Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

EU and India Foreign Policy Engagement in Global Security Governance – Compliance, Localisation and Contestation in Peace Operations

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Abstract

This article-based doctoral dissertation analyses the EU's and India's approach to global security governance through the prism of peace operations. Although approaches to peace operations and norms related to this endeavour have been studied in the past, the focus of the literature had been on discursive contestation in UN debates and has underexplored behavioural contestation, particularly at the level of practitioners both in the training of peacekeepers and in the missions. To fill this gap, the dissertation builds upon a nascent field in the literature, which has explored the possibility to combine the literature on norms with that of the practice theoretical turn. Moreover, the literature has overlooked the contribution of the Global South in shaping norms in peace operations. To address this shortcoming of the literature, the study offers an exploration into India's understanding of – and contribution to international norms and practices, hitherto underexplored. Overall, the dissertation is guided by two core research questions: What are the norms and practices India and the EU are supporting in peace operations? Why do the EU and India comply, localise, and contest existing norms and practices in peace operations and which form does this contestation take?

These research questions are answered in the three individual publications of the dissertation on training, local ownership, and gender mainstreaming. Building on data collected through semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis, the dissertation finds that the EU and India's approaches to peace operations are not as divergent as the literature has previously predicted. Moreover, that India has substantially contributed to normative debates in peace operations and has indeed acted as a norm entrepreneur. Finally, that to understand an actor's approach to peace operations, it is crucial to account for the implementation stage of international norms and practices at which the background knowledge of practitioners plays an important role.

In sum, the study informs our empirical understanding of the different approaches that actors bring to the table in their conduct of UN peace operations. This understanding is crucial for UN peace operations to remain an effective instrument of global security governance. Moreover, it informs our theoretical understanding of peace operations by introducing a conceptual framework combing the literature on norm compliance, localisation, contestation, and practice theory.

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List of acronyms

AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPTMS	Core pre-deployment materials
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUNPK	Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (Delhi)
EAPTC	European Association for Peace Operation Training Centres
EEAS	European External Action Service
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EC	European Commission
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/Vice- President of the European Commission
IAPTC	International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres
ICC	International Criminal Court
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB	New Development Bank
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

OECD-DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe UN- United Nations
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SBB	Sashastra Seema Bal (Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bhutan Border Police)
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPCAP	United Nations Peacekeeping Course for African Partners
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme
WPS	Women Peace and Security

Introduction

The United Nations has emerged as a central global security governance provider since it was first launched in 1945. One of the most readily recognisable trademarks of the international organisation's contribution to international security is its peace operations.[1] Although peacekeeping was not among the UN's originally foreseen tasks, the UN launched its first observer mission already in 1948. Ever since this first observer mission, the deployments of 'blue helmets' have proliferated; with more than 100,000 personnel in mission in various global conflict scenarios around the world today.[2] Today's operations are thereby much larger in scale than the early missions, fulfil an increasing number of mandate tasks, and are confronted with highly complex conflict scenarios. Given the many remaining intractable conflicts in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan, it is unlikely that the demand for these multidimensional operations will abate anytime soon.

Key to the UN's evolution as an actor in global security governance in the post-Cold War period has been the strong support from its member states. Testimony to this support is that most UN member states are involved in various ways in this endeavour, either through their provision of finances, troops, police, or specialised civilian personnel to UN peace operations. This makes peace operations one of the few globally organised instruments to sustain international peace. While the goal of restoring and upholding peace through UN peace operations has broad backing in the international community, the matter of *how* peace should

[1] If not specified otherwise, peace operations in this dissertation include both peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding see *section 1* of the dissertation. At times peace operations, will be subsumed under the broader term of conflict- or crisis management. Particularly in the EU parlance conflict- and crisis management are commonly used terminologies to express the integrated EU approach to conflicts, which includes a variety of tools, i.e. development assistance or peace operations

[2] For the current deployments of UN missions, see UN web site at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributons

be kept or built by UN peace operations is a matter of dispute in global institutions and among member states. The debates have primarily centred around the limits to a state's sovereignty, the importance of universal human rights, the foundations of stable peace, and the acceptable amount of force used in stabilising international conflicts (Barnett, 1995; Paris, 2000; 2003; 2014; Seaman, 2014; Williams and Bellamy, 2021). Moreover, there have been sustained international discussions about whether the traditional peacekeeping norms – impartiality, consent of the parties, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate – are still central to the conduct of today's peace operations, or if there is a need to focus on more expansive peace-operation tasks (Findlay, 2002; White, 2014). The latter argument has been connected with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and ideas of liberal peacebuilding (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010; Paris and Sisk, 2009). Another scholarly debate has evolved as a critique of the post-Cold War liberal peacebuilding agenda (Débrix, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Chandler, 2010; Paffenholz, 2015; Paris, 2003; Richmond, 2001; 2006). This literature raises doubts over the effectiveness and transformative power of liberal peacebuilding and points out the prescriptive and intrusive character of these interventions (Natorski, 2011; Richmond, 2001; 2006).

This doctoral dissertation wants to explore such debates by focusing on United Nations peace operations as areas of norm and practice compliance, localisation or contestation. The starting point for our research is a nascent field within the vast literature on peace operations, which has explored the possibility to fuse theoretical approximations on norms with that of practices (Bode and Karlsrud, 2019; Holmes, 2018; Laurence, 2019). Our argument is that norm compliance, localisation or contestation can be detected both at the discursive (in UN forums) as well as at the practice level (in UN pre-deployment training and deployment scenarios). Building on the existing literature, we hold that practice compliance, localisation or contestation can be linked to the normative level. For example, we find that norms play a role for peace operations practices as they are needed as a guiding framework to determine the conduct of

these interventions. As such, they enable personnel from different UN member states to work jointly in the mission scenario (Laurence, 2019). Simultaneously, these international normative frameworks are not linearly 'transferred' to the peacekeepers in pre-deployment training. On the contrary, in the socialisation process of peacekeepers, international norms compete with practitioners' background knowledge and pre-existing local normative understandings. Furthermore, upon deployment in the mission scenario, peacekeepers' everyday life is greatly influenced by the routines and practices which have developed among the previously deployed peacekeepers and other international actors present in the host country (Autessere, 2014). Hence, we believe a combined analysis of norms and practices is warranted.

Moreover, this doctoral dissertation aims to go beyond earlier explorations in the scholarly literature on peace operations. Most of the latter accounts have been concerned with the 'holy trinity' of traditional peacekeeping norms, in the sense of how they clash or are modified with the emergence of humanitarian imperatives connected to the liberal peacebuilding agenda.[3] For this reason, we have chosen three issue areas that have received comparatively less attention from scholars: training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming. These three areas are interlinked with, yet distinct from the debates on liberal peacebuilding. They are interlinked with the debates insofar as they all emerged with the shift towards liberal peacebuilding in the aftermath of the Cold War. They are distinct from the debates on liberal peacebuilding, as local ownership and gender mainstreaming debates are formulated as critiques of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. The literature on local ownership, for instance, has explicitly pointed out the failure of liberal peacebuilding to include local actors in the development of strategies for post-conflict reconstruction. Local ownership is even conceptualised as an 'alternative or supplementary mechanism' to liberal peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, Joshi and Lee, 2019). Moreover, these issue areas' stand-alone character is manifested

[3] See for instance Berdal and H Ucko, 2015; Findalay, 2002, Finnemore, 2003 on use-of force, Laurence, 2019; Rhoads 2016; 2019 on impartiality and Jose, 2018 on non-intervention

in their continuing importance and broad backing by the international community, while some of the original enthusiasm for liberal peacebuilding has faded (Richmond, 2009).

Finally, the analysis of UN peace operations in the scholarly literature has been dominated by insights from a Western standpoint. This doctoral dissertation will provide additional insights into the UN debates by adding the perspective of India. The two actors studied in the dissertation, the EU and India, are selected not only because of their importance as actors in peace operations more broadly but also because they portray themselves as influential advocates for norms and practices in the areas of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming (EEAS, 2018, October; Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Mac Ginty, 2018; Orchard, 2019; PMI, 2015, October). Our findings are significant because we will show that the EU and India have been portrayed as situated at opposing ends vis-à-vis the normative cleavages dividing the international community over the question of supporting human rights-focused norms versus those more strongly pivoting to sovereignty norms (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2007; Blah, 2017; Madhan-Mohan and Kurtz, 2014). The EU is considered to transcend the Westphalian approach and is strongly associated with the liberal peacebuilding agenda, whereas India is portrayed as following a classical Westphalian approach favouring traditional peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2021; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010; Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler, 2011). However, this is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence found through the research work of this dissertation. Instead, this dissertation finds both actors closer to each other in terms of norms and practices than the literature has acknowledged in the past.

The dissertation with its focus on EU and Indian contributions to global security governance, is guided by two core research questions: Firstly, the dissertation analyses what norms and practices the EU and India support in peace operations. Secondly, the study will assess why the EU and India comply, localise or contest international norms and practices in

peace operations and will elaborate on different types of contestations that can empirically be observed. The dissertation will argue that this will best be answered by combining literature on norm diffusion, localisation and contestation and practice theory. This enables the dissertation to discuss what norms the EU and India discursively embrace and how and whether the adherence to these norms is reflected in their practices. To answer these research questions, the dissertation draws on extensive fieldwork, two rounds in Delhi and one round in Brussels, during which semi-structured interviews and a participant observation were conducted.

The remaining introduction of this doctoral dissertation framework document is in what follows divided into four sections. It starts by locating peace operations within the broader field of security governance and explains when the subjects of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming entered global debates. This is followed by the dissertation's theoretical outline, discussing what the concepts of norms and practices can reveal about an actor's approach to peace operations. Subsequently, the aim and objectives of the research are stated, followed by a discussion of the methodology. Lastly, the content section introduces the EU's approach to peace operations and its position on the themes of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming. This is followed by a brief outline of the Indian approach, discussed in more detail in the three individual publications, thereafter, focusing on training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming.

Locating debates on training, local ownership, and gender mainstreaming in the history of peace operations

Setting the scene: peace operations in the larger frame of security governance

The idea that there is a need and a responsibility to respond to conflicts in a multilateral way led to the establishment of the global security governance regime at the end of the Second World War. Security governance is understood as the attempt to provide global goods, such as international peace and security, in the absence of a central authority (Kaldor and Rangelov,

2014; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). Instead, governance is provided through a networked set of authorities forming a regime based on norms, formal and informal agreements, processes and practices, and international organisations (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008). At the centre of this regime stands the United Nations, as the only globally organised security actor. Apart from the UN, there exist a number of regional security actors, such as the European Union, the African Union (AU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) providing security inside, and outside their regions (Krahmann, 2003). Moreover, individual states, such as the United States, China or India have acted as security providers in their respective regions and beyond (Krahmann, 2003; Medcalf, 2012).

As the foremost global security provider, the UN enshrined 'maintaining peace and security' as one of its founding principles in the UN Charter (see UN Charter, article 1). To that end, the UN is covering many different fields of global security governance, such as conflict management, arms regulation, non-proliferation, transnational organised crime and terrorism. Within the area of conflict management – the UN has developed a substantial arsenal of tools in the eighty years of its foundation, and some of the key instruments have become peacekeeping and, more recently, peacebuilding, which are sometimes clustered under the umbrella term of peace operations.[4] UN peace operations did not hail among the original activities foreseen by the United Nations in 1945 and were thus not explicitly mentioned in the Charter. However, when the international community was faced with the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, it was decided to send a mission to monitor peace based on the reading of two different articles of the Charter. The first set of actions is delineated as 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' falling under chapter VI of the UN Charter. These authorise the UN Security Council to call upon conflict parties to settle their dispute by peaceful means and allow it to

[4] For a detailed discussion on the terminology of peacekeeping, see Jett, 2020 p. 7-12

recommend methods of adjustment, as well as terms of conflict settlement. The tools include preventive diplomacy and mediation, special envoys, and political missions. The second set of actions allows the UN Security Council to mandate coercive measures to ensure peace. This section is delineated 'Actions with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression' and falls under chapter VII of the Charter. Actions include economic and diplomatic sanctions and as a last resort, military actions (UN Charter, chapter VI and VII). In practice, most peacekeeping operations fall in between the activities described by article VI and VII of the Charter. Given that peace operations fall neither under chapter VII nor VII, they are often referred to as 'Chapter VI and a half' (Peter, 2019).

Peace operations have become a key tool of the UN's conflict management efforts. The centrality of peace operations today is reflected in its great visibility with around 100,000 personnel currently deployed.[5] The significance of peace operations is also reflected in the broad backing for this endeavour by UN member states, the growth of demand for missions since the end of the Cold War and the relative ambitions of multidimensional operations, reflected in the significant number of tasks that fall within the responsibility of peacekeepers in war-torn countries (Oksaymtna and Karlsrud, 2020). This growing number of tasks has been accompanied by a lively discussion among the international community about what should be the scope and limits of the missions, the desired normative frames that should guide the endeavour and the most effective peacekeeping practices.

From peacekeeping to liberal peacebuilding: *en route* to transcending the liberal peace?

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, debates on global security governance have increasingly shifted from identifying the state as a referent object of threats towards acknowledging the violation and vulnerability of individual and community rights (Harman and

[5] For the current deployments of UN missions, see UN web site at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

Williams, 2013; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007). The idea of human security that became prominent in the UN in the 1990s goes beyond the idea of the absence of war and includes the political, economic, social and cultural, and environmental well-being of individuals (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). Thus, human security is not only about the 'freedom from fear', but also includes a 'freedom from want' (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007). In a conflict, this means that security of individuals or communities might be at risk even after military violence stops, as human rights violations, material consequences of conflicts, or displacement impact the population long after a military stabilisation. Rights related to human security are expressed in doctrines and human rights documents, as well as humanitarian, refugee and criminal laws. The Declaration of Universal Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 had been an early expression of the international community's aspiration to provide security to states and individuals. It postulates that individuals are inherently entitled to a set of rights, of which the right to physical security is only one right among others, such as, for example, the right to housing, food or water (Chandler and Hynek, 2011).

Two trends influenced the move towards a more inclusive definition of security. On the one hand, new actors, such as NGOs, multinational corporations, and intergovernmental organisations, have gained importance in an increasingly interdependent and globalised world (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008; Ruggie, 2004; Weiss, 2000; 2005). These actors are actively influencing the state's policy-making processes. On the other hand, the threats that have emerged, such as terrorism, climate change, pandemics, the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, financial and humanitarian crises, the persistence of poverty and the impact of migration are not confined within state borders but reveal transnational concerns which need multilateral responses (Karns, Mingst and Stiles, 2015, Rosenau, 1992). These trends have also impacted UN peace operations. As the number of actors in conflict scenarios has multiplied, peacekeepers were required to cooperate and coordinate their action more closely with these new actors.

Furthermore, peacekeepers are directly involved in responding to the newly emerging global threats, such as terrorism and pandemics.

While most states agree that these global problems require collective action, responding in a multilateral way to security challenges has proven much more difficult. The contours of what it means to maintain international peace and security have thus emerged and evolved through practices with a minimal framework of shared meaning and understanding of the norms that should guide this endeavour. The UN Charter itself provides a very vague normative framework, which leaves space for interpretation and stretching of norms and principles, as is later discussed regarding the peacekeeping and peacebuilding tools. The following subsection will outline the historical development of peace operations and highlight the critical turning points, which have shaped their evolution.

Traditional peacekeeping (1948-1988)

During the early years of peacekeeping, the confrontation between the Security Council members meant that they only authorised a small number of missions in places not affected by the superpower confrontation. Moreover, the missions which did get authorised were limited in their scope and focused foremost on the maintenance of ceasefires (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001; Usden and Juergenliemk, 2015). The Cold War period saw only 13 missions deployed from 1948-1987. Most of them were concentrated to the early parts of the period, as in later stages of the Cold War the UN was not able to mandate a single new mission (Autessere, 2019; Kertcher, 2012). The earliest UN missions consisted of unarmed or lightly armed military observers, tasked in monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles in situations of inter-state conflicts (United Nations, n.d.). The first two peacekeeping missions – the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in 1948 to monitor a ceasefire between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the UN mission to Kashmir in 1949 (UNMOGIP), both still in existence today – are classic examples of traditional observer missions.

A new stage in UN peace operations began, when the first armed peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was deployed in 1956 to secure and end the Suez Crisis, to supervise the cessation of hostilities, and the withdrawal of armed forces from Egypt. UNEF I is not only the first operation that officially was labelled 'peacekeeping' operation. It also helped to establish the defining normative framework for traditional peacekeeping: non-use of force except in self-defence, impartiality in regard to the different conflict parties and consent of the main conflict parties regarding the deployment of a peace operation (Jett, 2019; Oksamytna and Karlsrud, 2020).

In 1960, the UN reached another milestone in peace operations, when it launched its first large-scale mission: the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Apart from its size, the operation stands out in terms of its significant civilian component and the authorisation of substantial use of force, making it a peace-enforcement[6] rather than a peacekeeping mission. The interpretation of the UN's non-use of force norm had thus already been stretched in one of the first operations (Goulding, 1993).[7] The examples of UNEF I and ONUC show that during the Cold War, the UN was still able to occasionally mandate larger operations (Koops et al., 2015).

A characteristic feature of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War period was that the peacekeepers intervened in contexts where transitions from decolonisation to juridical sovereignty were underway. Moreover, conflicts were predominantly fought between states (Barnett, 1995). Following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations increasingly intervened in civil wars and intra-state conflicts. Here, the peacekeepers' task shifted towards

[6] Peace enforcement refers to mission, which are using force at the strategic level, where consent might be lacking among host authorities and/or main conflict parties ('Capstone Doctrine')

[7] For a detailed discussion of the non-use of force norm and its evolution in UN peacekeeping see Findlay, T. 2002. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations,* Oxford University Press.

helping a country from civil war towards sustainable peace upheld by a healthy civil society (Ibid.).

Multidimensional post-Cold War peace operations and evolving peacebuilding dimension (1988-1999)

The UN's peace operations would see a distinct upswing in the period shortly after the Cold War, when the rivalry between the USSR and the United States in the Security Council declined. Between April 1991 and October 1993, the UN launched 15 new peacekeeping operations, thus more than in the first 40 years of its existence (Autessere, 2019). The increased use of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool laid bare the necessity for a more robust institutional framework. For this reason, the report *An Agenda for Peace*, presented by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, assessed preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and made recommendations to increase their efficiency. In the field of preventive diplomacy, the Agenda recommends better early warning mechanisms and increased resort to fact-finding (para. 26, 27). Moreover, the Agenda advocates for a strengthened role of the International Court of Justice and underlines the need for peace enforcement units to enhance the UN's peacemaking capabilities (para. 38, 44). For peacekeeping, the agenda stresses the importance of providing national units with adequate equipment and highlights the increasing demand for UN peacekeeping personnel, particularly with non-military backgrounds (para. 47, 48, 53). Most importantly, the report introduced a fourth tool of crisis management: post-conflict peacebuilding (King and Mathews, 2012).

An Agenda for Peace defines peacebuilding as a tool to 'strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (para. 21) and further states that peacebuilding is thought to 'address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression' (para. 15). The report thus further shifted the focus towards the idea of human security and the need for positive peace (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Kaldor, Martin

and Selchow, 2007; King and Mathews, 2012). Three more points should be highlighted about the definition of peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace*. Firstly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali envisioned the responsibility for peacebuilding in the hands of the UN, rather than domestic actors (top-down). Secondly, he believed in establishing democratic structures and free-market economies (liberal peace) as the only effective way of peacebuilding. Finally, in its initial definition, peacebuilding was restricted to the post-conflict phase (King and Mathews, 2012).[8] *An Agenda for Peace* also fuelled the debate regarding human rights overturning traditional peacekeeping norms. Boutros Boutros-Ghali states in his report, that 'the time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed' (para. 17), meaning that the international community has the responsibility to intervene if states are unwilling or unable to protect their population and held that the use of force is essential for the UN's credibility once peaceful means have failed.

For peacekeepers deployed in often complex intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War, it meant that they were required to perform an increasing number of mandate tasks that went beyond the observation of ceasefire agreements. Traditional peacekeeping missions were thereby replaced by multidimensional endeavours (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; 2006). The new responsibilities of peacekeepers included a wide range of tasks, such as human rights and election monitoring, assisting in building sustainable institutions of governance, humanitarian assistance, disarmament and demobilisation tasks, reintegration of former combatants, supporting national reconciliation efforts, demining programs, the return of refugees and displaced persons or security sector reform (United Nations, n.d.). These tasks have in common that they aim to ensure long-term sustainable peace by strengthening the national capacities, i.e. a state's security sector. While most peacekeepers on the ground remained military personnel, the new mandate tasks set off by *An Agenda for Peace* also required for police

[8] In 1995 Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* moves away from his unequivocal support for liberal peacebuilding, stating, for instance, that the United Nations cannot 'impose a new political structure or new state institutions' (para.14)

officers, legal experts, or humanitarian workers (Jett, 2019). Moreover, the new peacebuilding agenda, demanded the UN peacekeepers to work in more close cooperation with other UN agencies, such as UNICEF, non-governmental organisations and regional organisations to coordinate their peacebuilding efforts in a comprehensive and integrated manner.

Given the significant number of additional skills needed for peacekeepers to fulfil the new mandate tasks, the UN progressively worked towards an adequate training structure (Fetherston, 1994; Curran, 2013). This process was initiated with the creation of a UN Lessons Learnt Unit in 1995. Over the last decades, the UN training architecture has substantially evolved, and the UN now provides standardised core pre-deployment materials on a wide range of topics, such as conflict-related and sexual violence, Child Protection, and Protection of Civilians among others (UNDPKO/DFS, 2017). The primary responsibility for the preparation of peacekeepers remains with the member states, which are conducting the pre-deployment training aimed at socialising peacekeepers into the relevant UN frameworks.

The initial enthusiasm for deploying highly ambitious peace operations to scenarios where the conflict had not ended, and no peace was there to be kept, led to peacekeeping operations' failures. In 1993 the UN lost a substantial number of peacekeepers from Pakistan and the United States in the UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II). A year later peacekeepers failed to protect civilians in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and in 1995, they were bystanders to the massacre in Srebrenica. These failures resulted in the UN to initially refrain from establishing further missions in the mid-to late 1990s. As the number of international conflicts increased, these setbacks were put aside, however. The UN went back to authorising new missions, including more robust chapter VII missions in East Timor, Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 1999.

Transcending liberal peacebuilding? (1999-today)

At the turn of the century, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested a comprehensive assessment of the UN's peace operation activities to strengthen the instrument. This request led to the 2000 *Brahimi Report.* The report identified the challenges of peace operations and the risks for peacekeepers arising from the lack of equipment and resources, as well as from unrealistic expectations of the UN exemplified in unachievable mandates. The report made specific recommendations aimed at a better integration of the three pillars of complex peacebuilding operations: the political pillar in the form of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the military pillar in the form of peacekeeping personnel and the humanitarian pillar in the form of specialised agencies such as the World Food Programme (Hatto, 2013). The UN moreover tried to adapt its institutional setup to the new challenges. It created a Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, an intergovernmental advisory body aimed at coordinating the peacebuilding efforts of the international community. Moreover, it established the Department for Field Support in 2007 tasked to ensure peacekeeping personnel's safety and maintain the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Finally, new peacekeeping norms were adopted in the first decade of the 2000s, all expressing the shift towards human or individual security. Examples are the formal adoption of a 'Protection of Civilians' norm with UN resolution 1265 in 1999 and the adoption of the 'Responsibility to Protect Norm (R2P)' in 2005 at the World Summit. These newer protection norms required the UN to adopt its normative frameworks towards a more pro-active use of force. The more pro-active use was granted in the 2008 Capstone doctrine (De Coning, Karlsrud and Aoi, 2017). This doctrine allows the use of force not only in self-defence but also to protect the mandate and at the tactical level to protect civilians.

While in principle, there is a shared understanding that changing conflict scenarios required the UN to move towards multidimensional peace operations and address conflicts in a more comprehensive way, there has been substantial contestation from both within the UN and

the scholarly community about the proper conduct of comprehensive crisis management. This contestation was fuelled by the negative track record of peacebuilding operations and the many challenges they continued to face. One of the major critiques raised by scholars in the early 1990s was that the UN's peacebuilding framework is embedded within a liberal normative framework, meaning that it is aimed at transforming post-conflict states into democratic market-economies (Débrix, 1999; Duffield, 2001; Paffenholz, 2015; Paris, 2003; Richmond, 2001, 2006). The scholarly community was joined in their critique by many UN member states, for whom liberal peacebuilding clashed with their firm adherence to the non-intervention norm, violated the sovereignty of the host state and was generally understood as a Western imposition of liberal templates (Chandler, 2010). The concern about disempowering local communities and insensitivity towards local context created the call for more 'local ownership' of peacebuilding activities.

Local ownership expresses the idea that international crisis management efforts need local input and knowledge to establish sustainable peace and gain more legitimacy and greater effectiveness (Ejdus and Juncos, 2018; Ejdus, 2017). Initially debated within the development cooperation field in the 1990s, the concept quickly entered the discussion of peace operations. Similarly, as with other international norms, there is no real consensus over local ownership's exact definition (Donais, 2009; Chesterman, 2007). Open questions remain regarding the implementation process of local ownership, the question of who has the authority to judge successful implementation and who should be regarded as 'the local' (Tartir and Ejdus, 2018). Nevertheless, local ownership as a norm is now widely accepted in the international community. The Global North has embraced the norm, as it had realised that its initial enthusiasm for exporting liberal market democracies after the end of the Cold War was met with substantial resistance in the local communities. The Global South has welcomed the norm of local ownership, as it is overlapping with its general concerns about overriding sovereignty and non-intervention norms (Klossek, 2020a).

Another parallel and, at times, overlapping debate is the discussion on gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming in the UN context entails the imperative to continuously assess policies, legislations, or decisions with regard to how they impact women and men. Moreover, to adjust policies, legislations, or decisions so that women and men 'benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated' (UN, 1997). The gender mainstreaming agenda was incorporated at UN level with the shift towards peacebuilding in the aftermath of *An Agenda for Peace* and as a response to the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which highlighted that women faced violence in war differently than men and were mostly absent from peace processes (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018). Initially the focus was predominantly on protection of women against cases of sexual- and gender-based violence (Barbé, 2016a). In 1993, for instance, sexual violence for the first time was recognised as an international war crime and prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Barbé, 2016b).

A more comprehensive acknowledgement of the gendered nature of conflict and violence and thus the different experience of conflict by men and women was achieved with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 on Women, Peace and Security (Väyrynen, 2010). The resolution and its nine follow-up resolutions for the field of peacekeeping and peacebuilding translated into the provision of gender focal points and gender advisor for the missions, encouraged gender training for all mission personnel, and led to the call for increasing the number of women in peace operations (True and Wiener, 2019). As with the discourse on local ownership, the scholarly community has only partially celebrated the UN and other international actors' attempts to incorporate gender into their conflict management efforts. Many voices have expressed that the UN's approach essentialises women as inherently peaceful and thus by default suitable for peace operations (Karim and Beardsley, 2017; Puechguirbal, 2010). Moreover, as the UN has associated women with the local, apolitical or informal spaces, women in the missions are given the tasks to interact with the local population, rather than being

involved in security tasks, such as patrolling (Klossek and Johansson-Nogués, 2021; Shephered, 2017).

The general assessment by the literature has been that while the international community has tried to include interventions such as the one made by the local ownership discourse or the one on gender mainstreaming, it has failed at large to implement these agendas more comprehensively in practice. Consequently, there remain many problems that stand in the way of transcending the current liberal peacebuilding framework (Von Billerbeck, 2016; Shephered, 2017). As a consequence of that, both challenges in terms of peacebuilding's legitimacy and effectiveness are not addressed and 'local ownership and 'gender mainstreaming' while being added to the debate translate into a simple 'add local' and 'add women' and stir approach. Moreover, while these are legitimate and needed debates, they add additional layers of complexity to the international community's peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Thus, after three decades of post-Cold War crisis management, peace operations and their underlying normative frames are today more contested than ever.

Given the ongoing contestation on debates such as training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming, they remain prominent themes in current UN discourses and recent UN documents on peace operations. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres's 2018 Action for Peace (A4P) reform agenda, for instance, includes a call for bolstering the training architecture, supports the strengthening of national ownership and capacity, and demands a more comprehensive implementation of gender mainstreaming (United Nations, 2018). The outcome of these debates – which are not only taking place at UN level, but also involve practitioners in the member states, as well as in the field deployments, and academics alike – will have a significant influence in shaping the future of peace operations.

