contrary, Model 2 and Model 3 show that those variables' interactions with CMP are negative and significant at the 95% level. Model 4 displays the interaction result of the variable age at migration and the origin country's democratic characteristics. While I predicted that the impact of age at migration is conditional on the country of origin, the interaction term provides no support for this expectation. Turning now to the interaction between the host country's immigrant integration policies and its political rhetoric about immigrants, we can observe that the interaction is positive and significant at the 95% level.

[Table 3-3 about here]

To interpret the magnitude and significance of factor in the interactions, Figure 5 presents the predicted probabilities of each significant interaction term in Table 4 (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Regarding the graph showing the interaction between CMP and attachment to the nation, we can observe that the moderating effect of sense of attachment on CMP weakens as CMP moves from the most negative (-0.66) to the most positive (-0.15). That is, respondents who are exposed to the most negative political position about immigration are more likely to believe that voting is an obligation as their sense of attachment to the nation increases. On the other hand, we can see that there is no change among respondents who are exposed to the most positive political position about immigration. Concerning the second graph that shows the interaction between CMP and satisfaction with democracy, we can see that the effect of CMP changes dramatically as satisfaction with democracy increase. For instance, respondents who are exposed to the most negative political position about immigration (-0.66) are more likely to hold a sense of duty to vote as their satisfaction with democracy increases. However, the probability of declaring that voting is a duty decreases among respondents who are exposed to the most positive political position about immigration (-0.15) as their satisfaction with democracy increases. Finally, we turn to the graph showing the interaction between CMP and MIPEX. We see that there is a positive relationship between CMP and MIPEX. In other words, MIPEX works to increase the probability of believing that voting is a duty across all respondents, even those who experience the most negative political tone on immigration. However, the MIPEX effect diminishes among the ones with the most negative CMP score while it strengthens among those with the most positive CMP score.

[Figure 3-5 about here]

To summarize, these results do not provide support for the H1, the hypothesis that naturalized citizens who migrate at a later time in life are resistant to adopting the belief that it is a duty to vote in the host country's elections. The results yield no support for H2, the hypothesis that the origin country's political regime affects immigrant

integration in the host country since we see that migrants from democratic countries are not more likely to believe that voting is a duty. Similarly, the results provide no support for H3, the hypothesis that the host country's political participation culture can influence naturalized citizens' perception of their civic responsibilities. Finally, the results provide contradicting results for H4a and H4b, the hypotheses that the inclusive nature of host country's political-institutional context matters in naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty and that the mechanisms through it matter is the sense of attachment to the nation and satisfaction with democracy. While the host country's policies toward immigrant integration have the expected positive effect, we find that a negative position on immigration is conducive to naturalized citizens' sense of duty while a positive one is not.

3.5 Conclusion

This article provides some of the first insight into the development of the sense of civic duty among naturalized citizens to their host country. While many studies have investigated the political integration of naturalized citizens through electoral behaviors, research exploring the assimilation of naturalized citizens into their host countries through the acceptance of its civic culture is rare. In this study, I draw on cross-country data to determine that the inclusive nature of the host country's institutional context and political rhetoric are the strongest predictors of the sense of civic duty to vote among naturalized citizens. Since research has shown that civic duty motivates regular voter participation, facilitating a sense of duty among naturalized citizens is a central component in closing the nativity turnout gap.

Previous research on the political resocialization of immigrants has put forth three competing theories on how foreign-born individuals adapt to the host country’s political settings. Scholars in this field debated whether prior experience in the origin country impede or facilitate the political engagement of immigrants in a new country, as well as how exposure to the host country’s political culture can mediate the impact of the origin country’s political regime. One of

the conclusions in this literature is that different theories hold for different forms of political engagement (Stephen White et al. 2008). In terms of immigrants adapting host country's civic norms, this paper's findings indicate that it does not matter when one migrates to the host country (resistance theory), where one comes from (transfer), or what one observes in the immediate context (exposure). These results reveal that political beliefs, unlike political behaviors, are not determined by pre-migration democratic experiences.

Contrary to previous findings that show exposure to a new political system can facilitate the adaptation of immigrants' behaviors to match the host country's political culture, these results tell us that another mechanism could be at play when it comes to immigrants adopting the host country's political norms. What are the additional pathways through which immigrants internalize (or reject) political beliefs from the host country? Future scholars in the field of political socialization could provide further insights into how socializing in multiple contexts impact a person's ability to develop and internalize political norms in a new society.

A central finding of this analysis is that the host country's political-institutional context towards immigrants as people and immigration as a topic does affect naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty. This finding directly contradicts the results of Voicu and Comşa's (2014) article in which they consider the three political socialization theories, as well as the host country's political-institutional context, in explaining immigrants' voter participation in the host country. The authors concluded that neither the host country's political parties' message on immigration (CMP) nor the inclusiveness of its institutions (MIPEX) determine immigrant's voter turnout. Instead, Voicu and Comşa (2014) found strong support for the exposure hypothesis by showing that the host society's culture of voting can adequately explain immigrants' electoral turnout. The significant effects of both CMP and MIPEX in this article suggest that scholars should reconsider the role of the host country's policies and political rhetoric in the integration process for immigrants. As previously contended, full political integration—in terms of consistent participation at a similar or same level as native citizens—can only be achieved when naturalized citizens believe that it is their duty to

participate in the host country's democratic institutions. This article put forth the argument that it is within the policymakers' powers to close the nativity turnout gap by establishing policies that foster a space for immigrant, both self and social, inclusion.

Among the limitations of this article are the modest and uneven sample size for naturalized citizens, the small selection of host countries, and the accessibility of internet surveys for immigrants. Because the aim of the MEDW project was not to study naturalized citizens, the sample in the data is not representative of the actual naturalized citizen population in each geographic area. Also, the small selection of host countries may not be able to capture enough variation in host countries' political-institutional contexts. Similar to most Internet surveys, less educated and poorer people are less likely to be included due since they may not have access to a computer device and the Internet. In the case of MEDW, naturalized citizens face an additional barrier if they do not speak or read the host country's official language(s). These limitations do reduce the generalizability of the findings in this article. However, this means that we need better studies to understand the normative side of political integration, especially among immigrants who have already been incorporated via citizenship. Since naturalized citizens are understudied in both the field of immigration and political participation, more research is needed before we can evaluate the effects of the political resocialization process and the host country's political-institutional context on their internalization of the host society's political norms.

Finally, the discussion around immigrant political immigration has traditionally held naturalization as its holy grail. However, we know that electoral participation, and not citizenship alone, is the main pathway for foreign nationals to empower themselves in their new societies. Given that the sense of duty to vote is one of the main motivations for continuous turnout, it is critical that naturalized citizens adopt this democratic norm to maintain a consistent voice in government. While immigrants' political values have long been attributed to early socialization in the origin country, this study shows that naturalized citizens can adapt to the host country's cultures of civic duty. This finding has important implications for the role and

responsibilities of policymakers in the host country. One of the steps that policymakers can undertake is to develop and implement programs that economically, socially, and politically integrate migrants before naturalization. As democracy subsists on an active and engaged citizenry, a government that endeavors to promote an inclusive political community and political regime can encourage participation from all of its citizen groups.

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Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics before imputation.

	Duty	**Choice/ Don't Know**	**Total**
N	1160	823	1983
%	58.5	41.5	100
Resistance			
Average Age at Migration (SD)	18.4 (12.9)	16.5 (12.9)	17.6 (12.7)
Transference			
Average Origin Country's Polity IV (SD)	3.8 (6.6)	3.2 (6.5)	4 (7)
Exposure			
Average Official Election Turnout (SD)	.62 (.09)	.63 (.09)	.63 (.10)
Political-Institutional Contexts			
Average CMP (SD)	-0.39 (.13)	-0.37 (.13)	-0.38 (.13)
Average MIPEX (SD)	65.4 (7.8)	62.3 (8.0)	64.1 (8.1)
Controls			
Average National Attachment (SD)	8.6 (1.8)	7.6 (2.2)	8.2 (2.1)
Average Satisfaction with Democracy (SD)	6.98 (6.0)	8.24 (14.4)	7.45 (10.0)
Average Political Participation Index (SD)	0.5 (0.9)	0.3 (0.6)	0.5 (0.8)
Average Age (SD)	50.3 (15.9)	45.3 (14.8)	48.2 (15.7)
Average Age Square (SD)	2785.5 (1628.6)	2267.8 (1427.5)	2570.9 (1568.8)
% Female	48.0	55.7	52.0
% Post-Secondary Education	78.7	62.2	75.0
Average Years in Host Country Square (SD)	1218 (1166)	1316 (1210)	1052 (1065)

Table 3-2. Logit models of political socialization and host country's political-institutional context on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age at Migration	0.001				0.020
	(0.017)				(0.019)
Origin Country's Polity IV		0.004			0.010
		(0.015)			(0.014)
Official Election Turnout			-2.616		-3.906
			(1.783)		(3.212)
MIPEX				0.058***	0.085***
				(0.013)	(0.029)
CMP				-3.693***	-2.862***
				(1.010)	(0.786)
Controls					
Attachment to Host Nation	0.134**	0.135**	0.124*	0.116*	0.120*
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.032	-0.033	-0.033	-0.022	-0.032
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Political Participation Index	0.348***	0.346***	0.321***	0.283**	0.277**
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Age	-0.005	-0.004	-0.000	0.013	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Age Square	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.341**	-0.342**	-0.380**	-0.348**	-0.367**
	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.157)	(0.153)

Post-Secondary Education	0.283*	0.285*	0.368**	0.223	0.232
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.146)
Years in Host Country Square	0.000	0.000**	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.296*	-1.316*	0.299	-6.446***	-5.230***
	(0.691)	(0.726)	(1.592)	(1.099)	(1.484)
Observations	1983	1983	1983	1983	1983
Pseudo R_2	0.047	0.047	0.057	0.073	0.081
Log Likelihood	-1757.774	-1757.618	-1738.980	-1709.531	-1695.171
Chi_2	72.677	68.344	82.630	104.149	144.560

Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2010-2015.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance is shown at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 1 tests the resistance theory; Model 2 the transference theory; Model 3 the exposure theory; Model 4 tests the host country's political-institutional context; and Model 5 is a full model.