Norms and practices in peace operations

This doctoral dissertation analyses European and Indian approaches to peace operations in the contexts of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming. Approach is understood in its two conceptualisations: as a specific way of *thinking about* something and as a particular way of *doing* something. On the one hand, the dissertation is interested in the way the EU and India think and express opinions about peace operations, and how they interpret the norms guiding the endeavour. On the other hand, the study observes how the ideas are practised and implemented by the EU and India in the mission scenario. Finally, the study analyses why the EU and India comply with international norms, localise or contest them and how this contestation materialises. The above-outlined research objectives contain several conceptual and theoretical assumptions. The most fundamental assumption is that actors can diverge in their approach to peace operations both in terms of their interpretation of norms, as well as their implementation practices. Thus, the dissertation presupposes that international norms, while seemingly having a global outreach, will have different localised understandings which at times prompts contestation. Furthermore, international actors have different options to react to international norms, ranging from complying, to localisation to contestation. The following section will illustrate these assumptions in detail. Firstly, norms will briefly be located within International Relations theory, with a special focus on the Constructivist school of thought. Thereafter, the concepts relevant for the dissertation's study of norms in peace operations – namely norm compliance, norm localisation and norm contestation – are outlined in detail. Finally, the concepts of practices and practice communities are introduced as complementary conceptual frameworks for observing an actor's approach to peace operations, with particular relevance at the implementation stage.

Norms in International Relations theory

Classical Realists like Morgenthau acknowledge the existence of norms but within the core assumptions of Realist theory, namely that actors on the international stage are rational and comply with norms to maximise their power, to defend national interests (e.g. economic wealth or military power) or to avoid sanctions (Jütersonke, 2010). With their premise that anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system, Neorealists give even less importance to norms. In the anarchic self-help system, states operate under constant insecurity and strive to maximise their material capabilities (Waltz, 1979). While sharing with Realism the assumption that states are interest-driven, Neoliberal Institutionalists differ on the point that they acknowledge that norms embedded in international organisations or regimes can alter a state's cost-benefit calculations (Keohane, 1984). Norms are thus intervening variables that can compel states to comply with international regimes, even if this might not give them a short-term advantage (Ibid.). In the English School's conceptualisation of international society, states with shared interests and common values form a society in which states are bound by a common set of rules and common institutions (Bull, 1977, 13). In this conceptualisation, order exists as an intersubjective agreement between states on the need to accept the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Among the English School scholars, a group of writers leaning more closely to a Solidarist conception of international society have gone beyond this minimum reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention norms. They argue that individual and human rights should be at the centre of international society, and consequently that states have a responsibility to protect human rights beyond their borders (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996). While the role of norms has thus been explored within many schools of International Relations theory, they became the centre of research, with the emergence of Constructivist scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s (Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1998; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992). Based on the notion that 'ideas matter' and that the social world is inherently constructed, Constructivist

scholars have studied the explanatory power, the nature, function, origin, and diffusion of norms.

The complexity of norms as a concept in International Relations has been reflected in the various attempts to define them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 2003; Panke and Petersohn, 2012). However, a common ground between Constructivist definitions of norms exists insofar as they acknowledge a dual function for international norms. Norms enable and constrain actors' behaviour by delineating what appropriate behaviour in a given situation is. Furthermore, norms are constitutive because they define categories of actors and actions and construct interests and identities (Checkel, 1997; Adler, 2002). Rather than following a 'logic of consequences' (a rational cost-benefit calculation) when deciding whether to comply with a norm, actors follow a 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 2013). According to the logic of appropriateness, compliance with international norms is a consequence of norms and rules being considered legitimate or natural, and rule-following is anchored in actors' identities (March, 1982).

From stable norms, linear diffusion and norm's inherently positive character towards their localised, contested and procedural form

Early enquiries into the topic of norms have focused on the way norms emerge and are diffused in the international system (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 2013). One of the most notable contributions to this first set of norm literature is the 'norm life cycle' model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), suggesting that norms travel through a life cycle from 'norm emergence' over 'norm cascade' to 'norm internalisation'. Other scholars studied the diffusion of human rights (Risse, Sikkink and Ropp, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) or norms limiting the use of weapons of mass destruction (Price, 1995; Tannenwald, 1999). These studies suggest non-coercive processes such as persuasion by the international community or social learning to encourage compliance with international

norms (Checkel, 2001). Furthermore, in these early explorations of norms, the structure of norms is understood as relatively stable, and their diffusion process was presented as a linear top-down process from the international to the domestic sphere, respectively from an original community of states which embraced the norm to the states outside the community (Risse, Sikkink and Ropp, 1999). The objective of these earlier works was thus to show how states are socialised into compliance with transnational norms (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). Following the premises of earlier Constructivist scholarship, scholars interested in peace operations have analysed how international norms are diffused from the UN level through the missions on the ground to local actors, which eventually comply with UN standards (Björkdahl, 2006; Seaman, 2014; Tryggestad, 2010). In this understanding of norm diffusion, peacekeepers were conceptualised as 'norm-followers par excellence', representing the UN's principles and values in their international deployments (Laurence, 2019, p. 3). Not only did they represent the UN norms, they were also able to replace local norms with international UN standards. Thus, peacekeepers ensured compliance with international norms among the local population.

The assumptions of norms being inherently positive, a harbinger of local progress, as well as being linearly diffused have been criticised on several accounts by many observers, even from within the Constructivist school of thought (Acharya, 2004; Bettiza and Lewis, 2020; Epstein et al. 2014; Wiener, 2010; Zarakol, 2014). Firstly, it has been pointed out that the idea of linear norm diffusion strips actors on the national and domestic level of their agency to contest or modify these norms. Here, Acharya (2004, p. 244) contributed to the debates with his idea of norm localisations, understood as '[c]omplex processes of reconstitution to make an outside norm congruent with a pre-existing local order'. This idea implies that local actors – rather than only having the decision over whether to comply or reject outside norms – can actively construct these norms through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection to fit the local context (Wolters, 1999). Many studies on peace operations have observed how local actors in host countries, in which peace operations are active, are not blindly adopting

international norms, but resist or localise them to make them fit local contexts (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Groß, 2015; Hellmüller, 2013). Moreover, it has been depicted how matches between international norms such as peaceful conflict resolution and pre-existing local norms can facilitate their localisation (Björkdahl, 2006). The importance of local actors and their resistance against internationally imposed norms and liberal peacebuilding templates has been a major concern of the 'local turn' in the peacekeeping literature (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Paris, 2002; Pfaffenholz, 2015).

In his later work, Acharya added to the idea of local agency in shaping international norms by introducing the idea of norm subsidiarity (Acharya, 2011a; 2014). By subsidiarity norms he refers to regional-specific interpretations of international meta-norms. These regional specific interpretations of norms emerge in response to a country's exclusion from global norm-making and are thus specific to peripheral actors (Acharya, 2011b; 2018). The concept of subsidiarity goes beyond localisation insofar, as it recognises the agency of local actors to not only adapt international norms to local contexts, but to export or universalise locally constructed norms (Acharya, 2011b). Acharya's work, therefore, points out the bias of only focusing on the diffusion of global norms portrayed as desirable and fitting for everyone (mostly liberal Western), as well as the flaws in depicting the Global North as norm entrepreneurs and the Global South as passive norm recipients (Acharya, 2004, 2014; Jose, 2018, Wiener, 2017). These biases are also at work in peacekeeping and peacebuilding scenario, where often the troop-contributing countries from the Global South have been presented as material, rather than ideational contributors in the field. Acharya himself has investigated the R2P norm, popularly depicted as a norm with a Western origin. His analysis has contributed to refining this story by pointing out how the norm has its origin in the 'responsible sovereignty' principle promoted by Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng in the field of internally displaced persons (Acharya, 2018). Moreover, Acharya has demonstrated how Brazil's attempt to modify the R2P norm into the 'Responsibility while protecting' principle, is an example of a process of norm subsidiary. In

this process, a weaker state introduces a modified international norm to prevent it from being dominated by a small group of actors (Acharya, 2014).

Apart from the idea of norm localisation and subsidiarity, a second discourse has evolved around the question, whether norms should be treated as stable and intersubjectively held (Krook and True, 2012; Wiener, 2004). Scholars have pointed out that rather than a stable nature – norms have a dual character: they are stable but always 'entail an inherently contested quality' (Wiener and Puetter, 2009, p.2). Put differently; they are 'contested by default' (Wiener, 2007, p.6). This idea recognises the possibility of a lack of intersubjective understanding over norms and therefore the logic of contestation (Wiener, 2007; 2010; 2014; Wiener and Puetter, 2009). The study objective then shifts from looking at moments when international actors comply with international norms through an intersubjective understanding of their meaning, towards elaborating on incidences where compliance is challenged. Contestation can thereby take place regarding the content of a specific norm, the validity of the norm or its applicability in a specific situation (Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020; Wolff and Zimmermann, 2016). Moreover, the literature on norm contestation has attempted to direct the focus to norm implementation at the individual level. While formal validity of norms is usually reached in closed negotiating settings (for instance the UN Security Council), it is argued that this does not apply for cultural validation for which '[i]ndividuals will resort to their respective culturally constituted 'normative baggage' (Wiener and Puetter, 2009, p. 6). The notion of cultural validation has received critique for its suggestions of a fixed cultural script that individuals conform to in the first place, which turns norm contestation into a form of inter-cultural contestation over norm meaning (Niemann and Schillinger, 2017). While the dissertation agrees with the critique, the problem seems primarily with the terminology. Wiener's understanding of cultural validation includes individual background experiences detached from narrowly defined cultural upbringings (Wiener, 2014b). In the dissertation, the term cultural validation or normative baggage is nevertheless avoided. Instead, as pointed out

in the next section, the understanding is that individuals when deciding over practice or norm-following fall back on knowledge gained through belonging to specific communities of practices (Wenger, 1998). The idea of norm contestation has contributed to the literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding by providing it with a framework to explain why actors understand and react differently to the normative frames guiding the endeavour (Contessi, 2010).

Finally, the dissertation draws on two more recent developments in the literature on norms. Firstly, it has been suggested that norms should be studied as part of broader 'norm clusters' or 'norm bundles', thus that norms are not operating in a vacuum but in broader normative frames (Epstein, 2013; Scott and Bloomfield, 2017; Winston, 2017). This perspective is relevant for studying contestation in the field of peace operations as actors must navigate the widening normative frames of the endeavour and negotiate between previously existing norms, such as the traditional peacekeeping norms and human rights-focused imperatives (Orchard, 2019). Furthermore, conceptualising norms as part of more complex norm assemblages is a valuable perspective, as it enables the researcher to disentangle the different ways actors engage with these norm regimes, localising parts of it while contesting others. An example is India's ambivalent approach to gender mainstreaming (Klossek and Johansson-Nogués, 2021).

Secondly, a need to focus more closely on non-discursive forms of contestation has been highlighted (Huelss, 2017; Stimmer and Wisken, 2019). Behavioural contestation plays a significant role in peace operations, as policymakers representing their member states at UN level often feel compelled to pay lip-service to international norms in order to maintain a positive international reputation, but later chose not to implement these norms (Contessi, 2010). Behavioural contestation can also play a role when actors feel that discursive forms of contestation have been exhausted without any positive outcome (Stimmer and Wisken, 2019).

In an interview with an Indian policymaker, the interviewee described how India had taken alternative routes to influence decision-making on peace operations at the UN level after discursive interventions had been ignored.[9] India's choice of 'silent contestation' (read: non-discursive) to preserve its role as a Global South donor in the debate on local ownership is another case in point (Klossek, 2020a). While in Stimmer and Wisken's (2019) reading, behavioural contestation is primarily used by policy actors at the state level, the dissertation proposes that even on the individual level behavioural contestation plays a critical role. This 'everyday resistance' might go unnoticed, as it will not impact the norm meaning and validity beyond the specific situation, but it is still showing the 'meaning in use' of international norms (Scott, 1985). The dissertation incorporates this understanding in its first article, where it reflects on the dispositions of peacekeeping trainers in the EU and India's peacekeeping training communities (Klossek, 2020b). The everyday resistance of individual actors also comes to the fore in the third article, which discusses how Indian female peacekeepers in the mission have to negotiate both domestic understandings of gender mainstreaming and international expectations emerging from the norm bundle (Klossek and Johansson-Nogués, 2021). Shifting the focus to this behavioural contestation on the micro-level, the dissertation draws on the concept of practice, which is introduced in the following section.

Implicit background knowledge and behavioural contestation – Insights from practice theory

Apart from norms, this doctoral dissertation draws on the concepts of practice and practice communities developed by a vast field in the social science literature interested in the study of social practices (Bicchi and Bremberg, 2016; Bueger and Gadinger, 2018). Practice theories share with norm compliance, norm localisation, and norm contestation literature their close link to the Constructivist scholarship (Adler, 2008; Bode, 2020; McCourt, 2016; Pouliot, 2007).

[9] Interview former representative of India to the UN, 3 April 2019

This sub-section does not aim to provide an outline of the plurality of practice theoretical approaches that have been developed but will limit itself to the aspects of practice theories relevant to the context of the dissertation.

As a starting point, a 'practice community' a concept introduced by Lave and Wenger, can be defined as a community with a shared domain of interest, a specific expertise and joint activities and shared experiences and practices within their community (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998, 2000). Practices can be understood as 'material patterns of action that are organised around common, implicit understandings of actors' (Neumann, 2002, 629). In the same vein as norms, practices are thus intersubjectively held among a group of actors (or the 'practice community'), which can judge over the practice's successful performance (Adler and Pouliot, 2011, 6). Given their 'socially meaningful' character, practices are different from actions such as bodily movements (Lechner and Frost, 2018). For the purpose of this study, two key points will be taken from the theoretical literature on practices: its focus on more implicit or non-reflective knowledge as compared to conscious deliberations over international norms, and its focus on 'acting and doing' as compared to the discursive focus of the norm literature, which correlates with a shift towards studying the implementation part of international norms at the micro-level (Bicchi and Bremberg, 2016; Bremberg, 2015; Stimmer and Wisken, 2019).

Firstly, practices rest on 'background knowledge' which is a more implicit or common-sense form of knowledge (Adler and Pouliot, 2011, 7). Background knowledge is non-reflexive and is enacted in doing and saying (Bueger, 2014, 2017; Pouliot, 2008). For instance, Bourdieu has argued that norms or rules can take the form of traditions, in which case the rule-following takes place for the sake of the rule itself, not necessarily because it is considered appropriate (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Practice approaches thus offer the idea that norms do not always emerge as a result of deliberative processes at the international level, but also through practices and implementation processes at the individual or micro-level (Bode and Huelss,

2018; Bode and Karlsrud, 2018; Solomon and Steele, 2017). This seems a fruitful reflection when looking at peace operations. As the previous section has shown, by no means did the early peacekeepers have a clear idea of the underlying normative framework in which they were operating and conducting these missions. They had to rely on whatever they had learnt in their respective previous lives as soldiers, civilians, or police. Hence, they obtained their background knowledge through membership in a specific practice community, i.e. the military (Sookemany, 2011). Furthermore, upon arrival in the mission scenario, they started to adapt to the other interveners' habits and routines in the mission environment (Autessere, 2014; Rhoads, 2016). Kaldor, Martin and Selchow (2007) found that practitioners articulated that they enacted 'human security' long before it entered UN debates. Similarly, interviews with peacekeepers conducted for this dissertation revealed that the importance of engaging the local population to achieve sustainable peace had already been a common practice in the missions before it was given a terminology through the local ownership discourse.[10] In these incidences, practices or habitual background knowledge preceded norms.

While today, normative frames have become more elaborate, and peacekeeping training has become standardised and encompasses a 'socialising process' of peacekeepers into UN norms, the dissertation argues that peacekeepers will still – at times – refer back to the scripts learnt in their practice communities, rather than engaging in reflective and deliberative processes over the appropriateness of international norms in a given incidence (Autessere, 2014; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2000). This applies particularly to incidences in the operations when peacekeepers are confronted with a threatening situation where there is no time to reflect upon the required reaction. Even in their daily routines and work it has been depicted how peacekeepers are driven by a set of interrelated practices, habits and narratives that shape their daily routines in the community of international interveners, i.e. to collect

[10] Interview with former member of the Indian army, deployed in Somalia 1992

information on violence primarily from other interveners and local elites (Autessere, 2014, p. 30). UN pre-deployment training, which is understood to 'socialise' peacekeepers into UN norms require the participants to become familiar with and to internalise a large number of new topics, such as legal frameworks of the mission, Security Council mandates, conflict-related sexual violence, child protection, among others within a limited period (United Nations, 2017). The internalisation of the practices of their respective practice communities, on the other hand, has stretched over their whole career. This is reflected in the assessment of the literature on peacekeeping, which has found that within peace operations, multiple communities with diverging cultures exist, such as the diplomatic, military, police, and civilian community (Duffey, 2000). Interviewees have reflected on these different professional cultures, stating that during their deployments 'the military would overlook the civilian aspects of peacekeeping, while civilians would only worry about their aspects.'[11]Apart from situations in which practices precede the existence of international norms as previously discussed, even if international norms do exist as guiding frames, peacekeepers might draw on their background knowledge. Peacekeepers' compliance, localisation, and contestation with transnational norms at the domestic or local levels thus depend not only on whether international norms match pre-existing local norms but also whether they fit with practitioners' background knowledge.

Secondly, the practice theoretical turn shifts our focus away from discourses to study what practitioners do in the field (Bremberg and Bicchi, 2016; Neumann, 2002; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017). This idea mirrors the intervention within the field of norm contestation literature, which states that it is crucial to study behavioural contestation, or as put by Stimmer and Wiskens (2019): 'actions are sometimes louder than words.' With this shift to behavioural contestation, the micro-level or level of the practitioners is given centrality. The practitioners' negotiation of international norms does not only involve abstract debates over their legitimacy

[11] Interview with former member of the Indian army, 28 December 2019

but a need to make norms fit with the practical reality in the missions during the implementation phase. An interviewee describes these practical constraints regarding the protection of civilian imperative:

> So, the question, as you know, when you talk about protection of civilians, what does it mean? […] there are 20.000, 50.000, people, what does protection mean? Does it mean physical protection? Put them in a camp and guard them? Can I put the whole country in a camp? No, certainly not.[12]

A popular sentiment among interviewees has been that UN diplomats' lack of understanding on-the-ground realities contributes to the gap between normative directives for missions and practical challenges peacekeepers face in their deployments.[13] While in principle, both norms and practices can be found at the macro- as well as the micro-level, there has been a tendency of the literature to study norms at the more institutional level, i.e. at UN level (macro), while practice theoretical contributions haven often focused on the level of practitioners (micro) (Laurence, 2019).

To sum up, the literature review presented above has already touched upon gaps in the study of peace operations, norms and practices. Two gaps in the literature will be stressed again, as these have greatly informed the study aim and objectives of the dissertation presented in the following section. Firstly, the normative frames of peace operations have raised the scholarly interest as depicted above, particularly with the shift towards liberal peacebuilding (Berdal and H Ucko, 2015; Björkdahl, 2011; Contessi, 2010). While the norm localisation and norm contestation literature had enabled scholars to reflect upon the meaning-in-use of international norms, their ambiguity and localised forms, the central focus has been on discursive contestation in UN debates (Stimmen and Wisken, 2019). Here, the dissertation raises doubts whether normative deliberations alone can explain an actor's approach to peace operations, and

[12] Interview with former member of the Indian army, 3rd January 2019
[13] Interview with former member of the Indian army, 7 December 2018

it engages with the idea that more implicit background knowledge should play a complementary role in the analysis. The dissertation contributes here to a nascent field in the literature, that has combined critical research on norms with concepts of the practice theoretical turn in International Relations theory (Bode and Karlsrud, 2018; Bourbeau, 2017; Holmes, 2019; Laurence, 2019). Apart from directing the interest towards implicit routinised knowledge driving practitioners, practice theory draws the scholarly attention to the implementation stage of international norms at the micro-level, which plays an important role in peace operations (Autessere, 2014; Bode and Karlsrud, 2018; Huelss, 2017).

Secondly, the literature on peace operations had the tendency to depict the Global South in the role of a receiver of international norms advanced in the Global North (Abdenur, 2019; Kenkel, 2010). This initial tendency of the literature has been partially shifted with the intervention of Acharya and others, to study more closely the contribution of the Global South in norm-making and it has been noted how norms in peace operations are localised and contested (Acharya, 2004; 2014; Coe, 2015; Jose, 2018; Roberts, 2018; Welsh and Rhoads, 2018). As the Global South is generally associated with a Westphalian approach to peacekeeping, thus strongly supporting sovereignty focused norms, case-studies have often depicted the contestation to be between the Global South emphasising sovereignty focused norms and opposing liberal and humanitarian-based norms versus the West embracing liberal peacebuilding. Consequently, the literature has dealt with how the Global South has shaped sovereignty focused norms such as non-intervention, however, much of the research has to date overlooked that the Global South has also shaped the liberal peacebuilding agenda and the norms associated with it (Brosig, 2019). Case studies on norms connected with the liberal peacebuilding agenda, such as local ownership or gender mainstreaming, have instead predominantly focused on Western actors, popularly associated with this agenda. Particularly

the EU's approach and implementation of gender mainstreaming and local ownership in its crisis management have drawn the scholarly interest.[14]

Aim and objectives of the doctoral dissertation

The aim of the doctoral dissertation is to place the EU and India in the discussion on global security governance by assessing their approaches to peace operations. Their approach is composed both of their ideas and interpretations of international norms and how these ideas are implemented and practised on the ground. How an actor ultimately understands peace operations is a multi-layered process of compliance, localisation and contestation of norms and practices. In this multi-layer process, international norms and practices do not just replace local norms or are replaced by other newly emerging norms, but international norms are adjusted to pre-existing local norms and background knowledge of practitioners. An actor's approach to peace operations is thus shaped by a combination of deliberations over international norms, as well as implicit and routinised background knowledge (Bueger, 2017; Laurence, 2019). Finally, within this multi-layer process, the meaning of norms itself is in constant flux.

The dissertation's aims and objectives are reflected in the two core questions of the dissertation.

> **RQ 1**: *What are the norms and practices the EU and India are supporting in peace operations?*
>
> **RQ 2**: *Why do the EU and India comply, localise or contest existing norms and practices in peace operations and which form does this contestation take?*

The first research question is concerned with the norms and practices that the EU and India are supporting in peace operations. The objective of this research question is to explore India's and the EU's normative understandings in global security governance. Thus, one objective of the

[14] See studies on gender and EU: Deiana and McDonagh, 2018; Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Guerrina, Chappel and Wright, 2018; Haarstrup, 2018, see studies on local ownership and the EU: Collantes-Cellador and Juncos, 2012; Ejdus, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2017, Oksamytna, 2011; Rayroux and Wilén, 2014).

dissertation is to map out the EU's and India's perception and understanding of norms in peace operations and how they fill these abstract entities with meaning. A second objective is to analyse whether the discursive support to UN norms does translate into implementing these norms in practice. Moreover, as it has been previously pointed out, practices in peace operations may precede norms. Hence it is crucial to include this concept in the research question. Our case studies are focused on three debates which have received relatively little attention in the literature on UN-lead peace operations: training, local ownership, and gender mainstreaming. These case studies were chosen not only based on the rich field of research they offer in terms of norms, but they also offer a different angle on peace operations compared to the principles of R2P or the traditional peacekeeping norms of impartiality, consent of the parties and non-use of force, which already have received ample scholarly attention. This dissertation defends that peace operations can be conceptualised as larger norm bundles. Our focus on the three sub-themes here allows us to 'unbundle' these larger normative cluster to reveal how they are interconnected and how they refer back to other parts of the norm bundle, such as traditional peacekeeping norms.

The second research question reveals our research objective to examine how and why the EU and India comply with, localise or contest existing norms and practices in peace operations. This question reflects upon the different ways an actor can react when confronted with international norms and practices. As the question indicates, the dissertation is interested in the processes of compliance, localisation and contestation. The dissertation understands compliance with international norms and practices in peace operations to take place when actors consider these norms or practices legitimate and start to internalise them. Norm localisation and thus, a modification of norms or practices will occur if practitioners' prior local understandings or background knowledge conflict with international norms or practices. A contestation of norms or practices takes place if the gap between the local understanding or background knowledge of practitioners and the international norm and practices is too far to bridge.

Furthermore, the dissertation understands different actors at different levels in the peace operation, i.e. policymakers, trainers, and peacekeepers, to have inconsistent access to contestation. This divergence helps to explain the choice of discursive over behavioural contestation and vice versa.

Finally, a core objective of the dissertation is to provide a multi-level analysis (international – state – local) of the peace operations process, to give a nuanced picture of the complex process of compliance, localisation and contestation. The multi-level analysis also accounts for the underexplored level of peacekeeping training. This level is significant for the peace operation process, given that training is the entry point for any peacekeeper to be confronted with standards, norms and principles, which their behaviour will later be judged upon in the mission (Flaspöler, 2016).

The following figure depicts the process of norm diffusion in peace operations at different levels in the process (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Norm diffusion, localisation and contestation in peace operations



The graph illustrates the process by which norms are implemented and diffused through UN peace operations. The dissertation in its three individual publications points out compliance, localisation and contestation, and a mismatch in background knowledge at different stages of this implementation process (arrows 1 and 2). These processes of localisation and contestation at the local, respectively state level can impact the international level (feedback loops) as indicated with the arrows 3 and 4 in the graph. The first publication discusses the divergence in training practices in the EU and India (state level). The divergence can thereby not be explained with differing norm understandings, as both training communities understand their training to comply with transnational norms. Instead, background or implicit understandings among the training communities are central to the construction of training structures. The second publication analyses how India is contesting the EU in UN debates on local ownership

(international level). Moreover, it assesses whether the contestation at international level is reflected in the peacebuilding practices of the EU and India. Finally, the third publication deals with the Indian localisation and contestation of the gender mainstreaming norm in the domestic security sector and what this means for the female peacekeepers at the local levels (local level). Feedback loops exist from the state level to the international and from the local level to the international level (arrows 3 and 4). For example, India's interpretation of gender mainstreaming has led to gender-segregated units in its domestic security sector. This preference for gender-segregated units has impacted the Indian deployments in peacekeeping missions, with India providing all-female police units and female engagement teams. The format of all-female police units has later been replicated, for instance by Bangladesh, representing an internationalisation of India's contestation of the norm bundle.

Methodology

The previous sections have presented the study's understanding of norms and practices and have established the key objectives of this dissertation. This section presents the dissertation's methodology. The dissertation follows the key ontological proposition of Constructivism, which suggests that the social world is comprised of values, practices, norms, and other intersubjective meanings (Reus-Smit, 2018). These social facts only exist because humans have agreed to share and follow these meanings. Thus, social relations are logically prior to the social phenomena itself, the latter which only exists through intersubjective understandings (relationalism). Peace operations as a socially co-constituted activity are possible through the existence of shared meanings, that is norms and practices, which actors previously agreed upon. Without an intersubjective agreement over these practices, they do not have any substance. Furthermore, peacekeepers internalise and act upon socially shared meanings of what it entails to be a 'blue helmet'. Their identity is thus established through

intersubjectively agreed upon structures. These structures are by no means fixed but can be altered at any moment, such is the case with inherently contested norms.

The core methodological assumption is that the social world is constructed through discourses and actions (Kratochwil, 2018). Studying social phenomena such as peace operations requires a combination of methods directed at capturing discourses and actions, such as document analysis and participant observation. In terms of data collection, the dissertation draws on interviews and observations made during three rounds of fieldwork, two in India from November 2018-February 2019, as well from January 2020-March 2020 and one secondment at the South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels from March 2019-July 2019 during which interviews with the European side were conducted. Moreover, desk-based research in the form of document-analysis. The following section briefly outlines methods and tools of data collection, which have been used in the individual contributions to the overall dissertation. The data-collection process has been a non-linear one, following the premise that knowledge production should be a reflective process.

Document analysis

Document analysis has been applied as the central method in all individual publications of the dissertation. It is understood as a systematic review and evaluation of documents directed by the research questions (Bowen, 2009). The type of document analysis conducted follows a qualitative approach informed by the dissertation's underlying interpretative and reflexive methodology. This means documents, such as speeches or policies, were read to uncover underlying meanings and to understand the context of these documents and the authors (Altheide et al., 2008). Reading and interpretation during the document analysis have been an iterative process (Bowen, 2009). An initial reading identified themes and discourses in which norms for peace operations are embedded and assessed whether these norms have any importance for the EU or India. Thereafter in additional rounds of reading it was established

whether themes are re-occurring in the discourses, thus expressing the theme's salience and how such themes reveal the speaker's perception of the same. The document analysis also paid attention to instances where the speaker is complying, localising and contesting the normative content expressed. The coding of the material has been conducted manually, and the context of the speaker or the document has been considered.

One of the most consulted sources are the UN Security Council and General Assembly speeches of the EU and India. These speeches are particularly valuable in detecting a government's positions on certain norms and practices in peace operations or on the relative importance of an issue. Moreover, UN speeches can reveal insights into a state's identity and how the state wants to be viewed by the international community (Hecht, 2016). For the purpose of this doctoral dissertation we studied the EU's and India's speeches for the time period 2011-2020. The starting year and posterior timeframe were chosen because of the fact that India served as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2011 and became actively involved in global discussion formats related to peace operations. Also, in 2011 the EU gained enhanced observer status with the UN, which gave it a platform to speak and elaborate on its position at the UN General Assembly (Johansson-Nogués, 2014). Finally, in 2011 debates on UN peace operations had been particularly fierce. This was caused by the first reference to the R2P principle in UNSC resolution 1973 authorising military intervention in Libiya (Barbé, 2013).

Beyond the EU and India's UN speeches, the dissertation has looked at a variety of additional documents. These include UN resolutions, UN policies regarding peace operations, and training manuals. Moreover, press releases, such as by the Ministry of Defence of India or the EU's External Action Service, policy documents and reports by the EU and finally, newspapers and other media sources. The table gives an overview of the data sources consulted for the individual publications (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Overview of analysed documents in individual publications

Publication 1: training	Publication 2: local ownership	Publication 3: gender mainstreaming
• UN speeches EU and India 2011-2019, keyword search 'peacekeeping training' • training manuals, training policies, annual reports of training institutes	• UN speeches EU and India 2011- 2019, keyword searches 'peacebuilding', 'peacekeeping' and 'local ownership' • other speeches dealing with the topic of local ownership and peacebuilding • policy documents on the EU's and India's peacebuilding strategies	• UN speeches EU and India 2011-2020, keyword searches 'women' + 'peacekeeping' 'female peacekeeper' 'gender' + 'peacekeeping' • other speeches dealing with the topic of gender and peace operations and gender and domestic security sector • UN resolutions, UN policies, reports on the status of women in the police/military in India

Data collection encompassed desk-based research, as well as three rounds of fieldwork. The desk-based data collection was focused on assessing online repositories, such as the UN's online library. Moreover, the websites of the EU and India's permanent missions to the UN have been consulted. Additionally, websites of government agencies have served as sources for data collection. A more detailed overview of the types of documents acquired was given in the previous section. Data collection during fieldwork took place in the form of observations and informal interviews during participant observation, as well as semi-structured interviews.

Participant observation

Participant observation as a data collection method is closely associated with ethnographic or sociological research (Jerolmack and Khan, 2017). It can broadly be defined as 'the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day routine or activities of participants in the research setting' (Schensul et al., 1999). In ethnography, participant observation usually involves long periods spent in the community observed. This has to do with the amount of time it takes for the researcher to be accepted in the observed community.

However, in cases where these obstacles of acceptance are not given, participant observations can also entail shorter observations (Knoblauch, 2005). In the case of this dissertation, the observation encompassed the duration of a one-week *United Nations military contingent officers' course (UNMCOC-18)* at the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in Delhi, as well as a one-day workshop titled *International workshop on integrated protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations* organised by the CUNPK and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Apart from not encountering obstacles in terms of acceptance by training attendees, the timeframe of the participant observation reflects the length of the training course.

Following the distinction of Gold (1958), in these interactions the researcher had the role of 'participant as an observer'. This means that all the course participants had been aware of the research activity, but the researcher did not actively participate in the course. Data collection during the participant observation involved the taking of field notes. These field notes included information about attendees, such as their gender or age, a detailed description of the activities observed, including the participants' roles in these activities, and notes about the setting of the observation. Field notes also included reflections on the observed activities. Furthermore, the participant observation provided the opportunity to interact with the participants informally. These informal interactions revealed insights into the peacekeeper's positions regarding a wide range of topics, such as the importance to increase the number of women in peacekeeping. Given that the participant observation was conducted relatively early into the research process (at the end of the first year), it gave a preliminary insight into how peacekeeping training is organised, which topics are prioritised and how and whether norms matter in the pre-deployment training (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). The observations then triggered the original research question's modification and broadened the conceptual framework by including the concept of 'background knowledge' as an important driver of peacekeeping actors. Finally, the participant observation was an opportunity to establish contacts for interviews and to generate interview questions. To gain access to the 'field' had been a long and complicated process, as

an observation of military activities requires the approval of India's military intelligence bureau.

Interviews

Semi-structured interviews had been used both in their exploratory, as well as their systematising function (Bogner et al., 2009). An early round of interviews served as an initial orientation in the field (exploratory function). At a later stage, interviews were used to complete the data gaps found by assessing the secondary literature, available documents, and evaluating earlier interview and participant observation material. This systematising function of interviews aims at a more comprehensive collection of data (Döring, 2020). Approaching interviews in a semi-structured way, meant that a topic guide was used to structure the interviews, but interviews remained flexible in accommodating other subjects the interviewees deemed relevant. Thematically, interview questions covered a wide array of topics that implicitly and at times explicitly touched upon the questions of norms and practices in peace operations. They included – among others – the interpretation of peacekeepers and trainers of specific norms, i.e. *what is your understanding of impartiality and non-intervention*, questions directed at assessing their role as UN peacekeepers, i.e. *what is your main task as UN peacekeepers?* or the difference they felt between their former role in the military, as compared to their requirements as peacekeepers. As non-verbal clues in an interview have been deemed relevant, interviews have been conducted in-person, as far as this was possible. A few interviews were conducted via skype. Moreover, the context of interviewees has been taking into consideration in the analysis (Creswell, 2007; Mikecz, 2012). On average interviews lasted around one and a half hours, and they ended with an open-ended question to see if interviewees had to add any information or wanted to add themes that might have been overlooked. Towards the end of the interview, the interviewees often recommended additional contacts (snow-balling method) (Mikecz, 2012). In case of consent by the interviewee, interviews have been recorded and transcribed using a

transcription software (https://transcribe.wreally.com). The data was stored in strict compliance with EU and the UAB Doctoral School's guidelines for data protection (for more see the section on ethical principles below). In total 39 semi-structured interviews were conducted for this dissertation. A list of anonymised interviewees, including their professional background and gender can be found in the annex.

Ethical principles

All interaction with informants in the research was based on participants' informed consent (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017). Prior to any interaction, the researcher explained to the participant the objective of the research and the implications of participating in the interview or activity observed. This included information on the researcher, as well as the intent of the research. Moreover, the participant was ensured that s/he can withdraw at any time during, as well as after the interview. The respondents' privacy and anonymity have been ensured in all the article contributions, and names were not stated. Furthermore, it was ensured that there is no possibility to trace back the name or identity of an interviewee by only using quotes and information, which cannot be associated with a specific person.

Data storage of research observations, field notes, interview transcripts and all other collected material are kept to ensure the traceability of findings. This includes all the preliminary, negative, unexpected, or discordant results. Any personal information and data are stored securely. Hard copies are stored in a secure place only accessible to the researcher. Computer files that contain personal data, i.e. names of interviewees, are encrypted or password protected. Anonymised computer files are not necessarily encrypted, or password-protected, but still stored safely. The data storage policy follows the 'Code of Good Practices' by the Doctoral School UAB.[15] Prior to the fieldwork, the research project had also been approved by

[15] https://www.uab.cat/doc/Bones-Practiques-Recerca-en

an external ethical commission of the European Union. This is a standard procedure for any EU funded research, and all activities carried out under Horizon 2020 must comply with ethical principles and relevant EU and international legislation, i.e. the European Convention on Human Rights (European Commission, n.d.- a).

Conclusion

The different methods of data collection described in the methodology section are interacting with each other in the dissertation project. For instance, through document analysis of UN speeches, new interview questions were developed. Apart from the above-named tools for data collection, the dissertation is based on an in-depth study of secondary literature in the field of global security governance, peace operations, norms and practices and EU and India's foreign policy. In this way, different data sources were always compared to minimise the bias of individual sources and 'anecdotalism' (Silverman, 2010). Through this collection of 'bits and pieces of evidence to formulate a compelling whole' internal validity of the project was ensured (Creswell, 2007).

Content

The two core research questions guiding the study, which have been established in the previous sections, will be answered in the following sub-sections. The first sub-section provides a brief overview of the history and approach of the EU and India to peace operations. This overview serves as an outline for the three individual publications that are presented thereafter. Moreover, while also covering the EU's understanding, the three individual publications give more weight to the Indian approach. Therefore, the first sub-section also serves as a space to analyse in detail the EU's history as an actor in crisis management and its approach to peace operations, particularly its interpretations of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming.

The table below depicts to what extent each research question is covered in the individual publications (Table 1.2). The individual publications thereby each touch upon parts of the core research questions; nevertheless, they can also be read in isolation. The common thread of all publications is to understand the European and Indian approach to global security governance through the study of peace operations.

Table 1.2 Coverage of research questions in individual publications

Article Title	RQ 1	RQ 2
A – 'Training for peace' – a universal practice? How micro-processes are impacting the likelihood of an EU-India cooperation in peacekeeping	◑	◑
B – India's silent contestation' of the EU's perspective on local ownership	●	●
C - The 'female boot on the ground': Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations	◑	◑

Legend
RQ 1: What are the norms and practices the EU and India are supporting in peace operations?

RQ 2: Why do the EU and India comply, localise or contest existing norms and practices in peace operations and which form does this contestation take?

Publication 1) 'Training for peace' – a universal practice? How micro-processes are impacting the likelihood of an EU-India cooperation in peacekeeping

The first article of the dissertation argues that actors at the training level of peacekeeping are driven by practical imperatives rather than abstract questions over norms. Interested in the possibility of a peacekeeping training cooperation between the EU and India, the article argues that this cooperation is possible if actors' disposition in the training communities is favourable or if the communities' structures overlap. The article discusses the structures of India and the EU's training communities and analyses what practices India and the EU support in peace operations. Moreover, the article is interested in explaining how practices in the peacekeeping

training communities became routinised, touching here upon the second core research question of why an actor complies, localises or contests an existing practice.

The article draws on 28 semi-structured in-depth interviews with peacekeeping trainers, peacekeepers and policymakers from the EU and India, conducted during a four-month fieldwork stay in Delhi between November 2018 and February 2019, as well as a four-month fieldwork stay in Brussels between March 2019 and July 2019. Moreover, the article uses material from a week-long participant observation during a military officers' training course at the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping, New Delhi (CUNPK) in February 2019. Finally, the article draws on document analysis of policy documents, training manuals and official speech records to complement and validate the primary data collected during the fieldwork.

The article concludes that the structure of training communities in the EU and India are not compatible, as they diverge in the internal mission, the backgrounds of training instructors and the encouraged background of participants, and the type of courses offered. The analysis of the disposition of actors in India's training community, moreover, revealed that the EU is considered a credible actor in peacekeeping, but that implicit knowledge among the training community entails that the EU and India's training philosophies diverge. Given that the structure of the training centres depends on the overall contribution of the EU and India to peace operations, which has not significantly changed over the last decade, the article argues that for cooperation to materialise, disposition of actors needs to change through increased interaction.

Publication 2) India's 'silent contestation' of the EU's perspective on local ownership

The second publication explores how the EU and India understand the principle of local ownership. It analyses why and how India contests the EU's understanding of this principle and discusses how far this impacts the legitimacy of the EU's principles and norms. The publication

thus touches upon both core questions of the dissertation and goes beyond them insofar, as it also asks how India's contestation affects the legitimacy of the EU's norms.

The chapter uses document analysis of UN speeches by the EU and India (125 speeches) from 2011-2019, as well as other speeches available online which discuss the theme of local ownership and peacebuilding. Moreover, it draws from policy documents, outlining the EU and India's peacebuilding strategies.

The publication concludes that the EU and India connect the local ownership principle to different fundamental norms. In the understanding of Indian policymakers, local ownership is related to the fundamental norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. The EU, on the contrary, connects local ownership to the fundamental norm of democracy. Moreover, the article identifies three modes of contestation from the Indian side: political contestation, moral contestation and 'silent' contestation. These three modes of contestation imply that India contests the meaning-in-use of the norm, rather than the norms itself. Furthermore, that India's contestation is restricted to discursive, rather than behavioural contestation. As India's contestation remains 'soft', it does only slightly influence the legitimacy of the EU's reading of the principle (cf. Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020).

Publication 3) – The 'female boot on the ground': Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations

The third article, co-authored with Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, explores the Indian government's understanding of gender mainstreaming and delves upon how this understanding impacts the domestic security sector and the Indian female personnel deployed in international missions. The publication thus touches upon the first and second core question of the dissertation for the Indian context. The exclusive focus on India for the third publication emerges out of the assessment of the literature on gender and peace operations, which revealed several reflections on the European side, but a dearth of literature for the Indian context.

The article draws upon 25 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2019 and 2020, with members of the all-female police unit India deployed in Liberia from 2007-2016, the Female Engagement Team deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2019-2020, representatives of UN Women India, as well as members of the Indian army. The interview material is complemented by official documents, such as government reports and secondary literature.

The article, which conceptualises gender mainstreaming as a norm bundle, concludes that India is localising parts of the bundle while contesting other parts. The localisation of gender mainstreaming is asymmetrical in India's domestic security sector with the police making more advancements in providing a gender-equal environment than the military. Moreover, the article demonstrates that the contestation of gender mainstreaming entails keeping women from combat roles and deployments in security-sensitives areas and a preference for gender-segregated over integrated units. Consequences for the female personnel on the ground is that they are underrepresented in numbers, particularly in military deployments. They will not be deployed to complex and unsafe areas and preferably in gender-segregated units. Finally, they are expected to conduct gender-related work, such as assisting victims of sexual violence rather than security-focused work.

The EU and India's approach to peace operations

EU and peace operations

The involvement of Western European countries in the nascent UN peacekeeping endeavour has been ambiguous. As many early peacekeeping missions were tasked to resolve conflicts emerging from decolonisation processes, the neutrality of European former colonial powers was questioned. The British and French involvements are good cases in point. Both countries were active conflict parties in the Suez crisis and showed reluctance regarding a UN-led intervention, arguing that it was in their responsibility to handle the crisis (Curran and Williams,

2016; Guillot, 1994). Furthermore, during the Congo crisis from 1960-1964, the UK and France sided with Congo's former colonial power Belgium to argue against a UN intervention in the conflict (Guillot, 1994, Combs, 1967). Other Western European countries, such as Germany, joined the UN only by 1973 and after joining restricted its contribution for UN peace operations to civilian missions and finance throughout the Cold War (Torsten, 1994; Koops, 2016). This long German absence from military operations is explained by constitutional restrictions and a general anti-military sentiment in the public in the aftermath of Germany's role in the Second World War (Koops, 2016). The Nordic states provided a more continuous and active contribution. Participation in peace operation for these relatively small-states coincided with their interests to prevent great power abuse, it offered a possibility to gain international prestige, and overlapped with the support of Nordic states for rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Jakobson, 2006). The contribution was moreover facilitated, as other countries perceived the Nordic states as politically neutral and non-threatening (Ibid., 2006). Finally, the first two Secretaries-General who had substantially contributed to shaping and advocating for the peacekeeping tool came from Denmark and Sweden, respectively. Another Western European country with a long trajectory in UN peacekeeping is Ireland, which had its first major contribution to ONUC in Congo. Similarly, like the Nordic states, the commitment to peace operations is rooted in the Irish support for peaceful conflict resolution and an interest to establish itself as an important contributor to global security governance. Moreover, Ireland was perceived as non-threatening and politically and militarily neutral, as it had itself been under colonial rule and did not join NATO or other military alliances (Murphy, 1998). These divergent political, historical and legal contexts have led to differentiated peacekeeper profiles of EU member states. In the early period of UN peacekeeping, we can thus not talk about a European approach. A more common approach to peacekeeping developed only over time, initiated through greater integration of EU crisis management structures.

The object of the EU to preserve peace and strengthen international security per the UN Charter is anchored in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) from 1992, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, which states, that the object of a common foreign and security policy shall be to 'preserve peace and to strengthen international security in accordance with principles of the UN Charter' (TEU 1992, p. 123). This treaty established the EU's political and diplomatic role and initiated its actorness in the field of peacebuilding (Bátora al., 2010; Richmond et al., 2011).

Internally, the integration and enlargement process of the EU might be the EU's most potent peace policy, for which it received the Nobel Prize in 2012. For peace and conflict outside Europe, the EU early on recognised, that its soft tools, such as a policy of persuasion and normative power, that made countries adhere to EU norms and laws to gain membership, were not enough to respond to an external crisis. The need for the US, respectively NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1999, made the EU aware of its limits as a provider for global security governance and pushed the development for an autonomous EU crisis management capability (Barbé and Johansson, 2001; Biscop and Whitman, 2013; Howorth, 2014). Moreover, as the EU blamed ineffective UN command and control mechanisms for the UN failures in Rwanda, Somalia and former Yugoslavia, the EU member states largely abandoned UN missions and were thus in need of an alternative channel for their security provisions (Pietz, 2013).

At the meeting in St. Malo in 1998, Tony Blair, and Jacques Chirac enabled the discussion on the need for an autonomous military force for the EU and set the foundations for a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, created the office of the High Representative (HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The first HR, Javier Solana, oversaw the transfer of the Petersberg tasks, i.e. humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including

peacemaking, to the EU. These tasks had originally been adopted in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU) to strengthen the operational capacity of the WEU as defence component of the EU (Pagani, 1998). The inclusion of these tasks into the Treaty of Amsterdam had been championed by Sweden and Finland, who also launched the civilian crisis management mechanism, that complemented the military one envisioned at St. Malo (Barbé and Johansson, 2001). This shows that the distinct peacekeeper profiles, such as the neutrality and civilian outlook of the Nordic states, have played a role in shaping a common European approach to conflict management (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008).

In 2003, Javier Solana formulated the first European Security Strategy (ESS), which identified common threats and objectives to give the EU a coherent security actorness. The ESS has a strong focus on human security, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, democracy, and other concepts associated with the liberal peace agenda, which emerged after the end of the Cold War (ESS, 2003). Moreover, the ESS calls for coherent use of different EU instruments needed in response to an international crisis, such as political, diplomatic, development and civilian and military crisis management (Ibid.). Furthermore, the instruments were strengthened individually. For instance, the EU's military crisis management capacities were increased through the reinvigoration of the EU Rapid Reaction Force concept in the form of EU Battle Groups (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2016). Following the adoption of the ESS, the EU launched its first crisis policing mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and its first CSDP military operations: Concordia in FYR Macedonia and Artemis in Congo in the same year (Palm and Crum, 2019). The early CSDP missions and operations were often designed as bridging or stabilisation missions before UN forces' arrival and engaged in classical peacekeeping tasks, such as the implementation of peace agreements. Debates surrounding the rationale for these EU deployments – in the spirit of the ESS – highlighted humanitarian values (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Palm and Crum, 2019; Tardy, 2019).

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty paved the way for greater coordination of the EU's peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, particularly between the Council and the Commission. More integration and more effective leadership regarding CFSP and CSDP were achieved through the creation of the dual-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The Lisbon Treaty also established the EU's External Action Service (EEAS), as a quasi-diplomatic corps of the EU, which served to streamline a common strategic vision and to coordinate the EU's external actions (Bátora et al., 2016). With the new more integrated structure, the Lisbon Treaty overall gave the EU a renewed strong mandate to engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding and broadened the Petersberg tasks to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilisation, and support to third countries in combating terrorism (Juncos and Blockmans, 2018). Finally, the Lisbon treaty enabled the EU to gain a legal authority and thus to achieve external representation, i.e. in the form of enhanced observer status at the UN (Johansson-Nogués, 2014).

Today, the EU's civilian and military missions and operations, pursue a complex set of different peacebuilding objectives, such as border management, advisory and security sector reform, military training, the rule of law, policing, monitoring, counter-piracy and capacity building, whereby the EU has continued to deploy more civilian than military missions (EEAS, 2020; Koenig, 2016; Tor, 2017). Moreover, EU mission and operations are very moderate in size compared to UN deployments. Apart from CSDP deployments, EU member states – with a varying degree – have participated in other formats, such as NATO or operations led by individual member states (Koops and Tercovich, 2016; Pietz, 2013). Finally, there is a slow return by EU member states to UN peacekeeping, mainly confined to high-end, low-risk capabilities and timely limited deployments (Brosig, 2014).

The European Union's approach to peace operations

In order to comprehend how the EU approaches the topics of training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming, it is essential first to outline the EU's broader approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The EU has noted that it understands itself as a 'force for peace' (EEAS, 2017). Indeed, the literature understands building peace as a core value of the EU (Manners, 2002). The EU's self-understanding as a peace project has significantly shaped the EU's external approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as it sees itself as a role model for other countries and considers itself as an 'anchor of stability' 'spreading democracy and prosperity across our continent' (ESS, 2003; European Council, 2012). In the earlier years of crisis management, EU policymakers believed that the EU's policy of carrots and sticks, which brought new member states to adhere to the EU's core norms would be the best strategy to approach international conflicts. Not only did they believe in the effectiveness of this non-coercive method, for many member states, this was the only method consistent with the EU's civilian power outlook. In this understanding of being a 'Normative Power Europe (NPE)' which was shared by policymakers and academics alike, there was neither support nor a felt need for a more coercive approach to crisis management (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Manners, 2002; Smith, 2005). The 2003 ESS reflected a strong focus on values and norms in the EU's approach to crisis management. It is very clear about envisioning a liberal form of peace, supported by the principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law, good governance, and economic development (ESS, 2003; Huelss, 2017).

The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which has replaced the ESS, recognises that the EU's normative sphere of influence that had enabled it to solve conflicts in its more direct neighbourhood would not suffice to impact global conflicts. The inability to influence global security challenges is explained in the literature with a lack of internal capability, unfavourable perceptions of the EU's actorness in security, internal contestation, as well as an increasingly complex international security environment (Barbé and Morillas, 2019; Costa, Kissack and

Barbé, 2016; Smith, 2017). Regarding the changing security environment, the strategy points out that 'peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given' (EUGS, 2016). The changing international environment and contestation within the EU have brought about changes in the EU's crisis management approach. Firstly, the EUGS has linked CSDP missions and operations with the goal of protecting 'the EU and its citizens' (EUGS, 2016). This recognition of a growing nexus between internal and external security has been responsible for shifting priorities, i.e., an increasing engagement in counter-terrorism (Barbé and Morillas, 2019). Secondly, the strong focus on democracy export, good governance and liberal peace in the ESS is replaced by a more pragmatic vision and a focus on resilience, capacity building, and stabilisation (Barbé and Morillas, 2019; Bargués, 2020; Ejdus and Juncos, 2018; EEAS and EC, 2017a; EUGS, 2016; Joseph and Juncos, 2020). While still underlining that the EU will uphold norms such as international law, human rights, and democracy which remain core values of the EU's approach to crisis management, the EUGS acknowledges 'each country's right to choose its future freely' and is overall vocal in stressing the importance of being sensitive to local structures (EUGS, 2016). These attempts of the EU to transcend an overly liberal peacebuilding approach, have been deemed unsuccessfully in several assessments in the academic literature (Juncos, 2017; Natorski, 2011; Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler, 2011; Tocci and Marchetti, 2015). For instance, the EU's ability to implement the newly emerging resilience concept has been considered a rhetorical move, rather than an actual practice change (Joseph and Juncos, 2020; Petrova and Delcour, 2020).

Changes have, however, been noted regarding the EU's pragmatist rhetoric on capacity-building and stabilisation. Karlsrud (2020), for instance, has illustrated how the EU has shifted away from liberal peacebuilding mandates towards the less ambitious goal of conflict stabilisation. Moreover, the EU's peacebuilding approach has been found to be more militarised than in its original outlook (Iñiguez de Heredia, 2020). For instance, the EU's CSDP operations have increasingly focused on military capacity-building in the host state, still touching upon

liberal values for justification, but moving away from good governance and the rule of law discourses (Ibid.). The shift away from soft approaches towards militarism has also been noted in regard to the EU's involvement in counter-terrorism operations (Karlsrud, 2020). The more military-focused approach and a need to increase military CSDP operations' effectiveness are prevalent in the EUGS (EUGS, 2016). The 'soft' approach by the EU is thus at least partially replaced by a recognition of the need to use more coercive instruments. Nevertheless, the EU has not undertaken any peace enforcement missions until date, and the civilian missions continue to outnumber military operations. This has to do with internal divisions among EU member states, among which many still want to preserve the EU's civilian power outlook and disapprove of a more pro-active use of force (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Fiott, 2020).[16]

Apart from understanding itself as an actor for peace, the EU has strongly supported 'effective multilateralism' and has highlighted that it links its objectives with those of the UN (Natorski, Barbé and Herranz-Surrallés, 2014; ESS, 2003). The EU reaffirms its support for multilateralism and the centrality of the UN for international peace both in the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the more recent EUGS, which states that the EU pursues a 'multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in conflict and necessary for its resolution' (EUGS, 2016). Along these lines, the EU has made substantial efforts to coordinate its crisis response with other international and regional organisations, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, and AU, but also with the civil society or bilateral donors. The EU's multilateral approach is one of the four key pillars of what the EU has described in the EUGS as its 'integrated approach' to peace. The other being, multi-phased, multidimensional, and multi-lateral (EUGS, 2016). The EU's approach is multi-phased, as it addresses all stags of a conflict-cycle.[17] It is multi-dimensional,

[16] Interview with EU policymaker 30 April 2019

[17] The stages of the conflict-cycle in the EU's understanding are prevention, crisis response, stabilisation, and longer-term peacebuilding

as it draws on all instruments available to the EU in its crisis response, such as CSDP missions and operations, diplomatic and political tools, as well as development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The latter reflects the idea that security is a precondition for development, and that sustainable peace needs development (EC and HRVP, 2013). Finally, the integrated approach is described as multi-level, as it acts at the local, national, regional and global levels of conflicts. The integrated approach to peacebuilding is clearly aimed at creating 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' and thus embraces the idea of human security. This even applies to concepts traditionally associated with state security, such as conflict stabilisation. Concerning stabilisation, the EU highlights that human security is the 'primary lens through which we approach stabilisation' and further, that 'unless, stabilisation ultimately contributes to addressing the insecurities experienced by the population and delivers a tangible peace dividend at the community level (taking into account gender age, and other perspectives), it will not lead to peace and stability' (EEAS and EC, 2017a).

EU and debates on training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming in peace operations

First, in terms of training the EU has a largely decentralised training architecture. Training is thus in the responsibility of EU member states (Koukhol, 2017). Training structures for CSDP missions and operations on a European level have developed in parallel to the deployment of the first CSDP missions in 2003. The *EU Training Concept for CSDP* in 2004 is the first formulation of a European approach to training and provided an overall political and operational framework to EU training activities (Political and Security Committee (EU), 2004). The *Training Concept* states two overall goals for the EU's training structures. Firstly, to enhance effectiveness for missions and operations, particularly improving civilian-military and civilian-civilian coordination and interoperability between the different actors. Secondly, to 'spread ESDP culture' (Political and Security Committee (EU), 2004). The *Training Concept for CSDP*

facilitated the creation of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2005, which acts as a network college connecting over 165 training institutes within the EU's member states. The ESDC aims to 'promote a common European security culture' and 'to promote EU values and share best practices in security and defence.' (Katsagounos, 2020). The different institutes within member states range from police colleges to peace universities, national defence academies and diplomatic institutes, thus a whole range of military police and civilian partners. This mix of partners reflects well on the EU's approach to combining civilian and military actors in its integrated crisis management approach. It is also a result of the different capacities of member states for peacekeeping training. Some member states, such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic states, and Slovenia, have well-established training centres focusing on civilian CSDP (Leiberich and Wolter, 2017). Smaller member states are often only represented through their defence ministries or military academies (Ibid.). Overall, while the ESDC attempts to streamline training and prepare mission personnel for their deployments, the responsibility for pre-deployment training lies with the member states, leading to significant variance in the preparedness of mission personnel. The new *EU Policy on Training for CSDP* highlights the importance of adequate training as 'mandatory prerequisite of deployment' (Council of the European Union, 2017). The policy is also more pronounced on highlighting the importance of training reflecting and promoting EU principles. It points out that 'support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principle of international law are integral to the EU's peacekeeping activities' and moreover states that 'training must rigorously reflect EU policy' (Council of the European Union, 2017). Thus, the EU's approach to peacekeeping training is still preoccupied with creating a common training culture among the EU's member states. At the level of the ESDC, training is already reflecting important concepts of the EU's approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, i.e. local ownership being an integral part of EU crisis management. Similarly, 'gender issues and UNSCR 1325 awareness in the context of

ESDP missions/operations are training requirements', and a gender perspective is reflected in all ESDC training activities (EC, 2008).

Second, local ownership has remained a key tenant of the EU's crisis management approach, but the EU has substantially shifted in its discourse from the early embracement of the concept to its current application. The local ownership norm emerged as an acknowledgement of the problematic top-down nature of many international development cooperation projects but was later taken up in crisis and conflict management debates. The increasing importance of including local actors in crisis management is reflected in the extensive use of the term in the EUGS, as compared to the ESS (local appears, 3, respectively 21 times). The EUGS states that the EU will 'pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security, and defence sectors and support fragile states in building capacities' (EUGS, 2016). The importance of local ownership is included in all recent Commission, and Council conclusions and the EU has allocated substantial amounts of funds for its implementation (Mac Ginty, 2018). The *Parameter Concept on Stability* produced by the EEAS and the European Commission in 2017, reflects that 'externally imposed approaches will not work, nor will purely top-down action. For any joint objective, local ownership should occur through a sufficient level of support and commitment to implementation' (EEAS and EC, 2017a). The 'local' in the EU's reading involves thereby national and local authorities, communities and the civil society, whereby the civil society focus seems to be the most pronounced (EEAS and EC, 2017b).