Table 3-3. Logit models of individual and institutional Interactions on naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age at Migration	0.020	0.018	0.020	0.021	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Origin Country's Polity IV	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.017	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Official Election Turnout	-3.906	-3.580	-3.468	-3.892	-3.046
	(3.212)	(3.200)	(3.210)	(3.206)	(3.035)
MIPEX	0.085***	0.045	0.082*	0.086***	0.245***
	(0.029)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.081)
CMP	-2.862***	4.535	1.031	-2.935***	-22.571***
	(0.786)	(2.926)	(1.980)	(0.785)	(8.340)
Attachment to Host Nation	0.120*	-0.622	0.134**	0.119*	0.117*
	(0.065)	(0.554)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.032	-0.036	-0.511	-0.032	-0.040
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.528)	(0.038)	(0.038)
MIPEX # Attachment		0.006			
		(0.007)			
CMP # Attachment		-1.021**			
		(0.398)			

MIPEX # Satisfaction			0.003		
			(0.007)		
CMP # Satisfaction			-0.792**		
			(0.355)		
Age at Migration # Origin Country's Polity IV				-0.000	
				(0.001)	
MIPEX # CMP					0.336**
					(0.145)
Political Participation Index	0.277**	0.267*	0.268*	0.283**	0.263**
	(0.115)	(2.23)	(2.41)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Age	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.005
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age square	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.367**	-0.358**	-0.376**	-0.363**	-0.366**
	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Post-Secondary Education	0.232	0.280*	0.271*	0.228	0.212
	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Years in Host Country Square	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-5.230***	-0.338	-3.766	-5.308***	-15.340***

	(1.484)	(4.420)	(3.479)	(1.470)	(3.875)
Observations	1983	1983	1983	1983	1983
Pseudo R_2	0.081	0.091	0.090	0.081	0.084
Log Likelihood	-1695.171	-1677.181	-1677.550	-1694.748	-1689.421
Chi_2	144.560	151.379	143.638	150.677	179.346

Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2010-2015.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance is shown at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 1 is the full model specification (Model 5) from Table 2. Model 2 tests the interaction between the inclusive nature of institutional contexts and sense of attachment. Model 3 tests the interaction the inclusive nature of institutional contexts and satisfaction with democracy. Model 4 tests the interaction between age at migration and origin country's political regime. Model 5 tests the interaction between MIPEX and CMP.

Figure 3-1. Voter turnout in most recent election among naturalized citizens by country.



Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2011–2015.

Note: Vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals. Data weighted by age, gender, and education and country of residence. There are 171 naturalized citizens in Switzerland, 212 naturalized citizens in France, 82 naturalized citizens in Spain, 214 naturalized citizens in Germany, and 1079 naturalized in Canada.

Figure 3-2. Sense of civic duty among naturalized citizens by country.



Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2011–2015.

Note: Vertical lines show 95% confidence intervals, based on clustered standard errors. Data weighted by age, gender, and education and country of residence.

Figure 3-3. Voting intention and behavior of naturalized citizens, sense of civic duty.



Voting intention in upcoming election



Voting in recent election

Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2011–2015.

Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals, based on clustered standard errors

Figure 3-4. Predicted probabilities of sense of civic duty among naturalized citizens by the host country's CMP and MIPEX scores (observed values).



Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the equation used in Model 5 of Table 2. All other independent variables held at their mean.

Figure 3-5 Predicted probabilities of sense of civic duty among naturalized citizens.



Interaction between CMP and Attachment to Nation



Interaction between CMP and Satisfaction with Democracy



Interaction between CMP and MIPEX

Source: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2010-2015.

Note: The predicted probabilities of interaction between CMP and attachment is based on Model 2 in Table 3, between CMP and satisfaction is based on Model 3 in Table 3, and CMP and MIPEX is based on Model 3 in Table 4. The predictions are calculated using actual values of the covariates in the model, not their means.

4 A HOUSE IS NOT A HOME: THE EFFECTS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP ON VOTER PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL ELECTIONS AMONG NATURALIZED CITIZENS

Abstract

As immigrants constitute a growing portion of homeowners in the United States, the political integration via civic participation of these citizens in their communities has become a pressing issue for both policymakers and researchers. While the study of immigrant political behavior has documented the positive effects of homeownership on the civic engagement of immigrants, research exploring the actual mechanisms behind this relationship is scant. This article attempts to fill that gap by presenting two mechanisms that explain the political effects of homeownership. First, homeownership motivates citizens to build social capital in their communities through frequent interactions with their neighbors. Active social participation in the community not only foster an attachment between homeowners and their neighbors but also provide the resources that lead to political involvement at the local level. Second, homeowners, compared to renters, are less mobile and are therefore more conscious of the impact that local institutions have on their long-term financial and social interests. The awareness that local policies can directly affect home values, quality of education in public schools, and even the socio-demographics of the neighborhood may be sufficient for homeowners to turn out. I use data from the Current Population Survey Civic Engagement Supplement 2011 and 2013 to empirically test these claims.

4.1 Introduction

Homeownership is a bedrock of American society (McConnell and Marcelli 2007; Shlay 2006). It is one of the few issues in US politics that both the Democratic and Republican parties support. The importance of homeownership is so enduring that its promotion and expansion have been a ubiquitous feature of every United States (US) administration's economic policy since the 1920s (Collins 2007). While homeownership policies are invariably linked to the promotion of personal wealth and national economic growth, many politicians and policymakers do believe that homeownership serves as a symbolic pathway to a more active local citizenry (Vale 2007). The virtues of homeownership are often extolled in statements such as this one by President Obama, "…Buying a home has always been about more than owning a roof and four walls. It's about investing in savings and building a family, and planting roots in a community" (The White House 2015). The rationale is that owning one's house provides both the motive and the mean for individuals to engage in local politics since a home financially, physically, and emotionally anchors citizens to their community. Homeownership, therefore, leads to an increase in citizen participation and creates stronger communities.

This article does not dispute the premise that homeownership can act as a catalyst for political participation. Instead, it argues that the mechanisms that underpin the political effects of homeownership remain an Eastonian black box. It also contends that research on the political consequences of homeownership has neglected the possible differential impact that this variable may have across various citizen groups. Considering that immigrant homeownership rates are ever increasing (Kolomatsky 2018), it is essential that we understand the extent to which homeownership plays a role in the political participation, and subsequent integration, of immigrants in their communities. The current study seeks to contribute to our knowledge of homeownership by examining its impact on the voter frequency of naturalized citizens. For instance, Figure 1 tells us that naturalized citizens who are homeowners are more politically active in local politics than renters (the difference is significant at the 0.01 level).

This observation is unsurprising considering the ample research has shown that ownership incentivizes citizens to politically participate in their communities (McCabe 2013; Holian 2011; Dehring, Depken, and Ward 2008). However, we do not know what drives this phenomenon among naturalized citizens since previous works have broadly considered homeowners as an amorphous group (for an exception, see Mireles 2017). This paper addresses this gap by focusing on the following research question: *what are the mechanisms through which homeownership work to motivate turnout among naturalized citizens in their communities?* In doing so, this paper explores the fourth and final dimension of Martiniello's (2006) definition of political integration: political participation in the host society.[26]

[Figure 4-1 about here]

This article focuses solely on differences among naturalized citizens, and not between native and naturalized citizens, for two reasons. Firstly, naturalized citizens are an important but understudied group of homeowners in American society. Their ownership rate is comparable to that of native-born and almost twice as high as noncitizen (Trevelyan, Acosta, and Cruz 2013); they also account for 44% of the nearly 45 million immigrants living in the US (Gonzalez-Barrera 2017).[27] The second reason is that one of the primary goals of homeownership policies in the US is to erase the socio-political and financial differences between minorities and whites (The White House 2002; United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995). However, some scholars have warned that indiscriminate homeownership policies can be more detrimental to

[26] Martiniello's (2006) fourth dimension also includes mobilization and representation. However, this paper only focuses on political participation because it is mainly interested in how homeownership affects the political behaviors of immigrants.

[27] According to a 2011 brief on the homeownership rate among foreign-born population, the homeownership rate of naturalized-citizen households is 66% compared to 67% in native-born and 34% in noncitizen (Trevelyan, Acosta, and Cruz 2013).

particular socio-economic group than renting (Shlay 2006). It is therefore imperative for policymakers to understand what homeownership does for the political integration of naturalized citizens and *why*. This insight will enable policymakers to craft policies that are effective in achieving the goal of socio-political equality across citizen groups.

The data are drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Civic Engagement Supplement (CES) in 2011 and 2013. This paper considers two theoretical mechanisms for how homeownership work to induce turnout among naturalized citizens in local elections. First, homeownership motivates citizens to build social capital in their communities through frequent interactions with their neighbors. Active social participation in the community not only foster an attachment between homeowners and their neighbors but also provide the resources that lead to political involvement in the local level. Secondly, homeowners, compared to renters, are less mobile and are therefore more conscious of the impact that local institutions have on their long-term financial and social interests. The awareness that local policies can directly affect home values, quality of education in public schools, and even the socio-demographics of the neighborhood may be sufficient for homeowners to turnout. These two aspects of homeownership may provide naturalized homeowners with additional motivations, other than the fact that they own a house, to vote in their local elections.

4.2 Theoretical Arguments

This study draws on two distinct strands of research to build a conceptual framework for analyzing the impact of homeownership on naturalized citizens' decisions to turnout in local elections. The first tradition concerns the determinants of immigrant political integration into American society. The second pillar in this research examines the established positive effects of homeownership on political participation in the US. I then build upon these two bodies of literature to argue that there are two aspects of homeownership that influence voter participation: active social capital building and passive political awareness.

Determinants of Immigrant Political Integration

Political participation is the *sine qua non* of immigrant integration in American society (Bloemraad 2006). As such, the question of why some immigrants become active political participants, and others choose to be spectators goes to the heart of the literature on immigrant integration. Some scholars have sought to explain variation in the extent to which immigrants integrate into American society through political socialization theories. Dominated by three competing paradigms—resistance, exposure, and transferability—the literature on immigrant political socialization examines the impact of pre- and post-migration events on immigrants' political behaviors.

The resistance theory, which is grounded in classic political socialization literature, emphasizes the role of political experiences that occur during the formative years in shaping life-long political orientations (Sears and Funk 1999; Jennings 2002).[28] In terms of immigrants, research shows that the age of migration and country of origin is a significant predictor of voter turnout, with immigrant migrating later in life and those from repressive regimes being the least likely to vote (Bueker 2005; Wass et al. 2015). In contrast, the *exposure* theory offers optimistic expectations about the adaptability of migrants in the US. The exposure hypothesis suggests that the integration of immigrants depend on the amount of exposure they have had in the new context. On the one hand, exposure to the American democratic system and ideals is a byproduct of the years that an immigrant has lived in the U.S. In other words, the more years spent in the US, the more time immigrants have had to gain experiences with and adapt to the prevailing political attitudes and behaviors of American society (Wong 2000). On the other hand, exposure to the American political system can come from social interactions with people from different backgrounds. Labeled as bridging ties by Putnam (2000a), these relationships provide

[28] Unfortunately, there is not a clear definition of the formative year in the literature, in this paper I will use the definition by (Norris 2004), which sets the period from childhood to adolescence or 0-18 years.

immigrants access to ideas and information about the US politics that they otherwise might not encounter if they only associate with people from the same ethnic community. Finally, the *transferability* hypothesis contends that immigrants can utilize the political values and knowledge they acquired at the origin country in the host country (Black 1987; S. White et al. 2008; Wals 2011). Other scholars also found that early socialization does indeed influence how individuals behave in the new environment, but this effect is only complementary to the impact of the host country's institutional settings (M. Voicu and Rusu 2012).