The EU's success to live up to its goal for more local ownership in crisis management has been questioned (Collantes-Celador, 2008; Dursun-Özkanca, 2018; Ejdus, 2017, 2018; Ejdus and Juncos, 2018; Juncos, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2018; Rayroux and Wilén, 2014; Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler, 2011). It has been noted that the EU's technocratic approach to crisis management is not flexible enough to account for the different local settings in which missions

are operating (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador, 2011; Edjus and Juncos, 2018). Moreover, it has been argued that the EU often only engages with local government elites rather than the civil society (Edjus, 2017). Even in cases where the EU approaches the civil society, it has been held, that the EU is very selective in its support. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are chosen according to whether their goals overlap with EU values, thus, i.e. organisations with a liberal outlook, rather than religious or ethnic organisations (Tocci and Marchetti, 2015). Furthermore, it has been noted that the EU can only read a specific 'format' of CSOs. i.e. in the form of government-approved non-governmental organisations (Mac Ginty, 2018). These non-governmental organisations might not necessarily be a representation of the whole of society. There is currently a shift in EU policy documents towards resilience as a new key concept connected to the local ownership principle (Juncos, 2017). Resilience acknowledges societies' internal capacities to withstand conflict and crisis situations and the need to support these internal structures, rather than externally intervene. It has been argued that with the EU's shift to a resilience discourse, local ownership has been turned from a moral imperative into a pragmatic solution to the current crisis management failures (Juncos, 2017).

Third, gender mainstreaming has been presented as a norm bundle deeply rooted in the EU's identity and is described, by the Commission, which adopted a formal commitment to gender mainstreaming in 1996, as:

> the systematic integration of the respective situations, priorities and needs of women and men in all policies and with a view to promoting equality between women and men and mobilizing all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account, at the planning stage, their effects on the respective situation of women and men in implementation, monitoring and evaluation (EC, 1996).

The Treaty of Amsterdam created a mechanism that obliges all EU institutions to include a gender dimension in all policy fields, including CFSP and CSDP (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). Internally, the EU is relatively successful in ensuring gender equality in Europe, with the

European Commission being the main motor for change. The EU's initial focus and its main achievements are thereby in the field of gender equality and employment. In the area of security, the EU has struggled substantially to achieve a common position and to implement a gender perspective (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018; Haastrup, 2018; Kronsell, 2015). The EEAS, as one of the most influential bodies on the EU's crisis management approach, for instance, lacks feminist actors, who could take forward the implementation of gender mainstreaming (Guerrina, Chappel and Wright, 2018). Moreover, even though EU member states publish the majority of National Action Plans for implementing UNSC resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, there are substantial divergences in these plans regarding individual member states' understandings of gender mainstreaming. Furthermore, many member states give seemingly little to no importance to the norm bundle, i.e. Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, or Luxembourg (Joachim and Schneiker, 2012; Guerrina and Wright, 2016). The divergence in member states' involvement in implementing gender mainstreaming has also influenced their support for this agenda on the EU-level. For instance, it has been noted that initiatives such as gender advisors in the EEAS can largely be credited to a Swedish initiative (Guerrina, Chappel and Wright, 2018). Similarly, there is disparity among member states regarding the opening of spaces for women in the domestic security sectors. Until date, only eleven EU member states allow women in front-line combat roles, and many continue to restrict female deployment in areas considered security sensitive (Percy, 2019).[18]Given that crisis management is an intergovernmental policy field, greater gender sensitivity of CSDP missions and operations depends significantly on member states' willingness to adopt gender mainstreaming.

On the EU level, it has been noted that the EU has included a gender dimension in all its policy documents and crisis management strategies. The first document outlining the EU's

[18] Combat position are open to women in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden. There is evidence from two of these states, that combat roles are not only theoretically open to women, but women are actually engaged in these role (Percy, 2019)

gender mainstreaming approach in the field of security is the *Comprehensive Approach on EU Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security in 2008* (Council of the European Union, 2008). This policy document was followed by several strategies aimed at identifying concrete steps for including gender mainstreaming in the context of the ESDP, such as creating indicators to measure implementation (Council of the European Union, 2016). The EU's *Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crisis (2013)* initiated an Informal Task Force on UNSCR 1325, which has regular meetings with the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EU Special Representative on Human Rights and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability of the EEAS (Jenichen et al., 2018). Moreover, the EU has established a network of gender advisors and gender focal points, assisting CSDP missions in integrating gender mainstreaming in their work (Legrand, 2017).

The EUGS pledges to 'mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions' (p. 11) and states that the EU will promote 'the role of women in peace efforts – from implementing the UNSC Resolution on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU's internal gender balance (p. 31)' (EUGS, 2016). The EU has underlined that its gender perspective incorporates both men and women. However, policy documents reflect that the EU is often limiting its understanding of gender to mean women only (Council of the European Union, 2018b). Consequently, the EU has narrowed down the goals of gender mainstreaming to imperatives, such as increasing the number of females in CSDP missions. Deiana and McDonagh (2018) have moreover pointed out that in their interviews, CSDP personnel understood the gender mainstreaming agenda to apply to the local counterparts, rather than as a need for the mission itself to be more gender sensitive. Finally, the EU has been criticised for debating women's participation only in terms of enhancing the effectiveness of missions, rather than as a goal in itself (Muehlenhoff, 2017).

Overall, while the EU positions itself as a champion for global gender norms and has put several mechanisms in place to mainstream gender across missions, the assessment is that the EU has not yet lived up to this self-proclaimed leadership role. The two primary reasons being that CSDP falls within the authority of EU member states, which show a mixed-picture in their effort to support gender mainstreaming, as well as the above-discussed failure of the EU to approach gender more comprehensively.

India and peace operations

India's first contribution to the support of international peace and security – aside the 2.5 million Indian army soldiers in the Second World War – starts with the deployment of a field ambulance and a small unit of officers to the International Custodian Force in Korea (1953-1954) (Bullion, 1997).[19] India deployed eleven infantry battalions to the UN's first armed peacekeeping mission UNEF I to ensure the withdrawal from French, British and Israeli troops from Egypt and maintain peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Nambiar, 2020). In the Middle East, India also participated in the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNGIL) and the Observation Mission in Yemen (UNYOM). India played a crucial role in the operation in the Congo in 1960, where the UN for the first time granted the 'use of force' in defence of the mandate, turning the mission into a peace enforcement, rather than a peacekeeping mission. Apart from troop contributions, India also provided the first military advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Major-General I.J. Rikhye, who played a significant role in offering one of the first detailed instructions on the role of the non-use of force norm in 1962 (Findlay, 2002).

With the rapid increase in peacekeeping missions in number and scale after the end of the Cold War, India stepped up its troop contributions. Indian troops participated in twelve of

[19] Strictly speaking the UN Force in Korea was not a peacekeeping operation, because the forces were not directed by UNSG, and they used substantial force without a UN chapter VII mandate. In historical overviews of India's peacekeeping contributions, Korea is however, always included as the country's first contribution to international peace.

the eighteen newly established mission between 1990-1994, in places such as Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Krishnasamy, 2010; Nambiar 2020). Police personnel was provided for UN missions in Namibia, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Congo or Liberia. In former Yugoslavia, India deployed the first Force Commander and Head of the Mission to the 28,000 strong multilateral peacekeeping force. Apart from supporting missions in countries helping to enforce peace, such as in Somalia or East Timor, India also endorsed the multiplex nature of the new peacebuilding operations with their complex mandates. India provided humanitarian aid in Mozambique; it engaged in de-mining action in Lebanon, assisted institution building in Namibia, or trained Liberia's local security forces (Mukerji, n.d.; Nambiar, 2020).

India's role in international relations in the post-Cold War period, including peace operations, has in general been portrayed as characterised by more confidence and increasing attempts to leverage its emerging influence and power to shape the global governance regime (Pant, 2017, Abdenur, 2019, Sundaram, 2017). During this period, India has actively aimed to change imbalances in global governance's decision-making structures and contributed in shaping its norms and practices (Mampilly, 2018).

Today, India's most considerable contributions are to the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), both missions with a robust mandate and strong protection of civilian component. Another major contribution is to the mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). India has thus maintained a high level of troop contribution over the years. As India has insisted on exclusively using the UN channel for mission deployments, except for its rather unsuccessful unilateral intervention in Sri Lanka and its involvement in the Bangladeshi Independence war – India has not exhausted other channels or military alliances (Bullion, 2007, Chacko, 2018).

India's approach to peace operations

India's approach to peace operations is embedded in its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vision for peaceful co-existence and non-intervention, his belief in Global South-South solidarity and the therewith connected support for decolonisation processes after World War II, and his firm commitment to a strong United Nations (Banerjee, 2013; Blah, 2017; Kaur, 2008). This initial outlook to peace operations continues to shape the current Indian approach and works as a frame of reference for India when it positions itself regarding the debates on training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming.

India has an 'unwavering belief in multilateralism' for resolving global conflicts, and in the realm of peace operations strongly supports multilateral formats under the umbrella of the UN (Nambiar, 2009; UN, September 2014). Furthermore, in a similar vein as the EU, India has stressed that in order to sustain international peace, a 'holistic' approach is needed, which cannot leave aside socioeconomic grievances as root causes of conflicts. Thus, peacekeeping is one among other tools, such as development cooperation and political and diplomatic efforts needed to ensure sustainable peace (UN, April 2018). Within this tool-box India has highlighted the centrality of peacekeeping as a 'unique innovation of multilateralism', which ensures the conflict stability needed, to implement post-conflict peacebuilding efforts (Banerjee, 2013; UN 2014, September).

As a formerly colonised country, principles associated with traditional peacekeeping, such as non-intervention, minimal use of force, and impartiality are firmly rooted in India's strategic culture (Pant, 2017). Consequently, India has remained critical vis-à-vis principles, such as R2P which would allow interventions based on humanitarian grounds (Mohan and Gippner, 2015; Chitalkar and Malone, 2015). India's last tenure on the UN Security Council from 2011-2013 has been described by the literature as characterised by India's strong emphasis on state sovereignty in cases of humanitarian crisis (Mukherjee and Malone, 2013). India's firm

adherence to the non-intervention principle also influences its position on liberal peacebuilding, and it has remained critical about attempts to blur the line of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Singh, 2017). While India supports a sustainable approach to peace, it considers the primary role of sustaining the peace to lie with the host state (UN, November 2020). Peace operations should thus not replace state institutions but only operate in an assisting function. India's scepticism with the peacebuilding agenda is further deepened because it perceives Western actors as trying to rebuild societies as liberal market democracies, overriding locally built structures. This scepticism and caution with norms associated with a liberal approach to peace, has also led India's policymaking elites to take a cautious stance vis-à-vis norms such as democracy export or good governance (Beri, 2008; Møller, 2017; Pant, 2017; Sidhu, Metha and Jones, 2013). This caution does not mean that India questions the legitimacy of democratic governance itself. Through its Election Commission, India has engaged in democracy assistance programs upon request (Choedon, 2015). The Indian caution derives from the interventionist character of many democracy export initiatives (Ibid.). India's support of the local ownership principle is firmly embedded in these above-outlined discourses, as depicted in the second publication (Klossek, 2020a). Nevertheless, India is known to make exceptions to its non-interventionist stance. Historically India has participated in peacekeeping operations with a pro-active use of force mandate, i.e. 1960 in Congo and it has used human rights-focused arguments to justify its unilateral interventions in Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Chacko, 2018).[20]

Moreover, the idea of south-south solidarity is still popularly evoked in the field of peace operations (Hansel and Möller, 2014). South-south solidarity in peace operations is equal with troop-contributing countries solidarity, as the Global South is supplying the lion's share of troops to peace operations. Some of the critiques India has raised on behalf of the troop-

[20] For a very detailed historical discussion of India's position on non-intervention and how it went through different phases from supporting multilateral intervention in the 1950s and 60s, its own unilateral interventions in the late 1970s, towards a stronger condemnation of interventionist approaches see Chacko (2018)

contributing countries are the remaining complexity of mandates, the lack of finances, the exclusion of troop contribution countries from important decision-making processes, such as formulation of mandates, the compromised security of peacekeepers and the disproportional appointment of financial contributors to high-level positions in the UN Department for Peace Operations (Blah, 2017; Mampilly, 2018, UN, 2019 September; UN, 2015 September). This association with the Global South has also meant that India constructs its approach to peace operation, as opposed to that of Western countries, which it accuses as stated above of 'liberal interventionism'. The findings presented in the publications on training and local ownership confirm that south-south solidarity remains a widespread narrative in the Indian approach to peace operations and crisis management (Klossek, 2020a; b). In the debate on local ownership and peacekeeping training, India thereby has to negotiate its role of being part of the Global South, but at the same time considers itself a forerunner or role model for other troop contributors (UN, September 2020).

Finally, India seems to become more pro-active in claiming its role as a global and normative power and has repeatedly called for an overhaul of the UN system and a seat for India in the UN Security Council (Hall, 2013; Sundaram, 2010; UN, September 2020). Peace operations are thereby a crucial hallmark of the country's commitment and claim to more global influence (Gowan and Singh, 2013; Mohan and Gippner, 2015). Apart from its continuous contribution of troop contingents throughout the history of peace operations, India has diversified its contributions to underline its claim over the last decade. The country has portrayed itself as a champion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda – actively pushing for more female personnel in peace operations – and has emerged as an important trainer for third countries, as depicted in the first and third publication (Klossek, 2020a, Klossek and Johansson-Nogués, 2021). Furthermore, India has offered its own interpretation of international norms, such as the local ownership principle as depicted in the second publication (Klossek, 2020b). In the following, the three individual publications will outline in detail how India positions itself

vis-à-vis the debates on training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming. Furthermore, the publications will analyse how India complies, localises and contests these norms and practices, and elaborate which forms of contestation can be observed.

Publication 1 – 'Training for peace' – a universal practice? How micro-processes are impacting the likelihood of an EU-India cooperation in peacekeeping

Table 2.1 Bibliographic information of publication 1

Title	'Training for peace' – a universal practice? How micro-processes are impacting the likelihood of an EU-India cooperation in peacekeeping
Author(s) and Affiliation(s)	Klossek, Lara Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internationals (IBEI)
Publication Outlet	European Security (Q1, JCR [2019])
Publication Type	Article
Publication Year	2020
Publication Status	Published
Abstract	Why have the EU and India been unable to explore the common potential of their partnership in peacekeeping training? Drawing upon the literature of practice theories and the concept of community of practices, as well as semi-structured interviews with policymakers and peacekeeping trainers from the EU and India, policy documents and participant observation, the article explores the complementarity of structures of the EU's and India's training communities and discusses the implicit knowledge which is guiding the practices of actors. Thereby, the article moves away from offering structural explanations, such as diverging strategic interests, which have dominated the literature on the EU's external relations with Asia. Comparing the practice communities, the article finds substantial divergence in the material and ideational structure of training institutes. Moreover, the article illustrates that the disposition of actors in the Indian training community is characterised by the unspoken understanding that India's training philosophy is more compatible with other countries from the Global South. While both structures, as well as dispositions of actors are unfavourable vis-à-vis an EU–India partnership in peacekeeping training, the article concludes that by addressing familiarity gaps among training communities, divergences in structures and dispositions can be overcome.

'Training for peace' – a universal practice? How micro processes are impacting the likelihood of an EU–India cooperation in peacekeeping

Introduction

Security governance has been transforming, driven by the United States' fading enthusiasm for supporting multilateral endeavours to address security dilemmas. This has also impacted the area of peacekeeping, where the Trump administration has indicated that it will reduce its financial contribution (Diehl 2019). At the same time, the number of global conflicts has been on the rise (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg, 2019). For the remaining supporters of a rules-based global order in security, this has meant to look beyond traditional security partners. Consequently, new partnerships have emerged – and have been envisioned – to preserve peacekeeping's central role in addressing global conflicts. The European Union, for instance, has increasingly pivoted towards Asia.[1] This interest is declared in a conclusion of the Council of the European Union, which recommends Asian participation in EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, offering European Security and Defence College (ESDC) training to countries interested in contributing to EU operations, and 'to observe or participate in Asian partner-led exercises and to advance cooperation on UN peacekeeping training' (Council of the European Union, 2018).[2] Given India's important role as a troop contributor, it is one of the key partners singled out in this conclusion.

The EU's keenness on India as a potential partner in peacekeeping also finds expression in the EU Strategy on India from November 2018. In this strategy, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding is identified as one of the areas of security, which is thought to offer a 'vast potential' for deepening the strategic partnership between the two actors (EEAS, 2018, p.12). Accompanying this synergistic relation there are very detailed proposals on implementation such as joint projects with India for training assistance to third countries, i.e.

from Africa (EEAS, 2018, p. 13). The strategy further suggests to 'encourage regular exchanges on EU CSDP operations with the view to promote the participation of Indian security experts, police, justice officials, and military advisors and it envisions invitations to each other's peacekeeping training'. In theory, the proposed initiatives are thus very solid and are re-iterated both in the EU Strategy on India and in the conclusion of the Council of the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2018; EEAS, 2018). Together with their successful performance and active contribution in the area of peacekeeping and training, one is tempted to share the EU's optimism regarding an intensified cooperation in training. Looking more closely at the trajectory of the EU and India's partnership in peacekeeping, the prospects for implementation, however, seem much more limited. In 2005, the EU and India had already proposed joint training of military and civilian components or exchange of trainees and instructors between training centres in a Joint Partnership document (Council of the European Union, 2005). More than a decade later, these proposals have not led to a change in practice. As both the EU and India have successfully cooperated with third countries in training peacekeepers and have shown a strong commitment and capacity in the area of training, this paper sets out to explore why the EU and India have been unable to explore the common potential for their partnership in peacekeeping training.

Literature on EU-India relations has highlighted a set of different obstacles hampering their strategic partnership. These include India's doubts about the EU's credibility as a security actor, Delhi's preference to approach member states bilaterally, the differences in foreign policy approaches, with the EU's normative power outlook and India's realist approach to international relations and the divergence in security challenges both actors face in the international system (Allen, 2013; Howorth, 2016; Jain and Pandey, 2019; Joshi, 2017; Kavalski, 2016; Lai, Holland, and Kelly, 2019; Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006; Sachdeva, 2014; Singh, 2019; Stumbaum, 2015; Wagner and Bendiek, 2008). Looking at these assessments, one could thus say that there has

been a preference to focus on structural constraints over individual (agential) factors. Furthermore, the literature, has either highlighted the material obstacles of the partnership or has put the focus on differences in perceptions and normative frameworks (Baroowa, 2007; Jain and Pandey, 2014; 2019; Joshi, 2017; Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2006). On a theoretical level, the article addresses this literature gap by applying a practice theoretical approach to explore the possibilities for a peacekeeping partnership between the EU and India (Adler, 2008, Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Pouliot and Cornut, 2015). Considering practices as the 'key entry point to study social and political life', which are understood to be co-constituted by ideational and material factors and shaped both by agents as well structure, the article aims to overcome this limitation of the literature (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 4, Bueger and Gadinger, 2018). Providing insights into the Indian peacekeeping training community, the paper offers an application of the practice theoretical approach outside the Global North, from where it emerged and has been applied to in the past.[3] Moreover, as peacekeeping cooperation has remained an underexplored field in the literature on EU India relations, as well as more general in the literature dealing with European security cooperation, the article empirically contributes to closing this gap.

In order to understand the 'background knowledge' of practitioners which drives their action in conducting the peacekeeping training, three types of data have been collected (Bueger, 2014). Firstly, during a four months fieldwork stay in Delhi between November 2018 and February 2019, as well as a four months fieldwork stay in Brussels between March 2019 and July 2019, the author was able to conduct 28 semi-structured in-depth interviews with peacekeeping trainers, peacekeepers and policymakers from the European Union and India. Interviews were conducted in English. The names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement to assure confidentiality. Secondly, the paper uses material from a one week-long participant observation in a military officer training at the Centre for UN Peacekeeping, New Delhi (CUNPK) in February 2019, including informal interaction with the participants and

trainers. Thematically, the questions focused on the activities conducted in the peacekeeping training centres to get an understanding of the structure and practices in the training communities. These questions were complemented by asking the practioners for their interpretation of inhibiting factors for an EU-India training cooperation, possible avenues for exchange and whether a training cooperation would impact the depths of the EU-India strategic partnership. Lastly, the article is based on the analysis of policy documents, training manuals, and official speech records to complement and validate the primary data collected during the field trips in Delhi and Brussels.

The article will proceed as follows: The first part of the paper provides the theoretical framework of the paper by referring to the literature on practice approaches and particularly the concept of 'community of practice' (Adler, 2008; Lave &Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). The second part introduces the training contexts in India and the EU followed by an analysis of their complementarity in structure. Thereafter, I will outline the dispositions, which actors in the Indian community of peacekeeping training are guided by. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings and gives a preliminary assessment of the potential for an EU-India training cooperation.

Peacekeeping training centres as communities of practice

Rather than arguing that overlapping normative frameworks (Constructivism) or strategic interests (Realism) of India and the EU are influencing their chances for cooperation in peacekeeping training, the paper predicts that chances for cooperation are shaped by the complementarity of practices within the peacekeeping training centres. Practices in the analysis are thereby understood as 'socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in an on the material world' (Adler and Pouliot, 2011, p. 4). In other words, practices

are an expression for the everyday, habitual routine of practitioners, the implicit or tacit knowledge that operates in the background (Bueger 2014).

The CUNPK and the ESDC are conceptualised in this paper as practise communities (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). The idea of practise communities has been borrowed from the work of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991), Wenger (1998) and its later application in IR theory by Emanuel Adler (2008). A community of practise – here the peacekeeping training community – is characterised by a shared domain of interest, an 'expertise' which distinguishes the group from people outside the community (Wenger, 1998). The members of the community of practise engage in joint activities and discussions and share experiences, they form a community (Wenger, 1998). Lastly, these practioners, not only have shared interests and form a community, additionally, they also share a common practise. Conceptualising peacekeeping training centres as community of practices might seem counterintuitive, given that the concept has mostly been applied to less geographically determined places of learning, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Adler, 2008), diplomatic communities in the EU (Bicchi, 2016; Hofius, 2016) or the community of practices involved in the decision-making for crisis management operations within the EU (Mérand & Rayroux, 2016). The article advocates nevertheless, for conceptualising peacekeeping training centres as practise communities, as it is believed that each training centre differs in the design and delivery of peacekeeping training and is shaped by the multitude of actors acting within them, expressed by the idea of peacekeeping training centres as 'hybrid spaces' (Holmes, 2018, p. 13). This diversity is not significantly affected by the UN's attempts to standardise pre-deployment trainings starting in the 90s, culminating in the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMS), which are recommended as a core resource for any UN pre-deployment course (Curran, 2013). While it is believed that the training centres are incorporating the CPTMs, the article argues that these materials are considered and used as guidelines, and not regulations.[4]

Considering practices as the main entry point to the research, and conceptualising training centres as community of practices, has the advantage that the structure-agency, as well as the ideational-material dichotomy can be addressed. This can be illustrated in the following. Firstly, institutes are established by actors with certain objectives and ideas in mind, which then provide the organisation with a direction to move forward. After this first step, the structure of the institute, as well as courses are designed according to these ideas, which establishes a material reality in the institute. Training manuals are produced, the institute creates facilities which can accommodate a certain number of participants, depending on the envisioned scope and so forth. Lastly, the actors involved in conducting and planning the trainings bring in their own understanding of what constitutes a good peacekeeping training. Trainers are thus important actors constituting the structure of the peacekeeping training communities (cf. Adler, 2019; Adler and Pouliot, 2011). They, for instance have a say in what kind of materials are used, how knowledge will be transferred, and what pedagogical approaches to follow. Vice versa the structure of the training community is impacting the actors within it, by setting the standards on who qualifies as a trainer within the community.

Following the logic of practise approaches to international relations and thinking through the concept of practise community, a training cooperation between the EU and India can only materialise if either the structure of the community of practices (ideational and material) or the dispositions of actors (ideas) within it, are favourable towards it (cf. Pouliot, 2008). In order to give justice to this complex system of co-constituting factors shaping peacekeeping training communities, the analysis is structured in the following. The first part will outline the structure of the peacekeeping training communities in India and the EU. Questions guiding this part of the analysis are: what goals are driving the training centres (ideational); how the institutes and trainings are structured (material); and finally who conducts the trainings. Thereafter, the disposition of actors within India's training community is

discussed, whereby the focus lies on their inclination towards entering a peacekeeping training partnership with the EU.

Training communities in the European Union and India – complementarity in structure?

The Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping was initiated in 2000 as a joint venture between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as the Service Headquarter of the Indian Army (Permanent Mission of India to the UN; United Nations, 2019a). Prior to this, no institutionalised pre-deployment training existed for the Indian troops and commanding officers of contingents had the task of training their personnel after receiving advice from other force commanders who would have previously participated in peacekeeping missions.[5] Being a brainchild of Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, Force Commander of the UN protection force in former Yugoslavia, in his words the underlying idea for the creation of the centre was to institutionalise the training philosophy and methodology acquired by India over the many years of its participation in UN peacekeeping so that eventually the CUNPK will emerge as a 'repository of our experiences in United Nations peacekeeping' (Nambiar, 2014). The collective understanding of what India's training practice community is all about, is thus to collect India's meaningful experience in peacekeeping and to advance its training capacities (cf. Wenger, 1998). At the same time – through offering international courses – the institute has also developed the external mission to act as a platform to share India's best practices and ideas on peacekeeping with other troop contributing countries (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2003).

The small amount of permanent staff required for the CUNPK is made available by the Indian army, which also provides facilities for the centre to conduct its courses. Political guidance is offered by policymakers within the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of

Defence, who are responsible for the financing of the institute. While most peacekeeping trainings in India are run by the CUNPK, it must be understood that training centres are communities with fluid borders. The CUNPK has academic partner institutes, such as the Centre for Land And Warfare Studies (CLAWS) or the United Service Institute of India (USI). The CUNPK is further partnering with other entities, such as UN Women India (UNW), to develop specialised training capsules. India is also a participant in the annual conference of the International Association for Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), where the country representatives exchange best practices and training experiences.

CUNPK offers two types of courses: international and national courses. The national courses are conceptualised for the Indian contingents, which are usually pulled around six months before their first deployment to Delhi. These include for instance, field training exercises. CUNPK also runs seven international courses, which are directed to a more senior military and police audience, such as military contingent officers, military observers, and staff and logistic officers. These courses focus on building leadership capacities, such as the 'Senior Leaders Course', the 'Female Military Officers Course' or focus on a specific issue area, for example on logistics or conflict-related sexual violence. Each of the international courses offers fifteen vacancies for foreign participants, whose travel expenditures, accommodation, meals and training are covered by the Ministry of External Affairs in case the participant is from a country of the Global South.[6] The few permanent staff members of the CUNPK are involved in organising the courses and act as lecturers. Additionally, senior members of the Indian army with prior experience in peacekeeping missions are performing the role of trainer. For specific training modules, such as conflict related and gender-based violence, external experts, i.e. from UN Women design the trainings.

The training scenario in the EU is more complex than in India, given that EU member states are contributing their troops not only through UN missions, but increasingly through other fora, such as NATO and since 2003 operate their own European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations (Koops and Tercovich, 2016). In comparison to India, the EU has thus alternative channels for mission deployments. CSDP missions share many similarities with UN missions. They are following the same core principles of - non-intervention, impartiality and minimum use of force, and many EU missions are in fact operating to support UN missions (Tardy, 2019). The close-knit partnership between the EU and the UN and their shared understanding of crisis management is also reflected in the field of training, where cooperation on training and capacity building is one of the eight priority areas of the UN-EU strategic partnership (UN, 2018). Moreover, the EU policy on training for CSDP clearly states that its 'role is to be compatible and complementary, where appropriate, with training activities carried out by the UN, OSCE, NATO, African Union and other international organisations or individual partner countries' (Council of the European Union, 2017).

Trainings for UN and CSDP missions and operations are primarily conducted by training centres within the member states (Koukhol, 2017). Since 2005, the ESDC has acted as a network college and the only provider of training at the European level (Dubois, 2017). The following discussion will focus on the ideas and the structure guiding the ESDC, as a training cooperation with India at a European level, would at least in its initial stage have to involve the ESDC. The institutes ideational structure is declared in its two-fold mission-statement. On the one hand, within the EU its aim is to support the development of a common European security culture and on the other hand, outside its borders, to 'promote EU values and share best practices in security and defence'.[7]

The ESDC, similar to the CUNPK, has a small number of permanent staff members. Its activities are hosted by Ministries or Permanent Representations, others by EU Institutions or

other EU entities including the European External Action Service (EEAS). Additionally, given its network character, the ESDC relies on more than 165 training institutes within EU member states for the conduct of its trainings (Katsagounos, 2020). These institutes include national defence academies, police colleges, peace universities and diplomatic training institutes, thus a whole range of military, police and civilian partners are involved. A steering committee in which the EU member states are represented provides political guidance to the ESDC. An Executive academic board plays the role of providing academic advice and ensures quality and coherence are maintained in these trainings (Katsagounos, 2020). Apart from the ESDCs efforts to coordinate the EU's peacekeeping training, institutes can exchange best practises during the annual meeting of the European Association for Peace Operation Training Centres (EAPTC). The EU is also represented at the IAPTCs annual meetings by the ESDC and through the institutions of its member states (EEAS, 2017). As India is also part of these meetings, the annual conference offers a space for informal exchanges between Indian and European counterparts.

Courses offered at the ESCD could be divided into those focusing on CSDP missions such as the CSDP orientation course or the pre-deployment training for CSDP missions and operations, and those focusing on specific issue areas, such as security sector reform, sexual and gender-based violence and the recently added course on cyber security. The courses are inclusive and encourage a mix of participants from civilian, military and police backgrounds (Katsagounos, 2020). While most of the participants in these trainings of the ESDC come from EU member states, the training is open to third countries, particularly those which are interested in – or already contributing to CSDP operations. Training cooperation with third countries on a larger scale are however restricted to partnerships with the institutes of the EU's member states, as the ESDC lacks the capacity to conduct these training.[9] Training in the ESDC is conducted by the internal staff of the ESDC with diplomatic, civilian, military and police backgrounds, as

well as external instructors, such as for instance from the European Union Institute for Security Policy (EUISS) (Dubois 2017).

Outlining the ideational and material structure of peacekeeping training communities in India and the EU unravels both complementarities, as well as inhibiting factors. In their external mission, thus, to share best practices in the area of peacekeeping, the ESDC and the CUNPK are largely aligned. In their internal missions, the CUNPK's motivation is to preserve the experiences previously collected by Indian peacekeeper in their participation in UN missions, while the ESDC is driven by the aim to develop a European security culture and to develop and promote 'a common understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel'(ESDC, 2018). These different ideational structures are impacting the material structure of the institutes, i.e. the courses offered, in two different ways. Firstly, the ESDC is focusing on courses with the aim to create expertise on CSDP missions among European member states, as well as third countries. Contrary, the CUNPK prepares its peacekeeper exclusively for UN missions. Nevertheless, as outlined above, the common understanding of crisis management among the EU and UN means that courses can serve as preparation courses for both EU- and UN missions. The Comprehensive Generic Training Peace Operations course (CGTPO) at the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZiF) in Berlin, one of the ESDC's partner institutes, is for instance conceptualised as preparation courses for peace operations of UN, OSCE and EU. Moreover, complementarity of structures between the ESDC and the CUNPK exists in regard to the content of specialised courses, such as for instance gender-based and conflict related sexual violence. Both the Indian and European policymakers have expressed their commitment to integrate gender concerns in peacekeeping trainings at the UN level. Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is thus a shared priority area. Secondly, given that India's peacekeeping contribution is primarily in form of military contingents, preserving India's peacekeeping experiences means foremost to direct CUNPK trainings towards military and to some lesser

extent police officers. This is also reflected in the military background of the trainers and staff at the CUNPK. To qualify as an expert or instructor in the CUNPK is largely influenced by a practitioners' 'on-the-ground' experience within a UN missions. The ESDC on the contrary, aims to create a common understanding of CSDP missions and operations amongst all staff members, that is civilian, military and police, which is reflected in the composition of trainees, staff members, as well as instructors. While some staff members do have previous experiences from mission deployments, others qualify based on their educational background. Among the many partners of the ESDC are however institutes with pre-dominantly military focused outlook, such as defence and military academies. Their material structure is more aligned with the Indian training institute.

Even though there is some complementarity in material and ideational structures, the interaction has been very restricted. Apart from EU member states financing a course for female military officers at the CUNPK, informal interaction during the annual conference of the IAPTC and the invitation of trainer based on personnel connections, the training cooperation is still at a nascent stage (Embassy of the Netherlands, 2018; Naik, 2015; Orchard, 2019).[10]

This missing understanding is partially caused by the 'severe shortage of Indian Foreign Service officers (IFS)', which forces India to focus its limited capacity on countries strategically more important to them than the EU (Bajpai and Chong, 2019, p. 18; Jain and Sachdeva, 2019). The Indian Embassy in Brussel is responsible for Belgium, Luxembourg, as well as the EU and India's military attaché is permanently based in Paris and not aggregated for EU-matters. This is also an expression of India's preference for bilateral defence ties with European member states, foremost France and the UK and to some lesser extent Germany (D'Ambrogio, 2017; Sachdeva, 2015). Similarly, the EU's interest in India as a security partner has only recently made them to recognise the importance to delegate a security advisor to Delhi in order to

facilitate a dialogue on defence and security matters (EEAS, 2017). Accordingly, it has been noted that neither are Indian diplomats able to grasp the working mechanisms of the EU, nor is the EU making the effort to understand the Indian side (Purusottam, 2012). While there are now some mechanisms in place to enhance a joint security cooperation, such as the EU-India Foreign Policy and Security Consultations, as well as rather recently established dialogues in the area of counter-terrorism, cyber-security, non-proliferation, disarmament and maritime security, these are still at a nascent stage and thus have not generated significant results (Allen, 2013). In the area of crisis management and peacekeeping, a security dialogue has not been initiated yet. Apart from a lack of interaction amongst policymakers on both sides, it has been illustrated, that in the area of military-to-military interaction 'uniformed personnel rarely meet at eye level' (Mohan and Rotmann, 2017, p. 5). Since this assessment was conducted, some movement has taken place - such as a joint naval passing exercise in 2017, India's escort of a World Food Program (WFP) vessel of the coast of Somalia in 2018 in support of Operation Atalanta and a visit of high-level EU military representatives to Mumbai and Delhi in 2019. These are only first steps to a an increased engagement (EEAS, 2019; Roy Chaudhury, 2019).[i] Given, this lack of interaction the consensus among interviewees from the peacekeeping training communities has been, that the 'EU India strategic partnership is in semantics rather than substance' and further that peacekeeping and crisis management has remained one of the weakest link in the EU India strategicpartnership.[13]

What drives the practitioners? Discussing the disposition of actors within India's training community

The absence of a more general interaction in the field of security, and particularly in the area of crisis management and peacekeeping has meant that mind sets about the EU among Indian policy making elites and practitioners have remained unchallenged. Three of these perceptions

and ideas, which are characteristic for the disposition of actors in India's training community and which are affecting the chances for a training cooperation with the EU are: the Indian perception of the EU's actorness in peacekeeping; the understanding that the EU is ensuing a different approach to peacekeeping; and the sentiment that India's long-standing peacekeeping contribution means that its role is that of a knowledge transmitter. The EU's actorness in peacekeeping is a disposition which is shaped by shared implicit understandings on the diplomatic as well as instructor level, whereas the question of the differences in approaches in peacekeeping and training are derived from tacit knowledge among the military community. Since the CUNPK is understood as a practice community in which actors interact and develop their common practices, the expectation is that both diplomats, as well as instructors shape the dispositions of the community.

Firstly, one common assessment in the secondary literature is that in India's understanding the EU cannot be considered a credible actor in security and is particularly irrelevant in the Asian security context (Howorth, 2016; Lai et al., 2019; Mohan & Rotmann, 2017; Sachdeva, 2015; Singh, 2019). This also applies in the field of peacekeeping, where the credibility of the EU is questioned by Indian policymakers at two levels. Speaking on behalf of the troop contributing countries, Delhi has criticised financial contributors such as the EU for failing to provide UN peacekeeper with the required equipment and finances to fulfil their mission mandates. Furthermore, there is an impression among policy making elites in Delhi, that the EU – in line with other Western peacekeeping contributors – practises liberal interventionism. Policymakers have, for instance, pointed out that some of the tasks performed by the EU's civilian missions, i.e. the enthusiasm for security sector reform, imposes in a top-down manner liberal templates on the host societies (Allen, 2013; Klossek, 2020). This contradicts, Delhi's advocacy to refrain from interventions which endanger the sovereignty of the host state (De Carvalho and De Coning 2013).[14] As a consequence of this implicit

understanding, Indian policymakers routinely place India with the group of troop contributing countries from the Global South as opposed to the group of financial contributors from the Global North, a category where the EU is placed under. This has created a tradition, whereby India enters into partnerships almost exclusively with countries from the Global South.[15] Within the military training community, the majority of interviewees have expressed some scepticism about the 'on-the-ground' experience of European armies, arguing that they are missing the skills that Indian soldiers acquire during their deployment in India's internal conflicts zones, such as the North-East and Kashmir.[16] They nevertheless consider the EU's actorness in peacekeeping, like that of an 'indispensable partner'.[17] Among other things, they noted that the European armies are very well equipped, professional and can provide specialised assets, such as drones (Gowan 2015).[18] Even more so, it was expressed that the current European absence from UN peacekeeping in the form of 'boots on the ground' is 'inexcusable'.[19]

A second disposition, which finds expression both in the Indian discourse at the UN, as well among the interviewees, is a perceived difference in the culture of operations. Thereby, it is expressed that the engagement of most of the EU member states in the NATO security community, makes the posture of their armies by large more offensive and robust, as compared to an Indian approach.[20] This is contrasted with the working mechanisms of the Indian army, which has been termed as a 'developmental army' or 'developmental peacekeepers', by security analysts within India (Nambiar, 2009, p. 398, cited in Choedon, 2014). The idea of developmental peacekeeper refers to India's internal deployments of the army in many aspects of communal life, such as for instance in the area of disaster relief. It is also thought to depict the ability of the Indian army to build strong community ties (Beri 2008).[21] The 'winning hearts and minds' approach and thus the capacity of Indian troops to reach out to the local population and gain their good-will, is cited as a case in point.[22] Close cultural proximity and a deep understanding for local cultures, in which peacekeeper are deployed are often identified as the

driver for this ability to foster ties with the local communities.[23] The unspoken understanding is that because of India's cultural proximity with other countries from the Global South it is better fit to reach out to the local population, whereas the EU because of its embeddedness in the NATO security community is as an outside actor with more robust and interventionist attitude. All interviewees from India's training community share the understanding, that the difference in military culture is impacting the training philosophy of the EU and India, and subsequently that it creates obstacles for a training partnership.[24]

Thirdly – both Indian and European training communities – understand their capacity in training as grounded in vast experiences and know-how. Consequently, there is an implicit expectation that their institutes will act as places of knowledge transfer, with their instructors in the clear positions as knowledge-providers rather than receivers.[25] Trainers at the CUNPK, as well as Indian senior UN officials, have taken pride in the trajectory of the institute, which has already enabled 1500 foreign participants to profit from India's knowledge in peacekeeping and which is offering courses certified by the UN.[26] The understanding among the training community of being able to transfer knowledge has shaped the external mission of the CUNPK. This has translated into the institute offering a number of training activities for third countries such as sending mobile training teams to Vietnam (2017) and Myanmar (2018), and training Kazakhstan's first ever peacekeeping contingent, which is currently deployed in an Indian battalion in Lebanon (Siddiqui, 2018). Furthermore, India has been conducting a training course for African Partners (UNPCAP) together with the United States since 2015 (Peri, 2016). Similarly, the EU has deployed its training missions in Somalia, Mali, Niger and the Central African Republic, and at the recent UN peacekeeping defence ministerial in 2019 has pledged to provide mobile training teams for pre-deployment training, as well as to provide support for African training centres (United Nations, 2019b; Tor, 2017).

Lastly, doubts about the complementarity of training structures have been expressed among Indian instructors. They pointed out that their training is directed primarily at the military contingents and would not overlap with the EU's comprehensive approach of including military, police and civilians in its trainings and that the EU's focus on CSDP missions is conflicting with India's support of UN missions.

Outlining the dispositions of actors in the Indian training community has revealed that they are motivated by practical imperatives more than abstract motives such as strategic interests (McCourt, 2016). A common denominator of this implicit knowledge is to project the EU as an actor from the Global North, with a liberal approach to peacekeeping, that is more interventionist and robust than what India is advocating. This knowledge among India's training community – both peacekeeping trainers and policymakers – means that in practise India has routinely aligned itself with countries of the Global South and has followed a pattern whereby it enters into training cooperation and partnerships with these troop contributors. In these partnerships, the implicit role allocation is that India is the knowledge transmitter offering training to countries with less experience in peacekeeping. This tacit understanding creates an obstacle for an EU-India training partnership, as the EU's training community has also been claiming for itself the role of knowledge transmitter.

Altering structures of the training communities or shifting the dispositions among actors?

Shifting the focus towards the concept of 'community of practices' and studying peacekeeping training centres through a practise theoretical lens, the paper has argued that a training cooperation between India and the EU can only materialise through complementarity in practice, i.e. if either the structure of the communities or the disposition of actors are favourable for a partnership or can be altered (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Pouliot, 2008).

The analysis has demonstrated that ideational structures of the institutes are not compatible, exemplified in the diverging internal missions of the ESDC and the CUNPK. This internal orientation is shaped by the nature and history of both the parties' contribution to peacekeeping. Their position has thereby been consolidated over time and it is unlikely that underlying ideas and orientations of these institutes will shift. This applies particularly to the Indian case, where the institute was established as a repository of India's experiences collected over the many years of its contribution of 'boots on the ground' since UN peacekeeping's inception in 1948. The ESDC's internal orientation, to create a common understanding of CSDP missions, is reflecting the change in the EU's contribution to peacekeeping, which has been consolidated in the recent years, and now leans towards favouring of CSDP over UN missions (Koops and Tercovich, 2016). While this difference in internal missions has created practise communities with different activities, the analysis has identified some overlaps. Firstly, because of the EU and UN's common understanding of crisis management, courses on CSDP missions cover many similar issue areas, like India's UN pre-deployment trainings (Tardy, 2019). Moreover, area specific courses, such as modules focusing on conflict related and gender- based sexual violence are prioritised by both the ESDC as well as the CUNPK.[27] Furthermore, amongst the partner institutions of the ESDC, are military academies, which in their material structure resemble the CUNPK's setup more closely.

The disposition of actors within the Indian training community might be summarised as follows: the EU is considered a credible actor in the area of peacekeeping, but implicit knowledge among the training communities entails that as the EU's and India's peacekeeping approaches differ, training philosophies are diverging.[28] Nevertheless, unless in other areas of security, where the EU's actorness is questioned by the Indian side, in peacekeeping the EU is considered an 'indispensable' partner.[29] This provides some basis for a partnership, once an implicit understanding of diverging training philosophies is overcome through increased

interaction and exchange.[30] While habits – such as the Indian training community turning towards partners from the Global South – create repetitive patterns of action, these practices can still be changed (cf. Cornut, 2017). The fact, that both the EU and India consider their institutes as places of knowledge transfer, could be channelled into a training cooperation for third countries.

The article has revealed, that practice communities engaging in a seemingly common practice, such as the one of peacekeeping training, can deviate in substantial ways, not evident to the eyes of policymakers, who – when identifying possible areas for cooperation – focus on strategic interests and shared values. These macro-level assumptions fall short of assessing the actual chances for partnerships, which depend more often on factors located at the practioners level. Furthermore, the risk with these macro-level assumptions, such as the widely quoted beliefs among the academic community that India questions the actorness of the EU in security, is that they overlook the differences between security fields. Letting the practitioners share their experience, understanding and perceptions during semi-structured interviews and participant observation has helped the author to identify the remaining obstacles for an EU-India peacekeeping training partnership, while at the same time pointing out areas where training communities are overlapping and where cooperation could materialise.[31]

Conclusion

The EU has shown great interest in deepening its security partnership with India. Peacekeeping training has thereby long-been identified as a promising field for cooperation, but as of now the cooperation has failed to materialise. Setting out to understand this failure for cooperation, the paper has identified the divergence in practice communities (structure and dispositions of actors) in India and the EU as the major obstacle for exploring the common potential of their partnership. At the same time, the findings indicate that by addressing familiarity gaps among

training communities, these divergences can be overcome. While the study has focused on the specific case of training communities in India and the EU, some general reflections can be drawn from the findings.

Overall, the article has shown the explanatory power of practices at the micro-level to point out inhibiting factors for joint partnerships, but also to find complementarities. Unlike earlier contributions which focused on a single practice community, the article has compared two communities engaged in the seemingly universal practice – that of training for peace – and looked for complementarities in its structure and disposition of actors. The focus on practices as the main entry point of research provides an interesting avenue for comparative studies. The type of research required from scholars following a practice approach depends however on a high degree of immersion in the field of study, given that traditional research methods will not be able to uncover the tacit background knowledge guiding practioners, a process which becomes more time-intensive if the study is designed as a comparative analysis. Moreover, the findings suggest that complementary practice communities are the exception rather than the rule, as each training centre is made up off a unique composition of actors and training structures which are developed over time. This acknowledgement of practices as evolving entities means that for future research projects focusing on the likelihood of security cooperation that they would profit from a strong historical angle and a focus on micro-practices in order to grasp the complex setting of structures and actors co-constituting practices.

Ultimately, for Indian and European training communities to merge their efforts into a shared community of practice, a common interest and shared practices are required (Wenger, 1998). The common interest that is deploying well-trained military, police as well as civilian personnel to the mission areas is already given. Sharing practices, expertise and lesson learned among training communities should thus be the way forward.

Notes

1. Some cooperation between the EU and its Asian partners has already materialised, such as for instance China and the Republic of Korea's contribution to the EU's mission anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden or a joint training between Dutch and Chinese troops in MINUSMA Mali.
2. The other key partners identified in the document are the EU's strategic partners Japan, the Republic of Korea and China.
3. See for instance Adler's (2008) study of the NATO security community, Bicchi's (2016) analysis of the EU's diplomatic community in Brussels or Græger's (2016, 2017) study of informal practice communities in the EU-NATO cooperation.
4. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 28, 2018.
5. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
6. Interview with former member of the Indian army, December 27, 2019.
7. see website of the ESDC: https://esdc.europa.eu/who-we-are/
8. https://esdc.europa.eu/courses/
9. Interview with member of ESDC, Brussels, April 30, 2019.
10. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 27, 2018.
11. Interview with member of EEAS, Brussels, March 26, 2019.
12. Interview with member of EEAS, Brussels, 26 March, 2019.
13. Interview with member of EEAS, Brussels, 26 March, 2019; Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
14. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, January 23, 2019.
15. The only partnership with a country from the Global North is a cooperation with the United States for training African peacekeeper. The cooperation materialised because the United States approached India.

16. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
17. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
18. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 27, 2018.
19. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
20. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 27, 2018
21. Interview (skype) with former member of the Indian army, April 2, 2019.
22. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018¸ Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 24, 2018.
23. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, January 23, 2019
24. Interview (written-form) with former member of the Indian army, September 10, 2019.
25. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, January 3, 2019, Interview with Member of EEAS, Brussels, April 3rd, 2019, Interview with member of the Indian army, 17 December 2018.
26. Interview with member of the Indian army, December 17, 2018.
27. This has for instance been reiterated by the EU and India in recent statements at the UN. See, i.e. EU Statement by Clara Ganslandt, Head of Division for Partnerships and Agreements, CSDP EEEAS, UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, March 29, 2019. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/60402/node/60402_fi [Accessed 14 December 2019] and statement by Ms Paulomi Tripathi, Indian First Secretary, UN Peacebuilding Commission, October 21, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/statements __231809450.pdf [Accessed 12 December 2019].
28. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
29. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, December 7, 2018.
30. Interview (skype) with former member of the Indian army, October 24, 2019.

31. Interview with former member of the Indian army, Delhi, January 23, 2019; Interview (skype) with former member of the Indian army, October 24, 2019.

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[i] Interview with member of EEAS, Brussels, 26 March, 2019

Publication 2 – India's 'silent contestation' of the EU's perspective on local ownership

Table 3.1 Bibliographic information of publication 2

Title	India's 'silent contestation' of the EU's perspective on local ownership
Author(s) and Affiliation(s)	Klossek, Lara Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internationals (IBEI)
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Abstract	Local ownership has become a central theme in today's discourse on peacebuilding, with the EU being very vocal in embracing the norm. On the surface, it thus seems that the EU is supported in its perspective on local ownership by the international community at large. Looking more closely at the discourse surrounding peacebuilding practices, it becomes however apparent, that local ownership remains contested, particularly among emerging countries such as India. The chapter, therefore, sets out to explore why and how India is contesting the EU on local ownership, and how far this impacts the legitimacy of the EU's norm. Using document analysis on the EU and India's speeches at the UN, as well as policy documents outlining their peacebuilding strategies, the chapter finds that while India is critical of the content of the norm and the degree of its institutionalisation, it chooses more indirect modes of contestation, such as 'silent contestation'. As a result, the European Union has not been receptive to India's critique. This is amplified, as the EU has developed its perspective on local ownership among like-minded countries, within the OECD-DAC context and hence relies on internal legitimisation of the norm.

India's 'silent contestation' of the EU's perspective on local ownership

Introduction

Peacebuilding has become a central activity to the international community's pursuit of sustainable peace. The rising number of violent conflicts over the last decades and the increasing complexity of conflict scenarios have contributed to this development (Strand, Rustad, Urdal and Nygård, 2019). With conflict centres remaining in many parts of the world, such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen or South Sudan, it is likely that the urge for the international community to engage in peacebuilding activities will not end any time soon. Given the weakening of a shared understanding over the right tools to address conflicts and a diversification of actors, we can thereby see an increasing contestation over the norms guiding peacebuilding endeavours. One of these contested norms is the norm of local ownership, i.e. the importance to include the 'local' into peacebuilding processes to achieve sustainable peace. The European Union has enthusiastically embraced this norm but has been challenged by other countries and the literature in regard to its inability to successfully implement it (Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin, 2018; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012; Ejdus, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2018). The 'new' actors on the scene such as the BRICS and other countries from the Global South have argued that the European Union and other traditional donors are not moving beyond their liberal peacebuilding approaches, which are often tied to a heavy external intervention in the sovereignty of the host state and hence in their eyes fail to ensure local participation (De Carvalho and De Coning, 2013).

At the same time, these new donors have claimed for themselves that their south– south partnerships are more successful in engaging the local population on a horizontal level (Brasilia Declaration, 2010; United Nations, 2018a). India has been particularly vocal in criticising external footprints of traditional donors such as the European Union (United Nations, 2014a).

Looking more closely at their discourse at the UN level, it becomes evident that the contestation is thereby not only over the implementation of the norm but also over its content.

While previous applications of the norm contestation framework in the field of security have substantively dealt with the organising principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), local ownership has not received the same interest (see for instance Glanville, 2015; Hofmann, 2019; Welsh, 2013).

The chapter, therefore, sets out to explore why and how India is contesting the EU on local ownership, and how far this is impacting the legitimacy of European Union's principles and norms. The chapter is based on a document analysis of UN speeches by India and the European Union (125 UN speeches) from 2011 to 2019, other speeches available online that deal with the topic of local ownership and peacebuilding, as well as policy documents which outline India and the European Union's peacebuilding strategies.

The chapter unfolds as follows. The first section gives a background of the norm under contestation and how it emerged in the international system. It further discusses how the European Union understands the norm, and how India, as the contester of the norm, interprets its meaning. Thereafter, the chapter discusses which modes India chooses to express their contestation and how this affects the European Union. Finally, the conclusion gives preliminary findings and offers some theoretical considerations regarding the norm contestation framework.

Whose peace? Locating local ownership within a larger framework of international norms on security governance

As local ownership does not stand as an independent principle, it is important to locate it within the larger framework of norms shaping security governance and the ideas on 'sustainable peace'. This also helps to identify where to place local ownership in Wiener's (2014)

categorisation of different norm types (Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020)[21]. Peace is a fundamental norm laid down in many international treaties. The UN Charter, for instance, names 'maintaining peace and security' as one of its founding principles (see article 1 UN Charter). The goal to maintain peace in the international system is therefore largely undisputed. This unanimity over the fundamental norm of peace is not achieved when it comes to questions of implementation. Since the first (ad-hoc) peacekeeping mission in 1948, a range of different tools emerged. Simultaneously, the norms that guide the international striving for peace have been shifting. Most importantly – with the end of the Cold War – there has been a transformation of the conduct of peacekeeping, which moved beyond maintaining order and settling territorial conflicts between states. Traditional peacekeeping, which had been based on the norms of non-intervention, impartiality and non-use of force, was put aside in favour of more ambitious mandates, which include institutional reforms and involvement in state designs, including liberal ideas and putting 'human security' at the centre of peacekeeping (Seaman, 2014). Aside from a 'negative peace' or the aim to stabilise a conflict situation, the international community now strives for a more sustainable peace, addressing the root causes of conflicts and engaging increasingly in post-conflict scenarios. This thinking was later folded into the nascent peacebuilding concept. Formally, peacebuilding was introduced with Boutros Boutros-

[21] Wiener (2014) has introduced three types of norms, which can be differentiated according to the degree of their specification and their moral outreach. The three categories of norms are fundamental norms, organising principles and standardised procedures. Fundamental norms have the broadest character and are widely recognised in the international system. Organising principles provide more explicit frames to actors and are less comprehensive in their moral outreach. Standardised procedures entail the most detailed instructions for actors on how to implement normative content in their work.

Wiener (2014) has moreover suggested four modes of contestation: arbitration as the legal mode of contestation in courts, deliberation as the political mode of contestation in international organisations and regimes, contention is the societal practice of contestation in societal protests, justification is the moral mode of contestation in epistemic communities

The three stages of norm validation are formal validation of norms at the constituting stage (process of drafting a constitution, treaty, convention), social recognition of norms at the referring stage (different social groups and how they understand appropriate behaviour in given situation) and cultural validation at the implementation stage (individuals and their understanding) (Wiener, 2014 p. 29).

Ghali's ambitious Agenda for Peace in 1992, which acknowledged that – aside from conflict settlement – restoration of core governmental functions as well as economic revitalisation are crucial to achieve peace in the long run (United Nations, 1992, 2000, 2009). While traditional peacekeeping had encompassed a relatively clear toolbox and was characterised by a small number of mandate tasks, peacebuilding has materialised as a far blurrier concept. At the UN level, it was presented as an entirely new norm in its own right. In practice, however, there are a number of overlaps with post-Cold War peacekeeping and peacemaking (Edgar, 2019). The outcome is that there is less intersubjective understanding among countries, as to which activities in security governance they would categorise as peacebuilding, and in whose responsibility these activities should fall.

One commonality is that everyone seems to embrace the idea of local ownership as a pre-requisite for the sustainability of peacebuilding endeavours. The popularity of this idea is today reflected in its extensive use as a catchphrase among policymakers. All major international organisations, such as the UN, EU, AU, OECD and other aid agencies have endorsed the principle in the discourse and in their policy documents (Ejdus and Juncos, 2018; OECD, 2005, 2008, 2011). The term became popular in the 1990s in the development cooperation discourse and 'the language of ownership' as Chesterman (2007) coined it was first used in a document by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) in 1995 (Reich, 2006). The reason it emerged is shaped by a critique of existing programmes of, i.e., IMF and World Bank, and at the same time, a recognition on behalf of the donors and multilateral agencies that sustainable development has to be 'locally owned' (Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Richmond, 2012).

In broad terms, local ownership refers to the importance of peacebuilding efforts to be designed in a manner that the domestic actors have control over the design and implementation

of the peace process (Donais, 2009). Beyond this minimal convergence over the understanding of local ownership, other aspects remain open to interpretation (Ibid.). This is reinforced through its connection with a number of other notions, such as 'local capacity building', 'localisation' and so forth (Ryerson et al., 2018). The major debates among policymakers, as well as academics, are thereby who constitutes 'the local', how ownership should be implemented into peacebuilding projects (top-down, bottom-up or middle-ground) and who should decide over the effectiveness of its implementation (Tartir and Ejdus, 2018).

The European Union sees itself as a 'force for peace and human development' and literature has recognised this role of the EU as a peace project (EEAS, 2017a; Tocci, 2007). Following a growing US retrenchment in security governance, which materialised, for instance, in form of Trump's attempt to cut down on the US' financial contribution to peacekeeping or the decision to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan, the EU has further aimed at stepping up its role as a global security provider (EEAS, 2017b; Gibbons-Neff and Barns, 2019; Williams, 2018). Thereby, the European Union has voiced the importance of long-term peacebuilding and the need to link humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities (Tardy, 2017). For the European Union, the peacebuilding principle encompasses a broad range of activities such as conflict prevention and conflict mitigation (De Coning and Call, 2017). In the EU's own words, expressed both in the 2016 EU Global Strategy as well as in later EU speeches, the integrated approach:

> [p]rovides the framework for a more holistic engagement in external conflicts and crisis to promote human security. It involves conflict resolution and mediation and stresses the importance of local ownership, inclusiveness and the sustainability of actions by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society. (United Nations, 2018b)

The European Union's vision and understanding of peacebuilding is thereby influenced and largely consistent with that of the other OECD countries. Underlying the EU's peacebuilding activities is at its core the norm of 'liberal peace', characterised by the idea that market democracies will be the only guarantors for sustainable peace (Adhikari, 2018; Donais, 2009).

This convergence with the OECD-DAC community of Northern donors has also united the European Union in its discourse on local ownership, which is considered to be driven by a liberal peace agenda (Rayroux and Wilén, 2014). Local ownership has entered the EU policy discussion in the late 1990s (Ejdus, 2018). On the one hand, local ownership was seen as an ideal fit for the European Union's normative framework and one policy document even named it as inherent to the European's approach to international relations (Ibid.). On the other hand, it is a way for the European Union to counter the accusations of having neo-colonial or neo-imperial ambitions shaping their peacebuilding agendas (Rayroux and Wilén, 2014).