Scholarship on immigrant political integration has also discussed the role that political contextual factors and political representation play in helping immigrants to integrate into their community politically. While early works on political contextual variables examined the variation in each state's political culture, recent research reveals that voter mobilization efforts by political organizations and by the availability of minority candidates are central to immigrant turnout (Boudreau, Elmendorf, and Mackenzie 2019; De Rooij 2012).[29] The discussion on immigrant political mobilization has traditionally centered on either immigrant encouraging each other to participate or issue-specific mobilization—mobilizing in response to anti-immigrant legislation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006). However, scholars have shown that mobilization by political entities outside of the immigrant community can further immigrant's mobilization efforts and lead to greater political engagement (DeSipio 2011; Bloemraad 2006). In addition to elite mobilization, research on ethnic politics tells us that minority candidates can mobilize the immigrant electorate because of the symbiosis between constituents and politicians. For the immigrant voters, minority candidates not only understand the political issues salient to their community but also reflect who they are ethnically and culturally (Barreto 2007; Leighley 2001). For

[29] Political culture refers to the sentiment on immigration and the historic voter turnout rate of each state (Jones-Correa 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001).

minority politicians, immigrant voters can change the results of the race in their favor (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005).

While the current literature provides great insight into the mechanisms through which political socialization and representation affect the voter participation of immigrants, we are unclear about the conditions under which homeownership politically benefit immigrants. The primary reason is that previous research has treated homeownership as a control variable—an indicator of high socioeconomic status. Although homeownership has been absent in the immigrant political integration literature, I argue in the section below that it makes a difference in the participation of immigrants and that there are two mechanisms through which it works to motivate turnout.

Homeownership and Political Participation

When answering the question "who participates in politics?" scholars have long pointed to homeowners as those have the resources and the motivation to be interested in local politics, be knowledgeable about the candidates, and be mobilized by parties (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Some scholars have emphasized the social impact of homeownership on voters' political behaviors. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that homeowners, compared to renters, are more politically active in their community for two main reasons: residential stability and social capital.[30] Their main point is that "while an owners' investment in social capital does not raise his resale value, his social capital investment raises his neighbors' resale value, and his neighbors' investment raises his resale value. Renters only receive benefits from their investments when they stay in their communities and when their investments are

[30] Their research defines social capital as "a connection to others which enables individuals to benefit from their neighbors' local amenity investment or to cooperate with their neighbors to improve local public goods (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999, 357–58). They argue that the efforts required to build a relationship with neighbors are distinct from local amenities, which are actions undertaken to improve the community (e.g., voting in local elections or gardening).

specific to them" (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999, 361). In essence, homeowners will invest the resources required to vote in local elections or to establish relationships with neighbors because they will reside in the community long enough to benefit from their actions. Recent research reinforces this finding by showing that community tenure and neighborhood social network are the mechanisms through which homeownership motivate individuals to participate in local politics (Rotolo, Wilson, and Hughes 2010; Kang and Kwak 2003; McCabe 2013).

Academic research has also focused specifically on the social effects of homeownership on the political participation of minority and low-income households. While early works find mixed support for the assumption that homeownership benefits everyone equally (Shlay 2006), other scholars show that homeownership has real advantages for certain minority groups. Using data from the Community Advantage Program (CAP), Manturuk, Lindblad, and Quercia (2010) used a treatment effects model to account for endogeneity when estimating the effects of homeownership on individual social capital among low- to moderate-income families.[31] They report that homeowners have higher individual and neighborhood social capital resources than renters, which in turn, promote greater social involvement within the community. A recent study by Mireles (2017) used data from the Washington State Farm Worker Survey to determine the impact of homeownership on immigrant social adaptation among farmworkers. The results show that homeownership has a positive influence on the social integration of immigrant farmworkers because they are more likely to report a higher sense of community efficacy, civic engagement, and participation in community activities. Broadly speaking, these studies suggest that homeownership can function as a pathway for immigrant political integration in their communities.

[31] They define social capital as the "connections within social networks and the resources exchanged via those connections" (Manturuk, Lindblad, and Quercia 2010, 471).

For another group of scholars, the economic incentive of maintaining the value of one's property is the main mechanism through which homeownership motivates participation in local politics (Goetz and Sidney 1994). Fischel (2001) coined the term "homevoter hypothesis" to explain the economic reasons behind voting-behavior differences between homeowner and renters. He suggests that unlike renters, the house is the most substantial portion of most homeowners' wealth; therefore, their involvement in local politics centers on the primary goal of promoting the property value in the community. Subsequent studies have built on Fischel's theory to show that homeowners are more active and more vocal in local decision-making because they need to safeguard their investments (Ahlfeldt and Maennig 2015; Jiang 2018).

In the section that follows, I outline my hypotheses for the three socio-political dimensions of naturalized citizens turnout: political socialization, political representation, and homeownership. Then, to answer the main research question of this paper, I delve into the two expected mechanisms that link homeownership with electoral participation.

Hypotheses

Beginning with the political socialization element of immigrant integration, we can expect that three variables would matter to how immigrants politically behave in the host country: the age at which the individual migrates, the origin country's regime, and the length of residency in the host country. The resistance theory tells us that those who migrate later in life may have difficulties adapting to the new context because they have become accustomed to the political culture of the origin country. In the same vein, immigrants who come from democratic countries can quickly adapt their political behaviors to that of the host country two reasons. They do not undergo a political culture shock upon arrival and bring with them political skills, such as knowledge of the electoral system, interest in political issues, and experience with voting. Regarding the exposure theory, we can presume that a longer length of tenure increases an individual's knowledge of the host country's political system and provides immigrants with the time necessary to have prolonged contact with

its political norms. I thus hypothesize the following regarding the three variables associated with political socialization theory:

Political Socialization H1: Naturalized citizens who are older at the age of migration are less likely to vote in local elections.

Political Socialization H2: Naturalized citizens who were socialized in a country with a democratic regime are more likely to vote in local elections.

Political Socialization H3: There is a positive relationship between the length of tenure in the US and turnout in local elections.

I contend the political representation—the supply of minority candidates—act as a mobilizing force for immigrant homeowners to turnout in their local elections. This hypothesis is based on the work of Barreto (2007) which argues that ethnic candidates mobilize immigrant voters by invoking a shared sense of ethnic attachment with the electorate and by running a campaign based on their social connections with the community. In respect to immigrant homeowners, minority politicians, through a campaign emphasizing their own immigrant experience, can provide an informational shortcut for these voters to pick a candidate that they believe will implement policies that promote not only their housing but also their social and political interests. Consistent with Barreto's (2007) work, I expect that:

Political Representation H4: Naturalized citizens are more likely to vote in local elections when ethnic candidates are present on the ballot.

Turning now to the main contribution of this paper—the political effects of homeownership and its mechanisms—I argue that being a homeowner makes a difference for the political integration of immigrants in their communities, even after we control for political socialization. The homeownership effect on voter participation with respect to naturalized citizens can be distinguished into several aspects. From a psychological perspective, homeownership in itself

can change immigrants' perception of their belongingness in the community vis-a-vis other residents. Since immigrants are often viewed as outsiders, ownership of a house provides naturalized citizens with both physical and social entry into the community. This elevation of their social status may encourage them to participate in local politics because they now have the same influence and power to effect change as others. I test this idea with the following hypothesis:

Homeownership H5: Homeownership increases voter participation in local elections among naturalized citizens.

From a social perspective, the homeownership effect on voter turnout may function through the social ties that homeowners actively build with their neighbors. These relationships (also known as bridging ties) are essential to immigrant homeowners' participation because it exposes them to information, either about homeowner rights or issues impacting their property values, otherwise might not be discussed among their co-ethnic peers (Putnam 1995). Additionally, immigrant homeowners may perceive their homes only as a financial investment that can increase in value—even without their political participation in local elections—since other homeowners will vote for the best policies for the real estate market of community. Bridging ties, however, can help immigrant homeowners become aware that homeownership is a political advantage since they are now part of the homeowner constituent—a group whose interests are prioritized by local politicians because of the property tax that goes to local government and of their reliable voter participation (Fischel 2001).

Alternatively, homeowners do not have to be active members of their community to turn out in local elections. Coined as the passive political awareness side of homeownership, I argue that homeownership could facilitate turnout through the understanding that local institutions and their policies directly affect all facets of owners' lives. Additionally, it is also important to note that homeowners are those that deliberately choose to live in their community for specific reasons—e.g., the quality of public schools, the property tax of the county, the availability of green space. One could argue that the awareness of the scope of the local government's

jurisdiction is sufficient to motivate homeowners to vote in local elections. Based on the arguments outlined above, I thus hypothesize the following about the active and the passive side of homeownership:

Homeownership H6: Frequency of socializing has a positive effect on voting in local elections, but this effect is stronger among homeowners than renters.

Homeownership H7: An increase in awareness of local governments' power is associated with an increase in voting in local elections, but this effect is stronger among homeowners than renters.

To test the two mechanisms of homeownership, I will run interactions between homeownership and frequency of socialization, as well as awareness of local governments' power. If the coefficients for both interaction terms are significant, then this means that the political effects of homeownership are stronger when the homeowners engage with their neighbors or when they are aware of the influence of local institutions. I will also run a three-way interaction between the variables. I expect that homeowners are not motivated either by active social building or by passive awareness of local governments' power. They most likely make their decisions to participate in local politics through a combination of those two factors. The real-world impact of this result would mean that it is not enough to just increase access to homeownership for immigrants. Rather, homeownership policies must be implemented in conjunction with community outreach programs to achieve to goal of full political integration for migrant and minority homeowners.

To gauge the impact of the political socialization, representation, and homeownership variables on voter turnout in local elections, I use the Current Population Survey Civic Engagement Supplement data from the state of California. In the next section, I describe the data and provide details on the measures employed in the statistical analysis.

4.3 Data and Methods

Data

This research uses the Civic Engagement Supplement of the Current Population Survey in 2011 and 2013 to test for the determinants of voter participation in local elections among naturalized citizens. The CPS is a monthly survey of households sponsored by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to collect information on the labor force statistics of the US' population. The CPS sample consists of about 60,000 occupied households that participate in the survey for four consecutive months, then exit the study for eight months, and finally return for another four months before ceasing to be a part of the sample permanently. The CPS sample areas were selected to measure demographic and labor force characteristics of residents 16 years of age and older. All sampling areas fall within the boundary of a state and are then divided into metropolitan areas and counties—the county is the lowest level of community identifiable. The CES is conducted in November of each year starting in 2008. It asks about respondents' involvement in civic activities in their communities and interaction with their family and friends. The questions asked in the CES is directed at respondents 18 years of age and older. I used the year 2011 and 2013 because they have all the questions relevant to my study. I retrieved the CPS CES data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) database from the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (Sarah Flood et al. 2017).

In addition to CES-CPS, I also used data from the American Community Survey (ACS), Voter's Edge California (previously Smart Voter), and Polity IV Project. I used data from the ACS five-year estimates (2009-2013) to gather information about the average socio-demographic characteristics of a county over the period that the Current Population Survey was conducted. I chose the ACS multiyear estimates rather than the single-year estimates that correspond with the 2011 and 2013 surveys because I wanted to capture the lagged effect of contextual factors. Voter's Edge California is a joint project by MapLight—a 501(c)(3) nonprofit

organization that tracks the influence of money in American politics—and the League of Women Voters of California Education Fund—a 501(c)(3) nonprofit educational organization. The website provides in-depth biographical information about political candidates. I used data from the Polity IV Project to calculate the origin country's democratic score.

Why California and Why Local Elections?

California is a compelling context for studying the determinants of immigrant homeowners' voter participation in local elections for several reasons. Firstly, the state's low homeownership rate (54.4% compared to the nation's 63.9% in 2017) and high median home value ($600,860 compared to the nation's $328,100) indicate that there are considerable barriers in achieving homeownership in California (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2018e, 2018a, 2018b; California Association of Realtors 2018). Therefore, immigrants who are homeowners in California should be the ones that are most likely to vote in local elections because they possess the characteristics that lead to self-selection into homeownership. Secondly, California has a higher than average percentage of the immigrant population—27.0% of California's population is foreign-born versus 13.2% in the US (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2018d, 2018c). Since studies have shown that areas with bigger populations of immigrants receive more mobilization resources by political organizations, immigrants in California should have a higher likelihood than those in other states to have had contact with the American political system and more inclined to participate in politics. Finally, studying voter participation within one state avoids some problems of unmeasured heterogeneity due to state-level differences in registration rules, in attitudes towards immigration, and the culture of political participation.

This research is specifically focused on local elections for two main reasons. As previously noted, home prices and property tax are more directly affected by changes in local than in federal policies. Thus, homeowners are motivated to either vote for local representatives or vote on local measures that can promote the financial values of the community. Secondly, uneven turnout in local elections has dire consequences on the ethnic and racial representation in local

governing bodies for immigrant groups such as Latinos and Asian Americans (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). Systemic political underrepresentation is a source of concern since politicians enact policies that serve their electorate; this consequently means that groups who do not vote will not have their interests met and their concerns addressed (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Measures

The dependent variable is the frequency of voter participation at the local level. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they 4 "always vote," 3 "sometimes vote," 2 "rarely vote," or 1 "never vote" in local elections, such as for mayor or a school board. Respondents can refuse to answer, not respond, or indicate "don't know." I recoded the frequency of voting into a dummy variable—1 if a person always or sometimes votes and 0 if rarely or never votes. I coded the refused to answer, no responses, and don't know as missing.[32]

This paper classified the independent variables into three categories: political socialization, political representation, and homeownership. The variables testing the impact of political socialization examine whether or not the origin country's political culture continues to affect immigrants' behaviors in a new context. The variable capturing political representation looks at how the political context of immigrants' residential areas can foster or impede their integration. Finally, the variables concerning the effect of homeownership assess whether it motivates turnout through social capital building or political awareness.

The variables that determine the role of political socialization in naturalized citizens' voting behavior are the age at migration in years, origin country's Polity IV score and years in the US. Age at migration tests the resistance theory and is operationalized using the variable "year of birth" subtracted from the variable "year of immigration." The practical implication is that naturalized citizens who migrate

[32] To test the robustness of my research, I kept voter frequency as an ordinal variable. The main findings did not change.

later in life should be less likely to vote than those who came at an earlier stage. I also test the resistance theory with the origin country's Polity IV score derived from the Polity IV data (Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers 2016). The original score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).[33] I recoded Polity IV as a dummy variable with 1 being democratic (a score of 6 to10) and 0 being non-democratic (5 to -10). The empirical expectation is that those who migrated from democratic countries are less likely to resist adopting the new country's political norms and are therefore more likely to vote. I test the exposure theory with the variable "years in the US." This variable serves as a proxy for an immigrant's acculturation experience in the U.S. I use the natural log of years in the U.S. because previous research has shown that changes from social learning occur mainly in the earlier period and decreases with additional time (Baltes, Staudinger, and Lindenberger 1999). The expectation is that the more years an individual has resided in the US, the more likely he or she is to participate in elections.

Political representation is measured as the supply of immigrant candidates in county elections. By election, by year, and by county, I first created a database of all the candidates that ran for seats in the county government. I then coded each candidate's immigrant background by using their biographical information from Voter's Edge California to the midterm election in 2010 and 2012 ("Directory of Counties in the State of California" 2010; "Directory of Counties in the State of California" 2012) or their website. The variable immigrant background is a dummy where 1 indicates that the candidates that mentioned their immigrant origin and a 0 means that

[33] If the respondent comes from a country that did not go through a regime change, then the variable is computed as the mean of the Polity IV scores from each year that the respondent spent in his or her origin country. If the respondent originates from a country that experienced a transition, then the variable is computed as a mean score of two socialization periods—one before and one after the transition. The Polity IV score from before the transition is calculated as the mean each year from birth to the year of transition. The Polity IV score from after the transition is calculated as the mean of each year from the year of transition to the year of immigration.

they did not. I then created a sum of all the immigrant candidates in each election and matched the data to each respondent's survey year. In total 776 candidates were running for seats—94 of which identified themselves as immigrants in their campaign materials—across 29 counties in both election years.

The effect of homeownership is captured using three variables: house tenure, frequency of socializing with neighbors, and confidence in local institutions. Respondents in CPS were asked about their tenure in their residence. They could indicate whether their residence is "owned or being bought," "rented for cash," or "occupied without payment of cash rent." I recoded the variable as a dummy: 1 if the respondent's residence is owned or being bought and 0 if it is rented for cash or occupied without payment of cash. I coded the "refused" and "don't know" responses as missing. The frequency of socializing with neighbors is measured using a question on how often the respondent socialize with neighbors in a typical month over 12 months. The question is coded as an ordinal variable with six categories: 1 "not at all," 2 "less than once a month," 3 "once a month," 4 "a few times a month," 5 "a few times a week" 6 "basically every day." I coded the "refused" and "don't know" responses as missing. I recoded the variable into a dummy: 1 for those who answered from "a few times a month" to "basically every day" and 0 for those who answered "not at all" to "once a month."

I use the variable "confidence in local institutions to do what is right" as a proxy for respondents' awareness of the influences that local governments have on their lives. Since there is not a question that directly measures the concept of awareness, I argue that the variable trust captures the same passive attitudes towards the role of government in one's life. This measurement reflects the one employed in van der Meer and Hakhverdian's (2017) recent study, in which the authors operationalized trust as confidence in political institutions and showed that this variable reflects citizens' evaluation

of political institutions' performances.[34] That is to say, each citizen recognizes that local institutions are responsible for some aspects of his or her life; and that he or she trust or do not trust those institutions to behave in their best interests. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they have 1 "a great deal of confidence," 2 "some confidence," 3 "hardly any confidence," and 4 "no confidence at all" in local institutions to do what is right. I recoded the variable into a dummy: 1 for those who answered a great deal of confidence and some confidence and 0 for those who responded hardly any confidence and no confidence at all.

I also include several demographic and contextual variables as controls. Demographically, I control for each respondent's age (in years), the square of age, female (0 male, 1 female), education level (0 without post-secondary education, 1 yes), married (0 others, 1 yes), number of own children in household (0-7), family income (4 categories). Regarding the contextual variable, I control for the ethnic residential concentration of the county. Research has shown that high ethnic residential density is particularly detrimental to immigrant homeowners' political participation because it depresses the social capital between immigrant and native homeowners (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006). I calculated ethnic residential concentration by dividing the total foreign-born population by the total population in a county. This calculation yielded a percentage of the foreign-born population in the county. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables considered in the analysis (see Appendix 4-I for variable construction).

[Table 4-1 about here]

Methods

[34] The authors operationalized political trust as satisfaction with democracy and confidence in political institutions (van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017). I opted not to include the variable satisfaction with democracy because this paper mainly aims to examine how evaluation of government affect homeowners' decisions to vote in local elections.

The estimation is binary logistic regression because of the nature of the dependent variable. All standard errors are clustered by counties to account for the interdependence among respondents living in the same county. Even though the structure of the data is hierarchal, I have decided not to run a multilevel model since my data does not fulfill the recommended sample size or the sample structure for a robust multilevel analysis.[35] All specifications were weighted using CPS final weight, which accounts for the state of the survey, origin, sex, age, and race. The full model specification is as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&voter\ turnout_i \\
&= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Age\ at\ Migration + \beta_2\ Origin\ Country's\ Polity\ IV + \beta_3 Years\ in\ US \\
&+ \beta_4 Supply\ of\ Immigrant\ Candidates + \beta_5 Homeownership \\
&+ \beta_6 Frequency\ of\ Socializing + \beta_5 Confidence\ in\ Local\ Institutions \\
&+ \beta_6 Homeownership\ x\ Frequency\ of\ Socializing \\
&+ \beta_7 Homeownership\ x\ Confidence\ in\ Local\ Institutions \\
&+ \beta_7 Homeownership\ x\ Frequency\ of\ Socializing\ x\ Confidence\ in\ Local\ Institutions + \varepsilon
\end{aligned}
$$

4.4 Results

I start by testing my hypotheses on the three socio-political dimensions: political socialization, political representation, and homeownership. The first model considers the three political socialization variables: age at migration, origin country's democratic regime, and years in the US. The second model accounts for only the impact of political representation. The third model tests the political effect of homeownership. The fourth model is an additive model of all three socio-political dimensions. The dependent variable across

[35] Some counties in my data have less than five observations, whereas the literature suggests at least 20 groups and 30 observations per group (Heck and Thomas 2000), or 30 groups and 30 observations per group (Hox 2002), or 50 groups and 30 observations per group (Maas and Hox 2004).

all models is the respondent's voting frequency in local elections. Table 2 presents the findings from the analysis.

[Table 4-2 about here]

In the first model, I tested the political socialization theories on voter participation in local elections. The results confirm the predicted relationship between age at migration and origin country's Polity IV score and voter turnout. We can see that age at migration has a negative effect ($p < 0.01$) and the origin country's Polity IV score has a positive but not significant effect. Age at migration remains significant at 0.01 level in Model 4. We find that the years in the U.S. has an unexpected significant negative relationship with voter turnout ($p < 0.05$); this significance remains in Model 4. The second model tested the effect of political representation on voter participation in local elections. We find that the number of immigrant candidates in an election does not have a significant predictor of voter turnout in local elections. This result should be interpreted with caution since 94 out of 776 candidates in the analysis were coded as having an immigrant background. Thus, most elections in the investigation did not have an immigrant candidate. In the third model, we see that the relationship between homeownership and turnout is positive and significant ($p < 0.05$). Homeownership remains significant in additive Model 4. This finding is consistent with previous work on the political benefits of homeownership among immigrants (Mireles 2017).