The EU has shown a lot of confidence that it has successfully mainstreamed local ownership in their peacebuilding approach and stressed that it is the base for all their ten currently operating civilian missions (EEAS, 2018). The scholarly literature has, however, been far less convinced of this achievement. Case-studies of the failure of implementing ownership in the CSDP missions, ranging from Bosnia, to Kosovo, Afghanistan to Somalia or Mali and so forth (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012). These case studies, have named the European Union's approach to local ownership as overly technical, directed only to the governmental elites in a top-down manner and are doubtful in regard to the EU's success to refrain from imposing their own vision of a sustainable peace (Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin, 2018; Ejdus, 2017; Mac Ginty, 2018). Following the so-called 'local turn' in the peacekeeping literature, the European Union, in recent years, has tried to include other stakeholders than just government elites into their peacebuilding projects, particularly when it comes to aid grants from the European Commission, and it shifted some focus towards women and youth, as well as other marginalised groups (Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin,2018; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Furthermore, the EU has tried to systematically include civil society in their peacebuilding projects. In that regard, the European Commission has, for instance, developed specific *Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society* (European Commission, 2017a).

This shift from government support towards a bottom-up approach is tied to the EU's understanding that a strong civil society is able to hold the government accountable and can thus reinforce democracy (EUGS, 2016). The European Union's support for ownership of civil society could then be understood as an element of its democracy promotion efforts (Pierobon, 2017). Ownership in the European—and more broadly in an OECD context—is therefore strongly tied to the *type 1* norm 'democracy'. This is reflected in the use of the expression 'democratic ownership' in policy documents (OECD, 2007). Given the EU's systematic effort to include local ownership in their peacebuilding approaches, the large amount of funds dedicated to its programmes, and its embeddedness in policy documents and practice, from a theoretical point of view, one could think of local ownership as a 'standardised procedure' (*type 3*) in the EU's peacebuilding projects.

India understands itself as an inherently peaceful and tolerant society that can accommodate an array of different interests and can, therefore, serve as a paragon for other countries, and models its stance in global security governance (Hayes,2016; United Nations, 2012). This confidence is mainly shaped by India's record as a major contributor of 'boots on the ground' to UN peacekeeping missions (United Nations, 2017). As a major troop contributor, India has been very vocal at the UN, which has not been entirely uncritical about the inclusion of peacebuilding tasks in the mandates of peacekeeper. India acknowledges that peacekeepers are 'early peacebuilders'. But the Indian government argues that the integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should only take place to the extent that is required to build sustainable peace and furthermore 'that humanitarian and development actors and other peacebuilders and peacekeepers all have different tasks and priorities' (United Nations, 2015a). Recognising a strong connection between socioeconomic grievances as barriers to sustainable peace, Delhi considers many peacebuilding tasks to fall within the category of development cooperation, rather than in the mandate responsibility of the peacekeeper.

India has consequently refrained from distinguishing in their discourse or policy documents peacebuilding from its other development cooperation programmes (Singh, 2017). A state official has even pointed out that a distinction is nothing more than 'academic hair splitting' (Ibid., p. 88). For Delhi, peacebuilding, therefore, includes an even broader range of activities, such as studentships and technical training, humanitarian relief, grants, lines of credits, loans and so forth (Mawdsley, 2012). Furthermore, unlike 'traditional' donors such as the European Union, India does not differentiate between conflict-affected, post-conflict and stable developing countries when it comes to decisions over development cooperation (Mullen, 2017). Overall, India has attempted to position its development cooperation as different from that of Northern donors—claiming to meet with their partners on an eye-to eye-level rather than in a typical donor–receiver relationship and laying its focus on fostering economic growth with a strong focus on engaging the private sector, rather than poverty reduction (Mawdsley and Roychoudhury, 2016). In order to keep their flexibility in regard to delineating their development cooperation, India has preferred to stay largely outside of the OECD-DAC structures and has, at the same time, attempted to shift the discourse on international development cooperation. The conference on aid effectiveness in Busan, has thereby been pointed out as a turning point. India and other emerging countries have successfully shifted the focus away from poverty reduction and good governance, towards a stronger stress on development (Ibid., 2014, 2018, 2019). The literature has even spoken about the 'southernisation' of development (Ibid., 2018). With India and other emerging powers' increasing projection of normative power in the international system, it is important to analyse their stance on local ownership.

In the Indian scenario, the support for local ownership is largely shaped by its own historical experience as a colony characterised by the intervention and imposition of an outside power. This led to a stress on state sovereignty in India's international position, which today is

still reflected in India's reluctance of having the international community intervene in a country's internal conflicts. An example is India's position on the Kashmir issue, which India understands as a bilateral one that does not require an outside mediation. Consequently, India considers the UN mission in Kashmir (UNMOGIP) obsolete (Miglani, 2014). Similarly, they have refrained from supporting interventions on humanitarian grounds, such as 2011 in Libya (Bloomfield, 2015; United Nations, 2011a). The meaning of local ownership for India is therefore mainly shaped in its negativity or opposition: non-intervention, no outside imposition and a refusal to engage in 'liberal peacebuilding' projects or in Delhi's words: 'the external footprint should be light to avoid any outcomes of neo-colonialism or humanitarian intervention' (United Nations, 2014a). The belief is further that the primary responsibility for maintaining peace is with the host government, which means that the majority of India's activity is directed towards capacity-building of the government (United Nations, 2014b). Local ownership is thus connected to *type 1* norms, such as non-intervention and sovereignty. While in the case of the European Commission, local ownership at least in theory, is referring to the civil society and their participation in peacebuilding and the idea that stabilisation is only possible in a democratic and inclusive environment, for Delhi local ownership means to respect the state sovereignty and to support the host government in their aim to stabilise and rebuild the country (United Nations, 2011b). In other words, local ownership and 'national ownership' overlap in an Indian discourse. This division between traditional donors and emerging donors over ownership also came to the fore during the conference in Busan, where countries positioned themselves as either supporting a reading of ownership as 'country ownership' or 'democratic ownership' (Carothers, 2015). India's reading of ownership as 'state ownership' is thus reflective of its reluctance to engage in democracy promotion and its scepticism towards liberal peacebuilding approaches. For the Indian government, local ownership in Wiener's

categorisation of international norms then has to be understood as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding and thus as an 'organising principle' (*type 2*).

Deliberation, justification, 'silent contestation', and questions over contestatory practice

India's contestation of the EU's understanding of local ownership is primarily restricted to the discourse and takes place at the UN level. Its preferred mode of contestation is of political one and can be considered, what (Wiener, 2014; see also Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020) termed 'deliberation'. India thus addresses "rules and regulations with regard to transnational regimes according to semi-formal soft institutional codes" (Wiener, 2014, p. 2). It should, however, be noted that the term 'deliberation' is somewhat misleading in an Indian context, as one of the major contestations of the Indian side has been the structure of the UN system itself. Delhi has argued that the limitations of the membership in the UN Security Council and the decision-making processes are precisely not deliberative – in the sense that it does not give an equal voice to each member state – and endangers the legitimacy of the UN's actorness as the 'custodian of global peace, security and development' (UN, 2015a). This criticism of the structures of the UN systems and the power of the UNSC are the starting point for most of India's contestations in security governance. It applies, for instance, in the area of peacekeeping where India has continuously pointed towards Article 44 of the UN charter that would allow for consultations with the troop-contributing countries in terms of mandate formulation (United Nations, 2014c). It is also named as a reason for India's resistance to recognise the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Linton, 2018). It is, therefore, important to keep in mind questions of access (or lack thereof) to contestation (Wiener, 2017). Particularly, since many scholars have predicted that a continuing denial of a voice for India in international fora will make India less willing to enter into negotiations over international norms in the form of deliberation at the UN level and will push them towards contestation outside of these

structures (Lettinga and Van Troost, 2015). Finally, before diving into a discussion of Delhi's contestation of the European Union, it is necessary to point out that in their narrative of contestation, it often does not distinguish between the European Union, Europe or NATO, but refer to these actors with the umbrella term: the 'West'.

As discussed above, India and the European Union have both recognised the value of local ownership for their peacebuilding and development projects, but they have distinct interpretations over its meaning. India's interpretation of local ownership as 'national ownership' is in itself constructed as a contestation of the meaning of the norm as promoted by the European Union, by building upon the argument that the West has not moved away from imposing their standardised liberal models of peace in the host societies. Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, former permanent representative of India to the UN has argued that '[p]eacebuilding needs to integrate indigenous and informal justice mechanisms into judicial reforms, instead of viewing them as incompatible with western liberal values' (United Nations, 2014a). Many statements by Indian policymakers, such as that of Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, reflect on this contestation of a liberal peace agenda, which ignores the local conflict environments: '[n]ational ownership is the key determinant of success in peacebuilding. The international community can encourage, motivate and facilitate. It cannot solve those problems which require national will and national ownership' (United Nations, 2011c). Attached to this debate is a feeling that the West is behaving in a teacher-like role vis-à-vis the developing world. Addressing this issue, India's former Minister of External Affairs Mr. S. M. Krishna has stressed the importance of avoiding these top-down approaches:

> Prime Minister Indira Gandhi once said that 'a nation's strength ultimately consists in what it can do on its own, and not in what it can borrow from others'. The international community can encourage, motivate and facilitate (…) The new orthodoxy of talking down rather than listening, must be avoided at all costs. (United Nations, 2011d).

The Indian government's support for ownership as an opposition to outside intervention also stretches into the area of human rights, which is often associated as a component of the liberal

peace agenda. In Myanmar, for instance, where the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state by security forces and Buddhist militias, has led to a humanitarian crisis. Delhi took the position that 'every state has the right to organise its internal affairs, including in the field of human rights' (United Nations 2015b). Consequently, it considered technical assistance, cooperation and a strong partnership with the Myanmar government as the only way to stabilise the country and opposed any unilateral actions (United Nations, 2015b; Viraj, 2018; Yhome, 2018). The European Union on the contrary, which emphasises a value-based human rights focused diplomacy, decided to issue travel bans and freeze assets of members of the Myanmar military (European Council, 2018).

The Indian government also projects its own role or identity as an international actor in peacebuilding or development cooperation as distinct from the European Union (Richmond and Tellidis, 2014). It claims for itself that its development cooperation 'ensures that all plans and programmes are implemented under national ownership and through national institutions', are free of conditionalities and that it meets with the host country on an eye-to-eye-level rather than in a typical donor–recipient relationship (Ministry of External Affairs (India), 2017). This also explains why Delhi has refrained from using terms such as 'developing aid' and has instead stressed the 'cooperative' character of the interaction. Building on a discourse of south–south cooperation and the understanding that India's own success story of poverty alleviation and economic development will be valuable for other developing countries, India perceives its own development cooperation projects as truly 'locally owned'. This narrative of a 'southern' alternative to peacebuilding and development cooperation, which is characterised by '[p]rinciples of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit' is also uniting India with other developing and emerging countries, as reflected in the narratives that are guiding the IBSA or the Non-Alignment Movement (Brasilia Declaration, 2010; United

Nations, 2018a). A similar rhetoric is also intrinsic to India's engagement with Africa, where Prime Minister Modi at the last India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015 had stressed on their commonalities in regard to their historical past as 'great civilisations', but also 'former colonies' and their partnership being based on 'emotional bonds' and 'solidarity', rather than 'economic considerations' (Prime Minister's Office, 2015). Political contestation in the form of deliberation is complemented here by moral contestation or justification (Wiener, 2014, p. 2). Following the Indian argumentation, peacebuilding activities by traditional donors are almost always bound to fail in terms of understanding the local population and to move away from a top-down approach, as they do not have the same affinity or closeness with the countries in which they operate. As Mawdsley (2012, p. 266), in her analysis of southern development actors put it: '[b]y making these assertions of subaltern expertise, and grounding development assistance in shared experiences and challenges, the Southern donors construct a distinct position for themselves in the foreign aid arena from those of the North.' Contestation of the EU's understanding of local ownership is, therefore, materialising in terms of a clear association with the developing world in their own respective fora, rather than working together with the Western donors as represented in the OECD-DAC. This also includes the creation of new fora that operates parallel to the ones associated with the Western liberal order, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) founded by the BRICS (Ollapally, 2018).

In terms of India's success to implement this alternative to liberal peace and Western aid practices in form of a 'truly locally' owned 'southern' model of cooperation, the literature has shown a mixed picture. Some of the literature has concluded that India does not move beyond implementing liberal peace 'with a southern twist' and consequently will face the same local resentments (Kenkel, 2016, p. 381; Mukherjee, 2015). This applies particularly to India's engagement in its own neighbourhood but has also been discussed in regard to its inability to sensitively deal with its own internal conflicts in the North East and Kashmir (Malone, Mohan,

and Raghavan, 2015; Pogodda, Mac Ginty, and Richmond, 2014). An example is Delhi's involvement in the peace process in Nepal in the aftermath of the Nepalese civil war. Delhi had successfully been lobbying at the UN for a limited UN mission without provisions for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction (Suhrke, 2011). Later, Delhi had used this as a narrative to portray itself as the protector of 'Nepalese ownership' in the peacebuilding process (Ghimire, 2018; Richmond and Tellidis, 2014). At the same time, it has actively tried to shape and mediate the peace process and had used its influence in its direct neighbourhood (Martin, 2012). Other scholars have been more positive about India's success to provide an alternative to liberal peacebuilding models which ignore local pre-conditions (Chanana, 2010). In Afghanistan, it has, for instance, been noted that India—with its 'non-invasive character'—managed to establish itself as the most popular foreign actor in the country (Destradi, 2014; Mishra 2018). India's engagement has also been highlighted for introducing the policy of 'Afghanization', which refers to Delhi's practice of giving direct payments to the Afghan government for capacity-building projects, which are free of any conditionalities (Peral, 2012). This practice has deepened the relations of India with the central government and other local authorities (Kavalski, 2015).

Afghanistan also serves as an example, where India and the European Union's discourse on local ownership has been an essential part of their peacebuilding and development cooperation initiatives, with both actors declaring that their engagement is focusing on 'Afghanistan's priorities', and a peace process that is 'Afghan-led, Afghan-owned broad-based and inclusive' (Bose, 2019; EEAS, 2019; Indian Embassy Kabul, n.d.). As discussed above, there is thus convergence in terms of recognising the importance of local ownership as a goal for their engagement with Afghanistan. There is also substantial convergence in terms of priority areas for India and the European Union, such as training of security forces, capacity building and infrastructure projects (Sachdeva, 2016). This convergence has however not

translated into a meaningful cooperation between the largest international, respectively, largest regional donor in Afghanistan, and Brussels and Delhi have operated largely in isolation (Joshi, 2017; Mohan, Kumar, and Xavier, 2016; Mullen, 2017).

Many explanations for this lack of cooperation build upon the argument that the Indian government does not perceive the European Union as a credible actor in security and is unimpressed with its track record in Afghanistan, thereby contesting the actorness of the EU itself (Howorth, 2016; Sachdeva, 2014). This might serve as an explanation for India's reluctance to join the EU's CSDP missions, even though Brussels has shown a keen interest to get Delhi on board (EUGS, 2016; Joshi, 2017). Additionally, three other explanations can be put forward. First of all, while both actors might agree on the importance of security sector reform and, in particular, to train the security forces in Afghanistan, India is traditionally very cautious about joining force with the EU, as it associates its practices with the imposition of Western norms and principles of security governance and a poor understanding of local structures (Adhikari, 2018). In an assessment of the state of police reform, Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, had repeatedly pointed out that '[g]iven the scarcity of resources, the priorities should be ensuring impartiality in recruitment and vetting and training new recruitments rather than seeking to make cultural change a central aspect of police reform' and further that the '[f]ocus on the political dimension of police reform will only be controversial and perhaps counter-productive' (United Nations, 2014d, 2015a). This statement aligns India with other emerging countries' preference for a pragmatic approach to security sector reform, which focuses less on liberal notions of transparency, accountability and democratic control. While the EU is not openly acknowledging Delhi's contestation regarding over-ambitious security sector reform ideas, its peacebuilding practices have often automatically adapted to ground realities in a manner that its ambitious agenda driven by liberal values and the idea to change security culture had to

make space to a security-focused government-led process (Sedra, 2013). Secondly, India's understanding of local ownership as state ownership has led them to engage almost exclusively with state-led agencies rather than civil society organisations (CSOs), which the European Union is strongly promoting in their own approach (Mawdsley and Roychoudhury, 2016). This also has to do with the idea among some of the governmental elites in India, that CSOs are being instrumentalised to promote the agenda of their donors. A shut-down of foreign-funded non-governmental organisations and CSOs in India, in recent years, is an expression of these accusations (Brechenmacher and Carothers, 2018). Lastly, India has established itself as popular actor in Afghanistan, and constructed its role as a southern donor whose engagement is characterised by mutual cooperation and a respect for state ownership as an alternative to traditional peacebuilding (Sinha, 2017). Cooperation with the European Union in that sense might hamper this self-proclaimed image. Aside from a first path of politically criticising the Western failure of implementing the local ownership principle in their peacebuilding practices (deliberation) and a moral contestation in terms of questioning the ability of traditional donors to comprehend the needs of the Global South, Delhi has therefore chosen a third path of 'silent contestation' or actively choosing to refrain from cooperation with the traditional donor countries. In many conflict scenarios, the EU and India have therefore talked at cross purposes and operated in parallel. Contestation, in this case, becomes visible without even encountering each other. Furthermore, the outlined case of Afghanistan and the actors entering a direct confrontation or example of 'silent contestation' support the argument of Wiener (2004, 2014, 2018), that even seemingly universally shared norms, which have found many advocates at the international level, remain contested at the implementation stage.

Looking at the major characteristics of India's contestation vis-à-vis the European understanding of local ownership, as outlined in the section above, the chapter argues that India's contestation remained 'soft' (Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp and Barbé, 2020). This

categorisation is justified in several ways. First of all, India does not contest the norm itself, but rather its meaning-in-use. Secondly, India often voices contestation in fora where the European Union is either not present, i.e. during BRICS summits or if present—such as in the UN—has restricted its verbal attacks in most cases. Thirdly, India's 'silent contestation' at the implementation stage of the norm has meant that instead of articulating a direct critique, India has simply ignored the EU's efforts on local ownership.

Outcome: rethinking legitimacy of local ownership?

Being challenged on having neo-colonial or neo-imperial ambitions shaping their peacebuilding agendas and undergoing a learning process in terms of effectiveness of liberal peacebuilding approaches, the EU has over the last decade increasingly stressed the importance of local ownership (Rayroux and Wilén, 2014). One could thus argue that the persistent critique of India and other developing countries has at least partially contributed to putting local ownership on the agenda in the first place. During the institutionalisation process of the norm and after it made its way into the policy discussions, the EU has however developed and maintained its own distinct understanding of the principle. In this understanding of local ownership—especially in the reading of the Commission—the main goal is to include as many society groups into peacebuilding and state-building interventions (Vogel, 2016). External contestation over the content of the principle, such as the one put forward by India, has thereby not impacted or fuelled the discussion over its legitimacy in the EU context.

For the European Union, it has been easy to ignore India's critique as they have alternative channels available for implementing their understanding of local ownership without having to consider external contestation, such as their own CSDP missions. Similarly, in development cooperation, they have played a leading role in defining local ownership in their club of like-minded Northern donors within the OECD-DAC context. This common

understanding of local ownership in the OECD-DAC context has also helped to foster the EU's belief in local ownership as a universally accepted standardised procedure (*type 3* norm) for peacebuilding projects.

With a growing influence of emerging countries in peacebuilding and developing cooperation (material, as well as normative) and a changing international system, it is, however, questionable if the EU will be able to maintain the legitimacy of local ownership solely internally. The EU has always put an emphasis on multilateral solutions, and in the Global Strategy, pledged to '[p]ursue a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution' (EUGS, 2016 p. 19). Entering into a dialogue with India and other emerging countries over the interpretations of international norms in the field would be necessary to live up to this self-proclaimed goal and increase legitimacy of the EU's foreign policy norms, such as local ownership. Shared meaning over norms can potentially be reached through more open deliberation among the different players present in conflict scenarios (Hansen-Magnusson, Vetterlein and Wiener, 2018). This would create the 'conditions for sustainable normativity' at the meso-level (organising principle) and enable actors at the implementation stage of norms to go beyond the formulation of a common goal (Ibid., 2018, p. 9).

Conclusion

The discussion has shown that divergent histories, as well as legal and political contexts, have shaped the emergence of local ownership in the EU and India's discourse, whereby both actors have settled for their own interpretation in terms of its meaning and degree of institutionalisation (organising principle and alternative to liberal peace vs. standardised procedure). India's preferred modes of contestation: deliberation, justification and 'silent contestation'—and the EU's availability of alternative channels for its peacebuilding

activities—have thereby led to a minimum of exchange and constructive debate over the meaning of local ownership. On the contrary, local ownership seems to be exploited by policymakers as a 'rhetorical cover' to claim what they are not. Brussels is using it to counter accusations of imposing liberal models of peace to local contexts and Delhi is claiming it for constructing their development cooperation as an alternative to northern donors (Chandler, 2011, p.87). Together with the fact that robust empirical research has shown that, in practice, international actors have struggled to implemented local ownership, this raises serious questions over the legitimacy and global character of this norm (Lemay-Hérbert and Kappler, 2016).

Regarding the literature on local ownership, there has been a great effort to critically distinguish between international and local actors and their divergent understandings of local ownership and the success of its implementation (Rayroux and Wilén, 2014). Most of these studies have thereby focused on the European Union and have overlooked other international actors active in peacebuilding. This Eurocentrism of the literature creates the impression that the principle of local ownership has originated among the 'Western' donor community. While this might hold true for the standing term 'local ownership', it seems quite far-fetched to claim that prior to the 1990s, no country had aimed to conduct peacebuilding in a way that is sensitive to the local pre-conditions and had argued that conflict resolution must be locally owned. As norms and principles are difficult to operationalise, a lot of the existing literature bases their analysis on an assessment of policy documents. This makes the European Union an easier case to study than a country like India, which has not produced many policy documents that would outline their approach to peacebuilding or peacekeeping. The above-discussed example of India's discourse and contribution serves as a reminder that these claims of the principle being intersubjectively held among the international community, emerged in the 'Western' donor

community and then was made popular among 'the Rest' are flawed. Here, the framework of norm contestation proves as a great analytical tool to unravel these tendencies.

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Publication 3 – The 'female boot on the ground': Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations

Table 4.1 Bibliographic information of publication 3

Title	The 'female boot on the ground': Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations
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Abstract	The Indian government has presented itself as a champion of gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping. At the same time, the domestic security sector in India continues to create a gender-segregated environment and experiences of uniformed women in the field show remaining barriers for gender equity. Given this contradiction, the article examines the ambivalence inherent to Indian gender mainstreaming of peacekeeping units. We argue that transnational norms, such as gender mainstreaming, are embedded in larger norm bundles, and we combine the literature of norm localisation and norm contestation in our conceptual framework to illustrate how India localises parts of the gender mainstreaming norm bundle while contesting others. We find that India's localisation of the gender mainstreaming norm has meant to pursue an asymmetric gender-parity approach between different branches of the Indian security forces and that it has fomented a division of labour within the police corps. Moreover, we illustrate how India contests the idea of placing women in security-sensitive areas, in combat roles, and gender-integrated police units.

The female 'boot on the ground': Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations

Introduction

The Indian government, headed by prime minister Narendra Modi, holds that the country has taken the lead in international efforts to ensure the increased presence of women in peacekeeping operations (PMI, 2015, October 13). Testimony to Indian efforts has, in part, been the country's decision to deploy an all-female police unit to Liberia (2007-2016). The unit was the first-ever all-women team in UN peacekeeping history and deemed as a gist which 'certainly raised the profile of female peacekeepers in general' (Dharmapuri, 2013; Pruitt, 2016). Moreover, an Indian Female Engagement Team is currently serving as part of a Rapidly Deployable Battalion in the UN Mission MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2019-2020), and India has pledged to assemble additional all-female units for UN peacekeeping service (PMI, 2019, April 11). Aside from deploying more female 'boots on the ground', the country has been active in terms of training future peacekeepers on gender-sensitive topics. India's Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping offers courses on conflict-related sexual violence and a leadership course for female military officers drawn from different troop-contributing countries (Naik, 2015). It has been argued that India has strived to become 'the champion in terms of training personnel from across the globe on gender-related issues'.[1] The Indian endeavours have been encouraged and warmly welcome in UN peacekeeping circles (Pruitt, 2018). It is seen as a substantial contribution to gender mainstreaming, and female empowerment in peacekeeping contexts, which has been an objective for the UN since the Women, Peace and Security agenda was first adopted two decades ago (Stiehm, 1999). Moreover, the Indian contribution is vital to the UN's continued efforts to increase the number of civilian and military women peacekeepers which, albeit, consistent attempts to the contrary, remain low. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed frustration over the latter in

connection with the launch of the UN's *2018-2028 Gender Parity Strategy*. Guterres has stated that although

> [p]eacekeeping is the most visible face of the United Nations […] The fact that only 3% of UN peacekeepers and 10% of police are women hampers our protection reach and operational effectiveness and sends the wrong message about who the UN serves and represents (UN, n.d.)

However, while the Indian government and the UN have reiterated their strong support for gender mainstreaming UN peacekeeping operations, the experience of uniformed Indian women show that many institutional and socio-cultural barriers stand in their way for greater professional gender parity whether at home or on duty. This article ponders the opportunities and challenges inherent to Indian gender mainstreaming through the analytical framework combining norm localisation and norm contestation. We argue that Indian efforts are fraught with determined ambivalence which sets the Indian gender mainstreaming norm in UN peacekeeping at variance with global objectives. The article uses a qualitative case-study approach to explore these topics. It draws upon 25 interviews carried out between 2019 and 2020, as well as speeches, official documents such as government reports and secondary literature. Interviews were conducted with members of the all-female police unit and the Female Engagement Team, representatives of UN Women India, as well as members of the Indian army. Interviews were conducted in-person in semi-structured form, as well as in the form of an online questionnaire. Thematically the questions focused on the work and experience of female peacekeeper in the mission scenario and in the national security sector and whether they felt there exist divergences. The reading of the transcripts has been a re-iterative process, which started with inductively identifying re-occurring themes in the interviews. The findings were then compared to pre-understandings of the field and contextualised within the relevant literature on norm contestation and norm localisation. The first section sets up the background for women peacekeeping in the UN and Indian settings, literature review and conceptual

framework. The second section provides an overview of the empirical cases. The third section analyses the Indian ambivalence through the norm localisation and norm contestation binary.

Gender mainstreaming UN peacekeeping operations and analytical framework

The United Nations' *Women Peace and Security Agenda* was initiated in 2000 and has since become a 'norm bundle' consisting of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and nine follow-up resolutions (True and Wiener, 2019). The Agenda, with all its attendant resolutions, has been hailed as a major step forward towards both gendering the impact of conflict, as well as the necessity for including women in the different phases of peace making and conflict resolution. In terms of peacekeeping, UNSC Resolution 1325 contains a specific call for increased female presence in UN field-based operations, especially in terms of military observers and civilian police. The Resolution, therefore, encourages willing member states to increase the number of their female security sector personnel and to offer specialised training for all peacekeepers on the protection of women and children. The Department for Peacekeeping Operations reacted to the call of Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions with a Policy Directive on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations (2006) outlining the obligations for mission personnel to facilitate gender mainstreaming. In 2008 and 2010, guidelines for police and military in the mission were issued, in order to provide them with the tools to translate the agenda into practice. Other measures put into place are the creation of the figure of gender advisors, of gender focal points and gender-sensitive training for peacekeepers (Simić, 2014). In their 2018 *Declaration of Shared Commitments to UN Peacekeeping Operation* the UN member states and relevant institutions vowed to renew the organisation's commitment to gender issues, by stating:

> [w]e collectively commit to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda and its priorities by ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process and by systematically integrating a gender perspective into all stages of analysis, planning, implementation and reporting. We further recommit to increasing the number of civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping at all levels and in key positions (UNSG, 2018).

The 2018-2028 *Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy* – an outcome of extensive consultation with military, police, and justice and corrections components, as well as the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN Women and the troop- and police-contributing countries – provides a roadmap to achieve such goals in terms of female peacekeeping (UNDPO, 2018; Ferrari, 2019). The Strategy acknowledges that a set of persistent gender barriers in member states, as well as in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, have impacted women peacekeepers negatively, and pledges to correct them (UNDPO, 2018). It suggests overcoming these barriers by creating a more enabling environment for women in headquarter and the field, to facilitate female recruitment and options for women to participate in peacekeeping training. The Strategy also stipulates gender targets, such as a requirement for troop-contributing countries to create engagement teams with at least 50 per cent women as part of each infantry battalion from the year 2021 onwards. The Strategy finally warns that troop-contributing countries might not be deployed if they are unable to meet the stipulated quotas.