The results thus far clear support for the H1, the hypothesis that naturalized citizens who migrate at a later time in life are resistant to adapting to the new political context. The results yield no support for H2, the hypothesis that the origin country's political regime affects immigrant integration in the host country. The results are mixed for H3, the hypothesis that exposure to the political system through the more years spent in the U.S. will facilitate participation. We must reject H4, the hypothesis that the supply of immigrant candidates matters in naturalized citizen's voter turnout in local elections. There is support for H5, the hypothesis that homeownership has positive political effects for naturalized citizens.

Turning now to the primary aim of this paper, I estimated four models to test the mechanisms through which homeownership work to motivate turnout among naturalized citizens. I begin by adding the variable frequency of socializing with neighbors and confidence in local institutions into the additive model (Model 4) from Table 2. In doing so, Model 1 provides us with the main effects of homeownership and the mediator variables. We can see that all three variables (homeownership, frequency of socializing, and confidence in local institutions) are positive and significant. Homeownership is significant at the 0.05 level, frequency of socializing is at the 0.01 level, and confidence in local institutions is at the 0.01 level. Table 3 presents the findings from the analysis on the mechanisms of homeownership, and Figure 2 provides visuals of the effects of the three variables from Model 1.

[Table 4-3 about here]

[Figure 4-2 about here]

In the second model, I test whether the positive effect of homeownership on voter turnout is mediated through active social capital building. I do so by adding the variable interacting frequency of socializing with homeownership. We find that the interaction term is not significant. We also find homeownership changed from significant to insignificant, albeit its relationships to voter turnout remain positive. Frequency of socializing remains significant although its level changed from .01 in Model 1 to 0.10 in Model 2. It should be noted that the interaction term did not change the impact of confidence in local institutions. The variable remains statistically significant and positive at the 0.05 level. The third model replicates the logic of the second model but replaces socializing with neighbors with confidence in local institutions. We find that the main effects of the two variables and the interaction term are not significant. Similar to Model 2, the interaction term did not change the significance of the other mediator variable (frequency of socializing). Overall, these results indicate that the frequency of socializing and confidence in local institutions may capture some of the effects of homeownership. However, the insignificance of the interaction term means that each combination of those variables is a not sufficient condition for

motivating naturalized citizens to vote in local elections. While the results of the interactions are not as expected, it is difficult to interpret interaction terms based on statistical significance alone (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Figure 3 thus presents visualizations of the two interactions.

[Figure 4-3 about here]

We can observe a few things from the graphs in Figure 3. Regarding the interaction between homeownership and frequency of socializing, we can see that both renters and homeowners benefit from frequent socializing with neighbors. However, the effect of frequency of socializing, moving from not frequent to frequent, is slightly stronger for homeowners than it is for renters. We can observe from the graph that renters who do not socialize have a 38.3 percent probability of voting while renters who do frequently socialize have a 46.4 percent probability (the difference is 8.1 percent). Homeowners who do not socialize have a 41.5 percent probability of voting while those that do frequently socialize have a 55.3 percent probability (the difference is 13.8 percent). Additionally, we can observe that there is a minimal difference in the likelihood of voting between renters and owners who do not socialize with their neighbors. The big picture from these results is that homeownership may not necessarily make a difference in the voter participation of naturalized citizens in local elections if homeowners do not build their social capital in the community. Turning now to the relationship between homeownership and confidence in local institutions, we can observe an effect similar to that in the interaction between homeownership and frequency of socialization. However, there is a lower difference in the change in the probability of voting between renters and homeowners as they move from not confident in local institutions to confident. Renters and homeowners who are not confident in local institutions have a 42.1 percent probability and 47.0 percent probability of voting in local institutions, respectively. Looking at the ones who are confident in local institutions, renters have a 44.5 percent probability (difference of 2.4 percent compared to no confident), and homeowners have a 53.6 percent probability (difference of 6.6 percent compared to no confident) of voting.

Lastly, Model 4 tests how the frequency of socializing and confidence in local institutions moderate the political effects of homeownership. It does so through a three-way interaction between those variables. We can observe that the interaction is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. The interaction changed the relationship and significance of those three variables on voting. Compared to Model 1, homeownership and confidence in local institutions have now a negative and not significant relationship to voter turnout while the variable frequency of socializing changed from significant to not significant. To better understand and interpret the substantive impact of this interaction, Figure 4 presents the adjusted predictions of the interaction term on the probability of frequent voting in local elections. It is clear from Figure 4 that homeowners who are confident in local institutions and frequently socialize with their neighbors have the highest predicted probability of voting in elections (57.5 percent). On the other hand, renters who meet the optimal condition of being confident in local institutions and frequently socializing with their neighbors have a 49.4 percent predicted probability of voting. That predicted probability is only slightly higher than homeowners who are solely motivated by an awareness of local governments' influences (48.7 percent).

[Figure 4-4 about here]

To summarize, the findings from Table 3 provide mix support for Hypothesis 6 and 7. The results from Model 1 yield clear support for the expectation that an increase of frequency of socializing and of confidence in local institutions is positively related to voting in local elections. However, Model 2 and Model 3 does not provide statistical support for the hypothesis that the effects of those variables are stronger among homeowners than renters. Interestingly, the three-way interaction in Model 4 offers ample support for the expectation that the political consequences of homeownership are moderated by active social capital and passive political awareness. Because homeowners are influenced by both variables and not just one or the other, it makes sense that the three-way interaction term is significant while the two-way interaction terms are not.

4.5 Conclusion

The present paper aimed to examine the determinants of political participation in local elections among naturalized citizens. The study began by establishing which of the competing theories—political socialization, political representation, or homeownership—best explain how or when naturalized citizens politically integrate into their communities. This paper finds that age at migration, years in the US, and homeownership are the strongest predictors of frequent voter participation in local elections. While the effects of age at migration and years in the host country are well detailed in the immigrant integration literature (S. White et al. 2008; Wass et al. 2015; B. Voicu and Comșa 2014), very little is currently known about the political effects of homeownership on the immigrant population. Thus, this study set out to identify and examine the mechanisms through which homeownership influences political participation among naturalized citizens.

This paper has posited that homeownership facilitates immigrant political integration, as it relates to voter participation in two ways. The first is that homeownership motivates immigrants to build social capital in their residential community through frequent interactions with all of their neighbors and not only with people inside their ethnic community. This mechanism referred to the as active social capital building, not only foster neighborly bonds but also provide immigrants with the resources (knowledge about local issues, information about community meetings, etc.) that lead to participation in local politics. The second mechanism considered in this paper referred to as passive political awareness is based on the economic motivations outlined in Fischel's (2001) homevoter hypothesis. Homeowners are acutely aware that policies made by local government can directly affect home values. And since people naturally want to protect their investments, this awareness of the powers of local governments may be sufficient motivation for participation in local politics. The most important finding to emerge from this analysis is that active social capital and passive political awareness do not independently mediate the effect of homeownership on political participation. Instead, it is the interaction

between those two variables and homeownership that explains why homeowners participate at a higher rate than renters.

The findings from this study make several substantial contributions to both the current literature on immigrant integration and current policies of promoting homeownership among migrants and minorities. First, this study has raised important questions about the extent to which the traditional resource theory of participation can fully explain immigrants' political beliefs. While it is often assumed that political power derives from socioeconomic power, this study reveals that, *ceteris paribus*, homeowners vote only marginally more frequently in local elections than renters. Given the high risks of homeownership for minorities (Shlay 2006), scholars need to explore the conditions under which socioeconomic integration leads to political integration to provide better policy recommendations. Second, the insights gained from this study may be of assistance to policymakers as they aim to use homeownership as a vehicle for citizen engagement. More specifically, politicians need to bear in mind that the positive political effects of homeownership are amplified when homeowners are connected with their communities and are aware of the influences of local government. To that end, local governments can invest in outreach programs and services that connect citizens and inform them about the functions of government. Because the wealth of any local community is its active and engaged citizenry.

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Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variable					
Frequency of Voting in Local Elections (0 rarely, 1 always)	1488	.47	.49	0	1
Political Socialization					
Age at Migration	1488	24.95	13.91	0	82
Democratic Origin Country	1488	.12	.33	0	1
Years in U.S.	1488	26.57	12.25	1	64
Political Representation					
Supply Immigrant Candidates	1488	4.25	4.36	0	12
Homeownership					
Homeownership (0 rent, 1 own)	1488	.63	.48	0	1
Frequency of Socializing with Neighbors (0 not frequently, 1 frequently)	1488	.58	.49	0	1
Confidence in Local Institutions (0 not confident, 1 confident)	1488	.40	.49	0	1
Controls					
Age	1488	51.51	15.37	18	85
Age Square	1488	2890.47	1649.40	324	7225

Female (0 male, 1 female)	1488	.57	.49	0	1
Post-secondary Education	1488	.35	.47	0	1
Married (0 others, 1 married)	1488	.68	.46	0	1
Number of children	1488	1.00	1.14	0	7
Family income	1488	2.53	1.06	1	4
Percent Foreign Pop. in County	1488	.30	.06	.07	.37

Table 4-2. Binary logistic estimations of voting in local elections.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age at Migration	-0.046***			-0.046***
	(0.009)			(0.009)
Democratic Origin Country	0.254			0.265
	(0.190)			(0.190)
Years in US (log)	-0.399**			-0.400**
	(0.159)			(0.158)
No. Immigrant Candidates in Election		0.006		0.007
		(0.011)		(0.011)
Homeowners			0.307**	0.277**
			(0.123)	(0.135)
Controls				
Age	0.106***	0.063***	0.058***	0.101***
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Age Square	-0.001**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.159*	0.137	0.126	0.147
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.090)
Post-Secondary Education	0.557***	0.494***	0.494***	0.560***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.089)
Married	0.187	0.137	0.091	0.150
	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.142)
No. Children in Household	0.077	0.062	0.059	0.077
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Family Income	0.187***	0.215***	0.165**	0.148**

	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.066)
Percent Foreign Pop. in County	0.268	-0.103	0.238	0.125
	(0.814)	(0.849)	(0.699)	(0.874)
Constant	-	-	-	-
	2.759***	3.041***	2.980***	2.615***
	(0.741)	(0.653)	(0.685)	(0.756)
Observations	1488	1488	1488	1488
Pseudo $R2$	0.054	0.038	0.041	0.057

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance is shown at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All standard errors clustered by county. Model 1 tests political socialization, Model 2 political representation, Model 3 homeownership, and Model 4 is an additive model.