India's commitment to gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping

India is a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping; some indeed argue that peacekeeping is the very hallmark of the country's commitment to multilateralism and the United Nations (Gowan and Singh, 2013). The country is among those which numerically has contributed most troops to UN peacekeeping operations over time and since 2000 the government has pledged to increase its share of female troop contribution for such operations (PMI, 2018, October 30). Female Indian peacekeepers can, in principle, be drawn from any part of the country's security sector. The security forces consist of the Indian Armed Forces (Indian Army, the Indian Navy

and the Indian Air Force), the Central Armed Police Forces (Assam Rifles, National Security Guard, Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force, *Sashastra Seema Bal* (Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan Border Police), Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Forces) and the civilian police. Numbers of women personnel are, however, modest across the different sets of Indian security forces. For example, of the 1.4 million active personnel in the Indian armed forces in 2019, less than 4 per cent women served in the Indian army, 6 per cent in the navy and 13 per cent in the air force. As for paramilitary forces – where the women peacekeepers have been drawn from until date – the Central Reserve Police Force, for example, as the largest armed police force of India employs almost 300,000 police officers of which a mere 2.65 per cent are women. In terms of the civilian police, a recent report based on government data found that 7.28 per cent of India's police force are women (Tata Trust, 2019). The government has time and again reiterated its will to encourage more women to join the Indian security forces (Press Information Bureau (GOI), 2019) . Most recently, Union Minister Kiran Rijiju announced the government's intention to set the targets for overall female personnel to 15 per cent for the Central Reserve Police Force and the Central Industrial Police Force and at 5 per cent for the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and the *Sashastra Seema Bal* (Print, 2019, January 8). The federal government has also instructed the Indian states to increase the number of women in the civilian police to 33 per cent.[22]

Norm localisation and norm contestation of transnational norm cluster

To explore Indian female UN troop contributions, we have chosen to combine insights and analytical parameters from the literature on norm localisation as well as norm contestation. Norm localisation is the idea that non-domestic norms are reinterpreted, re-represented and reconstituted to make them congruent with a pre-existing local normative order (Wolters, 1999).

[22] None of these quotas have not been met to date.

Norm localisation thereby focuses on the agency role of local actors, normally the country's socio-political elite, in the norm "translation" process and holds that domestic political, organisational, historical or cultural variables play an essential role in conditioning the diffusion of international norms (Checkel, 2001; Legro, 1997). Acharya, therefore, highlights that:

> [i]nstead of just assessing the existential fit between domestic and outside identity norms and institutions, and explaining strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance or rejection, localisation describes a complex process and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms […] and local beliefs and practices (Acharya, 2002, p. 241).

Norm localisation can thus be found in the active construction of foreign ideas by local actors through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection, which results in what Wolters calls a 'local statement [of the transnational norm] into which foreign elements have retreated' (Wolters 1999, p.57). We contrast norm localisation here with norm contestation, as in the Indian gender mainstreaming of its security forces and peacekeeping operation we find elements of both. Similarly, to norm localisation, the norm contestation literature see norms as intersubjective standards of appropriate behaviour, dependent on the interpretation of meanings and legitimacy given to them by the agent and their spatiotemporal context (Krook and True, 2012; Tully, 2002; Wiener, 2014). This may give rise to differentiated local understanding of a transnational norm, where the distance between the transnational norm and the local context might be too far to bridge. The resulting norm incongruence prompts contestation, i.e. acts of discursive expressions of disapproval of the norm or its practices, with the aim to establish the nascent or continued norm legitimacy (Tully, 2002; Wiener, 2014). Norm contestation has major implications for norms and their legitimacy, not only for the contesters' mismatched expectations but also for norm performative practices in and beyond the political community (Johansson-Nogués et.al., 2020). In India, it is, for instance, unacceptable to send women to dangerous deployments, given the risk that they might be captured. This has to do with the construction of women as nation bearers, protecting and embodying the values and honours of

the Indian community. Capturing of female personnel and the possibility of violation of female bodies is equalised with a national dishonour.

The critique that we issue here to both sets of norm literature is their inherent tendency to focus on single-issue norms or simple norm structures. This overlooks that most transnational norms, such as in our case, gender mainstreaming of peacekeeping operations, are nested, embedded or "bundled" (Bloomfield and Scott, 2016). This may give rise to localisation or congruence of parts of a complex and multi-dimensional norm-bundle, while norm contestation may simultaneously occur in other parts of the same bundle. In sum, our argument here is that India norm localises part of the gender-mainstreaming norm bundle in its peacekeeping operations while contesting others. It is in this tension inherent to norm localisation and contestation that we find the Indian ambivalence on female boots on the ground in UN missions.

India's gendered peacekeeping contributions and training

All-Female Police Unit, Liberia 2007-2016

In 2007 India deployed the UN's first-ever All-Female Formed Police Unit, to the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Drawn from the Central Reserve Police Force's *mahila* ("women") battalions, the unit consisted of approximately 112 female police officers and some male supporting staff (Pruitt, 2016). The unit, which was operative until 2018, was stationed in the Liberian capital Monrovia. Its mandate included tasks such as the protection of UN staff and local authorities within the country, provision of security during local events, riot control, as well as mentoring and assisting local security institutions, such as the Liberian National Police and the Liberian Armed Forces (UNMIL (OGA), 2010 September). As part of their deployment, the All-Female Police Unit was, for instance, called upon to guard the office of Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. While initially the UN had envisioned a rotation system for this task among the different police units, Johnson-Sirleaf specifically requested the

all-female unit to be in charge for the duration of their deployment. This was seen as a significant gist of recognition of the Indian all-female unit's professional competency (UNMIL (OGA), 2010 September). The all-female unit also successfully provided public order management in cooperation with other UN- and Liberian police officers during Liberia's crucial elections in 2011; the second elections after the end of the civil war and the first one organised by the Liberians themselves (UNMIL (OGA), 2010 September).

In addition to carrying out regular police work, the unit was tasked to serve as professional role models for local women and girls. For this reason, officers and constables of the All-Female Police Unit visited local colleges to inform on career options for women in the security sector.[2] The outreach programs served to increase the visibility of the all-female unit among locals. Furthermore, the all-female unit was also responsible for carrying out reporting on cases of sexual and gender-based violence in Monrovia. It is also worth mentioning that the Indian female police unit engaged in community-outreach work on their own initiative alongside their official mandate. For example, they offered free medical services, clean drinking water to the local population, alongside a range of classes in local schools such as self-defence, dance, computer or knitting classes. The all-female unit also adopted an orphanage close to their compound, helping with its day-to-day running.[3]

The Indian government's assessment of the All-Female Police Unit has been that the decade long UNMIL deployment served to impact the local setting positively. However, it should be noted that in governmental circles the Indian female peacekeepers have been valued more for their symbolism and capabilities to act as goodwill ambassadors, than their contribution to the eventual pacification or public order management of Liberia. Governmental officials, in this sense, have highlighted the value of the Indian female police officers in terms of providing 'a role model to the local women to participate in policing' (PMI, 2019, March

20). India's then-ambassador to the UN, Tanmaya Lal, has asserted that in the aftermath of the All-Female Police Unit deployment, the number of Liberian women entering into the security sector increased threefold (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2016; PMI, 2017, May 15). The Indian government also indicates that the female Indian peacekeepers in Liberia, for their voluntary work of offering self-defence or computer classes as well as medical and water services, 'set an example of what women can achieve through community engagement' (PMI, 2019, March 20).

Female Engagement Team, Congo 2019-

India deployed its first Female Engagement Team to the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in June 2019. The female unit is drawn from the *Sashastra Seema Bal* (SBB), the Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bhutan border police and co-deployed with the 16th Sikh Battalion of the Indian army, which counts of around 800 military troops. Half of the 22-strong female team is stationed at Himbi (Goma), the other half in Sake, in an area of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo heavily contested by armed groups over the control the areas rich in natural resources. The idea for female engagement teams originated in the context of the International Security Forces (ISAF) deployment in Afghanistan and has since been adopted by several UN troop-contributing, such as Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Pakistan or Zambia (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2014).

The mandate of the Indian Female Engagement Team in DR Congo encompasses patrolling, assistance in the conduct of investigations, riot control and rescue operations in cases where women and children are involved. Moreover, the team also engages with local women and children most affected by the conflict in order to assess the security situation, provide assistance in cases of sexual violence and to gather intelligence. To facilitate regular contact with local women, the Indian engagement team organises monthly *urafiki* (Swahili for "friendship") meetings, in which key leaders, women representatives and other local

functionaries can interact with the female Indian peacekeepers. These meetings serve to collect information about problems in the locality in order to assess the security situation and to create strategies for how to protect the local community from violence, such as rape, murder, abduction or domestic violence.[4] The team also works to inspire local women and girls to join the security sector, for instance, by organising programs and workshops at local schools.[5] Finally, and similarly to the peacekeeping operation in Liberia, the Female Engagement Team further organises community outreach programmes, such as self-defence or skill development classes for local women as well as sports events and cultural activities for the local population.[6] The team also visits villages to sensitise the local population on a wide range of topics, such as personal hygiene, child malnutrition or prevention of diseases such as Ebola or malaria.

The Indian government's decision to deploy the Female Engagement Team is closely aligned with the UN's priority and initiative to ensure increased participation of women peacekeepers in UN missions. India has thus fulfilled one of the UN's objectives as '[t]he United Nations has been seeking deployment of a female engagement team in its missions as part of its gender parity/sensitisation initiative' (Financial Express, 2019, June 24). Moreover, in the words of Colonel Sandeep Kapoor, Military Advisor to the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, '[w]omen in any field, especially in field missions are seen as role models by the local women', adding that women peacekeepers inspire women of the countries where they are deployed in contributing in the peace and security of the country. [7] The Female Engagement Team is thus envisioned to have a highly specialised role within MONUSCO, focused above all on local women, and differentiated from the tasks undertaken by the co-deployed all-male Sikh battalion.

Peacekeeping Training and Gender

Apart from its efforts to increase the number of women in its peacekeeping missions, the country has also taken a role in providing specialised training on topics related to the Women, Peace and Security agenda (PMI, 2017, May 15). The regional Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), based in Delhi, has regularly been conducting a training module on conflict-related sexual violence and since 2015 has offered an annual course specifically designed for female military officers (Naik, 2015). The latter course accommodates around forty students from 20-30 troop-contributing countries (Orchard, 2019).

Both the conflict-related sexual violence module and the female military officers' course have been developed by UN Women India in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operation and the CUNPK.[8] Gender-sensitive peacekeeping training is deemed essential for best practices in field deployments.[9] The general training session at the CUNPK, directed to both male and female personnel, is designed to create an understanding of gender, to address issues of conflict-related sexual violence, and to discuss how peacekeepers can help achieve the agendas and mandates.[10] UN women has since replicated its gender training schemes with other Indian security forces, such as the Border Security Forces, as well as the Central Reserve Police Force.[11] In terms of the Female Military Officers course, it was triggered by a study of UN Women on best practices in post-conflict scenarios. The analysis found that female peacekeepers have an advantage in engagement with local populations regarding cases of domestic or conflict-related gender-based or sexual violence. It is the first of its kind to provide training which is directed explicitly to female peacekeepers, such as helping victims of conflict-related sexual violence the course offers special modules on communication techniques with victims (Orchard, 2019).

Both peacekeeping training modules have provided the India government with a platform to show its commitment to increasing the number of women in peacekeeping and to generate gender sensitiveness. At the same time, the conduct of the courses has helped to push the issue of gender in institutions such as India's CUNPK, which is dominated by male military officials, often reluctant to give due importance to the topic.[12] It has however been noted that, that the strong focus of the female military officers' course on conflict-related sexual violence and the superficial understanding of gender among military officers, has prevented the female military officers' course from truly moving away from an essentialist understanding of gender in peacekeeping.[13]

Indian ambivalence over gender mainstreaming peacekeeping operations: between norm localisation and norm contestation?

India has manifested a decided interest for contributing to gender mainstreaming of UN peacekeeping. However, while some inroad has been made in terms of Indian gender mainstreaming of peacekeeping operations and training, as described in the section above, the process has been imbued with ambivalence both in terms of norm localisation as well as norm contestation.

The Indian norm localisation of gender mainstreaming

Women in the Indian Armed Forces

In India – while women can obtain officer positions in all branches of the Indian Armed Forces – their inclusion as regular soldiers remains very limited.[14] As officers are recruited at much lower numbers compared to the rank and file soldiers, the gender mainstreaming, both in terms of numbers as well as in terms of "normalising" women in this line of profession, within the broader make-up of India's armed forces remains difficult. Moreover, the gender mainstreaming of female officers within the army, navy and air force has proceeded on a very

gingerly basis. While women officers have been contracted by the different branches of the Indian Armed forces since 1992, in the army and navy they have until recently only been allowed to serve as officers on short-term, renewable contracts up until a maximum of 14 years. It is only following a 2020 Supreme Court ruling that army and navy women officers can opt for Permanent Commission, i.e. employment until retirement, with full benefits, at par with their male homologues. The Permanent Commission for women officers in principle opens the prospect for equality in career opportunities. However, while this is a welcome step in the direction of greater gender parity, the 2020 Indian Supreme Court case revealed that there are several informal barriers which will stand in the way for career advancements as well as for women assuming command.

In the context of the 2020 Supreme Court case, the Indian government argued that

> [t]he profession of arms is not only a profession but a "way of life" logic, which often requires sacrifices and commitment beyond the call of duty of the entire family of service personnel, involving separation, frequent transfers affecting the education of the children and career prospects for the spouse. As a consequence, it is a greater challenge for WO [women officers] to meet these hazards of service, owing to the prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations towards their children and families (Telegraph, 2020, February 18)

The government explicitly recognises that the primary care of the family and dependents are in the hands of women which in turn affects female officers' career opportunities (Bakshi, 2006). However, the Indian government makes no concessions to change dynamics by allowing family-work conciliation (e.g. day-care, paternal leave) or building facilities for families during posting in areas far from the family home.

Furthermore, in terms of women assuming command within the armed forces, the Indian government has upheld the principle to fill contracted military command positions with a woman as long as their qualifications are equal or superior to the other candidates and to not upset the Indian Armed Forces' organisational requirement, combat effectiveness and

functionality. The presumed equality of conditions for promotion was, however, undermined by the government's argument in the same context that women were of the 'weaker sex' and not suitable for undertaking' arduous tasks', such as, command.[15] Finally, the Indian government also put forward the dissertation that since '[t]he composition of rank and file being male, and predominantly drawn from rural background, with prevailing societal norms, the troops are not yet mentally schooled to accept women officers in command' (BBC, n.d.).

What is left unaddressed is the issue that it is difficult for women to be considered for leadership positions within the Indian security forces due to a lack of training or other professional development opportunities. Moreover, women cannot fall back on the same professional networks, that have consolidated masculine institutions like the army or the police since their inceptions (Bakshi, 2006). Consequently, women in the armed forces lack a platform or sufficient representation in numbers, that would make it possible to voice their point of view to policymakers and planners (Ibid.)

Women in the Indian Police Forces

In terms of the various Indian police forces, and in contrast to the above discussion of the armed forces, gender mainstreaming has been less riddled with institutional hurdles. Hence, some strides to address issues of gender parity have been made within the armed and civil police, where women may perform both as regular constables as well as in situations of command (Natarajan, 2014). A widely noted example is Archana Ramasundaram who became the first female director of one of India's armed police forces in 2018 (Srivastava, 2019). Furthermore, the Central Reserve Police Force, from where India's All-Female Police Unit in Liberia was drawn, has perhaps been the site of most advances in creating an enabling environment for women.

In terms of equipment, the Central Reserve Police Force has worked to develop a specific body armour for women as hitherto the female police personnel has been using standard male body protection (Hindu, 2019, July 19). Conscious of the lack of day-care facilities, the Central Reserve Police Force has allocated money for the provision of child care for its female employees. There is, moreover, a National Conference for Women in Police since 2002 which provides an opportunity for armed and civil policewomen to discuss issues related to gender within the police and to press for change in the sector, if need be (Press Information Bureau (GOI), n.d.). The idea for a body armour adapted to women had originated from this conference, showing that once the platform is given to women in the police, they are able to inform policy decisions. Female senior officers, in the Central Reserve Police Force, have suggested that 'in the last ten years a lot has changed in terms of gender equality' and further that today, albeit low in their numbers, 'women are very well integrated in the police'.[16]

However, even with these steps in the direction of greater parity within the Central Reserve Police Forces, interviewees recognise that more work across all the Indian police forces is needed. Petitions for separate housing and sanitation facilities, provisions for family care and reconciliation have been forthcoming.[17] Women in the police forces also note the need for a change of mindset within the various branches, so policewomen feel respected in their professional capacity by their male counterparts.[18] According to a recent report, male police officers are predominantly biased against their female co-workers doubting their physical strength and their capability of handling high intensity crimes, and over half of the respondents felt that there is no parity between men and women. The report also revealed that women are being more likely to engage in in-house tasks, such as computer operating or other desk-based work at the police station, while male personnel performs field duty (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 2019). This shows that work profiles of male and female police officers

are gendered, based on the idea that male officers are better able to engage in coercive policing work.

Gender mainstreaming, aside boosting the numbers of uniformed women, entails gender-sensitive practices, which involve men and women peacekeepers paying due heed to the issue of gender. The *Gender Responsive UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy*, states in this regard, that it is mandatory for all mission personnel, civilian, police, as well as military, to 'integrate gender in their daily work in line with the gender equality and women, peace and security principles to achieve tangible and measurable results' (UNDPKO/DFS, 2019). We argue that the Indian norm localisation of gender-sensitive practices reflects a domestic set up where the public space is more gendered than in many Western countries and separation between men and women in the public space is, where feasible, offered.[23]

In the security sector, this has, for example, translated into the creation of all-female police battalions within the Central Reserve Police Force at the behest of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1986.[19] Moreover, the Indian civil police run over 600 all-women police stations across the country, where female police officers attend to and carry out public order management related to women (Pruitt, 2016). Another initiative is that of the Delhi-based state police which has introduced an all-female motorcycle squad to tackle crimes against or perpetrated by women in the capital (Guardian, 2017, November 22). The government's ideas behind the gender-segregated policing are instrumental (Pruitt, 2016). Female police officers are needed to search women at check-posts, to assist in the arrest of women, to tackle female agitators, and it is held that women police stations offer a safer environment for women to report cases of sexual and gender-based violence (Lok Sabha, 2013). A report from the Committee on

[23] For example, gendered queuing systems, special areas for women in public transport etc.

the Empowerment of Women, consisting of members of the Indian parliament, sums up the Indian government's understanding of women's roles in the police as being:

> '[t]he increasing crimes against women which are becoming heinous and brutal have necessitated the need for augmenting the strength of women in the police force. The role of women police in promoting gender sensitivity, dealing with causes related to women and promoting friendly behavioural sub-culture in police are considered crucial' (Lok Sabha, 2013).

As a consequence of this understanding, gender-sensitisation has primarily been associated with women. A 2019 report on the status of policing in India, has found that gender-sensitisation training is not only offered on an irregular basis but also that when offered it is more likely that female police is attending these workshops (CSDC Report, 2019). This is a reflection of the expectation that promoting "gender sensitivity" both within and outside the police forces is the sole responsibility of women (CSDC Report, 2019). Consequently, the chances for changing male mindsets within and beyond the police forces diminish. Moreover, given the high number of crimes against women in India, assigning these cases to women officers has meant in practice, that they are often dealing with a large caseload, leading to extra working hours (PMI, 2014, October 28).

In sum, the Indian norm localisation of gender mainstreaming of its security forces has proceeded asymmetrically. The focus has been on police forces as opposed to the military. The government has been very reluctant to increase the presence of women in the Indian Armed Forces, especially in terms of opening up rank and file levels to women, as it has held that 'no useful purpose would be served if women become a part of military culture and glorified it'.[24] In terms of the police forces, the number of women officers has increased in past decades; however, an emergent normalisation of the presence of women inherent to gender mainstreaming has not occurred. This is due to, on the one hand, the gendered division of labour

[24] Permanent Mission of India, October 28, 2014

(the creation of specialised assignments), where female squads attend to public order management related to women, while male units deal with the male counterparts, have not substantially fomented a more gender mainstreamed or gender-neutral environment. On the other, the idea that women are responsible for promoting gender sensitivity places the full burden for gender mainstreaming on women as opposed to making it a shared task with men. Hence, gendered roles are stabilised and perpetuated.

The impact of localisation on Indian female peacekeepers in international deployments

The domestic set-up and localisation of the gender mainstreaming norm in India has affected UN peacekeeping in several ways. Firstly, India has predominantly sent police servicewomen, rather than military, as the government has acknowledged, that in peacekeeping missions 'we do feel that women can play an important role in police functions. Research has repeatedly shown that women perform better than men in certain specific police duties' (PMI, 2014, October 28). As of June 2020, women make up less than 1% of India's troop contributions (UN, 2020). Moreover, the general lack of women personnel in the national security sector is an important factor limiting India's ability to send female peacekeepers in more significant numbers as most women are needed for duties in the domestic context, such as checkpoints, cordon and search operations in villages where there are women, or in the female police squads dealing with gendered crimes (Lok Sabha (GOI), 2013).

Secondly, India's approach to have female police deal with "women's problems", is reflected in the government's narrative of its female peacekeeping contributions. The All-Female Police Unit, and even more so the Female Engagement Team, while also engaging in regular police duties, were explicitly designed to engage the local population, particularly women and children. The Indian government frequently conflated peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the sense that they see the WPS agenda as a part of a 'wider societal context

involving gender and development issues' (PMI, 2017, May 15). The work of the female peacekeepers is thus more understood in terms of development assistance, than security-focused work, much along the lines that any non-governmental organisation would be involved in a peacebuilding exercise (PMI, 2019, March 20). Interviewees have expressed in this regard a separate understanding of male and female peacekeeping functions. They hold that female peacekeepers' primary function is to reach out and protect women and children, while male or mixed units would be tasked to protect civilians.[20] A discourse constructing women and children as a category distinct from civilians is a sign for the gendered role specification of Female Engagement Teams. Here the UN has been complicit in promoting the picture of female peacekeepers better able to reach out to the local population, because of their compassionate and peaceful nature (Alchin et. al. 2018; Beardsley and Karim, 2017; Carreiras, 2010; Heinecken and Wilén, 2019; Holmes, 2018; Wilén, 2020).

Moreover, male peacekeepers are less likely to have attended gender-sensitisation training apart from the coverage of the issue in the UN pre-deployment training. This makes them, for instance, underprepared to deal with cases of sexual violence, which in many countries of UN deployments are not a "women-only" problem (CSDS Report, 2019). In conflict scenarios like the Democratic Republic of Congo, sexual violence and rape are directed towards men, women and children. Given the magnitude of this problem, both men and women peacekeepers should be equally sensitised to the issue and able to reach out to victims.

Finally, in UN peacekeeping missions, it has been found that women often informally work "double-shifts" (Pruitt, 2018). On the one hand, they carry out their mission mandates, and on the other hand, they act upon the gendered expectations of women to build cordial relations with the local populations, such as the all-female police unit operating an orphanage in their free-time (Pruitt, 2016). These role expectations have been internalised from police

duties in the Indian context but are also re-enforced by the duplicity in the UN's discourse on women's added value to peacekeeping operations.[21]

Indian norm contestation on gender mainstreaming in the security sector

While a few, mostly Western countries, have slowly moved towards greater parity across the board on military and police duties performed by women, India contests such gender mainstreaming. India upholds the norm of denying women combat roles in the army and remains overall reluctant to the deployment of women in politically and security-sensitive areas.[22] Moreover, India contests the idea of gender-integrated units in peacekeeping deployments.

Two arguments have been put forward by the government to contest women from taking up combat roles. Firstly, the Ministry of Defence has publicly upheld the idea that women, because they are physically weaker than men, are less capable of serving in front combat roles.[23] Even more so, it has been noted that the security of the country could be compromised by female deployment. The assessment is based on a generalisation of the average women, rather than giving individual women a chance to reach physical standards at par with their male colleagues. For example, the low physical training standard requirements for women in the Indian army are a reflection of the idea that women are unable to reach the fitness levels of their male colleagues (Bakshi, 2006).

Secondly, the Indian government has indicated that 'it is best to keep women away from direct combat since the capture of a woman officer or soldier as a prisoner of war would lead to a situation of extreme mental, physical and psychological stress for the captured individual *and the government*' (emphasis added).[24] A male interviewee from the Indian army has echoed the sentiment stating: 'if something happens to a woman that is like crossing a red line for the Indian army, strategically and emotionally females being kidnapped or harmed is the worst that

can happen'.[25] This fear of sexual assault of Indian women is attached to the idea of women as nation bearers, who are embodying the Indian values and honour of their communities (Chatterjee, 1989). In this narrative – the harming of the female body by the enemy – is equalised with the harming of the Indian nation. Historically, the discourse emerges out of the trauma of partition of the Indian subcontinent, during which rape and abduction of women had been a common practice (Menon and Bhasin, 1993). While women have been a signifier of the nation, men have been constructed as the protector of the nation and thus the protector of Indian women (Banerjee, 2003).

The same argumentation and role construction, excluding women from combat roles is also applied to postings considered high risk. Being confined to the safe areas, women are less often given the opportunity to gain operational experience and career advancements (Bakshi, 2006; Ghittoni et. al. 2018). This applies to women in the entire security sector, both armed forces and the police. In the police, it has, for instance, translated into women less likely to be sent on field duty, as compared to their male colleagues (CSDS Report, 2019). The segregation of work and postings is negatively impacting the integration of women into the forces. An interviewee from the Central Reserve Police Force has stated, that if women continue to not be able to prove their operational skills, 'they will be discriminated against'.[26]

Finally, India contests the UN's preference for gender-integrated units, expressed in the UN's policy on formed police units, as the distance between the transnational norm understanding and the local context of gender segregation is too far to bridge (UNDPO, 2018).[27] India's most visible female peacekeeping deployments, the all-female police unit in Liberia, as well as the Female Engagement Team in Congo, are both an expression of the support of gender-segregated deployments. The Indian government posits that its only possibility to reach the UN targets for gender parity in peacekeeping are the all-female formations drawn from the

armed police forces and that mixed-contingents are 'diluting the policy frameworks' (PMI, 2019, November 4). The discourse in which this contestation is embedded suggests that gender mainstreaming is automatically achieved once a higher number of women participate in peacekeeping and are empowered. Gender mainstreaming in the Indian understanding then primarily means women empowerment within a women-only setting. What India is contesting is the notion that there is a need to transform the entire security sector to become gender-inclusive and sensitive in order to perpetuate gender inequalities inherent to the culture of the institution itself.

Amongst the female peacekeepers, there is a mixed assessment of all-female formations. While interviewees stated that all-female teams are able to acquire more confidential information from local women, it has been noted by an interviewee that a 'mixed-team is more powerful' and that 'all-women teams are considered weak in an all-male dominated society' such as those they regularly encounter in UN peacekeeping scenarios.[28] Another interviewee has noted, that mixed units are better insofar as 'the idea of gender equality is raised among men also', which will ultimately help to increase mutual respect.[29] The latter reflects the doubts of many UN officials, who perceive the idea of all-female police units inconsistent with the spirit of gender mainstreaming (Pruitt, 2016). Nevertheless, in practice, the contribution of the all-female police units from India have been positively acknowledged in terms of the professionalism of their work and the approach has been replicated. In that sense, one could argue, that India has acted as a norm entrepreneur offering a localised understanding of gender mainstreaming – as women empowerment within female units – to other countries which in their domestic set-up resemble India's gendered public space.

In sum, India has two major contestations of the gender mainstreaming norms emanating from the UN in terms of peacekeeping. As a result of the gendered norm of protection, India has refrained from placing women in security-sensitive areas and has denied them combat roles.

Moreover, India has prioritised increasing the number of female peacekeepers through all-female police units and has contested that mixed contingents are more effective in ensuring gender mainstreaming.

The impact of contestation on Indian female peacekeepers in international deployments

India's norm contestation has impacted its UN troop contributions in several ways. Women will not be placed in UN missions where the security scenario is perceived complex or unsafe, and if they are placed in these missions, such is the case with the Female Engagement Team in Congo, they are co-deployed with a military contingent, reflecting the felt need of protection of India's female peacekeepers. On this subject, an interviewee has expressed, that while the women peacekeepers overall feel great support from the male colleagues in the missions, they also note how their presence is felt like a responsibility for their male co-deployers, because of the notion that women are not able to protect themselves.[30] The issue of safety also becomes a problem when female Indian peacekeepers are impeded to carry out their duties during their deployment due to that occasionally their male colleagues would not let them because of concerns their security was at risk.[31] Moreover, given the preference for gender-segregated deployments in peacekeeping, the Indian strategy to meet gender targets set by the UN has been – and will remain – to contribute all-female police units and female engagement teams. As women remain excluded from military contingents and are only deployed in small-sized all-female formations, within India's UN peacekeeping contribution, their presence will remain tokenism.