Table 4-3. Binary logistic estimations of the mechanisms of homeownership on voting in local elections.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Homeowners	0.287**	0.142	0.212	-0.048
	(0.134)	(0.212)	(0.155)	(0.190)
Frequently Socialize with Neighbors	0.511***	0.355*	0.509***	0.249
	(0.112)	(0.201)	(0.111)	(0.232)
Confident in Local Institutions	0.222***	0.221***	0.105	-0.043
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.122)	(0.179)
Homeowners # Frequently Socialize with Neighbors		0.240		
		(0.260)		
Homeowners # Confident in Local Institutions			0.183	
			(0.186)	
Homeowners # Frequently Socialize with Neighbors # Confident in Local Institutions				0.656**
				(0.319)
Controls				
Age at Migration	-0.043***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.044***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Democratic Origin Country	0.213	0.209	0.217	0.218
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.193)	(0.196)
Years in US (log)	-0.370**	-0.380**	-0.377**	-0.387**
	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.181)
No. Immigrant Candidates in Election	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.011

	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age	0.094***	0.095***	0.095***	0.095***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Age Square	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.153	0.155	0.153	0.157*
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Post-secondary education	0.538***	0.537***	0.539***	0.542***
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Married	0.173	0.175	0.171	0.173
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.141)
No. Children in Household	0.057	0.059	0.058	0.060
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Family Income	0.164**	0.166**	0.162**	0.160**
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Percent Foreign Pop. in County	0.043	0.045	0.049	0.135
	(0.832)	(0.818)	(0.825)	(0.825)
Constant	-2.956***	-2.851***	-2.884***	-2.735***
	(0.746)	(0.740)	(0.739)	(0.728)
Observations	1488	1488	1488	1488
Pseudo $R2$	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.072

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance is shown at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All standard errors clustered by county. Model 1 is the full-model specification (Model 4) from Table 2 plus frequency of socializing and confidence in local institutions. Model 2 tests interacts homeownership with frequency of socializing. Model 3 interacts homeownership with confidence in local institutions. Model 4 includes a three-way interaction between the homeownership, frequency of socializing, and confidence in local

Figure 4-1. Frequency of voting in local elections among naturalized citizens by house tenure.



Source: U.S. Census Bureau's Civic Engagement Supplement of the Current Population Survey 2011 and 2013.

Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals, based on clustered standard errors.

Figure 4-2. Adjusted predictions of house tenure, frequency of socializing with neighbors, confidence in local institutions on voting in local elections with 95% CIs.



Source: U.S. Census Bureau's Civic Engagement Supplement of the Current Population Survey 2011 and 2013.

Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the equation used in Model 1 of Table 3. All other independent variables held at their mean.

Figure 4-3. Adjusted predictions of interaction terms on voting in local elections with 95% CIs.



Homeownership # Frequency of Socializing with Neighbors



Homeownership # Confidence in Local Institutions

Source: U.S. Census Bureau's Civic Engagement Supplement of the Current Population Survey 2011 and 2013.

Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the equation used in Model 2 and 3 of Table 3. All other independent variables held at their mean.

Figure 4-4. Adjusted predictions of interaction between homeownership, frequency of socializing, and confidence in local institutions on voting in local elections with 95% CIs.



Source: U.S. Census Bureau's Civic Engagement Supplement of the Current Population Survey 2011 and 2013.

Note: The predicted probabilities are based on the equation used in Model 4 of Table 3. All other independent variables held at their mean.

5 CONCLUSION

This dissertation has aimed to examine why enfranchised, and high socioeconomic status immigrants integrate into their host countries' political life at different rates. While political scientists hold a steadfast belief that citizenship and socioeconomic success are the keys to immigrant political integration, few studies have investigated the political behavior and attitudes of immigrants once they gain legal and social power. Prior research has suggested that racial identity, democratic values, and social capital could matter for political behavior (McClain et al. 2009; Blais 2000; Putnam 1995), and that these could be of great importance for the immigrants (Boudreau, Elmendorf, and Mackenzie 2019; M. Voicu and Rusu 2012; Bevelander and Pendakur 2009). However, to-date, there is still a notable paucity of empirical research focusing specifically on the political behavior of immigrants who have attained social, legal, and economic equality in their host countries. To address this shortcoming, this dissertation examined the political integration outcomes of immigrants who have an elevated socioracial status in the host society, who have the citizenship of the host country, and who has ownership of a house. With a particular focus on contextual factors, this dissertation showed that political integration is not merely a byproduct of individuals' socioeconomic integration, but a reflection of the social and political opportunities that are afforded to them.

5.1 Filling the gaps in immigrant political integration literature

This dissertation made an original and important contribution to the immigrant political integration literature by establishing the mechanisms through which legal and socioeconomic power effectuate political power. To my knowledge, this thesis is a first attempt to empirically examine why normative expectations deriving from the resource model of political participation fail to materialize among immigrants. This dissertation found evidence that variation in the political integration outcomes of immigrants is due to the

environmental context as much as they are to individual choices. As the evidence suggested, immigrants' perceptions of inclusion or exclusion from the host society are the mechanism through which public policies or acquisition of resources facilitate political integration. Exploring both individual and contextual dimensions of immigrant integration, I found that immigrant political behavior is a function of how much immigrants believe that they are part of the ingroup or the outgroup—a perception based on their experiences with public institutions and people in their communities. In other words, emotional interests are as important as social or economic interests in motivating immigrants to integrate into their host societies politically.

This dissertation studied the political integration outcomes of immigrants in three chapters. The first chapter inquired into the conditions under which racial heritage becomes salient in the political decision-making process of voters with an immigrant background, i.e., those born outside the US and their US-born children. It found that racial heritage matters to the political calculus of minorities, even the ones who are told and are considered by whites to be an honorary member of their group. The following chapter examined the determinants of the sense of civic duty to participate in the host country's electoral politics among naturalized citizens. It found that civic duty is more prevalent among individuals who live in countries with strong policies designed to protect and promote the welfare of immigrants. The more positive political and social experiences that immigrants have in the host countries, they more likely they are to develop a sense of attachment to the country and to believe in the importance of its democratic institutions—two sentiments that have been shown to be vital to the sense of duty to vote (Blais 2000). The final chapter analyzed the mechanisms through which homeownership frequency of participation in local elections among immigrants. The paper particularly sought to explain the mechanisms through which homeownership drives political participation. The findings suggested that the homevoter hypothesis, which posits that homeowners vote to protect their financial interest (the house), does not hold across all groups of homeowners. The results showed that social capital incurred from strong neighborly ties with other

residents is what drives the positive effect of homeownership on voter turnout among immigrant homeowners.

In summary, the three chapters in this dissertation broaden our understanding of immigrant political integration and expand conventional political behavior theories that have departed from the assumption that social and economic power leads to political power. As understanding why some immigrants incorporate into host societies' political life and others remain on the fringes become an increasingly high social and political priority, the findings in this dissertation have important and wide-ranging implications for policymakers across Europe and North America.

5.2 Exploring the influence of racial heritage on immigrant political integration

The second chapter of this dissertation aimed to address the first dimension of Martiniello's (2006) definition of political integration: identification. This chapter specifically focused on racial identification and investigated the conditions under which a minority voter's racial heritage becomes salient in his or her political decision-making process. This article stemmed from the logic that if immigrants have a strong identification with the host society, then they should theoretically align their social and political interests with those of white voter—the political and racial majority in receiving countries. Hence, racial heritage should not be a primary determinant of political behavior among immigrants who strongly identify with the host country.

This chapter achieved the abovementioned objective by comparing the racial background of the preferred candidate of Asian and white voters in the US House of Representatives elections. Asian Americans are compared to whites because Asians' socioeconomic status is on par with that of whites and they are considered to be more socially proximal to whites on the US racial hierarchy than any other minority groups (DeNavas-Walt, Richardson, and Stringfellow 2010; Kim 1999). The hypotheses for this article were based on three strands of literature in political science. The first literature examined

how a candidate's race functions as an information heuristic for voters, the second analyzed the formation and political consequences of racial identity and group consciousness, and the third emphasized the importance of election-level variables in the candidate preference of voters. The findings indicated racial heritage matters to Asian voters but not in a manner that empowers theirs and other minorities' political power and representation. Consistent with previous findings on the effects of racial status on minorities' support for each other (Wodtke 2012; O'brien 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2004), results showed that Asian voters are significantly less likely than whites to prefer a Black/Latino candidate over a white one. This negative bias in Asian voters' preference against other minority candidates can be traced back to the insignificant effects of racial attitudes and racial consciousness on Asian voters. Asian voters, however, are found to be more likely than whites to prefer an option outside of the Republican or the Democratic candidate, even in a bi-racial election. Unfortunately, the motivations behind this preference are unclear. Further studies are therefore necessary to understand the political choices and calculus of Asian voters.

5.3 Examining the impact of civic duty on immigrant political integration

The next chapter aimed to explain the sources of civic duty to vote among naturalized citizens. It drew on immigrant political socialization literature and research on the roles of institutions to formulate the hypotheses. More specifically, the chapter investigated whether pre-migration experiences continue to determine naturalized citizens' political values, or that a host country's institutional-political contexts can facilitate immigrant adaption and adoption of the new society's political norms. Among the competing theories, the findings showed that age at migration and the inclusive nature of the institutional context in the host country are the strongest predictors. The results suggested that immigrant-friendly policies not only provide social and political pathways for immigrants to integrate but also foster a sense of attachment to the host country and a belief in its democratic institutions among immigrants. These sentiments are the

key mechanisms behind the policy effects on immigrants' sense of civic duty. This finding has important implications for how we approach the political integration of immigrants. While scholars have advocated, and justifiably so, for naturalization, less attention has been paid to the normative aspects of turnout that will motivate immigrants to implement their right to vote. Given that civic duty is one of the critical drivers of continuous turnout, it is crucial that naturalized citizens internalize this democratic norm to maintain their voice in government. As shown in this chapter, the espousal of civic norms among immigrants is as much about public policies as it is about personal actions.

5.4 Analyzing the effect of homeownership on immigrant political integration

The final chapter investigated the impact of homeownership on local political participation among naturalized citizens. While it is well established in the literature that homeownership is a positive determinant of political engagement, many studies on this topic have neglected the possibility that homeownership does not have the same emotional weight nor the same political impact across citizen groups. In other words, the idea that homeownership roots people to where they live and motivates individuals to engage in local politics to create stronger communities is a social value. Immigrants may not be familiar with this concept and may only view homeownership as a logically better choice than renting. Surprisingly, the relationship between homeownership and immigrant political behavior is seldom studied, and it is unclear to what extent of owning a home motivate immigrants to participate in local politics.

The article attempted to fill the existing gap in the research by presenting two theoretical mechanisms for how homeownership work to induce participation among naturalized citizens in local elections. On the one hand, homeownership motivates citizens to build social capital in their communities through frequent interactions with their neighbors. Active social participation in the community not connect individuals with their neighbors, but also

provide them with the resources that lead to participation in local politics. On the other hand, homeowners, compared to renters, are more conscious of the fact that local institutions often dictate their short- and long-term financial and social interests. Knowing that local policies can affect home values, quality of public education, and even the socio-demographics of the neighborhood may be the only motivation required for homeowners to turnout in local elections. The findings, using aggregate and individual-level data for counties across California, confirmed the active social participation hypothesis and provided no evidence for the latter hypothesis. The most important finding to emerged from this study was that active social capital and passive political awareness do not independently mediate the effect of homeownership on political participation. Instead, it is the interaction between those two variables and homeownership that explains why homeowners participate at a higher rate than renters. In line with the two previous chapters, the results suggested that emotional interests are significant predictors of immigrants' political participation and thereby represent an important contribution to the literature on immigrant political integration.

5.5 The limitations of the dissertation and future research

This dissertation is among the first to systematically assess the factors that shape enfranchised and socioeconomically empowered immigrants' decisions to participate in their host countries' political life. The results from the three chapters suggest that variation among immigrants' integration outcomes can be attributed to their emotional interests (or the lack thereof) in the wellbeing of their racial group, of the host country, and their community. The dissertation has also presented strong evidence of how intergroup racial dynamics, inclusion policies, and social capital are connected to political decisions. In doing so, this dissertation advanced our understanding of immigrants' political behavior by presenting evidence for why political integration does not always occur concurrently with legal and socioeconomic integration. However, this thesis has several limitations that must be acknowledged.

It is important to note that the findings in this dissertation only lay the groundwork for future research into the political outcomes of enfranchised and high SES immigrants. As those immigrants are often overlooked because of the assumption that their integration is already completed or is inevitable, further tests may be necessary to categorically determine if emotional interests cause political integration rather than vice versa. Additionally, new research is needed to assess the external validity of the results beyond the sample from the datasets. Nonetheless, I expect that future studies will reveal that sentiments about the host country and its society impact political behavior causally and that the inclusive nature of host countries' institutions can facilitate positive emotions is generalizable beyond the cases studied in this dissertation.

Another important limitation of this dissertation is that two out of the three chapters analyzed immigrant political integration within the context of the US. Although the US was chosen because of the socioeconomic success of its immigrants, the US stands apart from other countries in Europe and North America in terms of the length of its immigration history and the size of its immigrant population. However, findings from the US case can serve as a roadmap (or a cautionary tale) for new destination countries as their immigration population acquires more socioeconomic power and becomes more racially diverse.

Lastly, this dissertation has only begun to investigate the impact that place and context have on immigrant political integration. Although this dissertation does include contextual variables in the analyses, it has only considered them either the national or the local level and has failed to account for the effects of overlapping contexts. This means that we do not know about how welcoming settings at the national level and hostile contexts at the local level, or vice versa, interact to shape immigrants' emotional ties to the host country and subsequently how those sentiments determine rates of political integration. As is clear from the abovementioned limitations, there is ample room for further progress in immigrant political integration.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the literature on immigrant political integration is vast, the need to understand this topic is ever

growing, and the gap in our knowledge about immigrants' political behavior remains to be filled. In light of the increasing academic interests and the availability of new data on immigrant integration across different political contexts, future studies must continue to explore how emotions affect different dimensions of political integration and devote particular care to the role of public policies in this process. Further research into other political integration outcomes, such as the perception of political representation, election of immigrants to national and local legislatures, and non-electoral forms of political participation, is an essential next step in confirming the findings from this dissertation. It would be interesting to assess and compare the effects of political mobilization by co-minority or co-ethnic actors versus by white actors. Finally, it is suggested that future studies explore the potential consequences of race and ethnic relations on the political outcomes of specific immigrant groups.

The findings in this dissertation suggest several courses of actions for policymakers at the national and local level of government. First, I believe that political parties at the national level need to increase their investment in minority outreach and tailor their messages to each ethnic or racial group. Political parties need to seriously engage with issues that impact each group rather than make blanket statements that they think appeal to everyone (i.e., education, crime, taxes). This political strategy of micromarketing is useful for mobilizing immigrant voters and also for incorporating those voters into each political party's base. Second, I recommend that immigrants be given easy access to citizenship, social services, education systems, and other programs that would empower them to find social and economic success in the host country. While enfranchised and high SES immigrants may not always integrate politically into the host society, strong integration policies would promote a sense of inclusion and belongingness among immigrants. As is clear from the evidence, it is this perception of being part of the in-group that motivates immigrants to partake in the host country's political life. Finally, local governments can increase civic participation among their residents by making community programs and activities available and affordable, by prioritizing cultural diversity in the design of those programs, and by increasing access to information about community resources and issues. The easier it is for citizens to

connect with others and their community, the easier it is for them to engage in and to care about local politics. Of course, I acknowledge that these policy recommendations are not without their challenges. However, those challenges are worth confronting as the failure or success of immigrant political integration is consequential for not only the immigrants but also for the sustainably of democratic ideals and institutions.

APPENDIX

Appendix 2-A. Count of respondents and election racial and party matchup by state-district.

State	Dist.	Total	White	Asian	Racial Matchup	Party Matchup
Alabama	3	68	66	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	5	76	75	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Arizona	5	98	91	7	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Arkansas	2	90	89	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
California	5	68	63	5	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	6	62	47	15	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	88	80	8	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	8	53	51	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	9	37	35	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	13	51	39	12	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	14	102	55	47	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	16	33	31	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	21	20	19	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	22	37	34	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	24	75	71	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	27	72	33	39	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.

	28	75	68	7	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	31	35	31	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	32	25	17	8	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Dem.
	33	79	62	17	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	35	24	20	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	36	66	64	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	40	17	13	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Alt. Opt.
	41	40	34	6	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	42	56	53	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	46	31	19	12	A v. W	Dem. v. Dem.
	52	90	71	19	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Colorado	1	87	84	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Connecticut	3	102	101	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Delaware	1	165	162	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Florida	5	87	84	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	127	118	9	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	20	37	37	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	26	36	34	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Georgia	2	46	46	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	5	63	54	9	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	82	76	6	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Hawaii	2	48	30	18	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.

Idaho	1	146	146	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	2	92	91	1	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Illinois	1	68	63	5	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	62	52	10	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	8	106	97	9	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	18	105	104	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Indiana	2	122	122	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	99	96	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Maryland	4	41	38	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Massachusetts	4	107	104	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Michigan	11	93	87	6	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	13	51	49	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	14	48	44	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Minnesota	7	93	93	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Missouri	1	78	76	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	5	139	137	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Nevada	4	112	103	9	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
New Hampshire	2	145	138	7	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
New Jersey	8	37	31	6	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	9	64	61	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	12	109	89	20	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
New York	2	80	77	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.

	5	31	24	7	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	9	57	54	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Alt. Opt.
	15	13	12	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
North Carolina	4	116	104	12	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	9	71	69	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	12	73	67	6	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	13	111	110	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
North Dakota	1	105	104	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Ohio	3	119	117	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	11	76	74	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Oklahoma	2	75	74	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Pennsylvania	1	68	65	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	13	118	106	12	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	14	157	153	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
South Carolina	6	53	53	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Tennessee	3	103	102	1	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	8	76	75	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Texas	1	65	64	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	6	68	67	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	9	30	21	9	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	10	94	91	3	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	16	24	24	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Alt. Opt.

	20	54	53	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Alt. Opt.
	22	67	60	7	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	23	32	28	4	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	27	56	55	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	28	21	21	0	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	29	17	15	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	33	20	19	1	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Virginia	3	86	81	5	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
Washington	3	137	134	3	A v. W	Dem. v. Rep.
	7	118	112	6	A v. W	Dem. v. Dem.
Wisconsin	4	81	79	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Alt. Opt.
	5	121	119	2	B/L v. W	Dem. v. Rep.

Note: The columns show the count of the total, the white, and the Asian respondents in each congressional district. B/L stands for Black/Latino, W for white and A for Asian. Dem. is short for Democratic and Rep. for Republican.

Source: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Cooperative Congressional Elections Study.

Appendix 2-B. Candidate preference and vote choice by race.





Note: The data is unweighted.

Source: 2016 Cooperative Congressional Cooperative Congressional Elections Study.

Appendix 2-C. Variable Construction.

Respondent Race is a dummy variable. 1 for Asian and 0 for White.

Immigration Policy Index is based on each respondent's support for or opposition to four immigration policy proposals. Respondents were asked "what do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?" They could then select all policy proposals that they think should be applied. I chose the following four questions to capture respondents' views on policies that are linked to migration from Latin America: 1) identify and deport illegal immigrants; 2) grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school; 3) grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes; and 4) increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border.

Criminal Justice Policy Index is based on each respondent's support for or opposition to four criminal justice policy proposals. I selected the following four questions to encapsulate respondents' judgement of the criminal justice system: 1) eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders; 2) require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of their activities while on duty; 3) increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services; and 4) increase prison sentences for felons who have already committed two or more serious or violent crimes.

White Advantage is based on respondents' response to the following statement: White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 1 "strongly agree" to 5 "strongly disagree." I reversed the order of the scale for ease of interpretation in the statistical output.

Racial Problems in US is based on respondents' response to the following statement: Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 1 "strongly

agree" to 5 "strongly disagree." I reversed the order of the scale for ease of interpretation in the statistical output.

Candidate Ideological Divergence is the absolute value of the difference between the main candidates' Campaign Finance Score compiled by Bonica (2013) CFscores.

Margin of Victory is the difference between the percentage of votes that the winner and the second-place finisher received. This information was taken from Ballotpedia.

Campaign Spending Parity is the difference in campaign spending between the two candidates. This information was taken from the Federal Election Commission website.

Party identification is a categorical variable with 1 being "Democrat," 2 "Republican," and 3 "Independent or other parties."

Candidates' Race Awareness is a continuous variable indicating each respondent's knowledge of the main candidates' racial background. I established this variable by using two questions that asked respondents to identify the race/ethnicity of House candidate 1 and House candidate 2. I then compared respondents' answers to the data that I compiled on the candidates' race. I created a continuous variable that ranges from 0 (no correct answer) to 2 (both answers are correct).

Political interest is a continuous variable where 1 indicates that the individual "hardly at all" follow government and public affairs and 4 means "most of the time."

Family Income indicates the family's annual income of each respondent. The original CCES income variable comprises of 17 categories starting from less than $10,000 to $500,000 or more per year. I collapsed the categories into 3 groups, but treated family income as a continuous variable: 1 "less than $10,000 - $50,000," 2 "$50,000 - $100,000," and 3 "more than $100,000." Respondents who answered "prefer not to say" (9.93% of the sample) were coded as missing. I then used multiple imputation to generate predicted

values for these respondents. I created scatterplots to checked for linearity between family income and RPC (treating RPC as a continuous variable), as well as age and RPC. No linearities are present between the two independent variables and the dependent variable.

Education is a continuous one that ranges from 1 "No high school" to 6 "Post-grad" with each increasing category corresponding to more years of education.

Age is a continuous variable that was calculated by subtracting year of birth from the 2016 election year.