Conclusion

The Indian government has proclaimed itself to be a leader on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping. However, if the gender-mainstreaming norm bundle is unpacked, we see evidence of Indian norm localisation and contestation. India's localisation of the gender

mainstreaming norm has entailed the pursuit of an asymmetric gender-parity approach between different branches of the security forces, with the police overall more accommodating to female personnel. Within the police corps, there persists however a gendered division of labour, which makes it impossible for women to shift gender binaries and undermines the possibility of gender equality. Moreover, the Indian norm localisation of "gender" is widely equated with "women" which entails that the burden of gender mainstreaming falls on women only. In terms of norm contestation, India contests the idea of placing women in combat or high-risk situations due to predominant socio-political perception of women as devoid of the agency to ensure their own protection. Finally, India has contested gender-integrated units. In part, this is a consequence of its understanding of "gender mainstreaming" as providing better opportunities for women "empowerment" in women-only settings. It is unlikely that gendered hierarchies within India's domestic security sector are going to disappear, as long as the government is not willing to create a more enabling environment for women. For the lack of norm congruence between the local and the global, the Indian contribution with female boots on the ground in UN peacekeeping scenarios is thus likely to remain modest in the short to medium term.

The article has made several contributions to the literature on female peacekeeper. Firstly, the thick-descriptive analysis and use of original primary material on India's approach to gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping can help to enhance the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda by reflecting on how one of the major troop contributors understands and disseminates the norm bundle in practice. Moreover, we expect that India's case is representative for other South Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, all among the top troop contributors, which resemble in their gender-segregated domestic set-up the one in India. Apart from contributing the lion's share in peacekeeping, countries from the global south increasingly shape the discourse on female peacekeeper and need to be accounted for.

Secondly, the literature has tended to study female peacekeeper in their international deployments or the domestic security sector. The article has suggested that these two questions cannot be dealt with separately as the domestic set-up significantly impacts the international deployments. This is slowly recognised within UN circles, with the recent UN policy on gender mainstreaming, reflecting on the importance of the domestic set-up of member states as an essential inhibiting factor for greater female participation in peacekeeping.

Thirdly, the article has explored in more depth the concept of norm bundles, thus the idea that it is more fruitful to study aligned norms and principles relating to a common subject, such as gender mainstreaming. This enables the researcher to depict how countries can agree to international norm bundles at the UN level, and indeed present themselves as advocates in the field, but later localise and contest parts of this norm bundle at the implementation stage. Vice versa localised versions of gender mainstreaming can influence international deployments. An example is the replication of India's idea of all-female-police units.

As an explorative study of a previously little researched field, the article has not been able to cover all aspects of gender mainstreaming in India. Firstly, while the focus of this study has been on the Indian government's understanding of gender mainstreaming and how it impacts the female peacekeepers, a future study could look in more detail how different actors within India, such as NGOs, the media, legal experts or women activist groups are shaping the discourse on gender. Furthermore, future research on the Indian security sector could include other layers of discrimination, such as caste which intersect with gender (Henry, 2012).

Finally, it is important to note, that the UN itself has been complicit in consolidating gendered roles, using the same functional arguments as its member states, such as women being better to reach out to the local communities, to underline the need for more female peacekeepers. While the 20th anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security agenda can look

back on many positive developments, more reflection is thus needed in order to achieve a truly gender-equal peacekeeping environment.

Notes

[1] Interview with member of UN Women India, December 4, 2018

[2] Interview with female peacekeeper 1, February 29, 2020; Interview with female peacekeeper 2, March 5, 2020; Interview with female peacekeeper 3, February 25, 2020

[3] Interview with female peacekeeper 2, March 5, 2020

[4] Interview with female peacekeeper 4, February 10, 2020

[5] Interviews with female peacekeepers 5-12, March 2020

[6] Interview with female peacekeeper 4, February 10, 2020

[7] Ibid.

[8] Interview with former member of UN Women India, March 14, 2019

[9] Ibid.

[10] Interview with member of UN Women India, December 4, 2018

[11] Interview with member of UN Women India, December 4, 2018

[12] Interview with former member of UN Women India, March 13, 2019

[13] Ibid.

[14] In 2021, once their training formally ends, a first group of female army military police officer will represent the first incorporation of women into the army in other than in officer ranks. The Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Babita Puniya & Ors. (February 2020) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117198144/; Union of India & Ors. vs Lt Cdr Annie Nagaraja & Ors. (March 2020)

https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2015/35837/35837_2015_3_1502_21539_Judgement_17-Mar-2020.pdf

[15] The Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Babita Puniya & Ors. (February 2020)

[16] Interviews with female peacekeepers 1, 2, 3 and 13, February and March 2020

[17] Interview with female peacekeeper 13, February 27, 2020

[18] Interview with member of UN Women India, December 4, 2018

[19] Female Peacekeeper 3, Interview with the author, February 25, 2020; India has currently six operative *mahila* battalions deployed across the country

[20] Female Peacekeeper 5-12, Interviews with the author, March 2020

[21] Interview with female peacekeeper 2, March 5, 2020

[22] Interview with former Indian army official, December 7, 2018

[23] The Secretary, Ministry of Defence vs Babita Puniya & Ors. (February 2020)

[24] Indian government note to Supreme Court, as reported in https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/02/18/how-supreme-court-put-women-in-command-in-india+n-army.html

[25] Interview with Indian army official, December 17, 2018

[26] Interview with female peacekeeper 2, March 5, 2020

[27] UNDPKO/DFS, "Policy Formed Police Units"

[28] Interview with female peacekeeper 9, April 1, 2020

[29] Interview with female peacekeeper 13, February 27, 2020

[30] Interview with female peacekeeper 4, February 10, 2020

[31] Interview with female peacekeepers 4, 5, 7, 8, March 2020

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Conclusion

The aim of this article-based doctoral dissertation was to understand the EU and India's engagement in global security governance through the prism of peace operations. The interest in their perception of and engagement in peace operations arose from the assessment that while the international community is largely unified in its commitment to establishing and sustaining international peace, there is still little intersubjective agreement over how the objective of peace can be achieved through peace operations, both among policymakers, practitioners and the academic community. The dissertation's objective has been to shed light on the content of three such debates, which have previously been relatively little assessed by the literature, namely training, local ownership and gender mainstreaming. As the dissertation has discussed, these debates are related to the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding agenda in the mid-1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, they are discussed independently from the liberal peacebuilding discourse, and local ownership and gender mainstreaming debates are even formulated as critiques of liberal peacebuilding.

The doctoral dissertation has approached these debates by conceptualising peace operations as spaces of norm and practice compliance, localisation and contestation. Drawing from both the literature on norms and practices, the dissertation has proposed to combine the concepts of norms and practices into a unified analytical framework. This combined conceptual framework enables the dissertation to account for both deliberative reflections over international norms, as well as more implicit background knowledge in the shaping of an actor's approach to peace operations. Moreover, the combined conceptual framework permitted a stronger focus on the implementation stage of international norms.

Apart from this theoretical contribution to the literature, the dissertation offers an empirical exploration into India's normative approach to peace operations, hitherto

underexplored. The dissertation has posed two interrelated questions. Firstly, what norms and practices do the EU and India support in peace operations? This research question had a two-fold objective. On the one hand, the objective was to outline how the EU and India understand and interpret the normative guiding framework of peace operations. On the other hand, the objective was to examine whether the EU's and India's discursive support for these norms is reflected in their practices in peace operations. This directs the analysis to the implementation stage of norms which involves a stet of actors from policymakers to trainers and peacekeepers. The objective is thus to account for the plurality of actors involved in a country's approach to peace operations. Secondly, the dissertation asked why the EU and India comply, localise, and contest existing peace operation norms and practices and which form this contestation takes. The objective of this research question was to explain why actors chose compliance, localisation or contestation to react to international norms and practices.

Empirical findings

In the field of training, it has been demonstrated that neither India nor the EU deliberatively contest the UN's core pre-deployment materials and related norms. Both actors have been supportive of the UN's efforts to standardise pre-deployment training for peace operations and recognised the importance of training for peacekeepers' performance. Moreover, both actors have well-established training centres, which were founded around the early 2000s, when the training discourse started to gain more prominence. These training centres train the EU's and India's personnel but also engage in the training of third countries and act as places of lessons-learn exchanges. The finding of the dissertation is thus that both the EU and India comply with the training norm.

The dissertation demonstrates the divergences in training, resulting from the different training structures and implicit background knowledge shared among practitioners working in these institutes. The disposition among actors in India's training community, which have been

analysed in detail, have demonstrated that an implicit understanding of the training community is that financial contributors to UN peacekeeping, foremost the United States and European countries, let troop contributors do the groundwork while failing to support them sufficiently with the required equipment. Furthermore, if these Western countries deploy personnel – their approach is understood to be intrusive and overlooking pre-exiting local peacebuilding mechanisms. As a consequence of this disposition, India's training community routinely engages with other troop-contributing countries from the Global South and has shown little enthusiasm to enter partnerships with the Global North.

In terms of the local ownership norm, the dissertation demonstrates that India embraces the norm, as it reflects on the country's critique of the liberal peacebuilding endeavour. The country holds that liberal peacebuilding ignores local capacities and resources to support peace processes and that it replaces these with the standard liberal template of market democracy. The norm is also portrayed as a key tenant of the EU's approach to peacebuilding, and the EU considers it an ideal fit for its approach to peace operations. While both actors endorse the local ownership principle at the UN level, the analysis demonstrated that the EU and India differ in their interpretation of the norm. In India's reading of local ownership, the principle relates to the fundamental norm of sovereignty, whereas the EU connects local ownership with the fundamental norm of democracy. Overall, the dissertation finds that the EU and India contest the meaning-in-use of the norm, not its validity.

As the EU and India have demonstratively differed in their interpretation of the norm, the analysis looked further into how India contest the EU's understanding of the norm. The analysis has identified three modes of contestation from the Indian side, political contestation, moral contestation, and 'silent contestation'. The latter depicts India's tendency to purposefully avoid cooperating with the EU and other Western actors in the area of peacebuilding, as this would harm its narrative as an alternative actor of the Global South, which conducts its

peacebuilding projects free of conditionalities and in consultation on equal footing with the host state.

With respect to the international norm bundle of gender mainstreaming, the dissertation has concluded that the norm bundle has vocally been embraced by India, which has put forward its contribution of the first all-female police unit, the female engagement team, and its conduct of female military officer's courses to underline its support for the norm bundle. In the EU's policies on peace operations, gender mainstreaming is popularly evoked, and the EU considers itself an important advocate of the norm bundle.

Beyond this discursive support at the UN level, the dissertation has demonstrated India to show ambivalences in terms of implementation. Some parts of the norm bundle have been localised to make it fit the domestic environment, whereby mainstreaming of gender has been more successful in the police sector than the more restrictive military apparatus. These localisations and contestations of the gender mainstreaming bundle in the domestic security sector have impacted India's international deployments. In the case of the EU, there are substantial divergences among EU member states regarding their enthusiasm vis-à-vis the norm bundle. For instance, only eleven member states allow women in frontline combat roles, and many continue to contest the idea of placing women in security-sensitive areas. Moreover, analysing EU documents dealing with gender mainstreaming reveals that in the EU's localisation of gender mainstreaming – similar like in the Indian case – the EU has conflated gender with women. Thus, the finding is that the EU and India contest and localise the norm bundle of gender mainstreaming.

Based on these findings, we draw four main conclusions. Firstly, we conclude that the EU and India diverge in their interpretation over peace operation's normative guiding framework, but mainly over the meaning-in-use of international norms and practices, rather than their validity. Hence, the divergences between the EU's and India's approach to peace

operations are less pronounced. Furthermore, divergences in the discourse, such is the case with local ownership, do not necessarily translate into diverging practices. While Delhi has discursively constructed a counter-model to the Western approach to local ownership in peacebuilding, it is confirming to a liberally routed peacebuilding approach in practice, i.e. the country supported democratisation processes in its neighbourhood. Moreover, even though Delhi has taken a cautious position regarding the shift towards liberal peacebuilding and the overruling of traditional peacekeeping norms, the country continued to participate in operations with liberal inspired peacekeeping mandates. The EU, which is discursively trying to move away from a liberal peacebuilding approach and has shifted towards a rhetoric of resilience, stabilisation and pragmatism, has been considered to fall short of turning this rhetorical shift not an actual change in the conduct of its crisis management. The dissertation thus refutes the idea of strong normative clashes over how best to supply world order in the field of peace and security. These findings contradict earlier scholarly assessments of the literature, which predicted that emerging powers like India would strongly contest the current liberal order.

Secondly, the dissertation concludes that India has acted as a norm entrepreneur in peace operations. The dissertation has drawn attention to India's overlooked early normative contributions, such as the first detailed description of the non-use of force norm and India's contestations and localisations of more recent liberal peacebuilding norms. The latter had been particularly understudied in the Indian case, as they are popularly associated with Western liberal actors. Here, the dissertation has not only shown how India offers a different interpretation of these norms, i.e. deployments of gender-segregated units to UN peace operations but also how India has inspired other actors to follow the Indian interpretation of gender mainstreaming. These findings contradict assessments by the early Constructivist literature on norms, which had argued that just by participating in UN peace operations, countries automatically become norm-takers and that peacekeepers are norm-followers par excellence. These assessments had overlooked that agreeing to send troops to UN deployment

is not a wholesale commitment to UN norms and practices, as the ambiguity of peace operations' current normative frames leaves peacekeepers on the ground with the space of interpretation of mandates, tasks, and norms. India was currently elected, with 184 out of 192 votes, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the term 2021-2022, which will put the country in a strong position to exercise its influence and shape the global agenda in the coming years. Fittingly, India's objective for the Security Council term is coined N.O.R.M.S or New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System.

Thirdly, we conclude that if international norms and practices have a broad backing by the international community at the UN level, policymakers – out of fear their reputation will be tarnished – tend to support these norms discursively but contest them either at the domestic level or interfere with the implementation of these norms. Gender mainstreaming is such a norm, which is difficult for policymakers to openly contest at the UN level. While India has thus broadly embraced related norms and practices of the gender mainstreaming norm bundle at the UN level, the bundle is discursively contested at the domestic level. For instance, statements by the Indian government during a 2020 Supreme Court ruling have revealed, that the Indian government believes women to be unable to commit to the 'army's way of life', as they should be committing to their family obligations. Moreover, that women are the 'weaker sex' and unsuitable for command positions in the army.

Fourthly, we conclude that a country's approach to peace operation is not only shaped by policymakers at the UN level but involves a range of actors from policymakers over trainers and peacekeepers at domestic and local levels. Actors can permeate these levels. Particularly high-ranking military, which has served in roles of UN force commander often continues to take-up important positions in the domestic security sector or is posted as military advisors to the UN in New York. Thus, practical lessons-learnt from the mission scenario feedback to Delhi, Brussels, or New York. For instance, Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, who served as the force

commander for the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia from 1992-93, became the founder of India's peacekeeping training centre in 2000. To date, he is an important figure influencing the structure of this training institute. Moreover, in 2003 Nambiar became part of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan created to make recommendations on how the UN system can better respond to international security challenges. The outcome report of this panel has greatly shaped the UN discourse on global security governance.

Theoretical Findings

Theoretically, the dissertation contributes to a nascent field in the literature that has explored how norm contestation literature could draw on the literature related to the practice theory and *vice versa*, and how this cross-pollination could enhance both sets of literature. Combining these two sets of literature has several advantages, of which three will be specified in the following.

Firstly, through its combination of literature on norm compliance, norm localisation, norm contestation, and practice theory, the dissertation was able to provide preliminary reflections on actors' expected behaviour in their reaction to international norms and practices in peace operations. The findings suggest, that compliance occurs if the international norm or practice does fit with existing norms and practices at the local level. The dissertation demonstrated localisation to be the preferred mode to react to norms and practices if they are still to a certain degree reflecting on the domestic context. The corresponding empirical example from the dissertation is the more generous space given to women in the Indian police force as compared to the military. This has to do with the fact that female police have socially and politically been acceptable in the Indian context for a long time. When the distance between the international norm or practice and the domestic context was too far to bridge, the dissertation identified contestation as the preferred mode of reaction, such is the case with excluding women

from combat roles in several EU member states and India. Apart from the mismatched fit of international norms and practices with local norms, the dissertation also demonstrates that localisation or contestation takes place if international norms do not fit with the background knowledge of practitioners. An example is the modification of UN standardised pre-deployment training manuals, which need to be adjusted to match actors' dispositions in the EU and India's training practice communities.

Furthermore, missing access to formal channels of contestation through exclusion from decision-making processes contributed to making countries move from discursive contestation towards more behavioural forms of contestation. Interviewees have described how the UN Security Council had changed peacekeeping mandates without consulting with the troop-contributing countries directly affected by these changes. Upon request to explain what the new mandate changes implied for the troops in the mission scenario, no opportunity was given to the country to meet the UN Security Council. Consequently, India moved to the unusual step of arranging a briefing for the Council on its own embassy premises.[25]

Finally, as depicted throughout the present doctoral dissertation, contestation occurs because the current normative framework of peace operations does not give a clear directive to peacekeepers on the ground. Even more so, the current framework contains conflicting norms that peacekeepers then must negotiate in their deployments. This is more apparent regarding the clashes between non-intervention norms and imperatives such as protecting civilians, but even regarding the norms observed in this dissertation which are all associated with the same liberal peacebuilding agenda, conflict may arise. For instance, local conflict resolution mechanisms, which should be supported based on the call for more local ownership, might not always be inclusive or gender-balanced, thus running counter the call for more gender-inclusive practices.

[25] Interview Indian policymaker 2 April 2019

Secondly, the dissertation had pointed out the tendency for literature on norm contestation to look at empirical case studies in which contestation is particularly visible in the discourse at the UN level, such is the case with the R2P principle. This meant that many studies of contestation had focused exclusively on discursive modes of contestation. This selective bias contradicts the premise of norm contestation theory, which predicts that contestation is the default status of international norms. In order to detect contestation at the state and local level, this dissertation has purposefully selected norms for its analysis which are embraced at the UN level by the two actors analysed in the dissertation. Identifying the contestation in these debates required studying more thoroughly the implementation part of norms on the ground. Here, the dissertation has contributed the idea of a 'silent mode' of contestation, which is a deliberate decision of an actor not to cooperate with another actor, whose norm interpretation differs from the countries understanding of the norm. An actor's choice for 'silent contestation' can have two reasons. The first reason is that actors might feel that they lack the required access to voice their contestation in a formal setting. The second reason is when actors feel that their discursive contestation has been exhausted without achieving the desired changes. In these cases, actors consider that a behavioural mode of contestation will be their most productive strategy at hand. The empirical example here is India's decision to preserve its role as an actor from the Global South in peacebuilding that offers an alternative approach to the Western liberal peacebuilding interventions, i.e. in the context of its peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the dissertation has demonstrated that a shift towards practice theory is necessary to understand why training practices differ. The UN standardised pre-deployment training materials and the connected UN norms that these training materials convey to the peacekeepers compete with the structure of the practice community and its actors' dispositions. The actor's dispositions rest on background knowledge that guides the practice community to which they belong. For instance, there is the above-mentioned implicit understanding among the Indian practice community, that their training philosophy overlaps to a greater extent with

that of other troop-contributing countries from the Global South, which explains why the Indian training centre predominantly enters into training partnerships with other troop contributors. This finding suggests that actors do not necessarily engage in deliberation over international norms or revert to cultural scripts at the individual level, but practitioners' background knowledge plays a significant role. Apart from suggesting a less deliberative character, the dissertation's use of the concept of background knowledge, borrowed from practice theory, advances the literature of norm contestation in another way. The concept of background knowledge could replace norm contestation's somewhat loaded terminology of 'cultural scripts', which had been criticised for its suggestion of a fixed unidimensional character or a stable culture, as discussed in the literature review. Rather than one cultural script, individuals have different sets of background knowledge acquired through their belonging to several practice communities. For instance, peacekeepers have their respective professional background community of military practitioners. At the same time, they become part of the practice community of international interveners upon their deployment. Thus, the concept of background knowledge is more suitable to deal with the unfixed character of international norms and the multiple ways individuals can react to them.

Thirdly, the dissertation answers the call in the literature for more studies of peace operations, which combine a macro and micro-level analysis of these operations (Autessere, 2014). It goes beyond this call to observe the international and local levels insofar, as it adds a third layer of analysis. The domestic level – involved in the preparation and training of peacekeepers – has largely been underexplored in the literature. The importance of a multi-level analysis of norm and practice compliance, localisation, and contestation at different stages of the peace operation process can be exemplified with an empirical example from the dissertation. India's interpretation of the gender mainstreaming bundle at the UN level had impacted the domestic security sector. Localised and contested understandings of gender in the domestic security sector are then replicated in the mission scenario, impacting the personnel deployed.

Conversely, India's contestation of gender-integrated units had led to the practice of all-female police units, a practice which was later internationalised as other troop-contributing countries replicated these all-female police units. As pointed out in the previous section, norm contestation thus plays a role from negotiation settings at the UN level to the peacekeepers deployed in the field. While the doctoral dissertation has thus highlighted the importance to look at contestation at local levels, at the same time, it has not lost sight of the global dynamics and the way these have impacted peace operations. For example, the shift from traditional peacekeeping towards liberal peacebuilding or global power inequalities such as the exclusion of troop-contributing countries from decision-making processes. In conclusion, peace operations have an international, national, and local dimension.

Avenues for future research

One of the core premises of the dissertation was that norms and practices are not intersubjectively held and their meaning-in-use shifts in different contexts, with contestation happening all the way down to the micro-level. Based on this premise, the individual publications presented in the context of the present doctoral dissertation have aimed at portraying the voices of different actors involved in the conduct of peace operations, for instance, policymakers at the UN level or peacekeeping trainer at the domestic level, who do not necessarily converge in their approach to peace operations. Nevertheless, it was beyond the scope of the dissertation to further open further the black box of a unitary European or Indian approach to peace operations. Therefore, future lines of inquiry could look in more depth into how different communities of actor's shape and contribute to their approach to peace operation. The inclusion of norms such as local ownership or gender mainstreaming in the training of peacekeepers in India, can for instance, often be credited to external actors, i.e. UN Women.[26] Thus, it is likely that these actors are equally involved in shaping a countries' approach to peace

[26] Interview with member UN women India, December 4, 2018

operations. Moreover, while there is now a certain degree of coherence, EU member states continue to differ in their approaches when it comes to a European approach to crisis management. Differences include the material capabilities of individual member states, varying preferences for UN, NATO, unilateral or CSDP-led endeavours, but also their normative understandings of peace operations. For instance, Sweden's forerunner role in the field of gender and security and its civilian outlook had a significant impact on influencing debates over crisis management in the EU context. Future research could thus investigate in more detail how individual member states are shaping the EU's approach to peace operations.

Furthermore, the dissertation has focused on global security governance and international deployments, either under the umbrella of the UN or in the context of CSDP missions and operations. Many interviewees from the Indian military and police, have underlined that India's deployments in internal conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East significantly impact the preparedness and effectiveness of its contingents for UN peacekeeping deployments.[27] Future avenues of research could thus investigate how India's involvement in its internal conflicts has shaped the country's peacekeeping and peacebuilding approach.

Regarding the data collection process, two points will be underlined. Firstly, the present dissertation could have been strengthened through more extended participant observations, preferably in the mission scenarios. Participant observation in the mission scenario would have provided a more first-hand insight into peacekeeping practices. In every interview situation, practitioners already added a first layer of interpretation to their own practices by deciding how and what to narrate in the interview. As practices are often an unconscious and more habitual way of doing things, they might not even be deemed necessary by the interviewee to be

[27] Interviews former members of the Indian army, December 7, 2018; December 4; December 28; January 3, 2019

verbalised. Consequently, as has been noted in the methodology section, the closest analytical approximation to study practices remains to observe and participate in the practice itself. Restricted by time and issues of access to the field and at the later stages of the project, the current global pandemic and related travel restrictions, participant observation for this project was limited to the participation in a military officer course at the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in Delhi. Future research could thus involve longer, more ethnographic inspired participant observations in the mission scenario and additional training modules.

Secondly, the dissertation has focused its analysis on more recent data, with UN speeches assessed from 2011 onwards. The reason hereof is that the dissertation was concerned with more current debates on local ownership, gender mainstreaming and training. However, interviews for this dissertation revealed that, for instance, the engagement with the local population had been a central aim for practitioners before the term was coined at the UN level in the 1990s.[28] Moreover, peacekeepers have argued that the increasingly complex mandates for operations represent a shift in language rather than a change in what has already been practised in the missions. For instance, it was stated that the task to 'provide a secure environment' that was characteristic of early peacekeeping mandates entailed the responsibility to protect the peacekeeping mission itself, UN personnel, and the local population, including all vulnerable groups.[29] Consequently, specialised tasks such as protecting children were already undertaken by the operations before they became enshrined in peacekeeping mandates.[30] Norms can thus be practised before they are institutionalised in policy documents or even law, which can only come to the fore by hearing practitioners' voices. A historical angle is important in another way: it enables a researcher to point out the change in an actor's approach to international norms and practices. The EU's understanding of local ownership, for

[28] Interview former Indian military, 7 December 2018
[29] Interview former member of the Indian army, 7 December 2018
[30] For instance, 'the protection of children' was included for the first time in a peacekeeping mandate in 2001

instance, has substantially evolved from initially focusing its support on governmental elites towards conceptualising the call for local ownership as a demand to include the society as a whole, with a special focus on civil society organisations. Thus, future research could collect additional historical material that could give a more detailed understanding of the trajectories of these norms and practices.

Concluding Remarks

UN peace operations are not mere technical tools but political instruments. This means that there will always remain some disagreement over the conduct of such operations. Furthermore, the norms that should be guiding this instrument – even though signed off at the UN level – will not automatically achieve a global outreach as has been depicted throughout this dissertation. Nevertheless, for peace operations to remain effective and legitimate, it is crucial that at least a minimal common understanding over its normative frames exists. To reach a consensus will be increasingly difficult as the international system seems to be plagued by growing geopolitical fragmentation. Both the EU and India, as has been discussed in this dissertation, have somewhat failed to move beyond their own normative echo-chambers. India tends to cooperate and align with other troop contributors who share the Indian approach to peace operations. The exclusion of troop-contributing countries from decision-making processes has contributed to this trend. The EU member states have largely limited their contributions of personnel to CSDP missions and operations to maintain greater control over the conduct of such missions. As the EU and India consider multilateralism a core norm of global security governance, leaving these echo chambers behind, and engaging in more open deliberations over international norms, particularly with actors that might diverge in more substantial ways from one's own normative core, are necessary to honour this commitment to a global security governance regime anchored in multilateralism.

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Annex

List of Interviewees

Code	Gender	Role	Type	Date
Interview 1	Male	Former Military (Rank Major), UN Military Advisor	In-person	07.12.2018
			Online (Written-form)	07.10.2019
Interview 2	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen.)	In-Person	03.01.2019
Interview 3	Female	UN Women	In-person	04.12.2018
Interview 4	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen.)	In-person	07.12.2018
Interview 5	Male	ZiF Director for Training	Telephone	16.05.2018
Interveiw 6	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen.)	In-person	10.11.2018
Interview 7	Male	Former Military (Rank Major)	In-person	04.12.2018
Interview 8	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen.)	In-person	24.12.2018
Interview 9	Female	Former UN Women	Telephone	18.03.2019
Interview 10	Female	Former UN Women	Telephone and E-mail Follow UP	14.03.2019
Interview 11	Female	EEAS	In-Person	26.03.2019
Interview 12	Male	EEAS	In-person	10.07.2019
Interview 13	Male	German Embassy/Military Attaché	In-person	02.01.2019
Interview 14	Male	Former Military (Rank Major); UN	In-person	27.12.2019
Inteview 15	Male	Military (Rank Major)	In-person	03.01.2019
Interview16	Male	Military (Rank Major)	Online (Written-form)	12.12.2018
			Online (Written-Forum)	10.09.2019
Interview 17	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen)	In-person	24.12.2018
Interview 18	Male	ESDC	In-person	30.04.2019
Interview 19	Male	Former Military (Rank Lt. Gen.)	In-person	28.12.2018
			Online (Written-Form)	22.10.2019
Interview 20	Male	Former Representative of India to UN (Ambassador)	Online (Written-Form)	02.04.2019

Interview 21	Female	Researcher	Online (Written-Form)	19.05.2019
Interview 22	Male	Researcher	In-person	03.05.2019
Interview 23	Female	Police (Commander of FET)	Telephone	10.02.2020
Interview 24	Female	Former Military	In-person	21.02.2020
Interview 25	Female	Police (Former Commander of the AFPU)	In-person	05.03.2020
Interview 26	Female	Police (Commander of Female Battalion stationed in Delhi, former Commander of AFPU)	In-person	27.02.2020
Interview 27	Male	EEAS, EU Delegation, Military Affairs	In-person	05.03.2020
Interview 28	Female	Police, Former Commander of AFPU	Phone	29.02.2020
Interview 30	Female	Police, Medical Unit, Serving in UNIFIL	Written-Form	11.02.2020
Interview 31	Female	Sub-Inspector, Former Member of APFU	In-person	25.02.2020
Interview 32	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020
Interview 33	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020
Interview 34	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020
Interview 35	Female	FET	Written-Form	02.02.2020
Interview 36	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020
Interview 37	Female	FET	Written-Form	02.04.2020
Interview 38	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020
Interview 39	Female	FET	Written-Form	01.04.2020