Gender is a dummy variable where 1 indicates female and 0 male.

Majority-Minority District is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the district is a majority-minority and 0 if not. Since majority-minority districts are areas where a racial minority is the dominant group, Asian and white voters living in those districts are more likely to have interracial encounters and therefore more likely to be influenced by race in their candidate preference. This information was taken from Ballotpedia

Party match-up is a categorical variable where 1 indicates that the contest was between a Democratic and a Republican, 2 means Democratic versus Democratic and 3 is Democratic versus an Alternative option.

Incumbent is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that one of the candidates is an incumbent and 0 means none of the candidates are incumbents.

Proportion of White is a continuous variable showing the population percentage of white living in the congressional district. This data came from the American Community Survey 2016 1-year estimates.

Proportion of Asian is a continuous variable showing the population percentage of Asian living in the congressional district. This data came from the American Community Survey 2016 1-year estimates.

Average household income is continuous variable indicating the average wealth of a congressional district. The data is originally measured in dollars, but I decided to use the log form since this variable varies widely across the country.

Trump Rally is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that Donald Trump held a rally in the congressional district and 0 indicates Trump did not held a rally there. I compiled the information about the location of Trump rallies from June 2015 – October 2016 through press coverage of Trump on C-Span and on mainstream media outlets. During this time period, Trump held 300+ rallies across the country. I recorded the zip code of each location and used www.ziplook.house.gov to find the congressional district that the location is in.

Appendix 2-D. Map of Trump Rallies.



Appendix 3-E. List of surveys.

Region	Country	Type of election	Time	N
Lucerne	Switzerland	National (Fed.)	Oct. 2011	33
Lucerne	Switzerland	Regional (Cantonal)	Apr. 2011	26
Zurich	Switzerland	National (Fed.)	Oct. 2011	47
Zurich	Switzerland	Regional	Apr. 2011	64
IDF	France	National	June 2012	42
Provence	France	National	June 2012	41
Paris	France	Municipal	March 2014	77
Marseille	France	Municipal	March 2014	52
Catalonia	Spain	National	Nov. 2011	18
Catalonia	Spain	Regional	Nov. 2012	33
Madrid	Spain	National	Nov. 2011	31
Madrid	Spain	Regional	May 2015	43
Lower Saxony	Germany	National	Sept. 2013	28
Lower Saxony	Germany	Regional	Jan. 2013	32
Bavaria	Germany	National	Sept. 2013	145
Bavaria	Germany	Regional	Sept. 2013	192
Ontario	Canada	National	Oct. 2015	370
Ontario	Canada	Regional	Oct. 2011	195
Quebec	Canada	National	Oct. 2015	138
Quebec	Canada	Regional	Sept. 2012	37
British Columbia	Canada	National	Oct. 2015	339
Total				1983

IDF: Île de France

Appendix 3-F. Variables construction.

Civic duty is a dummy variable where duty = 1 and 0 = choice or don't know. Respondents were asked "is voting a duty or a choice at the National level of government?"

Age at Migration is a continuous variable that indicates how old a respondent was when he or she arrived in the host country. It was created from "years in country" subtracted from the variable "age."

Origin Country's Polity IV is a continuous variable. It is each origin country's POLITY score from the Polity IV dataset, a mean score was computed for the years spent in the origin country. The POLITY index ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

Election's Official Turnout Rate is a continuous variable. It is the official voter turnout rate recorded in each election.

CMP Systemic Position on Immigration is a continuous variable. It is the mean of the host country's parties' positions on immigration was weighted by the percentage of vote that each party received in the national election. Immigration position was calculated from five categories in the Comparative Manifesto Project: multiculturalism positive (per607), multiculturalism negative (per608), underprivileged minority groups (per705), national way of live positive (per601), and law and order positive (per605).

Formula for each party's position:

$$Party\ position = \frac{(\text{per607} + \text{per705} - \text{per608} - \text{per601} - \text{per605})}{(\text{per607} + \text{per705} + \text{per608} + \text{per601} + \text{per605})}$$

Formula for all parties' position:

$$Systemic\ position\ on\ immigration = \frac{\sum(\text{party position} * \text{percentage of vote})}{\sum(\text{party position})}$$

MIPEX is a continuous variable that captures the host country's MIPEX score from the year prior to the respondent's survey year.

National attachment is a continuous variable. Respondents were asked to answer the following question: Using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means not attached at all and 10 means very strongly attached, how attached are you to the national level of government?

Satisfaction with democracy is a continuous variable. Respondents were asked to answer the following question: Using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means not satisfied at all and 10 means very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works at the national level of government?

Political participation activities variable is an index, ranging from 0 to 4, was constructed from the following four questions:

Answering 1 means yes and 2 means no, and 9 means don't know, during the last 12 months have you: A= contacted a government official, B= bought or boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, C= taken part in a public demonstration, D= signed a petition. "No" answers were recoded as 0 and "don't know" recoded as missing.

Age is year of birth subtracted from survey's election year.

Female is a dummy variable where males = 0 and females = 1.

Post-secondary education is a dummy variable where respondents who have a post-secondary education = 1, and those do not = 0.

Years in country is a continuous variable that was taken from this question: For how many years have you lived in "host" <country>? The natural logarithm of years to capture its non-linear effect.

Appendix 3-G. Logit models naturalized citizens' sense of civic duty excluding "don't knows" responses.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age at Migration	-0.004				-0.001
	(0.021)				(0.022)
Origin Country's Polity IV		0.017			0.027**
		(0.014)			(0.013)
Official Election Turnout			0.643		2.610*
			(0.912)		(1.503)
MIPEX				0.058***	0.045***
				(0.011)	(0.015)
CMP				-2.526***	-3.401***
				(0.715)	(0.697)
Controls					
Attachment to Host Nation	0.134**	0.141**	0.138**	0.121*	0.130**
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.064)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.013	0.008	0.013	0.020	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)

Political Participation Index	0.176	0.168	0.182	0.139	0.118
	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.111)
Age	-0.000	-0.002	-0.004	0.011	0.015
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Age Square	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.554***	-0.565***	-0.550***	-0.527***	-0.549***
	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.167)
Post-Secondary Education	0.368**	0.368**	0.347**	0.252	0.245
	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.167)
Years in Host Country Square	0.000	0.000*	0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.036	-1.062	-1.407	-5.612***	-6.980***
	(0.745)	(0.775)	(1.161)	(1.166)	(1.335)
Observations	1752	1752	1752	1752	1752
Pseudo R^2	0.051	0.053	0.051	0.066	0.073
Log Likelihood	-1402.125	-1399.136	-1401.253	-1378.946	-1369.073
Chi^2	63.670	77.461	64.765	107.208	114.433

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance is shown at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. "Don't know" responses are excluded. Model 1 tests the resistance theory; Model 2 the transference theory; Model 3 the exposure theory; Model 4 tests the host country's political-institutional context; and Model 5 is a full model. *Source*: Making Electoral Democracy Work, 2010-2015.

Appendix 4-H. California county observations and immigrant candidates.

County	Number of Observations	Immigrant Candidates 2010 Election	Immigrant Candidates 2012 Election
Alameda	102	3	1
Butte	4	0	0
El Dorado	1	0	0
Fresno	13	0	1
Imperial	17	7	1
Kern	18	0	3
Los Angeles	585	11	1
Madera	2	2	2
Merced	12	0	1
Monterey	8	2	4
Napa	2	0	0
Orange	104	6	3
Placer	13	0	0
Riverside	63	0	1
Sacramento	36	2	1
San Bernardino	64	2	1
San Diego	111	2	0
San Francisco	58	7	12
San Joaquin	9	2	1
San Luis Obispo	7	0	0
San Mateo	37	1	2
Santa Barbara	11	1	1
Santa Clara	110	1	3
Santa Cruz	4	0	1
Solano	15	1	0
Sonoma	11	0	1
Stanislaus	18	0	0
Ventura	48	0	0
Yolo	5	2	1
Total	1488	52	42

Appendix 4-I. Variable construction.

Voter Frequency is a dummy variable that indicates how often the respondent votes in local elections. Respondents who always or sometimes vote = 1 and those who rarely or never votes = 0. Respondents were provided with two examples of local elections: mayoral and school board.

Age at migration is a continuous variable. It is the value of the variable "year of birth" subtracted from the variable "year of immigration."

Democratic Origin Country is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the respondent is from a democratic country (Polity IV score of 6 to 10) and 0 if the respondent is from a non-democratic country (Polity IV score of -10 to 5). Polity IV project by Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers (2016) codes authority characteristics of states in the world system through the perspective that the qualities of democratic and autocratic institutions span on a spectrum. The regime of each country is given a score on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into three categories: "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).

If the respondent comes from a country that did not go through a regime change, then the variable is computed as the mean of the Polity IV scores from each year that the respondent spent in his or her origin country. If the respondent originates from a country that experienced a transition (for example, countries from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), then the variable is computed as a mean score of two socialization periods—one before and one after the transition. The Polity IV score from before the transition is calculated as the mean each year from birth to the year of transition. The Polity IV score from after the transition is calculated as the mean of each year from the year of transition to the year of immigration. This variable is intended to capture the respondent's experience with democratic values that are similar to that of the host country's norms. It is believed that respondents who were socialized under a political

regime with a Polity IV score closer to 10 are more likely to adopt the host country's values.

Years in the US is a continuous variable of the number of years the respondent has lived in the US. The natural logarithm of the variable is used to account for its non-linear effect.

Number of Immigrant Candidates is a continuous variable that accounts for the supply of candidates with immigrant background in each election.

Homeowners is a dummy variable where homeowner = 1 and renter = 0. The original variable categorizes the household in terms of the household's tenure in the residence. Households are identified as renting or owning. Renters are differentiated as paying in cash rent or not. Respondents were asked to indicate whether their residence is: 1 "owned or being bought," 2 "rented for cash," 3 "occupied without payment of cash rent." I dropped respondents who refused to answer or do not know the status of their residency.

Age is a continuous variable. It is the year of birth subtracted from survey's election year.

Female is a dummy variable where males = 0 and females = 1.

Post-secondary education is a dummy variable where respondents who have a post-secondary education = 1, and those do not = 0.

Number of Children in Household is a continues variable that indicates the number of children living with the respondent.

Family Income is categorical variable of respondents' family income. 1 is under $5,000 - $24,999, 2 is $25,000 - $49,999, 3 is $50,000 to $99,999, and 4 is $100,000 and over. I treated the variable as a continuous variable since the categories increase in a linear manner. The variable reports annual family income, in categories, of all persons living in the household who are 15 years of age or older.

Percent Foreign Population is a continuous variable that indicates the percentage of foreign-born population in each county. The data is from the American Community Survey five-year estimates (2009-2013). I chose the ACS multiyear estimates rather than the single-

year estimates that correspond with the 2011 and 2013 surveys because I wanted to capture the lagged effect of contextual factors.